

## Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See *United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.*, 200 U. S. 321, 337.

**SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

## Syllabus

CLARK *v.* ARIZONA

## CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA

No. 05–5966. Argued April 19, 2006—Decided June 29, 2006

Petitioner Clark was charged with first-degree murder under an Arizona statute prohibiting “[i]nten[tionally] or know[ingly]” killing a police officer in the line of duty. At his bench trial, Clark did not contest that he shot the officer or that the officer died, but relied on his own undisputed paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the incident to deny that he had the specific intent to shoot an officer or knowledge that he was doing so. Accordingly, the prosecutor offered circumstantial evidence that Clark knew the victim was a police officer and testimony indicating that Clark had previously stated he wanted to shoot police and had lured the victim to the scene to kill him. In presenting the defense case, Clark claimed mental illness, which he sought to introduce for two purposes. First, he raised the affirmative defense of insanity, putting the burden on himself to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, in the words of another state statute, “at the time of the [crime, he] was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that [he] did not know the criminal act was wrong.” Second, he aimed to rebut the prosecution’s evidence of the requisite *mens rea*, that he had acted intentionally or knowingly to kill an officer.

Ruling that Clark could not rely on evidence bearing on insanity to dispute the *mens rea*, the trial court cited the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in *State v. Mott*, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P. 2d 1046, which refused to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent and held that Arizona does not allow evidence of a mental disorder short of insanity to negate the *mens rea* element of a crime. As to his insanity, then, Clark presented lay testimony describing his increasingly bizarre behavior over the year before the shooting. Other lay and expert testimony indicated, among other things, that Clark thought that “aliens” (some impersonating government agents) were



































































































## Opinion of the Court

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Arizona's rule serves to preserve the State's chosen standard for recognizing insanity as a defense and to avoid confusion and misunderstanding on the part of jurors.<sup>46</sup> For these reasons, there is no violation of due process under *Chambers* and its progeny, and no cause to claim that channeling evidence on mental disease and capacity offends any "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," *Patterson*, 432 U. S., at 202 (quoting *Speiser*, 357 U. S., at 523).

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The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Arizona is, accordingly, affirmed.

*It is so ordered.*

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bly not be reached or ruled upon; the defendant will simply be acquitted (or perhaps convicted of a lesser included offense). If an acquitted defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect that makes him dangerous, he will neither be confined nor treated psychiatrically unless a judge so orders after some independent commitment proceeding. But if a defendant succeeds in showing himself insane, Arizona law (and presumably that of every other State with an insanity rule) will require commitment and treatment as a consequence of that finding without more. It makes sense, then, to channel capacity evidence to the issue structured to deal with mental incapacity when such a claim is raised successfully. See, e.g., *Jones*, 463 U. S., at 368 ("The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal . . . is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness").

<sup>46</sup>The rule also deals in a practical way with those whose insanity has been shown to make them dangerous to others. See n. 45, *supra*.





















































KENNEDY, J., dissenting

the crime with which he was charged.

These are the reasons for my respectful dissent.