1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - x POLAR TANKERS, INC., : 3 4 Petitioner : 5 : No. 08-310 v. CITY OF VALDEZ, ALASKA. 6 : 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 8 Washington, D.C. 9 Wednesday, April 1, 2009 10 11 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 12 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 13 at 10:18 a.m. 14 APPEARANCES: CHARLES A. ROTHFELD, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf 15 16 of the Petitioner. 17 THEODORE B. OLSON, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf 18 of the Respondent. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (10:18 a.m.) CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear 3 4 argument this morning in Case 08-310, Polar Tankers v. 5 City of Valdez. Mr. Rothfeld. 6 ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES A. ROTHFELD 7 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 8 MR. ROTHFELD: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice 9 10 and may it please the Court: The Valdez vessel tax violates the 11 12 Constitution's Tonnage Clause because it operates as a 13 charge on a privilege of trading in the port of Valdez, 14 and that tax is apportioned in a way that is guaranteed to tax extraterritorial values and values that do not 15 have a connection to the city. That violates the Due 16 17 Process and Commerce Clauses. JUSTICE KENNEDY: It's not often that we 18 19 have disagreements as to the basic facts. The red brief 20 says that the tax in question constitutes 11 percent of 21 the tax base, and you talk about that in the reply 22 brief. Can you spend just a little bit of time at the 23 outset telling us your views of this tax? And although 24 it's the Respondent's statement and not yours, do you 25 think 11 percent of the tax base means 11 percent of

what's collected under this tax or under all taxes
 imposed by City of Valdez?

3 MR. ROTHFELD: Well, I think that it means 4 all taxes that are imposed not only by the City of 5 Valdez, but they are including taxes imposed by the 6 State of Alaska that are collected by the City of 7 Valdez. The --

3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: In which case, that seems9 really quite irrelevant.

10 MR. ROTHFELD: That is our position. We 11 think that's absolutely right. I think it is useful to focus on the nature of this tax. It is a tax that is 12 13 directed exclusively at vessels and not on all vessels. 14 It's -- by exempting small boats and all boats that are 15 engaged in commercial fishing and all boats that dock 16 exclusively at city-owned harbors. This is a tax, a 17 property -- it's calls a property tax, but it's a tax 18 that falls only on vessels and is directed at those 19 vessels, that --

JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, some -- some of those vessels, I take it, are taxed under other statutes. Is that correct?

23 MR. ROTHFELD: I think -- I think not. I 24 think that -- so far as Valdez is concerned, the vessels 25 we are talking about are subject simply to this property

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1 tax.

2 JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, do you -- do you take 3 the position -- let's say that if the State of Alaska 4 taxed all the other property you had mentioned except 5 for the tankers and the city taxed the tankers, that that would by definition be discriminatory tax and/or on б 7 some other basis violate the Tonnage Clause? 8 MR. ROTHFELD: Well, that -- that would be quite a different situation than what we have here. 9 10 Here, the city --JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, the reason I raised 11 12 it was that -- in -- in your response to my first 13 question, you said, well, you didn't think the city was 14 taxing these other -- these other pieces of property, 15 and I'm -- I'm not sure why that is significant. MR. ROTHFELD: Well, there are -- there's a 16 17 huge universe of personal property that could be taxed 18 in the City of Valdez. Valdez has the authority to tax 19 all of this property except for a discrete category of oil and gas property that is subject to taxation by the 20 21 State. So Valdez can tax all the ordinary kinds of personal property -- movable property, personalty --22 23 that any jurisdiction can tax. They can tax cars and 24 trucks and moving vans and refrigerators and jewelry. 25 Of all those innumerable things that they could tax,

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1	they have chosen to tax a single item. They have chosen
2	to tax vessels and, as I said, not all vessels.
3	JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes, but you you want us
4	to ignore the the State tax. Do you really want us
5	to do that? I mean, it would be the easiest thing in
6	the world for the State of Alaska, instead of imposing
7	it at the State level, to authorize the municipality to
8	do it. I don't want this case to come back here for a
9	second time.
10	MR. ROTHFELD: But
11	JUSTICE SCALIA: Now now that the
12	municipality is imposing the taxes that the State used
13	to impose, don't you think you have to count both of
14	them?
15	MR. ROTHFELD: I I don't think so. The
16	State of Alaska treats oil and gas property as
17	JUSTICE SCALIA: You are going to get a
18	fragile judgment if if we go on those grounds. All
19	it takes is a modification of the of the legislation.
20	MR. ROTHFELD: Not so, Your Honor, because
21	State of Alaska takes very seriously it's stewardship of
22	oil and gas property. That is something of tremendous
23	fiscal importance to the State of Alaska. I think that
24	there is little practical risk that the State is going
25	to assign the right to tax that property.

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1 JUSTICE SOUTER: How about the risk in the 2 other direction, that the State will simply take over 3 this tax and remit the proceeds to the city? Would the 4 result on your view be the same if it did that? 5 MR. ROTHFELD: The result in my view would be the same, but that would be a different and more б 7 difficult case. Here, focus on what Valdez is doing: 8 It is -- it has the authority, as I said, to tax the 9 universe of personalty in the City of Valdez. It has 10 chosen to tax only particular types of vessels that are 11 used in the export of oil. Imagine, though --12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: There are other vessels, It's the -- it's the oil tankers, and there are a 13 too. 14 few other vessels that were included? JUSTICE SCALIA: Including a -- a cruise 15 16 ship is covered. I --17 MR. ROTHFELD: There is -- there is one 18 cruise ship, Your Honor, that was caught up in the net 19 in the first year the tax was imposed. Otherwise the 20 tax falls exclusively on what vessels that are involved 21 in the export of oil -- principally tankers, also service vessels. 22 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why does that -- why does that matter? I mean, do you concede that if this 24 25 tax were in some sense nondiscriminatory, you would

7

1 lose?

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2 MR. ROTHFELD: No, I think that --3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why are we having 4 all this talk about -- in other words, you think if 5 there was a tonnage tax applicable to everything -- you know, your pickup truck holds two tons; it has got to б 7 pay a certain amount or whatever. Then do you lose or 8 win? MR. ROTHFELD: If a -- if a tonnage tax --9 10 look at what the tonnage tax was initially designed to 11 do. The Framers chose the term "duty of tonnage" because at the time -- the time this clause was it was 12 13 written in the late 18th century, tonnage was the 14 ordinary way of valuing the value of a ship and the 15 ordinary way of imposing tax on a ship. 16 If -- if the City of Valdez were to impose a 17 property tax measured by tonnage on everything -- on 18 vans and trucks and refrigerators and ships -- that 19 would be a difficult case for us. But, obviously, it hasn't done that. It has not imposed a tonnage tax or 20

21 and it has not imposed a property tax on any other type22 of property except particular types of vessels.

I think you apply the duck test: It lookslike a duck --

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I think you're --

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1	MR. ROTHFELD: it quacks like a duck
2	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes. I think you're
3	giving up an awful lot. I mean, what if the Framers
4	couldn't they be have been more concerned about making
5	sure that there is a free flow of commerce, that ships
б	go, and the fact that everything is taxed would be less
7	of a concern to them? But you're you're willing to
8	say that if it's nondiscriminatory, even if you would
9	call it a "tonnage tax," you lose?
10	MR. ROTHFELD: Well, I I was using a
11	response to the previous question, and actually they
12	were imposing a property tax and they were measuring it
13	in an unusual sort of way. And the Court has said that
14	if there's a generally applicable property tax which
15	happens to fall on vessels, the reality of that tax is
16	that it is a tax on property and not a tax on vessels.
17	But here we have quite the opposite. Here
18	we have tax that falls only on vessels as cargo
19	vessels. And you're quite right: The Framers were
20	concerned with the free movement of commerce. The
21	Tonnage Clause was designed to close the loophole that
22	was thought to be left by the Import-Export Clause,
23	which bars the taxation of imports and exports. Taxing
24	vessels would be a way of circumventing that.
25	JUSTICE SOUTER: Let's let's assume that

1 you're -- that a given tanker came into the harbor at 2 Valdez on one occasion and one occasion only. Would the 3 City of Valdez, under its own statutes, by the terms of 4 its own ordinance, tax that ship? 5 MR. ROTHFELD: It would, indeed, because the city in its code creating the tax conclusively presumed б 7 that a vessel was subject to the tax so long as it takes on cargo worth a million dollars over the course of a 8 9 year. Oil tankers --10 JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, let me -- let me just 11 change the question then. If -- if it came in and sort of took half a tankful that didn't reach the point of a 12 13 million dollars' value, there would be no tax then. Is 14 that correct? MR. ROTHFELD: Well, it would have to take a 15 16 lot less than half a tankful. I think --17 JUSTICE SOUTER: Whatever it would take to 18 get it under the minimum. 19 MR. ROTHFELD: Yes. If -- if it were not -if it visited the port of Valdez once and took on less 20 21 than a million dollars and never came back to the port of Valdez --2.2 23 JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay. Under the old 24 tonnage laws, wouldn't that ship in the 18th century 25 have been taxed?

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1	MR. ROTHFELD: I think that they
2	jurisdictions impose all kinds of different variations
3	of tonnage duties. And as the Court
4	JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, the the point that
5	I am getting to is and I'd I'd like you to address
б	this one of the arguments on the other side is that
7	one reason this should not be treated as a tonnage tax
8	is that it relies upon the concept of a tax situs. And
9	the the implication is that not every ship that comes
10	into the harbor is going to be subject to the tax;
11	whereas, under the old tonnage laws, any ship that came
12	in would be. And what is what is your response to
13	that argument?
14	MR. ROTHFELD: Well, two responses. First,
15	I think it is not the case that under the old tonnage
16	laws necessarily every ship was subject to tax. Ships
17	could be subject depending upon how how large they
18	were, and some ships could be exempted. So I think it's
19	not implicit in in the nature of a tonnage duty that
20	it applies to every ship that that enters the harbor.
21	JUSTICE SOUTER: Where do we where do we
22	look to find this out?
23	MR. ROTHFELD: One would have to look at the
24	practice in the 18th and 19th centuries. And some of
25	the Court's decisions

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JUSTICE SOUTER: Do you know of any source that we could look at to support the proposition that you just made?

4 MR. ROTHFELD: I -- I can't point you to any 5 authority directly addressing the point, but I can point you to the general treatment of what a tonnage duty is. б 7 I mean, it's a duty which is imposed on vessels on the 8 basis of tonnage. It -- it does not have to be imposed on every vessel that enters the harbor. But I think 9 10 probably the more important response to your question is 11 the reality of this tax.

Valdez knew what it was doing. It wanted to target -- it was commendably candid in saying what it was doing. It wanted to target the vessels that were engaged in the transport of oil. It knows how big oil tankers are. It knows that the tankers are always full. When they come in, they take a full load of oil. That's -- that is the whole point of --

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But you don't -- you 20 don't suggest that it matters, right? You -- you have 21 talked to some extent in the briefs about the bad --22 evil motive.

23 MR. ROTHFELD: No, I - 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But you are not
 25 going to suggest that the same tax could be valid or

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1 invalid depending on why it was enacted. MR. ROTHFELD: No, I -- I don't, but I --2 3 JUSTICE BREYER: May I ask one other 4 question before you leave this, which is where Justice 5 Kennedy started? Suppose a State says: In our State, we want to tax all oil and gas property, and here's how б 7 we do it. We assess the value of all oil and gas 8 property, ships and everything else included. Then we impose a tax of 20 mills per dollar of assessed value, 9 10 something like that, on all of it. Now, the State will collect all of it, and 11 12 we make one exception. We define which property the 13 State will directly get the money from, and then the 14 city can do the rest, if it wants. Now, here's what we 15 do with the State money. We give it to the city. So if 16 the city wants to, it can put the same tax on that 17 little bit of property left over, which is a subcategory 18 of oil and gas property. And by the way, the name of 19 that little bit of property left over is called "a 20 ship." 21 Now, is that a tonnage tax, and is that what Alaska has done here? 22 23 MR. ROTHFELD: If I understand the example, 24 that -- that might be a tonnage tax, depending upon the 25 _ _

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1	JUSTICE BREYER: I described to you the
2	entire tax. We know no more about it.
3	MR. ROTHFELD: Well, if if it's a tax on
4	oil and gas property, and that is the definition of the
5	tax and it happens to fall on vessels as part of the
6	JUSTICE BREYER: The way it does is just as
7	I said. And maybe I was it was too much for you to
8	take in. So the point is that it's a tax on oil and gas
9	property. That's Code section 1. Code section 2 is
10	defined subcategories (a), (b), (c), (d, (e), (f)
11	all of that. Code 3 says (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e).
12	The the State government collects and remits it to
13	the city. (G), the city can assess the same tax if it
14	wishes. It doesn't have to and keep the money. (G)
15	is ships.
16	And the reason I have asked that question is
17	I read something from a Alaska Department of Economic
18	and Community Development which suggested to me that
19	that is Alaska's tax. I might have that wrong. I just
20	read a sentence or two, and maybe I am wrong that that
21	is Alaska's tax, and
22	MR. ROTHFELD: Yes, and
23	JUSTICE BREYER: But if it's Alaska's tax
24	MR. ROTHFELD: That's
25	JUSTICE BREYER: what's wrong with it?

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1 It's a -- it's a tax on all oil and gas property, and 2 all they do is they let the city collect some of that if 3 they want, and they collect the rest of it and give it 4 to the city.

MR. ROTHFELD: Well, what's -- what's wrong 5 with what's going on here and -- and I think this is an б 7 answer to your question -- the City of Valdez has the 8 authority to tax an entire -- as I said, the entire universe of personalty. And -- and as -- as you 9 10 described it, the City of Valdez also can impose a tax, 11 although it doesn't have to, on -- on vessels. And the 12 city has chosen to single out vessels out of all the 13 types of property that it could tax, and it imposes a 14 tax on them called a property tax.

15 The reality of it is that it's a tax on 16 vessels.

17 JUSTICE BREYER: What I'd like to know is: 18 Do you think what I said was a misdescription? What's 19 worrying me about this aspect of this case is a possible 20 need to send it back to find out what Alaska's tax 21 system is. Now -- now, if what I just said is a -- is a 22 correct description approximately and if the other side 23 thinks it is, too, then at least I -- I know how to go 24 about deciding it. And if I don't, I don't know quite 25 what to do.

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1	MR. ROTHFELD: My my understanding of how
2	the tax system works is that this this is a State
3	level tax. Alaska determines what are subject to tax,
4	determines the items of property that are subject to
5	tax. It determines which of these vessels are subject
б	to to the Alaska tax. It then allows the City of
7	Valdez to collect the tax and to use the tax, but it is
8	a tax imposed by law by the State of Alaska.
9	Valdez has no discretion to tax things that
10	are not oil and gas property, that are not taxed by the
11	by subject to the tax at the State level by the
12	State.
13	JUSTICE KENNEDY: As you understand it, with
14	reference to the tax base referred to in the red brief
15	at page 14 where it says it's 11 percent of the tax
16	base, is that tax base all city-imposed?
17	MR. ROTHFELD: No. My my understanding
18	of what they are referring to is that this is Alaska
19	tax oil and gas property, including the Alaska oil
20	pipeline and the oil terminal in the City of Valdez,
21	which are enormously valuable pieces of property. So I
22	think that that we are sort of talking apples and
23	oranges here.
24	JUSTICE SCALIA: Was your answer to the
25	Chief Justice that if there is a tonnage tax imposed on

1 everything including -- including ships, it would still 2 violate the Tonnage Clause. Is that right? 3 MR. ROTHFELD: If it's a -- a literal duty 4 imposed on the -- the cubic capacity of the ship, it --5 it's difficult to see how that could really be imposed in terms -- on every other item of property. I suppose б 7 if the -- if the --8 JUSTICE SCALIA: It's my -- it's my 9 hypothetical. I made it up. 10 (Laughter.) MR. ROTHFELD: Well, if the city were --11 12 were to say that every transportation -- device of 13 transportation was going to be -- be taxed on the basis 14 of its cubic capacity, you know, vans and railroads --15 JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you think it would be 16 okay? 17 MR. ROTHFELD: I think that would be --18 JUSTICE SCALIA: It's only discrimination 19 that counts? 20 MR. ROTHFELD: Well, we focus on -- well, 21 no. I would say -- I would not say it's necessarily okay. That would be a different kind of situation than 22 23 we have here. Here we have the purest case of what's --24 of -- of a tax which is focused exclusively on vessels. JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, there's some --25

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1 there's some fight about that, obviously. There --2 there is no fight about the fact that this tax is based 3 upon how long the ship remains in port, right? MR. ROTHFELD: Well --4 5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: How many days. 6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right. How many days it 7 remains in port. 8 MR. ROTHFELD: Well, there are two of --9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Which means, the argument 10 could go that this is obviously a -- a tax for the use 11 of the port. And that's exactly what the Tonnage Clause was directed against, preventing Philadelphia and New 12 13 York from taxing the consumers in New Jersey by imposing 14 taxes on ships that bring in goods. 15 MR. ROTHFELD: I -- I agree entirely with 16 that. The -- the effect of this tax is to tax 17 essentially the charge for trading in the Port of 18 Valdez, and that is exactly what the Framers --19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And you don't dispute 20 that in light of the benefits provided by Valdez to the 21 shipowners, that they could be a legitimate tax on these 22 vessels? 23 MR. ROTHFELD: That is -- that is absolutely 24 right. There -- there --25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So could you describe

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1	what tax authority you think Valdez has?
2	MR. ROTHFELD: There are two ways that
3	Valdez could go about taxing these vessels. It could
4	impose a user fee, and the Court has recognized in its
5	Tonnage Clause decisions that even a a tax on cubic
б	capacity, a tax on weight, would be fine if that is a
7	user fee which is designed to provide pay for
8	services that are provided specifically to vessels
9	roughly equivalent to the value of the services
10	provided. So that is one way Valdez could do it.
11	A second way they could do it is to impose a
12	nondiscriminatory property tax. If they imposed a tax
13	on the citizenry of Valdez affecting some broad array of
14	personal property, that would impose the kind of
15	political constraints that would discourage, you know,
16	abusive export of the city's tax burden, which is just
17	what the Framers
18	JUSTICE GINSBURG: How much property you
19	said if they if they taxed all moveables, that would
20	be okay. Could they have some exemptions and still
21	MR. ROTHFELD: It it may I I
22	suppose the test would be if it's predominantly focused
23	on vessels, that would be unconstitutional. This case
24	doesn't provide an opportunity to to explore exactly
25	how far that goes because this is, as I say, the purest

1 case of a tax, property tax, all the property tax, which 2 applies only to vessels. 3 JUSTICE SCALIA: But you don't think a daily 4 -- a daily charge on vessels for remaining in port 5 violates the Tonnage Clause? 6 MR. ROTHFELD: It would violate the Tonnage 7 Clause. 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is this anything else than 9 that? 10 MR. ROTHFELD: I -- I agree with you, 11 Justice Scalia, that however ports, States, or cities go 12 about trying to impose a tax on vessels for the -- I'm 13 calling it the privilege of trading in the port, as 14 distinct from the user fee I discussed with 15 Justice Ginsburg, that would be an unconstitutional 16 tonnage duty. That's what the Court has said --17 JUSTICE SOUTER: What about a --18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I was going to say, 19 even if it's a flat fee? 20 MR. ROTHFELD: According --21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Every vessel has to 22 pay, you know, \$1,000. MR. ROTHFELD: The Court has so held on 23 several occasions that a flat fee violates the Tonnage 24 25 Clause.

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1	JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Rothfeld, can I ask
2	you a question, just focusing on the Tonnage Clause, not
3	the elements of discrimination? If you assume that the
4	Tonnage Clause was designed to protect New Jersey from
5	being exploited by New York and perhaps other States
б	because they don't have their own ports, why does that
7	rationale have any application to this case, because the
8	only State ships oil out of Alaska is Alaska? So there
9	is no other State like New Jersey who could be harmed by
10	the Tonnage Clause.
11	MR. ROTHFELD: Well, if the recipients of
12	the property are Valdez is taking it this is
13	really
14	JUSTICE STEVENS: What State is being
15	discriminated against in the scenario we have before us
16	today?
17	MR. ROTHFELD: All of the States that are
18	using the oil shipped through Valdez are paying
19	ultimately paying this tax. I mean, this is what the
20	Framers were concerned about. The the danger that
21	JUSTICE STEVENS: But you are saying it's an
22	unduly onerous burden on the oil companies and their
23	tankers, and they only ship oil out of Alaska.
24	MR. ROTHFELD: Well, the concern that the
25	Framers had in putting the Tonnage Clause in the

1	Constitution, as with the Import-Export Clause, was that
2	States with favorable port facilities were going to be
3	imposing burdens by taking advantage of their favorable
4	geography to impose burdens that are going to be felt by
5	the other States. That is exactly what Valdez has done.
6	JUSTICE SCALIA: Not felt by the other
7	States, felt by the consumers in other States.
8	Ultimately, it's not going to be the oil companies that
9	pay this tax; it's going to be purchasers of oil.
10	MR. ROTHFELD: That that's right.
11	JUSTICE SCALIA: All of whom are going to be
12	outside of Alaska, since this oil is leaving Alaska,
13	right?
14	MR. ROTHFELD: That that is exactly
15	right.
16	JUSTICE SCALIA: It's a neat tax, you know,
17	get somebody else to pay your taxes.
18	MR. ROTHFELD: That that is precisely
19	right, and that's just what the Framers were concerned
20	with, the Tonnage Clause in the Constitution.
21	If if I may, I will move to the
22	apportionment issue in the case. I don't want I
23	don't want to to leave behind the Court had
24	questioned on the Tonnage Clause.
25	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but just on

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1	a maybe this doesn't matter. I have seen the
2	capacity of cargo planes described in terms of tonnage.
3	Does this clause apply to those?
4	MR. ROTHFELD: That that is an
5	interesting question. It it was written to apply to
б	ships simply because in the late 18th century, the only
7	way of moving substantial amounts of cargo was by was
8	by vessel. And I imagine that if the Framers had in
9	mind airplanes and railroads
10	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It is that we have
11	an evolving Constitution, after all.
12	MR. ROTHFELD: I will leave that one alone,
13	Your Honor.
14	(Laughter.)
15	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, then, do you
16	know it's not an entirely frivolous point. I mean,
17	do you know if States, localities where airports are
18	located charge things that might be viewed as Tonnage
19	Clauses on airplanes?
20	MR. ROTHFELD: I don't know a definitive
21	answer to that. Generally speaking, airplanes and other
22	types of property are are subjected to property taxes
23	on the value, and not on capacity. Although, as I said,
24	the Framers, I don't think, cared about capacity as

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1	imposed upon vessels that were going to be passed
2	through, as Justice Scalia said, to the ultimate
3	purchasers or sellers of the imports and exports that
4	were that were in the vessel.
5	JUSTICE SOUTER: I thought you said earlier
6	or implied earlier that we couldn't draw a distinction,
7	really, between capacity and value because tonnage in
8	the 18th century was simply a proxy for the for the
9	value of the ship?
10	MR. ROTHFELD: That that's right. And I
11	don't I hope I didn't
12	JUSTICE SOUTER: So a value tax is going to
13	run into the same problem
14	MR. ROTHFELD: That's right.
15	JUSTICE SOUTER: as a tonnage tax.
16	MR. ROTHFELD: That's right. And as for the
17	Chief Justice's question, application to moving vans or
18	cargo planes, the Court did not consider that because
19	this is the purest case. It is within the plain terms
20	of the Tonnage Clause, the historical application of the
21	Tonnage Clause. It's the clear intent of the Framers in
22	writing the Tonnage Clause.
23	JUSTICE ALITO: If the amount of the tax
24	were measured by the number of sailors who were going to
25	come ashore and the number of days they would be ashore,

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and a small port city wanted to recover the costs that they impose on municipal services, would that be -would that be subject to the same flaw that you see here?

5 MR. ROTHFELD: It -- it would, although it might be possible for the city to impose some type of б 7 user fee calibrated in that direction. The Court's cases refer to -- the tonnage principle applies to the 8 9 number of passengers that the ship may carry or the 10 number of crew members on the ship. If -- if it's not a 11 proxy for particular expenses that are imposed on the 12 jurisdiction, as this concededly is not, that was not 13 what the -- Valdez intent in passing this tax, then it 14 would be problematic under the Tonnage Clause.

But I say again we have here the clearest, easiest case under the Tonnage Clause. It's a -- it is a tax that is designed exclusively of vessels that trade in the harbor.

On the apportionment question -- and I don't want to give short shrift to that, because the Valdez tax is apportioned in a way that is guaranteed to impose a tax on values that are not present in the jurisdiction -- Polar's tankers spend only a small part of the year in Valdez. They spend the rest of the time on the high seas or in other ports either unloading oil

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or in dry dock. And, therefore, everybody agrees the
 tax has to be apportioned.

3 The ordinary way and the way that this Court 4 has approved the apportionment of a tax on physical 5 property -- physical property is straightforward. You would put in the numerator of the tax the number of days б 7 with the number of miles they spent in or number of 8 miles traveled in the taxing jurisdiction; you put in the denominator 365, the total number of miles traveled 9 10 everywhere. You multiply that fraction times the value 11 of the property. And so, for example, if I have a 12 13 transcontinental passenger train moving from New York to 14 California that spends 20 percent of its time in 15 New York, New York could tax 20 percent of the value of 16 the train. 17 That is not how Valdez does it. 18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But that's -- the train 19 is going to be some place throughout its trip, unlike the ship that's going to be on the high seas. 20 21 MR. ROTHFELD: That's right. But the -- the 22 Valdez theory does not depend upon the taxation, the 23 taxability of a ship somewhere else. Valdez is simply saying that we are entitled to tax, you know, not on the 24 25 basis of physical presence in this jurisdiction at all.

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1	We are entitled to tax on some concept of where
2	productive commercial activity takes place.
3	And so it does not apportion on the basis of
4	amount of time spent in the jurisdiction over the course
5	of the year, which is the approach that the Court
б	ordinarily has used. The Valdez approach is precisely
7	the equivalent of New York saying, in my
8	transcontinental train example, we are going to take
9	into account only time spent in New York and Los Angeles
10	loading and unloading passengers, and we are going to
11	discount all of the rest of the year, all the rest of
12	the time that the train has spent moving the passengers
13	from place to place.
14	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Who can tax for the time
15	on the high seas?
16	MR. ROTHFELD: This Court has held in the
17	Central Railroad case that the taxing authority goes to
18	the domicile. That for time
19	JUSTICE GINSBURG: And the domicile here is
20	Texas. Is that right?
21	MR. ROTHFELD: The commercial domicile is
22	Texas. The corporation is incorporated in Delaware.
23	JUSTICE GINSBURG: In either case, no ships
24	berth in either Delaware or Texas. Is that right?
25	MR. ROTHFELD: These ships do not the

1 ships berth in Texas. The ship do not --2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So the home port might 3 have had in the old days the notion that's really where 4 the vessel is berthed. But, nowadays, Delaware has very 5 little to do with where the vessels are berthing and where they are being serviced? б 7 MR. ROTHFELD: If I may, Your Honor, I'll --8 I'll answer that question and sit down to reserve a little bit of time. You are right as to the physical 9 10 location of the ship, but the -- the jurisdiction, the 11 authority of a non-domicile to tax has always been 12 constrained by -- under the Due Process Clause -- by the 13 physical location of the property. 14 And so, the fact that the property may or 15 may not be subject to tax somewhere else does not give 16 Valdez additional authority to tax property that's not 17 present there. 18 Now, the Court has said that the domicile, 19 whether or not the property is present, is providing 20 benefits to the owner of the property, and it's those 21 benefits that justify the imposition of the tax for 22 periods when it is not in any tax situs subject to tax 23 by anybody else. 24 And if I may, Your Honor, I will reserve.

24 And II I may, Your Honor, I will reserve.
 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

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1	Mr. Olson.
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF THEODORE B. OLSON
3	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
4	MR. OLSON: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
5	please the Court:
6	In the Wheeling case, this Court said it is
7	too well settled to question the taxes upon vessels
8	based upon their value as property do not violate the
9	Tonnage Clause. In fact, no ad valorem property tax has
10	ever been held to violate the Tonnage Clause.
11	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, it says "vessels of
12	all kinds are liable to taxation as property in the same
13	manner as other personal property."
14	MR. OLSON: Yes, Justice Kennedy, precisely
15	in the same manner as other ad valorem property taxes.
16	Now let me answer the question that both you and Justice
17	Breyer particularly addressed, which was the oil and
18	and gas tax imposed with respect to much of the property
19	in Valdez. Valdez taxes homes, it taxes oil and gas
20	property, it taxes barges, it taxes cruises, it taxes
21	all sorts of things just like every other jurisdiction
22	does. The oil and gas tax that you ask about,
23	Justice Kennedy, and you did, too, Justice Breyer, is
24	imposed and there is no need to remand this case to
25	address this. It's in Section 43.56 of the Alaska Code.

1 The State of Alaska imposes an oil and gas tax on 2 property used in the oil and gas extraction, 3 transportation, et cetera, business, but it also 4 authorizes a city under Section 43.56 and 29.45 -- the 5 City of Valdez may impose that tax as well. It's two mils, it's just like every other tax that is imposed in б 7 Valdez. These are taxes imposed on the same basis. If the city imposes the tax, which the City of Valdez does, 8 then the tax by the State -- that tax paid to Valdez is 9 10 a direct credit, dollar for dollar credit, for the tax 11 that would otherwise have to go to the State. 12 So, in the first place, I think would it 13 make no difference as suggested by your question, 14 Justice Breyer, whether it was the State or the city 15 that imposed the tax. The constitutional provision 16 refers to states. States divide up their taxing 17 authorities in various different ways. The fact is that 18 the State of Alaska through the City of Valdez imposes a 19 tax on lots of different things. 20 This oil and gas tax that we are talking 21 about consists of 60 to 70 percent of the revenue base 22 of taxation for the City of Valdez. The -- the ship

tax, the tax on the -- that actually applies to vessels which include the tankers, include barges, include a cruise ship, includes just Alaska ships and -- and

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1 ships --2 JUSTICE SCALIA: Not fishing ships, right? 3 MR. OLSON: The fishing --4 JUSTICE SCALIA: None of -- none of Valdez's 5 fishermen have to pay this tax at all? 6 MR. OLSON: They don't have to pay this tax, 7 Justice Scalia, but they pay other taxes. There is tax 8 on -- on the weight of fish and there is tax on the value of fish and there's tax -- there's -- fees, they 9 10 use a different dock and they pay taxes there, to. 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But your answer it seems 12 to me does put the issue squarely before us in the terms 13 that the Petitioner has presented, that is to say, sure, 14 suppose you tax the vessel and you tax trailers and 15 small vessels and a lot of other things, but as to all 16 of the latter category, you have -- you have an 17 exemption. So the -- the only people that effectively 18 pay the tax are the tankers. 19 MR. OLSON: No. 20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And I thought that that 21 was the way the case was presented. 22 MR. OLSON: No. Well, that is not correct, 23 if I understood your -- your statement correctly. This oil and gas property, cranes, heavy equipment, fire 24 engines, motor vehicles, everything else, including the 25

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1 people's home in Valdez get taxed. 2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the people's homes 3 only if they are affixed to the property and they --4 MR. OLSON: No, that's with respect to 5 mobile homes. 6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes. 7 MR. OLSON: They are taxed as real property 8 when they are affixed in that way. JUSTICE SCALIA: And nonmobile homes are not 9 10 taxed as real property? 11 MR. OLSON: The tax -- cities may impose 12 taxes as real property or -- or personal property, 13 Justice Scalia. Some states will tax mobile homes. 14 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Now, the question is what 15 is imposed here? My understanding from the yellow 16 book -- do you agree the yellow brief is accurate in its 17 factual descriptions, perhaps not in its conclusions 18 that it draws? 19 MR. OLSON: No, Justice Kennedy. I have --20 I've given you --21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: See, we have a problem 22 with the facts here. But my understanding of the case, 23 and please correct me if I am wrong, is that sure, Valdez has tax authority and tax statutes which would 24 25 cover a considerable amount of personal property on an

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1 ad valorem basis. But because of exemptions, only the 2 tankers pay this tax. 3 MR. OLSON: The -- there are various taxes 4 imposed by Valdez on personal property and real 5 property. 6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Was my statement correct? 7 MR. OLSON: Your statement is correct only with respect to the ordinance that -- that eliminated 8 9 the exception. These big ships that impose enormous 10 burdens on the municipality, you can only imagine what three, four hundred --11 12 JUSTICE BREYER: That's a different 13 argument. Can we just get to --14 MR. OLSON: Yes, I know. But these ships 15 were exempt from taxation in Valdez until the year 1999 16 when that ordinance that you are referring to, 17 Justice Kennedy, was adopted. It eliminated --18 JUSTICE SCALIA: So was all other personal 19 property exempt from taxation, they didn't have a 20 personal property tax, right? 21 MR. OLSON: Except -- except, under the --22 to the extent that that personal property was covered by 23 the oil and gas tax, the provisions that I have referred to, Valdez had been imposing that tax. 24

JUSTICE SCALIA: That's nicely targeted as

25

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well. But there is no constitutional impediment to
 targeting the people of New Jersey through taxing the
 oil equipment.

4 MR. OLSON: If the Wheeling case is correct 5 and the other cases that have repeatedly said this, 6 there is no constitutional impediment for a city or a 7 state to impose a property tax on property being 8 used in --

JUSTICE GINSBURG: But Wheeling -- Wheeling 9 10 was, it was a general property tax. And as I read the 11 case, it said if you are going to tax property, you can 12 include vessels. This statute, and I think the Alaska 13 Supreme Court treated it discretely, is a tax on one 14 kind of property only, these vessels. I don't know of 15 any other property tax that is confined to just one type 16 of property. Is there another? Is there a comparable 17 tax that is focused on a single category of property? 18 MR. OLSON: There -- well, I -- I think what 19 my point here with respect to this, Justice Ginsburg, is 20 I don't know the answer specifically to that question, 21 but we are looking at what the bundle of taxes that a 22 community or a state imposes on property used that 23 imposes a burden on the community. Property is taxed 24 for the purpose, so that the property owner will bear

25 the burden of the governmental services that a city has

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to impose. It -- there is no constitutional provision that I am aware of that says that you have to have it all in one statute, collected -- and there is no discrimination --

JUSTICE SCALIA: But you can't -- you can't 5 make vessels bear the overall burden of municipal б 7 governance. You can make them bear the burden of the services provided to them in harbor. But you cannot 8 make them the instrument of funding all other municipal 9 10 services. That's what the Tonnage Clause means. 11 MR. OLSON: Well, I disagree in part with 12 what you said, with respect, Justice Scalia; these 13 shelves pay 11 percent -- vessels pay 11 percent of the

14 revenue base for the city; 11 percent. This is a city 15 of 4,500 people.

16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: How do you define revenue 17 base?

MR. OLSON: This is the amount of tax collected by the City of Valdez with respect to the ad valorem taxes in the city, including ships, mobile homes, cranes, barges, appliances, real property, and so forth.

JUSTICE SCALIA: You are counting the state tax as well, right?

25 MR. OLSON: Pardon me.

1	JUSTICE SCALIA: You are counting the state
2	tax on oil equipment?
3	MR. OLSON: I am I am saying to you that
4	the State imposes a tax but the State specifically
5	allows valid to impose that very tax.
6	JUSTICE BREYER: That makes matters worse.
7	MR. OLSON: Valdez imposes that tax as a
8	part of its total taxation package.
9	JUSTICE BREYER: Let's suppose I accept just
10	what Justice Ginsburg said, and said it's a hopeless
11	morass if we look at all taxes. Let's look at this tax.
12	This tax you call an ad valorem tax on personal
13	property levied by Valdez, and then on page 11 of your
14	brief you say that's not just on ships, it's also on
15	mobile homes, trailers, recreational vehicles, and
16	various types of personal property defined under State
17	law as oil and gas property, motor vehicle, machinery,
18	supplies and maintenance equipment.
19	They come back and they say, as to your
20	mobile homes, trailers and recreational vehicles, all
21	that's happening there is either you have exempted them
22	or they are fixed in place, and they are like real
23	property and that's what you are doing. As to the other
24	things, you do not impose a tax on those other things.
25	Rather, the State imposes a tax on those other things.

1	And it may be that you help the State do it by providing
2	them with the assessment, and it may be even that you
3	could do it, but you haven't; and therefore, the only
4	thing you have imposed this tax on are the ships.
5	Now I think I have that argument right. If
6	I do, what's the answer to it?
7	MR. OLSON: The answer is
8	JUSTICE BREYER: If I don't, what's the
9	right argument?
10	MR. OLSON: The answer is Section 43.56 that
11	allows the State statute may impose that tax you just
12	described. And it and section 29.
13	JUSTICE BREYER: May impose doesn't help if
14	you don't do it.
15	MR. OLSON: Yes, it does impose it, and
16	then, Justice Breyer
17	JUSTICE BREYER: State imposes it or
18	MR. OLSON: section 29.45.080 says I am
19	going to read it exactly; this seems to be an important
20	point. It doesn't seem to me that it ought to make any
21	difference from the Tonnage Clause standpoint whether
22	it's a tax imposed by the State or a subdivision of the
23	State, but this provision specifically says a
24	municipality may levy and collect taxes on taxable
25	property, taxable under AS 43. That's the one. The

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1 State does impose this tax but it also allows the city 2 to impose it. 3 This city does impose it. And when it is 4 paid, that is a credit against what might otherwise be 5 owed to the State. So the city does impose that tax, it does collect that tax, and that tax is not --6 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Wait a minute, owed to the State for what? What would be owed to the state? It's 8 still a State tax and they are the collection agent, and 9 10 it's a -- a credit against what they owe for their 11 collections, right? 12 MR. OLSON: A municipality may levy and 13 collect taxes on property under this section. The city 14 levies and collects those taxes. Now --15 JUSTICE SCALIA: What -- what's it a credit 16 against? I don't understand what it's a credit against. 17 MR. OLSON: The State also imposes the 18 liability. Any individual community in Alaska may 19 impose that tax itself. If it does -- Valdez does --20 then you don't have to pay it to the State, you pay it 21 to the city. So it's a city tax. Now --22 JUSTICE SCALIA: What does the city get a 23 credit against? 24 MR. OLSON: The --25 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- as referred to in the --

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1	MR. OLSON: The taxpayer, once he pays \$10
2	to the city under this tax, doesn't have to pay \$10 to
3	the State under this tax because he gets a credit for
4	JUSTICE SCALIA: Oh, I thought it was the
5	city that got the credit
б	MR. OLSON: No, it is the taxpayer that gets
7	the credit. The city levies the tax. The city collects
8	the tax. And then the taxpayer doesn't have to pay the
9	State.
10	JUSTICE BREYER: And that happens with all
11	these other properties? That is, in Valdez, you pay the
12	city you pay the city for the for the taxes on
13	that oil and gas property that isn't shipped?
14	MR. OLSON: Yes, Justice Breyer. And
15	JUSTICE BREYER: And you write the check to
16	the city.
17	MR. OLSON: What? Pardon?
18	JUSTICE BREYER: All the things you listed
19	on page 11
20	MR. OLSON: Yes.
21	JUSTICE BREYER: The the oil and gas,
22	motor vehicles, machinery, appliances, supplies, and
23	maintenance equipment.
24	MR. OLSON: Those are money paid to the
25	city.

1 JUSTICE BREYER: So they write a check to 2 the city. Okay. MR. OLSON: Yes. Now, it shouldn't matter. 3 4 The Tonnage Clause prohibits States from imposing a 5 tonnage tax. JUSTICE STEVENS: Well, that's exactly the 6 7 question I wanted to ask you. Supposing the city did 8 not impose any taxes on anybody except the people who pay this tax, and that's all. Would it -- would it be 9 10 constitutional or unconstitutional? 11 MR. OLSON: No, it would not be. In the 12 first place --13 JUSTICE STEVENS: It would not be 14 constitutional? 15 MR. OLSON: It would not be -- it would not be unconstitutional, Justice Stevens. 16 17 JUSTICE STEVENS: Oh, but then why is the --18 what other people pay on other taxes even relevant? 19 MR. OLSON: I don't think it is relevant. The nondiscrimination issue has been introduced by the 20 21 Petitioner in this case. It is not in the Tonnage Clause. It is not in any of the cases decided by this 22 23 Court having to do with the Tonnage Clause, having to do with wharfage fees, pilotage fees, other things having 24 25 to do with commercial activity in a --

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1	JUSTICE STEVENS: So we can take as a as
2	a given for the purpose of analyzing the issue, that
3	this tax is either the only tax that's relevant to our
4	analysis or that it's so much higher than all the other
5	taxes, it should be treated as the functional equivalent
6	as the only tax we have to look at?
7	MR. OLSON: I'm saying that it would not
8	make any difference if this was the only tax that the
9	city imposed unless it was a tonnage tax, and the
10	tonnage tax this Court has repeatedly
11	JUSTICE KENNEDY: But the answer to
12	Justice Stevens's question is we can take this case as
13	presenting to us the fact that the ships pay more than
14	other property?
15	MR. OLSON: No.
16	JUSTICE KENNEDY: And you say that doesn't
17	make any difference.
18	MR. OLSON: No, the ships do not pay more.
19	I don't think it would make any difference if if the
20	city decided to impose a different rate of tax on motor
21	vehicles than it did on homes or or vessels, as long
22	as it was an ad valorem property tax, and this one is.
23	The vessels are not based the tax is
24	assessed every year on the replacement value of the
25	vessels. A big ship that is worth less money because it

would cost less to replace it, because it doesn't have a double hull or a double bottom, will be taxed -- it will be taxed greater in proportion to its value. The value imposed is assessed every year.

5 There's no challenge here -- it's very 6 important to understand that there is no challenge by 7 the Petitioners with respect to the valuations placed on 8 these ships. There's no contention that the value 9 placed upon these ships by this ad valorem property tax 10 is based upon cubic capacity. They have --

JUSTICE GINSBURG: But is it -- do you -- do you contest the point that was made in the reply brief that back at the end of the 18th century, tonnage was considered a proxy for value, that it was the customary mode of measuring the value of a ship?

16 MR. OLSON: I do contest that, 17 Justice Ginsburg. The only citation for that is Justice 18 Miller. Justice Miller is cited for that in a lecture that he gave after he left the Court. He was on the 19 20 court from 1862 to 1890. He joined the Court in the --21 in the Inman case, the Wheeling case, the Parkersburg 22 case, and here's the quote from the Inman -- from the 23 Clyde Mallory case in 1935, which is quoting the Inman 24 case from during that period of time. "At the time the 25 Constitution was adopted, 'tonnage' was a

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1 well-understood commercial term signifying the internal 2 capacity of the vessel." This Court has said that over 3 and over again. In the Wheeling case, when it said --4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Which is -- for a 5 commercial vessel, is a rough calculation of how much 6 it's worth. 7 MR. OLSON: It is not --8 JUSTICE SCALIA: The more cargo you can 9 carry, the more valuable the commercial ship. 10 MR. OLSON: That is not correct, 11 Justice Scalia, and it's -- and it's not correct in this 12 case. Experts put an assessment on these ships based 13 upon their replacement value. It may have -- one factor 14 may be how -- how the ship is constructed, whether it 15 has a double hull. These have to be Jones Act-compliant 16 The newer ones are more valuable. If they move ships. 17 faster, they're more valuable. If they're more efficient, they have more value. One of these ships in 18 19 this case is valued 10 times more as -- higher value --20 than a ship that carries more capacity because it's 21 newer. 22 JUSTICE SOUTER: But all you're saying --23 MR. OLSON: And --JUSTICE SOUTER: All you're saying is that 24 25 there are other factors that -- that preclude using

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1 tonnage simply as a single crude measure. But isn't it 2 fair to say that, other things being equal -- the engine 3 capacity, the hull construction, et cetera -- the 4 tonnage is a rough measurement of the value of the ship, 5 for just the reason that Justice Scalia gave? Ιt determines the amount of cargo the ship can carry, and 6 7 what it can charge for it, and that is capitalized into 8 the value of the ship. Isn't that true? MR. OLSON: Well, if -- if everything else 9 10 was equal, the bigger, the more capacity, the more 11 valuable the vessel might be, that's true. But that --12 that is not the case. Different ships are different 13 sizes. They are made out of different materials. They 14 have different structural capabilities --15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So as long as you are 16 taxing on the basis of the value of the ship, then you 17 have no Tonnage Clause problem. Is that your -- the 18 Tonnage Clause was a specific type of measure, and if 19 you're taxing based on the assessed value of the 20 property, it isn't a Tonnage Clause. Is that your --21 MR. OLSON: That is what this Court has 22 In the Wheeling case, where we were talking about said. 23 steamships, the Court said that same statement that you 24 just made about an ad valorem tax property tax 10 times. JUSTICE BREYER: What about a porthole tax? 25

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1 MR. OLSON: Pardon me? 2 JUSTICE BREYER: Is a porthole tax in your 3 view okay? 4 MR. OLSON: A what? 5 JUSTICE BREYER: A porthole tax. They charge for portholes. Anyone who has a porthole who б comes into our city pays taxed. That's not a tonnage 7 8 tax. 9 MR. OLSON: That's not a tonnage tax. 10 JUSTICE BREYER: So, in your view, a masked 11 tax. 12 MR. OLSON: To the extent that the tax is on 13 a vessel as an instrument of commercial conveyance, what 14 this Court has said --15 JUSTICE BREYER: Oh, but the porthole tax 16 applies, by the way, to that ship's captain who has 17 retired, who has built his house with portholes instead 18 of windows. 19 (Laughter.) MR. OLSON: I have --20 21 JUSTICE BREYER: So there are 2 or 3 percent of the -- I mean, it's only 99.9 percent on ships. 22 23 MR. OLSON: Let's start on the basics. 24 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes. 25 MR. OLSON: When the Constitution was

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1 written, the Constitution did not intend to take away 2 the power from the States to impose taxes. The 3 provision on the import-export prohibition on the States 4 and Tonnage Clause was an instrument to protect 5 commerce. It wasn't an instrument to reduce the power of States to impose taxes. The baseline is States have 6 7 the power to impose taxes unless there's an explicit --8 and the court has said narrow -- limitation on that tax 9 power in the Constitution.

10 Now, what this Court has said over and over 11 again, Justice Breyer -- it hasn't had a chance to deal 12 with portholes -- but it has had a chance to deal with 13 most of these various earlier cases in the -- in the 14 1860s and '70s had to do with tax on tonnage. And there 15 was one case where New Orleans levied a tax just for the 16 entry and departure of the ship, and the Court said, 17 well, that's -- that's a tax on the ship as a -- as a 18 commercial instrument of commerce, and that would be 19 covered also. But nothing else has been covered.

20 And the Court has gone out of its way to say 21 that communities, States, are entitled to tax people 22 that possess property within their jurisdiction because 23 of --

24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, if you --25 if you are right that any type of ad valorem tax is

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1 okay, well, then why in the world would the Framers have 2 adopted a prohibition on a tonnage tax, if you could 3 just say it's a tax on value, which is going to have the 4 same impact on commerce?

5 MR. OLSON: Because -- because, if you are 6 taxing -- I think that the Court had reasons for the 7 conclusion it came to. What I'm saying is not what I've 8 invented; it's what the Court has said repeatedly, that 9 because property may be taxed as property because the 10 users and owners of property are the source of revenue 11 for the communities --

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, putting aside 13 what the Court has said, I'm looking at what the Framers 14 have said. What good does a tonnage tax prohibition do 15 --

16 MR. OLSON: It does --

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- if you are right? 18 MR. OLSON: It -- if it's -- if it's a State 19 using a tax on a vessel qua vessel as an instrument to 20 limit commerce, that is something that the Framers did 21 not want to do. They -- they prohibited taxes --22 JUSTICE SCALIA: It offended them 23 aesthetically?

24 (Laughter.)

25 MR. OLSON: No, because -- for --

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1	JUSTICE SCALIA: So all the State has to say
2	is we are not we're not taxing you qua vessel.
3	(Laughter.)
4	MR. OLSON: No, Justice Scalia
5	JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, what
6	MR. OLSON: What the Framers were concerned
7	about and what I was trying to say in response to the
8	Chief Justice's question is that there was a limitation
9	on the states' power to tax imports or exports because
10	of the fact that that would put the states on the coast
11	at an advantage and they would pass those burdens on to
12	the inland states. The Tonnage Clause was put there as
13	a specific provision to implement and to prevent the
14	circumvention of the export/import prohibition.
15	JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Olson
16	JUSTICE STEVENS: But I suppose you could
17	JUSTICE SCALIA: let me ask you something
18	about about discrimination. Let's assume that I
19	think it is relevant whether the tax is a discriminatory
20	tax, property tax just levied on on ships or not.
21	If that is my position, why should I count
22	as establishing nondiscrimination the fact that Alaska
23	or Valdez is also taxing most of its other property
24	tax revenue comes from taxing oil equipment, right? And
25	the burden of all of that tax, just like the burden of

1	this vessel tax, is paid by people in New Jersey. I
2	mean, you know, that
3	MR. OLSON: You can
4	JUSTICE SCALIA: It's getting somebody else
5	to bear the burden of your taxation.
6	MR. OLSON: If do it would be
7	JUSTICE SCALIA: Taxing that equipment
8	raises the price of oil, almost all of which the oil
9	goes out of Alaska and is paid for by people in other
10	states. Why should I count that property tax as proving
11	that either the State of Alaska or Valdez is not being
12	discriminatory? Just because it it can't possibly
13	violate the the Tonnage Clause doesn't mean that it
14	isn't as much discriminatory against other states.
15	MR. OLSON: That then might that might be
16	a Due Process Clause problem
17	JUSTICE SCALIA: No, I
18	MR. OLSON: But it wouldn't be a Tonnage
19	Clause problem. I would submit, Justice Scalia, you
20	would be very upset at the at Silicon Valley because
21	the property tax imposed on Silicon Valley gets all put
22	on those chips that we used in all of these computers,
23	and everybody else in the country is using those
24	computers, so the property that is taxed in that
25	community is the property that creates the value of that

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1 community.

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2 JUSTICE SCALIA: And if -- if California 3 taxed vessels, I would not allow California to come in 4 and say, oh, we are just subjecting them to the same tax 5 that our own citizens are subjected to. 6 MR. OLSON: And Justice Scalia --7 JUSTICE SCALIA: I wouldn't let them point 8 to the Silicon Valley tax. 9 MR. OLSON: You would -- you would, I submit, then, say that vessels are exempt from property 10 11 tax. 12 JUSTICE SOUTER: That may be the only way 13 they can accomplish what they want to. Because as the 14 Chief Justice's question suggested a moment ago, if in 15 the 18th century the port of Boston said, "We are not 16 going to charge tonnage anymore. We are simply going to 17 tax on the value of the ship," that is going to have 18 exactly the same effect that a tonnage tax would have. So maybe exemption is the only way it can be done. 19 20 MR. OLSON: Well, it's going to require an amendment to the Constitution because what the Framers 21 22 talked about was a Tonnage Clause, and they were talking 23 about --24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But we have said --

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MR. OLSON: -- and they did not exempt --

1 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Olson, we -- we have 2 said it's not just tonnage. It said that the clause 3 bars states, we said, from imposing a charge even if not 4 measured by a vessel's tonnage, for the privilege of 5 entering, trading in or lying in a port. So we have ruled out the position that it's got to be an б 7 old-fashioned tonnage charge, and can't be based on the 8 assessed value of the property.

9 MR. OLSON: Well, I guess I have to resort 10 to the fact that every time this Court has considered 11 it, or at least in almost every case, the Court has gone 12 out of its way to say, they were not intending to 13 prohibit states from taxing the value of property, if 14 it's an ad valorem tax.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: But -- but in all of those cases the vessels were being taxed as one item of property in a general moveable property, personal property tax. I asked you before, I think, is there any other tax like this, that -- an ad valorem tax that is applied to one single category of property? MR. OLSON: If this -- this is an ad valorem

22 tax, it has various different statutes and ordinances 23 that it comes from, but there's ad valorem taxes in 24 Valdez across the board for all kinds of property. 25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: This statute deals with

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1 one category of property. Is there another statute like 2 this one?

MR. OLSON: Well, there -- no. This statute is -- every other statute in the same manner imposes taxes on property based upon their value. This was a separate ordinance that decided to remove an exemption that had existed for 27 years --

8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: That was the other, the 9 State taxes were no part of the Alaska Supreme Court's 10 decision in this case.

MR. OLSON: Well, I think what we are 11 12 talking about is whether or not this community can 13 impose a tax on the people that own property in this 14 community. There's no denial that there is a property 15 tax situs here. The average length of the time in port 16 of these ships was 45 days. The entire fleet has a tax 17 situs in Valdez. So this property, like other property 18 in the same manner, is being taxed by the City of 19 Valdez.

The Wheeling case was a case a little bit like this in the sense that it was West Virginia that passed a statute that allowed Wheeling to impose the tax on steam ships.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: And on what else? In that -- in that tax that was before the port. What else

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1 did Wheeling tax?

2 MR. OLSON: The only thing that the Court 3 talked about because it was -- like this it was an 4 as-applied case, the taxpayer was wanting a refund from 5 the taxes and the taxpayer owned steam ships that --6 that went back and forth from Wheeling. And the Court 7 talked about the fact that this wasn't a Tonnage Clause, 8 this was a state-authorized municipal -

9 JUSTICE BREYER: What about the Greer? You 10 haven't mentioned that. Greer in Norris v. City of 11 Boston. Where he says the -- you know what it says; 12 it's on the front page of their brief. All right. That 13 seemed to me to say, don't interpret the Tonnage Clause 14 to apply to tonnage. Interpret it, same thing as if it 15 was mass, it's mariners, power of the steam engine, 16 number of passengers, the master or owner of the 17 vessel -- all those fall within the Tonnage Clause. 18 That's what the paragraph seems to say.

MR. OLSON: And what -- what the thrust of the overall bulk of the cases including the language by this Court repeatedly is that property taxation based upon the value of property, not imposing a value -- not imposing a tax on the ship. There are various ways I suppose one could say that every time a ship enters a harbor without developing a tax situs -- I think Justice

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1	Alito's question focused on that this is not
2	JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask a
3	MR. OLSON: You don't get charged a fee for
4	entering the port. Or one of those cases when
5	imposes a tax because it called it a wharfage tax,
б	but you didn't have to touch the wharf to pay the tax.
7	JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask you a
8	question that I don't' think has come up, but I just
9	wondered if anybody has argued this. The duty of
10	tonnage, it seems to me, might refer to the cargo rather
11	than the ship. So if the ship made ten voyages it might
12	have ten times the tonnage of another vessel of exactly
13	the same value. Has anybody argued that that's what the
14	Tonnage Clause refers to?
15	MR. OLSON: I think I think you're
16	correct, Justice Stevens, that what the Framers were
17	concerned about was a substitute for export or import
10	tou bu touring what was in the shin and that tonness

18 tax by taxing what was in the ship, and that tonnage referred to that, but it wasn't the value of the vessel 19 20 itself because the Court -- the Framers wouldn't have 21 wanted to take away the power of the states to tax 22 commercial activity using property in their communities 23 in the same manner that they taxed other property. 24 JUSTICE SCALIA: If that's all it applied 25 to, then the wharfage tax would have been perfectly

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1	okay. You can't say that was
2	MR. OLSON: The wharfage tax the wharfage
3	tax has been upheld by this Court frequently. The only
4	reason why it was struck down in that case is that you
5	didn't have to put into the wharf. So the Court knew it
6	wasn't really a wharfage tax, but if it was really a
7	wharfage tax, the Court has upheld it.
8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
9	Mr. Rothfeld, you have three minutes
10	remaining.
11	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES A. ROTHFELD
12	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
13	MR. ROTHFELD: Thank you, Your Honor. A
14	couple of quick points. First on this confusing
15	question of what the State of Alaska does in the nature
16	of its tax. Mr. Olson began by by saying the State
17	of Alaska imposes this tax through the City of Valdez.
18	That is right. It is a tax imposed by the State of
19	Alaska that is collected by the City of Valdez. If the
20	city did not collect the tax, it would go directly to
21	the State of Alaska. It is an Alaska tax.
22	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Where where does
23	the money go? If the City of Valdez collects it, where
24	does it go?
25	MR. ROTHFELD: If the city collects it, it

keeps it, but it has been authorized to do that by the
 State.

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, then I think 4 we ought to regard it as a city tax, not a State tax. 5 MR. ROTHFELD: Uh --CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: They collect it; 6 7 they keep it; that sounds like a city tax. 8 MR. ROTHFELD: But it -- it is imposed by the State. The State decides decide what subject it 9 10 has. It identifies the property that --11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I suppose the 12 State can regulate what cities and municipalities and 13 counties can do throughout the State. That doesn't make 14 everything those cities and counties do the actions of 15 the State. 16 MR. ROTHFELD: That -- that's true, but this 17 particular tax is a tax that is imposed by the State at 18 the State level. It -- it's notable that Valdez has 19 never before, until we reached this Court, said that 20 this is a -- that it is taxing oil and gas property. 21 The property is subject to tax by the State. The State 22 authorizes Valdez to collect the tax, but it is imposed 23 by the tax -- the city -- the State determines which

25 discretion. Valdez chose to tax only particular types

items are subject to tax. So this is out of Valdez's

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1 of personal property, and that is vessels.

2 Second, on the question of what the Tonnage 3 Clause was designed to do and -- and the Wheeling case, 4 Wheeling says that a property tax is okay when the tax 5 is imposed on vessels the same as other property owned by its citizens. That is not what is going on here. б 7 Contemporaneous understanding of the rule at the time was that taxes that singled out vessels were 8 unconstitutional. We cite authority for this 9 10 proposition in our reply brief. 11 To -- to address Justice Ginsburg's question 12 as to whether there were other taxes like this, we have 13 not found any other tax anywhere that has been imposed

14 singling out vessels as -- for -- for property taxation.
15 Either now or in the past, we have not found any case
16 addressing that, not only not in this Court, but in any
17 other court.

18 And then finally --

JUSTICE SOUTER: What about the -- the broader tax situation at the -- at the -- in -- in 1789? Did -- did ports have sources of -- or exercise the authority at that time to tax property generally, e.g., real estate in the city to support the activities of the ports, or were they dependent solely upon things like import-export taxes, et cetera?

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1	MR. ROTHFELD: My my understanding is
2	that real estate certainly was subject to tax and that
3	ports would have the authority to tax other types of
4	property. Vessels were set aside as a particular item
5	by the Tonnage Clause.
6	JUSTICE SOUTER: So so that the argument
7	they are taxing other things, therefore it's okay to tax
8	this, would have been an argument just as potent in the
9	18th century or impotent, as the case may be, as it is
10	now?
11	MR. ROTHFELD: That's right.
12	JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay.
13	MR. ROTHFELD: And so setting aside vessels
14	in a in a unique category when other things could be
15	taxed would have been problematic
16	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How under your
17	view, how is a city supposed to impose a property tax on
18	a vessel?
19	MR. ROTHFELD: It it should impose a tax
20	by imposing a tax on personal property generally. And
21	if it does, it would fall on vessels as items of
22	personal property. It it is significant well, if
23	I may, Your Honor, just to finish, what Valdez has it
24	could have taxed all of that types of or it could
25	have taxed particular types of it. But it has seized on

1 only one particular type of personal property to be 2 subject to taxation. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So -- so you think 3 4 we should resolve the tax by seeing how generally 5 applicable property taxes are in Valdez? 6 MR. ROTHFELD: I -- I think it's an easy 7 case when, as in this situation, there is only one item of property that is taxed, and that's a vessel. 8 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but your -your brother suggests that other items of property are 10 11 taxed under other provisions of the tax ordinance. MR. ROTHFELD: Again, Valdez does not. The 12 State does. Valdez does not. And so I think that there 13 14 is no need for the Court to go beyond and decide how 15 broadly applicable -- as I suggested earlier, our test 16 would be predominantly on vessels it is 17 unconstitutional, and that clearly is the case here. 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. The case is submitted. 19 20 MR. ROTHFELD: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 (Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the case in the 22 above-entitled case was submitted.) 23 24

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