1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 PARENTS INVOLVED IN 3 : 4 COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, : 5 Petitioner : : No. 05-908 6 v. 7 SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT : NO. 1, ET AL. 8 : 9 10 Washington, D.C. Monday, December 4, 2006 11 12 13 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 14 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 15 at 10:01 a.m. 16 APPEARANCES: 17 HARRY J.F. KORRELL, ESQ., Seattle, Wash.; on behalf 18 of the Petitioner. GEN. PAUL D. CLEMENT, ESQ., Solicitor General, 19 20 Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; as 21 amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner. 22 MICHAEL F. MADDEN, ESQ., Seattle, Wash.; on behalf of 23 the Respondent. 24 25

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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (10:01 a.m.) CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument 3 4 first today in 05-908, Parents Involved in Community 5 Schools versus Seattle School District Number 1. 6 Mr. Korrell. 7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF HARRY J.F. KORRELL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 8 9 MR. KORRELL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 10 please the Court. In an effort to achieve its desired racial 11 balance in its popular high schools, the Seattle school 12 district denied over 300 children, both white and 13 14 minority children, admission to their chosen schools 15 solely because of their race and without any individualized consideration. This strikes at the heart 16 17 of the Equal Protection Clause which commands that 18 Government treat people as individuals, not simply as 19 members of a racial class. 20 This fundamental equal protection principle 21 was reiterated in Grutter and in Gratz. The central question in this case is not, as the school district and 22 23 many of its allies suggest, whether integration is 24 important or whether desegregation is compelling. The 25 central question in this case is whether outside of the

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1	remedial context, diversity defined as the school
2	district does, as a white/non-white racial balance, can
3	be a compelling interest that justifies the use of race
4	discrimination in high school admissions.
5	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Korrell
6	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do you disagree in general
7	with the Solicitor General's brief? Do you agree in
8	general with the brief submitted by the Government or do
9	you have differences with it in its approach?
10	MR. KORRELL: Justice Kennedy, we we
11	agree mostly with the Solicitor General's brief. I
12	believe the Solicitor General might take a different
13	position on whether race neutral mechanisms can be used
14	to accomplish race specific purposes.
15	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I can
16	MR. KORRELL: But that's not an issue the
17	court needs to reach in this case.
18	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, it, it is a point
19	that I, I'd like both him and you to discuss at some
20	point during your argument. If can you use race for
21	site selection? When you have, you need to build a new
22	school. There are three sites. One of them would be
23	all one race. Site two would be all the other race.
24	Site three would be a diversity of races. Can the
25	school board with, with the intent to have diversity

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1 pick site number 3? 2 MR. KORRELL: Justice Kennedy, I think the 3 answer turns on the reason that the schools have the racial compositions that they do. 4 5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: It -- there's -- well, we can have all kinds of different hypotheticals, but 6 7 there's residential housing segregation, and it wants, it wants, the board wants to have diversity. 8 9 MR. KORRELL: Your Honor, our position is 10 that if, if the resulting -- if the racial composition 11 of those schools is not the result of past de jure 12 segregation --13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: No. It is a new school. 14 It's a new school. 15 MR. KORRELL: In that case, Your Honor, 16 Parents' position is that the Government can't be in the 17 position of deciding what right racial mix is. 18 JUSTICE KENNEDY: So it'd have to take the 19 three sites, all of them in the hypothetical, all of 20 them equal, and just flip a coin, because otherwise it 21 would be using a --22 MR. KORRELL: Your Honor, obviously it is 23 not the facts of the Seattle case. In the hypothetical 24 Your Honor posits, perhaps the right analogy is 25 something similar to the, a redistricting cases. Where

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1 a court could look at see whether the racial motive was 2 a predominant factor as opposed to -- JUSTICE KENNEDY: 3 No, no. The school board says we want, right up front, we want racial diversity in our new schools. Illicit 4 5 under the Fourteenth Amendment in your case? 6 MR. KORRELL: Your Honor, school districts 7 can do many, many things through race neutral means that 8 they could not do with race discrimination. 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But can they have a race conscious objective? I think that that's the question 10 11 that Justice Kennedy is asking you, and I don't get a 12 clear answer. You say you can't use a racial means. 13 But can you have a racial objective? That is, you want 14 to achieve balance in the schools. 15 MR. KORRELL: Justice Ginsburg, our position 16 is that that is prohibited by the Constitution 17 absent past discrimination. 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: You would object, then, to 19 magnet schools? You would object to any system that is designed to try to cause people voluntarily to go into a 20 21 system that is more racially mixed? 22 MR. KORRELL: Justice Scalia, our objection 23 to the Seattle program is that it is not a race neutral 24 means. 25 JUSTICE SCALIA: No, I understand. But I'm

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1 trying to find what, you know, the outer limits of your 2 contentions are. It doesn't seem to me that your briefs 3 indicated that you would object to something like magnet 4 schools. The -- even if one of the purposes of those 5 schools is to try to cause more white students to go to 6 schools that are predominantly non-white. It's just 7 voluntary, I mean, but the object is to achieve a 8 greater racial mix. 9 MR. KORRELL: Your Honor, we object to 10 the -- if that's the sole goal of a school district 11 absent past discrimination, we object. But that kind of hypothetical situation isn't even necessary for the 12 13 Court to reach. 14 JUSTICE SCALIA: I understand. 15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, it may not be 16 necessary for you but it might be necessary for us when 17 we write the case. We're not writing just on a very 18 fact-specific issue. Of course, the follow-up question, 19 and the Solicitor General can address it too, is this: 20 Assuming some race-conscious measures are permissible to 21 have diversity, isn't it odd to say you can't use race 22 as a means? I mean, that's the next question. That 23 may, in fact, be why you give the -- seem to give the 24 answer that you do. You just don't want to embrace that 25 contradiction.

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1	MR. KORRELL: Your Honor, it is certainly
2	difficult if race if racial balance can be a goal of
3	government, then it is more difficult to defend a racial
4	balancing plan as unconstitutional, or to attack one as
5	constitutional.
6	JUSTICE KENNEDY: That is true.
7	MR. KORRELL: And this Court has said
8	repeatedly that racial balancing is unconstitutional.
9	JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, we have said it
10	repeatedly in contexts different from this. I mean, the
11	paradigm context in which we made remarks to that
12	effect, stated that, are affirmative action cases. The
13	point of the affirmative action case is that some
14	criterion which otherwise would be the appropriate
15	criterion of selection is being displaced by a racial
16	mix criterion. That is not what is happening here.
17	This is not an affirmative action case.
18	So why should the statements that have been
19	made in these entirely different contexts necessarily
20	decide this case?
21	MR. KORRELL: Justice Souter, we disagree
22	that the analysis in the Grutter and Gratz cases is
23	entirely different from the analysis in this case.
24	JUSTICE GINSBURG: But don't you agree that
25	those cases left someone out of the picture entirely

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because we were talking about a selection of one person or another? The word "sorting" has been used in this context because everybody gets to go to school. Indeed, they are required to go to school. So no one gets left out of the system, and I think there have been Court of Appeals judges who have noted. We have never had that case before, not like the affirmative action cases.

8 MR. KORRELL: Your Honor, I agree that this Court has not had a case like this before. I disagree, 9 10 however, that it's not like the Grutter or Gratz 11 decision. The plaintiff in Gratz, as the Court is 12 aware, attended the University of Michigan at Dearborn. 13 He got into a school. He didn't get into the school 14 that he wanted to go to. Similarly, in our case, with 15 the plaintiffs, they wanted to go to their preferred 16 schools, schools that the school district acknowledges 17 provided different educational opportunities, produced 18 different educational outcomes, and they were preferable 19 to the parents and children who wanted to go.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Why do you agree that this is not an affirmative action case? Is it not? Wherein does it differ? I thought that the school district was selecting some people because they wanted a certain racial mix in the schools, and were taking the affirmative action of giving a preference to students of

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1 a certain race. Why isn't -- why doesn't that qualify 2 as affirmative action? 3 MR. KORRELL: If that's what affirmative 4 action is, Your Honor, then --5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I don't know what 6 else it is. What do you think it is that causes you to 7 seemingly accept the characterization that this is not 8 it? 9 MR. KORRELL: Your Honor, perhaps I 10 misspoke. I didn't mean to accept the characterization 11 that this case is not at all --12 JUSTICE SOUTER: Let me help you out by 13 taking you back to my question. One of the 14 characteristics of the affirmative action cases was the 15 displacement of some other otherwise generally 16 acknowledged relevant criterion such as ability as shown 17 in test scores, grade point averages, things like that; 18 and that was a characteristic of those cases. 19 It is not a characteristic of this case, as 20 I understand it. MR. KORRELL: I'm not sure that's exactly 21 22 right, Your Honor. In this case, the school district 23 admitted in the response to request for admissions that 24 had the identified children been of a different race, 25 they would have been admitted into the schools.

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1	JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought there was a
2	criterion here, and that is, you can go to whatever
3	school you want. You are allowed to go to a certain
4	choice of school. The criterion was your choice.
5	MR. KORRELL: Justice Scalia, you're right.
6	And there's another criterion which I think is getting
7	to Justice
8	JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, when you state
9	Justice Scalia is right, you are assuming, I think as
10	your brief assumed, that the definition of the benefit
11	to be received here is the active choice, not the
12	provision of an education.
13	Now the active choice may be of value. I do
14	not suggest that it is not. Clearly the school district
15	thinks it does or it wouldn't provide choice. But it is
16	not the entire benefit that is being provided, and the
17	principal benefit is the education, not the choice of
18	schools. Isn't that correct?
19	MR. KORRELL: Your Honor, they are both
20	benefits. I would point Your Honor back to this Court's
21	decision in Gratz, where the same analysis would apply.
22	And if Your Honor's analysis is correct, that would
23	mean, I think, that the Gratz case would have been
24	decided differently.
25	JUSTICE BREYER: But I think that the point

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1 that Justice Souter is trying to make, as I understand 2 it, is of course there are similarities to Gratz, they 3 can choose, but there's a big difference. The 4 similarity in Grutter, or the difference in Grutter and 5 Gratz is that you had to prod a school that was supposed to be better than others, that the members of that 6 7 school, the faculty and the administration tried to make it better than others. It was an elite merit selection 8 academy. And if you put the black person in, the white 9 10 person can't get the benefit of that.

11 Here we have no merit selection system. 12 Merit is not an issue. The object of the people who run 13 this place is not to create a school better than others, 14 it is to equalize the schools. That's in principle and 15 in practice, if you look at the numbers, you see that 16 the six schools that were at the top, their position 17 would shift radically from year to year, preferences was 18 about equal among them. They have the same curriculum, 19 they have similar faculties, and I don't think anyone 20 can say either in theory or in practice, that one of 21 these schools happened to be like that prize of 22 University of Michigan, a merit selection system. That, 23 I think, was a major difference that he was getting at, 24 why is this not the same kind of thing? That was at 25 issue in Grutter and Gratz. Now what is your response

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1 to that?

2	MR. KORRELL: Your Honor, we have several
3	responses. The first is that the premise of Your
4	Honor's question is that the schools are in essence
5	fungible for purposes of providing a high school
6	education. And I would direct Your Honor to the
7	District Court judge's decision, a footnote in the
8	decision in which she acknowledged that the schools were
9	not of equal quality, that they provided different
10	levels of education.
11	JUSTICE SCALIA: Of course they're not.
12	That's why some of them were oversubscribed. That's why
13	others were undersubscribed.
14	JUSTICE BREYER: I didn't say that they
15	were. What I said was that the object of the school
16	board and the administering authority was to make them
17	roughly equal. I said that in terms of curriculum and
18	faculty, they're about roughly equal. And in terms of
19	choice, what you see is a wide variation in choice by
20	those who want to go as to which is their preference
21	among six schools over a period of five years.
22	And that suggests a rough effort to create
23	the equality, not an effort as in Michigan, to run a
24	merit selection system.
25	MR. KORRELL: I agree with Your Honor that

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1 there's not a merit selection system in --

JUSTICE BREYER: Fine. Now the question is, why doesn't that fact that this is not a merit selection system put a different kind of thing, a sorting system or a system designed to maintain a degree of integration, why doesn't that difference make a difference?

8 MR. KORRELL: Your Honor, I think that the fundamental command of the Equal Protection Clause is 9 10 that government treats as individuals, not as members of 11 a racial group. And that command I don't think is suspended because of the nature of a school's admissions 12 13 process. That right is still possessed by the 14 individual students, and if a student is entitled to be 15 treated as an individual as opposed to a member of a 16 racial group at a university level, it's Parents' 17 position they are entitled to that same protection at 18 the high school level.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Korrell, before your time runs out, I did want to clarify something about the standing of the plaintiffs here.

Do I understand correctly that none of the parents who originally brought this lawsuit have children who are now pre-ninth grade, but that newcomers, people who recently joined, do have children

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1 of pre-ninth grade age? 2 MR. KORRELL: Your Honor, that is mostly 3 correct. There is also a family that joined the parents association back in 2000 that has a child in seventh 4 5 grade, that will be approaching high school by the time this Court decides the case. 6 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But the lawsuit was 8 originally brought by a corporate entity, correct? 9 MR. KORRELL: That's correct, Your Honor. 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Not by individual 11 parents. 12 MR. KORRELL: That's correct. 13 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But you don't dispute 14 that membership, for standing purposes, the membership 15 is what counts, not the association but the members? 16 MR. KORRELL: Your Honor, my understanding 17 of the Court's jurisprudence on associational standing 18 is as long as a member of the association has standing, 19 then the association has it. We submit that that has 20 been established by the complaint, the interrogatory 21 responses, and --22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, if it is a member, 23 jurisdictional questions generally, don't we go by what 24 the membership was when the complaint was filed and not 25 what it has become in the course of the litigation?

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1	MR. KORRELL: I don't think that's right,
2	Your Honor. We cited to the Court the Pannell case, the
3	Associated General Contractors case, and Roe versus
4	Wade, all of which look at post-filing factors to
5	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes, but the transaction
6	case situation is different.
7	MR. KORRELL: You're right, Your Honor, none
8	of those were class action cases. Pannell and
9	Associated General Contractors were association cases
10	much like this one. Roe, of course, was individual
11	plaintiffs.
12	JUSTICE STEVENS: I have a question. Does
13	the record tell us, the 300 people who have failed to
14	get into the schools they wanted, the racial composition
15	of that group?
16	MR. KORRELL: It does, Justice Stevens. The
17	record shows that 100, roughly 100 students who were
18	denied admission to their preferred schools were
19	non-white and roughly 200 who were denied admission were
20	white students.
21	If there are no further questions, Mr. Chief
22	Justice, I will reserve the balance of my time.
23	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
24	General Clement.
25	ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

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1	ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE
2	SUPPORTING THE PETITIONER
3	GENERAL CLEMENT: Mr. Chief Justice, and may
4	it please the Court:
5	Respondents assert an interest in addressing

the most racially isolated schools in the district, yet 6 7 their plan does not address the two most racially 8 concentrated high schools in their district. They likewise have certain interests in diversity, yet their 9 10 plan does not directly address diversity other than pure 11 racial diversity, and they do nothing to assemble the kind of critical mass that was at issue in the Grutter 12 13 case.

14 In fact, if you look at the program and how 15 it operates in practice, the triggering critical mass 16 for the use of the racial tie breaker is when a 17 student -- when a school has less than 25 percent white 18 students or when it has less than 45 percent non-white 19 students. There is nothing in the record or in social science that suggests that there's a radical difference 20 21 in the critical mass based on the race of the students. 22 Of course what explains that difference in 23 the triggering critical mass of white students versus 24 non-white students, the answer to that does not lie in 25 educational theory, the answer lies in the demographics

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of the district. The district happens to have 25
 percent more non-white students than white students, so
 they trigger the race tie breaker at a different point
 under those circumstances.

5 With all respect to respondents, the answer 6 to how this program works lies not in diversity but in 7 demographics. They are clearly working backwards from 8 the overall demographics of the school district rather 9 than working forward to any clearly articulated 10 pedagogical role.

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, if I could get back to Justice Kennedy's question earlier, how do 12 13 you distinguish decisions like citing magnet schools, 14 clustering, from the consideration of race in this case? GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, Mr. Chief Justice, I 15 16 think that those decisions are different primarily 17 because the resulting decision is not a racial 18 classification. And if you think about it, when you had 19 an overt racial classification, like you clearly do in 20 these cases, then you naturally ask the strict scrutiny 21 questions and look for a compelling interest. If instead you start with a race-neutral government action 22 23 that doesn't classify people directly based on race, 24 then I suppose you could try to do some kind of 25 Arlington Heights-Washington Davis type analysis.

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1	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, what would you do
2	with strategic site selection in order to create racial
3	diversity?
4	GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, Justice Kennedy, I
5	think
6	JUSTICE KENNEDY: I mean, that's expressed
7	and principal purpose. You know the hypothetical.
8	GENERAL CLEMENT: Okay. And Justice
9	Kennedy, I will answer the hypo, but let me say it's
10	easy for purposes of the hypo to say the sole reason was
11	for race. In the real world, in fact I can't imagine
12	that a site decision won't be based at least in part on
13	concerns about the overall educational benefits. And I
14	think that's important. The reason I start with that
15	preface is because when you have mixed motives and a
16	variety of factors I think you'd be unlikely to strike
17	down that kind of motive.
18	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Are you suggesting there
19	was no consideration of overall educational benefits in
20	this plan?
21	GENERAL CLEMENT: No, Justice Stevens. I'm
22	saying you start at a different departure point when you
23	have an express racial classification. I think I'm
24	trying to answer Justice Kennedy's question about what
25	if you have a sort of a race-conscious goal at some

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1 level and that's why you select a particular site or you 2 decide that you're going to invest in magnet schools and 3 want to put a magnet school in a particular school 4 district. My humble point is simply that in the real 5 world I think you're unlikely to have the pure racial 6 motive type objective. I would say that --7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Suppose it was faculty, 8 and the school district makes a deliberate effort to have members of the white race and members of other 9 races represented in -- on the faculty of every school, 10 11 so you won't have one school with all white teachers, so 12 that you'll have a mix, and that's quite explicit. 13 That's their objective and they're using a racial 14 criterion criterion to get there. 15 Would that be impermissible, to have a mix 16 of teachers in all the schools? 17 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, Justice Ginsburg, I 18 think if what they wanted to do is have an mix of 19 teachers that might be okay. If they're going to start 20 assigning teachers to particular schools and have sort of racial quotas for the faculty at various schools, I 21 think that crosses a line. 22 23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, what would be okay? 24 How would you get there other than having -- the point 25 I'm trying to make has been made by others. Let me read

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1 from Judge Boudin's decision. He says: "The choice is 2 between openly using race as a criterion or concealing 3 it through some clumsy or proxy device."

4 If you want to have an integrated school and 5 you site the schools deliberately to achieve that objective, it's very hard for me to see how you can have 6 7 a racial objective but a nonracial means to get there. 8 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, with respect, Justice Ginsburg, I think there's a fundamental 9 10 difference between how the same intent with two 11 programs, there's a fundamental difference if one of them necessarily classifies people on the basis of their 12 13 skin color and the other does not.

JUSTICE SCALIA: General Clement, is there anything unconstitutional about desiring a mingling of the races and establishing policies which achieve that result but which do not single out individuals and disqualify them for certain things because of their race? Is there anything wrong with a policy of wanting to have racial mix?

GENERAL CLEMENT: Justice Scalia, we would take the position that there's not and that there's a fundamental difference between whether or not the policy manages to avoid classifying people on the basis of their race.

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1	JUSTICE KENNEDY: At page 7 of your brief
2	you say: "School districts have an unquestioned
3	interest in reducing minority isolation." If I put a
4	period in there, then I would get to my strategic site
5	selection, and I still haven't got your answer on that.
6	You don't put a period there. You say: "have an
7	unquestioned interest in reducing minority isolation
8	through race-neutral means." And this brings up this
9	same question Justice Ginsburg had. Isn't it odd
10	jurisprudence where we have an objective that we state
11	in one set of terms but a means for achieving it in
12	another set of terms, unless your answer is that
13	individual classification by race is, is impermissible,
14	but other, more broad measures based on, with a racial
15	purpose are all right?
1.0	

16 GENERAL CLEMENT: I think that's ultimately 17 the answer, Justice Kennedy, which is there's a 18 fundamental difference between classifying people and having the real world effect. I mean, in this case 19 20 don't forget that there were 89 minority students that 21 wanted to attend Franklin High School. They could not 22 solely because of their race. At the same time, every 23 white student who applied to Franklin High School was 24 allowed in solely base would on their race.

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JUSTICE KENNEDY: And what is the answer to

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1 my strategic site selection hypothetical?

2 GENERAL CLEMENT: We would say that's fine.
3 We would say that that is permissible, for the school to
4 pursue that.

5 Just to get back, though, again, we say that 6 that avoiding racial isolation is -- I just want to make 7 the point, we say that racial isolation is an important government interest. I think if you put this plan up 8 against that objective, it solely fails, because there 9 10 are two high schools that I think you would look at as being racially isolated. They're Cleveland n Rainier 11 Beach, and this plan does nothing to directly address 12 13 those high schools.

14 JUSTICE SOUTER: My question is really Judge 15 Boudin's question. You are in effect saying that by 16 siting the school they can achieve exactly the objective 17 they are seeking here. It's a question of do the -- the 18 question comes down to whether they can do it candidly 19 or do it by clumsier. That is, it seems to me, an 20 unacceptable basis to draw a constitutional line. 21 GENERAL CLEMENT: With respect, 22 Justice Souter, first of all I think the kind of 23 interests we're talking about, avoiding racial isolation 24 and the like, do not lend themselves to absolutely 25 targeted, it has to be 15 percent, it has to be 50, it

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1 has to be 25, it has to be 45. I would actually suggest 2 that the danger is in the opposite direction. 3 JUSTICE SOUTER: That isn't what they said I mean, they were dealing with a zone within 4 here. 5 which they operated, and it was only when the numbers 6 got to the outer limits that they said, okay, we're 7 going to use a racial criterion to prevent anything 8 more, any more extreme disparity. 9 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, I mean, in the 10 second stage --11 JUSTICE SOUTER: That's what they do when they site the school. They said, you know, we'll get a 12 13 rough whatever it is, 40-60 mix. 14 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, I think in the 15 second case you'll see that, you know, the same logic 16 that leads to this leads itself to stricter bands. But 17 let me say, I would have thought the analysis would run 18 the exact opposite way, and I would think that if you 19 got to the point, which the Ninth Circuit did on page 20 58-A of its opinion, where it says, you know, with this 21 objective that we've allowed, the most narrowly tailored 22 way to get there is to expressly use race. I would have 23 thought that might have suggested there was something 24 wrong with the compelling interest, if that's the way --25 JUSTICE BREYER: While you're talking about

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1 the way, let me ask a practical question. 35 years ago 2 in Swann, this Court said that a school board, 3 particularly an elected one -- it didn't say that 4 -- "could well conclude that to prepare students to live 5 in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting 6 7 the proportion of the district as a whole." Far more radical than anything that's at issue here. 8 9 Then it adds: "To do this as an educational 10 policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities." That's what this Court said 35 11 years ago. Thousands of school districts across the 12 13 country, we're told, have relied on that statement in an 14 opinion to try to bring about a degree of integration. 15 You can answer this in the next case if you want. So 16 think about it. 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You can answer in 18 this case, General. 19 (Laughter.) 20 JUSTICE BREYER: My question, of course, is 21 simply this. When you have thousands of school 22 districts relying on this to get a degree of integration 23 in the United States of America, what are you telling 24 this Court is going to happen when we start suddenly 25 making -- departing from the case? Do you want us to

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1	overrule it? Why? Why practically?
2	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: General?
3	GENERAL CLEMENT: If I could answer the
4	question, I think that the fact that you point to the
5	specific language of Swann is helpful, because the Court
6	there in dictum I think everybody would agrees that
7	was dictum said that you could achieve a prescribed
8	ratio. And that's exactly where the logic of the other
9	side, of the Ninth Circuit, of Judge Boudin, with all
10	respect, that's where it takes you.
11	And I think anybody that relied on that
12	language in the wake of cases like Crosson, in the wake
13	of Freeman against Pitts, that said achieving a racial
14	balance for its own sake is not constitutional, and
15	Bakke and Grutter against Gratz, that all said that
16	racial balancing is verboten, I think those school
17	districts would have been misguided in relying on that
18	language. Thank you.
19	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, General.
20	Mr. Madden.
21	ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL F. MADDEN
22	ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS
23	MR. MADDEN: Mr. Chief Justice and may it
24	please the Court:
25	When Seattle was last before this Court you

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1 struck down a State law that prevented bussing for 2 integration purposes because that law prevented the 3 school board from seeking to provide the educational 4 benefits of integrated schools. At that time you said 5 it was clear enough that all children benefit from exposure to ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom 6 7 by preparing them for citizenship in our pluralistic 8 society and teaching them to live in harmony and mutual 9 respect.

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Madden, that's certainly an admirable goal. Could a local unit, a 11 12 municipality, or even a State have another goal? Let's 13 say what used to be great about the United States was 14 the presence of various ethnic groups. I mean, there 15 were the Pennsylvania Dutch, there were the Amish, there 16 were Little Italy's, there were Chinatowns, and these 17 things are beginning to disappear. And we think that we 18 should encourage the continuation of that diversity, as 19 the Federal Government has done with respect to American 20 Indian tribes.

And therefore, we're going to use public funds for such things as street festivals, a Chinatown street festival, an Italian street festival. We're going to encourage those organizations that maintain that separateness.

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1 Is there anything unconstitutional about 2 that objective? 3 MR. MADDEN: Providing funding for street 4 festivals? 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: About the objective? I 6 mean, think we should foster separateness? Is there 7 anything wrong --8 MR. MADDEN: I think that in the context that you've described it that would be constitutionally 9 10 very problematic. JUSTICE SCALIA: Fine -- it would be 11 12 problematic? 13 MR. MADDEN: Yes. 14 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why? MR. MADDEN: Because I can conceive that 15 16 it's not -- unlike education, where the goal is to 17 educate the entire community and to help to prepare the 18 community, the students to live in that community, it's 19 not a traditional role of government --20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well then, let me change 21 Justice --22 JUSTICE SCALIA: Please let me finish the 23 line of questioning. 24 Assume with me that it is not an unconstitutional objective, which I am sure it's not. 25

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1 Could the -- could the government achieve that objective 2 by barring people from moving into Little Italy or 3 giving a preference to some people to buy real estate in 4 Little Italy if they are of Italian ancestry? Could it 5 do that? Absolutely not, right? 6 MR. MADDEN: I would agree with you. 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: So it would appear that even if the objective is okay, you cannot achieve it by 8 any means whatever. And the mere fact that the 9 10 objective of achieving a diverse balanced society is 11 perfectly all right, although certainly not the only objective in the world. The mere fact that it's okay 12 13 doesn't mean you can achieve it by any means whatever? 14 MR. MADDEN: I would submit that there's a 15 fundamental difference between the circumstances you've 16 described and a school system which takes all comers and 17 is tasked to educate them by preparing them to live in a 18 pluralistic society. 19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, my slight 20 modification of Justice Scalia's hypothetical -- and it 21 proceeds on the same theory -- is suppose there's a huge demand for housing. A developer has a plan to build 500 22 23 units. Can the city say, we'll grant you the permit on 24 the ground, on the condition that 30 percent of all the 25 houses go to minorities? That means people will live

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together. Then we can have a school, a school that can
 be diverse.
 MR. MADDEN: I would say not, because

MR. MADDEN: I would say not, because housing decisions are inherently private, unlike public education. And there's no way to know how those benefits are being distributed, if they're going to be comparable. I would say no, it is not comparable to the schools.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, your system is theone that gives a choice to the individuals.

11 MR. MADDEN: It does, and when there are 12 more choices than there are seats available.

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Does that make a 14 difference? What if you adopted a plan that insisted on 15 a more or less rigid 60-40 ratio at every school and 16 assignments were made on that basis. It was not a 17 follow-on to a choice system. 18 MR. MADDEN: Well, I think --

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Would that be

20 unconstitutional?

21 MR. MADDEN: Excuse me, Mr. Chief Justice.
22 I'm sorry to interrupt.

I think in each circumstance it depends on the status of the school system.

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The same -- the

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1 facts are otherwise the same, except you conclude that 2 private choice contributes to further division rather 3 than integration and so the assignments are made on a 4 60-40 basis.

5 MR. MADDEN: I think that is roughly the 6 circumstance that existed in the first Seattle case, 7 Mr. Chief Justice. And additionally, I think that you then have to move into the realm of what's 8 constitutionally permissible and can in a 9 10 constitutionally permissible use of race a school system 11 accommodate other values like choice and neighborhood 12 ties and family connections to the school system. 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I still don't have 14 your answer. 15 Is strict assignment 60-40 without regard to 16 choice constitutional or not? 17 MR. MADDEN: I -- I would want to know more 18 about the system because I think strictly if there's 19 nothing else and there's no flexibility, I think it 20 presents narrow tailoring problems. 21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And how does this not present narrow tailoring problems if -- if the --22 23 when you get to the fact of choice, the sole criteria at 24 that level is the same as would be the case in a 60-4025 assignment.

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1	MR. MADDEN: Well, we have accommodated	
2	choice to the extent there are seats available. And	
3	then we go to family connections. And then we in	
4	operation, admit everyone who lives close to the school.	
5	And then as to those that live further away, we look to	
6	see what's the school's racial demographic. Is it	
7	significantly different than the community's? These	
8	schools we have talked about have been the objects of	
9	significantly more aggressive segregation efforts, and	
10	the board wanted to preserve those.	
11	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: One of the, one of	
12	the factors our prior cases looked to was whether the	
13	plan has a logical end point. What is the logical end	
14	point in this plan?	
15	MR. MADDEN: Well, the board actually at	
16	every turn reflected in the record discussed whether it	
17	was necessary to continue the use of race, whether to	
18	narrow it, and eventually to end it. And I think it is	
19	in the joint appendix at 408, the superintendent's	
20	testimony of the, simultaneously the measures that the	
21	board was implementing in terms of resource allocation,	
22	implementation of new programs, because they realized	
23	that by diversifying choice, they could hopefully	
24	achieve some of these same ends, not as quickly, not as	
25	efficiently, but that they could achieve them. That's	

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1 been indeed the entire trajectory of Seattle's 2 integration efforts since the first Seattle plan. JUSTICE KENNEDY: But in Grutter we said, to 3 shorten it just a little bit, at page 329-330 of the 4 5 U.S. Reports, 539, "the law school's interest is not 6 simply to assure within its student body some specified 7 percentage of a particular group because of race ... 8 that would amount to outright racial balancing which is patently unconstitutional." And that seems to be what 9 10 you have here. 11 MR. MADDEN: I think that the term racial 12 balancing has two significant meanings. One is a plan 13 that does not foster a compelling interest. And second, 14 a plan that is too rigid, a guota, for instance, that 15 might not pass narrow tailoring given the context. 16 In this case we're not after a rigid set of 17 numbers, and certainly not after a rigid set of numbers 18 for their own sake. The purpose was to have schools that had become diverse through integration efforts not 19 20 stray too far from the community's demographic because 21 we're trying to prepare students to live in those 22 communities. 23 JUSTICE KENNEDY: The problem is that unlike 24 strategic siting, magnet schools, special resources, 25 special programs in some schools, you're characterizing

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each student by reason of the color of his or her skin.
That is quite a different means. And it
seems to me that that should only be, if ever allowed,
allowed as a last resort.

5 MR. MADDEN: The board here was trying to 6 distribute, sort out seats that were available at these 7 popular schools; and so it devised a system whereby 8 every student had the opportunity to be assigned to at least one of those popular schools; and as far as the 9 10 record shows in plaintiffs' briefing, there's no 11 material differences between those -- those popular 12 schools.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you have quotas for, for racial hiring of your faculty in these schools? MR. MADDEN: No.

16 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why not?

17 MR. MADDEN: I don't think the board has 18 ever found that necessary to, to achieve diversity in 19 the faculty.

JUSTICE BREYER: Justice Kennedy's question, I think, was is this basically a kind of last report? Or how close to a has resort is it? What's the history of this? I thought the history involved a lawsuit to desegregate the schools, a much more rigid system of racial -- abuse of race. Ultimately you come to this.

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1 Now you stop this. And what happened after you stopped 2 it? 3 MR. MADDEN: What happened is that, that it 4 ___ 5 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, what is the history 6 basically? Am I right? 7 MR. MADDEN: The history is that the board 8 had both narrowed the use of the integration tie breaker in '99 and 2000 and then continued it for the 2001 9 10 school year. We were -- in 2000-2001 school year, we 11 were enjoined in 2001 to use it in that year, which was considerably disruptive. But the board was also, the 12 13 measures that it had implemented, implementing magnet 14 schools at Rainier Beach and Chief South high schools in 15 the South End, implementing it in --16 JUSTICE BREYER: But that's not what I'm 17 thinking. 18 MR. MADDEN: I'm sorry. 19 JUSTICE BREYER: I mean I'm thinking that, I 20 thought as I read this, and you have to correct me 21 because you have a better knowledge, originally the 22 schools were highly segregated in fact. People brought 23 a lawsuit. Then to stop that Seattle engaged in a plan 24 that really bused people around on the basis of race. 25 That led to white flight. That was bad for the schools.

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They then tried a voluntary choice plan. This is part of that plan. Then when they abandon this plan, they discover more segregation. Is that basically right or not?

5 MR. MADDEN: When, when this plan has --6 this -- the description is yes, basically right. 7 When this plan was suspended in, after the 8 Court of Appeals enjoined it, the board had, as I said, experienced some considerable disruption in the 9 10 assignments because of the timing of the injunction. 11 But the board was also looking at the effect of the 12 race-neutral, if you will, program measures that it had 13 implemented.

14 Such that now, Ingram high school in the 15 north end of Seattle is much more popular. Nathan Hale 16 is no longer over-subscribed. There's less demand for 17 Ballard, but there have been --

JUSTICE ALITO: Do you think your, do you think your schools as they are operated now are segregated?

21 MR. MADDEN: We have some change of 22 conditions, but the basic conditions remain, the trends 23 has not been positive. For example, and I think that 24 the petitioner picked --

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: To say segregated,

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segregated -- you refer to some of the schools as segregated. And I, that's not what I understand by segregated.

4 MR. MADDEN: Not, not in the sense --5 JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, you know, if you 6 belong to a country club that, that -- that has 15 7 percent black members, I would not consider that a segregated country club. So what you are complaining 8 about is, is not segregation in any, in any reasonable 9 10 sense of the word. You're complaining about a lack of racial balance. 11 12 MR. MADDEN: We are not complaining about 13 segregation resulting from purposeful discrimination.

14 That's --

15 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's the only meaning of 16 segregation.

17 MR. MADDEN: I --

18 JUSTICE SCALIA: You're talking about racial 19 balance.

20 MR. MADDEN: Talking about schools that are 21 on the one end racially isolated. The Solicitor General 22 mentioned two of those. And talking on the other end 23 about preserving the diversity that we had achieved 24 through these years of effort in these north end 25 schools.

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1 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I think you're also 2 ___ 3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Justice Alito and Justice Brever and I myself am interested: Can you tell us what 4 5 has happened since the plan's been enjoined? 6 MR. MADDEN: Yes. 7 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I mean, have you gone back 8 to square one? And it's just, there's no diversity at all? Or is there substantially more diversity? Can you 9 10 tell us about that? Because it's important. It may mean that you don't need to identify students by the 11 color of their skin in assignment. 12 13 MR. MADDEN: It, it may mean the board 14 confronted with the circumstances might well make that 15 decision independent of this litigation. But let me 16 answer the specific. 17 Let's take Franklin High School to begin 18 with. In, in 2000, that school was -- had 25 percent 19 white enrollment. In 2005, it had 10 percent white 20 enrollment. In the ninth grade, which is really the, 21 the level at which we see the effect of the segregation tie breaker, in 2000, the white enrollment was 21 22 23 percent; it was 8 percent in 2005. 24 Go to Ballard High School on the other end. 25 Ballard was 56 percent white students in 2000; it's 62

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percent in 2005. The ninth grade class has moved from 46 percent white students to 58 percent white students. Keeping in mind that that school is now significantly less popular than it was, I think those effects would probably be, be more extreme.

But the plan -- I want to emphasize, the plan was to try to disperse demand and to foster choices that would result in diversity, not to compel it. We do not --

10 JUSTICE ALITO: How do, how do you square 11 your objective of achieving racial balance with your disinterest in the situation at Cleveland and Rainier 12 13 Beach? Those are the most unbalanced schools under your 14 definition, and yet those are not affected at all by 15 Why, why are you not concerned about that? this plan. GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, they are affected by 16 17 the plan in this in this way, that in the past the 18 district had used mandatory measures, busing students 19 across town, to try to integrate those schools. And the 20 board decided after many years of effort that it would 21 no longer do that, but it was also of the firm conviction that it would allow students who wanted the 22 23 opportunity to opt out of those schools to do so. 24 At the same time, it implemented magnet 25 schools at Rainier Beach, there's a new building under

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1 construction at Cleveland. And so --JUSTICE ALITO: Are the students who are 2 3 attending those schools getting the benefits of 4 attending a school that's racially balanced? And if 5 they're not, why are you not concerned about that, if 6 that's an important objective of your program? 7 MR. MADDEN: We, we are concerned about 8 improving the quality of education in all the schools. We do not mandate that a student attend a school for 9 10 integration purposes as we once did. 11 JUSTICE SOUTER: Why? 12 MR. MADDEN: Because it, it's important to 13 the credibility and functionality of the school system 14 to have a system that is accepted by the public, by our 15 constituents. And so people like choice; they also like 16 neighborhood schools; they also like diverse schools. 17 And the board recognized when it set about to develop 18 this plan that accommodating all of those values would 19 require some trade-offs. And the board, familiar with 20 the local conditions, familiar with the history, did 21 just that in what I submit was a narrowly tailored and 22 appropriate way. 23 JUSTICE STEVENS: May I go back to the 24 Cleveland school that Justice Alito mentioned? An I 25 correct that there were 16 percent whites under the

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1 plan? And I'm just wondering what happened to it during 2 the last couple of years? 3 MR. MADDEN: Cleveland is now about 8 4 percent. 5 JUSTICE STEVENS: And it was -- about half 6 as many whites as there were under the plan. 7 MR. MADDEN: I don't remember the precise 8 number in 2000, but that sounds about right. 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Madden, there was a 10 question raised about your categories, that is, you have 11 white and then everything else. And it was suggested that if you are looking for diversity, what was -- the 12 13 schools that you just mentioned had a large percentage 14 of Asian-Americans, but they don't count. 15 What is your response to that? 16 MR. MADDEN: Well, the -- the problem that 17 the board was addressing was principally a, a problem of 18 the distribution of white and non-white students. The 19 -- as a generality, 75 percent of all non-white students 20 in the district lived in South Seattle. And that was 21 true for all the ethnic groups except Native Americans, 22 who are a very small --23 JUSTICE ALITO: Why is that a problem? 24 Suppose you have a school in which 60 percent of the 25 students are either of Asian ancestry or Latino

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1 ancestry, and 40 percent are white as you classify 2 people. And there are no African-American students at 3 all. You would consider that to be a racially balanced 4 school, would you not? 5 MR. MADDEN: I would say if that 6 circumstance occurred, that that would be something that 7 the board would have to pay attention to and consider. 8 But the fact of the matter is that --9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Nothing under the 10 plan requires that, does it? 11 MR. MADDEN: No, because the numbers in terms of the distribution of ethnic groups, separate 12 13 ethnic groups and the benefits or impacts of the plan 14 were spread proportionately --15 JUSTICE ALITO: And what is the theory 16 behind that? Is, the theory is it that the white 17 students there or the Asian students or the Latino 18 students would not benefit from having African-American 19 classmates? It is enough if they have either Asian 20 classmates or Latino classmates or white classmates? 21 How do you -- how do square that with your, your 22 objective of providing benefits that flow from racial balance? 23 24 MR. MADDEN: I may, I may have confused the 25 answer to the hypothetical with the, with rationale on

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1	the ground, which was that we did not have that kind of
2	single minority ethnic group disparity existing in any
3	school. I was saying, however, that if that existed, I
4	think that would be something the board would have to be
5	mindful of. As a practical matter, because our
6	non-white ethnic neighborhoods in South Seattle are
7	themselves quite integrated, that the movement under
8	this plan did not produce disparities for or against any
9	particular ethnic group. And so I think in the end it
10	might have been more divisive to have individual
11	tiebreakers for the separate minority ethnic groups.
12	JUSTICE SCALIA: What criteria of race does
13	the school, just out of curiosity, does the school
14	district use? I mean, what if a particular child's
15	grandfather was white? Would he qualify as a white or
16	non-white.
17	MR. MADDEN: I would say well, the answer
18	is
19	JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, there must be some
20	criterion. There are many people of mixed blood.
21	MR. MADDEN: The district has no criteria
22	itself. The district uses classifications that are
23	developed by the Federal Government but allows parents
24	to self identify children.
25	JUSTICE SCALIA: It allows parents to say

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1 I'm white, no matter what? 2 MR. MADDEN: That allows the parents to self 3 identify, and the record in this case through the 4 testimony of petitioner's president is they were aware 5 of no abuse of that. 6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Seems like a big loophole. 7 MR. MADDEN: It seems like one but according 8 to the record, it's not an issue. I'd like to --9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You don't defend the 10 choice policy on the basis that the schools offer 11 education to everyone of the same quality, do you? MR. MADDEN: Oh, yes. Yes. They offer --12 13 the popular schools to which everyone had access under 14 this plan who wanted access, I think it's -- there is no 15 dispute. 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How is that 17 different from the separate but equal argument? In 18 other words, it doesn't matter that they're being 19 assigned on the basis of their race because they're 20 getting the same type of education. 21 MR. MADDEN: Well, because the schools are 22 not racially separate. The goal is to maintain the 23 diversity that existed within a broad range in order to 24 try to obtain the benefits that the educational research 25 show flow from an integrated education.

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1	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Even though in the
2	individual cases the students, including minority
3	students, and I gather 89 to 100 of the cases are being
4	denied admission on the basis of their race?
5	MR. MADDEN: They're not being denied
6	admission. They're being seats are being distributed
7	to them. This is not like
8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: They are being
9	denied admission to the school of their choice?
10	MR. MADDEN: Yes. But this is not like
11	being denied admission to a state's flagship university.
12	I think for that proposition, I would cite Justice
13	Powell's opinion in the Bakke case where he was at some
14	pains to point out that a school integration plan is
15	wholly dissimilar to a selective university admissions
16	plan.
17	JUSTICE ALITO: If we look at the things
18	that Parents are concerned about when they're
19	considering where their children are going to high
20	school, we look at things like SAT scores, for example,
21	or performance on statewide tests, would we see that,
22	the oversubscribed schools and the undersubscribed
23	schools have similar test scores?
24	MR. MADDEN: It depends on what school
25	you're talking about, Justice Alito. In this case, I

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1 think the most important point to start with is that 2 there was no contention that there was any material 3 difference in quality between the five popular high 4 schools.

5 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, if we looked at 6 Garfield and Cleveland, what would we find? 7 MR. MADDEN: You would find a reasonable 8 basis to perceive a quality difference between those two 9 schools, but this plan didn't assign any students to 10 Cleveland.

I want to take a moment, if I can, to turn to the issue of individualized consideration, because so much emphasis has been placed on it in the earlier discussion.

It seems to us, first of all, that this 15 16 Court in Grutter said that not all uses of race trigger 17 the same objections and that the Court must be mindful 18 of the context. This is not, as I've said, a selective 19 or merit-based system where we adjudge one student to be 20 better than the other. We do consider individual 21 factors before we get to race, starting with choice and 22 family connection, and how close you live to the school. 23 But ultimately, this is a distributive system which, as Justice Powell -- as I noted, Justice 24 25 Powell said in the Bakke case, is quite wholly

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dissimilar to a merit or selective-based system. What it seems to us is being suggested by the United States and by the petitioner is a system that would force an individualized merit-based review on any kind of race conscious program, specifically an assignment to public schools.

7 That rule allows the means to define the 8 ends; and it ends up, I think, defeating the purpose 9 that the Court had of not stigmatizing --

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But the reason that 11 our prior tests have focused on individual determination is that the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to 12 13 ensure that people are treated as individuals rather 14 than based on the color of their skin. So saying that this doesn't involve individualized determinations 15 16 simply highlights the fact that the decision to 17 distribute, as you put it, was based on skin color and 18 not any other factor.

MR. MADDEN: Mr. Chief Justice, in Grutter you said specifically that individualized review was required in the context of university admissions. In this context, the kind of review, the specific kind of review that I understand the United States to urge and the petitioner to urge, serves no purpose, and it may itself be stigmatizing in the context of public schools

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1 where everyone gets a seat.

2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You're saying that 3 individual treatment makes no sense in terms of the objective here. I thought that's what you were saying. 4 5 MR. MADDEN: Justice Ginsburg, that is 6 correct. I am saying, however, that this plan, 7 consistent with narrow tailoring, provided consideration of individual circumstances, including an appeal on 8 hardship grounds for someone who felt that they had been 9 10 denied a school that they needed to be in. 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But the emphasis on the 12 fact that everybody gets into a school, it seems to me 13 is misplaced, but the question is whether or not you can 14 get into the school that you really prefer. And that in 15 some cases depends solely on skin color. You know, it's 16 like saying everybody can have a meal but only people 17 with separate skin can get the dessert. 18 MR. MADDEN: Well, like the Michigan cases, 19 sometimes student in the end of the day have an 20 assignment determined by race. Just like in the 21 university cases, at some point race will be a tipping 22 factor. It's different, though, when we put someone in 23 a basically comparable school. 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, you're saying 25 every -- I mean, everyone got a seat in Brown as well;

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but because they were assigned to those seats on the basis of race, it violated equal protection. How is your argument that there's no problem here because everybody gets a seat distinguishable?

5 MR. MADDEN: Because segregation is harmful. 6 Integration, this Court has recognized in Swann, in the 7 first Seattle case, has benefits. The district was --

8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, it seems to me you're saying you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs. 9 Can you think of any area of the law in which we say 10 11 whatever it takes, so long as there's a real need, whatever it takes -- I mean, if we have a lot of crime 12 13 out there and the only way to get rid of it is to use 14 warrantless searches, you know, fudge on some of the 15 protections of the Bill of Rights, whatever it takes, 16 we've got to do it?

17 Is there any area of the law that doesn't 18 have some absolute restrictions?

19 MR. MADDEN: There are many areas of the 20 law, certainly in the First Amendment and the Fourth 21 Amendment, that have considerable flexibility.

JUSTICE SCALIA: But what about the Fourteenth? I thought that was one of the absolute restrictions, that you cannot judge and classify people on the basis of their race. You can pursue the

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objectives that your school board is pursuing, but at some point you come against an absolute, and aren't you just denying that?

4 MR. MADDEN: I think that in Grutter and 5 Gratz, this Court rejected the absolute and instead described discretely, which we feel we need, and which 6 7 is why we are not urging an absolute position. We say that we indeed comply with the requirements of narrow 8 tailoring, and that the plan therefore should be upheld. 9 10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And the question of 11 integration, whether there was any use of a racial 12 criterion, whether integration, using racial integration 13 is the same as segregation, it seems to me is pretty far 14 from the kind of headlines that attended the Brown 15 decision. They were, at last, white and black children 16 together on the same school bench. That seems to be 17 worlds apart from saying we'll separate them. 18 MR. MADDEN: We certainly agree, 19 Justice Ginsburg. We'd go one step further and note 20 that in Brown, this Court said that the effects of 21 segregated schools are worse. 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: There's no effort 23 here on the part of the school to separate students on

24 the basis of race. It's an assignment on the basis of 25 race, correct?

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1	MR. MADDEN: And it is in effect to bring
2	students together in a mix that is not too far from
3	their community.
4	I see that my time has expired. Thank you.
5	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
6	Mr. Madden.
7	Mr. Korrell, you have four minutes
8	remaining.
9	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF HARRY J.F. KORRELL
10	ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
11	MR. KORRELL: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
12	There were some questions of my friend Mr. Madden about
13	the record and the statistics about enrollment, and I'd
14	like to draw the Court's attention, particularly
15	Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens' questions about what
16	the schools look like now.
17	If the Court looks at pages 6 and 7 of our
18	reply brief, we provided the enrollment data. The
19	information on page 7 comes from the school district
20	website that provides enrollment data at the individual
21	schools. In 2005 and 2006, enrollment at the
22	oversubscribed schools is now 54 percent non-white,
23	which is greater than it was under the district's
24	JUSTICE BREYER: This is the as I gather,
25	the plan where race is used, has to do only with the

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1 ninth grade. And therefore, what you would like to note 2 is when you look at the ninth grade after they stopped 3 using any racial criteria at all, what happened to those 4 ninth grade classes. Did they become more heavily 5 separated or did they retain their diversity? Are the 6 numbers that you are about to read us, which I have in 7 front of me, going to do that? Tell us that? I think 8 they're about the whole school.

9 MR. KORRELL: They are, Your Honor, but 10 they're about the whole school after four years of 11 operating without the race preference. So each of the 12 four years they're represented in the aggregate shows 13 the effect that I think Your Honor was asking about.

14 So, the record in this case shows the 15 Seattle schools are richly diverse. It's very important 16 in our view that the Court not lose site of that. We've 17 talked about integration and segregation, but I urge the 18 Court to take a look at the data the petitioners submit 19 regarding the actual enrollment in those schools.

A couple of other record citations I'd like to bring to the Court's attention. Justice Kennedy, I think, asked about considering race at a last resort. It's simply not the case that the school district looked at race as a last resort. And I would draw the Court's attention to the superintendent's testimony at joint

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1	appendix 224 and 25, where he said in essence, the
2	reason we didn't consider race neutral plans is because
3	we were interested in racial diversity.
4	JUSTICE BREYER: The numbers I have here,
5	Franklin went from 25 percent white to 12.7 percent.
6	Roosevelt, which was basically a white school, jumped up
7	from about 51 to 59. Ballard jumped up from about 56 to
8	62. Then Garfield went down some, more mixed. But
9	those were the worst ones; am I right on that?
10	MR. KORRELL: Your Honor, I think the
11	numbers that you're reading are from the difference
12	between the 2000 and '99 and the 2000 enrollments.
13	JUSTICE BREYER: Okay.
14	MR. KORRELL: The numbers I was trying to
14 15	MR. KORRELL: The numbers I was trying to bring to the Court's attention were the difference
15	bring to the Court's attention were the difference
15 16	bring to the Court's attention were the difference between the enrollment under the race-based plan and the
15 16 17	bring to the Court's attention were the difference between the enrollment under the race-based plan and the enrollment in 2005 and 2006, which shows significant and
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15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	bring to the Court's attention were the difference between the enrollment under the race-based plan and the enrollment in 2005 and 2006, which shows significant and continued racial diversity in Seattle's high schools. Counsel suggested also that there is no material difference among the five oversubscribed schools. And I would draw the Court's attention to the testimony of the board president at joint appendix 261

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1 provide unique programs, some of which as we indicated 2 in our briefs, required children to meet certain 3 prerequisites to be able to attend. 4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Was the board 5 simultaneously trying to introduce similar programs or 6 attractive programs in the undersubscribed schools? 7 MR. KORRELL: Your Honor, I'm perhaps not 8 the best person to answer that. I believe the board has 9 been trying to introduce programs at all of its schools 10 that would make each school unique, and I think that includes the undersubscribed schools as well. 11 12 Justice Brever asked a question about the --13 about the process of this litigation, and my 14 understanding is there was never a lawsuit against 15 Seattle to compel desegregation, that they were always 16 following a plan. 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. 18 The case is submitted. 19 (Whereupon, at 11:02 a.m., the case in the 20 above-entitled matter was submitted.) 21 22 23 24 25

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