

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
UNITED STATES

CAPTION: TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., ET AL.,
Appellants v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, ET AL.

CASE NO. No. 93-44

PLACE: Washington, D.C.

DATE: Wednesday, January 12, 1994

PAGES: 1-48

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY

1111 14TH STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-5650

202 289-2260

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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3 TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, :
4 INC., ET AL., :
5 Appellants :
6 v. : No. 93-44
7 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS :
8 COMMISSION, ET AL. :
9 - - - - -X

10 Washington, D.C.

11 Wednesday, January 12, 1994

12 The above-entitled matter came on for oral
13 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at
14 10:02 a.m.

15 APPEARANCES:

16 H. BARTOW FARR, III, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of
17 the Appellants.

18 DREW S. DAYS, III, ESQ., Solicitor General, Department of
19 Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the
20 Appellees.

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (10:02 a.m.)

3 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We'll hear argument
4 first this morning in Number 93-44, the Turner
5 Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications
6 Commission. Mr. Farr.

7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF H. BARTOW FARR, III

8 ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

9 MR. FARR: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please
10 the Court:

11 The Government defends the must-carry law
12 primarily by analogy to the antitrust laws, saying that it
13 protects the broadcast system from anticompetitive actions
14 by cable operators, but there is a critical flaw in this
15 argument. The law does not just prohibit anticompetitive
16 activity. It prohibits all decisions not to carry
17 broadcast stations for whatever reason the cable operator
18 may choose.

19 Thus, we submit, the Government must put forth
20 an interest to justify what the law actually does, which
21 is to override all editorial discretion with regard to
22 carriage of broadcast stations, and we further submit that
23 neither interest put forward by the Government can meet
24 that burden.

25 First, an interest in promoting particular

1 programming does not meet the burden, because Government
2 can't generally promote speech that it favors by the means
3 of ordering others to carry it, or by discriminating
4 against disfavored speech, and the interest in protecting
5 the economic viability of the broadcast system as a whole
6 does not support the law, because even without must-carry,
7 cable systems carry the vast majority of broadcast
8 stations, and the broadcast system is concededly thriving.

9 QUESTION: Well, Mr. Farr, there is -- we have a
10 situation where one medium has a limited number of
11 channels, and does the Government have no interest at all
12 in seeing that those channels are opened up --

13 MR. FARR: I think the Government --

14 QUESTION: -- to others on a neutral basis, for
15 example?

16 MR. FARR: Justice O'Connor, I think the
17 Government has an interest in seeing that cable operators
18 like other businesses, including like other members of the
19 press, do not make decisions about what to carry on an
20 anticompetitive basis, and if the law was narrowly
21 directed to that problem, then it seems to me the case
22 would be different, but the law is not.

23 QUESTION: For instance, the dissenting judge on
24 the panel below suggested an alternative way that the
25 Government might proceed. Would you like to comment on

1 that suggestion?

2 MR. FARR: Justice O'Connor, I don't completely
3 agree with Judge Williams on the idea that least access
4 channels are a less restrictive alternative for two
5 reasons, even though, quite frankly, it is in one sense a
6 helpful argument to us.

7 The first is that even least access doesn't
8 require any showing of anticompetitive behavior by the
9 cable operators. It is again a law that is directed to
10 all cable operators and simply removes discretion from
11 those operators to program particular channels, whether
12 they've ever engaged in any economic misconduct or not.

13 QUESTION: What if a municipality chose or
14 perhaps, if the Federal Government had the power, the
15 Federal Government chose to say that all cable operators
16 must be merely carriers? We're not going to allow anybody
17 to put copper under our streets in order to carry their
18 own programs.

19 MR. FARR: I think it is --

20 QUESTION: You have to be like the telephone
21 company. Anybody who wants to use it may use it.

22 MR. FARR: Although I wouldn't concede it, I
23 suppose it is possible that at one time that is something
24 that could have been considered, but now we have a system
25 with operating cable systems which --

1 QUESTION: But why is that any different from
2 Justice O'Connor's least access proposal? It's just doing
3 it wholesale instead of for a limited number of --

4 MR. FARR: Well, that's correct, and as I'm
5 saying, I have a difficulty --

6 QUESTION: So you think that would be
7 unconstitutional, too.

8 MR. FARR: That's correct, I do. I think at
9 least to the extent that one is saying we're going to
10 take --

11 QUESTION: We do it for telephone companies. It
12 is unconstitutional there?

13 MR. FARR: It is not unconstitutional for
14 telephone companies, because they are not essentially
15 engaged in the business of providing news, information,
16 speech of that nature to the public.

17 QUESTION: But does that sort of define the
18 problem in a way that makes it easier for you? Why is it
19 illegitimate to look at the operating companies simply as
20 carriers as opposed to originators, and say that in one
21 respect, i.e. their respect as carriers, they are subject
22 to obligations the way the phone company might be?

23 MR. FARR: What -- it seems to me that the
24 particular activity that the must-carry law is aimed at is
25 choice of material to be carried on a cable system. The

1 cable operator has a choice of a number of different
2 sources from which it can obtain programming, including,
3 as you suggest, Justice Souter, creating its own
4 programming, and what the must-carry law deliberately aims
5 at doing is saying when you make that choice you must make
6 it in a way that the Government directly controls, and not
7 because the Government is saying you're engaging in some
8 anticompetitive behavior, simply because the Government
9 wants you to make a different choice.

10 QUESTION: Of course, the significance of that,
11 in a way, is easy if we use the terms like editorial
12 discretion, which have taken on a meaning from the
13 newspaper context, but this doesn't quite fit the
14 newspaper context.

15 I suppose the position that the carrier is in
16 here, the operating company is in here, is somewhere in
17 between that of the newspaper and the telephone company,
18 and how should we decide whether the significance of a
19 limitation on editorial discretion should be analyzed as
20 if it were a newspaper, or on the other hand as if we were
21 looking at it as an analogue to the phone company?

22 MR. FARR: Well, it seems to me that 1) the term
23 editorial discretion means a particular thing. It means
24 that a business which is engaged in providing speech to
25 the public, and the Court has recognized that that's what

1 cable systems do, is in fact making decisions about what
2 material it would be, whether it is public television
3 stations, alternative to public television stations --

4 QUESTION: But Mr. Farr, they're not making
5 particular decisions. If they're carrying a program or
6 they're carrying a broadcaster, they're not deciding what
7 that broadcaster -- each individual program. They're
8 making a gross decision.

9 MR. FARR: That's correct, Justice Ginsburg,
10 they are not deciding each moment of the day what is put
11 on a particular channel. That is something that the
12 programmer itself does.

13 QUESTION: I think one of the briefs suggested a
14 better term would be an entrepreneurial decision rather
15 than an editorial --

16 MR. FARR: Well, Your Honor, to begin with, the
17 term "editorial discretion" is a term that this Court has
18 used in Preferred and other cases with respect to what the
19 cable operators are doing, so I'm not simply creating it
20 out of thin air, but I think it is an entrepreneurial
21 decision in the sense that any member of the media who is
22 choosing speech is choosing it in part, at least, for
23 entrepreneurial reasons.

24 The question is, what, in fact, do the
25 subscribers to a cable system, the readers to a newspaper,

1 the patrons of a bookstore or a movie theater -- what will
2 interest them? What will they come to see, what will they
3 pay money to see or hear?

4 QUESTION: But that's essentially an economic
5 decision, not a literary or choice one.

6 MR. FARR: Well, it's a combination of the two.
7 It seems to me that any member of the media can make
8 decisions, and to say, for example, that we are simply
9 going to say that you are making a decision for an
10 economic reason, if a newspaper decides that it's going to
11 carry a particular political cartoonist because that
12 political cartoonist is popular and that will increase
13 circulation, that may be entirely a business decision, but
14 that's certainly something we don't think the Government
15 can step in a preempt.

16 So the -- indeed, this goes very much to the
17 point that I'm trying to make, which is it seems to me
18 that Government does have a legitimate interest in saying,
19 when you are acting in a way that we typically prohibit
20 under the antitrust laws, the laws that regulate
21 competition, then when we tell you that you can't exercise
22 your discretion for that reason in order to injure
23 somebody anticompetitively, then we have the power to
24 impose some regulation.

25 But when Government goes further and says, we're

1 going to control all of your decision-making with respect
2 to a particular subject, whether you're acting
3 anticompetitively or not, then it seems to me to have
4 crossed a very important line.

5 QUESTION: Well, of course, I guess we can argue
6 about Judge Williams' solution if and when it's ever
7 adopted. I suppose you really don't have to fight whether
8 that's feasible or not, do you. I mean, what's happened
9 here is that the Government has not said you must make
10 your channels available to everybody. They've said, you
11 must make your channels available to this person.

12 MR. FARR: Well, that's correct.

13 QUESTION: So it isn't really the same thing as
14 what's done with the telephone company.

15 MR. FARR: That is correct.

16 QUESTION: I think Justice O'Connor's question
17 was whether, in your -- based on your argument, least
18 access -- least access would be equally unconstitutional.
19 You're arguing that must-carry is unconstitutional. Would
20 least access, as a substitute for it, also be
21 unconstitutional?

22 MR. FARR: I think that is a closer question,
23 and let me explain why. The difficulty that I have with
24 least access from the standpoint of cable systems is that,
25 like the must-carry law, it does take away the discretion

1 to program particular channels, and as I mentioned before,
2 it doesn't do that based on any determination that there
3 is anticompetitive activity. It simply makes the decision
4 that we are going to preempt the programming for those
5 channels.

6 What it does not have is the element of pure
7 discrimination against particular programmers and in favor
8 of other programmers, so in that sense it does not have
9 one of the evils that the must-carry law has.

10 QUESTION: Can you explain one thing to me,
11 because I think it was the nub of the answer that you just
12 gave, and that is, Judge Williams relied very heavily in
13 his opinion on the fact that the FCC requires certain
14 elements of content in local programming, and therefore a
15 fortiori it is required by must-carry.

16 Would your argument then equate must-carry with
17 least access if the Government stopped regulating --
18 through the FCC stopped regulating the content of local
19 programming? Would they then be on par?

20 MR. FARR: I would not put them specifically on
21 a par, because I think it still is a particular
22 discrimination in favor of identified speakers, and I
23 think it would be illusory, frankly, to assume that
24 Government is not generally aware of what speech on
25 broadcast station consists of. Indeed, even apart from

1 particular regulation by the FCC, there are specific laws
2 that Congress has enacted that deal with programming on
3 broadcast stations, so I would still have concern --

4 QUESTION: But they deal with programming on all
5 broadcast stations, so that your identification of the
6 speaker would be purely geographic at that point, wouldn't
7 it?

8 MR. FARR: In the sense that --

9 QUESTION: I mean, i.e., locally. The only way
10 you would identify them would be their point of origin
11 rather than anything to do with their content, let alone
12 their prescribed content.

13 MR. FARR: Well, for example, if I understand
14 the question, Justice Souter, a law that says that a
15 broadcast station cannot have indecent material, let's
16 say, that is a law that applies to broadcast stations
17 throughout the country, so Congress could know that if
18 it's expressing a preference for broadcast stations, that
19 it is therefore at the same time really expressing a
20 preference for stations that are subject to that law and
21 that restriction on their speech in ways that other
22 possible programmers would not be.

23 QUESTION: That would distinguish -- I guess
24 this is my point of ignorance. That would distinguish
25 between cable and broadcast, the cable operators could be

1 indecent?

2 MR. FARR: They are not subject to some of the
3 same restrictions on their speech that broadcast stations
4 are, and I think that is because they do not share the
5 physical -- the spectrum and the physical scarcity
6 rationale has not been applied to them. The Congress has
7 not done that.

8 QUESTION: Mr. Farr, if a municipality is
9 reviewing bids for a cable company, and let's assume
10 economically there can probably be only one cable company,
11 I take it it's entitled to assess the cultural offerings
12 of the different programs from the different bidders?

13 MR. FARR: Well, I am not sure that I would give
14 them much leeway in that regard, quite honestly. I mean,
15 I think if what Government is doing is essentially trying
16 to use a franchising process where there is perfectly
17 adequate room for other cable operators to function,
18 because there's plenty of space on the rights of way for
19 additional lines or additional cable, if Government is
20 using that process as a way to start to press for
21 distinctions in speech, then I find that troubling.

22 Now, I think it's probably unrealistic to assume
23 that when local governments are considering applications,
24 that they don't take into account something on the grounds
25 of content, but my general feeling is that that should be

1 at a very, very attenuated level if it's permitted at all.

2 QUESTION: Well, Mr. Farr, let's suppose that a
3 municipality decides, we don't want our telephone poles
4 cluttered with a lot of things, so we're only going to be
5 able to have one cable television within the -- and there
6 are three or four applicants. Now, aren't they entitled
7 to make some judgment as to at least which the majority of
8 the people in the municipality might prefer?

9 MR. FARR: Assuming the premise, I think it is
10 possible that there is some very modest leeway for that.

11 QUESTION: Well, why should it be modest?

12 MR. FARR: Well, because -- first of all because
13 I do quarrel with the premise, quite honestly. When --

14 QUESTION: Well, accept the premise, though.

15 MR. FARR: But I think the premise is important,
16 too, and I mean -- I will accept it, but I think the
17 premise is important to it, because the question that one
18 is always asking when one is extending Government leeway
19 to get into content is, why are we allowing Government to
20 do this?

21 Typically, Government is not allowed to do it,
22 so if the answer is, because we have no choice,
23 essentially Government is in a position, as it is in the
24 broadcasting situation, where there is a spectrum which
25 can only accommodate so many speakers, and the Government

1 therefore has to shut down other speakers, has to silence
2 particular speech, then the Government has been accorded
3 some greater leeway with respect to the speech that gets
4 on.

5 That really doesn't exist with cable operators,
6 and therefore it seems to me if the local government says,
7 we're only going to have one cable system, something which
8 I point out Congress has now prohibited in the 1992 act,
9 but if they say that, really they're using one power, the
10 power to grant rights of way, to essentially leverage
11 themselves into a second power to control content, and I
12 do find that troubling.

13 QUESTION: So you say if there are 10 cable
14 companies that apply, and the municipality says, we only
15 want one, the First Amendment says no, you have to take
16 all 10, no matter how cluttered the streets get?

17 MR. FARR: No, no, I would not suggest that
18 cities have that obligation to allow all-comers to come
19 in. I mean, essentially that's the issue that the
20 Court --

21 QUESTION: Yes, but okay, well --

22 MR. FARR: -- had before it in Preferred.

23 QUESTION: -- you have a number of observations
24 around the fringe, but how about the actual situation
25 where you have several applicants, the city says we're

1 only going to take one?

2 MR. FARR: When the city says that, and there is
3 no absolute requirement that the city has to take one in
4 the sense that it could easily accommodate others, then it
5 seems to me the city's power to discriminate on the basis
6 of content is very limited, if it exists at all.

7 QUESTION: So 10 applicants, the city says we're
8 only going to take one, the applicants could make out a
9 case that physically with a lot of cluttering you might be
10 able to take three or four, the city can do nothing, it
11 has to take all 10?

12 MR. FARR: No, no, I'm not saying that it has to
13 take all 10. I'm saying that its basis for choosing among
14 them cannot be dictated by its views about the content of
15 programming.

16 If, for example, they say, we will accept -- we
17 will give preference in the application process to cable
18 operators who agree that they will not show the following
19 25 cable networks, they will go into an upper tier if they
20 agree not to show these, I think that would be
21 impermissible.

22 QUESTION: Mr. Farr, to what extent is the
23 scarcity rationale undercut by current technology? I
24 guess we have now coming on line satellite services that
25 will provide hundreds of channels with a tiny dish --

1 MR. FARR: That's correct, Justice O'Connor.

2 QUESTION: -- available so there would be no
3 scarcity. We have fiberoptics coming on line, and they
4 have virtually unlimited capacity. Does this undercut the
5 scarcity rationale, in your view?

6 MR. FARR: Well, I think it changes part of it.
7 I think what clearly is happening in the communications
8 world is there are a number of new technologies, which
9 means that the opportunities for those who want to reach
10 the public are greatly increasing, and I think they're
11 going to accelerate in the next 10 or 15 years.

12 In the particular scarcity rationale, really the
13 only scarcity rationale that this Court has recognized,
14 deals with one specific thing, which is the
15 electromagnetic spectrum, and the limitations on assigning
16 licenses based on frequencies in the spectrum, that
17 spectrum is not really changing, so in that sense there
18 still is physical scarcity.

19 It would seem to me that the difficult question
20 in the broadcast context, none of which, I hasten to point
21 out, applies to cable, is, even if you still have scarcity
22 of the spectrum, given all the other ways that people can
23 reach the public through other technologies, is the
24 regulation that has been premised on the scarcity still
25 justified, and it seems to me that is the question that

1 the Court has suggested that it is at some point willing
2 to reconsider in League of Women Voters.

3 QUESTION: But Mr. Farr, what does it do to your
4 argument that many cable companies have, say, only 30-odd
5 channels now, and one of the reasons you say you don't
6 want to be forced to carry is that you then have to give
7 up something. Now, I can understand your point about the
8 favored position that you're required to give to
9 broadcasters, but if there's not going to be any limit on
10 the number of channels that you can have, doesn't that
11 dilute your objection?

12 MR. FARR: It's possible in the future, Justice
13 Ginsburg, there may be a situation where essentially the
14 ability of all programmers to reach the public through a
15 cable system is essentially not foreclosed by a law like
16 the must-carry law, but I would have a couple of comments.
17 First of all, obviously we're not at that position now.
18 The must-carry law applies today, and nobody disputes the
19 fact that most cable systems have a definitely defined
20 capacity which is already filled up, and therefore any
21 inclusion of broadcast stations necessarily means the
22 exclusion of some other programmer.

23 Secondly, of course, the hard thing to speculate
24 about is, if at a time when the average cable system has
25 200 channels, it may be that there are 400 programming

1 services, because programming services have expanded to
2 meet the expansion in channel capacity of cable systems as
3 that has occurred, so I think it's hard to say, even in
4 the abstract, that in the future when there are more
5 channels, that a preference for a particular kind of
6 programming imposed on operators will not be troublesome,
7 because there still may be the same need to make
8 choices --

9 QUESTION: How many --

10 MR. FARR: -- just in larger numbers.

11 QUESTION: What is the maximum number of local
12 channels that realistically a cable company might be
13 compelled to carry?

14 MR. FARR: I don't have a precise answer to
15 that. I think we're talking somewhere in the 15 to 20
16 range, depending -- it depends, because --

17 QUESTION: If there are that many local stations
18 that want to be -- that would request access.

19 MR. FARR: That's correct.

20 QUESTION: Because in most markets there
21 wouldn't be that many.

22 MR. FARR: That many stations total? You have
23 VHF stations, you have UHF stations, if that doesn't fill
24 up your number, then you have low power which you're
25 required to carry as well, so the number actually does

1 fill up fairly quickly, so I think it is basically
2 correct, although I can't say this with absolute
3 assurance, that most cable systems subject to must-carry
4 are finding that, through the combination of stations that
5 are being carried through retransmission consent, and
6 those carried pursuant to must-carry, they are filling up
7 their limit.

8 QUESTION: Based on what we've said so far, I
9 assume that the must-carry provision for public
10 broadcasting is the most vulnerable based on the content
11 argument, is that correct?

12 MR. FARR: I think that -- certainly there are
13 specific findings, Justice Kennedy, about the public
14 television station's content, although there are still
15 findings of a slightly less specific nature about the
16 commercial stations, so frankly I don't make much
17 distinction between the two.

18 QUESTION: Well, if we assume for the moment
19 that it's the most vulnerable, and if we assume also for
20 the moment -- there can be a debate about it, but if you
21 assume that that's the most justifiable provision from the
22 standpoint of improving our young people's intellectual
23 life, does that mean there's something wrong with our
24 doctrine?

25 MR. FARR: Well, I don't think so. It seems to

1 me that the doctrine permits choices by cable operators,
2 and there is no reason to expect, based on history, that
3 in fact cable operators aren't interested in providing
4 programming that people want to see anyway. Most cable
5 operators voluntarily, without must-carry, since 1986,
6 when the rules were struck down, have carried the vast
7 majority of stations.

8 I mean, 95 to 98 percent -- as an affidavit that
9 we submitted in the Joint Appendix at page 305 suggests,
10 98 percent of the stations have been voluntarily carried,
11 including public television stations. Why? Because there
12 is in fact a demand. There is a certain kind of
13 programming on public television stations that the public
14 wants and the one thing it seems to me that is clear is
15 that cable systems have the primary incentive to provide
16 programming that the subscribers want, rather than
17 incentives to drop broadcast stations for other reasons.

18 QUESTION: To the extent that's true, aren't you
19 saying the must-carry rules just -- largely just make the
20 cable companies carry what they'd carry anyway?

21 MR. FARR: I think that's correct, in a sense,
22 Justice Stevens.

23 QUESTION: So maybe the fight isn't quite as
24 serious as it sounds on the surface.

25 MR. FARR: Well, it's serious in one sense. I

1 mean, if we're saying that this is going to dramatically
2 change the face of television, whether must-carry stands
3 or doesn't stand, I don't think it will, for exactly the
4 reason that I'm saying.

5 On the other hands, I do think there is a very
6 real difference between a voluntary decision to utter
7 speech, to use the term in First Amendment language, and
8 being compelled to do so, and I assume that, for example,
9 most people voluntarily say the Pledge of Allegiance, but
10 I think then when Government says, even if you would
11 voluntarily say it, or even if most people would
12 voluntarily say it, we're going to make it a matter of
13 compulsion, then they have crossed over into an area of
14 unconstitutionality.

15 QUESTION: Mr. Farr, as I understand your
16 argument this morning, you pretty much are saying that
17 even if we accept all the congressional findings, you
18 should prevail on the theory you've been advancing.

19 MR. FARR: That would be true, that this law is
20 not tailored to anticompetitive activity, and it is based
21 specifically on discrimination among different
22 programmers, and that itself is enough to make the law
23 invalid.

24 QUESTION: What if we agree with you, Congress
25 goes back, drops all the findings about content and the

1 value of local origination, and simply sticks to findings
2 about the threat to competition?

3 MR. FARR: Well, the problem is, simply making
4 findings about the threat to competition, even if they
5 were better substantiated than these findings, which show
6 that in fact the stations are being carried, they're not
7 being dropped in order to get advertising revenues, more
8 broadcast stations are in fact carried on cable systems
9 now than when there was must-carry.

10 QUESTION: Congress just says, look, we want to
11 lock the door before the horse has gone.

12 MR. FARR: But the difficulty that they would
13 not cure by simply going back and simply reenacting the
14 same law with anticompetitive findings is the point that I
15 made precisely at the outset. This is not a law directed
16 specifically at anticompetitive conduct. It's not
17 tailored to that problem.

18 So as long as the law reaches all decision-
19 making with respect to broadcast stations, not simply
20 decision-making for anticompetitive reasons, it doesn't
21 make any difference what findings Congress makes, it is
22 not justifying the law on that basis.

23 I'd like to reserve the remainder of my time.

24 QUESTION: Very well, Mr. Farr.

25 General Days, we'll hear from you.

1 ORAL ARGUMENT OF DREW S. DAYS, III

2 ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEES

3 GENERAL DAYS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
4 please the Court:

5 What Mr. Farr wants the Court to do is basically
6 ignore significant elements of the congressional decision
7 to enact the 1992 law. At least two things can be said
8 with conviction about the regulation of electronic media
9 in the United States. First, the Federal Government made
10 a promise to the American public in 1934 that it would
11 make available so far as possible to all the people of the
12 United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and
13 worldwide wire and radio communications service, and it
14 expected that the administrative agency charged with
15 promoting that policy would do so consistent with public
16 interest, convenience, or necessity, and do so in a way
17 that was fair, efficient, and equitable.

18 Second, the electronic media field has been from
19 its beginning, to quote Justice Frankfurter in the 1943
20 National Broadcasting Company case, "a field of enterprise
21 the dominant characteristic of which was the rapid pace of
22 its unfolding."

23 Over the intervening 50 years, Congress has
24 striven to strike a balance in the best interests of the
25 American people on the one hand by developing a regulatory

1 framework that does not retard the growth of the
2 electronic media and increased outlets for expression
3 while on the other assuring the growth of the electronic
4 media did not disserve the goals of diversity and broad,
5 equitable, and free geographic distribution of access to
6 electronic media. It is a dynamic, not a static process
7 that has required Congress to be alert to the existence
8 and impact of new technologies. It is a process that goes
9 on as I speak. It is this morning's headline news.

10 We respectfully submit that the lower court
11 correctly upheld the constitutionality of the must-carry
12 provisions of the 1992 act, finding it essentially
13 economic regulation designed to create competitive balance
14 in the video industry as a whole.

15 QUESTION: Now, Mr. Days --

16 GENERAL DAYS: Yes.

17 QUESTION: -- do you acknowledge that to be
18 valid the congressional regulation has to be content-
19 neutral?

20 GENERAL DAYS: We do not. We think that in this
21 case there is no focus on content.

22 QUESTION: Well --

23 GENERAL DAYS: We think it's --

24 QUESTION: Wait a minute. Maybe I didn't
25 express myself clearly enough.

1 GENERAL DAYS: Yes.

2 QUESTION: Do you acknowledge the legal
3 principle that to be valid it must be content-neutral?

4 GENERAL DAYS: I think that if it is not
5 content-neutral then it has to meet a very exacting test
6 that this Court has set out, but our position is that this
7 regulation is not content-based. It is content-neutral.
8 It is not focused --

9 QUESTION: Yes, I understand that.

10 GENERAL DAYS: -- on the speaker.

11 QUESTION: I was just trying to ascertain
12 whether you take the position or acknowledge that it must
13 be content-neutral to survive.

14 GENERAL DAYS: No, not at all. It just requires
15 that the regulation meet a higher standard of
16 justification.

17 QUESTION: And do you say the same thing about
18 the public broadcast must-carry provision, that that's not
19 content-based?

20 GENERAL DAYS: I think the lower court was
21 correct in referring to it as being content-based in a de
22 minimis sense, and this may get to your point, Justice
23 Kennedy, about the doctrine.

24 To characterize what Congress has done here in
25 promoting the increase in voices to provide educational

1 and constructive video programming to the public as being
2 content-based is somehow to distort this Court's decisions
3 and the doctrines that have developed. This is not a
4 situation where Congress is focusing on what the speakers
5 are saying.

6 Now, with respect to section 5, it is true that
7 Congress made references to educational television, but I
8 think in only the most generalized sense. It's not a
9 situation where Congress is dictating what those stations
10 must carry. In fact, this Court's decisions make very
11 clear that educational stations enjoy editorial discretion
12 and freedom. That's really the League of Women Voters,
13 and that's also true with respect to local broadcasting.

14 QUESTION: In other words, our doctrine puts you
15 in the position of trying to minimize the content-based
16 aspect of the decision, which might really be its best
17 justification from a cultural standpoint.

18 GENERAL DAYS: Well, I think, Your Honor, that's
19 why it was our argument on this particular legislation
20 that the existing tools for evaluating it were really not
21 adequate to the task, and that it was more productive not
22 to look at the so-called content related cases or
23 doctrines, but rather to look at those regulations, or
24 those doctrines that deal with attempting to address
25 market dysfunction and economic scarcity, the inability of

1 speakers to have their messages heard because of control.

2 QUESTION: General Days, there's one point I
3 wasn't clear on in your presentations in your brief.

4 GENERAL DAYS: Yes.

5 QUESTION: Are you saying, based on your
6 argument that minimal scrutiny should apply here, that
7 there really is no difference in the authority of the
8 Government vis-a-vis cable and, on the other hand, radio
9 broadcasting, radio and television broadcasters?

10 GENERAL DAYS: We are not --

11 QUESTION: In other words, could the Government,
12 if it wished, have a fairness doctrine, have an equal time
13 doctrine, have a decent speech regulation with respect to
14 cable operators and programmers as it does for radio and
15 television broadcasting?

16 GENERAL DAYS: That is not our position, Justice
17 Ginsburg. The fact that we relied upon Red Lion was not
18 to suggest that Congress necessarily has the power to
19 regulate cable television in the same way that it does
20 broadcast stations, but simply to indicate that the
21 monopoly power of cable may justify some regulations that
22 implicate but do not transgress First Amendment
23 prohibitions.

24 QUESTION: But the same argument was made, or
25 one much -- in the Tornillo case, that Tornillo's only

1 opportunity to have his views heard was if the Miami
2 Herald would publish his letter to the editor.

3 GENERAL DAYS: Well, certainly that argument was
4 made. I don't think the Court actually resolved the
5 question of economic scarcity, but the fact was that there
6 were other ways in which Tornillo could express his views
7 and be heard.

8 QUESTION: Well, do you think the case would
9 have come out differently if he could have shown as a
10 matter of fact that there was nothing nearly as adequate
11 as publishing his letter to the editor in the Miami Herald
12 to express his views to the public?

13 GENERAL DAYS: Mr. Chief Justice, I think that
14 saying that there was nothing quite so adequate is not
15 analogous to this situation. What Congress was looking at
16 was basically a bottleneck, a control, a gatekeeper
17 function that cable was performing with respect to the
18 development of broadcast television.

19 I think that in the Tornillo case what we would
20 have to have is a situation where the only way in which
21 Tornillo could express himself was through the Miami
22 Herald, or through the newspaper that published the
23 particular article.

24 QUESTION: Excuse me. It seems to me the
25 programs that are aired over broadcast television have

1 many other ways to get onto the screen, not to mention
2 many other ways of getting into human minds through the
3 print media. They can get on the screen through cassettes
4 that you can take home. They can get on the screen
5 through cable programs that are not over the air.

6 I don't see how -- it seems to me there's much
7 more scarcity in the daily -- which most of our cities
8 have, the single daily newspaper situation than there is
9 in the cable system.

10 GENERAL DAYS: Well, Justice Scalia, certainly
11 that argument can be made. There are problems there, but
12 again, to divorce the history of Congress' consideration
13 of cable television from what it did in 1992 is to miss
14 the point. This is not Congress deciding one morning when
15 it got up to regulate the cable TV industry.

16 QUESTION: But my point is, we shouldn't look at
17 this as the voice we're trying to get in is the voice of
18 the over-the-air broadcaster. What we're talking about is
19 whatever the over-the-air broadcaster chooses to program,
20 and that can get to the viewer through many other means.
21 They can syndicate it in cable instead of over the air.
22 They can get it to the viewer on cassettes, in a lot of
23 other ways. I don't see how there's this great bottleneck
24 that you're talking about for the individual speaker.

25 GENERAL DAYS: There is the bottleneck insofar

1 as we're talking about Congress' commitment that I just
2 mentioned to the American people to ensure that they were
3 able to get free television service.

4 QUESTION: That's a different issue. Now you're
5 not talking about the message, you're talking about
6 whether you get it free or not, I suppose.

7 GENERAL DAYS: That's precisely right. We're
8 not talking about the message, Justice Scalia.

9 QUESTION: It has nothing to do with the
10 content, then?

11 GENERAL DAYS: That's correct.

12 QUESTION: Well, that's a difficult argument to
13 make in light of the findings that place such stress on
14 the desirability of public television and local
15 broadcasting and discussing local issues and so forth. I
16 think it's very difficult to sustain that argument.

17 GENERAL DAYS: Justice O'Connor, it in our view
18 is not difficult. It may be different, but not difficult,
19 in the sense that there is nothing, in our estimation,
20 constitutionally improper or inappropriate for Congress to
21 express its views on the importance of local
22 broadcasting -- it's something that it's been doing since
23 1934 -- or to talk about educational television.

24 QUESTION: Well, but Congress went ahead on that
25 basis, then, and set aside a third of a whole medium for

1 the benefit of a favored class of speakers, so it's a
2 little difficult to justify that --

3 GENERAL DAYS: Well, Your Honor --

4 QUESTION: -- on existing doctrine.

5 GENERAL DAYS: I think the point is that it's
6 not favoring the broadcast industry in the sense of
7 promoting it plain and simple.

8 The idea is to make broadcast television
9 available to 40 percent of those households that do not
10 have cable, and also to make certain that people who have
11 cable get the quality of programming that they deserve,
12 and to the extent that the cable industry, with its
13 tremendous horizontal concentration, vertical
14 concentration, tremendous control over the market present,
15 what Congress envisioned was, down the line before long,
16 there would not be that availability, and that's why
17 Congress responded.

18 QUESTION: Yes, but Congress responded -- I
19 mean, it seems to me the point of Justice O'Connor's
20 question is, Congress responded by explaining why the
21 content of local programming and educational television
22 programming was more desirable, or was in itself
23 desirable.

24 They were putting a content justification on it,
25 and I don't know how you get over that hurdle except

1 perhaps by saying, look, the motives were mixed, or on the
2 other hand we have a justification that will avail us even
3 though there is a content basis, but it's still the case
4 that they have made the decision and have explained the
5 decision on a content basis, haven't they?

6 GENERAL DAYS: Justice Souter, certainly there
7 were all kinds of statements and findings, but I think
8 they go to the point of diversity. It was not Congress
9 saying, now, we're going to allow local stations on cable,
10 we're going to allow educational stations on cable --

11 QUESTION: Sure, but whenever --

12 GENERAL DAYS: -- and we're going to watch to
13 make certain that you do precisely what you expected.
14 That was not what Congress had in mind.

15 QUESTION: But whenever you get a particular
16 content which is not otherwise being broadcast, your
17 justification is always diversity. If we don't require
18 it, or push someone else aside to allow it in, we will not
19 have diversity to that extent.

20 I don't see the difference between a diversity
21 argument and a content argument here, and in any event I
22 don't see how you could make that distinction so long as
23 the Government through the FCC does regulate the content
24 to some degree of the broadcast medium.

25 GENERAL DAYS: Yes, it's been suggested that

1 this was perhaps a way in which Congress could control the
2 cable TV industry, but I think this Court's decisions have
3 made very clear that the editorial discretion of even
4 broadcasters is fairly broad, and the FCC and the Congress
5 are restricted in the way they go about regulating that
6 particular part of the media.

7 QUESTION: And you conceded that there are more
8 restrictions on what the legislature could do vis-a-vis
9 the cable -- the content of what cable operators could
10 choose to put on?

11 GENERAL DAYS: Certainly, given the record that
12 Congress has compiled up to this point, I don't want to
13 preclude Congress' looking at the issue at a later stage,
14 but I think at this point there's nothing in the record
15 that would justify Congress' extending its regulation to
16 cable in the same way that it regulates the broadcast
17 industry.

18 QUESTION: General Days, is it the Government's
19 position that there is no violation of the First Amendment
20 to discriminate with respect to speakers so long as there
21 is no discrimination with respect to content? That is,
22 can the Government say to a particular individual, you
23 can't talk, and to someone else, you can talk, so long as
24 the Government's -- I don't care what you say. It's just
25 that we don't want you to talk.

1 GENERAL DAYS: No, I don't believe that the
2 Government can silence people, but this is not a situation
3 where cable operators are being silenced. As was
4 suggested in the questions about --

5 QUESTION: Well, they're saying the broadcasters
6 have to talk, and that means that these other people who
7 want the same space can't talk.

8 GENERAL DAYS: But Justice Scalia, it's a matter
9 of reasonableness, and whether it's tailored to the
10 particular problem that Congress identified, and it's our
11 position that in this legislation that's what Congress
12 did.

13 QUESTION: Well, how closely tailored is it?
14 You say that there's this great problem. They're carrying
15 98 percent of all of the signals anyway. Must we accept
16 Congress' assessment that there is a major market failure
17 here?

18 GENERAL DAYS: I think what Congress identified
19 was an enormous development in the power of the cable TV
20 industry, and was projecting down the road the extent to
21 which that power would overcome the ability of broadcast
22 TV to reach the 40 percent --

23 QUESTION: But it was all prediction, because it
24 hadn't happened. When the D.C. Circuit dealt with the FCC
25 regulations, and so must-carry was out, there wasn't a

1 huge change, was there, so these findings -- what you
2 refer to, findings, are more in the nature of predictions,
3 well, they're not so bad now, but they're going to get
4 worse?

5 GENERAL DAYS: Well, Justice Ginsburg, they're
6 not solely predictions. They're based on evidence in the
7 record that Congress considered over many years through
8 many hearings that there were denials of carriage, that
9 there were limitations on carriage, that stations were
10 being dropped, that they were being repositioned -- that's
11 in the record, and I think --

12 QUESTION: Maybe they were very bad stations
13 that people didn't want to watch, which is why the cable
14 systems didn't have them.

15 GENERAL DAYS: Well, that may be the case, but
16 what Congress found was that there was an incentive on the
17 part of cable operators to drop certain stations because
18 of their desire to have greater access to advertising
19 revenue.

20 QUESTION: Well, now -- I thought the ratio for
21 a cable station between the money it gets from advertising
22 and the money it gets from the subscribers is 25 to 1, so
23 if by failing to carry this single station they lose 1
24 subscriber, they have to make up from advertising 25
25 times --

1 GENERAL DAYS: Justice Scalia, I think that the
2 record reflects that cable operators are carrying network
3 affiliates, but they are dropping some of the independent
4 stations not because they don't have attractiveness to
5 cable viewers, but because of the fact that if they're
6 dropped, then other stations can be brought on, and those
7 basically benefit the cable operators.

8 QUESTION: So that --

9 GENERAL DAYS: They're also able to use the --

10 QUESTION: Excuse me.

11 GENERAL DAYS: They also are able to use that
12 for their own programming. There's a tremendous
13 integration here, cable operators owning cable
14 programmers, cable programmers owning cable operators. To
15 that extent, cable operators do benefit by dropping some
16 broadcast stations that are not affiliated with them.

17 QUESTION: Maybe Congress should pass a law
18 against that.

19 GENERAL DAYS: Well, it's certainly trying --

20 QUESTION: Instead of saying who can speak and
21 who can't speak.

22 GENERAL DAYS: Well, it's not a matter of
23 telling people who can't speak and who can speak.
24 Congress has dealt with this, for example, with respect to
25 the cross-ownership rules, on the grounds that that

1 created a problem within the marketplace for the
2 availability of quality programming.

3 QUESTION: But in the present day context, if
4 the networks are being carried, the network affiliates,
5 then what we're talking about is replacing marginally
6 successful broadcast stations against marginally
7 successful cable offerings. Is that all this is about?

8 GENERAL DAYS: I don't believe it is, Your
9 Honor. I don't think marginal is the right way to
10 describe it. I think the record reflects that even those
11 independent stations that have been dropped or refused
12 carriage actually have more of an attractiveness to
13 viewers than some of the cable programs that are put on,
14 and the cable programs are put on because there is this
15 interlinking relationship that stimulates that type of
16 anticompetitive practice. That's what Congress felt was
17 going on.

18 QUESTION: Are there findings to that effect, to
19 the effect that you just described --

20 GENERAL DAYS: Yes. Yes, there are --

21 QUESTION: -- by Congress?

22 GENERAL DAYS: -- Mr. Chief Justice. There are
23 references in the record. I can cite the Court, for
24 example, to this interrelationship in the Senate report,
25 which was an appendix to the Senate brief that was filed

1 in the lower court at pages 00268.

2 There's a chart that was before the Congress,
3 indicating top cable networks owned by cable operators,
4 top cable networks not owned by cable operators, and this
5 is part of a discussion that was reflected in this report
6 in Congress over this tremendous concentration.

7 QUESTION: And there is a finding by Congress
8 that the result of this is to put owned subsidiaries,
9 owned cables on at the expense of a broadcast station even
10 though the broadcast station might be preferred by more
11 people?

12 GENERAL DAYS: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice, there's a
13 finding in the act at 2(a)(15) discussing the incentives
14 on the part of cable operators to drop commercial and
15 noncommercial stations. There are also other --

16 QUESTION: Incentive, but the experience --
17 Mr. Farr gave some figures about how little had in fact
18 been dropped, and you're not disputing the accuracy of his
19 figures? You point out that yes, there are some stations
20 that have been dropped.

21 GENERAL DAYS: Yes.

22 QUESTION: But it's not an impressive record of
23 what's been dropped so far.

24 GENERAL DAYS: Justice Ginsburg, I don't know
25 about the word impressive, but I think that what it was

1 for Congress was an indication of a problem that ought to
2 be dealt with now, rather than waiting until devastation
3 was wrought upon the broadcast industry and companies were
4 either going dark or had so reduced the quality of their
5 programming that they were not legitimate competitors.

6 QUESTION: So even though there was no clear and
7 present danger of anything like that from the signals that
8 had happened.

9 GENERAL DAYS: Well, I don't think that's the
10 standard, with respect, Justice Ginsburg, in this
11 situation, insofar as Congress is concerned.

12 Congress -- there was a discussion about new
13 technology. Congress was aware of the new technology, and
14 the record reflects the fact that fiber optics and what's
15 called video compression will before long present a
16 situation where most cable companies, most cable operators
17 can have 500 channels.

18 QUESTION: Well, even more currently, does the
19 record reflect any findings to the anticipated effect of
20 this new satellite service that will go on line within a
21 year that will make virtually unlimited access to people?

22 GENERAL DAYS: Your Honor, Justice O'Connor, I
23 don't have any information to that effect. I do know in
24 talking about this issue being as current as today's
25 headlines that the vice president gave a speech yesterday

1 about this administration's views on the so-called super
2 highway, information super highway, and the position of
3 this administration has been that there be open access and
4 program diversity.

5 What that essentially means is that, even with
6 this new technology, there will be an effort on the part
7 of the administration, with the assistance of Congress, to
8 ensure precisely the types of things that Congress has
9 tried to achieve in the 1992 act.

10 QUESTION: But that's more like the telephone
11 industry. The capacity will be virtually unlimited, and
12 Congress on a content-neutral basis can say, okay, serve
13 everybody. I mean, that's a very different proposition
14 than what you have here, isn't it?

15 GENERAL DAYS: It is a different proposition,
16 but I think it goes to the issues here in the sense that
17 1) we have -- in talking about the burden on cable
18 operators, 1) if they're indeed carrying most of the
19 stations that would be subject to must-carry, there's not
20 a burden. If, indeed, there's this increased technology,
21 then the must-carry responsibilities are also going to
22 have less of an impact.

23 I think what it shows is that Congress was
24 trying to deal with the problem but not in a blunderbuss
25 fashion. It was not trying to make cable operators common

1 carriers. It was trying to use a very limited mechanism,
2 viewpoint neutral, to deal with a problem that had been
3 identified, and it's not simply a matter of antitrust
4 violations by the cable industry. It's something much
5 more than that.

6 QUESTION: Well, this is, it seems to me, very
7 blunderbuss if you're worried about broad -- I gather what
8 underlies all of this supposedly is that Congress is
9 worried about some broadcasters not being able to make it,
10 and therefore going out of business, right?

11 GENERAL DAYS: Justice Scalia, I --

12 QUESTION: And in order to protect against that,
13 cable systems are required to carry even the richest
14 broadcasters, many of whom make millions of dollars a
15 year. Why isn't that blunderbuss? I mean, why couldn't
16 there been some system, if you talk about narrow
17 tailoring, whereby local broadcasters who can't make it
18 have a right to apply to be admitted to cable systems
19 instead of just generally saying everybody has to be
20 carried?

21 GENERAL DAYS: Well, Justice Scalia, Congress
22 has tried to respond to that. Section 6 of the act, which
23 is disparaged by the other side, by the cable operators
24 and programmers, is in fact a way to allow the more
25 powerful stations to negotiate with the cable operators

1 for carriage, leaving those who are not in the position
2 with market power to negotiate to take advantage of the
3 must-carry provisions.

4 QUESTION: I don't see how that narrows the
5 focus. That just gives the powerful stations double
6 advantage. Not only must they be carried if they want to,
7 but they can demand money to be carried if the cable wants
8 to carry them anyway.

9 GENERAL DAYS: Well, just as an aside, I'm not
10 sure that that's working very well, but again, let's put
11 this in context. Cable operators have been able to carry
12 broadcast stations free for a number of years with the
13 assistance of Congress.

14 Now, for Congress in 1992 to decide that some
15 stations may be in a position to negotiate with the cable
16 operators does not seem to us to raise any major issues of
17 government regulation of the cable industry. This is a
18 response to, as I was suggesting at the outset, a very
19 long relationship between Congress and the Federal
20 Government and the cable industry.

21 In 1958, at least as early as 1958, Congress
22 recognized the relationship between what was called at the
23 time CATV and the broadcast stations and the possibility
24 that there would be some problems.

25 QUESTION: General Days --

1 GENERAL DAYS: Yes.

2 QUESTION: -- before you conclude, can you focus
3 attention on the programmer, not the operator. The
4 programmer's argument, I take it, is why am I being
5 disfavored?

6 GENERAL DAYS: There are several answers:
7 1) the cable operators, or the cable programmers do have
8 other outlets. They can sell their programs to broadcast
9 stations. It's not a matter of their having to go to
10 cable operations.

11 Secondly, the act in section 11, I believe,
12 actually tries -- 11 or 12 -- tries to get at the problem
13 that independent programmers have been encountering, faced
14 with competition by affiliated programmers, so that what
15 Congress has done is try to give them a better position in
16 the competition for access to these channels, but there
17 are public educational and governmental channels that have
18 been given over that can't be used by programmers, there's
19 leased access that can't be used by programmers -- this is
20 an effort by Congress to deal with another problem in the
21 same way that it dealt with the problems that PEG and the
22 leased access arrangements did, so this is not in any
23 sense an effort to get the programmers.

24 It's consistent with what Congress has tried to
25 do over the years to create a marketplace in which people

1 who have televisions without cable, and people who have
2 cable availability, can get quality program stations both
3 broadcast and cable and have the type of diversity of
4 information and education that, as I indicated at the
5 outset, Congress had in mind in 1934.

6 Before I close, I'd like to just respond to some
7 of the questions that were put to Mr. Farr. He was asked
8 about the capacity of stations, how many local stations
9 would have to be carried, and he said 15. I think that's
10 very high. For one thing, the act recognizes that there
11 does not have to be duplication, so that in the case where
12 there are 15 stations, there's bound to be some
13 duplication.

14 Congress also found that 9,000 of the 11,000
15 cable operators had unused capacity, and just to pick up
16 in closing on the questions about a municipality and
17 whether it could make decisions about which cable operator
18 to carry, based in part on programming, Mr. Farr gave a
19 very modest response by suggesting modest regulations, but
20 I think the fact is that what this case presents, as do
21 those hypotheticals, is a situation where economic
22 regulation, where the need to ensure that the best service
23 is provided to a community, comes into the decision-making
24 process.

25 Thank you.

1 QUESTION: Thank you, General Days. Mr. Farr,
2 you have 3 minutes remaining.

3 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF H. BARTOW FARR, III

4 ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

5 MR. FARR: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

6 I would just like to briefly address, if I may,
7 a few of the points of the economic theory on which the
8 Government is relying.

9 First of all, I could not emphasize more
10 strongly that this is not a law that is tailored to the
11 economic problem that the Government is talking about.
12 It's the problem set out at findings 15 and 16 at 6 and 7
13 of the Joint Appendix, which is that cable operators will
14 drop popular programming in order to divert advertising
15 revenues. That's the theory on which it is based.

16 But the law does not prohibit cable operators
17 from dropping broadcast stations for that reason. It
18 prohibits them from dropping them for any reason, however
19 protected that might be in First Amendment Terms.

20 But second, if one looks at this practice which
21 the Government has identified and the supposed threat to
22 the local broadcast system, which is what is predicted in
23 finding 16, there are two immediate problems *with it.

24 First of all, as I have said, 7 years of
25 experience without must carry show that in fact cable

1 operators drop very few broadcast stations, and of course,
2 even the numbers that are shown by the Government don't
3 reflect the fact that cable operators also drop cable
4 stations. They're changing their programming as time goes
5 on, so many cable programmers have been dropped during
6 this period, too, from particular stations.

7 But in addition to that they carry virtually all
8 stations. They carry the most popular stations, which are
9 their greatest competitors for advertising revenues. The
10 FTC staff study that we lodged with the Court last week
11 shows that, of the stations that are dropped, they either
12 don't compete for advertising because they're public TV
13 stations, or in fact they are very little watched, so they
14 are very weak competitors for advertising.

15 And overall the number of stations carried on
16 broadcast systems has gone up, and Congress clearly
17 expects this to continue, because in section 6, the
18 retransmission consent provision, it gave broadcast
19 stations the right to demand payment for carriage, so
20 obviously the incentive to carry popular programming for
21 subscribers, where most of the money comes from, is much
22 greater than any incentive to drop stations in order to
23 get advertising revenues.

24 I'd like to make two other brief points. First
25 of all, there has been discussion about the term, content-

1 related, and I would simply like to say, I think it's
2 important to recognize that this has two different
3 meanings, both of which are implicated in this case.

4 This law is content-related in one sense because
5 it specifically dictates the kind of programming, or at
6 least who provides the programming that is seen on
7 somebody's television screen, so it is putting this
8 programming on instead of this programming, the programmer
9 who is knocked off.

10 Second, the reason it's doing that is also
11 content-based, because Congress, as the findings suggest,
12 has a preference for local programming, for the kind of
13 programming seen on public TV stations specifically.

14 QUESTION: You agree it's not viewpoint
15 discriminatory.

16 MR. FARR: It's not viewpoint discriminatory.
17 Thank you, Your Honor.

18 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr. Farr.
19 The case is submitted.

20 (Whereupon, at 11:02 a.m., the case in the
21 above-entitled matter was submitted.)
22
23
24
25

CERTIFICATION

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc., hereby certifies that the attached pages represents an accurate transcription of electronic sound recording of the oral argument before the Supreme Court of The United States in the Matter of:

TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. V. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

NO. 93-44

and that these attached pages constitutes the original transcript of the proceedings for the records of the court.

BY Am. Mani Federico

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