1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - x : 3 CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL 4 : DEAN, Petitioner : 5 : No. 08-5274 6 v. 7 UNITED STATES. : - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 8 9 Washington, D.C. 10 Wednesday, March 4, 2009 11 12 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 13 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 14 at 11:10 a.m. 15 APPEARANCES: SCOTT J. FORSTER, ESQ., Calhoun, Ga.; on behalf of 16 17 the Petitioner. 18 DEANNE E. MAYNARD, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor 19 General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on 20 behalf of the Respondent. 21 22 23 24 25

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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(11:10 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear
4	argument next in Case 08-5274, Dean v. United States.
5	Mr. Forster.
6	ORAL ARGUMENT OF SCOTT J. FORSTER
7	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
8	MR. FORSTER: Thank you, Your Honor.
9	Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the
10	Court:
11	The issue before the Court in this case is
12	whether the discharge provision of 924(c) carries with
13	it some requirement of intent. We believe that the
14	answer to this question is yes. And to that end we
15	would cite to the leg to the text of the statute
16	itself as well as the history involved, the presumption
17	of mens rea that is inherent in all statutes such as
18	this Court's case law has been clear on as well as the
19	principle of the rule of lenity, if we get to that
20	point, and if the Court deems that there is some type of
21	ambiguity.
22	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Forster, there are
23	three levels under this: Possession, brandishing, and
24	if the gun is discharged. You don't quarrel with the
25	notion that Dean at least brandished this gun?

1		MR. FORSTER:	We we do not	dispute that,
2	Your Honor.	No, he clear	ly intentionally	brandished the
3	weapon.			

JUSTICE GINSBURG: So we're talking about a
three-year difference between brandishing and if the gun
is discharged?

7 MR. FORSTER: Yes, Your Honor, that's 8 exactly right. And the statute in 924 requires that the use of the firearm be during and in relation to the 9 10 underlying crime of violence, which in this case is a 11 bank robbery. And we believe that the proper reading of 12 the statute would require that the discharge also be 13 done during and in relation to the underlying crime of 14 violence. Otherwise, the statute simply would not make 15 any sense.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I think one of the 17 stronger arguments against you is the use of the passive 18 voice. It doesn't say anybody who discharges a firearm. 19 It says a firearm is discharged. And that seems to me 20 to take it away from the element of intent that you're 21 trying to focus on.

22 MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, I think that it's 23 a transitive verb the way it's used. By definition it 24 would have some object. Someone would have had to have 25 discharged the weapon. And so I think that the Court's

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cases on mens rea and so forth would continue to apply,
 even given the way that it's phrased in the statute. I
 don't think --

4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So you think it's 5 different -- I don't remember the grammar too well. You 6 think "if firearm is discharged" is different than 7 "firearm discharges;" is that your point?

8 MR. FORSTER: I'm not sure it would make a 9 difference in this case, Your Honor, because I don't 10 think there's any -- I think that by definition the 11 Court would have to ask itself who discharged the 12 weapon. I don't think you can just use the word 13 "discharge" in a vacuum. It has to be during --

14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I'm not sure 15 that's right. I mean, if in fact the bank robber tries 16 to flee and the security guard is forced to use his 17 firearm, increasing the danger to everybody else in the 18 bank, I'm not sure this statute wouldn't cover that as 19 well.

20 MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, I don't believe 21 the statute would, because the individual who would be 22 charged with it would not himself have "during" or "and 23 in relation to" the underlying crime of violence. 24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But it doesn't say -- it

25 says, "if the gun is discharged." And I think on the

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1 government's reading it would cover the police officer 2 who is trying to apprehend a robber and fires a gun. MR. FORSTER: Yes, Your Honor, I think under 3 4 the government's theory that would be true. But I think 5 that would open up --6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Excuse me. What -- what --7 I quess I'm not following this. You say it would be true that if the blank -- if the bank guard fires his 8 own gun when -- when the bank robber is fleeing, that 9 10 would come within this? 11 MR. FORSTER: No, Justice Scalia, not under 12 our reading. I think --13 JUSTICE SCALIA: You say under the 14 government's it would? I don't think it would under the government's either. Do you? 15 16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: You have to use or carry 17 the firearm before -- before section 2 even applies. 18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But it's the police 19 officer who snatches the gun. 20 JUSTICE SCALIA: Ah, that's different, yes. 21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: That's different. 22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So it's using the 23 robber's gun, but by the police officer who is 24 apprehending him. In other words, as I understand the government's view, it doesn't matter whether it's the 25

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police officer. It has to be the gun of the robber, but
 it doesn't matter whether it's the robber or the police
 officer who discharges it.

4 MR. FORSTER: That's true, ma'am. 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: I guess it's also the 6 government's view -- this is even weirder -- that it 7 doesn't matter who brandishes the gun. The -- the bank 8 guard grabs the gun and brandishes the gun, and that 9 also gets additional time served for the bank robber. 10 It doesn't seem fair.

11 MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, I don't believe 12 that the -- that the hypothetical of the guard waving 13 the gun around, I don't think that would meet the 14 definition of "brandish" the way 924 defines it. 15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: It has very specific --16 what are the words that define what is brandishing? 17 MR. FORSTER: Justice Ginsburg, "brandish" 18 is defined under the statute a couple of different ways. 19 The -- the dictionary definition of "brandish," which is 20 to grab something and wave it around, is certainly 21 contained in that.

But the definition goes further. The definition also says that if I, for example, make known that I have a gun, if I pass a note saying I have a gun, that would also be brandishing under the statute.

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1	JUSTICE GINSBURG: I I didn't think the
2	government or anybody was reading the definition of
3	brandishing to include a police officer.
4	MR. FORSTER: The way the government's brief
5	well, with regards to brandish, Your Honor, I don't
6	know that the government goes that far.
7	JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, it runs into the
8	problem, which is also a different problem for you, and
9	that is the brandishing must be for the purposes for
10	the purpose of intimidating.
11	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Right.
12	JUSTICE SOUTER: So that's probably going to
13	eliminate the case in which the officer grabs the
14	felon's gun. So the problem that it seems to me that it
15	creates for you is that "brandish" is specifically
16	defined to have that particular intentional element.
17	There is, however, no definition of of the of the
18	term in question here, which suggests that they did not
19	have any discharge that they did not have any
20	any any intent to impose an intent requirement. When
21	they do it, they know how to do it. In this case they
22	didn't do it.
23	MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, I would disagree
24	with that simply for this reason. This Court's case law
25	is clear that if Congress wants to do away with the mens

1 rea element, they must affirmatively do so. And I don't 2 think that it's proper to say that because there's a specific definition of "brandish," therefore they meant 3 4 discharge to be basically strict liability. 5 JUSTICE SOUTER: Why is it improper? I mean, it may not be conclusive, but it seems to me б 7 evidence that points in that direction. 8 MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, I think that that would be disregarding the presumption of mens rea that 9 10 exists pursuant to this Court's case law as well as the 11 requirement --12 JUSTICE SOUTER: We have -- we have lots of 13 cases in which it makes sense to disregard that 14 presumption, and -- and nobody thinks twice about it, I 15 mean, accomplice liability being an example. 16 There are -- there are -- there are lots of 17 State crimes in which it is dispensed with, reckless 18 driving, death resulting. And in all of those cases 19 what in effect the rationale is that the -- that the 20 individual who is being charged has created a risk, no 21 one can control that risk, including himself. But he bears the responsibility for, if you will, bad luck if 22 the risk is realized. And that is the rationale for --23 24 for holding him liable for discharge here without any 25 particular knowing or -- or intentional act in making

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1 the discharge. 2 So why doesn't that make sense and why is 3 that not an answer to the usual presumption that there 4 will be a specific state of mind required? 5 MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, I don't think this statute is driven by consequence. And as I understand б 7 Your Honor's hypothetical --JUSTICE SOUTER: Why? Why? 8 9 MR. FORSTER: Because the words that the 10 statute uses are directly focused to the -- to the 11 conduct of the defendant: "Possess, use, brandish, 12 discharge," as opposed to, for example, carjacking. 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, this is conduct. I mean, it isn't just bad luck. This is -- what we have 14 15 here is a negligent bank robber. I mean, he has left 16 the safety off, okay, and -- and trips the gun. I mean, 17 bank robbing is bad enough, but negligent bank robbing 18 is something --19 (Laughter.) 20 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- is something that should 21 be punished more severely. 22 MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, certainly under 23 the statute the Court has far more authority than the ten years it imposed, and I think Congress is clear that 24 25 they -- they allowed for substantially larger sentences

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in such a case. This case obviously just discusses the
 application of the mandatory minimum.

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Your -- your 4 argument would give rise to very serious problems of 5 proof. Every time a gun goes off, the bank robber would 6 be able to say it was an accident. I mean, we had a 7 particularly klutzy robber here that everybody agrees it 8 was an accident, but, you know, in many cases it won't 9 be clear.

10 Yes, I was pointing the gun at the person, 11 but I didn't mean to fire it. It just went off. And 12 he's sad about it just as everyone else is. And that 13 would get to the jury in every case.

Just because it was easy here doesn't mean it's going to be easy every time to draw a line. And it gets back to Justice Souter's point. If you pose the risk that the gun is going to go off, that's additionally punishable conduct.

MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, obviously -- I mean, the risk certainly does go up. But as I -- as I think the statute is written, it's not driven by what the risk is. As I say, as opposed to --

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: That's not my
question, really. The question is the problem of proof.
Yours is an easy case. Most cases it's not going to be.

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Most cases when the gun goes off, the robber will be able to say, I didn't intend that it discharged. It was -- it was an accident.

4 MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, I don't believe a 5 jury would be -- would make that decision, because under 6 this Court's authority in Harris, that would be for the 7 judge; and -- and obviously criminals would make these 8 claims, and it would be --

9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Excuse me? That would be 10 for the judge?

MR. FORSTER: Under this Court's authority in Harris, Your Honor, brandish and discharge are not elements of the offense that must be indicted and proved to a jury. They are sentencing elements or enhancement, if you will, that -- that would be up to the judge, and that's this Court's Harris ruling.

17 JUSTICE ALITO: Doesn't that undermine your 18 argument that there's a presumption that a mens rea has 19 to apply, because this is just a sentencing element? 20 MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, I don't believe 21 This Court has never said that merely because it is so. 22 a sentencing enhancement rather than an element of the 23 offense that somehow the statutory rules of construction 24 cease to apply.

25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Isn't it part of the

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1 background here that it was proposed at the time these 2 enhancements came into the law, it was proposed that 3 there be a specific state of mind requirement for the 4 discharge of the gun, and that was not enacted? 5 MR. FORSTER: I didn't hear the -- I'm б sorry, Your Honor. 7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought that part of 8 the legislative history was that there were proposals --9 I mean, there is a rather sharp difference between 10 "possess" -- yes, you have to have a knowledge, intent 11 element -- "brandishing," very clear, for purposes of 12 intimidation -- then "discharge" has no -- it's just 13 that the gun is discharged. 14 Weren't there proposals to include something 15 like what was included for the other two, that is, that 16 there be an intent requirement? 17 MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, there were various 18 drafts in the House and the Senate that -- that 19 specifically provided the intent requirement. The 20 compromise that came out was basically a disagreement 21 over the penalty, and the language that the Congress 22 used, "during and in relation to," necessarily implies 23 some type of an intent element. I think the circuits 24 are clear on that; it has to be knowing, otherwise it's 25 not during and in relation to.

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1	And so I believe that the choice of language
2	that Congress uses there has to be the connection, we
3	believe, between the use during in relation to and
4	the discharge. Otherwise the statute makes no sense,
5	because it wouldn't be triggered by anything.
6	JUSTICE BREYER: Why? I can't get anywhere
7	with the language, to tell you the truth. I could read
8	it either way. It the House language is the same.
9	The person "discharges," yeah, but what if he discharges
10	it accidentally? Is the accidental case or unintended
11	case meant to be covered or not meant to be covered?
12	MR. FORSTER: We don't
13	JUSTICE BREYER: And you don't get anywhere
14	I just can't get anywhere with the language. The
15	reason they put the "is discharged" is probably for
16	parallelism. It was a drafting section in the Senate,
17	and they do their job in a stylistic way. I found
18	nothing that suggests anything other than that.
19	So so where am I? Sometimes a person who
20	discharges the weapon accidentally is really much worse
21	than the one who does it purposely. Purposely, he
22	shoots at the ceiling; accidentally, he kills a person
23	dead; okay? So I mean, I can't get too far with that.
24	So where so there we are. Is there
25	anything else there is the post problem that the

1 Chief Justice mentioned. Is there anything else you can 2 say to me, who really doesn't see it one way or the 3 other way in this statute? 4 MR. FORSTER: Your Honor --5 JUSTICE BREYER: Would you say, look, this б is why you win? 7 MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, in the committee 8 reports and so forth I think it's pretty clear that they did not intend an unintentional or an accidental 9 10 discharge to be covered. 11 JUSTICE BREYER: Why -- why do you think 12 that? I mean, it is absolutely true that a person who 13 is a bank robber and has a gun and has already shown it, 14 and it goes off accidentally is, is -- has caused a 15 tremendous harm in certain cases, which traditionally 16 has been thought meriting a higher sentence. 17 And it is also true that he doesn't have the 18 same state of mind as the one who does it purposely. 19 That is true, too. Both are true. And so now what 20 should I do? I know what you want me to do, but why? 21 MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, the requirement --22 we think that the discharge again must be during and in relation to. There has to be that connection. And --23 24 JUSTICE SCALIA: Which -- it's during the 25 bank robbery.

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1	JUSTICE BREYER: It's in relation to the
2	I mean, you know, in a sense it is, in a sense it isn't;
3	same problem.
4	MR. FORSTER: I don't think this case
5	this Court's case law would support a finding that an
6	accidental use would have been in relation to. That's
7	this Court's ruling in Smith.
8	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, there's accidents
9	and accidents. And couldn't one say, looking at this
10	that, well, we will the State will find that the
11	culpability that we will attribute to this statute is
12	reckless? If recklessness were the requirement
13	certainly the facts in this case would fit, would they
14	not?
15	MR. FORSTER: I think that the evidence
16	would suggest that he was reckless
17	JUSTICE GINSBURG: You accept that
18	MR. FORSTER: but I don't believe that it
19	was knowing. And then I think that
20	JUSTICE GINSBURG: You say reckless is not
21	enough, it has to be knowing. This is not a mere
22	accident. It's this the gun was loaded, it wasn't
23	locked, and he's raking in money with one hand, holding
24	the gun with the other. The teller is crouching down.
25	I mean, there was there was a pretty substantial risk

1 of something going wrong, right?

2 MR. FORSTER: Absolutely, there was. But I 3 think this Court's authority in Smith talks about the --4 the intent element that is inherent in this. It has to 5 be purposeful, it has -- it cannot be by accident, and 6 that's what this Court --

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why? You place a lot of 8 reliance on this: During and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. But that --9 10 that's in the prologue, and it applies only to the 11 matter covered in the prologue -- to wit, "During and in 12 relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking 13 crime, for which the person may be prosecuted in a court 14 of the United States, uses or carries a firearm or in 15 furtherance of any such crime possesses a firearm." 16 That -- that's what all that language 17 "during and relation to" applies to. And then it 18 continues: "Shall," if that "in relation to" exists, 19 "in addition to the punishment provided for such crime:" One, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less 20 21 than five"; two; and number three, what we're dealing with here, "if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced 22 23 to a term of imprisonment of not less than ten years." 24 I don't see how that language during and in 25 relation to any crime of violence applies to anything,

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except the use or carrying of a firearm.
 MR. FORSTER: Justice Scalia, sir, we

3 believe that the proper -- that the better reading would 4 be some connection between those two, between the 5 discharge and the underlying, the during and relation 6 to.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Why is that? How could you -- how could you make the lack of connection any clearer y than by ending the first, the introduction with a dash, and then putting 1, 2, and 3? I mean, it seems to me that it applies to the portion before the dash.

MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, if that were the 12 -- if that were the interpretation, then it would lead 13 14 to what we consider to be some of the absurdities as far 15 as the results qo. If there is no connection between 16 "during and in relation to" -- I will refer to it as the 17 connection. In absence of that connection, any number 18 of different things could occur, and that connection is 19 what makes this statute make sense.

And I believe that the government basically acknowledges that in their brief, that there has to be -- if there's not some connection -- I think it's page 23 29 of the government's brief. When we discussed the absurd results that might flow from a statute where there is no such connection, what the government says --

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I I believe it's on page 29 -- is that to avoid these absurd results, this connection does exist. But then the next sentence they say: But it doesn't mean there is a mens rea.

5 And it seems to me that what the government wants in that case is the "during and relation to "has б 7 to apply to discharge to avoid the absurd results, but yet they don't want Smith to go along with it. And 8 Smith said that during and relation to is purposeful, 9 10 has to have an effect, and it can't be done by accident. JUSTICE SCALIA: How would -- how would a 11 12 discharge not be during and in relation to? Give me an 13 example of -- of what you're worried about. 14 MR. FORSTER: Any discharge any other time. 15 JUSTICE BREYER: He sees a duck fly by the 16 window and he's a hunter. 17 JUSTICE SCALIA: But that -- excuse me. 18 That's not -- that's not covered. Number 3 only applies 19 to someone who has already been quilty of what's set 20 forth in the proloque. 21 MR. FORSTER: That's the connection that we 22 believe is --23 JUSTICE SCALIA: And that's the only connection that's necessary. You have to have done what 24

25 was set forth in the prologue, and it has -- has to be

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in the course of doing that. But "the course of doing
 that" means just in the course of using a firearm in
 connection with the bank robbery.

4 MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, I don't think 5 that's the -- the best way to read it. I think it has 6 to be during and in relation to the bank robbery.

7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The -- the "use or carry" 8 certainly has to be in relation -- during and in 9 relation to, but that's step one. So he already is 10 using and carrying or carrying in relation to the bank 11 robbery. And then -- so that's the starting premise. 12 That excludes all your things about years before or 13 years after he carried -- he carried a gun. You -- step 14 one narrows it to the person who uses or carries a gun 15 in connection with a bank robbery.

16 MR. FORSTER: And -- and I would agree with 17 that, and then when you take this Court's authority in 18 Smith to say that that type use during and in relation 19 to cannot be accidental. And so I go back to the 20 original question Your Honor asked me, did he 21 intentionally brandish it? Clearly. And so we believe 22 that if -- if this case we are here about is fit into 23 Smith, he's on the hook for the seven years under 24 brandish, but because the discharge was accidental, it 25 cannot constitute use under this Court's authority in

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1 Smith. 2 JUSTICE STEVENS: Let me ask you a question 3 about that. I thought that "or possesses" was separate 4 from the "uses or carries." Is possession an example of 5 using or carrying or is it as it says -- "or who in 6 furtherance of such crime possesses"? Is that a 7 separate -- separate enhancement? 8 MR. FORSTER: I don't know that I would use the word "enhancement," Your Honor. The principal body 9 10 of 924 --11 JUSTICE STEVENS: Right. MR. FORSTER: -- "carries" with "uses" as in 12 13 this case as well as later on in the statute 14 "possesses." So it says both. 15 JUSTICE STEVENS: But merely possessing is 16 enough to get the first enhancement of five years. 17 MR. FORSTER: If it is in furtherance --18 JUSTICE STEVENS: Or relation to. 19 MR. FORSTER: If it --JUSTICE STEVENS: The "uses or carries" 20 21 doesn't -- doesn't necessarily apply to the possession. 22 MR. FORSTER: The -- I believe, under the 23 reading of the statute, Your Honor, they're separate. 24 He could have been charged arguably with possession --25 JUSTICE STEVENS: Right.

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1	MR. FORSTER: in furtherance of, but he
2	wasn't. He was charged with using during and in
3	relation to the underlying crime of violence.
4	JUSTICE SCALIA: Why do we have to find that
5	the phrase "if a firearm is brandished" and the later
6	phrase "if a firearm is discharged" require intentional
7	brandishing and intentional discharging? Why can't we
8	limit it by saying, oh, of course it means if the
9	firearm is brandished by the bank robber or by the felon
10	or if it's discharged by the felon, but leaving it quite
11	undetermined whether it has to be intentionally
12	discharged, or even intentionally brandished for that
13	matter.
14	MR. FORSTER: Well
15	JUSTICE SCALIA: The definition of
16	brandishing, I guess, requires some intent to put
17	another person in fear.
18	MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, I think that you
19	would then have to turn to this Court's well, first
20	of all, I think it's the best reading of the statute.
21	It doesn't make sense any other way to say that you can
22	have the gun discharged but not be during and in
23	relation to the underlying crime of violence. It
24	doesn't make sense.
25	Second, I believe that this Court's

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1 statutory rules of construction would say that if 2 Congress wanted to do away with the mens rea element in 3 this case, they would have had to have done so 4 expressly. And we don't believe that they did. 5 Now, every circuit that has discussed the requirement "during and in relation to" has found a б 7 knowledge requirement that you can't not know the gun is 8 there, for example. There has to be the knowledge requirement. And this Court's authority in Smith 9 10 suggests or says clearly that it cannot be used 11 accidentally.

So now the question becomes this: If the 12 13 Court decides that during -- that the discharge must be 14 during and in relation to, and when the Court does that 15 it takes its own authority in Smith to say that it has 16 to be purposeful, it has to have the effect of the 17 commission of the crime, now is -- would the use in this 18 case be subject to Smith? And Smith is clear that 19 accidental discharge simply -- or accidental use, rather -- it didn't talk about discharge exactly -- but that 20 21 accidental use would never be because it --22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why -- you say that this 23 background -- that there has to be a state of mind 24 element. And we can accept that that's a general

25 principle, but here we have a provision that does

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1 require a state of mind -- specifically requires a state 2 of mind for the possession, for the brandishing, intent 3 to intimidate, but here is this other one that suddenly 4 doesn't. So wouldn't the text of this statute say --5 the third one, discharging a gun, they didn't mean to have any element because -- any element of mens rea -б 7 because they had it in number 1 and 2, and 3 leaves it 8 out.

MR. FORSTER: Your Honor, if -- I believe 9 10 such an interpretation would basically mean that that 11 silence would be interpreted as a strict liability, that 12 silence with regards to the specific intent requirement 13 would mean the Congress meant that no intent was 14 necessary. And that's simply never what these cases 15 from this Court have held. There's the presumption that 16 Congress operates against, and if they wish to eliminate 17 the mens rea element, they must do so expressly. And we 18 simply do not believe that it -- that it happened in 19 this case.

One last point is, we believe there's nothing else that Congress would have had to have done to establish a general intent, and if that's true, then I think the very least that could be said about our interpretation is that it would be a reasonable one, in which case lenity principles would then come into play.

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1	Mr. Chief Justice, if there's no other
2	questions I would like to reserve the remainder of my
3	time.
4	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
5	MR. FORSTER: Thank you.
6	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Ms. Maynard.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF DEANNE E. MAYNARD
8	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
9	MS. MAYNARD: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
10	please the Court:
11	By its terms, the sentencing factor in
12	section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) contains no mens rea
13	requirement. Rather, it requires a certain fact to be
14	present in the course of the section 924(c) offense,
15	namely that the firearm is discharged.
16	JUSTICE SCALIA: Does it require that the
17	discharge be during and in relation to the crime? I
18	mean, suppose the bank robber, you know, he sees son
19	of a gun, he sees among the customers a man that ran off
20	with his wife a year ago, and he is just overcome with
21	anger, and he you know, he takes a shot at this guy.
22	It's not in relation to the bank robbery. Would
23	would that discharge be covered?
24	MS. MAYNARD: As long as the discharge
25	occurs while the 924(c) offense is going on

1	JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes.
2	MS. MAYNARD: yes, Justice Scalia, it
3	would it would apply. The "during and in relation
4	to" language from the principal paragraph is part of the
5	offense, but it does not carry down to the separate
б	sentencing factors.
7	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What about the
8	police come in and say, "Drop it"; he says, "Oh, my
9	robbery's over"; he drops it, and it goes off?
10	MS. MAYNARD: That case might present a
11	question about whether or not, once he drops it in
12	compliance with a lawful order to do so, he is still
13	committing the section 924(c) offense. If the section
14	924(c) offense is deemed to be over at that point, then,
15	no, the firearm would not the fact would not have
16	been present while the course of the section 924(c)
17	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So that's the line
18	between is it going on. But assuming the offense is
19	the bank robbery is still going on, like he's got
20	confederates gathering up the money or something, does
21	that fall under your theory that the gun is discharged?
22	MS. MAYNARD: In our under our theory,
23	the there must be a temporal connection between the
24	offense for which the defendant is being sentenced,
25	which is a section 924(c) offense, the using or carrying

the firearm during and in relation to the bank robbery in your hypothetical or possessing it in furtherance of the bank robbery in your hypothetical.

If one concluded that because the bank robbery continued, even though he was no longer using or carrying the firearm or no longer possessing it, that the 924(c) offense also continued, and the firearm discharges when he drops it, then, yes, the firearm is discharged while the section 924(c) offense is ongoing, and, yes, the mandatory minimum would apply.

But -- but that hypothetical presents questions about the beginning and end of the section 924(c) itself, not questions about whether or not the discharge was intentional or accidental.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you think that -regardless of whether it's intentional or accidental, do you think he has to discharge it or that he has to brandish it? It is the passive voice. Does it mean if anybody discharges it or brandishes it?

MS. MAYNARD: Two -- at least two points about that, Your Honor. The passive voice makes clear that Congress cared about the fact of the discharge, that Congress was indifferent as to who discharged the weapon. Because the "is brandished" is also stated in the passive voice, we think Congress was also

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1 indifferent as to who brandished the firearm, although 2 there is a separate provision giving content to what it 3 means to brandish, and brandish must be done in order to 4 intimidate. So -- but if a confederate, for example --5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Grabs it out of his hand and brandishes it. б 7 MS. MAYNARD: -- and brandishes in order to intimidate the victims in the bank, then yes, both of 8 them would be subject to the brand -- to the brandishing 9 10 enhancement. And even if one thought that the language 11 in the -- in the sentencing factor, "if the firearm is 12 discharged, " applied only to the defendant's conduct, 13 which -- that's not our position, and we think that 14 clearly -- it clearly encompasses others -- ordinary liability rules under Pinkerton and aiding and abetting 15 16 principles would hold a confederate liable for discharge 17 by another. 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So even if the

19 police officer -- the police officer disarms the robber 20 and ten minutes later mishandles the gun and it goes 21 off.

MS. MAYNARD: Again, I think that would present questions about whether or not the section 924(c) offense was still continuing, if the law enforcement officer has the weapon.

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1	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, assuming it
2	is. I mean, he has got the one guy neutralized but the
3	others are still, you know, under the teller's window,
4	and that isn't over. So then the guy who is captured
5	already gets an extra three years because the officer
6	mishandled the gun?
7	MS. MAYNARD: If the section 924(c) offense
8	is is is ongoing and if the firearm is discharged,
9	the mandatory minimum sentence applies. One might
10	conclude that if third parties take the weapon and
11	discharge it and, by the way, I do believe these are
12	purely hypotheticals. They point to no case where
13	that's actually been the case but
14	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, there probably
15	aren't a lot of cases where the bank robbers are such
16	klutzes that they're fumbling with the gun and it goes
17	off, either.
18	MS. MAYNARD: That's true, there may not be
19	very many accidental discharges. But there's no reason
20	to believe Congress wanted courts to engage in the
21	inquiry about whether or not the defendant accidentally
22	discharged the weapon. If this Court were to her to
23	hold that accident accidental discharges are not
24	covered by the sentencing factor, I think that we would

see more claims of accidental discharge.

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CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I interrupted your
 answer.

3 MS. MAYNARD: About the third -- if one is 4 concerned about the actions of third parties who are not 5 confederates in any way taking the weapon -- and we do believe it does under the statute's language need to be 6 7 the firearm that is the basis of the section 924(c)8 offense, and not someone else's firearm. But if -- if -- in other words, not the security guard's firearm. If 9 10 the firearm is discharged by third party causes you 11 concern, one could conclude that that is not the manner in which the defendant committed the offense; and that 12 13 this Court's decision in Harris described this type of 14 sentencing factor, these very sentencing factors, as the 15 kind of factor that one looks at: Is a fact present in 16 the manner in which the defendant committed the offense? 17 And so one might conclude that if the law 18 enforcement officer disarms the robber and then later 19 discharges the weapon, that that fact of a discharge is not part of the manner in which the defendant committed 20 21 the offense. We don't think that's compelled, by the 22 way.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: It would be the same -you would give the same answer if the teller grabbed the gun from the robber and it went off?

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1 MS. MAYNARD: If the teller grabs the gun 2 from the robber and it discharges, as long as the 3 section 924(c) offense is continuing, then the firearm 4 is discharged.

5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But your alternate
6 position would apply to the teller as well as the police
7 officer?

8 MS. MAYNARD: One could reasonably conclude that if the teller discharges it, it is in fact the 9 10 manner in which the defendant committed the offense. 11 But I do think there's reason to believe Congress may 12 have been concerned about the fact of the discharge by 13 anyone. I mean, what you're talking about is someone 14 who's engaging in inherently dangerous activity. They 15 brought an armed weapon to commit a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime, and they've handled it in such 16 17 a way that either it is discharged --

JUSTICE SCALIA: We don't really have to decide all this stuff, do we? We just have to decide whether if he discharges it the discharge has to be intentional.

JUSTICE BREYER: There is another --

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23 MS. MAYNARD: There is no question here, 24 Your Honor, but that it was the robber that discharged 25 the weapon. And in fact the Petitioner testified that:

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"I pulled the trigger when I was switching the gun from
 one hand to the other."

JUSTICE STEVENS: But it's also uncontested4 it was accidental, I think.

5 MS. MAYNARD: We have not challenged that it 6 was accidental. But I think that it --

JUSTICE STEVENS: What do you say to your opponent's argument -- I don't know if it's right or not -- but that there's sort of a background rule that generally we assume when Congress prohibits conduct, it means intentional conduct; and normally if they don't mean that, they make it rather clear in the statute. Is that a correct -- is his background

14 principle correct?

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MS. MAYNARD: I don't think so, Justice Stevens, with respect to sentencing factors. I think there's no case in which this Court has indicated -- and no common law principles --

JUSTICE STEVENS: What's the difference between a sentencing factor that adds five years to a sentence and an element of the crime? There are a lot of us that think that -- you've read Harris and Apprendi. You know there is some debate about whether that really makes all that much difference.

MS. MAYNARD: Well, in Harris, which was --

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1 in which this Court was interpreting these very 2 sentencing factors here, the Court note -- noted that --3 JUSTICE STEVENS: Let me -- let me rephrase 4 the question. 5 MS. MAYNARD: Yes. JUSTICE STEVENS: If it were an element of 6 7 the crime, would you then agree with his background 8 rule? 9 MS. MAYNARD: No, Your Honor, because if it 10 were an element --11 JUSTICE STEVENS: Then the fact that the 12 sentencing factor is an element really isn't 13 significant. 14 MS. MAYNARD: I think it might be a harder case for us if it were an element of the crime, but it 15 16 wouldn't be an element that would be necessary. 17 JUSTICE STEVENS: But why would it be a 18 harder case for you? 19 MS. MAYNARD: Why would it be a harder case for us? Because if it were a harbor -- hard -- if it 20 21 were an element of the crime, then it would be an 22 aggravated offense, and then one could debate whether or 23 not the --24 JUSTICE STEVENS: But in that situation 25 would there be a background rule that we normally think

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1	Congress intends to punish intentional conduct?
2	MS. MAYNARD: I think there is a background
3	rule with respect to the definition of criminal offenses
4	that Congress intends some mens rea.
5	JUSTICE STEVENS: So you really then are
6	relying on the difference between an element of the
7	crime and a sentencing factor?
8	MS. MAYNARD: Not no, Your Honor, not in
9	this way, because it it would it would be a more
10	difficult caper case for us, I can see, but that you
11	would still be talking about somebody who was engaged in
12	wrongful conduct. There would be no danger.
13	I mean, one of the reasons the Court assumes
14	a mens rea requirement or reads in a mens rea
15	requirement when one's not there, is because of the fear
16	of capturing innocent conduct; but what you would be
17	talking about is someone who has taken a loaded weapon
18	to commit a crime of violence or a drug trafficking
19	crime and used it during in relation to that crime or to
20	possess it in furtherance of that crime, and is already
21	guilty. They are engaged in
22	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It's entirely
23	fortuitous; you have two bank robbers, they both do
24	exactly the same thing, in one case the gun goes off and
25	the other it doesn't. Does that does it seem does

1 it seem fair to add three years onto the sentence of the 2 one whose gun happens to go off but not on the sentence 3 of the one whose doesn't?

4 MS. MAYNARD: They both engaged in 5 inherently dangerous activity.

6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes, they both did. 7 That's my point, they both did exactly the same thing. 8 MS. MAYNARD: And it's common in criminal law to hold criminals responsible for their unintended 9 10 consequences of their criminal acts, and that's -- in 11 your hypothetical it wouldn't be unusual at all to hold someone liable for the accidental discharge when they've 12 13 taken a loaded weapon to commit a violent crime, here a 14 bank robbery, and handled it in such a way that it goes 15 It's completely reasonable for Congress to off. 16 conclude --17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You get three extra years for having bad luck? 19 MS. MAYNARD: Well, no, well they're -- just to be clear, they're both subject to life imprisonment for taking the gun and committing -- and using it to

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20 21 commit the bank robbery. So it's not tacking on three 22 23 years; it's increasing the minimum; and that is a 24 significant difference, Justice Stevens that this Court 25 has recognized with respect to these various factors in

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Harris itself, that the -- whether or not there was a
 discharge.

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, is this guy 4 likely to get life for a bank robbery, the gun 5 accidentally goes off? I don't know whether it's his 6 first offense or not.

7 MS. MAYNARD: As a practical matter, no, 8 Your Honor. However, had the accidental discharge 9 caused a death, then he would have committed a more 10 serious offense, and that may have been the penalty. 11 But the point is that one is often subject to higher 12 penalties than one might have expected by the unintended 13 consequences of one's criminal act.

JUSTICE BREYER: What would you think -- to go back to Justice Stevens' question, I would start with the assumption that, normally, not always, where you have a criminal statute and the crime has elements, that Congress intends that the elements be carried out with a guilty state of mind; I would start with that assumption.

Now I would agree with you that sentencing is different, and the reason that it's different is because sentencing often goes up or down depending upon whether the harm that is foreseen does or does not occur, irrespective of the state of mind. So we

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couldn't apply that normal background rule, in my view.
 MS. MAYNARD: I think that's correct, Your
 Honor, and that's our view.

4 JUSTICE BREYER: Now -- now, having done 5 that I wonder if the background rule should come into play once again where a mandatory minimum sentence is at б 7 stake, for the reason that if the harm eventuates, there 8 are many ways in which the sentence will go up. If this person had been killed, for example, it becomes a murder 9 10 in the course of a felony. There are all kinds of other 11 statutes that can aggravate the felony; and if you don't 12 apply the mandatory minimum, the judge still can give 13 him the higher sentence, if he warrants it.

But if you apply the mandatory minimum where the judge wouldn't go up, the only impact that has is to take people who the judge and others think fall into the minimal category of bad behavior plus consequences, and force them to have a higher sentence. Now, that would be a rationale for a rule of lenity in mandatory minimum sentencing matters.

21 MS. MAYNARD: But that would be a 22 reconceptualization of the rule of lenity, Justice 23 Breyer.

24JUSTICE BREYER: Yes, it would. It would.25MS. MAYNARD: And what, it would be a -- as

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you said for this Court, in Muscarello, the rule of lenity has never been a rule where the defendant always prevails; and it would be an odd notion to have a more muscular rule of the rule of lenity in the sentencing enhancement context than you have with respect to the crime itself.

7 The whole point of having the mandatory 8 minimum is to take away discretion from judges. What --9 and the language of the statute here in our view is 10 clear. It says "if the firearm is discharged," and I 11 think it's the present tense that gets you the -- the temporal connection to the crime here. If it is 12 13 discharged while you are using or carrying it or 14 possessing it, in the offense in the principal 15 paragraph, Congress wanted you to have ten years. JUSTICE BREYER: No, I can't -- I can't --16 17 the trouble is I can't find anything in the history of 18 this that really says why they use "is discharged" or 19 used "as opposed to discharges." And I find those very

20 metaphysical, those arguments, unless I -- I can see 21 either something in the history or some functional 22 consideration.

23 MS. MAYNARD: Well, in the blue brief they 24 lay out the House's final version, and we have the 25 House's final version in one of our footnotes. And then

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1 they lay out the Senate's final version.

And one important distinction, Justice Breyer, between those two versions is that the House's version would have made it active voice, but not only active. But it would have been amenable to the argument that during and in relation to -- discharges, because it's structured different.

8 But the House would have set the penalty for 9 a discharge at 20 years. Okay. That's -- you can infer 10 from that that the House thought an intentional 11 discharge should subject you to 20 years.

The Senate's version, which put it in the 12 13 passive voice, said if the firearm is discharged and set 14 a mandatory minimum of 10 years. And I think you can 15 infer from that, Justice Breyer, the -- the current 16 structure allows what you're positing, which is more 17 culpable defendants who intend to discharge the firearm 18 to receive a higher sentence. And one could infer, I 19 think, that the House thinks that should be 20 years.

20 So I think the -- the current structure does 21 allow judges to take into consideration. It just sets 22 the floor. And Congress is entitled to do that, and I 23 think they have clearly done that and then to take out 24 of the realm of debate whether or not the defendant 25 intended to discharge the firearm or didn't mean to

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1 discharge the firearm.

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I would like to -- to say one factual point, which is in the -- in the indictment Petitioner actually was charged with use or carrying. It just seems -- if I could explain, the "use or carry during or in relation to," is one prong, one way in which to commit the principal offense.

8 "Possessing in furtherance" is another way 9 to commit the principal offense. The "use or carry" is 10 not modified by "possession in furtherance of," and 11 "possess" is not modified by -- by "during or in 12 relation to," which is another reason it makes no sense 13 to -- to trail the "during or in relation to" down to 14 the generally applicable sentencing factors.

15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is there a difference, a 16 practical difference, between the two formulations?

17 MS. MAYNARD: The legislative -- well, the 18 words are actually different; the text is different; and the legislative history suggests that Congress wanted a 19 beefed-up "in relation to" requirement for possession in 20 21 order to make sure that incidental possession during --22 you know, incidental possession while one is also 23 committing a crime wasn't captured. So the "in 24 furtherance of " --

JUSTICE STEVENS: What you're saying, to

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1 make sure I understand, is that the "in relation to" 2 language modifies both "use" and "possession"? 3 MS. MAYNARD: No, sir. The "in relation to" 4 -- the "during or in relation to" modifier modifies only 5 "use or carry." And if one is charged with a "use or carry" offense, then the government must show that you 6 7 "used or carried during or in relation to" in the way 8 those words have been given meaning by this Court. 9 If you're charged with possession, the 10 government must show that you possessed the firearm in 11 furtherance of. Now, the -- the "in furtherance of" and 12 the "in relation to" prong have been given similar 13 meanings by the courts, although generally it's thought 14 that the "in furtherance of," like I say, is a sort of 15 beefed up "in relation to" requirement because --16 JUSTICE BREYER: "Carries," what about 17 "carries"? If a person is carrying the gun in his 18 pocket but he doesn't know it, which could happen, does 19 that fall within "carries" or not? 20 MS. MAYNARD: He would be carrying, Justice 21 Breyer. 22 JUSTICE BREYER: So is he guilty of the first; do we know? 23 MS. MAYNARD: He would be carrying -- if I 24 25 understood you, he would be carrying. And if he was

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1	also committing a crime, he would be carrying if he
2	was also committing a crime of violence, he would be
3	carrying it during the crime of violence. But under
4	this Court's decision in Smith, if it were
5	JUSTICE BREYER: The carrying has to be
6	although the statute doesn't say it, Smith says the
7	carrying has to be in relation to the crime.
8	MS. MAYNARD: The statute does say that
9	carrying has to be in relation to
10	JUSTICE BREYER: I thought it just said "who
11	in furtherance of any such crime possesses a firearm."
12	MS. MAYNARD: I am sorry. I thought you
13	were asking me a "carry" hypothetical. If you are
14	asking me a "possession" hypothetical
15	JUSTICE BREYER: No, it's a "carrying." My
16	my interest is the whoever, blah, blah, blah, for
17	which the person may be prosecuted uses or carries a
18	firearm, or who in furtherance of any such crime
19	possesses a firearm. So I thought that the "in
20	furtherance" does not modify "carry".
21	MS. MAYNARD: It doesn't.
22	JUSTICE BREYER: Okay.
23	MS. MAYNARD: You are right. Okay. I am
24	sorry. I answered
25	JUSTICE BREYER: So, you know, what happens

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1	if the person has the firearm he is carrying the
2	firearm in his pocket and doesn't know it? He picked it
3	up from the tailor, and now is is there an intent
4	requirement there? Do we know? Did Smith talk about
5	that? Do we know? I mean is there, you know, a state
6	of mind requirement?
7	MS. MAYNARD: It's hard to see how one could
8	meet this Court's definition in Smith for for "in
9	relation to," which was to have
10	JUSTICE BREYER: Smith says "in relation to"
11	and so the carrying has to be in relation to. And since
12	the carrying has to be in relation to, that pretty much
13	
14	MS. MAYNARD: The underlying
15	JUSTICE BREYER: covers the state of
16	mind.
17	MS. MAYNARD: The carrying had to be in
18	relation to the underlying drug crime or crime of
19	violence. This Court gave content to "in relation to"
20	in Smith to mean have some purpose or effect, facilitate
21	or further the underlying crime, not be by accident or
22	coincidence.
23	
	The gist of Petitioner's argument here is
24	The gist of Petitioner's argument here is they want to read that "accident or coincidence"
24 25	

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1	that that just doesn't work. And if if I can make
2	one more point about why it's clear it isn't that, which
3	is that the the "in possession in furtherance of
4	requirement" I mean one of the things they say in
5	response to our argument is that we are willing to put a
6	temporal limitation on the sentencing factors, but not
7	an "in relation to"
8	JUSTICE STEVENS: May I just make sure I
9	understand your position? "During and in relation to"
10	modifies the first words it follows. "In furtherance
11	to" modifies "possession." Now, do either "in relation
12	to" or "in furtherance" to it modify the three
13	subsequent subparagraphs?
14	MS. MAYNARD: Definitely not, no.
15	JUSTICE STEVENS: So neither of them
16	applies. So it doesn't have to be "in furtherance of"
17	or "in relation to"?
18	MS. MAYNARD: The the sentencing factors
19	are set out separately. And you don't get to them
20	JUSTICE STEVENS: None of the sentencing
21	factors require that that factor be in either in
22	relation to the crime or in furtherance of the crime?
23	It could be just walking down the street, you happen to
24	have a gun?
25	MS. MAYNARD: Well, you have to be guilty of

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1 the principal offense, Justice Stevens, before you get 2 to sentencing factors. So you have to have either --3 JUSTICE STEVENS: Sentencing factors need 4 not be in relation to the crime nor in furtherance of 5 the crime. 6 MS. MAYNARD: Right. The definitive --7 JUSTICE SCALIA: It has to be during the 8 crime. MS. MAYNARD: It has to be during and -- but 9 10 there -- but it's not because the word "during" appears 11 in the principal offense, which is how they would have 12 our argument be. The -- the -- it has to -- the 13 sentencing factor has to occur. First you have to 14 commit the principal -- let me just back up. You have 15 to commit the principal offense. 16 JUSTICE STEVENS: Why does it have to be 17 "during"? It -- it doesn't in the statute? 18 MS. MAYNARD: It has to be "during" for 19 three reasons. One, the -- the language of the sentencing factor says if the firearm is discharged. 20 21 It's in the present tense. So the present tense of the 22 "is discharged" language -- it has to be while you're 23 using, carrying -- "uses, carries, or possesses" is also 24 in the act.

The "is discharged" has to happen while

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you're using, carrying, or possessing. That takes out hypotheticals about, well, it was discharged at the factory before I got it, and law enforcement discharged it well after they took it from me to test the ballistics on it. Those aren't covered because it's not "is discharged" while you're using, carrying or possessing.

8 Secondly, this Court in Harris recognized 9 that these are the types of sentencing factors that one 10 considers when deciding whether a certain fact is present in the manner in which an offense is committed. 11 12 So the fact has to be present in the commission of the 13 offense. That's just the way this type of sentencing 14 factor operates, and the courts so interpreted these 15 particular sentencing factors in Harris.

16 And we know that it's not because of the 17 "during" in the principal paragraph, Justice Stevens, 18 because there is no "during" element to the "possession" 19 prong. Nevertheless, the sentencing factors apply to 20 that prong, and we would apply temporal in cases that --21 JUSTICE STEVENS: There is an "in furtherance." There is an "in furtherance of the 22 crime." 23 24 MS. MAYNARD: Yes, Your Honor, and if you

25 possess a firearm --

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1	JUSTICE STEVENS: I want to make sure I
2	understand. You are saying it need not be "during" or
3	you said it has to be "during" but not because the
4	statute includes the word "during."
5	MS. MAYNARD: Yes.
б	JUSTICE STEVENS: Well, what does where
7	does the "during" come from then?
8	MS. MAYNARD: The "during" comes from the
9	fact that the sentencing factor is in the present tense,
10	and says "is discharged." That means that the "is
11	discharged" must occur while the offense is is
12	occurring. So the temporal limitation comes from, and
13	is from, the nature of these types of sentencing
14	factors, which ask: Is this factor present? That's
15	what Congress cared about.
16	JUSTICE SCALIA: And you say it can't come
17	from the prologue, because if it came from the prologue,
18	it wouldn't apply to the mere possession.
19	MS. MAYNARD: Exactly.
20	JUSTICE SCALIA: And the possession could be
21	at any time, before the crime, after the crime,
22	whatever.
23	MS. MAYNARD: Possession it would just
24	have to be possession that was in furtherance of an
25	underlying crime. Once you're guilty of that, if the

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1 firearm was discharged while you were guilty of that --2 JUSTICE SCALIA: So you have to import some 3 -- some contemporaneous -- contemporaneous requirement 4 into the 1, 2, and 3. 5 MS. MAYNARD: Some temporal limitation, and the limitation is what -- is that it must be discharged б 7 while you're committing the offense for which you're 8 being sentenced when we're looking at sentencing factors, which is set forth in 924(c). 9 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: What if it's committed when 11 the guy is trying to escape, and the gun goes off 12 accidentally? Is that in -- I mean is that during the 13 crime? 14 MS. MAYNARD: Again, it would turn on -- on -- it wouldn't turn on whether accidental or intentional 15 discharge, Justice Stevens. That would present a 16 17 difficult hypothetical about whether or not the 924(c)18 _ _ 19 JUSTICE SCALIA: Two hours later when he got home -- he carried the gun in -- IN furtherance of the 20 21 crime. He still had it with him all the way through, 22 and the gun went off after he left the bank. 23 MS. MAYNARD: If -- if it were determined that the -- the 924(c) offense, which is the possession 24 25 in furtherance of crime, were still going on at that

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point -- in other words he was still possessing it in furtherance of the underlying crime of violence, and it discharges -- then, yes, the sentencing factor, by its plain terms, applies.

5 JUSTICE STEVENS: Then you're telling me that it need not be during as long as it's in б 7 furtherance of. So the "in furtherance of" is also 8 incorporated implicitly in the sentencing factors. MS. MAYNARD: Well, the -- no, the "in 9 10 furtherance of," it -- the inquiry we would be making at 11 sentencing, Justice Stevens, is not was the discharge in furtherance of. You would -- you would -- all you would 12 13 be asking is, were you still possessing the firearm in 14 furtherance --

JUSTICE STEVENS: This must be during? MS. MAYNARD: The discharge must be temporally related to the principal offense, yes, because the discharge is discharged while you're in the course of the principal offense, that's the way these types of sentencing factors --

JUSTICE BREYER: I think I got everybody mixed up, because the first sentence of the statute is on the preceding page. And if I start at the beginning, I would discover -- of my memo -- if -- it says, if -in -- who -- any person who during and in relation --

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1 during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug 2 trafficking crime, blah, blah, blah, of a certain kind uses or carries a firearm. 3 4 MS. MAYNARD: Right. 5 JUSTICE BREYER: So there it is right there, or who in furtherance of such a crime possesses shall be 6 7 sentenced. Okay. So we've got the during and in 8 relation to covering the whole bunch. Then we have to read that into little (ii) and little (iii). 9 10 MS. MAYNARD: No, Your Honor. I mean, just 11 to make sure I understand what you're say. The "during and in relation to" only modifies the verb "uses or 12 13 carries"? 14 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes, exactly. MS. MAYNARD: Okay. 15 16 JUSTICE BREYER: Then we have to read that 17 by implication where it says if the firearm is 18 brandished during or -- you have to imply that. 19 MS. MAYNARD: That's their argument. 20 JUSTICE BREYER: Yeah, that's not your 21 argument? 22 MS. MAYNARD: No, Your Honor. 23 (Laughter.) 24 JUSTICE BREYER: Forget it. 25 (Laughter.)

1	JUSTICE SCALIA: It's not your argument
2	because if that was the only if that was the source
3	of the contemporaneous requirement, there would be no
4	contemporaneous requirement for the in furtherance?
5	MS. MAYNARD: That's right. And also
6	JUSTICE SCALIA: The provision the in
7	furtherance provision.
8	MS. MAYNARD: The reason we don't believe
9	that's the correct reading is because, as this Court
10	indicated in Harris, the principal offense the
11	principal paragraph sets forth the complete crime, and
12	it ends with "shall." So once you do the things in the
13	principals for crime, you're guilty. And then the only
14	question is, what shall your sentence be?
15	JUSTICE SCALIA: And, of course, some of
16	these difficult hypotheticals such as the one that
17	Justice Stevens put about the gun going off while the
18	while the individual is escaping, that's going to be a
19	problem whether you adopt your interpretation or the
20	or the petitioner's interpretation, even if you assume
21	that it has to be during and in relation to it's still
22	going to be a problem. Is this is this during and in

23 relation to the crime.

MS. MAYNARD: Well, just to -JUSTICE SCALIA: If it occurs, you know,

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1 five hours later while he's escaping, I don't know. 2 MS. MAYNARD: Just to be clear about --3 JUSTICE SCALIA: You don't have to decide 4 that. 5 MS. MAYNARD: It wouldn't have anything to do with whether it intentionally goes off, Justice б 7 Stevens. Your hypothetical could still raise a 8 question --9 JUSTICE STEVENS: The strange thing about 10 this case is we're talking about a category of crimes in 11 which somebody person mistakenly fires the gun, that 12 doesn't happen very often. The whole -- the whole 13 dispute is about really a trivial set of crimes. 14 MS. MAYNARD: Well, I think it's important 15 to recognize, though, that Congress didn't want to open 16 the door to claims that -- that the firearm was 17 discharged accidentally. 18 JUSTICE STEVENS: Sure, when the 19 defendant -- and says I didn't really mean to shoot the 20 quy? 21 MS. MAYNARD: Right. I mean, the -- the 22 fact of a discharge is what Congress is clearly 23 concerned about, and you can tell that from the text. 24 What it did want to say is that in the indictment here 25 he was actually charged with uses, carries, and

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1	possesses. The indictment is not perfectly worded. It
2	only has the "during and in relation to," and it but
3	the the instructions were proper and there were no
4	the jury instructions in trial were proper and there
5	were no objection to the instructions, but I did want to
б	correct one point about that.
7	And if there are no further questions
8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
9	Four minutes, Mr. Forster.
10	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF SCOTT J. FORSTER
11	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
12	MR. FORSTER: This Court in U.S. Gypsum was
13	very clear when it said that far more than the simple
14	omission of the appropriate phrase of a statutory
15	definition is necessary to justify dispensing with the
16	intent requirement.
17	And our argument is simply this, merely
18	because this might be a sentencing enhancement rather
19	than an element of the offense, this Court never says
20	that the normal rules of statutory construction cease to
21	apply under those circumstances, which means that the
22	mens rea presumption is appropriate in this case, and
23	just like this Court said in the passage I just cited.
24	If Congress wants to dispense with that
25	requirement, they must do so clearly, and they simply

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1 did not do that in this case. If they wanted to do 2 that, they could insert the words "intentionally" or 3 "unintentionally discharge," in which case that would be 4 clear. And that simply is not the way this statute 5 reads. 6 The best reading of the statute, I believe, 7 and this is what Your Honor was headed toward, is to read the discharge to require during and in relation to. 8 9 I just think that's the best --10 JUSTICE BREYER: Is that helping? I mean, 11 this did take place during, and you would have thought when something goes off accidentally it's in relation 12 13 I mean, you know, I can imagine an argument to the to. 14 contrary, but it isn't obvious. It just is --MR. FORSTER: But, Your Honor --15 16 JUSTICE BREYER: They have during, in 17 relation to and in furtherance of, so their in 18 furtherance of doesn't carry over. The first two do. 19 An accidental discharge is it not in relation to the 20 crime? MR. FORSTER: Not under this Court's 21 22 authority in Smith. I think Smith is clear, the purpose 23 and effect and not be used by accident. 24 JUSTICE STEVENS: What was the case you 25 cited when you started your rebuttal?

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1	MR. FORSTER: U.S. Gypsum.
2	JUSTICE STEVENS: Is that the antitrust
3	case? You caught me by surprise.
4	MR. FORSTER: I believe it is. I believe it
5	is, Your Honor.
6	Mr. Chief Justice, if there are no other
7	questions, I thank the Court.
8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel,
9	the case is submitted.
10	(Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the case in the
11	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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