(ORDER LIST: 610 U.S.)

MONDAY, OCTOBER 19, 2026

CERTIORARI -- SUMMARY DISPOSITION

25-1269 BURFORD GERMAN FUNDING, ET AL. V. FINANCIALRIGHT CLAIMS GMBH

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The

judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for further

consideration in light of Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, 608

U. S. 200 (2026).

ORDERS IN PENDING CASES

26A237 GOLDEN, CHIDDY V. TRANSUNION, LLC, ET AL.

The application for an injunction pending appeal addressed

to Justice Thomas and referred to the Court is denied.

26A265 EVANS, MARJORIE V. FED. HOME LOAN MORTGAGE, ET AL.

The application for stay addressed to Justice Alito and

referred to the Court is denied.

26M27 RENTERIA, MARTIN V. UNITED STATES

The motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of

certiorari with the supplemental appendix under seal is granted.

25-1391 BMG RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, ET AL. V. VETTER, CYRIL E., ET AL.

Because the Court lacks a quorum, 28 U. S. C. §1, and since

the qualified Justices are of the opinion that the case cannot

be heard and determined at the next Term of the Court, the

judgment is affirmed under 28 U. S. C. §2109, which provides

that under these circumstances "the court shall enter its order

affirming the judgment of the court from which the case was

brought for review with the same effect as upon affirmance by an

equally divided court." Justice Sotomayor, Justice Gorsuch,

Justice Barrett, and Justice Jackson took no part in the

consideration or decision of this petition.

26-49 BIRD, ATT'Y GEN. OF IA V. IOWA MIGRANT MOVEMENT, ET AL.

The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this

case expressing the views of the United States.

CERTIORARI GRANTED

26-12 ASS'N FOR ED. FAIRNESS V. MONTGOMERY CTY. BD. ED., ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted limited to

the following question: Whether a plaintiff challenging a

facially neutral admissions policy as racially discriminatory

must establish that the targeted racial group suffered an

aggregate disparate impact relative to its share of the

applicant pool.

26-204 DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ET AL. V. SCOTT McNUTT, ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted.

CERTIORARI DENIED

25-1158 HADLEY, AMY V. SOUTH BEND, IN, ET AL.

25-1163 PENA, CARLOS V. LOS ANGELES, CA

25-1230 GOOGLE LLC V. VIRTAMOVE, CORP., ET AL.

25-1231 HASTINGS COLLEGE COMM., ET AL. V. CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

25-1314 GOMEZ, ERIC V. SACCOCCIO, DAVID

25-1335 bIN ‘ATASH, WALID V. UNITED STATES

25-1372 ASG SOLUTIONS CORP. V. UNITED STATES

25-7371 McMICHAEL, TRAVIS V. UNITED STATES

25-7478 HARRIS, MICHAEL V. UNITED STATES

25-7530 LANDRUM, LESTER V. UNITED STATES

26-5 WILCOX, GWYNNE A. V. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF U.S., ET AL.

26-32 AARON, BREAYONNA, ET AL. V. NAT. R.R. PASSENGER CORP.

26-58 KILNAPP, JENNIFER V. GANNON, BAILEY

26-114 ALLEN, FREDERICK L., ET AL. V. STEIN, GOV. OF NC, ET AL.

26-164 A. A., ET AL. V. MAST, JOSHUA, ET AL.

26-191 COPELAND, BRUCE D. V. McCLINTOCK, EVA, ET AL.

26-209 MIDDLEBROOKS, LILLIE M. V. KASMAR, SCOTT, ET AL.

26-213 COOK, NYANZA V. WILLIS, KELVIN, ET AL.

26-214 FIEDLER, MURIEL, ET VIR V. U.S. BANK TRUST N.A.

26-217 DEAN, SHERIFF V. BOND, AUSTIN P.

26-225 CEMEX CONSTR. MATERIALS PAC. V. NLRB, ET AL.

26-226 MAST, JOSHUA, ET AL. V. DOE, JOHN, ET AL.

26-248 GOLDEN, LARRY V. UNITED STATES

26-258 BECKWITH, ANDREA, ET AL. V. FREY, ATT'Y GEN. OF ME

26-266 VICARIO, STEVEN V. OHIO

26-269 CARDIFF, JASON E. T. V. USDC CD CA, ET AL.

26-289 BRUNSWICK, GA V. HONEYWELL INT'L, INC., ET AL.

26-309 CANTU, ISRAEL V. COLLINS, SEC. OF VA

26-327 BARNETT-MORGAN, RENETE V. INVERNESS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

26-361 NM TRAPPERS ASSN., ET AL. V. TORREZ, ATT'Y GEN. OF NM, ET AL.

26-373 JOHNSON, ANTOINE D. V. UNITED STATES

26-5318 SMITH FUNDERBURG, BRANDY V. HRC DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES

26-5320 STEPHENS, LINH T. V. OK DEPT. HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.

26-5321 GREENE, DAVID V. IGC MS. PULLIAM, ET AL.

26-5328 JU, MAO V. BRIGHT, FOREST M.

26-5330 E. R. V. NJ DIV. OF CHILD PROTECTION

26-5338 GIGENA, GABRIEL O. V. NIELSON, HOWARD C., ET AL.

26-5339 PERKINS, CASSANDRA V. USDC ND GA, ET AL.

26-5341 CORDERO, MISAEL V. KELLEY, GREGORY, ET AL.

26-5345 DAVIS, JASPER V. GUERRERO, DIR., TX DCJ

26-5350 SOUARE, ELHADJ A. M. V. AKRON METRO. HOUS. AUTH., ET AL.

26-5352 JOHNSON, HARRIUS V. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FL

26-5358 TATAS, MEHMET E. V. ALI BABA'S TERRACE INC., ET AL.

26-5359 CLARK, WILLIAM R. V. WY DOC, ET AL.

26-5365 STONE, EMMA V. EXTRA SPACE MANAGEMENT, ET AL.

26-5388 RODRIGUEZ, HIRAN V. META PLATFORMS, INC., ET AL.

26-5390 THORTON, KENNETH E. V. BEAVER CTY, PA, ET AL.

26-5396 LOWERY, MARGARET J. V. OK, EX REL. OK BAR ASSN.

26-5398 PERRY, DeTRON L. V. BOTTLINGER, JASON B., ET AL.

26-5402 CLARK, NICOLAS A. V. PERKINS, JEFFEREY, ET AL.

26-5410 MARTIN, ELIZABETH J. V. DEPT. OF VA

26-5436 WILLIAMS, DEBBIE V. HOLT, RODNEY, ET AL.

26-5443 ) TZUNUX-ZACARIAS, MARIO V. KENTUCKY

)

26-5521 ) TZUNUX-ZACARIAS, ISABEL V. KENTUCKY

26-5459 WISEMAN, RICHARD V. CALIFORNIA

26-5465 STUKEL, MITCHELL V. FLORIDA

26-5477 KIRK, KEVIN V. NIPD-NJ

26-5525 McGEE, LOLA B. V. STEINER, POSTMASTER GEN., ET AL.

26-5533 BRAUN, SUSAN V. SAGER, TRACEY, ET AL.

26-5535 MARTIN, DONTAY D. V. ENGLISH, WARDEN

26-5560 SADEEK, EHAB V. UNITED STATES

26-5599 ROMERO, FRANK V. FHUERE, SUPT., OR

26-5603 THOMAS, BRYAN O. V. UNITED STATES

26-5605 FOWLER, MARC S. V. UNITED STATES

26-5609 LARKINS, RODERICK V. UNITED STATES

26-5619 WALKER, THOMAS G. V. PIERCE, WARDEN, ET AL.

26-5623 CARSON, ADAM V. UNITED STATES

26-5649 SULLIVAN, PATRICK J. V. MINNESOTA

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.

25-1115 UTAH V. MULLINS, MORRIS T.

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is

denied.

26-13 MOHAMMAD, KHALID S., ET AL. V. UNITED STATES

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice

Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this

petition.

26-34 HANAWAY, ATT'Y GEN. MO., ET AL. V. SANDERSON, THOMAS

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice

Alito would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.

25-7647 BORNEMANN, GINA P. V. BORNEMANN, PAUL H.

The motion of respondent for leave to file a brief in

opposition under seal with redacted copies for the public record

is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

26-5355 MANAOLE, DE MONT K. V. OFFICE OF HI AFFAIRS, ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment is

denied.

26-5615 EARLS, FAIRLY W. V. GIROUX, WARDEN

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice

Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this

petition.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RYAN O’DONNELL, et al. v. CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, et al.

on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit

No. 25–1098. Decided October 19, 2026

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Statement of Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins, respecting the denial of certiorari.

In Chicago, a driver who fails to pay as few as two parking tickets risks forfeiting his vehicle to the city. The city then can do as it pleases with the vehicle, with no obligation to pay compensation, offset the unpaid ticket debt, or return any surplus to the owner if the vehicle is sold for a profit. See Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code §§9–100–120(b), (f ) (2026). The Seventh Circuit upheld that scheme as consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, reasoning that it is “an exercise of the City’s police power to enforce its traffic code.” 163 F. 4th 411, 414 (2025). I have serious concerns about that conclusion, which implicates a Circuit split over whether, and under what circumstances, exercises of the State’s police power are immune to takings claims. Because that split would continue to benefit from further percolation, however, and because this case is not the best vehicle to resolve the split, I concur in the Court’s denial of certiorari.

Chicago’s vehicle-forfeiture scheme is vast and lucrative, helping the city generate, according to one estimate, $264 million in traffic-ticket revenue (or 7 percent of the city’s operating budget) in 2016. See M. Sanchez & S. Kambhampati, How Chicago Ticket Debt Sends Black Motorists Into Bankruptcy, ProPublica (Feb. 27, 2018), https://features.propublica.org/driven-into-debt/chicago-ticket-debt-bankruptcy/ (archived at https://
perma.cc/K8MU-KVTW). Petitioners Ryan O’Donnell and Michael Goree are two of the many Chicago motorists subject to that scheme. According to the complaint filed in this case, O’Donnell received two tickets for an expired meter and one ticket for time-restricted parking, totaling approximately $524. Goree did not have any tickets himself; rather, a co-signer on his vehicle had approximately $560 of outstanding ticket debt from a different vehicle. After those tickets went unpaid, the city towed and impounded petitioners’ vehicles, adding additional boot, tow, and storage fees. It then sold O’Donnell’s vehicle for its scrap value of $273 and relinquished Goree’s vehicle to the lienholder. Neither petitioner received any compensation for the loss of their cars.

Petitioners sued the city, alleging that its scheme facially violates the Takings Clause, which bars taking “private property” for “public use, without just compensation.” They asserted that §9–100–120 empowers the city to take vehicles “without providing any compensation to the owner or even a hearing to determine fair compensation.” Complaint in No. 1:23–cv–01192 (ND Ill.), ECF Doc. 1, ¶73. The District Court dismissed the suit, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 16–18; and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, see 163 F. 4th, at 414–415. As relevant here, the Seventh Circuit rejected petitioners’ argument that Chicago’s vehicle-forfeiture scheme is like the tax-forfeiture statute this Court invalidated in Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U. S. 631 (2023), for failure to return any surplus to the homeowner after a tax sale. The better analogy, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, was to Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U. S. 442 (1996), where this Court held that the government may seize property used in the violation of the law without providing any compensation to the owner. See 163 F. 4th, at 414–415 (citing Bennis, 516 U. S., at 453); see also id., at 452 (forfeitures that comport with due process do not trigger the duty of just compensation).

Unlike the laws discussed in Bennis, however, Chicago does not impound only those vehicles involved in violations of its municipal traffic code. Rather, the city may impound any vehicle of a delinquent resident so long as ticket debts remain unpaid, regardless of whether the vehicle was involved in an infraction. §9–100–120(b). Indeed, that is precisely what happened to Goree, who lost his car because a co-owner incurred ticket debt on a different vehicle. After the vehicle is impounded, moreover, forfeiture is a consequence only of the failure to pay, not the antecedent legal infraction. §9–100–120(f ). Those features strongly suggest that “the purpose of vehicle impoundments” under Chicago’s scheme “is to collect a debt, not enforce public safety laws.” Pet. for Cert. 10. If so, then Tyler would seem to control, and the city’s failure to compensate owners for the loss of their vehicles would likely violate the Takings Clause. The city’s practice of surrendering cars to lienholders or selling them for their scrap value, rather than at a fair auction, only amplifies the potential constitutional infirmity. Cf. Pung v. Isabella County, 609 U. S. 30, 33 (2026) (just compensation is measured based on “fairly conducted” tax sale).

Because of its mistaken reliance on Bennis, the Seventh Circuit considered Chicago’s vehicle-forfeiture scheme “a ‘classic example’ ” of the State’s “police power.” 163 F. 4th, at 414 (quoting Hadley v. South Bend, 154 F. 4th 549, 556 (CA7 2025)). As I have previously written, the lower courts are divided over “the extent to which the Takings Clause applies to exercises of the police power.” Baker v. City of McKinney, 604 U. S. 1035, 1038 (2024) (statement of Sotomayor, J., respecting denial of certiorari). Here, the Seventh Circuit embraced the expansive notion that “exercise[s] of the City’s police power to enforce its traffic code” are immune to takings claims. 163 F. 4th, at 414. Some courts have likewise appeared to adopt a categorical rule that the Takings Clause does not apply when the government acts under any of its police powers. See, e.g., AmeriSource Corp. v. United States, 525 F. 3d 1149, 1153 (CA Fed. 2008); Lech v. Jackson, 791 Fed. Appx. 711, 717 (CA10 2019). Others have held, more narrowly, that the just-compensation requirement is subject to a public-safety or necessity exception, see, e.g., Baker v. McKinney, 84 F. 4th 378, 388 (CA5 2023); Pena v. Los Angeles, 158 F. 4th 1033, 1035 (CA9 2025), or that no property is taken when it is damaged incident to a lawful search or arrest, see, e.g., Slaybaugh v. Rutherford County, 114 F. 4th 593, 598 (CA6 2024); Hadley, 154 F. 4th, at 554; Pena, 158 F. 4th, at 1050 (Friedland, J., concurring in judgment). It is still an “open question” whether these or any other approaches are consistent with this Court’s precedents. Baker, 604 U. S., at 1038. Few of these decisions likewise explain the source of any such police-power exception to the Takings Clause—whether the common law, the Constitution, or elsewhere.

Such questions thus continue to “benefit from further percolation” in the lower courts before this Court chooses to intervene. Id., at 1039. Petitioners, moreover, have lodged a facial challenge to Chicago’s ordinance, which might require this Court to invalidate even those features of the law that have nothing to do with vehicle forfeiture. See, e.g., §9–100–120(a) (providing for immobilization of vehicles). I therefore concur in the Court’s denial of certiorari. I nonetheless write to emphasize that courts should carefully and narrowly define the circumstances in which the State’s exercise of its police powers are held exempt from the just-compensation requirement, as well as explain the source of any such exemption. Where, as here, a person alleges a “classic taking in which the government directly appropriates private property for its own use” or to pay an outstanding debt, like a tax lien, Tyler, 598 U. S., at 639 (internal quotation marks omitted), the talismanic invocation of the State’s “law enforcement authority,” 163 F. 4th, at 414, may be insufficient to avoid the requirement of just compensation. I again encourage courts considering this issue to take care that due deference to state police powers does not eclipse constitutional rights.