1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - x 3 JOHN BRIDGE, ET AL., : 4 Petitioners : : No. 07-210 5 v. 6 PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY : 7 CO., ET AL. : - - - - - - - - - - - - x 8 9 Washington, D.C. 10 Monday, April 14, 2008 11 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 12 13 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 14 at 11:10 a.m. 15 **APPEARANCES:** THEODORE M. BECKER, ESQ., Chicago, Ill.; on behalf 16 17 of the Petitioners. 18 DAVID W. DeBRUIN, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf 19 of the Respondents. ERIC D. MILLER, ESO., Assistant to the Solicitor 20 21 General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, 22 23 supporting the Respondents. 24 25

| 1 | CONTENTS | |
|----|---|------|
| 2 | ORAL ARGUMENT OF | PAGE |
| 3 | THEODORE M. BECKER, ESQ. | |
| 4 | On behalf of the Petitioners | 3 |
| 5 | DAVID W. DEBRUIN, ESQ. | |
| 6 | On behalf of the Respondents | 19 |
| 7 | ERIC D. MILLER, ESQ. | |
| 8 | On behalf of the United States, as amicus | |
| 9 | Curiae, supporting the Respondents | 34 |
| 10 | REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF | |
| 11 | THEODORE M. BECKER, ESQ. | |
| 12 | On behalf of the Petitioners | 40 |
| 13 | | |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | | |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | | |
| 21 | | |
| 22 | | |
| 23 | | |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | | |

1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (11:10 a.m.) 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument 4 next in Case 07-210, Bridge versus Phoenix Bond & 5 Indemnity. 6 Mr. Becker. 7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF THEODORE M. BECKER ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS 8 MR. BECKER: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, 9 10 and may it please the Court: 11 Both parts of the question presented in this 12 case should be answered "yes." For a treble damage 13 civil RICO claim based on fraud, someone must rely on 14 the alleged misrepresentation, and that someone must be 15 the plaintiff. But that's the very nature of a fraud 16 claim. Plaintiffs here claim that they were injured by 17 reason of a RICO violation, the predicate acts of which 18 involved a scheme or artifice to defraud. 19 But no one in this case is arguing that a civil RICO claim based on fraud can proceed without 20 21 someone relying. So some reliance is required; the only 22 question is who must rely? And we submit that the 23 natural answer is the plaintiff. 24 A plaintiff who hasn't relied to his 25 detriment on an alleged misrepresentation hasn't been

3

| 1 | defrauded; he hasn't been injured by reason of a scheme |
|----|---|
| 2 | to defraud. Plaintiffs here haven't alleged that they |
| 3 | relied on any misrepresentation; they haven't even |
| 4 | alleged that they received a misrepresentation. |
| 5 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: So what about a case, |
| 6 | say, you've got organized crime wants to get rid of |
| 7 | an organized crime enterprise wants to get rid of |
| 8 | rivals, so it makes misrepresentations about those |
| 9 | rivals to customers and suppliers, not to the to the |
| 10 | rival. So there was no there is no misrepresentation |
| 11 | made to the plaintiff but to the plaintiff's customers |
| 12 | and suppliers. |
| 13 | So on your theory, is there no RICO claim |
| 14 | because the misrepresentation was made to someone other |
| 15 | than the plaintiff? |
| 16 | MR. BECKER: Yes, that's correct, Justice |
| 17 | Ginsburg. There would be a criminal RICO prosecution |
| 18 | because, under the Neder case, we know that reliance, |
| 19 | justifiable reliance, and injury is not required. |
| 20 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: But no civil case in |
| 21 | that in that situation? |
| 22 | MR. BECKER: That's correct, Justice |
| 23 | Ginsburg. |
| 24 | JUSTICE SCALIA: But that doesn't even |
| 25 | comport with common-law civil cases. I mean, for a long |

4

1 time courts have allowed someone who's been euchred by a 2 competitor's misrepresentations to his customers. An old New York case that was discussed in the briefs that 3 4 I used to teach in contracts class, where he told 5 somebody that the horse was no longer for sale and it was still for sale, and the person who wanted to sell 6 7 the horse at the higher price should have -- to buy the 8 horse should have had a cause of action, even though the 9 representation was not made to him.

10 MR. BECKER: Justice Scalia, those cases as 11 well as the Rice versus Manley New York case, the cheese 12 buyer's case, similar situation, do exist, but they are 13 really tortious interference with business expectancy 14 cases. And we believe that the law makes that clear. 15 When RICO was enacted in 1970, the law even 16 in New York, as we point out in our reply brief, had

evolved to the extent where -- where there were some references to fraud in those early cases in the 19th century.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Suppose in a tortious interference case, the two tort -- there are two tort feasors, and they communicate with each other by mail. Is that a violation of the mail fraud statute? MR. BECKER: It would be a violation of the mail fraud statutes. But I will say, Justice Kennedy,

5

1 that the government's position here seeks to extend the 2 mail fraud statute far beyond what this Court did in 3 Neder. As a matter of fact, the government made the 4 exact same argument in Neder as it did to this Court, 5 and the Court --6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: In my -- in my 7 hypothetical, there was no -- there was no reliance on 8 anything said. It was just used to facilitate the 9 scheme. And I assume the plaintiff could recover. 10 MR. BECKER: I think that in criminal mail 11 fraud, reliance is not required, Justice Kennedy. And that's what the Neder Court held. But in doing so, it 12 13 looked to the common law and imposed a materiality 14 requirement. And the only reason that the Neder case 15 ruled that it's not required in criminal mail fraud is because no one has to be injured; there does not have to 16 17 be a completed scheme. 18 Civil -- there is, of course, no private 19 right of action in mail fraud. And when we look to

19 right of action in mail fraud. And when we look to 20 whether or not someone has a civil claim under RICO 21 through the predicate act of mail fraud, we have to go 22 through 1964(c), the "injured by reason of" requirement. 23 As this Court found in Holmes, the common-law 24 requirement of proximate cause applies, we submit so 25 does the common-law element of reliance, justifiable

6

reliance, apply in a civil RICO case predicated on mail
 fraud.

JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, isn't -- isn't the 3 4 difference that, in Holmes, it was the textual basis "by 5 reason of" through which the -- as we read it -- the proximate cause standard was -- was brought into the 6 statute. Here, in fact, there -- there isn't any text, 7 8 it seems to me, that you can -- can rely on. The fact of fraud itself doesn't do it 9 10 because the statute speaks in terms of an offense for 11 which an individual should be prosecuted. So it's 12 looking to the criminal rather than the civil model. 13 And isn't that the distinction, in effect, a textual 14 distinction, between Holmes as a means for importing 15 proximate cause and the statute in this case as a means 16 for importing first-party reliance? 17 MR. BECKER: Well, Justice Souter, of 18 course, in Holmes the Court was looking at the "injured 19 by reason of "language and looked to the Clayton Act and 20 looked to the Sherman Act before it, where Congress used 21 precisely the same language. Certainly RICO doesn't

22 have proximate cause in its text at all.

The reason -- the very reason that the common law does apply when you are construing a mail fraud predicate act through a civil RICO claim is

7

because Congress has not told us what "defraud" means.
It has not defined "scheme to defraud," and of course
that's --

4 JUSTICE SOUTER: Why hasn't it done so 5 simply or sufficiently done so by referring to the -- in effect -- the criminal mail fraud violation? 6 7 MR. BECKER: Because in other cases where 8 this Court has looked at the same type of situation, the 9 Neder case, Field versus Mans, for example, where there 10 is not a definition of a term such as fraud, the Court 11 has looked to the common law to define that term. JUSTICE SOUTER: Yes, but we didn't have --12 13 I don't think we had in those cases the phrase that 14 occurs here. I think the phrase here is "could be 15 prosecuted or indicted" for something -- I think it was 16 prosecution -- which tends to narrow it down to the 17 criminal model, rather than allowing us to roam into the 18 civil field.

MR. BECKER: Except, Justice Souter, that the -- the requirement that there need to be an indictable offense is not enough to make out a civil fraud because criminal law recognizes a -- an uncompleted fraud, simply a scheme, where here, if you're talking about a completed fraud, for someone to be injured by reason of a fraud, it has to be completed

8

1 and someone has had to rely on it. 2 JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay. Well, that means 3 that to that extent the criminal -- in effect -- the 4 criminal cause of action is narrowed down. It doesn't 5 follow from that that the statute contemplated adopting a civil model regardless. б 7 MR. BECKER: I -- we -- we believe it does. 8 If Your Honor will contrast the Salinas case with the Beck versus Prupis case, we believe it's the similar --9 10 JUSTICE SOUTER: You're going to have to 11 help me do that. 12 MR. BECKER: All right. I will. In the 13 Salinas case, which was a criminal RICO case, the Court 14 ruled that it was not necessary to have a wrongful overt 15 act in order to make out a criminal cause of action for 16 conspiracy under the RICO statute. And the reason was 17 because all you need is the agreement and any acts. 18 This was a situation where a sheriff 19 actually was the wrongdoer, but the deputy sheriff took 20 some innocent acts that were in furtherance of 21 conspiracy. The Court said that's conspiracy. 22 However, in the Beck versus Prupis case, the 23 Court said that for civil RICO cause of action based on conspiracy, you need to look at the combination between 24 25 1964(c), the "injured by reason of" language, and the

9

| 1 | actual statutory language. And since conspiracy is not |
|----|--|
| 2 | defined in the RICO statute, the Court looked to the |
| 3 | common law, and the common law requires that there needs |
| 4 | to be an unlawful overt act or tortious act in order to |
| 5 | make out a common-law cause of action for conspiracy. |
| 6 | And the Court ruled that that was necessary. |
| 7 | We think it's the exact same relationship |
| 8 | Salinas is to Beck as Neder is to this case. |
| 9 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, why |
| 10 | JUSTICE SOUTER: No, but |
| 11 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why isn't it there is |
| 12 | reliance on their allegations by the county. The county |
| 13 | thinks that each bidder is putting in only one bid. So |
| 14 | the county has been deceived, and the plaintiff suffers |
| 15 | the effect of that deception. Why doesn't that qualify? |
| 16 | MR. BECKER: Because no representation has |
| 17 | been made to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff hasn't |
| 18 | relied on the misrepresentation that was made to the |
| 19 | county. |
| 20 | JUSTICE KENNEDY: But without the mail fraud |
| 21 | violation let's assume the tort would have been |
| 22 | unsuccessful. It would not have been complete. |
| 23 | MR. BECKER: Without the misrepresentation |
| 24 | to the county, Justice Kennedy? |
| 25 | JUSTICE KENNEDY: Yes. Yes. Let's assume |

10

that. And it was directed at this class of persons and 1 2 it was relied upon by the county. It seems to me that 3 that's certainly sufficient under the -- it's a mail 4 fraud violation. MR. BECKER: Well, I think this --5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I mean, refer to the mail 6 7 -- the civil RICO refers to whether it's a mail fraud 8 violation. You want to assume this additional reliance 9 requirement. 10 MR. BECKER: We think it's necessary, Your 11 Honor. The other aspect, of course, in the hypothetical is that there needs to be some direct injury, and we 12 don't believe that a direct injury is presented here. 13 14 In order to -- in Anza and, of course, before in Holmes, the Court set forth three basic 15 16 quidelines in order to determine whether there was 17 sufficient proximate cause to bring a cause of action 18 under civil RICO, and in Anza under mail fraud. We 19 don't think those three are enough in this kind of a 20 situation. 21 JUSTICE SOUTER: But isn't the problem with 22 your argument that if this isn't direct enough, there is 23 no injury at all? The county isn't hurt by this. The 24 county has got its rotational scheme basically to avoid 25 favoring particular bidders who appear in multiple

11

guises, but the county isn't getting hurt. So that if it's not direct enough for -- for the Plaintiffs in this case to sue, then nobody has a direct enough interest or can show direct enough causation for RICO.

5 MR. BECKER: Well, Justice Souter, first, we 6 disagree that the rotational allocation is well pled 7 fact. As we pointed out in our reply brief toward the 8 last several pages and in footnote 7, the actual sale 9 and the bidding is nothing like the concept of 10 rotational allocations.

But putting that aside for a moment, the county certainly could be a victim. First of all, the county -- this is a violation of an administrative rule. That's what is at the heart of this case, an alleged violation. The county has made the rule possibly for the purpose that Your Honor just articulated, although there is nothing in the record to let us know that.

But what we do know is that these types of rules exist for the benefit of the property owners, and that's because the Illinois Supreme Court in -- the same plaintiff brought a case challenging a very, very similar rule.

JUSTICE SOUTER: But how could the property owner be hurt if there is -- if we are dealing in a situation here in -- in which the penalty is zero

12

1 percent, and everybody is bidding zero percent, then 2 this is a situation in which the property owner isn't 3 going to get hurt no matter who ends up with it. 4 MR. BECKER: Justice Souter, zero percent is 5 by no means guaranteed. That's only been the last three years. In fact, in the 2000 case before the Illinois б 7 Supreme Court --8 JUSTICE SOUTER: Yes, but that's the -that's the case here. So if your direct-injury 9 10 requirement, as you construe it, applies here, I think 11 we are still left with a situation in which on these facts, nobody would be injured, because nobody -- or 12 13 nobody would be -- be able to prove injury by a 14 sufficient direct route to establish causation. 15 MR. BECKER: Including the bidders and the 16 Plaintiffs, Your Honor. 17 JUSTICE SOUTER: Yeah. Right. 18 MR. BECKER: Well, I think that they 19 certainly could not prove injury as a matter of proof. 20 The problem with that, of course, is in a RICO case it 21 takes five years to get there. And someone can artfully 22 plead -- use two words with no elaboration at all, "rotational allocation." 23 24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes, but that's a 25 different point, the point that you made in your reply

13

1 brief, that maybe there isn't this rotational system, 2 and maybe they can't prove that they were -- that they 3 were injured; that they would have gotten a greater 4 share. But your case is about -- it doesn't matter even 5 if you -- you have to accept the allegations of their complaint as true, even if everything they say in the 6 7 complaint is true, they have no claim. They have no 8 RICO claim. 9 MR. BECKER: That's correct, Justice 10 Ginsburg. 11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So we have to assume what 12 they say about the rotational system is right and -- but 13 -- but you are hanging your hat on no misrepresentation 14 was made to them. 15 MR. BECKER: That's correct, Justice. We --16 we are -- we have raised below, but not in this Court, 17 that there was not sufficient injury, directness of 18 injury; and it can't be proved in this Court. I think 19 it comes into play in the reliance concept under 20 proximate causation. 21 And what we are asking the Court to do is to 22 recognize that, in the context of a civil RICO claim 23 based on fraud, that there is -- there is nothing that 24 is -- that is revolutionary about finding that a 25 reliance requirement should be applied. This case, as

14

the Court knows, was originally dismissed by Chief Judge
 Holderman on that very basis.

3 If we have -- if we were to accept -- if the 4 Court were to accept our opponents' position, a 5 remarkable array of lawsuits could be brought as RICO actions: Competitor versus competitor for harm that 6 7 allegedly is caused by false statements to customers, 8 suppliers, distributors, marketing agencies, government entities; consumer or end user versus manufacturer for 9 10 harm allegedly resulting from false statements to the 11 first buyer in a distribution chain.

And the circuit court cases in the Fifth --Fourth and Fifth and Sixth and Eighth and Eleventh circuits have recognized this, and they require reliance as a part of proximate causation, and we believe this Court should do the same.

I also wanted to make the point that to elaborate, in the Neder case, the Government -- and this is a case where the Government ostensibly argues that it wants us not to restrict civil RICO claims. But in the Neder case the Government made the very same argument in trying to expand mail fraud claims under the criminal statutes.

And I think that's -- that's a sub rosa issue in this case. The Court nine years ago

15

1 specifically said in a unanimous opinion, with Chief 2 Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court, that the Court 3 disagreed that mail fraud was moored to the common law 4 of fraud, and it is not unmoored in the Neder case. 5 They said it was moored, and even in a criminal prosecution materiality is required. And although б 7 justifiable reliance and injury is not required in a 8 criminal prosecution, to unmoor the mail fraud statute in a civil RICO context and to then make the argument 9 10 that all sorts of other claims can -- can also be 11 included such as tortious interference -- because at its heart this is a tortious interference case. We know 12 13 that because the Plaintiffs pled it in their complaint. 14 That's their pendant State court action. And that's where this case should be. It should be a tortious 15 16 interference case.

17 If they can prove that case and if they have 18 pled it, then they have a remedy. If they can't, they 19 don't. But the problem is that to give the civil RICO tool, to call "racketeers" -- to call your competitor a 20 21 "racketeer" and to seek treble damages and attorney's fees in this kind of such an attenuated situation, 22 23 should not be something that the Court condones. 24 And it's different; if you Google my 25 clients, you'll come up -- they will come up as

16

1 racketeers now, and -- and that's the problem that we 2 have. If there were a reliance requirement, you could 3 immediately tell if this was a situation where the 4 common law --

5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: May I just go back to a 6 statement you made? I thought you -- you conceded that 7 on their allegations your client would be indictable for 8 mail fraud?

9 MR. BECKER: Well, I didn't concede that my 10 client would be indictable for mail fraud. I think that 11 there would have to be -- we'd have to take a careful 12 look at the indictment, certainly. But I will say that 13 -- that I do -- I do say that the mail fraud statute 14 does not require justifiable reliance or injury.

15 I think the problem is when you ask the 16 direct -- my client hasn't been indicted for mail fraud, 17 and I don't think it's any -- it's any oversight because 18 this has been a very well known case in Cook County. I 19 think the reason, if one were to ask me why my client hasn't been indicted for mail fraud, is because they 20 21 didn't commit it, because the county in its own rule --22 the treasurer wrote the rule and expressly says in the 23 rule that she has the exclusive discretion to determine whether or not there has been a violation of the rule. 24 25 She has not so determined. And this case has been

17

| 1 | pending now for close to over three years. The |
|----|--|
| 2 | treasurer is aware of it, and we know that, and she |
| 3 | still has not determined that there has been a |
| 4 | violation. So if there hasn't been a violation of the |
| 5 | rule, there is no criminal mail fraud violation either. |
| б | JUSTICE SOUTER: Is your client still |
| 7 | bidding on on these |
| 8 | MR. BECKER: Yes, Justice Souter, and also |
| 9 | all of the al of the plaintiffs the Respondents |
| 10 | are still bidding, which I think is an interesting fact. |
| 11 | And it's not it's in the record because they have an |
| 12 | amended complaint where they have pled subsequent sales. |
| 13 | That's how far afield from the law of fraud this is |
| 14 | going. |
| 15 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Are all the shell |
| 16 | corporations still bidding? |
| 17 | MR. BECKER: Mr. Justice Mr. Chief |
| 18 | Justice, if all of them aren't, it's simply because |
| 19 | there may be new corporations that are, and they are |
| 20 | formed not for the purpose of defrauding anybody, but |
| 21 | for tax purposes. |
| 22 | If there are no further questions, I'd |
| 23 | I'd like to reserve the rest of my time for rebuttal. |
| 24 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, |
| 25 | Mr. Becker. |

| 1 | MR. BECKER: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. |
|----|--|
| 2 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. DeBruin. |
| 3 | ORAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID W. DEBRUIN |
| 4 | ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS |
| 5 | MR. DeBRUIN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it |
| 6 | please the Court: |
| 7 | It is presumed true in this case that |
| 8 | Petitioners submitted false affidavits, filled the |
| 9 | auction room with related entities, and obtained |
| 10 | thousands of liens that would have been awarded to |
| 11 | Respondents and other bidders, causing them injury in |
| 12 | fact. I submit the central issue in this case is |
| 13 | whether on those facts Respondents can establish |
| 14 | proximate cause, and specifically whether in order to do |
| 15 | so they must establish that they personally received and |
| 16 | relied upon the false statements at issue. |
| 17 | I submit that this Court already has |
| 18 | established in its decisions in Holmes and in Anza the |
| 19 | proper test for proximate cause. And no claim has been |
| 20 | made in this case, at least not until perhaps briefly |
| 21 | this morning, that the Respondents cannot establish |
| 22 | proximate cause under the standards set forth in those |
| 23 | cases. Moreover, no argument is made that the standards |
| 24 | articulated in Holmes and in Anza are insufficient to |
| 25 | ferret out the appropriate cases that can go forward; |

19

| 1 | that those cases produce anomalous results either here |
|----|--|
| 2 | or in any other case that has been decided. |
| 3 | JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is is it your view that |
| 4 | assume assuming there is a State law cause of action |
| 5 | for tortuous interference, that if that tortious |
| 6 | interference was effected through the use of the mails |
| 7 | by the co-tort features, that that automatically invokes |
| 8 | the RICO statute? |
| 9 | MR. DeBRUIN: Your Honor, all of the |
| 10 | elements of RICO would have to be established. There |
| 11 | would have to be predicate acts of mail fraud. |
| 12 | JUSTICE KENNEDY: That that there are |
| 13 | predicate acts, yes. |
| 14 | MR. DeBRUIN: And they would have to form a |
| 15 | pattern and all the other requirements that were |
| 16 | significant would have to be met, but yes. |
| 17 | And I submit in this case there is no |
| 18 | serious dispute but that the allegations over the course |
| 19 | of many years of the complaint established indictable |
| 20 | mail fraud. The issue is not whether the fact pattern |
| 21 | is under the common law tortious interference or some |
| 22 | other common-law tort. |
| 23 | The question is: Do the facts as alleged |
| 24 | make out indictable mail fraud? There is no question |
| 25 | but the mail fraud statute is broad. It prohibits any |

20

scheme or artifice to defraud; and I believe that if the
 facts here were proved, the submission of false
 affidavits to the county on a regular basis, there is no
 need under mail fraud to prove reliance.

5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But those -- those 6 weren't mailed, or at least that's not what you're 7 relying on. You're not relying on the affidavits that 8 make the misrepresentation using the mails. I thought 9 your reliance on the mails is only the tail end of this 10 transaction, the notices that get sent to the property 11 owners.

12 MR. DeBRUIN: That's correct, Justice 13 Ginsburg. The mails here are an essential component to 14 allow this fraud to have any effect. If it weren't for 15 the use of the mail, the Petitioners could never realize 16 the economic value of the liens that they obtained 17 through the fraud. And in that sense the use of the 18 mails are essential to the scheme. And that's what this Court held in the Schmuck decision: That the mails, 19 themselves, don't have to be false so long as the use of 20 21 the mails is essential to the scheme.

Here it clearly is. Absent the notices given to property owners, there would be no way for the Petitioners to realize the value of the liens and obtain the benefit of the fraud by -- by making the false

21

statements to the county and literally obtaining
 thousands of additional liens that otherwise would have
 gone to other entities.

4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, what --5 would your position be different if the county were, in 6 fact, injured; we didn't have the zero-percent situation 7 but different percentages? Your client would not be 8 able to sue them, right?

9 MR. DeBRUIN: Mr. Chief Justice, I believe 10 the Court has already addressed that in Anza and has 11 made clear that if in an appropriate case the government 12 had been harmed and was in fact -- could be expected to 13 sue, as it was in Anza -- in that case the claim was 14 that the defendant had not paid its taxes to the State 15 of New York. And the Court found that New York was the 16 directly injured party, could be expected to sue, and 17 under Anza there was no proximate cause. We accept that 18 test.

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, what does that 20 do to your statutory argument? In other words under 21 your statutory argument, you still could sue; but 22 because of other considerations you can't? 23 MR. DeBRUIN: Well, we have to establish 24 predicate acts of mail fraud, but we also have to 25 establish proximate cause. And under Anza the failure

22

1 was an inability to prove proximate cause. In this case 2 it has not been seriously disputed that we satisfy the 3 factors set forth in Anza. The county was not harmed. 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, what happens 5 -- what happens if some of the bids were more than zero, and some weren't? You get to sue for part of the 6 7 damages, and the county gets to sue for the rest? Or 8 how do you divvy that up? MR. DeBRUIN: Well, the only time that the 9 10 affidavits and the representations in this case have 11 effect is if all the bids are zero. The county, in 12 order to protect itself from property owners, provides 13 that if there are multiple bids above zero, the county 14 will not issue the lien. It holds the lien itself. 15 The only time that this rule comes into 16 effect where there is a rotational award is if the 17 county is paid its taxes in full, and there are multiple 18 bidders at zero percent. 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but I suppose since we are talking about a rotational rule, you could 20 21 have -- what are these, monthly or annually -- one, 22 possibly, cycle where it's all zero percent, and then 23 others where it isn't, and then another where it is. 24 And that would affect the rotation in a way that would 25 injure your client but would also injure the county.

23

MR. DeBRUIN: Not the way the county administers these auctions. If that happened -- and it certainly could happen -- that the bidding process that takes the penalty down stopped at five percent or two percent, the county rules under the program at issue provide the county will not apply the rotational system. It won't award the lien at all.

The rotational rule only applies when there 8 are multiple, zero-percent bids. And Respondents will 9 10 show, as this case goes forward, that they can identify 11 the specific properties on which there were multiple bids; that the Petitioners and the related entities, 12 13 which they will prove are related, received liens and 14 thereby increased to the thousands the number of 15 valuable liens that the Petitioners got, leaving the 16 Respondents essentially with hundreds of liens.

17 The key is, the central question is, whether 18 Petitioners can show proximate cause under the standards 19 in Holmes and Anza. And under Anza what this Court held 20 is the central question for proximate cause is the 21 directness between the violation alleged and the injury. And in this case there is a direct relation between the 22 23 violation of mail fraud alleged, the predicate acts, and 24 the injury that Respondents have incurred.

25

JUSTICE ALITO: Would you explain why your

24

1 argument is consistent with Beck versus Prupis? In that 2 case, couldn't the plaintiff show that it was injured by 3 reason of the criminal violation that was alleged, the 4 RICO conspiracy; and, yet, the Court said something more 5 was required, taking an additional requirement from the 6 law of civil conspiracy? How is your argument here 7 consistent with that?

8 MR. DeBRUIN: Justice Alito, Beck was a completely different case. The issue in Beck was --9 section 1964(c) says that the plaintiff must prove 10 11 injury by reason of a violation of the act. And the violation of the act at issue in Beck was 1962(d), which 12 13 is a conspiracy to violate the other provisions. And so 14 what the Court was looking at was the word "conspiracy," 15 which was not defined in the statute. And the Court 16 applied the accepted rule that where a word is not 17 defined, the Court can assume that Congress intended its 18 ordinary meaning.

JUSTICE ALITO: But -- well, the meaning of a RICO conspiracy in the criminal context is very well known. I don't know why it matters whether it is defined in the statute or not; and there is no requirement in that that anybody be injured by virtue of an unlawful, overt act.

MR. DeBRUIN: But the Court looked to --

25

25

1 JUSTICE ALITO: Why is it appropriate there 2 to look to the law of civil conspiracy and yet inappropriate here to look to the law of civil fraud? 3 4 MR. DeBRUIN: Well, it looked to conspiracy 5 to make up the elements of the civil cause of action there. But here the relevant provision that is relied б 7 upon is 1962(c), which is a violation of RICO. And we 8 also alleged 16, 1962(c). But in (c) the violation of RICO is to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through 9 10 a pattern of racketeering activity. None of those words, "conducting the affairs 11 12 of an enterprise", are words that Petitioners contend 13 you look to the common law to define. There could be a 14 pattern of racketeering activity that would consist of 15 fraud, of violence, of bribery all together. 16 JUSTICE SCALIA: Am I -- am I reading these 17 provisions wrong? I thought you were proceeding in a 18 1961, and that the conspiracy -- the conspiracy 19 provision is 1962(c). 20 MR. DeBRUIN: 1961 is the definitions. We 21 allege a violation of both 1962(c) and 1962(d). 22 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's the conspiracy 23 provision. 24 MR. DeBRUIN: 1962(d) is the conspiracy. We allege a violation of that. We also allege a violation 25

26

1 of 1962(c). 2 JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm looking on page 2 of the Petitioner's brief. Have I -- have I been 3 4 misinformed? 5 The blue brief, page 2, maybe that's wrong, but that's what it says. It says 1962(c), it shall be б 7 unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of 8 the provisions of subsections (a), (b) or (c). 9 MR. DeBRUIN: Your Honor, the citation 10 appears at the bottom of the quote, the way it's set 11 forth on page 2. 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: All right. I understand. 13 MR. DeBRUIN: So if you look at the very 14 first quotation, you'll see where it follows. 15 JUSTICE SCALIA: Oh, I see, I see, I see. 16 Okay. 17 MR. DeBRUIN: So in this case, we allege 18 both a violation of 1962(c) and (d). 1962(c) prohibits 19 conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a 20 pattern of racketeering activity. That pattern may 21 consist of fraud, violence, bribery --JUSTICE ALITO: No, I understand that, but 22 23 when the pattern of racketeering activity consists of 24 predicate acts of mail fraud, why isn't -- why does not 25 Beck point you to the word "fraud," which like

27

| 1 | "conspiracy," I don't believe is defined in the RICO |
|----|--|
| 2 | statute? So why if you look to civil conspiracy to |
| 3 | understand what "conspiracy" means in the RICO statute, |
| 4 | why do you not look to "civil fraud" to find out what |
| 5 | the word "fraud" means in the RICO statute? |
| б | MR. DeBRUIN: I would say two things: |
| 7 | First, what that argument would do would make |
| 8 | essentially common-law fraud the predicate act under |
| 9 | RICO, when instead it is indictable mail fraud, not |
| 10 | common-law fraud. And |
| 11 | JUSTICE ALITO: But you can say the same in |
| 12 | Beck. It would make civil conspiracy the predicate act |
| 13 | in RICO, rather than the RICO violation, rather than |
| 14 | criminal conspiracy. |
| 15 | MR. DeBRUIN: Well, the Court, again, in |
| 16 | Beck, was looking to the common-law word "conspiracy" to |
| 17 | apply it in different contexts. There is not a |
| 18 | common-law fraud that is actionable under RICO. |
| 19 | But secondly, even if you accept that test, |
| 20 | Justice Alito, under the common law of fraud, there is |
| 21 | no doubt that claims like ours were actionable and were |
| 22 | actionable as fraud. The case that Justice Scalia |
| 23 | referenced to, the common-law cases involving the buyer |
| 24 | of cheese and other facts, those were actionable as |
| 25 | fraud where |

28

| 1 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Becker says they were |
|----|--|
| 2 | interference with a business relationship, not fraud. |
| 3 | MR. DeBRUIN: Well, under the law of torts |
| 4 | as it has evolved, there are different labels that are |
| 5 | applied. But what was critical is that that conduct, |
| б | the interference through fraud with a contract of |
| 7 | another, was actionable at the common law. The |
| 8 | plaintiff could make out a claim and recover damages, |
| 9 | even though the plaintiff had not received the statement |
| 10 | at issue and had not relied on the statement at issue. |
| 11 | So that even if, under RICO, you were to look for civil |
| 12 | purposes to a common-law analogue, the common law made |
| 13 | clear that these kinds of claims were actionable, |
| 14 | whatever label might be applied to them today in terms |
| 15 | of the nature of the of the tort. |
| 16 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: One concern, because RICO |
| 17 | can be a very broad statute, is that if you are right, |
| 18 | then any unsuccessful bidder could look through a |
| 19 | rival's submission, find a false statement, and sue |
| 20 | under RICO. |
| 21 | MR. DeBRUIN: Your Honor, I believe that is |
| 22 | not true for the reasons this Court set forth in Anza. |
| 23 | The standards set forth in Holmes and in Anza are very |
| 24 | rigorous tests to establish proximate cause. So the |
| 25 | merely assertion of falsity by a competitor I mean, |

29

Anza involved a competitor situation. There the claim
 was that had been mail fraud that caused the competitor
 harm.

The Court recognized in Anza that that case was different than Holmes. There was an allegation of a direct injury in Anza, but nevertheless the relation between the violation and the harm was far less direct than it is in this case, as Judge Easterbrook, Chief Judge Easterbrook explained.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Why -- why is it -- I really worry about adopting a rule which would produce the result that whenever anyone makes a false statement in an official form, someone who is deprived of a business opportunity, or at least can say so, can bring a RICO action.

16 MR. DeBRUIN: Justice Scalia, I would say 17 two things: First of all, I think it's critical to 18 realize that Congress enacted RICO to protect 19 competitors. One of the principal motivations behind 20 RICO was to protect legitimate businesses that are 21 injured in their business or property by reason of a 22 pattern of racketeering activity as defined under the 23 statute. That's number one.

Number two, there are important restrictionsthat this Court repeatedly has recognized. It's not

30

1 enough that there be a single act. There must be 2 predicate acts that are a pattern of activity. 3 "Pattern" doesn't just mean two. It means a continuing 4 threat of continuing criminal activity. There must be 5 proximate cause under Holmes and Anza. All of those restrictions exist. And only if the plaintiff can 6 7 successfully navigate all of those things, proving not 8 common-law fraud but indictable criminal activity, proving a pattern of continuing criminal activity, 9 10 proving proximate cause, only then can the plaintiff 11 make out a RICO violation.

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I suppose that every 13 other bidder in this situation is a viable plaintiff. 14 MR. DeBRUIN: In this case, we don't submit 15 that we are the only potential plaintiffs. That there 16 were other bidders -- the bidders at these auctions fall 17 into perhaps two different categories. Many bidders --18 over 50 percent of all the registered bidders receive 19 fewer than 10 liens. In other words, they are at the 20 auction to bid on a specific property or small number of 21 properties.

Then there are other what I would call professional tax buyers, who basically do research, identify the most attractive properties, and we will show, are essentially bidding on the same group of

31

1 properties. And those are the properties at issue. 2 Those are the bidders at issue. It is more than just 3 the Respondents, but it is a relatively small group --4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I suppose in 5 other cases where if we adopt the rule you argue for, that wouldn't be confined at all. For example, in a 6 7 situation where a competitor is defrauding a supplier, 8 every competitor no matter how many there were, could 9 bring a RICO action.

10 MR. DeBRUIN: Well, I think the Court -again, if you look to the Anza case, the Court has made 11 clear that if a RICO defendant takes actions that simply 12 13 enhance the defendant's own competitive position, which 14 was the allegation in Anza, that that may not be enough 15 to establish proximate cause. But whereas here the 16 foreseeable and clear effect of defendant's actions is 17 to work a direct injury on competitors and, in fact, on 18 no one else, not on the county, not on the property 19 owners, but only on competitors, that was within the 20 ambit of what Congress sought to protect in RICO. 21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Regardless of how 22 many competitors there are? 23 MR. DeBRUIN: Well, yes. As this Court

24 recognized in Storey Parchment and Hazeltine, in
25 antitrust cases as well as RICO cases, damage issues

32

have to be worked out. But the fact that there may be multiple bidders that you may have to award damages to a group does not defeat the claim. The defendant cannot come into court and say because damages here have to be allocated among a larger number of people, you can't establish a claim.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is it the law generally in the States that an unsuccessful bidder can sue the successful bidder if the successful bidder misstated qualification?

MR. DeBRUIN: Justice Kennedy, the common-law rule actually was, I believe, in 27 of 40 States -- this unfortunately came up after the briefing -- that a disappointed bidder could bring an action at the common law if the allegation was one of fraud in the procurement. So that the common law did not provide an absolute bar to claims like this.

Now, again, the issue is: Will the claims satisfy Holmes and Anza? There is no argument here that that standard, the framework this Court established first in Holmes and then applied in Anza, that that framework is inadequate, that it produces an anomalous result here or will produce an anomalous result in other cases. It's a very rigorous test.

25 This Court looked at directness; it looked

33

| 1 | to the suitability of other plaintiffs; it looked to |
|----|--|
| 2 | whether the harm was derivative. That's a |
| 3 | quintessential proximate cause analysis. Proximate |
| 4 | cause is, historically through the common law, a very |
| 5 | fact-based intensive test. But the Court has made clear |
| 6 | that the ability of the RICO plaintiff to overcome that |
| 7 | test, it's a significant showing that must be met. |
| 8 | Chief Judge Easterbrook, in this case, went |
| 9 | through the Anza factors very methodically. He showed |
| 10 | that, under each factor, proximate cause clearly can be |
| 11 | met under the common law. The Respondents were directly |
| 12 | injured in a significant and substantial way, and that |
| 13 | is sufficient, I submit, to make out the elements of the |
| 14 | RICO claim, assuming all the other elements are also |
| 15 | met. |
| 16 | If there are no further questions, thank |
| 17 | you. |
| 18 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, |
| 19 | Mr. DeBruin. |
| 20 | Mr. Miller? |
| 21 | ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC D. MILLER |
| 22 | ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS |
| 23 | MR. MILLER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it |
| 24 | please the Court: |
| 25 | RICO provides a cause of action to |

34

plaintiffs who have suffered injuries by reason of, that is, proximately caused by, a RICO violation. Now, when the RICO violation is predicated on an act of mail fraud, the plaintiff ordinarily will need to show that somebody relied on the false statements in order to establish that the fraud was even a "but for" cause of injury.

8 A plaintiff who can establish that it was the one who relied on the false statements would be able 9 10 to show proximate causation. But that's not the only 11 way to establish proximate causation, and there is no 12 basis for this -- for the imposition of a per se rule 13 requiring that the plaintiff be the one who has relied. 14 Instead when a defendant creates a scheme to defraud 15 that induces reliance by one party in order to injure 16 another party, the injured party should have a cause of 17 action under --

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What is the answer 19 to Justice Kennedy's question with respect to Federal 20 Government contracts?

21 MR. MILLER: My understanding is that the 22 case has established that they can. Again, since this 23 came up after the briefing, one illustrative example is 24 in the Eighth Circuit, Iconco against Jensen 25 Construction Company, which is 622 F.2d 1291. In that

35

| 1 | case, it was a contract that was set aside for small |
|----|---|
| 2 | businesses, and the company got the contract by falsely |
| 3 | claiming to be a small business. And then in a |
| 4 | diversity case applying Iowa law, the Eighth Circuit |
| 5 | held that the disappointed bidder could bring an action |
| 6 | for fraud and unjust enrichment against the successful |
| 7 | bidder. So I think that and that's of a piece with |
| 8 | the long common-law tradition, going back to cases like |
| 9 | Rice against Manley, where |
| 10 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But what if there |
| 11 | are 50 disappointed bidders? |
| 12 | MR. MILLER: Well, it would be the burden of |
| 13 | the plaintiff to establish that, but for the fraud, it |
| 14 | would have gotten the contract. So in most cases of |
| 15 | contracting, that's going to be very difficult for a |
| 16 | plaintiff to show. This |
| 17 | JUSTICE SCALIA: Wait. |
| 18 | MR. MILLER: is somewhat usual. |
| 19 | JUSTICE SCALIA: Why couldn't you show |
| 20 | why couldn't that's like the situation where a |
| 21 | company runs a runs a lottery and in fact |
| 22 | misrepresents what the odds are. And then you mean the |
| 23 | people can't recover because they couldn't show that |
| 24 | they would have won? It seems to me you can calculate |
| 25 | the difference in the odds or something and place some |

36

1 value on that. Is it really painless to say, you know, 2 I'm running a lottery and your chances of winning are 3 one in a thousand, and everybody buys a ticket on that 4 basis, and it turns out that really your chances are one 5 in a million? Nobody has a cause of action because nobody can prove he would have won? 6 7 MR. MILLER: No, the participants in the 8 lottery in that case would have a cause of action because they have paid money to the person running the 9 10 lottery. 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's all they can get? 12 Just what they paid for the ticket? 13 MR. MILLER: I think -- I think the -- the 14 common-law measure of damages would be -- would be what 15 they paid in that situation. But certainly the recovery 16 for disappointed bidders in cases like this, does have a 17 long common-law tradition, and with the more modern 18 elaboration of tort law, as demonstrated by the 19 secondary statement, it has sometimes been given a different label, and that is either "injurious 20 21 falsehood" or "intentional interference with a prospective contractual relation," but at its heart, the 22 action that's at issue here is one that's for fraud. 23 24 But I would like to say in response to some 25 of Justice Alito's questions that, with respect to the

37

1 Beck case and the relevance of it, that ultimately in 2 our view it doesn't really matter whether the common law 3 would have allowed recovery in this case, and that's 4 because, unlike in Beck where the Court had to consider 5 what is the meaning of -- what does it mean to be injured by reason of a conspiracy? And the Court б 7 answered that question by looking at the common law of 8 civil conspiracy. That mode of analysis would be appropriate here if the relevant predicate under 1961 9 10 were fraud or any conduct involving fraud or otherwise 11 made reference to common-law fraud. But, of course, 12 1961 does not say that; it says "any act which is 13 indictable under section 1341," the mail fraud statute. 14 So under -- given the structure of the statute, the only 15 inquiry is: Is the injury incurred by reason of an act 16 which is indictable under 1341? 17 JUSTICE ALITO: But the RICO statute doesn't 18 say you can recover if you're injured by reason of 19 conspiracy, without any elaboration. It says "by reason of a violation of this statute." And therefore you look 20 21 to 1962(d), which tells you what the violation is. It's 22 a RICO -- it's a criminal RICO conspiracy. So I just 23 don't see how that argument works. 24 MR. MILLER: Well, 1964(c) refers you, as

25 you noted, to 1962, which simply says "conspiracy." And

38

1 so the Court in Beck explained that to figure out how 2 you tell when someone has been injured by civil 3 conspiracy, there is a body of law, the common law, that 4 answers that question. There is no corresponding 5 common-law principle of what it means to be injured by an act of mail fraud because there is no common law of б 7 mail fraud per se; it's a statutory creation. And so 8 the relevant inquiry is simply: Did the conduct violate the mail fraud statute, section 1341? Not was it common 9 10 law fraud?

JUSTICE BREYER: Well, I don't think it's 11 12 because there's no common-law equivalent. I think it's 13 simply because the word "conspiracy" is a -- the 14 substantive violation under 19 -- under 1962(c). "It 15 shall be unlawful for any person to conspire." And we 16 have to interpret the word "conspire," and we say we 17 give it its common-law meaning; whereas, for a violation 18 of the general racketeering statute, there's -- there's 19 no equivalent reference to a word that we have to give 20 content to. It just says -- unless it's the word 21 "indictable."

22 MR. MILLER: No. I think that's right. And 23 certainly the "by reason of" requirement in 1964, it 24 does refer to the common-law requirements of proximate 25 cause. But that -- that language -- "by reason of" --

39

1 does not contain a reliance requirement because it 2 applies to any number of predicate acts, all of the 3 predicate acts under 1961. And in the context of many 4 of those acts, reliance would be completely 5 inappropriate. I would also like to point out that I think the conduct that is alleged here really does go to 6 7 the core of what RICO is intended to redress. Congress 8 made clear, in the finding that accompanied the statute, 9 that one of its principal concerns was that criminal 10 enterprises could use illegal means to compete unfairly 11 with legitimate businesses. And so if a business -- a criminal business were to use threats of violence 12 13 directed at its competitor's customers to get them to 14 switch their business to it, the competitor would have a cause of action for that. And then the same should be 15 16 true, we submit, if the business uses fraud directed at 17 its competitor's customers to induce them to switch 18 their business. 19 If there are no further questions. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 20 21 Mr. Miller. 2.2 Mr. Becker, 10 minutes remaining. 23 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF THEODORE M. BECKER

ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

25 MR. BECKER: Thank you.

24

40

| 1 | The difference between this case and what |
|----|---|
| 2 | Congress intended is that, yes, in the comments to the |
| 3 | enactment of RICO, Congress did say that it was trying |
| 4 | to protect legitimate competitors from illegitimate |
| 5 | conduct or unlawful conduct. This case has now morphed |
| б | into a situation where competitors are using RICO as an |
| 7 | anticompetitive device, and that's what we believe the |
| 8 | reliance requirement will will at least rein in, |
| 9 | totally consistent with the common law. |
| 10 | We are not asking this Court to impose any |
| 11 | requirement on RICO that does not already exist by |
| 12 | reason of the common-law meaning rule. Actually, we |

13 believe our opponents and the S.G. are asking this 14 Court to expand RICO by unmooring it from the common 15 law. We believe that Beck versus Prubis is exactly the same situation and the same analysis. Although 1962(d), 16 17 which is a substantive conspiracy violation of RICO, was 18 at issue in Beck versus Prupis, you get to the same 19 situation just as an extra step. Here's the -- here's 20 the analysis. You look to 19 -- they have a conspiracy 21 count of course. But you look to 1962(c), and it says that "any person injured by reason of" -- if you read in 22 1964(c) to it -- by reason of a RICO violation or a --23 24 or a racketeering activity "shall have a cause of 25 action."

41

| 1 | Now, you look to racketeering activity in |
|----|---|
| 2 | 1961, and that has a hundred and something predicate |
| 3 | acts, one of which is mail fraud. You look at mail |
| 4 | fraud, and it says "a scheme to defraud." It uses the |
| 5 | word "defraud." What does that mean? It's the same |
| 6 | place; you just you just need to take one more step |
| 7 | to get there, but it's the same place the Court found |
| 8 | itself, we submit, in Beck versus Prupis. If criminal |
| 9 | conspiracy means the same thing as civil conspiracy, |
| 10 | Beck versus Prupis would not the Court would not have |
| 11 | held what it did in Beck versus Prupis. And if mail |
| 12 | fraud only means an indictable offense and nothing more |
| 13 | under the criminal law, it should be the same as the |
| 14 | civil law, then there would be no common-law meaning |
| 15 | rule. To apply the common-law |
| 16 | JUSTICE SOUTER: Isn't isn't the weakness |
| 17 | of the argument that you're, in effect, dividing mail |
| 18 | and fraud? You're saying there are two requirements, |
| 19 | and therefore, fraud here is just like conspiracy in |
| 20 | Beck. But in fact, mail fraud is is a single term of |
| 21 | art. It refers simply to a criminal violation for which |
| 22 | there there is no exact civil counterpart. And so, |

24 then it seems to me that your argument falls apart,

23

25 because you can't treat the fraud in the mail fraud the

if you take mail fraud as being a unified term of art,

42

| 1 | way you treated the conspiracy standing alone in Beck. |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. BECKER: Justice Souter, we respectfully |
| 3 | disagree and refer the Court to Field versus Mans, where |
| 4 | it was bankruptcy fraud. And I believe the exact |
| 5 | same thing. What does bankruptcy mean? What does mail |
| 6 | fraud mean? Well, they looked to the Court looked to |
| 7 | the common law meaning rule, and looked to the elements |
| 8 | you need for fraud in order to determine what has to be |
| 9 | proved for bankruptcy fraud. |
| 10 | JUSTICE SOUTER: But there was no definition |
| 11 | of bankruptcy fraud as a separate definition, was there? |
| 12 | Whereas in mail fraud, we know what it means. |
| 13 | MR. BECKER: Not from the statute we don't, |
| 14 | Justice Souter. There is no definition of mail fraud in |
| 15 | the statute. The only reason we know what it means is |
| 16 | because the Court has construed it over the years. In |
| 17 | order to construe it now in a civil context, we are |
| 18 | asking the Court to apply the common law meaning rule |
| 19 | because that's the analog is fraud; that's the |
| 20 | obvious source to look to the common law. |
| 21 | If I may I'd like to make a few other |
| 22 | points. |
| 23 | First of all, I cannot leave this podium and |
| 24 | leave this Court under the impression that there is |
| 25 | directness of injury. There are 195 bidders. The |

43

1 plaintiffs themselves alleged this in paragraph 46, our 2 joint appendix 20 and 21. Without belaboring it, the 3 last few pages of our reply brief show all of the things 4 that would have to be shown in order to have even --5 even a remote directness of injury in this case. 6 So the -- we have not -- we have not in any 7 way conceded that the requirements of Anza or Holmes 8 have been met. And -- but I think our brief adequately deals with that. 9 10 I'd also like to point out that RICO and 11 mail fraud don't reach everything actionable at common 12 law. I mean, if there was an argument, that would mean 13 that civil RICO in every case involving a false 14 statement -- every case involving a false statement, no matter to whom it's made, would be a civil RICO case. 15 16 The general idea of protecting competitors 17 doesn't mean that Congress provided that anything that 18 anyone says to anybody violates civil RICO. That's not 19 the way that this Court interprets statutes; and there 20 is no allegation in the complaint at all as -- that the 21 rotational basis applies only when bids are at zero 22 percent. 23 In the year 2000 the Illinois Supreme Court confronted the same plaintiff in this case, Phoenix

25 Bond, challenging a very similar rule because at that

24

44

| 1 | point in time there was collusion including the same |
|----|--|
| 2 | plaintiff to keep the penalty rate at 18 percent. And |
| 3 | the Illinois Supreme Court said the rule will is |
| 4 | something that the treasurer has the right to make to |
| 5 | try to regulate the bids, and the treasurer certainly |
| б | can be a victim of this situation. If the bid is not |
| 7 | perceived as fair, the treasurer will not have enough |
| 8 | bidders in order to sell all the bids, and therefore, |
| 9 | the county will not be paid the unpaid taxes. |
| 10 | If the treasurer thought that there really |
| 11 | was a misrepresentation here made by the Petitioners, |
| 12 | the treasurer would have a very great incentive and a |
| 13 | very great state in enforcing this rule; and the |
| 14 | treasurer did not, we believe because the treasurer |
| 15 | doesn't believe there is any violation. |
| 16 | The the other ways that the county could |
| 17 | be injured are that if the if the penalty rate goes |
| 18 | up beyond zero percent, there is no guarantee that the |
| 19 | same number of bidders will will come to the sale. |
| 20 | There I also want to refer the Court to |
| 21 | other this is not new. In Safeco Insurance just |
| 22 | recently, last term, the Court asked was asked to |
| 23 | define the term "willfulness" in a civil liability |
| 24 | provision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the |
| 25 | Court observed that there is different meanings in the |

45

civil and criminal law to the term "willfulness." In
 Farmer versus Brennan the Court recognized different
 uses of the term "recklessness" in the civil and
 criminal contexts.

5 So once again we are asking this Court to 6 rule consistent with the common law meaning rule that 7 the -- a civil RICO action predicated on mail fraud, 8 where one is -- it has to fulfill the requirement that you have been -- the plaintiff has been injured by 9 10 reason of mail fraud or racketeering activity. The plaintiff must rely on a misrepresentation or the fraud 11 directly, because that's the essence of civil fraud. 12 13 If there are no further questions. 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Counsel. The case is submitted. 15 (Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the case in the 16 17 above-entitled matter was submitted.) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

| | 1 | | | 1 |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| A | additional 11:8 | allowed 5:1 38:3 | appropriate | 20:7 |
| ability 34:6 | 22:2 25:5 | allowing 8:17 | 19:25 22:11 | avoid 11:24 |
| able 13:13 22:8 | addressed 22:10 | ambit 32:20 | 26:1 38:9 | award 23:16 |
| 35:9 | adequately 44:8 | amended 18:12 | April 1:10 | 24:7 33:2 |
| above-entitled | administers | amicus 1:22 2:8 | argue 32:5 | awarded 19:10 |
| 1:12 46:17 | 24:2 | analog 43:19 | argues 15:19 | aware 18:2 |
| Absent 21:22 | administrative | analogue 29:12 | arguing 3:19 | a.m 1:14 3:2 |
| absolute 33:17 | 12:13 | analysis 34:3 | argument 1:13 | |
| accept 14:5 15:3 | adopt 32:5 | 38:8 41:16,20 | 2:2,10 3:3,7 | <u> </u> |
| 15:4 22:17 | adopting 9:5 | annually 23:21 | 6:4 11:22 | b 27:8 |
| 28:19 | 30:11 | anomalous 20:1 | 15:21 16:9 | back 17:5 36:8 |
| accepted 25:16 | affairs 26:9,11 | 33:22,23 | 19:3,23 22:20 | bankruptcy |
| accompanied | 27:19 | answer 3:23 | 22:21 25:1,6 | 43:4,5,9,11 |
| 40:8 | affect 23:24 | 35:18 | 28:7 33:19 | bar 33:17 |
| act 6:21 7:19,20 | affidavits 19:8 | answered 3:12 | 34:21 38:23 | based 3:13,20 |
| 7:25 9:15 10:4 | 21:3,7 23:10 | 38:7 | 40:23 42:17,24 | 9:23 14:23 |
| 10:4 25:11,12 | afield 18:13 | answers 39:4 | 44:12 | basic 11:15 |
| 25:24 28:8,12 | agencies 15:8 | anticompetitive | array 15:5 | basically 11:24 |
| 31:1 35:3 | ago 15:25 | 41:7 | art 42:21,23 | 31:23 |
| 38:12,15 39:6 | agreement 9:17 | antitrust 32:25 | artfully 13:21 | basis 7:4 15:2 |
| 45:24 | al 1:3,7 18:9 | anybody 18:20 | articulated | 21:3 35:12 |
| action 5:8 6:19 | Alito 24:25 25:8 | 25:23 44:18 | 12:16 19:24 | 37:4 44:21 |
| 9:4,15,23 10:5 | 25:19 26:1 | Anza 11:14,18 | artifice 3:18 | Beck 9:9,22 10:8 |
| 11:17 16:14 | 27:22 28:11,20 | 19:18,24 22:10 | 21:1 | 25:1,8,9,12 |
| 20:4 26:5 | 38:17 | 22:13,17,25 | aside 12:11 36:1 | 27:25 28:12,16 |
| 30:15 32:9 | Alito's 37:25 | 23:3 24:19,19 | asked 45:22,22 | 38:1,4 39:1 |
| 33:15 34:25 | allegation 30:5 | 29:22,23 30:1 | asking 14:21 | 41:15,18 42:8 |
| 35:17 36:5 | 32:14 33:15 | 30:4,6 31:5 | 41:10,13 43:18 | 42:10,11,20 |
| 37:5,8,23 | 44:20 | 32:11,14 33:19 | 46:5 | 43:1 |
| 40:15 41:25 | allegations | 33:21 34:9 | aspect 11:11 | Becker 1:16 2:3 |
| 46:7 | 10:12 14:5 | 44:7 | assertion 29:25 | 2:11 3:6,7,9 |
| actionable 28:18 | 17:7 20:18 | apart 42:24 | Assistant 1:20 | 4:16,22 5:10 |
| 28:21,22,24 | allege 26:21,25 | appear 11:25 | assume 6:9 | 5:24 6:10 7:17 |
| 29:7,13 44:11 | 26:25 27:17 | APPEARAN | 10:21,25 11:8 | 8:7,19 9:7,12 |
| actions 15:6 | alleged 3:14,25 | 1:15 | 14:11 20:4 | 10:16,23 11:5 |
| 32:12,16 | 4:2,4 12:14 | appears 27:10 | 25:17 | 11:10 12:5 |
| activity 26:10,14 | 20:23 24:21,23 | appendix 44:2 | assuming 20:4 | 13:4,15,18 |
| 27:20,23 30:22 | 25:3 26:8 40:6 | applied 14:25 | 34:14 | 14:9,15 17:9 |
| 31:2,4,8,9 | 44:1 | 25:16 29:5,14 | attenuated | 18:8,17,25 |
| 41:24 42:1 | allegedly 15:7 | 33:21 | 16:22 | 19:1 29:1 |
| 46:10 | 15:10 | applies 6:24 | attorney's 16:21 | 40:22,23,25 |
| acts 3:17 9:17 | allocated 33:5 | 13:10 24:8 | attractive 31:24 | 43:2,13 |
| 9:20 20:11,13 | allocation 12:6 | 40:2 44:21 | auction 19:9 | behalf 1:16,18 |
| 22:24 24:23 | 13:23 | apply 7:1,24 | 31:20 | 1:22 2:4,6,8,12 |
| 27:24 31:2 | allocations | 24:6 28:17 | auctions 24:2 | 3:8 19:4 34:22 |
| 40:2,3,4 42:3 | 12:10 | 42:15 43:18 | 31:16 | 40:24 |
| actual 10:1 12:8 | allow 21:14 | applying 36:4 | automatically | belaboring 44:2 |
| | I | l | l | |

| | I | I | 1 | 1 |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| believe 5:14 9:7 | briefs 5:3 | 34:8 35:22 | Chief 3:3,9 15:1 | clients 16:25 |
| 9:9 11:13 | bring 11:17 | 36:1,4 37:8 | 16:1 18:15,17 | close 18:1 |
| 15:15 21:1 | 30:14 32:9 | 38:1,3 41:1,5 | 18:24 19:1,2,5 | collusion 45:1 |
| 22:9 28:1 | 33:14 36:5 | 44:5,13,14,15 | 22:4,9,19 23:4 | combination |
| 29:21 33:12 | broad 20:25 | 44:24 46:15,16 | 23:19 30:8 | 9:24 |
| 41:7,13,15 | 29:17 | cases 4:25 5:10 | 31:12 32:4,21 | come 16:25,25 |
| 43:4 45:14,15 | brought 7:6 | 5:14,18 8:7,13 | 34:8,18,23 | 33:4 45:19 |
| benefit 12:19 | 12:21 15:5 | 15:12 19:23,25 | 35:18 36:10 | comes 14:19 |
| 21:25 | burden 36:12 | 20:1 28:23 | 40:20 46:14 | 23:15 |
| beyond 6:2 | business 5:13 | 32:5,25,25 | circuit 15:12 | comments 41:2 |
| 45:18 | 29:2 30:14,21 | 33:24 36:8,14 | 35:24 36:4 | commit 17:21 |
| bid 10:13 31:20 | 36:3 40:11,12 | 37:16 | circuits 15:14 | common 6:13 |
| 45:6 | 40:14,16,18 | categories 31:17 | citation 27:9 | 7:24 8:11 10:3 |
| bidder 10:13 | businesses 30:20 | causation 12:4 | civil 3:13,20 | 10:3 16:3 17:4 |
| 29:18 31:13 | 36:2 40:11 | 13:14 14:20 | 4:20,25 6:18 | 20:21 26:13 |
| 33:8,9,9,14 | buy 5:7 | 15:15 35:10,11 | 6:20 7:1,12,25 | 28:20 29:7,12 |
| 36:5,7 | buyer 15:11 | cause 5:8 6:24 | 8:18,21 9:6,23 | 33:15,16 34:4 |
| bidders 11:25 | 28:23 | 7:6,15,22 9:4 | 11:7,18 14:22 | 34:11 38:2,7 |
| 13:15 19:11 | buyers 31:23 | 9:15,23 10:5 | 15:20 16:9,19 | 39:3,6,9 41:9 |
| 23:18 31:16,16 | buyer's 5:12 | 11:17,17 19:14 | 25:6 26:2,3,5 | 41:14 43:7,18 |
| 31:17,18 32:2 | buys 37:3 | 19:19,22 20:4 | 28:2,4,12 | 43:20 44:11 |
| 33:2 36:11 | | 22:17,25 23:1 | 29:11 38:8 | 46:6 |
| 37:16 43:25 | <u> </u> | 24:18,20 26:5 | 39:2 42:9,14 | common-law |
| 45:8,19 | c 2:1 3:1 26:8 | 29:24 31:5,10 | 42:22 43:17 | 4:25 6:23,25 |
| bidding 12:9 | 27:8 | 32:15 34:3,4 | 44:13,15,18 | 10:5 20:22 |
| 13:1 18:7,10 | calculate 36:24 | 34:10,25 35:6 | 45:23 46:1,3,7 | 28:8,10,16,18 |
| 18:16 24:3 | call 16:20,20 | 35:16 37:5,8 | 46:12 | 28:23 29:12 |
| 31:25 | 31:22 | 39:25 40:15 | claim 3:13,16,16 | 31:8 33:12 |
| bids 23:5,11,13 | careful 17:11 | 41:24 | 3:20 4:13 6:20 | 36:8 37:14,17 |
| 24:9,12 44:21 | case 3:4,12,19 | caused 15:7 30:2 | 7:25 14:7,8,22 | 38:11 39:5,12 |
| 45:5,8 | 4:5,18,20 5:3 | 35:2 | 19:19 22:13 | 39:17,24 41:12 |
| blue 27:5 | 5:11,12,21 | causing 19:11 | 29:8 30:1 33:3 | 42:14,15 |
| body 39:3 | 6:14 7:1,15 8:9 | central 19:12 | 33:6 34:14 | communicate |
| Bond 1:6 3:4 | 9:8,9,13,13,22 | 24:17,20 | claiming 36:3 | 5:22 |
| 44:25 | 10:8 12:3,14 | century 5:19 | claims 15:20,22 | company 35:25 |
| bottom 27:10 | 12:21 13:6,9 | certainly 7:21 | 16:10 28:21 | 36:2,21 |
| Brennan 46:2 | 13:20 14:4,25 | 11:3 12:12 | 29:13 33:17,18 | compete 40:10 |
| BREYER 39:11 | 15:18,19,21,25 | 13:19 17:12 | class 5:4 11:1 | competitive |
| bribery 26:15 | 16:4,12,15,16 | 24:3 37:15 | Clayton 7:19 | 32:13 |
| 27:21 | 16:17 17:18,25 | 39:23 45:5 | clear 5:14 22:11 | competitor 15:6 |
| Bridge 1:3 3:4 | 19:7,12,20 | chain 15:11 | 29:13 32:12,16 | 15:6 16:20 |
| brief 5:16 12:7 | 20:2,17 22:11 | challenging | 34:5 40:8 | 29:25 30:1,2 |
| 14:1 27:3,5 | 22:13 23:1,10 | 12:21 44:25 | clearly 21:22 | 32:7,8 40:14 |
| 44:3,8 | 24:10,22 25:2 | chances 37:2,4 | 34:10 | competitors |
| briefing 33:14 | 25:9 27:17 | cheese 5:11 | client 17:7,10,16 | 30:19 32:17,19 |
| 35:23 | 28:22 30:4,8 | 28:24 | 17:19 18:6 | 32:22 41:4,6 |
| briefly 19:20 | 31:14 32:11 | Chicago 1:16 | 22:7 23:25 | 44:16 |
| | | | | |
| L | | | | |

| | I | l | I | |
|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| competitor's 5:2 | 25:13,14,20 | Counsel 22:4 | crime 4:6,7 | defeat 33:3 |
| 40:13,17 | 26:2,4,18,18 | 46:14 | criminal 4:17 | defendant 22:14 |
| complaint 14:6 | 26:22,24 28:1 | count 41:21 | 6:10,15 7:12 | 32:12 33:3 |
| 14:7 16:13 | 28:2,3,12,14 | counterpart | 8:6,17,22 9:3,4 | 35:14 |
| 18:12 20:19 | 28:16 38:6,8 | 42:22 | 9:13,15 15:22 | defendant's |
| 44:20 | 38:19,22,25 | county 10:12,12 | 16:5,8 18:5 | 32:13,16 |
| complete 10:22 | 39:3,13 41:17 | 10:14,19,24 | 25:3,20 28:14 | define 8:11 |
| completed 6:17 | 41:20 42:9,9 | 11:2,23,24 | 31:4,8,9 38:22 | 26:13 45:23 |
| 8:24,25 | 42:19 43:1 | 12:1,12,13,15 | 40:9,12 42:8 | defined 8:2 10:2 |
| completely 25:9 | conspire 27:7 | 17:18,21 21:3 | 42:13,21 46:1 | 25:15,17,22 |
| 40:4 | 39:15,16 | 22:1,5 23:3,7 | 46:4 | 28:1 30:22 |
| component | Construction | 23:11,13,17,25 | critical 29:5 | definition 8:10 |
| 21:13 | 35:25 | 24:1,5,6 32:18 | 30:17 | 43:10,11,14 |
| comport 4:25 | construe 13:10 | 45:9,16 | curiae 1:22 2:9 | definitions |
| concede 17:9 | 43:17 | course 6:18 7:18 | customers 4:9 | 26:20 |
| conceded 17:6 | construed 43:16 | 8:2 11:11,14 | 4:11 5:2 15:7 | defraud 3:18 4:2 |
| 44:7 | construing 7:24 | 13:20 20:18 | 40:13,17 | 8:1,2 21:1 |
| concept 12:9 | consumer 15:9 | 38:11 41:21 | cycle 23:22 | 35:14 42:4,5 |
| 14:19 | contain 40:1 | court 1:1,13 | | defrauded 4:1 |
| concern 29:16 | contemplated | 3:10 6:2,4,5,12 | D | defrauding |
| concerns 40:9 | 9:5 | 6:23 7:18 8:8 | d 1:20 2:7 3:1 | 18:20 32:7 |
| condones 16:23 | contend 26:12 | 8:10 9:13,21 | 27:18 34:21 | demonstrated |
| conduct 26:9 | content 39:20 | 9:23 10:2,6 | damage 3:12 | 37:18 |
| 29:5 38:10 | context 14:22 | 11:15 12:20 | 32:25 | Department |
| 39:8 40:6 41:5 | 16:9 25:20 | 13:7 14:16,18 | damages 16:21 | 1:21 |
| 41:5 | 40:3 43:17 | 14:21 15:1,4 | 23:7 29:8 33:2 | deprived 30:13 |
| conducting | contexts 28:17 | 15:12,16,25 | 33:4 37:14 | deputy 9:19 |
| 26:11 27:19 | 46:4 | 16:2,2,14,23 | DAVID 1:18 2:5 | derivative 34:2 |
| confined 32:6 | continuing 31:3 | 19:6,17 21:19 | 19:3 | determine 11:16 |
| confronted | 31:4,9 | 22:10,15 24:19 | dealing 12:24 | 17:23 43:8 |
| 44:24 | contract 29:6 | 25:4,14,15,17 | deals 44:9 | determined |
| Congress 7:20 | 36:1,2,14 | 25:25 28:15 | DeBRUIN 1:18 | 17:25 18:3 |
| 8:1 25:17 | contracting | 29:22 30:4,25 | 2:5 19:2,3,5 | detriment 3:25 |
| 30:18 32:20 | 36:15 | 32:10,11,23 | 20:9,14 21:12 | device 41:7 |
| 40:7 41:2,3 | contracts 5:4 | 33:4,20,25 | 22:9,23 23:9 | difference 7:4 |
| 44:17 | 35:20 | 34:5,24 38:4,6 | 24:1 25:8,25 | 36:25 41:1 |
| consider 38:4 | contractual | 39:1 41:10,14 | 26:4,20,24 | different 13:25 |
| considerations | 37:22 | 42:7,10 43:3,6 | 27:9,13,17 | 16:24 22:5,7 |
| 22:22 | contrast 9:8 | 43:16,18,24 | 28:6,15 29:3 | 25:9 28:17 |
| consist 26:14 | Cook 17:18 | 44:19,23 45:3 | 29:21 30:16 | 29:4 30:5 |
| 27:21 | core 40:7 | 45:20,22,25 | 31:14 32:10,23 | 31:17 37:20 |
| consistent 25:1 | corporations | 46:2,5 | 33:11 34:19 | 45:25 46:2 |
| 25:7 41:9 46:6 | 18:16,19 | courts 5:1 | deceived 10:14 | difficult 36:15 |
| consists 27:23 | correct 4:16,22 | co-tort 20:7 | deception 10:15 | direct 11:12,13 |
| conspiracy 9:16 | 14:9,15 21:12 | creates 35:14 | decided 20:2 | 11:22 12:2,3,4 |
| 9:21,21,24 | corresponding | creation 39:7 | decision 21:19 | 13:14 17:16 |
| 10:1,5 25:4,6 | 39:4 | Credit 45:24 | decisions 19:18 | 24:22 30:6,7 |
| 10.1,5 25.4,0 | 37.4 | CICUII 43.24 | | 24.22 30.0,7 |
| | | | l | Ι |

| | | I | 1 | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|--|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 32:17 | either 18:5 20:1 | everybody 13:1 | 30:12 35:5,9 | 5:18,23,25 6:2 |
| directed 11:1 | 37:20 | 37:3 | 44:13,14 | 6:11,15,19,21 |
| 40:13,16 | elaborate 15:18 | evolved 5:17 | falsehood 37:21 | 7:2,9,25 8:6,10 |
| directly 22:16 | elaboration | 29:4 | falsely 36:2 | 8:22,23,24,25 |
| 34:11 46:12 | 13:22 37:18 | exact 6:4 10:7 | falsity 29:25 | 10:20 11:4,7 |
| directness 14:17 | 38:19 | 42:22 43:4 | far 6:2 18:13 | 11:18 14:23 |
| 24:21 33:25 | element 6:25 | exactly 41:15 | 30:7 | 15:22 16:3,4,8 |
| 43:25 44:5 | elements 20:10 | example 8:9 | Farmer 46:2 | 17:8,10,13,16 |
| direct-injury | 26:5 34:13,14 | 32:6 35:23 | favoring 11:25 | 17:20 18:5,13 |
| 13:9 | 43:7 | exclusive 17:23 | feasors 5:22 | 20:11,20,24,25 |
| disagree 12:6 | Eleventh 15:13 | exist 5:12 12:19 | features 20:7 | 21:4,14,17,25 |
| 43:3 | enacted 5:15 | 31:6 41:11 | Federal 35:19 | 22:24 24:23 |
| disagreed 16:3 | 30:18 | expand 15:22 | fees 16:22 | 26:3,15 27:21 |
| disappointed | enactment 41:3 | <u>4</u> 1:14 | ferret 19:25 | 27:24,25 28:4 |
| 33:14 36:5,11 | ends 13:3 | expectancy 5:13 | fewer 31:19 | 28:5,8,9,10,18 |
| 37:16 | enforcing 45:13 | expected 22:12 | field 8:9,18 43:3 | 28:20,22,25 |
| discretion 17:23 | enhance 32:13 | 22:16 | Fifth 15:12,13 | 29:2,6 30:2 |
| discussed 5:3 | enrichment 36:6 | explain 24:25 | figure 39:1 | 31:8 33:16 |
| dismissed 15:1 | enterprise 4:7 | explained 30:9 | filled 19:8 | 35:4,6 36:6,13 |
| dispute 20:18 | 26:9,12 27:19 | 39:1 | find 28:4 29:19 | 37:23 38:10,10 |
| disputed 23:2 | enterprises | expressly 17:22 | finding 14:24 | 38:11,13 39:6 |
| distinction 7:13 | 40:10 | extend 6:1 | 40:8 | 39:7,9,10 |
| 7:14 | entities 15:9 | extent 5:17 9:3 | first 12:5,12 | 40:16 42:3,4 |
| distribution | 19:9 22:3 | extra 41:19 | 15:11 27:14 | 42:12,18,19,20 |
| 15:11 | 24:12 | | 28:7 30:17 | 42:23,25,25 |
| distributors | equivalent | <u> </u> | 33:21 43:23 | 43:4,6,8,9,11 |
| 15:8 | 39:12,19 | facilitate 6:8 | first-party 7:16 | 43:12,14,19 |
| diversity 36:4 | ERIC 1:20 2:7 | fact 6:3 7:7,9 | five 13:21 24:4 | 44:11 46:7,10 |
| dividing 42:17 | 34:21 | 12:7 13:6 | follow 9:5 | 46:11,12 |
| divvy 23:8 | ESQ 1:16,18,20 | 18:10 19:12 | follows 27:14 | fulfill 46:8 |
| doing 6:12 | 2:3,5,7,11 | 20:20 22:6,12 | footnote 12:8 | full 23:17 |
| doubt 28:21 | essence 46:12 | 32:17 33:1 | foreseeable | further 18:22 |
| D.C 1:9,18,21 | essential 21:13 | 36:21 42:20 | 32:16 | 34:16 40:19 |
| | 21:18,21 | factor 34:10 | form 20:14 | 46:13 |
| $\frac{\mathbf{E}}{\mathbf{E}}$ | essentially 24:16 | factors 23:3 | 30:13 | furtherance |
| E 2:1 3:1,1 | 28:8 31:25 | 34:9 | formed 18:20 | 9:20 |
| early 5:18 | establish 13:14 | facts 13:12 | forth 11:15 | F.2d 35:25 |
| Easterbrook | 19:13,15,21 | 19:13 20:23 | 19:22 23:3 | G |
| 30:8,9 34:8 | 22:23,25 29:24 | 21:2 28:24 | 27:11 29:22,23 | |
| economic 21:16 | 32:15 33:6 | fact-based 34:5 | forward 19:25 | G 3:1 |
| effect 7:13 8:6 | 35:6,8,11 | failure 22:25 | 24:10 | general 1:21 |
| 9:3 10:15 | 36:13 | fair 45:7,24 fall 31:16 | found 6:23 | 39:18 44:16 |
| 21:14 23:11,16 | established | falls 42:24 | 22:15 42:7 | generally 33:7 |
| 32:16 42:17 | 19:18 20:10,19 | | Fourth 15:13 | getting 12:1 Cinchurg 4:5, 17 |
| effected 20:6 | 33:20 35:22 | false 15:7,10 | framework | Ginsburg 4:5,17 |
| Eighth 15:13 35:24 36:4 | ET 1:3,7 | 19:8,16 21:2 21:20,25 29:19 | 33:20,22 | 4:20,23 10:9 10:11 13:24 |
| 33.24 30.4 | euchred 5:1 | 21.20,23 29:19 | fraud 3:13,15,20 | 10.11 15:24 |
| | | | l | |
| | | | | |

| | Ĩ | • | • | • |
|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| 14:10,11 17:5 | higher 5:7 | inadequate | 43:25 44:5 | 7:3,17 8:4,12 |
| 21:5,13 29:1 | historically 34:4 | 33:22 | innocent 9:20 | 8:19 9:2,10 |
| 29:16 | Holderman 15:2 | inappropriate | inquiry 38:15 | 10:9,10,11,20 |
| give 16:19 39:17 | holds 23:14 | 26:3 40:5 | 39:8 | 10:24,25 11:6 |
| 39:19 | Holmes 6:23 7:4 | incentive 45:12 | insufficient | 11:21 12:5,23 |
| given 21:23 | 7:14,18 11:15 | included 16:11 | 19:24 | 13:4,8,17,24 |
| 37:19 38:14 | 19:18,24 24:19 | including 13:15 | Insurance 45:21 | 14:9,11,15 |
| go 6:21 17:5 | 29:23 30:5 | 45:1 | intended 25:17 | 16:2 17:5 18:6 |
| 19:25 40:6 | 31:5 33:19,21 | increased 24:14 | 40:7 41:2 | 18:8,15,17,18 |
| goes 24:10 45:17 | 44:7 | incurred 24:24 | intensive 34:5 | 18:24 19:1,2,5 |
| going 9:10 13:3 | Honor 9:8 11:11 | 38:15 | intentional | 20:3,12 21:5 |
| 18:14 36:8,15 | 12:16 13:16 | Indemnity 1:6 | 37:21 | 21:12 22:4,9 |
| Google 16:24 | 20:9 27:9 | 3:5 | interest 12:3 | 22:19 23:4,19 |
| gotten 14:3 | 29:21 | indictable 8:21 | interesting | 24:25 25:8,19 |
| 36:14 | horse 5:5,7,8 | 17:7,10 20:19 | 18:10 | 26:1,16,22 |
| government 6:3 | hundred 42:2 | 20:24 28:9 | interference | 27:2,12,15,22 |
| 15:8,18,19,21 | hundreds 24:16 | 31:8 38:13,16 | 5:13,21 16:11 | 28:11,20,22 |
| 22:11 35:20 | hurt 11:23 12:1 | 39:21 42:12 | 16:12,16 20:5 | 29:1,16 30:10 |
| government's | 12:24 13:3 | indicted 8:15 | 20:6,21 29:2,6 | 30:16 31:12 |
| 6:1 | hypothetical 6:7 | 17:16,20 | 37:21 | 32:4,21 33:7 |
| great 45:12,13 | 11:11 | indictment | interpret 39:16 | 33:11 34:18,23 |
| greater 14:3 | | 17:12 | interprets 44:19 | 35:18,19 36:10 |
| group 31:25 | I | individual 7:11 | invokes 20:7 | 36:17,19 37:11 |
| 32:3 33:3 | Iconco 35:24 | induce 40:17 | involved 3:18 | 37:25 38:17 |
| guarantee 45:18 | idea 44:16 | induces 35:15 | 30:1 | 39:11 40:20 |
| guaranteed 13:5 | identify 24:10 | injure 23:25,25 | involving 28:23 | 42:16 43:2,10 |
| guidelines 11:16 | 31:24 | 35:15 | 38:10 44:13,14 | 43:14 46:14 |
| guises 12:1 | III 1:16 | injured 3:16 4:1 | Iowa 36:4 | justifiable 4:19 |
| | illegal 40:10 | 6:16,22 7:18 | issue 15:25 | 6:25 16:7 |
| H | illegitimate 41:4 | 8:25 9:25 | 19:12,16 20:20 | 17:14 |
| hanging 14:13 | Illinois 12:20 | 13:12 14:3 | 23:14 24:5 | |
| happen 24:3 | 13:6 44:23 | 22:6,16 25:2 | 25:9,12 29:10 | <u> </u> |
| happened 24:2 | 45:3 | 25:23 30:21 | 29:10 32:1,2 | keep 45:2 |
| happens 23:4,5 | illustrative | 34:12 35:16 | 33:18 37:23 | Kennedy 5:20 |
| harm 15:6,10 | 35:23 | 38:6,18 39:2,5 | 41:18 | 5:25 6:6,11 |
| 30:3,7 34:2 | immediately | 41:22 45:17 | issues 32:25 | 10:20,24,25 |
| harmed 22:12 | 17:3 | 46:9 | | 11:6 20:3,12 |
| 23:3 | important 30:24 | injuries 35:1 | $\frac{J}{J}$ | 33:7,11 |
| hat 14:13 | importing 7:14 | injurious 37:20 | Jensen 35:24 | Kennedy's |
| Hazeltine 32:24 | 7:16 | injury 4:19 | JOHN 1:3 | 35:19 |
| hear 3:3 | impose 41:10 | 11:12,13,23 | joint 44:2 | key 24:17 |
| heart 12:14 | imposed 6:13 | 13:13,19 14:17 | Judge 15:1 30:8 | kind 11:19 |
| 16:12 37:22 | imposition | 14:18 16:7 | 30:9 34:8 | 16:22 |
| held 6:12 21:19 | 35:12 | 17:14 19:11 | Justice 1:21 3:3 | kinds 29:13 |
| 24:19 36:5 | impression | 24:21,24 25:11 | 3:9 4:5,16,20 | know 4:18 12:17 |
| 42:11 holp 0:11 | 43:24 | 30:6 32:17 | 4:22,24 5:10 | 12:18 16:12 |
| help 9:11 | inability 23:1 | 35:7 38:15 | 5:20,25 6:6,11 | 18:2 25:21 |
| | | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | l |

| 37:1 43:12,15 | 17:12 26:2,3 | marketing 15:8 | 4:8 5:2 | notices 21:10,22 |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| known 17:18 | 26:13 27:13 | materiality 6:13 | misrepresents | number 24:14 |
| 25:21 | 28:2,4 29:11 | 16:6 | 36:22 | 30:23,24 31:20 |
| knows 15:1 | 29:18 32:11 | matter 1:12 6:3 | misstated 33:9 | 33:5 40:2 |
| | 38:20 41:20,21 | 13:3,19 14:4 | mode 38:8 | 45:19 |
| L | 42:1,3 43:20 | 32:8 38:2 | model 7:12 8:17 | |
| label 29:14 | looked 6:13 7:19 | 44:15 46:17 | 9:6 | 0 |
| 37:20 | 7:20 8:8,11 | matters 25:21 | modern 37:17 | O 2:1 3:1 |
| labels 29:4 | 10:2 25:25 | mean 4:25 11:6 | moment 12:11 | observed 45:25 |
| language 7:19 | 26:4 33:25,25 | 29:25 31:3 | Monday 1:10 | obtain 21:24 |
| 7:21 9:25 10:1 | 34:1 43:6,6,7 | 36:22 38:5 | money 37:9 | obtained 19:9 |
| 39:25 | looking 7:12,18 | 42:5 43:5,6 | monthly 23:21 | 21:16 |
| larger 33:5 | 25:14 27:2 | 44:12,12,17 | moored 16:3,5 | obtaining 22:1 |
| law 5:14,15 6:13 | 28:16 38:7 | meaning 25:18 | morning 19:21 | obvious 43:20 |
| 7:24 8:11,22 | lottery 36:21 | 25:19 38:5 | morphed 41:5 | occurs 8:14 |
| 10:3,3 16:3 | 37:2,8,10 | 39:17 41:12 | motivations | odds 36:22,25 |
| 17:4 18:13 | | 42:14 43:7,18 | 30:19 | offense 7:10 |
| 20:4,21 25:6 | M | 46:6 | multiple 11:25 | 8:21 42:12 |
| 26:2,3,13 | M 1:16 2:3,11 | meanings 45:25 | 23:13,17 24:9 | official 30:13 |
| 28:20 29:3,7 | 3:7 40:23 | means 7:14,15 | 24:11 33:2 | Oh 27:15 |
| 29:12 33:7,15 | mail 5:22,23,25 | 8:1 9:2 13:5 | | Okay 9:2 27:16 |
| 33:16 34:4,11 | 6:2,10,15,19 | 28:3,5 31:3 | <u> </u> | old 5:3 |
| 36:4 37:18 | 6:21 7:1,24 8:6 | 39:5 40:10 | N 2:1,1 3:1 | once 46:5 |
| 38:2,7 39:3,3,6 | 10:20 11:3,6,7 | 42:9,12 43:12 | narrow 8:16 | opinion 16:1 |
| 39:10 41:9,15 | 11:18 15:22 | 43:15 | narrowed 9:4 | opponents 15:4 |
| 42:13,14 43:7 | 16:3,8 17:8,10 | measure 37:14 | natural 3:23 | 41:13 |
| 43:18,20 44:12 | 17:13,16,20 | merely 29:25 | nature 3:15 | opportunity |
| 46:1,6 | 18:5 20:11,20 | met 20:16 34:7 | 29:15 | 30:14 |
| lawsuits 15:5 | 20:24,25 21:4 | 34:11,15 44:8 | navigate 31:7 | oral 1:12 2:2 3:7 |
| leave 43:23,24 | 21:15 22:24 | methodically | necessary 9:14 | 19:3 34:21 |
| leaving 24:15 | 24:23 27:24 | 34:9 | 10:6 11:10 | order 9:15 10:4 |
| left 13:11 | 28:9 30:2 35:3 | Miller 1:20 2:7 | Neder 4:18 6:3,4 | 11:14,16 19:14 |
| legitimate 30:20 | 38:13 39:6,7,9 | 34:20,21,23 | 6:12,14 8:9 | 23:12 35:5,15 |
| 40:11 41:4 | 42:3,3,11,17 | 35:21 36:12,18 | 10:8 15:18,21 | 43:8,17 44:4 |
| let's 10:21,25 | 42:20,23,25 | 37:7,13 38:24 | 16:4 | 45:8 |
| liability 45:23 | 43:5,12,14 | 39:22 40:21 | need 8:20 9:17 | ordinarily 35:4 |
| lien 23:14,14 | 44:11 46:7,10 | million 37:5 | 9:24 21:4 35:4 | ordinary 25:18 |
| 24:7 | mailed 21:6 | minutes 40:22 | 42:6 43:8 | organized 4:6,7 |
| liens 19:10 | mails 20:6 21:8 | misinformed | needs 10:3 11:12 | originally 15:1 |
| 21:16,24 22:2 | 21:9,13,18,19 | 27:4 | never 21:15 | ostensibly 15:19 |
| 24:13,15,16 | 21:21 | misrepresenta | nevertheless | overcome 34:6 |
| 31:19 | making 21:25 | 3:14,25 4:3,4 | 30:6 | oversight 17:17 |
| literally 22:1 | Manley 5:11 | 4:10,14 10:18 | new 5:3,11,16 | overt 9:14 10:4 |
| long 4:25 21:20 | 36:9 | 10:23 14:13 | 18:19 22:15,15 | 25:24 |
| 36:8 37:17 | Mans 8:9 43:3 | 21:8 45:11 | 45:21 | owner 12:24 |
| longer 5:5 | manufacturer | 46:11 | nine 15:25 | 13:2 |
| look 6:19 9:24 | 15:9 | misrepresenta | noted 38:25 | owners 12:19 |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

| 21:11,23 23:12 | 19:8 21:15,24 | 20:11,13 22:24 | prospective | Q |
|------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| 32:19 | 24:12,15,18 | 24:23 27:24 | 37:22 | qualification |
| | 26:12 40:24 | 28:8,12 31:2 | protect 23:12 | 33:10 |
| P P | 45:11 | 38:9 40:2,3 | 30:18,20 32:20 | qualify 10:15 |
| P 3:1 | Petitioner's 27:3 | 42:2 | 41:4 | question 3:11,22 |
| page 2:2 27:2,5 | Phoenix 1:6 3:4 | predicated 7:1 | protecting 44:16 | 20:23,24 24:17 |
| 27:11 | 44:24 | 35:3 46:7 | prove 13:13,19 | 24:20 35:19 |
| pages 12:8 44:3 | phrase 8:13,14 | presented 3:11 | 14:2 16:17 | 38:7 39:4 |
| paid 22:14 23:17 | piece 36:7 | 11:13 | 21:4 23:1 | questions 18:22 |
| 37:9,12,15 | place 36:25 42:6 | presumed 19:7 | 24:13 25:10 | 34:16 37:25 |
| 45:9 | 42:7 | price 5:7 | 37:6 | 40:19 46:13 |
| painless 37:1 | plaintiff 3:15,23 | principal 30:19 | proved 14:18 | quintessential |
| paragraph 44:1 | 3:24 4:11,15 | 40:9 | 21:2 43:9 | 34:3 |
| Parchment | 6:9 10:14,17 | principle 39:5 | provide 24:6 | quotation 27:14 |
| 32:24 | 10:17 12:21 | private 6:18 | 33:17 | quote 27:10 |
| part 15:15 23:6 | 25:2,10 29:8,9 | problem 11:21 | provided 44:17 | |
| participants | 31:6,10,13 | 13:20 16:19 | provides 23:12 | R |
| 37:7 | 34:6 35:4,8,13 | 17:1,15 | 34:25 | R 3:1 |
| particular 11:25 | 36:13,16 44:24 | proceed 3:20 | proving 31:7,9 | racketeer 16:21 |
| parts 3:11 | 45:2 46:9,11 | proceeding | 31:10 | racketeering |
| party 22:16 | plaintiffs 3:16 | 26:17 | provision 26:6 | 26:10,14 27:20 |
| 35:15,16,16 | 4:2 12:2 13:16 | process 24:3 | 26:19,23 45:24 | 27:23 30:22 |
| pattern 20:15,20 | 16:13 18:9 | procurement | provisions 25:13 | 39:18 41:24 |
| 26:10,14 27:20 | 31:15 34:1 | 33:16 | 26:17 27:8 | 42:1 46:10 |
| 27:20,23 30:22 | 35:1 44:1 | produce 20:1 | proximate 6:24 | racketeers |
| 31:2,3,9 | plaintiff's 4:11 | 30:11 33:23 | 7:6,15,22 | 16:20 17:1 |
| penalty 12:25 | play 14:19 | produces 33:22 | 11:17 14:20 | raised 14:16 |
| 24:4 45:2,17 | plead 13:22 | professional | 15:15 19:14,19 | rate 45:2,17 |
| pendant 16:14 | please 3:10 19:6 | 31:23 | 19:22 22:17,25 | reach 44:11 |
| pending 18:1 | 34:24 | program 24:5 | 23:1 24:18,20 | read 7:5 41:22 |
| people 33:5 | pled 12:6 16:13 | prohibits 20:25 | 29:24 31:5,10 | reading 26:16 |
| 36:23 | 16:18 18:12 | 27:18 | 32:15 34:3,3 | realize 21:15,24 |
| perceived 45:7 | podium 43:23 | proof 13:19 | 34:10 35:10,11 | 30:18 |
| percent 13:1,1,4 | point 5:16 13:25 | proper 19:19 | 39:24 | really 5:13 |
| 23:18,22 24:4 | 13:25 15:17 | properties 24:11 | proximately | 30:11 37:1,4 |
| 24:5 31:18 | 27:25 40:5 | 31:21,24 32:1 | 35:2 | 38:2 40:6 |
| 44:22 45:2,18 | 44:10 45:1 | 32:1 | Prubis 41:15 | 45:10 |
| percentages | pointed 12:7 | property 12:19 | Prupis 9:9,22 | reason 3:17 4:1 |
| 22:7 | points 43:22 | 12:23 13:2 | 25:1 41:18 | 6:14,22 7:5,19 |
| person 5:6 27:7 | position 6:1 15:4 | 21:10,23 23:12 | 42:8,10,11 | 7:23,23 8:25 |
| 37:9 39:15 | 22:5 32:13 | 30:21 31:20 | purpose 12:16 | 9:16,25 17:19 |
| 41:22 | possibly 12:15 | 32:18 | 18:20 | 25:3,11 30:21 |
| personally | 23:22 | prosecuted 7:11 | purposes 18:21 | 35:1 38:6,15 |
| 19:15 | potential 31:15 | 8:15 | 29:12 | 38:18,19 39:23 |
| persons 11:1 | precisely 7:21 | prosecution | putting 10:13 | 39:25 41:12,22 |
| Petitioners 1:4 | predicate 3:17 | 4:17 8:16 16:6 | 12:11 | 41:23 43:15 |
| 1:17 2:4,12 3:8 | 6:21 7:25 | 16:8 | p.m 46:16 | 46:10 |
| | | | | |
| | - | - | - | - |

| | 1 | | 1 | 1 |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| reasons 29:22 | 38:9 39:8 | requires 10:3 | 46:7 | sale 5:5,6 12:8 |
| rebuttal 2:10 | reliance 3:21 | requiring 35:13 | rid 4:6,7 | 45:19 |
| 18:23 40:23 | 4:18,19 6:7,11 | research 31:23 | right 6:19 9:12 | sales 18:12 |
| receive 31:18 | 6:25 7:1,16 | reserve 18:23 | 13:17 14:12 | Salinas 9:8,13 |
| received 4:4 | 10:12 11:8 | respect 35:19 | 22:8 27:12 | 10:8 |
| 19:15 24:13 | 14:19,25 15:14 | 37:25 | 29:17 39:22 | satisfy 23:2 |
| 29:9 | 16:7 17:2,14 | respectfully | 45:4 | 33:19 |
| recklessness | 21:4,9 35:15 | 43:2 | rigorous 29:24 | saying 42:18 |
| 46:3 | 40:1,4 41:8 | Respondents | 33:24 | says 17:22 25:10 |
| recognize 14:22 | relied 3:24 4:3 | 1:19,23 2:6,9 | rival 4:10 | 27:6,6 29:1 |
| recognized | 10:18 11:2 | 18:9 19:4,11 | rivals 4:8,9 | 38:12,19,25 |
| 15:14 30:4,25 | 19:16 26:6 | 19:13,21 24:9 | rival's 29:19 | 39:20 41:21 |
| 32:24 46:2 | 29:10 35:5,9 | 24:16,24 32:3 | roam 8:17 | 42:4 44:18 |
| recognizes 8:22 | 35:13 | 34:11,22 | ROBERTS 3:3 | Scalia 4:24 5:10 |
| record 12:17 | rely 3:13,22 7:8 | response 37:24 | 18:15,24 19:2 | 26:16,22 27:2 |
| 18:11 | 9:1 46:11 | rest 18:23 23:7 | 22:4,19 23:4 | 27:12,15 28:22 |
| recover 6:9 29:8 | relying 3:21 | restrict 15:20 | 23:19 31:12 | 30:10,16 36:17 |
| 36:23 38:18 | 21:7,7 | restrictions | 32:4,21 34:18 | 36:19 37:11 |
| recovery 37:15 | remaining 40:22 | 30:24 31:6 | 35:18 36:10 | scheme 3:18 4:1 |
| 38:3 | remarkable | result 30:12 | 40:20 46:14 | 6:9,17 8:2,23 |
| redress 40:7 | 15:5 | 33:23,23 | room 19:9 | 11:24 21:1,18 |
| refer 11:6 39:24 | remedy 16:18 | resulting 15:10 | rosa 15:24 | 21:21 35:14 |
| 43:3 45:20 | remote 44:5 | results 20:1 | rotation 23:24 | 42:4 |
| reference 38:11 | repeatedly | revolutionary | rotational 11:24 | Schmuck 21:19 |
| 39:19 | 30:25 | 14:24 | 12:6,10 13:23 | se 35:12 39:7 |
| referenced | reply 5:16 12:7 | Rice 5:11 36:9 | 14:1,12 23:16 | secondary 37:19 |
| 28:23 | 13:25 44:3 | RICO 3:13,17 | 23:20 24:6,8 | secondly 28:19 |
| references 5:18 | Reporting 45:24 | 3:20 4:13,17 | 44:21 | section 25:10 |
| referring 8:5 | representation | 5:15 6:20 7:1 | route 13:14 | 38:13 39:9 |
| refers 11:7 | 5:9 10:16 | 7:21,25 9:13 | rule 12:13,15,22 | see 27:14,15,15 |
| 38:24 42:21 | representations | 9:16,23 10:2 | 17:21,22,23,24 | 27:15 38:23 |
| regardless 9:6 | 23:10 | 11:7,18 12:4 | 18:5 23:15,20 | seek 16:21 |
| 32:21 | require 15:14 | 13:20 14:8,22 | 24:8 25:16 | seeks 6:1 |
| registered 31:18 | 17:14 | 15:5,20 16:9 | 30:11 32:5 | sell 5:6 45:8 |
| regular 21:3 | required 3:21 | 16:19 20:8,10 | 33:12 35:12 | sense 21:17 |
| regulate 45:5 | 4:19 6:11,15 | 25:4,20 26:7,9 | 41:12 42:15 | sent 21:10 |
| Rehnquist 16:2 | 16:6,7 25:5 | 28:1,3,5,9,13 | 43:7,18 44:25 | separate 43:11 |
| rein 41:8 | requirement | 28:13,18 29:11 | 45:3,13 46:6,6 | serious 20:18 |
| related 19:9 | 6:14,22,24 | 29:16,20 30:15 | ruled 6:15 9:14 | seriously 23:2 |
| 24:12,13 | 8:20 11:9 | 30:18,20 31:11 | 10:6 | set 11:15 19:22 |
| relation 24:22 | 13:10 14:25 | 32:9,12,20,25 | rules 12:19 24:5 | 23:3 27:10 |
| 30:6 37:22 | 17:2 25:5,23 | 34:6,14,25 | running 37:2,9 | 29:22,23 36:1 |
| relationship 10:7 29:2 | 39:23 40:1 | 35:2,3 38:17 | runs 36:21,21 | share 14:4 |
| | 41:8,11 46:8 | 38:22,22 40:7 | S | shell 18:15 |
| relatively 32:3 relevance 38:1 | requirements 20:15 39:24 | 41:3,6,11,14 41:17,23 44:10 | $\frac{1}{\mathbf{S} 2:1 3:1}$ | sheriff 9:18,19 Sherman 7:20 |
| relevance 38:1 relevant 26:6 | 42:18 44:7 | 44:13,15,18 | Safeco 45:21 | show 12:4 24:10 |
| relevant 20:0 | 42.10 44.7 | 44.13,13,18 | Survey 15.21 | 5110w 12.4 24:10 |
| | | | l | |

| | I | I | 1 | |
|-------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|
| 24:18 25:2 | 19:14 | subsequent | taxes 22:14 | three 11:15,19 |
| 31:25 35:4,10 | standard 7:6 | 18:12 | 23:17 45:9 | 13:5 18:1 |
| 36:16,19,23 | 33:20 | substantial | teach 5:4 | ticket 37:3,12 |
| 44:3 | standards 19:22 | 34:12 | tell 17:3 39:2 | time 5:1 18:23 |
| showed 34:9 | 19:23 24:18 | substantive | tells 38:21 | 23:9,15 45:1 |
| showing 34:7 | 29:23 | 39:14 41:17 | tends 8:16 | today 29:14 |
| shown 44:4 | standing 43:1 | successful 33:9 | term 8:10,11 | told 5:4 8:1 |
| significant | state 16:14 20:4 | 33:9 36:6 | 42:20,23 45:22 | tool 16:20 |
| 20:16 34:7,12 | 22:14 45:13 | successfully | 45:23 46:1,3 | tort 5:21,21 |
| similar 5:12 9:9 | statement 17:6 | 31:7 | terms 7:10 | 10:21 20:22 |
| 12:22 44:25 | 29:9,10,19 | sue 12:3 22:8,13 | 29:14 | 29:15 37:18 |
| simply 8:5,23 | 30:12 37:19 | 22:16,21 23:6 | test 19:19 22:18 | tortious 5:13,20 |
| 18:18 32:12 | 44:14,14 | 23:7 29:19 | 28:19 33:24 | 10:4 16:11,12 |
| 38:25 39:8,13 | statements 15:7 | 33:8 | 34:5,7 | 16:15 20:5,21 |
| 42:21 | 15:10 19:16 | suffered 35:1 | tests 29:24 | torts 29:3 |
| single 31:1 | 22:1 35:5,9 | suffers 10:14 | text 7:7,22 | tortuous 20:5 |
| 42:20 | States 1:1,13,22 | sufficient 11:3 | textual 7:4,13 | totally 41:9 |
| situation 4:21 | 2:8 33:8,13 | 11:17 13:14 | thank 3:9 18:24 | tradition 36:8 |
| 5:12 8:8 9:18 | statute 5:23 6:2 | 14:17 34:13 | 19:1 34:16,18 | 37:17 |
| 11:20 12:25 | 7:7,10,15 9:5 | sufficiently 8:5 | 40:20,25 46:14 | transaction |
| 13:2,11 16:22 | 9:16 10:2 16:8 | suitability 34:1 | THEODORE | 21:10 |
| 17:3 22:6 30:1 | 17:13 20:8,25 | supplier 32:7 | 1:16 2:3,11 3:7 | treasurer 17:22 |
| 31:13 32:7 | 25:15,22 28:2 | suppliers 4:9,12 | 40:23 | 18:2 45:4,5,7 |
| 36:20 37:15 | 28:3,5 29:17 | 15:8 | theory 4:13 | 45:10,12,14,14 |
| 41:6,16,19 | 30:23 38:13,14 | supporting 1:23 | thing 42:9 43:5 | treat 42:25 |
| 45:6 | 38:17,20 39:9 | 2:9 | things 28:6 | treated 43:1 |
| Sixth 15:13 | 39:18 40:8 | suppose 5:20 | 30:17 31:7 | treble 3:12 |
| small 31:20 32:3 | 43:13,15 | 23:19 31:12 | 44:3 | 16:21 |
| 36:1,3 | statutes 5:25 | 32:4 | think 6:10 8:13 | true 14:6,7 19:7 |
| Solicitor 1:20 | 15:23 44:19 | Supreme 1:1,13 | 8:14,15 10:7 | 29:22 40:16 |
| somebody 5:5 | statutory 10:1 | 12:20 13:7 | 11:5,10,19 | try 45:5 |
| 35:5 | 22:20,21 39:7 | 44:23 45:3 | 13:10,18 14:18 | trying 15:22 |
| somewhat 36:18 | step 41:19 42:6 | switch 40:14,17 | 15:24 17:10,15 | 41:3 |
| sorts 16:10 | stopped 24:4 | system 14:1,12 | 17:17,19 18:10 | turns 37:4 |
| sought 32:20 | Storey 32:24 | 24:6 | 30:17 32:10 | two 5:21,21 |
| source 43:20 | structure 38:14 | S.G 41:13 | 36:7 37:13,13 | 13:22 24:4 |
| Souter 7:3,17 | sub 15:24 | | 39:11,12,22 | 28:6 30:17,24 |
| 8:4,12,19 9:2 | submission 21:2 | $\frac{T}{T}$ | 40:6 44:8 | 31:3,17 42:18 |
| 9:10 10:10 | 29:19 | T 2:1,1 | thinks 10:13 | type 8:8 |
| 11:21 12:5,23 | submit 3:22 | tail 21:9 | thought 17:6 | types 12:18 |
| 13:4,8,17 18:6 | 6:24 19:12,17 | take 17:11 42:6 | 21:8 26:17 | |
| 18:8 42:16 | 20:17 31:14 | 42:23 | 45:10 | $\frac{\mathbf{U}}{\mathbf{U}}$ |
| 43:2,10,14 | 34:13 40:16 | takes 13:21 24:4 | thousand 37:3 | ultimately 38:1 |
| speaks 7:10 | 42:8 | 32:12 | thousands 19:10 | unanimous 16:1 |
| specific 24:11 | submitted 19:8 | talking 8:24 | 22:2 24:14 | uncompleted |
| 31:20 | 46:15,17 | 23:20 | threat 31:4 | 8:23 |
| specifically 16:1 | subsections 27:8 | tax 18:21 31:23 | threats 40:12 | understand |
| | | l | l | l |
| | | | | |

| 27:12,22 28:3 | violation 3:17 | 22:20 26:11,12 | 41:20 | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---|
| understanding | 5:23,24 8:6 | 31:19 | 19th 5:18 | |
| 35:21 | 10:21 11:4,8 | work 32:17 | 195 43:25 | |
| unfairly 40:10 | 12:13,15 17:24 | worked 33:1 | 1961 26:18,20 | |
| unfortunately | 18:4,4,5 24:21 | works 38:23 | 38:9,12 40:3 | |
| 33:13 | 24:23 25:3,11 | worry 30:11 | 42:2 | |
| unified 42:23 | 25:12 26:7,8 | wouldn't 32:6 | 1962 38:25 | |
| United 1:1,13,22 | 26:21,25,25 | writing 16:2 | 1962 (c) 26:7,8 | |
| 2:8 | 20.21,25,25 | 0 | | |
| | | wrong 26:17 27:5 | 26:19,21 27:1 | |
| unjust 36:6 | 30:7 31:11 | | 27:6,18,18 | |
| unlawful 10:4 | 35:2,3 38:20 | wrongdoer 9:19 | 39:14 41:21 | |
| 25:24 27:7 | 38:21 39:14,17 | wrongful 9:14 | 1962(d) 25:12 | |
| 39:15 41:5 | 41:17,23 42:21 | wrote 17:22 | 26:21,24 38:21 | |
| unmoor 16:8 | 45:15 | <u> </u> | 41:16 | |
| unmoored 16:4 | violence 26:15 | | 1964 39:23 | |
| unmooring | 27:21 40:12 | x 1:2,8 | 1964(c) 6:22 | |
| 41:14 | virtue 25:23 | Y | 9:25 25:10 | |
| unpaid 45:9 | W | Yeah 13:17 | 38:24 41:23 | |
| unsuccessful | | year 44:23 | 1970 5:15 | |
| 10:22 29:18 | W 1:18 2:5 19:3 | years 13:6,21 | 2 | |
| 33:8 | Wait 36:17 | 15:25 18:1 | | |
| use 13:22 20:6 | want 11:8 45:20 | 20:19 43:16 | 2 27:2,5,11 | |
| 21:15,17,20 | wanted 5:6 | York 5:3,11,16 | 20 44:2 | |
| 40:10,12 | 15:17 | | 2000 13:6 44:23 | |
| user 15:9 | wants 4:6,7 | 22:15,15 | 2008 1:10 | |
| uses 40:16 42:4 | 15:20 | Z | 21 44:2 | |
| 46:3 | Washington 1:9 | zero 12:25 13:1 | 27 33:12 | |
| usual 36:18 | 1:18,21 | 13:4 23:5,11 | 3 | |
| | way 21:23 23:24 | 23:13,18,22 | | |
| V | 24:1 27:10 | 44:21 45:18 | 3 2:4 | |
| v 1:5 | 34:12 35:11 | zero-percent | 34 2:9 | |
| valuable 24:15 | 43:1 44:7,19 | 22:6 24:9 | 4 | |
| value 21:16,24 | ways 45:16 | 22.0 24.9 | 40 2:12 33:12 | |
| 37:1 | weakness 42:16 | 0 | 40 2.12 33.12 46 44:1 | |
| versus 3:4 5:11 | went 34:8 | 07-210 1:5 3:4 | 4044.1 | |
| 8:9 9:9,22 15:6 | weren't 21:6,14 | | 5 | |
| 15:9 25:1 | 23:6 | 1 | 50 31:18 36:11 | |
| 41:15,18 42:8 | We'll 3:3 | 10 31:19 40:22 | | |
| 42:10,11 43:3 | willfulness | 11:10 1:14 3:2 | 6 | |
| 46:2 | 45:23 46:1 | 12:05 46:16 | 622 35:25 | |
| viable 31:13 | winning 37:2 | 1291 35:25 | | |
| victim 12:12 | won 36:24 37:6 | 1341 38:13,16 | 7 | |
| 45:6 | word 25:14,16 | 39:9 | 7 12:8 | |
| view 20:3 38:2 | 27:25 28:5,16 | 14 1:10 | | |
| violate 25:13 | 39:13,16,19,20 | 16 26:8 | | |
| 27:7 39:8 | 42:5 | 18 45:2 | | |
| violates 44:18 | words 13:22 | 19 2:6 39:14 | | |
| | | | | |
| | 1 | 1 | | 1 |