OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CAPTION: CHRIS SALE, ACTING COMMISSIONER,

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION

SERVICE, ET AL., Petitioners v.

HAITIAN CENTERS COUNCIL, INC., ET AL.

CASE NO: 92-344


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1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - - X CHRIS SALE, ACTING COMMISSIONER, : 3 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION : 4 SERVICE, ET AL., 5 : 6 : 7 Petitioners • : No. 92-344 8 v. 9 HAITIAN CENTERS COUNCIL, INC. : ET AL. 10 : 11 - -X 12 Washington, D.C. 13 Tuesday, March 2, 1993 14 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 15 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 16 10:04 a.m. 17 **APPEARANCES:** MAUREEN E. MAHONEY, ESQ., Deputy Solicitor General, 18 19 Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of 20 the Petitioners. 21 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, ESQ., New Haven, Connecticut; on behalf 22 of the Respondents. 23 24 25 1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W. SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005

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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:04 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We'll hear argument
4	first this morning in Number 92-344, Chris Sale, Acting
5	Commissioner, and the Immigration and Naturalization
6	Service v. The Haitian Centers Council, Inc.
7	Ms. Mahoney.
8	ORAL ARGUMENT OF MAUREEN E. MAHONEY
9	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
10	MS. MAHONEY: Mr. Chief Justice and may it
11	please the Court:
12	This case concerns the scope of the President's
13	emergency powers to adopt measures that he deems to be
14	necessary to prevent a mass migration of aliens across the
15	high seas and to the ability of the alien migrants to
16	challenge those measures in United States courts.
17	Last May, in the first 20 days, more than 10,000
18	Haitians crowded into unseaworthy vessels and set sail for
19	our shores. The President determined that he could not
20	stop this migration while continuing to offer the migrants
21	any kind of asylum screening on board Coast Guard cutters
22	or at off-shore locations such as Guantanamo.
23	He accordingly concluded that a change in the
24	procedures was required in order to stop the migration and
25	to save lives that he concluded would be lost if that
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number of people continued to flow out of Haiti in the
 vessels which are clearly unseaworthy.

He accordingly invoked his powers under the 3 4 Immigration & Nationality Act, which are in the nature of emergency powers, to adopt the procedure that he thought 5 were necessary, and those procedures provided that the 6 7 Coast Guard should directly repatriate Haitians without asylum screening but that persons who genuinely feared 8 persecution should be given an opportunity to seek 9 admission as a refugee through asylum processing at the 10 11 embassy.

12 QUESTION: Ms. Mahoney, was this directive aimed 13 at any Haitians who were leaving Haiti, or just Haitians 14 who were leaving Haiti for the United States?

MS. MAHONEY: It's directed at Haitians who were leaving for the United States. The executive order directs the Coast Guard to determine whether they have reason to believe that undocumented aliens are seeking entry into United States territorial waters, and the Coast Guard has enforced it in that way.

21 QUESTION: Once the procedures were changed, the 22 exodus that had begun a number of months before was 23 halted. They were effective.

The problem that we face now is that the threat of the out-migration continues because the underlying

conditions in Haiti that have caused people to wish to
 leave their country -- a variety of political and economic
 conditions -- continue to persist.

The President has accordingly determined that in 4 order to prevent mass migration, just as last May, and 5 also to prevent loss of life at sea, perhaps hundreds or 6 thousands, the policy of direct repatriation must 7 continue, but the President has also directed that efforts 8 9 be made to fully fund the asylum processing in Haiti so 10 that those who wish to come to the United States because 11 they genuinely fear persecution will have an opportunity 12 to adjudicate those claims expeditiously in Haiti and flee 13 Haiti through those orderly procedures.

14 QUESTION: Ms. Mahoney, you don't claim that 15 section 1253(h) is unconstitutional, I take it?

16 MS. MAHONEY: No, Your Honor, we're not claiming 17 that it's unconstitutional.

18 QUESTION: Has any effort been made to amend the 19 statute?

20 MS. MAHONEY: Since this occurred?

21 QUESTION: Yes.

MS. MAHONEY: Not that I know of. I don't believe that -- a bill might have been introduced, I really can't say, but nothing has certainly gotten very far.

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The Coast Guard is accordingly still under 1 orders from the President to interdict Haitians and to 2 repatriate them without conducting asylum screening. 3 The 4 court of appeals, nevertheless, told -- directed the commandant of the Coast Guard to disregard the procedures 5 6 that had been established by the President and to resort to the procedures that had been suspended by the President 7 last year in the national interest. 8

9 We respectfully ask this Court to reverse the 10 order of the court of appeals and to permit the 20 11 military vessels that are currently stationed off the 12 coast of Haiti to operate under the direction of the Coast 13 Guard and the President and not the Federal courts.

QUESTION: Ms. Mahoney, after the court of appeal's ruling last spring, was an injunction actually entered by the district court?

MS. MAHONEY: Yes, it was, Your Honor, but thisCourt stayed it.

19QUESTION: And was -- did the injunction -- was20it directed against the Commandant of the Coast Guard and21the Commandant of the naval base at Guantanamo Bay, too?22MS. MAHONEY: Yes, I believe that it was23directed against all of the defendants, and definitely24against the Commandant of the Coast Guard.25QUESTION: What did it command them to do?

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MS. MAHONEY: It commanded them not to return any interdicted Haitian who would be threatened with persecution in Haiti, and necessarily, in order to comply with that order, Your Honor, we would have to conduct some sort of asylum screening so that we could be in compliance with the injunction, otherwise we wouldn't know whether we were returning someone who might fear persecution.

8 QUESTION: Is the asylum screening, Ms. Mahoney, 9 that's taking place in Haiti pursuant to the Government's 10 obligations under section 1253?

MS. MAHONEY: No, it is not, Your Honor. The Government does not have obligations under 1253(h) outside of the territory of the United States.

14 QUESTION: So this is just a gratuitous effort15 on the part of the Government.

MS. MAHONEY: Well, it is a humanitarian effort on the part of the Government to provide an orderly way for persons with genuine fears of persecution in Haiti to seek asylum and come to the United States.

The situation that he had before, when we were conducting screening on Coast Guard cutters and at Guantanamo, was conducting thousands and thousands of people to essentially risk their lives so that they could get the opportunity to apply for asylum outside of their own country and the chance to come to the United States,

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even though the vast majority of those people will not
 ultimately be found to be eligible for asylum.

This unnecessarily creates the risk of loss of life at sea, and it interferes with our foreign policy initiatives, which very fundamentally depend upon bringing order and stability into that country.

QUESTION: If a person in Haiti is found eligible for asylum, what steps are taken to allow him to enter the United States?

MS. MAHONEY: They are transported to the United States, and hundreds of people have in fact been brought to the United States pursuant to that procedure, which again is being expanded by the President, and emergency refugee funding was just devoted to that.

We are not under an obligation to provide that process, but it is part of the procedures that the President had determined constitute an appropriate response to the emergency situation in Haiti. In this way, the asylum claims can be made in an orderly way.

They can be adjudicated more effectively because persons at the embassy and asylum employees who are adjudicating the claims can look into the allegations. Trying to conduct asylum interviews on Coast Guard cutters at Guantanamo did not produce results that really very accurately reflect the true nature of the claims.

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1 QUESTION: What is the authority of the United 2 States to conduct such extrastatutory -- take such 3 extrastatutory steps?

MS. MAHONEY: Oh, those are not extrastatutory. That is a procedure that Congress adopted in section 1157. Lt's a procedure for refugee admissions for aliens who are outside the United States. In fact --

QUESTION: All right.

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9 MS. MAHONEY: The system that Congress set up 10 really reflects the differences in the obli -- in the 11 benefits that are to be afforded to aliens outside the 12 United States and aliens who have reached our shores.

Congress provided that you could apply for asylum in the United States and it could be granted in the discretion of the Attorney General if you've reached our borders. Outside the United States, you could only apply for asylum if the President determined in consultation with the Congress that a nation represented a particular -- an area of humanitarian concern.

And Haiti is one of the very few nations in the world where we have actually established in-country asylum-processing centers -- I believe there are only five or six -- and this was done, again, to try to facilitate the adjudication of those claims and to stop this exodus which is threatening our foreign policy interests and

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1 humanitarian interests as well.

I'd like to emphasize that we do not --QUESTION: None of this has anything to do with the legal issue in front of us, though, I believe. The position you've taken is that you have no obligation to permit aliens to come to the United States in order that they may apply for asylum here.

8 MS. MAHONEY: That is correct, Your Honor. I --9 QUESTION: So maybe we can talk about that legal 10 issue.

11 MS. MAHONEY: The -- the point here, Your Honor, 12 is that the power that the President has under 1182(f) and 13 1185(a)(1) is to adopt procedures -- these are in the 14 nature of emergency powers, and they are to adopt 15 procedures in response to crises abroad or international 16 situations which he thinks to be appropriate in the national interest, and it is these combination of 17 procedures, direct return plus the availability of the 207 18 19 screening, that makes for both a humanitarian policy and 20 one that is certainly well within his legal authority.

The scope of the powers that were conferred by Congress were addressed by this Court in Knauff v. Shaughnessy in 1950 before the '52 amendments to the INA, and there the Court emphasized that these powers were very broad, were in the nature of emergency powers, and in fact

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so broad that the President could in fact suspend
 exclusion hearings when he deemed it to be appropriate,
 even for aliens who had reached our borders.

In that case, the bride -- alien bride of an American soldier was not allowed entry and was not given a hearing because the President had delegated unreviewable discretion to the Attorney General to deny such procedures when he thought it appropriate in the national interest.

9 QUESTION: Ms. Mahoney, who directs the Coast
10 Guard under the current policy?

11 MS. MAHONEY: The Department of Transportation, 12 the Commandant of the Coast Guard. The Attorney General 13 has not issued any directives to the Coast Guard, Your 14 Honor.

15 QUESTION: Does the Attorney General ordinarily 16 have jurisdiction over the conduct of the United States on 17 the high seas?

MS. MAHONEY: No, Your Honor, the AttorneyGeneral does not.

20 Under 8 U.S.C. section 1357 his responsibilities 21 are to enforce the immigration laws within the borders of 22 the United States and within the territorial waters, so 23 this further underscores that if Congress intended to 24 limit the scope of the President's emergency powers under 25 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1), surely they would not have simply

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written 1253(h) as a direction to the Attorney General and
 included it in parts 4 and 5, which deal with exclusion
 and deportation proceedings. These are --

QUESTION: Ms. Mahoney, may I just interrupt you 4 5 on one point before you get too far from it? Isn't there a law to the effect that the Coast Guard is deemed legally 6 7 to be executing the policies of whatever department it may be responsive to so that if the Coast Guard is 8 implementing a policy which is set by the Attorney General 9 it would be treated as the Attorney General for statutory 10 11 purposes?

12 MS. MAHONEY: Your Honor, you're referring, I believe, to 14 U.S.C. section 89, and it does provide that 13 14 when the Coast Guard is acting under the -- basically as the agent of a particular department, that it will use its 15 procedures, but here it is clear that the Coast Guard is 16 17 acting at the direction of the President under the President's powers under 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1), and that 18 is a very different source of power than that which is 19 conferred on the Attorney General to enforce our 20 21 immigration laws within the boundaries of the United 22 States.

The Attorney General is responsible for making refugee determinations in the course of exclusion and deportation proceedings, and I would note that 1253(h),

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the express language is directed to the Attorney General, and if the Attorney General makes a determination that a person would be subject to persecution, then they shall not be deported or returned.

5 That language simply has no bearing on the 6 President's exercise of his powers, separate powers under 7 1182(f).

8 QUESTION: So basically your argument is that 9 1253(f) is really irrelevant to the issue that we've got 10 here.

MS. MAHONEY: No, Your Honor, I wouldn't say 11 12 that it's irrelevant. I -- I mean, certainly, it's the issue that the court of appeals looked at and said it was 13 not extraterritorial, which we agree with, but this simply 14 shows that, given that the President was exercising 15 16 authority under different sections, if Congress had 17 intended to circumscribe those powers, it would not have written 1253(h) in the way that it did. It clearly is 18 addressed to the Attorney General and his exercise of 19 20 powers, and this is particularly so, given that the --21 given the broad interpretation of 1185(a)(1) that had 22 already been adopted in Knauff v. Shaughnessy when Congress --23

QUESTION: Isn't it true that both 1182(f) and 1185 deal with the power of the President to prevent entry

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into the United States, rather than to return to any
 particular destination? It addresses a different problem,
 I think.

4 MS. MAHONEY: I don't believe so, Your Honor. I 5 think that those powers are very broad, they're designed to give the -- the President the authority to -- it says 6 7 to control the travel of aliens and prevent -- not prevent, excuse me, and to prohibit attempts to enter. 8 9 QUESTION: That's right. It talks about entry. 10 MS. MAHONEY: Right. 11 QUESTION: To suspend entry. 12 MS. MAHONEY: To -- to suspend entry, but 1185(a)(1) specifically talks about prohibiting travel, 13 14 and by adopting rules and regulations that he deems 15 appropriate. QUESTION: Well, it deals with aliens who are to 16 17 depart or enter, or attempt to enter or depart. 18 MS. MAHONEY: Attempt to enter, Your Honor. 19 Essentially, the proclamation in 1981 said that the 20 attempt to enter the territorial waters of the United 21 States on the high seas by undocumented aliens was 22 prohibited. So essentially what the President is doing 23 here is enforcing and asking the Coast Guard to enforce 24 that limitation that was established by proclamation for

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the purposes of protecting the sovereignty of the United

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1 States.

2 QUESTION: Not, but if there were another statute that said you shall never send anybody to Cuba, 3 for example in so many words, that wouldn't -- this 4 5 statute would be -- the statute on the books would still leave the President full of power to control entry and 6 7 departures from the United States. Because the statute 8 would then place a limit on where he could return someone. 9 He couldn't send them to Cuba, and that's what they argue here. I don't know if they're right or not. 10 MS. MAHONEY: Well -- well, that could be, 11 12 except that in this case these facts demonstrate that that would make the powers that have been conferred on the 13 President ineffective under these circumstances. 14 The President has determined that he cannot do any sort of 15 16 refugee screening or take them anywhere else. He simply cannot enforce the interdiction program if he is 17 prohibited from taking them back to Haiti. 18 19 QUESTION: Right. 20 MS. MAHONEY: So, in other words, the -- it 21 would be difficult to believe that Congress intended to 22 skirt -- circumscribe the President's authority in a way 23 that he has to permit a mass migration across the seas to 24 our shores. I mean we're talking about potentially 25 100,000 people.

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QUESTION: Well -- well maybe it's impractical 1 2 and unrealistic, but at least theoretically consistently 3 with the law, he could interdict them and send them someplace other than -- than Haiti. 4 5 MS. MAHONEY: Well --QUESTION: And that would be consistent with the 6 7 statutory authority to keep everybody out of the United States. 8 9 MS. MAHONEY: Uh --10 QUESTION: Maybe he can't do that as a practical 11 matter. 12 MS. MAHONEY: But he can't do that. That's the point. He can't enforce --13 QUESTION: But if you just look at the words, 14 it's consistent with the various --15 MS. MAHONEY: He can't enforce the prohibition 16 17 and 1253(h) is not directed to the President, it's directed to the attorney general. 18 OUESTION: The attorney general, I understand. 19 20 MS. MAHONEY: I'd also like to turn to the fact 21 that the court of appeals didn't address the threshold 22 issue really, of why it could assert jurisdiction in this case, what was the cause of action here? 23 24 QUESTION: The APA does provide a cause of 25 action, but we submit it does not provide a cause of 16

action for aliens outside of the United States to
 challenge the President's authority in this manner. The
 whole history of our immigration laws has been to deny
 access to aliens outside the United States to U.S. courts.

And, in fact, if we look at the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, they demonstrate very clearly that the way that aliens get a right to bring challenges in U.S. courts is to have territorial presence, to be here, to be at the borders or to be in the United States.

1105(a) specifically says that orders of 12 exclusion, and that would include, for instance, orders 13 saying that you are not allowed to come into the country 14 which are issued to persons outside the United States as 15 16 well as persons inside the United States, can only be challenged by persons who are at the border. Orders of 17 18 deportation, of course, can be challenged by people who are -- are within the United States. 19

20 QUESTION: Yes. If a treaty that said it was a 21 self-executing treaty had a provision in which the United 22 States undertook not to deter any person from attempting 23 to enter the United States, would an alien then have the 24 authority to seek the assistance of our courts to prohibit 25 the President from violating that treaty?

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MS. MAHONEY: Your Honor, if self-executing were meant to create a cause of action, an actual cause of action on behalf of that alien, I suppose that's true. But I don't think that -- certainly there's nothing in the text of article 33 or in the convention as a whole that indicates that it itself creates causes of action that can be brought in United States courts.

8 QUESTION: Do we have any treaties --9 MS. MAHONEY: And it was --

10 QUESTION: -- Which create causes of action 11 analogous to the one we're discussing in this 12 hypothetical?

MS. MAHONEY: I don't know the answer to that, 13 14 Your Honor. I can say, though, that in Amerada Hess 15 recently, the Court did note that even though there were 16 rather explicit obligations to pay compensation, it did not create a cause of action that was enforceable in 17 18 United States courts because it didn't say that. And I 19 don't think that there -- there is any language in the --20 in the protocol that would suggest that there is an 21 independent cause of action. It would be so contrary to 22 the whole history of our immigration laws.

I mean I would point out, for instance, that under the Immigration and National Act even persons outside the United States who claim to be citizens are not

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permitted to bring an action in United States courts. 1 2 That's because Congress has determined that the only way to bring that challenge is to get a certificate from the 3 4 consular office in the foreign locality that you, 5 basically, have probable cause to present a claim of citizenship, in which case they will permit you to come to 6 7 the United States to make that challenge, but you cannot do it from outside the United States. 8

9 QUESTION: Ms. Mahoney, does -- does that mean 10 that if, say, a Haitian appears at the American consulate 11 in Port-au-Prince and makes a case for political asylum 12 and the consul simply misunderstands the law and says 13 there is no case, does that person then have no remedy in 14 the United States courts unless --

MS. MAHONEY: That's correct, Your Honor. In fact, there's absolutely nothing in the statute that would provide any rights of review for persons who think that they have been unfairly denied, whether it be refugee admission or any of the other preferences that are established by the immigration laws.

And in the -- in one APA action that this Court decided, Brownell v. Tom We Shung, the Court found that the APA could be used for an alien child who came to the borders of the United States and claimed a right to enter under the War Brides Act, but it noted in -- in the course

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of reaching that conclusion that, of course, aliens
 outside the United States who have never reached our
 borders couldn't possibly maintain a claim under the APA.

But even the result that this Court reached in Brownell was overruled by Congress. And the legislative history indicated it was a fallacious doctrine to suggest that aliens outside the United States could come into U.S. courts under the APA.

9 QUESTION: Why wouldn't they have a claim under 10 the APA? Is the APA also territorial only?

MS. MAHONEY: No, Your Honor, I don't believe 11 12 that the APA is territorial only, but the INA precludes 13 review. It's very much like -- the provisions of the INA show that preclusion is intended. It's very much like 14 15 Block v. Community Nutrition where there is a class of --16 of applicants or claimants, and here it's aliens outside the United States, those who have no connection to our 17 18 country or our territory, who are not given any rights --19 any rights of access to the courts.

And to construe the APA to nevertheless provide them access with the courts when it historically has never been done, seems to me to be a grave departure from our law, particularly in the circumstances of this case where it's aliens outside the United States who are threatening to migrate en masse and, in fact, were migrating en masse,

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and they wish to come into the courts of the United States
 to challenge the action of the President in responding to
 that.

It seems to me that even if the Court were to 4 5 think that an APA action might be appropriate, equitable 6 relief under these circumstances certainly is not. The President has determined that the national interest here 7 is to pursue the procedures which he has established, and 8 9 to suggest that the persons who wish to avoid the 207 processing in Haiti so that they can seek more beneficial 10 asylum procedures or what they might view to be more 11 12 beneficial asylum procedures in the United States, does not strike us as equitable relief. 13

As this Court noted in Webster v. Doe, the Court, when exercising powers under the APA, must determine whether the relief requested is appropriate equitable relief, and continues to have authority to dismiss relief, whether declaratory or injunctive, that does not represent an appropriate exercise of judicial power.

This is certainly such a case, where the President has determined that to adopt the procedures that the court of appeals has required will result in mass migration and the loss of hundreds and possibly thousands of lives at sea. This is just not a sensible way to

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construe our laws, and certainly not one that we think
 Congress intended.

3 QUESTION: Does 1253(h) rest on the assumption 4 that the -- the powers over the very subject matter that 5 you are describing, or the executive power over the very 6 subject matter that you are describing will be exercised 7 only by the attorney general, and is that why 1253(h) is 8 addressed only to the attorney general?

9 MS. MAHONEY: No, Your Honor, I think that 10 1253(h) is addressed only to the attorney general because 11 it is only addressed to the removal of aliens within our 12 territory and that is done only by the attorney general.

In fact, if we look at the language of 1253(h), I mean not only is it contained in two chapters that pertain just to exclusion and deportation procedures --

16 QUESTION: Well, may I -- just because time is 17 short --

MS. MAHONEY: Certainly.

18

QUESTION: -- May I interrupt you with another question. If, in fact, we were to construe 1253(h) differently from the way you want us to do, and if we were to conclude that, in fact, 1253(h) does not have the territorial limitation for which you argue, then would it follow that the statute was -- was enacted on the assumption that the authority over the subject matter --

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1 that the executive power over the subject matter would be 2 exercised only through the attorney general?

MS. MAHONEY: If I understand your question, Your Honor, you're saying that we should conclude that the President's authority was circumscribed or that he did not have authority to do this.

QUESTION: That -- that it was circumscribed and it's a circumscription which, at least as a Constitutional matter, is not presently before us.

MS. MAHONEY: No, Your Honor, I don't think we 10 could construe it to circumscribe the President's 11 12 authority in that -- in that light, especially since in Knauff v. Shaughnessy itself, the President suspended 13 14 exclusion hearings which were required by statute for an alien bride who was entitled to admission so that she 15 could be with her husband, if she was otherwise 16 17 admissable.

18 So to say that -- that the -- the President's powers could suspend those kinds of procedures in Knauff 19 20 but nevertheless not permit the President to adopt 21 procedures that are necessary to protect our sovereignty 22 and to protect against a humanitarian tragedy at sea seems 23 to me to be an inappropriate way to construe Congressional 24 intent. Particularly when we're dealing with areas of 25 foreign affairs powers where, as this Court noted in

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1 Curtis Wright, Congress is expected to grant extremely 2 broad authority so that the President will be able to act 3 in the national interest without the kinds of limitations 4 that you might have in the domestic setting.

I'd further underscore that if we were to look 5 to the -- the protocol to which certainly this Court has -6 7 - has reference to inform the interpretation of 1253(h), one of the key concerns of the negotiators was that they 8 have the ability and the flexibility to prevent mass 9 migrations. Because no country can readily give up that 10 kind of sovereign power so that it subjects itself 11 12 essentially to an invasion of foreigners.

13 QUESTION: Was -- was that concern expressed by14 others than the Dutch and the Swiss?

MS. MAHONEY: Well, it -- it was responded to by the President, I believe in July -- in the July 11th negotiating session as well, saying that there was no great -- he was responding to concerns that it might be applied extraterritorially and pointed out that the second paragraph specifically refers to where the alien is and that that was a territorial limitation.

And, in fact, if article 33 is looked at in context, it's in a chapter called Administrative Remedies. And article 32 refers to persons within the territory who are entitled to some limited protections from removal and

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--excuse me, 32 is expulsion, those who were lawfully
 admitted.

31 is people who are entitled to a lesser level 3 of protection, and 33 is readily read to simply describe 4 the procedures that can be used to remove those people 5 from the territory and not creating some sort of 6 freestanding obligation to undertake obligations outside 7 the territory, particularly in light of the fact that this 8 9 would create a mandatory duty of asylum which this Court in Cardoza-Fonseca and in Stevic recognized no one agreed 10 11 to.

12 I'd like to save the remainder of my time for13 rebuttal.

QUESTION: Well, before you sit down, a couple
of irrelevant questions. Have you ever been in Haiti?
MS. MAHONEY: No, Your Honor, I have not.

17 QUESTION: Are you familiar with a book called18 The Comedians by Graham Greene?

19 MS. MAHONEY: No, Your Honor, I'm sorry, I'm

20 not.

21 QUESTION: I recommend it to you.

22 MS. MAHONEY: Thank you.

23 QUESTION: Thank you, Ms. Mahoney.

24 Mr. Koh, we'll hear now from you.

25 ORAL ARGUMENT OF HAROLD HONGJU KOH

25

ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

2 MR. KOH: Mr. Chief Justice, and my it please 3 the Court.

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You've heard the Government's case. But,
unfortunately, that case differs from the one that's
before in four crucial respects.

First, the right we claim is not a right of
entry. It's simply the right not to be returned to Haiti,
a country where our clients face political persecution.
These interdictions are going on over 700 miles away from
the United States. They are going on right outside Haiti.
People are fleeing from Haiti to anywhere they can get to.

13 There are some 700 islands, if you refer to a 14 map, between here and Haiti. People coming from 15 Port-au-Prince could go to the Bahamas. They could go the 16 Caymans. They can go to Mexico, Cuba, the Virgin Islands, 17 Honduras, Turks and Caicos, the Dominican Republic, but 18 they cannot because we've erected a floating Berlin Wall 19 around Haiti which keeps people in.

20 Secondly, our claim is --

QUESTION: Mr. Koh, uh, uh, Ms. Mahoney says that the order is directed just at Haitians who are leaving Haiti for the United States.

24 MR. KOH: Your Honor, they are not interdicting 25 people and asking them: Are you going to the United

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States? They are interdicting everyone, without regard
 and without asking them where they're going. And that's
 precisely the problem.

4 QUESTION: Well, then, are -- are they -- are 5 they out of compliance with the President's order?

MR. KOH: Your Honor, if someone was coming from 7 700 miles away and past many countries, it would be quite 8 a while before we were sure what their ultimate 9 destination was. And there's no way that we can establish 10 exactly where they are going.

11 Our own clients -- uh -- in another part of the 12 case who are being held at Guantanamo, all intended to go 13 elsewhere. Nevertheless, the interdiction order is not 14 designed to keep Haitians out of the United States. If 15 that were the case, the interdiction could be set up 13 16 miles outside the United States. Instead, it's set up 13 17 miles outside of Haiti.

QUESTION: Well, if you set up an interdiction order 13 miles outside the United States you turn people back for what may be a very perilous hundreds of miles of -- of journey.

22 MR. KOH: I understand that, Your Honor, but if 23 you refer to the Government's brief, on page three, they 24 point out that under the old interdiction program, the one 25 that operated under President Reagan and President Bush

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1 for more than 10 years, where there was minimal screening 2 applied, that that program was very effective, and that it 3 saved thousands of lives.

They have not explained why a program which now dispenses with the screening and returns people directly to their persecutors is somehow safer. This is not rescue. This is aiding and abetting their persecutors by delivering refugees directly into the hands of those people that they are fleeing from.

Now, the Defendant in this case is not the President. We have not sued him and he is not here. And we do not challenge his constitutional authority to direct foreign and military policy. The President has issued no national emergency order. He has not issued a new proclamation. Indeed, that's a core -- uh -- point of their case.

17 QUESTION: You -- you have joined the commandant 18 of the Coast Guard and the Commandant of Guantanamo? 19 MR. KOH: That's right, Your Honor. 20 Miss Mahoney conducted her entire argument 21 without reference to the order which is at issue here. 22 And if you refer to pages 378 to 379 of the joint 23 appendix, what you will see is that the President has not ordered that people be returned to Haiti. Indeed, on the 24 25 joint appendix, at 327, and I will read it to you, the

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press release that was issued on the day the Kennebunkport order issued: "President Bush has issued an executive order which will permit the Coast Guard to begin returning Haitians to Haiti."

5 And if you look at the order itself, he says that the secretary -- the Department of Transportation 6 7 shall issue appropriate instructions -- he does not say 8 what makes them appropriate. And then in 2(c)(3) - I'msorry -- 2 -- uh -- (c)(3) "to return the vessel" -- in 9 other words, there is no despot -- dispute that what he's 10 11 -- uh -- suggesting are instructions about return -- "when there is reason to believe that an offense is being 12 committed against the U.S. immigration laws." 13

In other words, the Coast Guard here is supposed to be enforcing the immigration laws, and as Justice Souter pointed out, that brings them firmly under 14 U.S.C. 89(b).

And then, "provided, however, that the attorney general, in his unreviewable discretion, may decide that a person who is a refuge will not be returned without his consent."

That is the target of 243(h). The attorney general does not have unreviewable discretion to decide whether someone who is a refugee may be returned. That discretion was removed from him by 1253(h), which says in

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1 unambiguous terms, "The attorney general shall not return 2 any alien" --

3 QUESTION: Yes, but, Mr. Koh, that's the issue. 4 I mean, if -- if the statute doesn't apply outside the 5 United States, then he does have unreviewable discretion. 6 And that's what we have to decide.

7 MR. KOH: Well, Your Honor, the point that we 8 have made in our brief is that you must look to the 9 broader purposes of this statute. If what the Government 10 says is --

11 QUESTION: Yes, I understand. But do -- would 12 you not agree that if 243(h) -- and neither the statute 13 nor the treaty applies outside the United States, then 14 there's nothing wrong with giving him unreviewable 15 discretion?

MR. KOH: Well, that's a further point of our contention. The Government suggests that what we are arguing here is somehow that 243(h) applies worldwide, and to any chance encounter between Haitians and the attorney general. That is not what we're contesting.

21 What we are contesting is that in the 22 unprecedent --

23 QUESTION: It -- it'd really help me if I -- I 24 understood what your answer to my question was.

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MR. KOH: Your Honor, what we're saying is that

the question here is when the attorney general takes the
 immigration laws out onto the high --

3 QUESTION: Let me just state my question, so you 4 understand it clearly. If you agree, which I know you 5 don't, that neither the treaty nor the statute applies 6 outside the territory of the United States, then would you 7 not also agree that the attorney general has unreviewable 8 discretion to return someone who is apprehended outside 9 the United States?

MR. KOH: If the issue were posed that way, yes, IN I would agree, Your Honor. But the question is not that. The question is: When the attorney general takes the immigration laws out onto the high seas, as he has done here, then do the restraints of the statute travel with him?

16 Now, as the Government points out, the authority that they claim is from 212(f) and 215(a). Those 17 provisions also, by the way, are not extraterritorial. 18 There is nothing that gives them an extraterritorial 19 20 scope. What takes them extrator -- territorially is that 21 the attorney general has taken them out onto the high 22 seas. But they want the power without the restraint that 23 goes along with it.

And our point is simply that when U.S. officials, themselves, choose to exercise their

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authorities, their immigration authorities, on the high
 seas, they must follow the statute that they invoke as the
 basis of their authority. They can't have it both ways.
 They can't have the power without the constraint.

5 And understand, Your Honors, that the motive, 6 the humanitarian motive that is raised repeatedly in the 7 Government's position, is irrelevant. Because if, as 8 Justice Stevens has pointed out -- uh -- the attorney 9 general's discretion were unreviewable, then the attorney 10 general could simply shoot everyone on the high seas. His 11 motive would be irrelevant.

12 If this were in fact the case in the current 13 day, the attorney general could send the Coast Guard out 14 to apprehend fleeing Nazis and deliberately return them to 15 their pre -- persecutors.

16 If Chinese students were outside the United 17 States or Salman Rushdie was outside the United States, 18 they could be returned to China and Iran, respectively, 19 for the worst of motives, because there would be no law 20 governing their conduct.

And, indeed, Your Honor, if President Aristide himself were coming from Haiti, someone who undeniably has a fear of political persecution, he would be returned, no questions asked, directly into the hands of his persecutors.

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1 This has a broader worldwide implication. If 2 this interpretation is true, the Germans, facing a flow of 3 refugees from Bosnia, could take to the high seas, 4 apprehend Bosnians, and deliberately return them to 5 Serbian death camps, because they are under no constraint 6 of law.

7 QUESTION: Since it is good for it to be that way, it must be that way. Is -- is that your argument? 8 I 9 mean, well, it seems that we have a statute in front of 10 us, in the text in front of us, one can create horribles -- all sorts of horribles, but simply to acknowledge it is 11 12 a horrible is not necessarily to acknowledge that there is a law against it, is it? 13

MR. KOH: Justice Scalia, there is a law against
it. It says that the attorney general --

QUESTION: Well, let's talk about the law. Uh -- in -- in -- in -- in Stevic, we discussed the prior version of 1253, which we said complied with article 33 and the protocol -- substantially conformed with it. And we said that the later amendment made some changes, but not substantial ones.

22 And that prior version, which we said complied 23 with -- uh -- the protocol, that prior version read very 24 explicitly the attorney general was authorized to 25 withhold, disporz -- disportation -- uh -- deportation of

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any alien within the United States to any country in
 which, in his opinion, the alien would be subject to
 persecution.

4 MR. KOH: Justice --5 QUESTION: That one contained explicitly a 6 territorial limitation. And in Stevic we thought that complied with article 33 and with the protocol. 7 MR. KOH: Justice Scalia, I would -- uh --8 9 differ with your interpretation of the case. The holdings in the earlier determinations or the earlier 10 11 determinations or the earlier cases of this Court regarding 243(h) did not address the question of -- uh --12 13 the Refugee Act of 1980 and what it did to the previous version of the statute. 14

In -- there were three important changes made. May -- or in the discretionary power in the attorney general was made mandatory -- the word "return" was added, and the words, "within the United States" were dropped. In other words, it's now made, "shall not return any alien," where before it was, "may return an alien."

Now, what's Stevic held, and this was also the burden of -- of the long footnote in Justice Stevens' opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca is that the -- uh -conformance of the United States to article 33 compelled the discretion of the attorney general under the old

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243(h) and all that the Refuge Act did in 1980 was to make
 it mandatory.

What is -- is going on here is that lower 3 executive officials, operating pursuant to discretion, 4 5 supposedly given by an executive order, have rewritten the statute back to the way it was. Instead of saying "may," 6 7 it now says -- instead of saying "shall," it now says "may." Instead of saying "any aliens," they would read it 8 to say "any aliens within the United States." And instead 9 of saying "deport or return," they would eliminate the 10 word "return." 11

12 QUESTION: Well, here's what we said in Stevic. We said there were of course differences between the 13 14 protocol and the text of domestic law. The most significant difference was that article 33 gave the ref --15 16 refugee an entitlement to avoid deportation to a country in which his life or freedom would be threatened, whereas 17 18 domestic law merely provided the attorney general with discretion. 19

The attorney general, however, could naturally accommodate the protocol -- and so -- and it mentions a few other -- uh -- differences. You would think --

23 MR. KOH: But --

24 QUESTION: That if one of the differences was no 25 extraterritorial application, that would have been --

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1 would have been a prominent one that -- that we would have 2 mentioned.

MR. KOH: But, Your Honor, if you read on, what you will see is that it was suggested that the attorney general honored the dictates of article 33, and thereby exercised his discretion in conformity with it.

QUESTION: Yes, but we mention nothing about
extraterritoriality.

9 MR. KOH: Your Honor, that's because no 10 extraterritorial interceptions and returns were going on 11 at the time.

12 QUESTION: But -- but that language leaps out at 13 you, "within the United States," in the earlier version.

14 MR. KOH: Your Honor --

QUESTION: And if we had thought that that was a difference from the protocol and from article 33, we would certainly have noticed it.

MR. KOH: Your Honor, we cite here simply plain language. It used to say "any alien within the United States," and that's precisely the language that they removed. And Cardoza-Fonseca says that nothing is clear, that language that was removed should be not be sub silentio added into another provision.

24 QUESTION: Well, but we acknowledge that even 25 with that language, before it was removed, it was in

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1 conformity with article 33 and the protocol. And we also 2 say in the opinion that the changes were not meant to make 3 any substantial changes, but were to conform the law with 4 what the practice had been.

5 MR. KOH: But that illustrates, Justice Scalia, 6 is the point that was raised by Justice Kennedy. Article 7 33 is self-executing, so that the attorney general could 8 not exercise his discretion, under the statute, to deport 9 people from within the United States back to their 10 persecutors.

What happened was that the discretion was being exercised in conformity with article 33. The revision in 13 1980 brought the two into line explicitly by using the 14 same language, "shall not return any aliens." And the 15 only way that this can be avoided is to read those words 16 out to read "within the United States" back in.

17 QUESTION: Mr. Koh, what did the 11th Circuit 18 think the statute meant, and determine that it meant, in 19 the case that was brought there in the 11th Circuit?

20 MR. KOH: Your Honor, the 11th Circuit accepted 21 in dictum the assertion which is now being made by the 22 Government. Which is that the removal of the words 23 "within the United States" was meant to encompass 24 deportables, as well as excludables.

QUESTION: Now, are you going to address any

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question of collateral estoppel in your comments today? 1 2 MR. KOH: Yes, I will. 3 As we pointed out in our brief, collateral estoppel requires the same parties, the same issue, in an 4 issue that was actually litigated and necessarily 5 determined. Our people were not there. That's as simple 6 as that. They were different parties. 7 8 These are screened in Haitians who have credible 9 fears of persecution. And they were not adequately 10 represented by --QUESTION: Well, if you read the court's 11 12 description of the class, it certainly is broad enough to 13 include the people that you have -- uh -- that you're 14 representing today. MR. KOH: We would challenge that, Your Honor, 15 as the 2nd Circuit pointed out below. The class 16 17 definition was people who have been detained or will be detained on cutters and Guantanamo. We concede that that 18 19 was part of it. 20 But the second provision was, who are 21 interdicted pursuant to the -- the U.S. interdiction 22 program. At the time there was a lawful program of 23 interdiction and screening. Now, there is an illegal 24 program of interdiction without screening. Those are 25 different programs.

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1 Third, the claim was that were challenging --2 that the class includes people who were challenging a 3 violation of their procedural rights. Those people who 4 were screened in and found to have credible fears of 5 persecution claimed no challenge or no violation of their 6 procedural rights, because they had benefitted by those 7 procedures. So we were not encompassed in the class.

8 Even assuming arguendo that we were encompassed 9 in the class, we were not adequately represented by the 10 people who were there. They were all screened out. And 11 they were neither adequate nor typical of our class.

12 And, for that reason, different parties were 13 there. Your Honor, this is similar to -- uh -- the 14 opinion in the Falcon case, General Telephone v. Falcon, 15 where a conclusion was made that an employee could not 16 adequately represent the class that consisted of both 17 employees or applicants for employment, because they are 18 different groups.

Or, to give another example, Martin v. Wilkes, whether the white fire fighters are precluded by the black fire fighters. Again, here, they are both Haitians, but one group is a group without credible fears of persecution, who are therefore economic migrants, and our class are those who have the most fear of all. And that's precisely the point. This is not a

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polite, bloodless process which is going on. Our clients, 1 our named Plaintiff, Mr. Bertrand and Mr. Remy, who my own 2 3 co-counsel counseled, these people were interdicted on the high seas. Their boats were destroyed by the Coast Guard. 4 5 They were taken to Guantanamo, where they were held behind barbed wire in U.S. captivity for months. And then, when 6 7 they asked for lawyers, before they had an asylum hearing, 8 they were forced back onto the boats and returned to 9 Haiti.

I am -- uh -- I will point you out the trial 10 affidavits, on pages 51 to 65 of our joint appendix, at 11 Port-au-Prince, Mr. Bertrand was driven off the boat with 12 fire hoses. He was fingerprinted, identified by the 13 Haitian military. That night he was -- uh -- taken from 14 15 his bed, beaten, his left arm was fractured, and he fled 16 into hiding. And he would now flee again, but for this program. He has a credible fear of persecution. He would 17 be screened in, but for this policy, which does not 18 recognize a legitimate distinction between political 19 20 refugees and economic migrants.

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Now, the point --

QUESTION: Mr. Koh, do you agree with Ms. Mahoney that if a Haitian makes an application for political at the consultant in Port-au-Prince, and the consul does not follow applicable law in processing it,

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that Haitian, nonetheless, does not have a remedy in the
 United States courts.

MR. KOH: Yes, we do, and this comes back to the 3 point that I was making with Justice Stevens. We are not 4 talking about whether 243(h) applies to any random 5 encounter between an alien and a U.S. official outside the 6 7 United States. What we are talking about is a case where 8 the United States, in an unprecedent move, intentionally 9 goes out on the high seas, takes people into their 10 custody.

It is the act of taking them into their custody outside the United States that brings them within the control of the attorney general, and it is that act which then, authorizing them to be returned, makes the Coast Guard an agent of the attorney general for the returned.

Now, Justice O'Connor raised the question, could they have been referring, when they withdrew the words "within the United States," to excludables as well as deportables. The short answer to that, Your Honor, is had they intended merely to reach deportables and excludables, they could have said shall not return any alien physically present in the United States.

If you examine the Government's reply brief, you will see that on page 14 the Government concedes this point. It says, "The essential characteristic shared by

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those in exclusion and deportation proceedings are both
 are physically present in the United States."

3 In other words, there was no need for Congress 4 to delete the words "within the United States" altogether. And there is no valid claim that what was actually going 5 6 on here is that they -- the pen slipped, because at the 7 same time that they deleted the words "within the United 8 States," they added the words "physical present within the 9 United States" into 208. That was part of the procedure 10 that was going on at the same time.

In short, what happened in 1980 was that Congress was creating three statutory classes of aliens. First, aliens within the United States, those lawfully admitted, who are subject to deportation proceedings. Secondly, those physically present in the United States who are either deportable or excludable. And third, any aliens, those -- wherever they are taken a hold of.

And that's precisely the point. Someone becomes a refugee not when they make it to the United States, they become a refugee when they flee the -- when they clear their own borders. Then they have escaped their persecutor. And the question is not whether we need to let them in, the question is why do we at that point take them back to their persecutor.

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There are many other things we could do. We can

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1 interdict and screen them, as was done for 10 years. We 2 could let them go to third country sites. We could just 3 let them sail on to the Bahamas and Caimans. OUESTION: Mr. Koh, could I ask you another 4 5 question about the prior suit. If -- if, as you say, 6 the -- the prior suit involved only screened-out Haitians, 7 would not the screened-out class, at least, be bound by 8 that prior litigation? 9 MR. KOH: That's right, Your Honor, and we 10 represent no screened-outs here. 11 QUESTION: And pardon me? 12 MR. KOH: We represent no screened-outs here. 13 QUESTION: Okay. So -- so whatever decree would come out of this litigation would not -- would not apply 14 to that group. 15 16 MR. KOH: It would affect those people who have been screened in or who will be screened in. 17 And I should point out that the Government's --18 19 QUESTION: How can this injunction apply to only 20 -- you know, only that class and not the other class. I 21 don't quite see how it would work. 22 MR. KOH: All that we're -- the Government has no -- they claim to have a problem with the injunction. 23 24 What they have a problem with is the statute. The statute 25 says you shall not return any alien without screening. 43

If -- the point of our clients, the 150 who were screened
 in and then returned, is they would flee again were
 screening reinstituted.

To reinstitute screening, as was done for 10 years under President Reagan and President Bush, would not create a massive inflow. Last year, over a 9 month period with no serious attempt to restore the democratic government of Haiti, in uncontrolled migration 37,000 people came of whom only something like 10,000 were screened in.

And if you examine the amicus brief of the 11 American Jewish Committee, you will see that 900,000 12 Cubans have been admitted, that 200,000 Eastern Europeans, 13 that nations many times smaller than ours have shown much 14 more generosity. And we're not asking that they be 15 admitted. All we're asking is that they be given some 16 form of temporary safe haven outside of Haiti, the country 17 18 that they're fleeing from.

Our amicus briefs by Amnesty International and Americas Watch and the two court rule applying to the district court findings of fact and the Second Circuit's affirmance of that, demonstrate that there's heightened political repression currently occurring in Haiti, and also evidence that specific plaintiffs who have been returned have been abused, were tortured, and are in

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1 hiding for fear of their lives.

So why return these people directly into the 2 hands of their persecutors? This is tantamount to being 3 accomplices to their persecution. And in the same way as 4 the rules against torture and genocide were set up to be 5 universal proscriptions, we cannot see any reason why a 6 7 country would have no power to send someone back to their 8 persecutors in their own territory where they're most 9 powerful, but then somehow have such power on the high seas where they have no sovereignty. 10

And this also disproves the point about the 11 presumption against extraterritoriality. This is an 12 13 international statute. It controls refugee flows in and 14 out of the United States. It effectuates a treaty, an 15 international treaty. It effectuates an international human rights norm. And most conclusively, our officials 16 17 have themselves taken these laws extraterritorially, and 18 now that -- they argue that this presumption against extraterritoriality should somehow apply to rewrite the 19 20 statute to add words that were taken out previously.

Now, Ms. Mahoney has suggested that what is not required is asylum screening, but the kind of screening that went on before was preasylum screening. And you can examine the joint appendix at 378; what was asked was whether they had a credible fear of persecution. If you

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1 lack such a fear, you could be returned.

2 This was a -- a nononerous procedural burden. 3 And the fact that the new policy is effective and has 4 terrified people so that they will not flee is not a 5 reason why it's legal. I'm sure that shooting them would 6 also -- or drowning them would also dissuade people from 7 coming, but that is our shame, that is not the reason why 8 it's a legal policy.

9 This also rebuts their point about 10 reviewability, for if it is true that the only way that an 11 alien outside the United States can get review of a 12 generally applicable Government policy is through habeas 13 or exclusion then, again, the attorney general could 14 simply order that all Haitians coming on the high seas be 15 shot and that would be unreviewable.

16 The Japan whaling case and Cardoza-Fonseca both -- both made it absolutely clear that what's going on 17 18 here is immigration. It's a construction of an immigration statute. Of course it touches on foreign 19 20 policy, immigration cases always do, but the Court can construe the statutes in a manner which is consistent with 21 22 the plain language of the statute, the plain language of the treaty which here is also "return." Return is return 23 24 is refolai is return.

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In other words, you don't take people back, and

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there should be no doubt as to what's going on here because the executive order that's being invoked says, "you shall not" -- that is what is being done is "return." So even if there is some confusion as to what "return" means, that is what the executive order authorizes.

6 The Government repeatedly cites the Knauff case, 7 but the Knauff case had to do with a claim of inherent 8 executive power over immigration. What is going on here 9 is a power which is purportedly being executed pursuant to 10 statute. And I would note Justice Jackson's powerful 11 dissent in that case, where he said security, like 12 liberty, is dangerous, for many other crimes that are 13 committed in its name. This is essentially what's going on here, Your Honor. 14

In short, the plain meaning of the statute, the mutually reinforcing plain meaning of the statute and the treaty make it clear that lower executive officials shall not return any aliens to conditions of persecution without regard to their physical location. Once they have cleared their own frontiers, they become subject to the statute.

Once they come under the attorney general's control, he can do many things with them, and we do not tell him what he must do with them, we only tell him that he cannot return them. Ironically, the only option that is forbidden is the one that has been chosen here.

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1 QUESTION: Do you take the position that it's 2 irrelevant whether the treaty is self executing or not 3 self executing, because it's been executed through the 4 statute?

5 MR. KOH: We believe that that only reinforces 6 our result. It -- by the way, if the treaty is self 7 executing, as we assert, it eliminates any claim that the 8 Coast Guard or the President are not bound by the treaty. 9 And we believe it's absolutely clear, and we --

10 QUESTION: But it's -- you're -- you're -- it's 11 not fatal to your case to find that the treaty is not self 12 executing because of the statute, I take it.

MR. KOH: Because of the statute, which expressly embodies the treaty. So we win either way, and we direct you to the attention -- your attention to the amicus brief of the Lawyers Committee which examines the self executing question.

Your Honor, in closing, ours is a Nation of refugees. Most of our ancestors came here by boat. If they could do this to the Haitians, they could do this to any of us. Because the Second Circuit correctly ruled that blanket summary return violates the plain language of the statute and the treaty, its judgment should be affirmed. Thank you.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Koh. Ms. Mahoney, you

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1 have 2 minutes remaining.

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MAUREEN E. MAHONEY 2 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS 3 4 MS. MAHONEY: There's a basic principle in our law that is reflected in Johnson v. Eisentrager, it's 5 reflected in the INA, it's reflected in the construction 6 7 of 243(h) that governed here for 30 years, that ordinarily an alien's right to protection from a country only arises 8 when they arrive in the territory of the United States. 9 It is not at all unusual that aliens outside the United 10 States should not have rights under U.S. law or access to 11 its courts. 12

13 I'd like to emphasize that the removal of the 14 language "within the United States" is a direct response 15 to this Court's holding in Leng Ma May Ma v. Barber, that 16 that language meant it could not apply in exclusion 17 proceedings.

18 QUESTION: Then -- then why didn't it say so? I 19 mean why didn't it simply refer to exclusion rather than 20 return?

MS. MAHONEY: The word return, as Judge Walker notes in his dissent, had been used as a reference in statutes before to the manner in which you exclude people from the United States. If the statute had read deport or exclude to a country where they would be threatened with

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persecution, it wouldn't make any sense.

So in order to respond to the concern that -that the INS had that they'd like to go ahead and extend it to exclusion proceedings, they need to add -- take out "within the United States" and add another word. This was done voluntarily by the INS when the '80 act was being amended.

8 In fact, Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca say that it 9 is important to look at how the act was being interpreted 10 in the 12-year period after accession to the protocol and 11 prior to the amendment, because we should conclude that 12 what we were doing during that 12-year period was 13 consistent with the protocol.

And contrary to what Mr. Koh has said, the INS in fact, and the BIA took the position repeatedly that 243(h) had not been extended to exclusion proceedings. In Matter of Pierre that was settled by the BIA, it still during that period applied only to persons who were within the United States, but we believed that we were in compliance with the protocol and, in fact, we were.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Ms.
Mahoney. The case is submitted.

23 (Whereupon, at 11:01 a.m., the case in the 24 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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CERTIFICATION

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc., hereby certifies that the attached pages represents an accurate transcription of electronic sound recording of the oral argument before the Supreme Court of The United States in the Matter of:

Chris Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and

<u>Naturalization Service, et al., Petitioners v. Haitian</u> Centers Council, Inc., et al. Case No. 92-344 and that these attached pages constitutes the original transcript of the proceedings for the records of the court.

BY Gona may

(REPORTER)