1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - x 3 TAYLOR JAMES BLOATE, : 4 Petitioner : 5 : No. 08-728 v. 6 UNITED STATES. : 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - x 8 Washington, D.C. 9 Tuesday, October 6, 2009 10 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 11 12 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 13 at 12:59 p.m. 14 APPEARANCES: MARK T. STANCIL, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of 15 16 the Petitioner. 17 MATTHEW D. ROBERTS, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor 18 General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on 19 behalf of the Respondent. 20 21 22 23 24 25

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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(12:59 p.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear
4	argument next in Case 08-728, Bloate v. United States.
5	Mr. Stancil.
6	ORAL ARGUMENT OF MARK K. STANCIL
7	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
8	MR. STANCIL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
9	please the Court:
10	Pretrial motion preparation time is not
11	automatically excluded under Section 3161(h)(1) of the
12	Speedy Trial Act. Such delays are subject to exclusion
13	only on a case-by-case basis under (h)(7).
14	I would like to focus today on three
15	features of the statutory text that make that abundantly
16	clear. First and foremost, when crafting $(h)(1)$
17	Congress specifically addressed pretrial motion delays
18	and precisely defined that exclusion. Subparagraph (D)
19	declares that the exclusion shall begin with the filing
20	of the motion and end with the hearing on or other
21	prompt disposition of the motion.
22	Reading the general language in (h)(1) to
23	encompass preparation time would circumvent the
24	deliberate legislative choice to limit the pretrial
25	motion exclusion.

1	JUSTICE GINSBURG: That would allow the
2	prosecutor's time to be excluded, right? On your theory
3	that it starts the trigger is the filing of the
4	motion, and it ends when the motion is disposed of. So
5	the prosecutor might say, I need additional time, and
б	that would be included in the suspension period, right?
7	MR. STANCIL: Yes, Your Honor. The
8	government's motions and the defense motions are treated
9	equally under (h)(1), which is why the government's rule
10	to treat defense motions, or defense requests for
11	additional time differently
12	JUSTICE GINSBURG: But I'm
13	MR. STANCIL: The exclusion I'm sorry,
14	Your Honor.
15	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes.
16	MR. STANCIL: The exclusion begins with the
17	filing of the motion, be it the defense motion or the
18	government's motion. That is clear on the text, the
19	face of the text of the statute, which
20	JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the clock the
21	clock would run, on your theory, during the preparation
22	time of the defendant. It would not run during the
23	preparation time of the prosecutor. So I don't think
24	they are being treated the same.
25	MR. STANCIL: No, Your Honor, that is not

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1 our position. The clock runs up until the moment of 2 filing. 3 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Right. 4 MR. STANCIL: Whether it is a defense motion 5 or a government motion. So --6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: No, no. I'm talking 7 about the prosecutor's answer to the defense motion. 8 MR. STANCIL: Oh, yes, Your Honor. Their response to the motion, it is tolled -- or the clock 9 10 stops during the preparation of the response by either 11 side. And that was a deliberate legislative choice by 12 Congress. It says -- on the face of (h)(1), it says the 13 clock stops at filing and remains stopped through the 14 conclusion of the hearing or other prompt disposition of the motion. 15 16 That was an express choice by Congress. Ιt 17 was not lost on them that a response time would be 18 treated differently. And the government's suggestion that that, therefore, means we should factor back in 19 20 preparation time is --21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Shouldn't we be looking --22 23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: One point that I would like you to clarify. I -- I understand you to take the 24 position that the interest of justice would be the route 25

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1 to take, where the judge would have to stop and make a 2 finding. In your view, would it be appropriate, 3 assuming your interpretation of (B)(i) holds, for us to 4 send the case back, or is it too late, because the 5 interest of justice finding was never made? 6 MR. STANCIL: It is too late because this 7 Court answered that question -- that very question in 8 Zedner and held that an (h)(7) ends of justice finding 9 cannot be supplied retrospectively on remand. That was 10 the precise question put to this Court and it was 11 rejected by the Court unanimously. 12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But you think it could be 13 If it doesn't have to be found on the spot by found. 14 the judge, when is the latest time the judge could make 15 the interest of justice filing? 16 MR. STANCIL: Zedner says that as long as it 17 is made -- or the latest it could be made is the time by 18 which the district court rules on the motion to dismiss 19 on speedy trial -- on speedy trial grounds. So it can 20 be made in the district court up until the time the 21 district court decides the speedy trial motion. It does 22 not -- at least it is left open in Zedner. 23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So the result in your case would be that the case is dismissed, period. 24 25 MR. STANCIL: Yes, Your Honor. It would be

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1 -- it would be remanded with instructions to dismiss.
2 However, the district court -- it remains for the
3 district court to determine whether to dismiss with or
4 without prejudice according to the factors specified in
5 the act.

JUSTICE ALITO: Is it clear that a period of time attributable to a defense request for time to prepare pretrial motions can fall within (h)(7)? Because (h)(7) speaks of a continuance. Isn't that a very -- wouldn't that be a very odd use of the word "continuance"?

12 If you make an application to a judge for 13 time, additional time to prepare pretrial motions, do 14 you say, "I want a continuance of the date on which my 15 pretrial motions are due"?

16 MR. STANCIL: I think that's not an unusual 17 reading of the term "continuance," yes, Your Honor. Ι 18 think they frequently -- trial counsel will frequently 19 ask for a continuance of the date. But what I think 20 both parties agree is that that is how the courts almost 21 universally interpret (h)(7), that any time that is 22 excluded, even if it doesn't result in the moving of the 23 trial date per se, is treated as an (h)(7) exclusion. 24 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, there's -- but the 25 courts of appeals have almost universally read

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1 (h)(1)(D), or overwhelmingly read (h)(1)(D) to apply in 2 this situation as well.

3 I'm sorry. Not (h)(1)(D), but the 4 introductory phrase.

MR. STANCIL: Yes, Your Honor, but this rule 5 wasn't confined to pretrial motions. So even in those 6 7 jurisdictions that follow the majority position at issue 8 here, also to my understanding use (h)(7) to exclude intermediate delays before trial. In fact, in the 9 10 government's brief, the government acknowledges that 11 courts treat pretrial motion delays under either (h)(1) 12 or (h)(7), and more specifically (h)7)(B)(iv), which 13 specifically speaks in terms of preparation. And in 14 fact, that's still further evidence that Congress 15 specifically contemplated that preparation time would go 16 under (h)(7). Both (h)(7)(B)(ii) and (h)(7)(B)(iv)17 specifically direct district courts to consider the need 18 for additional time for adequate or effective 19 preparation.

And Justice Alito, back to your concern specifically with motions. (B)(ii) specifically refers to pretrial proceedings. So I think there, in that sense, there is evidence that Congress didn't think that a continuance under (h)(7) would refer only to a continuance of the trial date. At least, that's --

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1 that's my understanding.

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, at the time 3 that (h)(1)(C) -- or (D) was being looked at, wasn't it 4 a fact that some circuits had reviewed the prior 5 exclusion as applying only to the date in which there were actual hearings before the court? 6 7 MR. STANCIL: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So isn't it -- shouldn't 8 we be looking at what you did with respect to this time 9 10 period in light of the need that it was addressing? 11 MR. STANCIL: Yes, Your Honor. And the 12 Court -- and Congress did decide to expand or clarify 13 the end point and beginning point of the (h)(1)(D)14 exclusion. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, what's wrong with 15 16 the logic of district courts who have ruled in this --17 in the government's favor, that say Congress was only 18 looking at that particular part of the proceeding --19 what related to the hearing, the filing of the motion, its actual adjudication -- but they weren't considering 20 21 a motion by the defendant for time to investigate, and 22 that can be another proceeding? 23 Can you imagine a situation in which a court grants that adjournment to a defense attorney where we 24

25 would reverse that finding by the court?

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1 MR. STANCIL: I'm sorry, Your Honor? 2 Reverse --3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But -- it would seem to 4 me that if a defense attorney comes to a court and says, 5 I need an adjournment, and the Court says, you can have it, isn't that implicitly a proceeding in which the 6 7 court is saying there is a need for this? 8 MR. STANCIL: Not in a speedy trial context, Your Honor, for two reasons. First, it is not a 9 10 proceeding. There is no pretrial proceeding until the 11 motion is filed. That is -- that is the definition of a pretrial motion proceeding. It is a formal initiation 12 before the district court. 13 14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: "Proceeding" doesn't mean an act -- it is an act before the court. The 15 16 entire action is before the court. But it is a 17 proceeding in which the defense attorney is looking at 18 whether there's anything to file motions about. 19 MR. STANCIL: If that were correct, Your 20 Honor, then preparing your witnesses is a proceeding 21 respecting trial. I think that takes "proceeding" and 22 expands it so that everything would be excludable delay. 23 But if -- if I may return to your original question, Congress did look at preparation time when 24 25 drafting (h)(1) and (h)(1)B) specifically --

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JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, the Senate did. 1 2 MR. STANCIL: Pardon me. Yes, the Senate 3 Judiciary Committee specifically considered a proposal 4 by the government no less to include preparation time, 5 and the committee rejected that proposal as unreasonable. I think this is simply not a case in б 7 which we are left to quess whether preparation time was 8 on the table. It was on the table and it was declared unreasonable to suggest that it would be within the 9 10 automatic exclusion. 11 Moreover, I think that makes abundant sense. 12 It is not the case that simply asking for more time 13 necessarily means that you have some prejudice in the 14 speedy trial context, or even that the trial date 15 necessarily would move. In this case, the counsel 16 requested the extension for pretrial motions. That 17 extension was granted. The trial date held. It wasn't 18 moved until much later, under an (h)(7) exclusion on

19 unrelated grounds. So I think it's a -- I think it's a 20 false -- a red herring, if you will, for the government 21 to suggest that when the defendant asks for something, 22 it's necessarily -- it ought to be granted, fair enough, 23 but that it's necessarily going to prejudice the speedy

24 trial calculation.

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With respect, I don't think that's the case.

1 I think ordinarily, these things will come very early in 2 the speedy trial -- speedy trial clock, and there will 3 be relatively brief delays. And so I think it's quite 4 reasonable to think that district courts could be 5 allowed to give more flexible preparation time to decide whether to file, what to file, and then the exclusion 6 7 starts with the filing. And I think Congress has made 8 that abundantly clear in -- on the text of the statute. 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: That would certainly 10 encourage judges who don't want to get involved with 11 making findings, which you have to do to satisfy 12 interest of justice, to just say: Motion denied; I'm 13 sorry, I'm not going to let you have the clock run while 14 you -- you are asking me for a favor. You want time to 15 prepare, and the clock is going to run in the meantime. 16 Forget it. You are not going to get the extension. 17 MR. STANCIL: I disagree, Your Honor. 18 First, I think courts will granted them when 19 necessary. Again because it is early in the clock, 20 there won't necessarily be speedy trial -- some sort of 21 speedy prejudice to the government. But moreover, all 22 this means is that the court needs to put findings on 23 the record to say this is preparation time that is 24 legitimately needed, the defendant's interests here 25 outweigh the public's interest, and so I'm going to

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1 grant that and I'm going to put those findings on the 2 record. And I think it's clear from the statute that 3 that's how Congress anticipated this would work. But 4 I --

5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What must the judge --6 the judge must make a finding orally or in writing. Can 7 it just say, okay, I'm giving it to you in the interest 8 of justice?

9 MR. STANCIL: I think -- I don't believe 10 that precise question has come to the Court. But courts 11 are very permissive in terms of how much needs to be put 12 on the record, and it's my understanding that this 13 happens quite literally every day in scores of contexts 14 where courts, as long as they make the finding, it is 15 reviewed for an abuse of discretion only and that's 16 sufficient.

JUSTICE ALITO: So the rule that you are arguing for really will accomplish nothing, other than to benefit a small set of defendants who -- who got pretrial preparation time in reliance on court of appeals decisions saying that those could be done without making explicit ends of justice findings on the record?

24 MR. STANCIL: No, Your Honor. If we are 25 correct, the decision will have significant effect on

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1 the public's interest. In fact, an individual defendant 2 has very little to gain from such gamesmanship as the 3 government suggests would be at issue. What you get is 4 a dismissal of your indictment with or without 5 prejudice, and there are no statute of limitations problems --6 7 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, how is the public 8 going to benefit if all the judge needs -- presumably, district judges are not granting these extensions of 9 10 time in situations in which they do not think that the 11 ends of justice are served by granting the extension of 12 time. 13 So what is going to be served by requiring 14 them to recite this -- to make this rote recitation on 15 the record? 16 MR. STANCIL: First, Your Honor, it's not 17 It specifies four factors that they have to rote. 18 consider, including and before, it says, whether its 19 time -- the time is necessary for effective preparation, 20 taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 21 What this -- what putting this under (h)(7)22 and making that process required will do is weed out the 23 very worst sorts of delays where counsel, even for the defendant or the government, comes in and asks for the 24 25 delay without the exercise of due diligence and without

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1 any showing that this is actually necessary. And I 2 think that's exactly what Congress was doing by not 3 putting this under the automatic exclusion in (h)(1). 4 If it's automatically excluded, and there is 5 additional time granted for no reason whatsoever or for something that wouldn't meet the due diligence standard 6 7 in (B)(iv), the speedy trial clock is effectively lengthened automatically. 8 9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Could you tell me how it 10 works in district courts? This district court set 11 September 13 originally for the -- for the motion. Do 12 the district courts generally have a custom schedule for 13 every case where they set times or do they have local 14 rules on the subject? 15 MR. STANCIL: With respect to pretrial 16 motions specifically? 17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Yes. 18 MR. STANCIL: It varies widely from district 19 to district. For example, in some districts the default 20 is 21 days. So, if you try a case in Chicago, you go to 21 arraignment, your pretrial motions, unless set by a different rule, are due in 21 --22 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And that's -- that's part 23 of -- that there in the local rule of court? 24 25 MR. STANCIL: Yes, Your Honor. In D.C., it

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is 11 days. In many other jurisdictions and here, there
 is no set time limit.

3 And one of the problems -- one of the 4 fundamental problems with the government's rule that a 5 request -- a defense request for additional time must be treated differently and does stop the clock, is that 6 7 gives speedy trial consequences to those variations in local rules. So, in districts where you have a very 8 short standard timeframe, the defendant has to run in, 9 10 if he wants to file pretrial motions, and stop the clock 11 almost automatically. If you have -- say, your motions 12 are due automatically in seven days; you have got to run 13 in there and stop the clock.

As a practical matter, the speedy trial, the 70 days, it's that much longer in those districts because you have got to stop the clock compared to districts where, say, 21 days are ordinarily allotted. Well, they may not have to stop the clock. It's clear that Congress did not --

JUSTICE KENNEDY: But I'm -- I'm not sure that that isn't -- that that argument doesn't cut both ways.

MR. STANCIL: I'm sorry, Your Honor?
JUSTICE KENNEDY: I'm not sure if that -- if
you have a district where you have five days, a very

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1	short period and almost nobody can comply with it, then
2	maybe that's an argument for the government's rule.
3	MR. STANCIL: I disagree, Your Honor. I
4	think that illustrates the problem, because if there is
5	a call it an unreasonably short time period in this
6	district, the speedy trial clock only burns for four or
7	five days or a week, and then someone is going to have
8	to run in and stop it. So those trials are just going
9	to take longer.
10	Let's assume that it takes two weeks on
11	average or three weeks on average to prepare a
12	reasonable pretrial motion. Well, in those
13	jurisdictions that have that local rule, the short local
14	rule, you get two extra weeks on the speedy trial clock,
15	because you have to run in and hit stop on the clock by
16	asking for additional time.
17	In those districts that give you 21 days by
18	default, by contrast, that whole 21 days counts against
19	the 70 days. And that is, I think I think that is an
20	essential judgment that Congress made. It decided on 70
21	days
22	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I think an
23	assumption in your mathematical analysis is that there
24	will be a difference in the time that it takes to
25	dispose of the motion. If the time to dispose of the

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1 motion is the same, then you are wrong, I think. I will 2 work it out. 3 MR. STANCIL: I don't believe so, Your 4 If you assume hypothetically 21 days to prepare Honor. 5 _ _ 6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Right. 7 MR. STANCIL: -- 21 days to respond and call 8 it 21 days to rule --9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Right. 10 MR. STANCIL: -- in a district that allows 11 21 days of preparation time by default rule, 21 days 12 will burn and then 42 days with response and ruling. 13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Right. 14 MR. STANCIL: In a district that allows only 15 five days, five days burn, and then you have to stop the 16 clock for the additional 16 days of preparation, plus 17 21, plus 21. You end up effectively, if the difference 18 is 5 days or 21 days, there is an 86-day speedy trial 19 clock in the district with the short rule and a 70-day speedy trial clock in the district with the local 20 21 rule -- with the 21-day rule. And so I think it's -- and it's clear that 22 23 what Congress did not want in the Speedy Trial Act was these time periods to be amended by local rule 24 25 effectively. And that's what would happen. I think

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1 more fundamentally --2 JUSTICE ALITO: Where does that show, 3 because the disposition time isn't going to be the same 4 from district to district? Districts vary. MR. STANCIL: That's correct. 5 6 JUSTICE ALITO: Congress could have 7 required, as they have in some instances, to have a judge decide a matter within a certain period of time. 8 They didn't do that, did they? 9 10 MR. STANCIL: That's not correct, Your 11 Honor. In subparagraph (H), 3161(h)(1)(H) allows only 12 30 days during which a matter is actively under --13 actually under advisement by the district court. So 14 here they actual did set a 30-day clock on which to 15 rule. 16 There is an exception to that. If there is 17 a hearing subparagraph (D) says, well, you know, we are 18 not going to govern the time in the hearing, and this 19 Court's in Henderson gives district courts flexibility 20 in that regard, when there is a hearing. But Congress 21 was pretty clear in trying to put a book end at either 22 It starts on filing and it ends with disposition, end. 23 and we only give you 30 days without a hearing or after 24 the hearing to dispose of it. 25

And I think more fundamentally this is a

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quintessentially legislative judgment. Congress said, this is a system of rules that we need in place to move cases more expeditiously toward trial. We are going to give you 70 days. We are going to exclude certain things automatically, and we are going to give district courts flexibility under (h)(7).

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Could a district 8 judge, as part of his normal pretrial order, say that I am inclined to grant normal motions for extensions, but 9 10 I think so we don't run into these problems that it's in 11 the best interest of justice that whatever time I grant, 12 I issue an order covered by (h)(7)(A)? That avoids all 13 this problem. I don't have to worry about the Speedy 14 Trial Act when I grant you a motion, because whatever I 15 grant you is going to be excluded under (h)(7)(A).

MR. STANCIL: I don't -- that sounds a lot like a prospective waiver of speedy trial, which is -this court rejected in Zedner. If I understand the hypothetical correctly, if the district court says if I give you extra time, we are not going to complain about it later. I don't think that the court could do that, and I don't think that would be consistent --

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But presumably, a
judge can do it in every case. You are saying they
can't tell you in advance this is what they are going to

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1	do, but they can do it automatically in every case?
2	MR. STANCIL: I don't believe so, Your
3	Honor. I think, if I understand the hypothetical
4	correctly, if a if we appear before the district
5	judge and the judge says exclusions or extensions for
6	pretrial motions will qualify for (h)(7), that sounds
7	like to me in an individual case a prospective waiver of
8	that defendant's Speedy Trial Act
9	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Wait a minute. If a
10	defense attorney comes in to you and says I'm a
11	district court judge I need time to prepare; granted,
12	I am excluding time under (7)(A). You are saying that
13	is insufficient?
14	MR. STANCIL: No, Your Honor. If it's done
15	on a case-by-case basis, where the time is requested and
16	the continuance or the delay is granted with the (h)(7)
17	findings made either then or later, that would be
18	perfectly appropriate. That's how Congress
19	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But it's not okay for a
20	district court to say, you tell me how much or you have
21	21 days to prepare motions and I'm excluding time
22	because of that?
23	MR. STANCIL: No. I'm not sure I I
24	apologize. I'm not sure I under
25	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Local rule from a

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district court judge: Defendant is arraigned; you have
 21 days to file motions.

3 MR. STANCIL: Yes, Your Honor. That is --4 that time is not excluded if it is just set by local 5 rule.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could you finish
answering one earlier question. You said that there is
no statute of limitations problems if we rule in your
favor. Could you explain why?

10 MR. STANCIL: Yes. Under 18 U.S.C., I 11 believe it's 3288 and 3289, essentially gives the government six months after the dismissal of an 12 indictment to reindict a defendant. And courts have 13 14 almost universally held that that applies -- or I 15 believe it's universally held that that applies where 16 the dismissal is based on Speedy Trial Act grounds. I 17 think we are in agreement with the government that there 18 is not a statute of limitations problem.

19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could under that retrial 20 provision the court begin excluding time?

21 MR. STANCIL: The speedy trial clock starts 22 anew after a new --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's what I mean.
MR. STANCIL: Yes, Your Honor. That is
clear under the statute.

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JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do you have any idea how 1 2 many convictions would be at risk for reversal under 3 this rule, that would be currently pending and subject 4 to a ruling in your favor now? 5 MR. STANCIL: I don't know. My supposition is that it's not very many. The government certainly 6 7 hasn't suggested that there are a lot. It would have to 8 be cases within those eight districts or -- pardon me --I quess it would be nine or ten, that have either not 9 10 taken a position or take the government's position, in 11 which the defendant raised this argument in the trial 12 court --13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: In a timely manner. 14 MR. STANCIL: -- in a timely manner. So I think if that is the case, it's an exceedingly small 15 16 number, and for that matter, that would be a problem in 17 any case in which this Court reverses an incorrect 18 ruling. 19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is -- is there any 20 indication in the circuits that follow what seems to be 21 the majority rule -- that is that the clock is stopped 22 during preparation time -- that there have been 23 excessive delays, in comparison to the -- what is it, two circuits who go the other way? 24 25 MR. STANCIL: Not that I am aware of, Your

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Honor, but nor has there been any indication that
 district courts in the two jurisdiction where they get
 the rule right in our view deny defense requests for
 additional time.

5 I think -- I think this rule will matter if you assume that the average pretrial motion extension is 6 7 relatively modest and that the lawyers are fairly 8 reasonable in what they request. We are talking about, you know, additional delays of a week or two weeks, but 9 10 that is -- again, that backs right up into the 11 congressional judgment, the legislative judgment that 12 Congress made.

And so those trials will on average in the majority of jurisdictions, I think, just take that much longer to get to trial.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, what is your 16 17 systemic concern with the -- with the government's rule? 18 The judge has to grant the continuance under either --19 under either of your rules, and you say he has to make a 20 finding that it's good. But are you concerned the 21 continuance would be because the attorney wants to play 22 golf or take a vacation with his kids, and that that's 23 not the cause?

24 MR. STANCIL: Well, that -25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is that's what's driving

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1 your concern? 2 MR. STANCIL: Well, that would be -- that is 3 the most important function of (h)(7), to screen out the 4 truly unmeritorious delays. That's what Congress wanted 5 to get at most of all. 6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But wouldn't judges in 7 many cases do that anyway just in the course of deciding whether to grant a continuance? 8 9 MR. STANCIL: The court may --10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Give -- give me the 11 consequences of ruling for the government that you see 12 that are adverse in your view. MR. STANCIL: The consequence -- ruling for 13 14 the government would mean that any time a defendant 15 needs any extra time, or -- or we would say either side 16 needs any extra time, the clock stops. And so any time 17 you need additional time for pretrial motions there is 18 no balancing. 19 So in the routine case that is not complex, 20 where the -- where the defendant's counsel may be just 21 simply not exercising due diligence, you could ask for 22 two weeks and there is no -- there is no balancing. The 23 district court doesn't even have to ask, what's the 24 delay, you know, why the extra delay? And that time is

25 automatically excluded.

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1	JUSTICE KENNEDY: But that's my point.
2	MR. STANCIL: Yes.
3	JUSTICE KENNEDY: I assume the district
4	judge will ask. Or is
5	MR. STANCIL: In the absence
6	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Or do you doubt that?
7	MR. STANCIL: I am sure it will vary from
8	court to court. But in the absence of (h)(7) and
9	putting it on the record, the district court is
10	certainly not required to ask and may not certainly
11	won't put those findings on the record. And I think
12	this Court made that point very clear in Zedner, that
13	(h)(7) balances substantive open-endedness with
14	procedural strictness, and the procedure is what
15	matters, and Congress made that explicitly clear in
16	drafting (h)(7).
17	If I may, I would like to reserve the
18	remainder of my time for rebuttal.
19	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
20	Mr. Roberts.
21	ORAL ARGUMENT OF MATTHEW D. ROBERTS
22	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
23	MR. ROBERTS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
24	please the Court:
25	Additional time granted for preparation of

pretrial motions is automatically excluded from the Speedy Trial Act deadline for commencing trial. For three reasons, that time falls under section 3161(h)(1) which excludes delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant.

6 First, Section (h)(1) excludes delay 7 resulting from various listed proceedings and other 8 proceedings that are analogous or ancillary to those proceedings. A court's grant of additional motions 9 10 preparation time is ancillary to pretrial motions 11 themselves, which are a listed proceeding. It 12 facilitates the motions because adequate time to prepare them is critical to their fair and accurate resolution. 13 14 The exclusion is similar to other excludable delays that 15 result from proceedings ancillary to listed proceedings. 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Could I ask a 17 specific date question? Am I right that you would 18 exclude the time from September 7th to October 4th? MR. ROBERTS: Yes, the time from 19 September 7th to October 4th. 20 21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, that doesn't -- I'm not sure that makes much sense. Before 22 23 the motion for extension was filed, the hearing date for pretrial motions was September 20. After the extension 24 25 was filed and granted, the hearing date was October 4th.

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1 So the only period of delay that you could say resulted 2 from the extension was from September 20 to October 4, 3 or 13 days. 4 Well, how can you possibly count the time as 5 a delay after he filed his extension up to the point when things would have been due anyway? 6 7 MR. ROBERTS: Well, the delay is just the 8 time that's being used for preparation, which was presumably the time all the way up to the period at 9 10 which the waiver of the intent to file motions was 11 filed. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but how is 12 13 that a -- how is the time being spent for preparation a 14 delay, when some of that time was going to be allowed 15 anyway? MR. ROBERTS: Well, I think the act --16 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: In other words, the 18 motions were not due until September 25th. So I don't 19 see how the time he spent before then can be regarded as 20 a delay. 21 MR. ROBERTS: Well, that's -- that's a result of the fact that the act doesn't exclude the time 22 23 before a routine deadline for filing the motion, because it only excludes the time -- the delay resulting from an 24 25 individualized proceeding. But it makes sense not to

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1 exclude the -- the time before the routine deadline as a 2 general matter, because if you excluded all that time, 3 then you -- the result would be that the basic deadline 4 of the act would be extended and time would be excluded 5 in cases where no time was being used for consideration or preparation of pretrial motions. But once you 6 7 know --CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What is the -- what 8 9 is the proceeding from which you count in determining 10 what should be excluded? 11 MR. ROBERTS: The time running from the 12 order of the district court granting additional time. 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Okay, that order --14 that proceeding was initiated and ruled on the same day. 15 The person comes in and says: I would like time. The 16 judge that same day says yes. 17 MR. ROBERTS: There were --18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: That proceeding 19 takes a day. 20 MR. ROBERTS: The request -- the request for 21 time, that proceeding was done. But the order -- the 22 order granting additional time is a proceeding, and the additional time that --23 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The additional time 25 flowing from the order is a proceeding?

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1	MR. ROBERTS: The order an order is a
2	step in the case, an act of the court
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Right.
4	MR. ROBERTS: and it's a proceeding.
5	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Right.
6	MR. ROBERTS: And it's
7	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And that's one day.
8	MR. ROBERTS: Yes, but it's the delay
9	resulting from the order that we are talking about.
10	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Ah. Now that now
11	now I don't see how that's consistent with the other
12	provisions of the act. If you take $(h)(1)(A)$, that
13	excludes delay resulting from any proceeding to
14	determine mental competency. Okay?
15	MR. ROBERTS: Yes.
16	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And under your
17	theory that would include the time from the filing of
18	that motion to the end of the determination of mental
19	competency, right?
20	MR. ROBERTS: I think courts have excluded
21	from the filing of a motion seeking an examination, yes.
22	You could also, that would probably be excluded under
23	(h)(l)(D)
24	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Ah. Well yes.
25	Well, or yesno, I'm looking at (h)(4). Now

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1	(h)(4) excludes any period of delay resulting from the
2	fact that the defendant is is mentally incompetent.
3	MR. ROBERTS: Right.
4	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It seems to me
5	redundant if you exclude the delay from the examination
6	and then also exclude mental incompetence.
7	MR. ROBERTS: I don't think so, Your Honor,
8	because the delay resulting from the examination would
9	would be excluded from the order granting the
10	examination until the examination was complete. And
11	then there would be a determination of competence or
12	incompetence.
13	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: All right. Well,
14	let's look at (h)(1)(G). That excludes delay resulting
15	from consideration by the court of a proposed plea
16	agreement. But then (h)(2) says any period of delay in
17	which prosecution is deferred pursuant to a written
18	written agreement with the defendant, for the purpose of
19	allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct,
20	which sounds an awful lot like a plea agreement to me.
21	MR. ROBERTS: I don't I think that
22	that's that that's a different a different
23	deferral, Your Honor. It's not for the court's
24	consideration of a plea agreement or even for
25	negotiations. It's saying we're going to take time out

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so that the defendant can demonstrate his -- his good
 conduct.

3 I think that the plea agreement provision is 4 once the parties have proposed an agreement to the 5 court, the court has time to consider whether it should approve that and that time's excluded. And in fact 6 7 courts have excluded the time that the parties are 8 engaged in plea negotiations as ancillary to that 9 provision of consideration of the proposed plea 10 agreement.

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: If I disagree with 12 you that, when the time that is extended before a 13 hearing on the pretrial motions and the acceptance of a 14 waiver, which runs from 13 days, September 20, the 15 original date, and the date that it actually took place, 16 which is 13 days, and if I think, contrary to your 17 submission, which is that the whole time from the filing 18 of the extension to the final hearing is delay, even 19 though it was only 13 days that was pushed back, then you lose, right? 20

21 MR. ROBERTS: I'm not sure. If you think 22 that the -- that there's delay that results from the 23 grant of the extension, I don't think that the 24 Petitioners ever challenged the length of the delay that 25 was excluded, so the only issue that's before the Court

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1 is whether that delay is excluded. 2 I don't know that the Petitioners preserved 3 any argument about the length of the delay, Your Honor. 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Putting aside what 5 Petitioners may or may not have argued, if I think that the delay is only how far the date for consideration of б 7 a motion and acting on the motion has been moved -- in 8 this case, from September 20 to October 4; in other words, it's 13 days, not 28 days -- then you lose, 9 10 right? 11 MR. ROBERTS: I'm not sure that we lose. Ι 12 have to confess that I haven't calculated the -- the 13 exact amount of time that that results. In any case, 14 there are other periods of delays --15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I quess it 16 would be, take 15 days from what time you have 17 calculated, and that's -- that's under the wire -- or is 18 it above the wire? 19 MR. ROBERTS: Yeah. I'm sorry, Your Honor. 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: In other words, I am 21 contesting 15 of your days, and you figured out how much 22 days you think can be excluded or not excluded. 23 MR. ROBERTS: Right. I guess I would say, 24 if there was some question about the length of delay, 25 the appropriate thing would be to -- to rule for us on

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the issue that's before the Court, remand to the courts below, allow them to decide whether the Petitioners preserved the question about the length of delay and what the effect is on a rule that would only limit the additional delay.

6 You know, we also have other arguments for 7 the fact that we think that, even if this time isn't 8 excluded, that, based on -- based on the additional 9 preparation time, that there's still no Speedy Trial Act 10 here, that we raised in the -- in the brief of -- in 11 opposition, and we would think that that should be taken 12 into account on any remand like that as well.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: What was -- what was the second point you just made, Mr. Roberts? That, even if the clock is running, you would still have an argument that you come within the 70 days because?

17 MR. ROBERTS: Because the -- on 18 September 25th, Petitioner filed a notice of intent to 19 waive pretrial motions, and then there was a hearing on 20 that on the 4th, and so that filing would be analogous 21 to a motion or a motion that would trigger it's own 22 delay, that it would trigger it's own exclusion of time 23 even if the time starting on September 7th was not 24 excluded.

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JUSTICE KENNEDY: Just for my -- just for my

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1	information, what's a motion to to waive? I mean,
2	why does he need permission to waive?
3	MR. ROBERTS: The the court had
4	originally said the court had originally provided in
5	its order that on the deadline for filing motions the
6	the Petitioner should either file the motions or
7	indicate whether he wanted to waive the motions and then
8	set a hearing on either one, on the 4th, and that's what
9	happened.
10	After he filed that paper on the 4th, the
11	court held a hearing, and the defendant discussed
12	with the defendant personally whether he wanted to waive
13	his right to file motions.
14	JUSTICE KENNEDY: I see.
15	MR. ROBERTS: And the defendant waived his
16	right to file motions, which had a consequence, you
17	know, in the case.
18	The second reason that the additional time
19	granted for preparation of pretrial motions is
20	automatically excluded is that the exclusion in Section
21	(h)(1)(D) for delay resulting from pretrial motions
22	themselves excludes the time that a court grants the
23	non-moving party to prepare a response.
24	And, as Justice Ginsburg, in her questions
25	suggested, it would make little sense automatically to

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1 exclude time granted to respond to motions, but not the 2 time granted for the specific purpose of preparing them. 3 In fact, this Court employed similar 4 reasoning to that in the Henderson case when it held 5 that the Act excludes the time after a court has held a hearing on a motion while the court's awaiting further 6 7 written submissions. The Court reasoned that it would make no 8 sense not to exclude that time because the act excludes 9 10 all the time before the hearing, as well as 30 days 11 after a motion's taken under advisement; and likewise it would make no sense not to exclude time that is 12 13 specifically granted to prepare motions when the Court 14 excludes the time granted to respond to them. 15 Third --JUSTICE SCALIA: Except for the -- for the 16 17 language, which -- which says that you -- you time it 18 from the beginning of the time granted. 19 MR. ROBERTS: Well, section -- Section 20 (h)(1), Your Honor, expressly states that it excludes 21 delays, including, but not limited, to the listed 22 delays, so no negative inference arises from the fact 23 that the listed examples don't specifically address delays resulting from the grant of additional motions 24 25 preparation time.

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1	Section (h)(1)(D) is addressing a related,
2	but different delay, the delay from the pretrial motion
3	itself.
4	JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, what's the effect of
5	that language then? Why didn't (D) just read "delay
б	resulting from any pretrial motion"?
7	MR. ROBERTS: Because Congress specifically
8	amended it in 1979, in response to previous
9	interpretations by some courts that had excluded only
10	the time that was spent in actual court hearings, and
11	the language makes clear that all the time from the
12	filing of the motion through the hearings, including
13	the not just the Court hearing time is excluded,
14	and it the language continues to to make that
15	clear, even if preparation time is also sometimes
16	excluded.
17	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, do you disagree
18	with your adversary, that there is no statute of
19	limitations problem if we rule against you?
20	MR. ROBERTS: No. I don't think that there
21	are statute of limitations problems, Your Honor, but
22	requiring judges to make superfluous ends of justice
23	findings
24	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But is it superfluous?
25	Because what your adversary is saying is that Congress

1 wanted district courts to think about why some things 2 were being -- additional time was being requested. Not 3 all motions by defendants would a district court 4 actually feel were warranted and might say to that 5 individual if they came in: Look; that shouldn't take you three weeks; that should only take you a week. б 7 Well, a court should always be MR. ROBERTS: 8 doing that in considering whether to grant additional time that's requested, Your Honor. Neither the 9 10 defendant nor the public is going to have an interest in 11 rushing to trial without adequate time to prepare --12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But that doesn't answer 13 my point. Without a requirement that the judge actually 14 has to make a finding in the interest of justice, once 15 the defense attorney comes in and says, I want a month, 16 and isn't the judge required to give him the month 17 because it's automatically excludable? 18 What, otherwise, forces the judge to look at 19 the request and say, no; is it really in the interest of justice for me to give you that month?" 20 21 MR. ROBERTS: The -- the judge doesn't have 22 to give him the additional time. Presumably, the judge 23 should only give him the -- the additional time if more time is needed to prepare the -- the motions, based on 24 25 the justification that the defendant --

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1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what so what
2	additional requirements are we imposing on the judge
3	that the statute itself doesn't command?
4	MR. ROBERTS: Well, what
5	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: If the judge always has
б	to listen to the reason, weigh it, determine whether or
7	not it is in fact in the interest of justice or not, how
8	much more burden are we putting on a judge than to say,
9	look, you are right, you need a month; I will exclude it
10	under (7)(H).
11	MR. ROBERTS: The judge has to specifically
12	consider all of the specified factors that are in (b)(1)
13	through (4).
14	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We have never required
15	the judge to give a litany of each of the factors under
16	(h)(7). We have never required him or her to do a
17	detailed finding. We've just required them to say
18	there's some reason for it.
19	MR. ROBERTS: Well, the court the statute
20	says that the judge shall consider the specific factors,
21	and some courts at least have have reversed if
22	a situations where the court hasn't considered the
23	factors.
24	In addition, there have to be specific ends
25	of justice findings, which I would respectfully disagree

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1 with counsel on the other side: The findings have to be 2 made before the continuance is granted. What --3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's what Zedner seems 4 to suggest. 5 MR. ROBERTS: What Zedner says is the findings have to be made before the continuance is 6 7 granted. They can be recorded later, but they have to 8 be made, because otherwise the continuance isn't made on the basis of the findings. So if the judge didn't go 9 10 through, consider the factors, and make the findings, if 11 only in the judge's mind, then the judge shouldn't be 12 recording them later on. 13 JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Roberts --14 JUSTICE SCALIA: And counsel wouldn't know 15 until -- wouldn't know whether the time was excluded or 16 not until -- until a later finding is either made or not 17 made. 18 MR. ROBERTS: Is recorded. I guess -- I 19 quess not, Your Honor. 20 JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask you, 21 Mr. Roberts, to comment on your opponent's argument that 22 you are creating a rule that if a particular district 23 has a standing order that motions be filed after seven days and then another district has a standing order that 24 25 it be 21 days, the effect of your rule would be to make

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1 the seven-day district an 86-day -- give them 86 days 2 under the Speedy Trial Act?

3 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, Your Honor. The -- the 4 act just doesn't operate so that -- so that all the 5 districts' excludable delays are even across districts. The exclusion in Section (h)(1)(D), the exclusion for 6 7 pretrial motions, excludes the time that's allotted to prepare responses. And there is wide variation among 8 the different districts in the time that's allotted to 9 10 prepare responses.

11 So, for example, the Northern District of 12 Florida gives 14 days after the motion. The Northern 13 District of Illinois gives ten days after the motion. 14 JUSTICE STEVENS: That's for response time. 15 MR. ROBERTS: For response time. 16 JUSTICE STEVENS: And that's automatically 17 excluded, so that won't affect the -- well, like you 18 said, it's --19 MR. ROBERTS: It's going to be different. 20 JUSTICE STEVENS: Yes. 21 MR. ROBERTS: So it's the same -- it's the 22 same issue. They're just -- it isn't in lockstep. 23 JUSTICE STEVENS: But if the difference is specifically authorized by Congress? 24 25 MR. ROBERTS: Well, this is specifically

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1	authorized by Congress, too, because section (h)(1) is
2	is a general exclusion for delay resulting from
3	proceedings concerning the defendant.
4	And, you know, these are the list of
5	things are examples only. And this covers those
б	proceedings and other proceedings, including those that
7	like this one that are ancillary to the listed ones.
8	JUSTICE STEVENS: But doesn't it seem fairly
9	clear that the district which has a 21-day rule, they
10	won't have to normally, they won't need extra time in
11	the routine case for an extra motion, whereas the
12	districts with a seven-day rule would pretty
13	automatically need another 10 days or so.
14	MR. ROBERTS: I think it depends on the
15	particular case and what motions are in or what
16	motions are involved, Your Honor.
17	But the the rule is going to operate
18	differentially, too. Under Petitioner's theory, people
19	come in asking for different extensions of time to get
20	(h)(7) continuances, which Petitioner says are not going
21	to be very difficult to get granted. So I think, both
22	in terms of the response time varying and in terms of
23	the rule having the same effect, whether it's excluded
24	under (h)(1) or (h)(7), I'm not sure that you are going
25	to ever get a complete parity. That's really not what

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1 Congress was intending.

2	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, this may be
3	the same question I was asking earlier, but I want to
4	make sure I've got your answer. Let's say the original
5	date for filing motions is, as it was here,
6	September 13th, right? On September 7th, Mr. Bloate
7	asks for additional time. So the judge's, you know,
8	runs a tight ship, and he says, I will give you one day.
9	One more day, so now it's due on September 14th.
10	You would say the delay resulting from that
11	extension was seven days, from September 7th, when he
12	filed it, to September 14th, and not one day.
13	MR. ROBERTS: That's the way the courts have
14	interpreted it, because once the once the
15	determination has been made that there should be time to
16	prepare a response, then you know that you're outside of
17	the case where you don't know whether any of this time
18	in the routine deadline is being used for response
19	for consideration of motions or preparation of motions.
20	You know that counsel is using time for that purpose.
21	But I would say, you know, the same answer
22	back to you, that that the issue here is whether
23	additional time should is excluded when it's granted.
24	The issue isn't how much time should have been excluded.
25	And if if the court thinks that an incorrect amount

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1 of time has been -- was calculated as excluded, I think 2 that the appropriate thing to do in that circumstance 3 would be for the Court to leave that open on remand, 4 assuming that it's -- that it's preserved. But, you 5 know, I think that -- that --

6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And you would argue it 7 wasn't reserved because both sides thought the period 8 was from September 7th until October 4th, and one 9 thought that that whole period should be excluded? That 10 was your position, and then the other side said none of 11 it --

MR. ROBERTS: That's right, Your Honor. I — Petitioner never argued, at least as far as I am aware, that the error was a miscalculation of the amount of time, rather than the exclusion of the time under the wrong statutory provision.

17 JUSTICE BREYER: How -- how do you think it 18 should work? It seems to me they are two separate 19 things. On September 7th, the defendant comes in and 20 says, "Judge, you've told me I have to have everything 21 ready by the 13th. I would like additional time to 22 prepare." And what he said was, "until September 25th." 23 He said that on the 13th: "I want until September 25th." This is what I think the Chief Justice 24 25 is asking, in part.

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1	Now, what the judge did is excluded
2	everything from September 7th all the way to
3	October 4th. And if I understand your argument I'm
4	not sure I agree with it, but on the 7th to the 13th,
5	that really wasn't additional time, but nonetheless,
б	maybe there's something there.
7	What about the period from the 25th to the
8	4th? I don't know what the theory could be on excluding
9	that one, because what the defendant said on the 7th
10	on September 13th, he said, "Judge, I don't want any
11	more time. I don't even want to file any motions."
12	MR. ROBERTS: On the 25th.
13	JUSTICE BREYER: Yes. On the 25th, he said
14	that. So what is the basis of excluding the 25th to the
15	4th?
16	MR. ROBERTS: As I was saying before, what
17	he did make a filing on the 25th, and the Court took
18	action in response to that filing on the 4th, by holding
19	a hearing at which he waived the motions as he indicated
20	that he was doing on the on the 25th. So
21	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So the delay so
22	saying I'm not going to file any pretrial motions
23	results in a delay from a pretrial motion?
24	MR. ROBERTS: Well, in this particular
25	instance, Your Honor, he made a filing and then the

1 Court -- the Court held a hearing in response to that, 2 and actually engaged in a colloguy with the defendant, 3 asked the -- asked the defendant, "Do you understand 4 what you are giving up? Do you want to waive these 5 motions?" He said, "Yes, I want to do that," and the Court ruled, then, on that on the 4th. 6 7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is that a normal course 8 of practice? I've never quite heard of other --MR. ROBERTS: I don't think it's a general 9 10 practice, Your Honor. It does seem to be typical in 11 this -- in this district, but I think that --12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But then the Court's 13 view a decision or statement that no motions are going 14 to be filed as a request for a waiver of that 15 obligation? MR. ROBERTS: Well, it was in fact a waiver 16 17 notice, a notice of intent to waive, that the defendant 18 filed. Not just --19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Intent to waive. MR. ROBERTS: Well, I mean, it was framed as 20 21 a waiver, a waiver of pretrial motions. It's Docket 22 Entry 21. But I don't think it's -- you know, it's in 23 the record, but not in the -- in the JA. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, I didn't see it as 24 25 a motion. It didn't move to waive. It said, "I waive."

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1	MR. ROBERTS: That that's true, but the
2	Court didn't the Court held the hearing on the 4th.
3	And it engaged in this conversation with the defendant
4	and then made a decision on the 4th that the time was
5	waived, that the the waiver, not
б	JUSTICE BREYER: So it's
7	MR. ROBERTS: Not at the time it was filed.
8	JUSTICE BREYER: That's what I understand.
9	You get the period from the the 25th to the 4th comes
10	under (D) or (H). It's a motion that is filed, and it's
11	under advisement.
12	MR. ROBERTS: I think that the
13	JUSTICE BREYER: So it comes under (D) or
14	(H). Is that right?
15	MR. ROBERTS: It comes under it probably
16	comes under (h)(1), Your Honor.
17	JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, I don't mean little
18	(h)(1). I mean big (H). It's attributed to a period
19	during which any proceedings actually under any
20	advisement or maybe it comes under (D) a motion
21	not to file a motion is a motion.
22	MR. ROBERTS: I mean, it could come under
23	(D), Your Honor. It could come under (h)(1). I would
24	say it really comes under both best fits under (h)(1)
25	as analogous to a motion that's not exactly a motion.

1	But, you know, either way, the point is that
2	it was something that the Court required the Court
3	action, or at least as the Court had set the rules in
4	this proceeding required Court action, and then it did
5	ultimately did have Court action on the Court.
б	JUSTICE STEVENS: Would you repeat that just
7	so I have you: It comes under (h)(1) what sub?
8	MR. ROBERTS: I think just under I would
9	say, Your Honor, just under the general language of
10	(h)(1), because it's not strictly a pretrial motion, but
11	it's the equivalent of a pretrial motion.
12	But you could say that it falls under
13	under $(h)(1)(D)$, and think of it as a motion itself.
14	JUSTICE STEVENS: Did
15	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do you have any idea of
16	how many, if we rule against you, until we speaking
17	hypothetically, how many convictions would be at risk
18	for
19	MR. ROBERTS: I couldn't say precisely, Your
20	Honor, but it is the rule that's been followed in eight
21	courts of appeals.
22	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But it's it's not
23	everybody who invokes a Speedy Trial Act violation
24	objection.
25	MR. ROBERTS: No. That's true. That's

1 true. I mean, I can't say that they are going to be --2 and I would have to agree with -- with Petitioner's 3 counsel that, you know, that there are consequences in 4 whatever ruling that the Court -- that the Court makes 5 in a case. 6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I would have been -- I 7 would have been interested in knowing the effects of 8 Zedner. 9 MR. ROBERTS: Yeah. 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And how -- what kind of 11 burden it placed. 12 MR. ROBERTS: I'm sorry, I don't have any 13 precise -- precise information on that. But I think 14 that, you know, even apart from the transitional effects 15 that there are going to be on a going-forward basis, 16 sometimes judges are going -- would -- would grant 17 additional preparation time and neglect to make the 18 required finding. 19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But that's true of all 20 Speedy Trial Act actions by the district court. They 21 always run the risk of forgetting to make a finding. 22 That's why you have two attorneys, presumably --23 MR. ROBERTS: That's right --JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- to remind them. 24 25 MR. ROBERTS: And that would be perfectly

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appropriate if findings under (h)(7) were necessary.
But section (h)(1) is designed to address frequently
recurring situations in which the ends of justice are
virtually always going to be served by delaying the
trial for the purpose. And that's exactly what we have
here.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Can I ask you about the language of (h)(1)? Do you think it's -- do you think it's proper to consider a period of delay that precedes the filing of the motion? That is, a period of delay in order to prepare the motion, as a delay resulting from a proceeding that has not yet occurred?

13 MR. ROBERTS: No, we -- we agree with that, 14 Your Honor. That's why Petitioner is wrong in saying 15 that (D) addresses the delay we are talking about here and precludes its recognition under -- under (h)(1). 16 17 The delay we are talking about here is not resulting 18 from the pretrial motion, it's resulting from the grant 19 of -- the order granting additional time to prepare for 20 the motion. And that, that is the related but different 21 proceeding and a different kind of delay related to 22 motions practice. So I would agree with Your Honor that --23

24 JUSTICE SCALIA: The grant of the motion is 25 the proceeding?

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1	MR. ROBERTS: That the order granting the
2	additional time of the proceeding
3	JUSTICE SCALIA: Is the proceeding.
4	MR. ROBERTS: and if the delay results
5	from that order and the order is ancillary to a listed
6	proceeding, which is the pretrial motions because it
7	facilitates that proceeding, because it provides for
8	adequate preparation, which enabled the motions to be
9	resolved favorably and accurately.
10	JUSTICE STEVENS: But what what
11	subsection does all this? I really I got lost in
12	MR. ROBERTS: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
13	JUSTICE STEVENS: Because you agree, as I
14	understand it, it is not covered by (D).
15	MR. ROBERTS: Right.
16	JUSTICE STEVENS: And what subsection does
17	cover it?
18	MR. ROBERTS: It's (h)(1), the general
19	provision, which courts have used to exclude numerous
20	JUSTICE STEVENS: But it's not governed by
21	any lettered subsection?
22	MR. ROBERTS: No. It's a another
23	proceeding that that is covered by the including but
24	not limited to language on
25	JUSTICE STEVENS: But there is no period

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1	MR. ROBERTS: (h)(1).
2	JUSTICE STEVENS: no subsection talks
3	about another proceeding? That's just your gloss on the
4	statute; is that right?
5	MR. ROBERTS: Well, I think (h)(1) says any
6	period of delay resulting from other proceedings
7	concerning the defendant. That could be a period, and
8	it covers a whole range of proceedings that generate
9	delay. And then
10	JUSTICE STEVENS: I see.
11	MR. ROBERTS: Then there is a list of
12	examples. And the examples are intended only to be
13	illustrative. And what's what's covered is in
14	addition to those examples, other proceedings that are
15	analogous or ancillary to them.
16	JUSTICE SCALIA: And you say the order is a
17	proceeding for that purpose, the order granting the
18	extension of time?
19	MR. ROBERTS: That is the proceedings
20	beforehand, Your Honor. Yes. But the that's not
21	the you know, first of all, as I said, a proceeding
22	is a is an act done by the court or under the court's
23	authority, so in order to fit squarely within that.
24	Plus I would direct you to (h)(1)(F), which indicates
25	that orders can be proceedings here because it excludes

1 delay following an order of removal or an order 2 directing the transportation of the defendant. 3 And, so, I think that there's indication in 4 the examples themselves when orders are sometimes 5 proceedings. 6 JUSTICE STEVENS: But just one quick 7 question. It seems to me that everything described in (7)(A) would fit your description of proceedings. 8 9 MR. ROBERTS: It -- there -- there would be 10 an order, so there would be a proceeding. But it 11 wouldn't be a proceeding that would be covered under 12 (h)(1) because it -- to be covered it has to be a 13 proceeding of the type that is listed here. It has to 14 be analogous to these proceedings or ancillary to them, 15 facilitating these proceedings in some way, Your Honor. 16 JUSTICE STEVENS: That's a tough argument. 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. 18 Mr. Stancil, five minutes. 19 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MARK T. STANCIL 20 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 21 MR. STANCIL: I would like to quickly 22 address what I hope to be just four points. The first 23 is the government's fundamental principle. The fundamental tenet is that the specific treatment of 24 25 pretrial motions in subparagraph (D) suggests no

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negative inference or limiting inference on the general
 standard of (h)(1).

The fall on that is evident by looking at 3 4 subparagraph (h), which automatically excludes up to 5 30 days during which a matter is under advisement by the district court. If the government's reasoning is б 7 correct, subparagraph (h) just does not address or contains -- or suggests no negative inference on whether 8 the 31st day of a matter being under advisement is 9 10 automatically excludable under (h)(1). That's why there 11 are settle -- in the statutory interpretation. 12 We take the general standard, first of all, 13 is it a proceeding? There is no pretrial motion 14 proceeding until the motion is filed. 15 Second, if you think there is any 16 uncertainty as to what a proceeding is, well, look at 17 how the enumerated subparagraphs that follow, what do 18 they describe. One specifically addresses pretrial 19 motions. It has a starting point and it has an end 20 point. That's the end of this case. 21 But even if you think you want to look 22 further. Well, is there any support in these enumerated 23 subparagraphs for the government's rule that you would treat a defense request for additional time differently? 24

25 No. None of the enumerated subparagraphs distinguishes

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1 between defense requests and government requests. None 2 distinguishes between routinely granted time or 3 specifically alloted time. 4 In fact, with respect to defense requests 5 specifically, it was not lost on Congress how to -- how to treat government counsel and defense counsel 6 7 differently. In (h)(7)(C), which is about the end of 8 justice exclusion, it specifies that the government cannot get an end of justice exclusion based on its 9 10 inability to exercise due diligence in obtaining a 11 witness or preparing. JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't understand -- I 12 13 don't understand the government to be argue -- to be 14 arguing that they are treated differently. 15 MR. STANCIL: Well, the government's rule I 16 think is --17 JUSTICE SCALIA: They are saying whoever --18 whoever asked for the extension of time in order to 19 prepare the motion gets it. And -- and it's the time 20 limit's suspended. 21 MR. STANCIL: That's not their position in 22 their brief, Your Honor. They say the defense requests for additional time --23 24 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well --25 MR. STANCIL: They don't say anything about

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1 government request. 2 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- they made it very clear 3 here that they think it applies to both the defendant 4 and the government. 5 MR. STANCIL: If that's their position, it's more unmoored from the text of subparagraph (D), because б 7 then both types of requests -- so subparagraph -- pardon 8 me -- so (h)(1)'s general standard is expanded even 9 farther --10 JUSTICE BREYER: You are right, (D) has a 11 special time limit built into it -- I mean, (h) or 12 whatever the number is now. It says not to exclude 13 30 days. Okay? 14 MR. STANCIL: Yes. 15 JUSTICE BREYER: None of the others do. So 16 I would say right there, Congress doesn't want the judge 17 to have it for more than 30 days. Congress doesn't say 18 a word in any of the others that says anything about 19 preparation time. 20 MR. STANCIL: Well, I disagree about 21 subparagraph (D) Your Honor. (D) says from point B 22 to --23 JUSTICE BREYER: No, I know. But there is not an indication about preparation time. Their 24 25 argument is a literal argument under the statute. Is it

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1	from other proceedings? Yes, we know that because of
2	(D), okay? Does it result from other proceedings? Yes,
3	because, in fact, the preparation time is a direct
4	result of the other proceedings as defined in (D).
5	Therefore, it is an ancillary matter related to other
6	proceedings that was caused by the other proceedings.
7	QED, their argument is literal and there is no policy
8	against it. That's what they said.
9	Now, as soon as you get to the last (h), you
10	would find a big policy against it. Called not
11	exceeding 30 days. Now, I take it that's roughly their
12	argument.
13	MR. STANCIL: But there is no
14	JUSTICE BREYER: At least my interpretation
15	of it.
16	MR. STANCIL: There is no difference, Your
17	Honor, between not exceeding 30 days and from and to.
18	And I think this is this case it comes to that and
19	that alone, which is Congress specifically addressed
20	pretrial motions, any delay resulting from a pretrial
21	motion and it said from point A to point B. And even if
22	you had to look behind that, you would look at the
23	legislative history and the Senate Judiciary Committee
24	was asked a specific question by the government no less,
25	can we include preparation time, and they said no.

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1	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, is your
2	friend correct that the issue of the proper calculation
3	is not before us? So that the time I spent figuring
4	that out should be excluded from something?
5	(Laughter.)
б	MR. STANCIL: As the question was presented,
7	Your Honor, it was specific to preparation time and the
8	period and the period from I don't want to get the
9	dates wrong but, September 7th to October 4th. But I
10	would add that the government didn't raise this argument
11	below, either. Nor did the government suggest, as I
12	understand it, that the delay that's at issue here
13	results from the grant on September 7th of additional
14	time. Rather their argument as I have understood it and
15	understood it when reading their briefs is that the
16	delay the ancillary delay stems from the pretrial
17	motion, the time allotted for pretrial motions itself.
18	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I would have thought
19	that whether or not you think that type of delay is
20	excludable depends on what that type of delay is, which
21	requires some sense of how it's going to be calculated.
22	MR. STANCIL: Yes, Your Honor.
23	JUSTICE BREYER: Does six days make a
24	difference to your case? If they lose six days, do you
25	win?

1	MR. STANCIL: I'm not sure, Your Honor, I
2	would have to plead ignorance the same.
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel,
4	this case is submitted.
5	(Whereupon, at 2:01 p.m., the case in the
6	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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