1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	THOMAS CARR, :
4	Petitioner : No. 08-1301
5	v. :
6	UNITED STATES :
7	x
8	Washington, D.C.
9	Wednesday, February 24, 2010
10	
11	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
12	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
13	at 10:09 a.m.
14	APPEARANCES:
15	CHARLES A. ROTHFELD, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf
16	of Petitioner.
17	CURTIS E. GANNON, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor
18	General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on
19	behalf of Respondent.
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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (10:09 a.m.) 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 08-1301, Carr v. 4 5 United States. б Mr. Rothfeld. 7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES A. ROTHFELD 8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 9 MR. ROTHFELD: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, 10 and may it please the Court: 11 When Congress uses ordinary words in the 12 statute, those words should get their ordinary meaning. 13 In SORNA, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Congress did use ordinary words, and it used them 14 15 in an ordinary way. But the government proposes that those words be given a most extraordinary reading. It 16 17 suggests that Congress wrote one of the elements of 18 SORNA's criminal offense in a sort of shorthand, and it 19 should be taken to mean something quite different than 20 what Congress actually said. It proposes --JUSTICE ALITO: Mr. Rothfeld, I wondered if 21 22 I could ask you about three interrelated points 23 concerning your textual argument. And if I could just 24 lay those on the table and get your reaction to them, I 25 would appreciate it.

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1	The first is that it appears that there is a
2	pretty universally accepted modern legislative drafting
3	convention that statutes should be phrased in the
4	present tense. The Senate drafting manual, for example,
5	says: Always use the present tense unless the
6	provision addresses only the past, the future, or a
7	sequence of events that requires use of a different
8	tense. And the House manual is to the same effect.
9	The second is that when the section that's
10	involved here, 2250, was drafted, the drafters didn't
11	know whether SORNA would apply to pre-SORNA sex offense
12	convictions. That was left up to the Attorney General.
13	And so when they were drafting this, they had it was
14	natural, perhaps, for them not to make a special
15	provision for the possibility that there might be some
16	pre-SORNA conduct involved. If the Attorney General had
17	determined that only post-SORNA convictions would qualify,
18	then only then the only travel that would qualify would
19	be would be post-SORNA travel. It was only when the
20	Attorney General decided that pre-SORNA convictions
21	could qualify that the question that's presented here
22	became a possibility.
23	And the third is that once the Attorney

And the third is that once the Attorney General decided that SORNA would apply to pre-SORNA sex offense convictions, that necessarily meant that conduct

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constituting a -- a SORNA -- constituting a qualifying sex offense could occur in the past. And yet there are at least four provisions of SORNA that refer to the conduct that constitutes a sex offense and uses only the present tense, although in those instances it seems that those provisions have to be read as also covering past conduct, pre-SORNA conduct.

8 These are all in 42 U.S.C. 16911, which is 9 reproduced -- the relevant provisions are on 3a to 3-6 10 of the government's brief. I'll just mention a couple of them to provide a flavor for this. Under 42 U.S.C. section 11 12 16911(3)(C), on 3a of the government's brief, an offense may 13 qualify as a tier II offense if, among other things, it, quote, "occurs after the offender becomes a tier I sex 14 offender." But there "occurs" and "becomes" have to be 15 read as applying to past conduct. 16

42 U.S.C. 1691(4) on the same page says that an offense may qualify as a tier III offense if, among other things, it involves a kidnapping of a minor. But "involves" there has to mean also "involved."

And the other two are subsection (7) on 5a and subsection (8) on 6a.

So I wondered if you could comment on that.Maybe you have a reaction to it.

25 MR. ROTHFELD: Well, I'll try to keep

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straight each of the parts of the question. A couple of
 reactions.

3 First of all, I think that the ordinary assumption is that when the present tense is used in a 4 5 statute that's creating a criminal offense, it refers to conduct that takes place after the statute was enacted. 6 7 We are not aware of and the government has not cited any 8 decision of this Court in which it has interpreted a present tense verb used in a criminal statute as 9 10 attaching criminal consequences to conduct that took place before the Act -- before the statute was enacted. 11 12 But before delving too deeply into the 13 present tense question, I think it's helpful to take a look at how that fits into the other elements of the SORNA 14 15 criminal offense, because there are a number of things about the statutory language that we think compel the 16 17 conclusion that Congress had in mind only the attachment 18 of criminal consequences to travel that took place after 19 SORNA was enacted.

For example, and to begin with, the first element of the offense, which provides that the defendant is required to register under SORNA, the government says, and we agree, that the elements of the SORNA offense have to be read sequentially so that the defendant is guilty only if he or she commits them in

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1 order.

2 The first element, as I said, the 3 statutory text, is "is required to register" under SORNA. 4 And it seems undeniable that a defendant is not and 5 cannot possibly be required to register under SORNA б until SORNA is enacted and is on the books. And that is 7 enough to dispose of this case because, as the 8 government agrees, the elements are sequential. The 9 first element is that there is a requirement to register 10 under SORNA. The second element, the travel in interstate 11 12 commerce, has to follow the first element. The travel, 13 therefore, must follow the enactment of SORNA. That we think is sufficient to dispose of this case. 14 The 15 government's answer to that point is to say -- really, to candidly acknowledge that the statutory language has 16 17 to be rewritten if they're to prevail. They say when 18 Congress said "is required" --19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Rothfeld, would you clarify one thing? You're not questioning the Attorney 20 21 General's determination that the underlying sex offense 22 can have occurred pre-SORNA?

23 MR. ROTHFELD: We are not questioning that. 24 Congress specifically authorized in SORNA that the 25 Attorney General had the authority to designate

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Official 1 pre-SORNA offenses as triggering the registration 2 requirement. 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is that -- that's pretty unusual, isn't it, to have Congress say it's up 4 5 to the Attorney General whether their laws apply prospectively or retroactively or -б 7 MR. ROTHFELD: It -- it certainly is unusual. 8 I think it's not for us to comment on whether that was a 9 sensible thing for them to do. But we don't dispute 10 here that -- that Congress did it and that the Attorney General was authorized to do what he did. But --11 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, it's not as though he 13 was authorized to make something a crime which wasn't --14 which wasn't a crime. 15 MR. ROTHFELD: That's absolutely right, Justice Scalia, and I think --16 JUSTICE SCALIA: He was authorized to say 17 18 you have to register. MR. ROTHFELD: It's -- it's actually quite 19 20 helpful to our argument in this case that Congress was aware of how to confer retroactive authority on the 21 22 Attorney General for some things, which it did, the 23 designation of pre-SORNA sex offenses as triggering 24 the registration requirement. 25 JUSTICE ALITO: I thought that the sequence

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1 argument that the government was making was that the 2 events have to occur in this sequence: the conviction, 3 the interstate travel, and the failure to register. 4 MR. ROTHFELD: That is their argument. But 5 the way that they reach that conclusion is to say that the first element of the offense, which is "is required 6 to register" under SORNA, was really a shorthand by 7 8 which Congress meant "committed a sex offense" that 9 Congress --10 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, they might be wrong on that. And I understood that you agreed that the 11

12 interstate travel has to take effect -- has to occur 13 after the sex offense conviction. It wouldn't --14 you couldn't violate -- you wouldn't violate SORNA if 15 there's interstate travel, then the conviction, and 16 then the failure to register.

17 MR. ROTHFELD: We -- we agree, but I think -- we do not agree, obviously, with the 18 government's understanding of the first element of the 19 20 offense. It's not that the sex offense took place. It's that the SORNA registration requirement attached. 21 22 JUSTICE SCALIA: You -- you're saying it has 23 to take place not just after the offense, but after the 24 obligation to register.

MR. ROTHFELD: That's absolutely right.

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1 JUSTICE SCALIA: Which is what the statute 2 says. 3 MR. ROTHFELD: Which is what the statute And, again, the government's only attempt to 4 says. 5 answer that point is to say that Congress actual meant something different when it wrote the first element of б 7 the offense. 8 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, but they might be wrong that the sequence -- that the way these set out --9 10 are set out in the statute dictates a temporal 11 sequence --12 MR. ROTHFELD: They --13 JUSTICE ALITO: -- that you can argue that the temporal sequence that's necessary -- conviction, 14 15 travel, failure to register -- follows from the purpose of this provision, which is to catch people who, after 16 17 having committing a sex offense and being convicted of a 18 sex offense in State A, move to State B. It would follow from the purpose of the statute, not necessarily 19 20 from the sequence of subsections in this provision. 21 MR. ROTHFELD: Well, we of course don't 22 agree with the government on everything, but we do agree 23 that they are right about the sequence, for a number of 24 reasons. One is that it follows -- I think it's the 25 most natural reading of the statutory language that one

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is required to register, travels in commerce, and
 knowingly fails to register. It explains why Congress
 put the interstate travel element second, which is
 somewhat a peculiar thing to do otherwise.

5 And if that were not the case, it creates the problem of what we we've been calling the "Lincoln б 7 Tunnel baby." If someone were an infant traveling and 8 went through the Lincoln Tunnel from New York to New 9 Jersey, lived in New Jersey for the rest of his life, 10 committed a sex offense at age 50 -- if sequential fulfillment of the elements was not necessary, that 11 12 person would be subject to criminal prosecution under 13 SORNA. So --

JUSTICE ALITO: Well, that makes -- that 14 makes a lot of sense. But you can get that from the 15 purpose of the statute, rather than from the sequence 16 17 in which these elements are listed. Is it -- is it 18 usually the case in a criminal statute that sets out a number of element that they have to be satisfied in 19 20 some kind of temporal sequence? I'm not aware of that. MR. ROTHFELD: I think sometimes it is and 21 22 sometimes it isn't. It's certainly not a universal rule 23 that it has to be. But, again, the language here makes 24 that a sensible rule.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, assuming it does

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1	depend on the purpose of the statute, what would the
2	purpose it wouldn't cover his transportation as an
3	infant. What does he have to be, 20 years old?
4	MR. ROTHFELD: No. I
5	JUSTICE SCALIA: Or 15 years old?
б	MR. ROTHFELD: Looking for
7	JUSTICE SCALIA: Or is it 20 years before
8	the offense or 25 years before the offense? I guess
9	we could make it up, couldn't we?
10	MR. ROTHFELD: You would have to make it up,
11	but if one were to depart from the text of the statute,
12	which says "is required to register under SORNA." So,
13	necessarily, the travel took place after SORNA was
14	enacted.
15	And I think the statutory language disposes
16	of the case. There's no reason to look beyond that to
17	broader purposes. But if one does look to the purpose
18	of SORNA and what Congress had in mind, the interstate
19	travel requirement and attaching that the travel took
20	place after SORNA was enacted is what Congress wanted
21	to do. It accomplishes the purpose. Congress wrote
22	SORNA because it was concerned that there was divergent
23	approach to registrations that were taken by by States,
24	that they had inconsistent applications of registration
25	programs. This was creating loopholes that allowed sex

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offenders who were unregistered not to register, and the congressional response to that was to create a uniform universal system of registration that it hoped all the States would enact that would facilitate exchange of information between the States and with the Federal Government.

7 And the purpose of the SORNA criminal 8 provision in that context is that it was designed to 9 discourage people from traveling, unregistered sex 10 offenders from traveling, after SORNA was enacted to evade the new SORNA registration requirements. For 11 12 that purpose, travel before SORNA is immaterial. It's 13 travel after SORNA is enacted that -- that brings into 14 effect the congressional purpose that they were trying 15 to accomplish. Congress wanted to keep out of the 16 channels of interstate commerce unregistered sex 17 offenders who were trying to evade the SORNA That's necessarily prospective. 18 requirements.

As to people who were unregistered sex offenders who either had never traveled in interstate commerce at all or who had traveled before SORNA was enacted, they are identically situated for SORNA's purposes. They are outside the system. They are not registered. No one knows where they are. They are not attempting to evade SORNA at that point. They are

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1 subject to prosecution, not by the Federal Government, 2 but by the States under the new, more punitive regime 3 of criminal punishments that Congress tried to induce the States to enact as part of the States' --4 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: But which the States didn't б enact. 7 MR. ROTHFELD: And States have 8 generally -- States have not complied with SORNA. 9 Almost universally, they have not complied with SORNA. But one thing many States have done is, in fact, enact 10 these new, more punitive criminal provisions for people 11 12 who have failed to register, as did, for example, Indiana, 13 the State in which Petitioner here was not registered. JUSTICE ALITO: Well, let's compare two cases. 14 We have this case, where you have conviction, interstate 15 travel, SORNA takes effect, failure to register. We 16 17 change that. That's case A. Case B is just like this case except the sequence is different. You have 18 conviction, SORNA takes effect, interstate travel, 19 20 failure to register. 21 Now, why would Congress have treated those 22 two situations differently? 23 MR. ROTHFELD: I think Congress had in 24 mind -- as I say, it was addressing a particular 25 problem. It was concerned that people were evading

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registration requirements because the States had
 different diverging systems, and it was allowing some
 people in some States simply not to register, not
 because necessarily they were evading State registration
 requirements, because the State didn't require them
 to register. States had very different systems as to
 what offenses triggered registration requirements.

8 And so the congressional reaction was to 9 We want the States to enact these new, much more say: 10 comprehensive and intrusive and elaborate registration requirements. And they are so -- so elaborate and 11 12 intrusive that the States are refusing to do it. But --13 but that was the congressional goal, that the States would enact these -- these regulatory regimes; people 14 15 would then register under them. Everybody was now going to have to be registered, or they would be in violation of 16 17 some State law, State registration requirement.

18 And if people after that were trying to get off the grid, disappear by moving in interstate 19 20 commerce, the SORNA criminal provisions would come into 21 effect at that point. For people who stayed put, people 22 who had committed a sex offense before SORNA was enacted 23 and just stayed there, they are identically situated, as I 24 said, to someone who never traveled in interstate 25 commerce at all, and they are subject to prosecution by

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1 the States.

Clearly, Congress did not intend that it was
going to federalize the entire regime of prosecuting
people.

5 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, what is the basic 6 purpose of this statute? I'm having a hard time with 7 it. Is it -- is the purpose of the statute to try to 8 get a lot of people to register who haven't registered 9 at all? Or is the purpose of the statute to get the 10 people who had registered in one State and then moved, 11 and make sure they register in another State?

12 MR. ROTHFELD: I think that the purpose was 13 generally to encourage registration of sex offenders. 14 Now, of course, when -- when Congress wrote the statute, 15 as -- as has been pointed out, it was not apparent to 16 them that it was going to apply to people who had 17 committed sex offenses before SORNA was enacted at all. 18 That turned upon the Attorney General's subsequent 19 determination.

JUSTICE BREYER: No, I mean, if they are just trying to get people to register in general, and they are not particularly worried about travel, then they are using this travel as a kind of jurisdictional hook. And if they are using it as a jurisdictional hook, they'd like to get everybody, as many as possible. That

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1 argues against you. 2 MR. ROTHFELD: Well, two points --3 JUSTICE BREYER: I -- I have a hard 4 time seeing just what they're aiming at. 5 MR. ROTHFELD: Well, it -- it's -- to -- to б be honest, I think it's not entirely clear that Congress 7 had anything specific in mind beyond a reaction to the 8 prior regime in which there were inconsistent approaches 9 being taken by the States. 10 JUSTICE BREYER: Basically, at the time they 11 passed this --MR. ROTHFELD: At the time they --12 13 JUSTICE BREYER: -- most States didn't require registration. 14 MR. ROTHFELD: All States did require 15 registration of some sort or another, but they had 16 17 different registration systems and different 18 requirements in their registration systems. There 19 were -- there were inconsistencies in them. 20 The one thing which appears from the legislative background of SORNA is that Congress was 21 22 concerned about loopholes in various State registration 23 regimes, and it wanted to have a much more 24 comprehensive, universal, uniform system of 25 registration. So to address your point

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specifically about the jurisdictional hook, I think
 there are two reactions to that.

3 One is, even if it were a jurisdictional hook, it is an element of the offense. No one denies 4 5 It has to be interpreted as written. It says that. interstate travel, as we read it, after SORNA was б 7 enacted. So I think that answers the -- the question. 8 But -- but it -- but it was, I would add, more than a jurisdictional hook, because Congress had in 9 10 mind this particular problem of -- of people who, post-SORNA, were going to be evading these new, more 11 12 comprehensive requirements by simply disappearing. Not 13 that they were complying with State regimes which -which didn't require them to register, but they would 14 15 simply cross State lines to vanish. That begs the question. 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: 17 They were concerned with people who had disappeared, but why is it logical for them to be worried about people 18 who disappear prospectively as opposed to the people who 19 20 have already disappeared and have failed to -- that's basically the -- the government's argument, which is: 21 22 One of the main purposes of the statute is to capture 23 those people who have disappeared. And so why limit it? 24 MR. ROTHFELD: Well, that's -- that's right.

25 The government's argument is -- is an appeal to what it

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sees as the gestalt of SORNA, rather than the statutory
 language.

3 But I -- I -- but I think the answer to your -- your question specifically, Justice Sotomayor, 4 5 is that they were -- they -- that when Congress passed the statute, it -- it had in mind this division of 6 7 responsibility in -- in criminal enforcement. It --8 it expected that the States, in order to comply 9 with SORNA, were going to enact these new and much 10 more -- more punitive criminal regimes to punish people who did not register. And so far as SORNA was 11 12 concerned, people who never traveled in interstate 13 commerce and people who traveled in interstate commerce 14 before SORNA was enacted are identically situated. 15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The problem is that the 16 people who had traveled previously and failed to 17 register would no longer be subject to any -- either any 18 registration process or presumably any punishment either, because they were no longer in the State in 19 20 which the conviction occurred, so any change in that statute wouldn't affect them. 21 22 MR. ROTHFELD: Well, that -- under the --

23 the new regime that Congress anticipated would -- would 24 be put in place, every State would enact, would have in 25 place a -- a criminal punishment. And these were --

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1 these States don't punish people simply who committed a 2 sex offense in that State and failed to register. They 3 require registration of sex offenders who committed sex 4 offenses anywhere. 5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And do -- do they generally require registration even if the offense was б committed before the registration act was passed in the 7 8 State? 9 MR. ROTHFELD: Yes, they do. So -- and in that sense mirroring the current interpretation of SORNA 10 11 by the Attorney General. JUSTICE KENNEDY: So what you're saying is 12 13 that, even under your interpretation, there is going to be registration in at least one State? 14 15 MR. ROTHFELD: Absolutely. JUSTICE BREYER: Would you say this at the 16 17 moment -- you may not know, but I think it would be 18 helpful. At the time this was passed, would you say almost all States had some kind of registration act? 19 20 MR. ROTHFELD: Yes. 21 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes. Okay. 22 MR. ROTHFELD: All States --23 JUSTICE BREYER: Now, thinking of that --24 thinking of that set of registration acts in virtually 25 every State, did most of those or none of them or a few

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1 of them or how many made it required that a person 2 register who had committed a crime, a sex crime, in a 3 different State and had moved to that State? Most, all 4 of them, none of them? 5 MR. ROTHFELD: I -- I believe that б universally --7 JUSTICE BREYER: Universally. 8 MR. ROTHFELD: -- they did not distinguish 9 based on the location of where the sex offense took 10 place. So --JUSTICE BREYER: All right. So -- so, 11 12 therefore, every person who has committed a sex offense, 13 or almost everyone, would have been subject to a requirement to move when he committed the offense and 14 15 would have been subject to a requirement to register when he moved under some law. Now, Congress's purpose 16 17 then must have been just to try to get uniformity here. 18 MR. ROTHFELD: Well, the -- the various registration -- State registration laws that existed 19 20 pre-SORNA, that -- all the States had registration requirements, but -- but they differed in a number of 21 22 respects. Which sex offenses would trigger the 23 registration requirement, for example. So -- so, there were people who -- who may 24 25 well have been sex offenders in -- in the broadest sense

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1	under under the SORNA, a very broad definition, but
2	who were not required to register in the State in which
3	they they lived because that State's law did not
4	have list their offense as a triggering
5	JUSTICE SCALIA: And would that be the case
б	after SORNA, that some States would have less extensive
7	coverage than others?
8	MR. ROTHFELD: It is possible after SORNA
9	that that States will enact criminal regimes that
10	don't that don't mirror the SORNA the SORNA
11	definition, but
12	JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, unless that could be
13	the case, then I don't see what is achieved by why
14	you worry about somebody moving to another State in
15	order to evade the registration.
16	MR. ROTHFELD: Well, SORNA
17	JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, if the new State
18	requires you to register just as much as the old one,
19	what are you worried about?
20	MR. ROTHFELD: Well, under the SORNA regime
21	if the States all implemented SORNA as Congress
22	anticipated that they would, if they all enacted these
23	statutes, I think that there wouldn't be the only
24	concern would be that people would simply fail to
25	register, they would then disappear

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1	JUSTICE SCALIA: Fail to register entirely?
2	MR. ROTHFELD: altogether. That's right.
3	And I think that is what SORNA is directed at. SORNA is
4	directed at people they are now all subject to
5	registration requirements. SORNA is directed at the
б	concern that people simply won't register. And and
7	it's designed after SORNA goes into effect, and there are
8	these new requirements on the books. The people
9	JUSTICE ALITO: Isn't the concern that the
10	State of conviction knows that an individual who has
11	been convicted of a sex offense has been released from
12	custody and, if that person is a resident of the State,
13	presumably knows that the person is likely to still be
14	in the State, but if the person moves to another State,
15	the State to which the person moves doesn't know that a
16	sex offender has moved into the State, and that's the
17	reason for the Federal law that imposes a penalty for
18	failing to register in the new State after having
19	traveled across interstate lines?
20	MR. ROTHFELD: That's that's that's
21	quite right. And SORNA addresses these problems by
22	saying, first of all, the States all have to have to
23	pool their information and exchange them.
24	Secondly, when the when the sex offender
25	moves from one State to another, he or she is required

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1 to register in the new State, has to notify both -- both 2 the State and Federal authorities. So it is designed --3 SORNA itself is designed to be a comprehensive response to this problem, encouraging State cooperation. 4 And 5 that is why if we are looking at the policy and -- and б just not paying attention to the language for the 7 moment, the focus was on post-SORNA activity, because 8 Congress has put in place this new regime which is 9 supposed to address the problem of missing sex 10 offenders. People who are taking steps after SORNA goes into effect, you know, offenders, to evade their 11 12 registration requirements are now subject to these new, 13 more comprehensive Federal penalties as well as State 14 penalties.

15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I -- I think that I remain a little bit confused by the question one of my 16 17 colleagues answered, and I'm not sure if this last 18 answer by you is helping me understand it, which is if 19 SORNA now -- if every State is supposed to pass 20 legislation which requires sex offenders who have been convicted elsewhere and moved to their State to 21 22 register, why do you -- I think that's what you -- that 23 you answered affirmatively for Justice Kennedy, correct? 24 SORNA requires every State to pass laws that obligate 25 people who have been convicted in other States to

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1 register, correct?

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MR. ROTHFELD: That -- that's right.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. So why do you need SORNA? Why can't those States that the individual has moved to simply prosecute the person for a failure to register? Why do you need SORNA?

7 MR. ROTHFELD: Those States could do that. 8 And I -- as to why we need SORNA, why Congress thought 9 that SORNA was a good idea, I -- I think there are a 10 couple of reasons. One is that there are Federal offenders and Congress, I think, believed that it was a 11 12 special Federal responsibility to -- to make sure that 13 Federal sex offenders were registered. And in addition, Congress regarded the problem of -- of unregistered sex 14 15 offenders as a Federal problem, and it was one that, after SORNA was enacted and this new systematic regime 16 17 was put in place, was more appropriate for Federal 18 prosecution. But I think --

JUSTICE SCALIA: Perhaps Congress -JUSTICE GINSBURG: Do you think part of it
is there was a -- SORNA requires a lot more information
than was required under the State statutes?
MR. ROTHFELD: Yes. SORNA is much more
expansive both in -- in the type of information that's

25 required and in the mechanism, in requiring in-person

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1 registration by --

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: It's conceivable also that 3 Congress was -- was not confident that the States would be as active in prosecuting violations as the Federal 4 5 Government would be. 6 MR. ROTHFELD: That -- that is -- that's 7 possible, too, and again that is a prospective focus. 8 And, of course, I -- my final point is that discussion of 9 the purpose I think illuminates this to some extent, but 10 the language itself is absolutely clear. There is no reason to go beyond the plain text of the statute. 11 12 And if I can reserve the remainder of my 13 time. 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. MR. ROTHFELD: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Gannon. 16 17 ORAL ARGUMENT OF CURTIS E. GANNON 18 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT MR. GANNON: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 19 20 please the Court: Petitioner's offense under 18 U.S.C. 2250(a) 21 22 occurred when he failed to register as required by SORNA 23 well after SORNA was enacted. As Justice Ginsburg 24 elucidated, he does not dispute that the first paragraph 25 of SORNA can be triggered by a pre-SORNA conviction, and

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1 adopting his construction of paragraph (2)(B) would 2 create a serious structural anomaly between the Federal 3 offenders, with whom there is no requirement that they engage in any post-SORNA conduct other than the failure 4 5 to register, and the State sex offenders, who are the б majority of the missing sex offenders that Congress 7 intended to capture by enacting the new registration 8 regime and ensuring that there would be a serious 9 Federal penalty that would encourage offenders who had 10 used interstate travel to evade their registration requirements to get back on the registration rolls. 11 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. -- Mr. Carr, was 13 in violation of the law the instant it was passed, 14 right? 15 MR. GANNON: We don't think he was in violation of the law the instant it was passed for 16 17 purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause; under cases like 18 Tranbarger and Samuels, we think that he did have a reasonable period of time to comply with the new 19 20 obligation. This is a problem that would occur with all sorts of Federal criminal statutes based on a status 21 22 that somebody was in at the time something was made 23 criminal. 24 In the -- in the case prohibiting possession

25 of handguns by persons who had been convicted of

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1 misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, that this Court 2 upheld that statute last year, when that statute came 3 into effect, if somebody had the relevant conviction on the books and possessed a handgun, they would have been 4 5 quilty at the instant the statute came into effect, but they would have been allowed a reasonable period to come 6 7 into compliance. That's the reasoning that the Court 8 used in Tranbarger and in Samuels; somebody who acquired 9 alcohol legally before a statutory prohibition provision 10 came into effect would be given a reasonable period of time to divest himself of possession. 11

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What's -- an obvious 13 question. What's the government's view on what a 14 reasonable time is?

15 MR. GANNON: Well, it's going to depend upon the facts of the individual case, as the Tranbarger 16 17 Court recognized. In -- in the context of this 18 statute, where somebody is typically allowed only 3 business days to update their registration, we think it 19 20 would be a fairly short period. It's something that -that -- that may depend on all sorts of circumstances. 21 22 If Petitioner -- or if a defendant, a sex offender, was 23 in the hospital for a long period of time and unable to 24 make it to the registry, that would provide him with an 25 -- an affirmative defense under the text of 2250(b).

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1 And -- and so -- but we do think that this is a --2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So -- but the 3 reasonable time question doesn't come up in your --4 in your hypothetical. 5 MR. GANNON: In -- in --CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: First because 6 7 he's in the hospital and he has got a defense there, 8 so --9 MR. GANNON: Well, that -- that's right, 10 and -- but I -- but we do think that it is a background principle in -- in all of these cases that if somebody 11 12 is literally unable to avoid the criminal consequences 13 of their pre-enactment conduct, that that would raise the concerns that the Ex Post Facto Clause is intended to 14 15 solve. And in cases like --16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But no -- but as far 17 as a reasonable time goes, nobody's literally incapable 18 of doing it the same day the law passed. 19 MR. GANNON: Well, I --20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Unless they meet one 21 of the other exceptions. MR. GANNON: Well, this -- I mean, this is 22 23 -- that's -- we -- we think that somebody does need a 24 reasonable time to come into compliance. It doesn't 25 need to be a long time. But this is an issue that --

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1	that exists in the statute completely separate from the
2	travel requirement here. The Federal offenders who
3	are who are covered by paragraph (2)(A) there's no
4	requirement, there's no actus reus for them under 2250,
5	other than the fact that they have a previous
6	conviction, which can be pre-SORNA.
7	JUSTICE SCALIA: Where where where?
8	(2)(A)? Which is where?
9	MR. GANNON: This is in 2250(a)(2)(A). It's
10	on page la of the government's appendix. And so
11	paragraph (2) is divided between (A) and (B)
12	JUSTICE SCALIA: I see. "Or"
13	MR. GANNON: (A) applies to sex offenders
14	who who are sex offenders by virtue of a conviction
15	under Federal or tribal law. Federal law
16	JUSTICE SCALIA: And they don't have to
17	travel in interstate commerce.
18	MR. GANNON: They don't have to travel in
19	interstate commerce because of the "or" between (A) and
20	(B). The only thing they have to do
21	JUSTICE SCALIA: Right.
22	MR. GANNON: is then knowingly fail to
23	register or update a registration as required by SORNA
24	in paragraph (3).
25	And so the reasonable grace period question

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for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause here is not something that the Court can -- can sidestep by deciding that interstate travel needs to occur after the statute was enacted. And, indeed, if somebody were traveling on the day the statute was enacted, there would still be a question about whether they had a reasonable time to comply.

8 JUSTICE ALITO: Do you happen to know what 9 Indiana law provided at the time? Within what period of 10 time after moving to Indiana was the Respondent required to -- rather, the Petitioner required to register? 11 12 MR. GANNON: It -- it was a few days at the 13 time. He was also required under Alabama law -- when he registered and signed a sex offender registration form 14 in Alabama in 2004, it said that he was required to 15 notify the law enforcement authorities in the 16 17 jurisdiction of his new residence within 10 days of his 18 arrival there. And the Indiana law was -- was I believe a period of 7 or 10 days at -- at the time. 19 20 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, should the reasonable time -- should the period under SORNA, which isn't 21 22 specified by statute, be the same as the period under 23 the law of the State into which the person moves? Well, the -- the period is 24 MR. GANNON:

25 specified under -- under SORNA with -- when, once the

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1 SORNA registration --2 JUSTICE ALITO: Right. 3 MR. GANNON: -- regime comes into effect. JUSTICE ALITO: 4 Right. 5 MR. GANNON: And it does require in -- in 16913(c), that somebody update the registration after a б 7 change in residence within 3 business days of -- of 8 coming to the new residence. And so we -- we do think 9 that that would be relevant in evaluating what would be 10 a reasonable time period to come into compliance here. This is the sort of thing that -- that after the statute 11 12 already comes into effect, that it would -- it would require 13 somebody to comply within 3 days. If they moved a year later, then -- then that should be a reasonable time 14 15 period to --16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Can you clarify --17 JUSTICE SCALIA: How long ago --18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Can you clarify what you mean by "the statute comes into effect"? Because if I 19 understand correctly, there's only one State and one 20 Indian tribe that are in compliance. 21 22 MR. GANNON: Well, that's -- that's partly 23 true, Justice Ginsburg. Since -- since the press 24 release that's cited in the briefs, another Indian tribe 25 has come into substantial compliance. But what's

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important here is that that's just a question of whether the State is in substantial compliance with SORNA's requirements for purposes of receiving Federal funding under -- under the Byrne program.

5 And here even if a State has not come into 6 substantial compliance -- and Indiana has not yet been 7 certified as having come into substantial compliance --8 it still had a functioning sex offender registry that 9 would take most of the information that SORNA required 10 Petitioner to provide, things like his name, his 11 physical characteristics --

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But that would be what 13 their --

14 MR. GANNON: -- his -- his address --

JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- what their old law was. It wouldn't be -- you have -- SORNA is in effect, but what the State is implementing is the pre-SORNA State law, right? MR. GANNON: It's true that, especially before SORNA was enacted, that that's all the State was doing, if the State has amended its law since then, and Indiana did update its law in 2006.

But to the extent -- so the State may well accept Congress's invitation to restructure its registration system to match what SORNA requires, but even when a State has not yet done that, there's no

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1	doubt that someone like Petitioner can go in and
2	register. He was supposed to be registered, and, indeed,
3	after he was arrested in a in an incident in 2007, he
4	did register under Indiana law, and he provided the
5	information that Indiana was willing to take. And so
б	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What what do you
7	do with Mr. Rothfeld's hypothetical about someone who
8	travels in interstate commerce as a young child and,
9	20 years later, is covered by SORNA?
10	MR. GANNON: Well, we think that that's not
11	covered under the sequencing argument that we've made,
12	which which partakes of the purpose of the statute
13	that Justice Alito was talking about and and the
14	order in which the relevant acts occur.
15	As long as somebody is already a convicted
16	sex offender of the kind that SORNA requires to
17	register, and they are within the time period within
18	which SORNA would require them to register and
19	Petitioner here is a tier II sex offender, so he would
20	be required to register for 15 years after his 2004 sex
21	offense conviction. As long as he is within that period
22	when he engages in the travel, then we think that it's
23	within the heartland of what Congress was concerned
24	about, which is a sex offender who is engaging in
25	interstate travel

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1	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm sorry. I'm not
2	I'm missing your answer to my question. The answer
3	to the child traveling and then 20 years later is
4	MR. GANNON: Is
5	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: is because it's
6	you have to require under SORNA before the travel?
7	MR. GANNON: It's no, it's you have to
8	have been convicted of a sex offense, because that
9	that's what brings you within the category of persons
10	JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't know where you get
11	that from. I can understand how you can say, which is
12	what Mr. Rothfeld says, that it has to follow the
13	requirement to register. That's the way the statute
14	reads: Whoever, one, is required to register, not
15	whoever has committed an offense that that would
16	later justify registration. It seems to me you are just
17	making up the the prior act that that triggers the
18	interstate travel requirement.
19	MR. GANNON: Well, I don't think that we are
20	making it up, Justice Scalia.
21	JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, what text do you base
22	it on? (1) says "is required to register," and the
23	position of the Petitioner is: After you are required
24	to register, you must travel in interstate commerce.
25	And you say: No, it's after you commit the offense that
	35

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1 you must travel in interstate. Where do you get that 2 from?

3 MR. GANNON: Well, we get that from the facts -- from the context here, from the anomaly that 4 5 would be created, the structural anomaly about the б differential treatment between Federal and State sex 7 offenders. The fact that the purpose of the statute is 8 to recapture missing sex offenders, which are persons 9 who engaged in interstate travel to elude the 10 registration requirements that already apply to them as sex offenders. And so we think that when Congress 11 12 invoked the -- its powers to regulate travel and interstate commerce, in order to give that element 13 14 meaning, we think that it makes sense to apply it to 15 persons who already have the type of sex offense 16 convictions that SORNA requires them to register for. 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So your answer to 18 Justice Scalia is that you don't get it from the 19 language? You get it from the anomaly; you get it from 20 the purpose.

21 MR. GANNON: We get it from the context. 22 That's right. And we know that the plain language of 23 the statute can't completely control this inquiry, 24 because the Congress changed the language that existed 25 earlier in the drafting process of the --

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1	JUSTICE BREYER: Well, what about going back
2	to the purpose? There's a section on page 26 of the House
3	report where they go in some length to saying that the
4	purpose is this is going to help with 100,000 missing
5	people. Don't worry; if you can't remember, it doesn't
6	matter. What they say is there are 100,000 missing.
7	What they do is they travel, let's say, from Alabama to
8	California and they don't register. Now, this statute
9	is going to help with that.
10	Well, how does it help with that? They are
11	already supposed to register in California. And I
12	thought, well, maybe the way it helps with that is that
13	it imposes some new information requirements, so that
14	Alabama, if it were complying, would now have a lot of
15	information about the sex offender, and it would have an
16	obligation it could more easily track him down, or at
17	least California could or somebody could more easily
18	track him down, because he has to give information to
19	Alabama, and Alabama has a registry up.
20	Is there something like that in this?
21	MR. GANNON: Well, there is something like that,
22	but that's not all that's going on. On page 26 of the
23	House report
24	JUSTICE BREYER: Yes.
25	MR. GANNON: that you're talking about,

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1 Justice Breyer, it specifically says that sex offenders 2 who fail to comply will face felony criminal 3 prosecution. And this -- this was a way --JUSTICE BREYER: Yes, but that's -- that's 4 true of everybody whether they have moved or not moved. 5 MR. GANNON: Well, it's --6 7 JUSTICE BREYER: That is, what I'm -the reason I brought up the other is because if this 8 9 is just a jurisdictional hook, I can see why Congress might be trying to get as many people as they want 10 11 to register. 12 But this -- this also serves some purpose, 13 like we're going to make Alabama get some information, makes it easier to catch these people, that purpose 14 wouldn't be served when the travel takes place before 15 this takes effect because Alabama wouldn't have kept the 16 17 information then. 18 MR. GANNON: Well, I think that Congress did pass the statute for -- for multiple reasons in -- in 19 20 order to encourage there to be a more effective, comprehensive nationwide registration scheme. And one 21 22 of the things that that required was -- anticipated, was 23 standardization among the States. 24 But it was also -- these -- Mr. Carr was 25 required to register both by the law of Alabama and

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1	by the law of Indiana at the time when he committed his
2	sex offense and when he moved from one State to the
3	other. Congress considered that type of regime as
4	being inadequate. Congress obviously thought that
5	the State violations that were occurring with
6	100,000 sex offenders who had eluded registration,
7	gone underground, was a problem they wanted to solve.
8	JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. So Congress passes
9	this statute. And how does it help specifically with
10	that?
11	MR. GANNON: Well, it it first of all
12	imposes a Federal registration requirement. So in
13	JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. So the person who
14	hasn't registered in California
15	MR. GANNON: in 16913
16	JUSTICE BREYER: He's afraid of the Feds.
17	He didn't he wasn't afraid of the California police,
18	but he's afraid of the Feds. Okay. I've got it. I've
19	got that. Any other thing?
20	MR. GANNON: It's it's not just that he's
21	afraid of the Feds when they can come with
22	prosecutorial powers under section 2250. It is also, as
23	you say, that there are several aspects of SORNA that
24	will encourage there to be much more cooperation among
25	jurisdictions in standardizing this information,

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1 notifying different jurisdictions when somebody moves 2 from one to another --

3 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. As far as I can read that page, it seemed to me, insofar as what you've just said 4 5 is true, that would happen only after this statute is passed. And, therefore, the fact that he had moved б 7 before the statute is passed would not trigger the 8 cooperation. It might trigger the Fed prosecution part, 9 but it wouldn't trigger the cooperation part. 10 MR. GANNON: Well, that -- that's true, but we already know that this is true without regard to 11 12 post-SORNA travel for persons who have Federal sex offense convictions. 13 JUSTICE BREYER: The only reason I bring it 14 up is if this is a very close case. That tends to cut 15 somewhat against you; namely, that the thing applies 16 17 full-force in terms of its purposes to people who travel 18 after, but it only applies as sort of this weak thing to

19 people who travel before.

20 MR. GANNON: Well, I think, to the extent 21 that the committee report identified 100,000 missing sex 22 offenders as the most significant enforcement problem in 23 the sex offender context, 10 years after every single 24 State and the Federal government had passed a panoply of 25 sex offender registration requirements, shows that they

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1 were concerned about persons who had fallen off the 2 sex offender registry rolls. And that this provision, 3 if it is -- if it is read to treat Federal and State sex offenders more consistently, which is to require them 4 5 both -- to subject them both to potential Federal prosecution if they knowingly fail to register after б 7 SORNA comes into effect --8 JUSTICE SCALIA: No, but -- but it doesn't, because if you haven't been -- if you are convicted of a 9 10 Federal offense, you are automatically in, but if you are convicted of a State offense, you're in only if you 11 12 travel in interstate commerce after that offense. So 13 you don't resolve the inconsistency between (A) and (B). 14 There is still going to be some inconsistency between 15 the two. 16 MR. GANNON: There is going to be some 17 inconsistency --18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Exactly. MR. GANNON: -- but we think that it's 19 dramatically lessened, and it's important in this 20 21 context to --22 JUSTICE SCALIA: That -- that's a much less 23 powerful point. There is inconsistency between (A) and 24 (B), no matter what you do. 25 MR. GANNON: There is, but the vast majority

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1 of the 100,000 sex offenders that were missing were people 2 who would have been convicted under State sex offenses. 3 And most of the -- most of the 705,000 registered sex offenders in the country right now have been convicted 4 5 under -- under State provisions, rather than Federal --6 JUSTICE BREYER: Have you been able to 7 find -- when in doubt about the purpose, let's turn to 8 the language. Is it the case that you found any other 9 statute, any other statute, where Congress phrased a 10 jurisdictional hook in the present tense? I think that lots of 11 MR. GANNON: jurisdictional hooks referring to travel and interstate 12 13 commerce are phrased in present tense. There are -there are a handful that -- that are -- are specifically 14 tailored and have extra language, like the one we cite 15 dealing with gambling devices that have been transported 16 in interstate commerce after the effective date of that 17 particular statute. But, for the most part, I think 18 that they are phrased in present tense and --19 20 JUSTICE BREYER: Do you find anywhere where 21 they're both phrased in present tense and it was 22 pretty clear that Congress intended to catch activity 23 that was -- at least where the jurisdictional part took 24 place before the statute took effect? You find that 25 good an analogy anywhere?

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1	MR. GANNON: I I'm not aware of of a				
2	provision that's that's phrased like that				
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I tried to				
4	MR. GANNON: where that where those				
5	are the only things that are at issue.				
6	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I tried to find				
7	one and and couldn't. I mean, looking up travels				
8	in in the Code, and in each of those cases that I				
9	found it's always it looks like it's it's linked				
10	directly to the activity that's meant to be covered,				
11	you know, traveling for the purpose of the the				
12	activity that's against the law.				
13	MR. GANNON: That's that's true. In				
14	most instances in which Congress has an interstate				
15	travel element, that's true. In some in				
16	some cases like the the statute at issue in the				
17	Trupin case about possession of of stolen goods				
18	that have traveled in interstate commerce, that				
19	that's that's that's an invocation of				
20	JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes, where where it				
21	means prior travel, it says so, use of a firearm that				
22	has traveled in interstate commerce. They use the past				
23	tense when they mean it.				
24	MR. GANNON: In those cases in context,				
25	I think it was easiest to say that when it has				

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traveled vis-à-vis the act that was in question there.
And -- and here -- neither side is contending that -that the travel can happen after the failure to register
and somebody immediately then becomes guilty of the
offense.

We think that the sequencing requirement 6 7 makes sense on both ends, that somebody needs to have 8 the sex offense conviction before they travel, and then 9 they need to fail to register after they have -- they 10 have engaged in the travel, because that's the concern that Congress was trying to get at, persons who were 11 12 able to use the fact of interstate travel to evade 13 registration.

And the reason, Mr. Chief Justice, why I 14 think that Congress didn't include a purpose requirement 15 there is because Congress didn't want sex offenders to 16 17 be able to take advantage of the fact that they had 18 another good reason to travel. If my employer transfers me from one State to another, and then I take advantage 19 20 of that situation to go underground and not re-register, that's one of the 100,000 missing sex offenders that 21 22 Congress was concerned about, even though I would have 23 had a good defense to the charge that I had traveled with 24 the purpose or for the purpose of evading sex offender 25 registration requirements.

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Justice Sotomayor, I think you were asking a question about -- about why the -- what the purpose would be served here if States would already have the underlying offense that would be made criminal by SORNA. I think that there are a couple different answers to that.

7 Mr. Rothfeld acknowledged that Congress may 8 well have intended there to be extra force that would 9 come from the -- from the Federal prosecution itself. 10 But separately I think it's important to note that -that States were given time to comply with SORNA, to 11 12 come into substantial compliance with SORNA. And -- and 13 even though no State at this point has said that they don't intend to come into compliance with SORNA, 14 15 Congress couldn't necessarily have expected States to adopt the particular offense that they -- that 16 17 they were concerned about. And I think that -- that -that here Congress did want to -- to cover that 18 19 situation.

20 One other factual point that's associated 21 with the -- the effectiveness there that was brought up 22 in the briefs and hasn't come up today is the question 23 of -- of when the prior Wetterling Act offenses were 24 repealed.

25 And I -- I -- in section 129 of SORNA, the

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Wetterling Act offense was repealed effective 3 years after the date of SORNA's effective date, even without regard to the 1-year extensions issued by the Attorney General, notwithstanding a point in the Petitioner's reply brief, simply because section 129 doesn't incorporate 124(B), which has the extension provision for the Attorney General.

8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- understand some of 9 the delay Congress may have in passing a law with 10 specifics about how things are done. Are you worried at all under Lambert whether or not there might be a due 11 12 process violation in all the indeterminate provisions of 13 this law? Where do you -- yes, you're supposed to register, but States don't have a place for you to 14 register, and now you are supposed to know that you are 15 supposed to register under the old systems, and you 16 17 don't know how much time to do it in.

18 MR. GANNON: Well, I -- I think here that 19 there -- the question of notice and knowledge has not 20 been an issue because it's --

21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I -- I --

22 MR. GANNON: And I think that's -- this --23 one of the things you said is the States may not have a 24 place to register. And that's -- that's just not true. 25 Since -- since before 1996, every State has had a sex

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1 offender registry.

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Absolutely --3 MR. GANNON: And -- and --JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- but they don't have a 4 5 SORNA place to register. б MR. GANNON: Well, it's the same place. 7 What SORNA requires is that you provide the following 8 types of information to the relevant officials that run 9 the sex offender registry for the jurisdiction. And 10 "jurisdiction" is defined to include the State. And, so, in -- in -- in these cases, even if 11 12 the State hasn't changed the name on the door to SORNA 13 registration facility -- it's just sex offender registration facility under, you know, Zachary's Law, 14 15 which is the name of the Indiana sex offender registration law, as opposed to Megan's Law -- there is -- they are 16 17 still required by SORNA to register, which requires them to give information to the relevant officials in the 18 relevant jurisdiction. 19 20 And the jurisdiction is there; the officials They are taking the information. As long as 21 are there.

22 the officials will take the information, the failure to 23 do that is a violation of 2250.

And there's one -- one other point that Petitioner was making in the reply brief was that there

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seemed to be some confusion about -- about whether there was an offense under SORNA when States had not yet come into compliance or whether that would have been an offense only under the pre-SORNA Wetterling Act.

5 And -- and the reason that there isn't a SORNA violation there, if -- if a State has not yet б 7 decided to accept things like digital palm prints or 8 whatever the extra information is that SORNA would 9 require, the -- the defendant is still required to 10 provide that, what information the State will accept. And the affirmative defense in 2250(b) would only be 11 12 applicable in circumstances where the State wouldn't 13 take that extra information.

So it's only those aspects of SORNA that are 14 above and beyond what the State will allow the offender 15 to do, that he's excused from complying with by the 16 17 affirmative defense, that it's uncontrollable circumstances 18 that he -- that he can't provide a DNA sample or a palm print in a particular State that doesn't do that yet. 19 But as long as the State is taking the rest of the 20 information, he needs to give that. 21

And this is a case where Petitioner utterly failed to give any of the information to Indiana once he arrived there at the end of 2004 or beginning of 2005. So, there's -- there's no dispute that the State would

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have taken that information had he been in compliance with that law. Once SORNA later came into effect, he probably wouldn't have been in violation of SORNA at that point.

5 But -- but that -- there's nothing unusual about the fact that he could have engaged in pre-enactment б conduct that would have prevented him from being in 7 8 violation, just as the person convicted of a misdemeanor 9 possession -- misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, if 10 he doesn't possess a gun before the -- the new provision in 922 comes into effect, then he hasn't committed the 11 12 offense. If somebody doesn't acquire the alcohol before 13 the statutory prohibition comes into effect that was at issue in Samuels before that law came into effect, then 14 15 he hadn't committed the offense.

So, there's nothing unusual about saying that he could have complied with SORNA effectively in anticipation of its being enacted, even though it didn't yet exist.

The -- the -- the question here is whether he knowingly failed to register as required by SORNA after it came into effect. And -- and we think that -that -- that he did, because he had already engaged in the interstate travel after he had been convicted of a sex offense.

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1	If there are no further questions, we would				
2	urge the Court to affirm the Seventh Circuit				
3	JUSTICE BREYER: One last one. It should				
4	help with a minor point. But but I take it, under the				
5	statute, you have to register if you are a sex offender.				
6	And that's true whether you've moved or not moved?				
7	MR. GANNON: That's that's true under				
8	Section 42 U.S.C. 16913.				
9	JUSTICE BREYER: Yes.				
10	MR. GANNON: That's true. The registration				
11	requirement applies without regard				
12	JUSTICE BREYER: But it's a crime it's a				
13	crime under the section we're talking about only if you				
14	are both the person who had to register and you didn't				
15	and you moved?				
16	MR. GANNON: If you fall within (2)(B)				
17	JUSTICE BREYER: Yes. Okay.				
18	MR. GANNON: the person who who has to				
19	JUSTICE BREYER: Everybody in the State has				
20	to register if they meet that definition?				
21	MR. GANNON: In order to to meet the				
22	JUSTICE BREYER: Moved or not?				
23	MR. GANNON: To meet the registration				
24	requirement of 16913, that's true. That's correct.				
25	JUSTICE BREYER: Okay.				

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1	MR. GANNON: And and and, obviously,				
2	that that makes sense in terms of implementing the				
3	scheme, that if somebody registers beforehand, it makes				
4	it much easier to catch them once they move afterwards.				
5	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.				
б	Mr. Rothfeld, you have 4 minutes remaining.				
7	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES A. ROTHFELD				
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER				
9	JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Rothfeld, I hate to eat				
10	up any of your rebuttal time, but this is sort of by way				
11	of unfinished business. Justice Alito asked three				
12	questions at the beginning of this interesting exercise.				
13	I think you only answered the first. I don't even				
14	remember the third anymore.				
15	(Laughter.)				
16	JUSTICE SCALIA: But I was interested in the				
17	second, which mentioned other provisions in this in				
18	this very statute that that use the present tense.				
19	MR. ROTHFELD: The those all appear in				
20	the civil registration provision, not in the criminal				
21	provision. And my answer to Justice Alito's question is				
22	that we are not aware of any case in which the Congress				
23	has used a present-tense verb in a criminal statute to				
24	attach criminal consequences to conduct that took place				
25	before the statute was enacted. And				

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1	JUSTICE ALITO: But all of those provisions					
2	refer now as a result of the Attorney General's					
3	determination that pre-SORNA convictions qualify, all of					
4	those provisions use the present tense to refer to					
5	activities that can have taken place in the past.					
6	MR. ROTHFELD: But at the time that					
7	Congress					
8	JUSTICE ALITO: This very this very					
9	statute. Isn't that correct?					
10	MR. ROTHFELD: That is correct. At the time					
11	that Congress wrote those civil provisions, this					
12	statute, on its face, applied prospectively only. The					
13	Attorney General had not yet retroactively applied it.					
14	Congress specifically gave the Attorney General the					
15	authority to apply it retroactively in defining which					
16	offenders had to register. It did not give him any					
17	authority to retroactively change the scope of the					
18	JUSTICE ALITO: No, but your main argument					
19	is that "travels" is in the present tense, and that					
20	means present and future. But there are provisions of					
21	this very statute that use the present tense to refer to					
22	past conduct. So why doesn't that knock the legs out					
23	from under your textual argument?					
24	MR. ROTHFELD: Well, the that's					
25	I'm not sure that I would say that's our principal					

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argument. That's one of our arguments, and the 1 2 argument which I think is dispositive. Given the way 3 that the Attorney General -- the Solicitor General has presented the case relates to the first element 4 5 of the offense, which is that the action -- the offender is required to register under SORNA, which, as 6 7 we have said, has to take place after SORNA is enacted. 8 I think Mr. Gannon candidly acknowledged 9 that basically, that has to be read to mean something 10 different. It has to be read to mean "is a sex offender," and that is simply not a plausible reading of 11 12 the statute. Not only because of the plain words "is 13 required to register," but the provision of the offense 14 which addresses Federal sex offenders sets out three 15 elements as to them. As to a Federal sex offender, it must be someone who is required to register. 16 17 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, Mr. Gannon may have 18 made an argument that's not helpful to his position, but you can accept that the first provision means 19 20 exactly what it says: "is required to register." And that takes effect on day when SORNA is enacted. 21 22 There's nothing in the statute that says 23 that those three events have to take place in -- in a 24 temporal sequence. It doesn't say "is required to 25 register and thereafter travels in interstate commerce."

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1	It doesn't say that. In fact, an earlier version did				
2	say that, and it was taken out, wasn't it?				
3	MR. ROTHFELD: An earlier version said				
4	"travels thereafter." I that was dropped, I would				
5	suggest, as superfluous, because the present-tense				
6	language encompasses that. But it it would not make				
7	sense to say if one disregards the temporal sequence,				
8	that brings back the Lincoln Tunnel baby. It would mean				
9	that someone could have traveled as an infant, and that				
10	satisfies the SORNA travel requirements.				
11	JUSTICE ALITO: It doesn't if that results				
12	from the aim of the statute, rather than the order in				
13	which those elements are set out in the statute.				
14	MR. ROTHFELD: But I'd suggest,				
15	Justice Alito, that requires an extensive rewriting of				
16	the language of the statute.				
17	JUSTICE BREYER: It doesn't. He said, first				
18	the crime has to take place, before the travel.				
19	MR. ROTHFELD: And one has to one would				
20	have to				
21	JUSTICE BREYER: And, moreover, there's a				
22	statutory limitation, because after a certain period of				
23	years, you don't have to register anymore. So the				
24	hypotheticals about the infant and 20 years ago are out,				
25	because the longest it could last is 15 years.				

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1	MR. ROTHFELD: But one has to
2	JUSTICE BREYER: And then you wouldn't have
3	committed the crime as an infant, so there we are.
4	But it's still a long time, 15 years, I grant you.
5	MR. ROTHFELD: Well, and even so, one has to
б	read into that limitation as to where why it is that
7	there is that limit on on the
8	JUSTICE SCALIA: You have to change the
9	language "is required to register" to "has committed
10	a"
11	MR. ROTHFELD: "Has committed a sex
12	offense."
13	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, you don't have
14	to you don't have to do that. I guess my problem
15	with your argument you say, "is required to register
16	under SORNA." But you can be required to register under
17	SORNA before SORNA is enacted to the extent that SORNA
18	is retroactive. You ask someone: Why are you
19	registering? Well, SORNA tells me I I have to.
20	MR. ROTHFELD: Well, I'd suggest that that's
21	a peculiar reading of the term "is required to
22	register," that, as written, it seems to me as a present-
23	tense requirement. You are now currently required to
24	comply with the terms of the statute. It does not say:
25	You are required you are a sex offender within as

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1	subsequently defined by SORNA. As Congress did expressly				
2	say in the Federal offender provision in section (2)(A).				
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.				
4	MR. ROTHFELD: Thank you, Your Honor.				
5	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The case is				
б	submitted.				
7	(Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the case in the				
8	above-entitled matter was submitted.)				
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