OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CAPTION: THOMAS CIPOLLONE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ROSE D.

CIPOLLONE, Petitioner V. LIGGETT GROUP, INC., et al.

CASE NO: 90-1038

- PLACE: Washington, D.C.
- DATE: January 13, 1992
- PAGES: 1 46

RE-ARGUMENT


ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY

1111 14TH STREET, N.W.

LIBRARY SUPREME COUNT, U.S. MASHINGTON, D.G. 20545

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-5650

202 289-2260



'92 JAN 15 All :21

•

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - X THOMAS CIPOLLONE, INDIVIDUALLY : 3 4 AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE : OF ROSE D. CIPOLLONE, 5 : 6 Petitioner : 7 v. : No. 90-1038 8 LIGGETT GROUP, INC., ET AL. : 9 - - - - X 10 Washington, D.C. 11 Monday, January 13, 1992 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 12 13 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 14 10:02 a.m. 15 APPEARANCES: LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ESQ., Cambridge, Massachusetts; on 16 behalf of the Petitioner. 17 H. BARTOW FARR, III, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of 18 19 the Respondents. 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.

SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202)289-2260 (800) FOR DEPO

1	CONTENTS	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	PAGE
3	LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioner	3
5	H. BARTOW FARR, III, ESQ.	
6	On behalf of the Respondents	23
7	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF	
8	LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ESQ.	
9	On behalf of the Petitioner	42
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25	2	

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:02 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We'll hear argument
4	first this morning in No. 90-1038, Thomas Cipollone v. the
5	Liggett Group.
6	Mr. Tribe.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF LAURENCE H. TRIBE
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
9	MR. TRIBE: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please
10	the Court:
11	Although the substance of this case focuses on
12	fair warning to consumers, at a structural level the case
13	is really about fair warning to the 50 States.
14 .	The premise of their ability to defend their
15	interests in the national legislative process is, of
16	course, that they be, clearly, warned of what they are
17	about to lose as Congress considers a new statute.
18	The Cigarette Labeling Act undoubtedly warned
19	the states that with respect to three specific areas
20	cigarette package labels, cigarette advertisements, and
21	cigarette promotions the States were about to lose the
22	authority to tell the cigarette companies what health
23	messages they must include, once those companies had put
24	the Surgeon General's warning on their package labels.
25	But if the Third Circuit is upheld and
	3

respondents prevail here, the States will end up having 1 lost considerably more than that, because affixing the 2 3 Surgeon General's warning to a cigarette companies' packages would absolve that company, prospectively, of any 4 5 legally enforceable duty, regardless of how longstanding 6 or broadly applicable that duty might be, in the context 7 of that company's communications with the public about 8 smoking and health.

9 Now in that context, the placement of the 10 Surgeon General's warning on all of the company's 11 cigarette packages becomes an iron-clad guarantee that, as 12 far as the 50 States are concerned, the company can do no 13 wrong. That is if it should deliberately lie or break its 14 promises, no State can make that company compensate its 15 victims providing the deception involves smoking and 16 health.

If the company should suddenly discover some new 17 health information that a similarly situated manufacturer 18 19 of another product would be duly bound under the 20 background law of the States in some way to communicate to 21 its buyers or to bystanders who are at risk, no State can 22 pressure this cigarette company to communicate that information or to make it compensate those who are hurt 23 because it chooses not to. 24

25

Now it is, of course, possible but I think quite

remarkable for Congress to take quite that much authority 1 away from all 50 States on the basis of a cigarette 2 3 company's compliance with this one requirement. I do submit that the Surgeon General's warnings are obviously 4 very important and quite effective, but this result, if 5 correct, treats them as though they were almost a rather 6 7 magical cure-all. And the issue, certainly, is whether Congress did that. Did it do it in a way that would have 8 alerted any State at the time that so large a part of its 9 10 basic body of law was being cut away?

Now, let me say very clearly at the outset, the 11 fact that Congress probably -- I say probably because I'm 12 no mind reader -- was not thinking in terms of preempting 13 damage actions, as such, is not decisive and I do not 14 intend to rely on it. I will not suggest that all State 15 16 court damage actions are simply beyond the reach of this labeling act just because the act's invocation in the 17 context of a damage action might surprise some of those 18 who drafted it or voted on it. 19

The only way to tell what the act does is to look carefully at its text. It's on page 3 of our opening brief, and I think it would be helpful if I focused precisely on it to analyze what legally enforceable duties it preempts.

And I would like, if I might, to begin with

5

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W. SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202)289-2260 (800) FOR DEPO

duties not to deceive and then turn to duties to warn. 1 With respect to deception -- broken promises, conspiracy 2 3 to mislead by neutralizing -- the active wrongs as opposed to the omissions -- the issue arises, of course, in part 4 5 because cigarette companies have so many avenues of communication besides just the package. It's rather hard 6 7 to deceive people on the package, although I suppose it can be done. 8

They have advertisements, which are subject to 9 10 the act's warning requirements, including, as of 1984, Congress' own four rotating warnings. And they have 11 promotions, which they have maintained are not subject to 12 the warning requirements. It's a little ambiguous, but 13 that seems to be the current state of the law. They have 14 what they call advertorials, opinion pieces, where they 15 16 communicate to the public and do not place the warnings.

One thing I should call to the Court's 17 18 attention, which I think escaped me the first few times I 19 read the statute, is that failure to comply with the 20 Federal warning requirements as to the advertisements is a 21 misdemeanor, a \$10,000 fine, but it does not prevent the 22 preemption provision of section 5 from kicking in. That 23 provision is triggered by compliance with the requirements 24 with respect to the package.

25

So the issue becomes could Congress have meant,

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W. SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202)289-2260 (800) FOR DEPO

could it have said, does this language say, that once you
 have stamped the proper warning on the package, you are
 home free with regard to deliberate torts like lying about
 smoking and health. Well, certainly not in 1965. I think
 that's clear.

67

MR. TRIBE: Yes.

OUESTION: Mr. Tribe?

8 QUESTION: When you say lying about smoking and 9 health, you're not then referring just to the general sort 10 of misrepresentation, which I think doesn't ordinarily 11 require actual lying. You're referring to something more 12 specific?

MR. TRIBE: No, actually Mr. Chief Justice, I would refer to anything positive that would otherwise violate the background law of torts. Whatever scienter might be required or even none -- that is, if it a false statement and meets the State's requirement with respect to whatever the state of mind is, then, in 1965, the question I think one would ask is, look at the

20 language --

25

21 QUESTION: Well, then, but your use of the word 22 lying, then, is somewhat hyperbolic.

23 MR. TRIBE: I don't mean, Mr. Chief Justice, to24 do that.

QUESTION: You don't mean lying.

7

1 MR. TRIBE: I would simply call it 2 misrepresentation. It includes lying, but is not limited 3 to lying. That's correct.

4 Section 5 provides essentially that no 5 statement, and I'm now talking about the way it stood in 6 1965, let me be clear, just 1965. I will turn to 1969 in 7 a moment. No statement relating to smoking and health, 8 other than the Surgeon General's package label, shall be 9 required on any cigarette package or ad.

Now, obviously that did confer a certain, I
suppose a limited, but a significant right of silence as
it were. In a certain sense, the cigarette companies
could take the Fifth.

14 They were free to say more, no ceiling, but they 15 had a right to stay mute. They did not have to say 16 anything. Of course, as we know from the Fifth Amendment 17 context, the right to say nothing does not include a right 18 to chose to say something and say something false.

There is no conflict between section 5 in any sense that arises from the fact that all 50 States, and I now continue to speak of it just as it was in 1965, that all 50 States have concurrent authority to say, if you make a false statement to our residents and they get hurt, you will be liable if our other background requirements are met. It's not at all like -- and I'll deal with this

> ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W. SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202)289-2260 (800) FOR DEPO

in a moment -- it's not at all like 50 different
 authorities each affirmatively telling you what you must
 say on your packages and ads in order to avoid liability
 there.

5 So it is curious that the Third Circuit, 6 nonetheless, held and that the respondents, as I 7 understand it, in this Court agree, that effective January 8 1, 1966, even liability for making false statements, 9 including deliberately false statements, is preempted. 10 What I want to do is try to figure out how they got there.

11 QUESTION: I suppose that depends to some extent, doesn't it, upon whether the falsity consists of 12 13 an omission. I mean, couldn't misrepresentation be based 14 upon an omission, for instance, under some State law 15 perhaps it would be said that if you show people, young people, having a good time smoking cigarettes that this is 16 deceptive and misrepresentation. It would at least 17 18 eliminate that kind of misrepresentation. Isn't that --

MR. TRIBE: I think, Justice Scalia, I would be prepared to say that most omissions, I will have to establish, are not preempted if they're not under the general rubric of failure to warn. It's not so clear to me, there will be grey areas where the classification is not going to be easy. But it is quite clear that if there is a positive misrepresentation by anyone's standards --

> ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W. SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202)289-2260 (800) FOR DEPO

QUESTION: Smoking is good for you.

1

2 MR. TRIBE: Smoking is good for you, it doesn't 3 addict you, and so forth. I'm trying to figure out how 4 they got to the conclusion there. And I think what I see 5 is a two-step procedure. The first is a kind of travel 6 back from the future.

7 That is, they rely heavily and repeatedly on the 8 1969, '70 text, which is different. It talks about no 9 requirement or prohibition with respect to advertising or 10 promotion. And then they use it in a sense to 11 retroactively read back meaning into the 1965 law. Now, I 12 submit, at the most elementary level, there is a problem 13 with that.

14 That is, if the 1965 law, in its text, will not 15 bear this meaning that liability for a positive 16 misstatement is somehow preempted, it can't acquire that 17 meaning retroactively in '69. It's entirely possible for 18 the law to have changed in 1969. The Third Circuit does 19 -- didn't think it did. The respondents did not argue it 20 did.

QUESTION: Well, what about that? There is substantially different language as of 1970, which makes your argument more difficult.

24 MR. TRIBE: It makes it more difficult from 1970 25 on. It still means that the judgment below cannot be

10

1 affirmed as to the intermediate period.

But let me focus on 1970. That is, suppose there were no 3-year gap. Suppose the language always had been as it is in this new version. The second step --

5 QUESTION: That makes it a little easier for 6 you, if the language were always the way it is in the new 7 version.

8 MR. TRIBE: Does it make it easier or harder? 9 QUESTION: I think it makes it a little easier. 10 If it always were the way it is in the new version? 11 MR. TRIBE: Well, in the new version, with

respect to part (b), no requirement or prohibition shallbe imposed with respect to advertising.

QUESTION: I mean, when one changes from a version that is less restrictive upon the States to one that is more restrictive, when the change is in that direction, don't you think that one is inclined to think that the change made a difference?

MR. TRIBE: In theory, I'm prepared to assume that it may have made a difference, but what I'm interested in establishing is that whatever difference it might have made does not establish that liability for misrepresentation could possibly be preempted. And that's really the gist of it.

25

The reason I say that is that it's terribly

11

important, and this is the second step in their argument, 1 to say that they make really nothing significant of the 2 3 language based on smoking and health. That is, they rewrite the text so that effectively it preempts not 4 5 requirements or prohibitions based on smoking and health, but requirements or prohibitions having some impact on 6 smoking and health or triggered in the particular case by 7 a relation between smoking and health. 8

9 Now, the prohibition against making 10 misstatements, it seems pretty plain to me, is grounded in, rooted in, based on something rather broader and more 11 12 general than smoking and health. Its roots are far more 13 universal: the Ten Commandments and the Koran, for starters. The law of virtually every jurisdiction. 14 Although there are questions of much scienter, as the 15 16 Chief Justice points out, might be required.

17 But this prohibition is based on a society-wide norm, the prohibition against making misstatements. 18 And the reason I stress this as particularly significant in 19 the context of this act, is that making that shift in the 20 21 statute, apart from a general aversion that I have to 22 rewriting other people's work, I think has a problem. The 23 problem is that it involves an attempt by the industry to 24 persuade the Federal judiciary to give it something that 25 the Congress was never asked to give it.

12

QUESTION: Mr. Tribe, it seems to me that at the most general level, it's not based on smoking and health, it's based upon the Ten Commandments or the Koran: people should not lie. But at a more specific level, it's based on smoking or health, isn't it?

I mean, that is to say, in this area of smoking and health, since in fact cigarettes are harmful to you, it amounts to a misrepresentation because they -cigarettes are harmful to you, to show people having a good time smoking without any thought of the harmfulness. Now isn't that specific prohibition at a more specific level, based on smoking and health?

MR. TRIBE: The prohibition, I think, has a different route or basis, but I fully agree that the reason that it comes into play here is because of empirical things in the world about smoking and health.

17 QUESTION: So it depends upon at what -- how 18 general a level you want to consider the "based on" 19 language here.

20 MR. TRIBE: Well, but it does modify the word 21 requirement or prohibition. And it seems to me that the 22 State should at least have the authority, if it is a 23 general prohibition and if it's not peculiar to this 24 industry, to have some say in the level of generality. 25 In particular, the industry came to Congress and

13

1 at no point suggested that it wanted protection from 2 anything but industry-specific regulation. Joseph Coleman, who was then the industry's chief spokesman in 3 4 '69 in Congress, told the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on July 22d, page 80 cigarette advertising shouldn't be the 5 target of discriminatory regulation. He told the House 6 Commerce Committee, on April 23d, page 555, the only issue 7 8 is whether cigarette advertising should be regulated 9 altogether differently.

10 Now this Court, this Court contrasted, in one 11 recent case, in a different context to be sure, rules 12 regulating an industry from rules that are rooted in 13 something broader but happen to be applied in a particular 14 case to the industry. The respondents twice cite Pilot 15 Life against Dedeaux, and the Court there says to regulate 16 an industry, a law must not just have an impact on that 17 industry, but must be specifically directed toward that 18 industry.

19 The roots of the State law of bad faith, the 20 Mississippi law at issue in Pilot Life, in Justice 21 O'Connor's opinion, are firmly planted, I continue 22 quoting, in general principles of the State tort and 23 contract law. And I submit the same is true of the law of 24 broken promises and the law of deception.

25

QUESTION: Mr. Tribe, just so I follow your

14

argument, your emphasis on the "based on smoking and 1 health" language is directed only to the affirmative half 2 of the case, or is that also applied to the omission? 3 MR. TRIBE: Well, with respect to express 4 preemption, to the extent that anyone relies on part (b) 5 6 of the statute, section 5(b) in the current version, I think it has to apply across the board. It seems to me --7 OUESTION: Well, wouldn't you say that, say, 8 preemption of an additional requirement in the label 9 itself was based on smoking and health? 10 11 MR. TRIBE: No doubt, if it was an additional requirement in the label itself, and I will get to that in 12 13 just a moment. 14 QUESTION: A duty to say something more, 15 wouldn't that be --MR. TRIBE: A duty to say something more in the 16 17 label of a cigarette --QUESTION: The duty, or even in the advertising, 18 19 because the -- (b) --20 MR. TRIBE: Because the statute says 21 advertising. 22 QUESTION: Yeah. 23 That's right, and I'm going to MR. TRIBE: 24 concede that in a moment. 25 QUESTION: That's what I'll -- you take it. 15

1 MR. TRIBE: I only want to say one final word 2 about deception, and then let me turn immediately to the 3 --

4 QUESTION: Before you do that, before we get too far away from the based on, if I am uncertain whether 5 6 based on smoking and health refers to the general Ten 7 Commandments level or the more specific level, why 8 wouldn't I look to the congressional declaration of policy 9 and purpose, section 1331, which doesn't use the "based on" language, but speaks much more broadly, saying that it 10 11 is the policy of Congress to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between 12 13 smoking and health?

Now, to be faithful to that purpose, it seems to me I ought to read the "based on" language at a more specific level rather than a general level.

MR. TRIBE: But if you were to continue, Justice Scalia, with the rest of the preamble, it makes it clear that the purpose is that there not be diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations. That's the phrase. And the industry came to Congress and said, don't regulate us differently.

Indeed, it's interesting to note that the respondents themselves, at page 14 of their brief, define the preempted field so as to exclude, and I quote duties

16

imposed on third parties unrelated to the cigarette
 industry, unquote.

3 QUESTION: Isn't this argument made in your 4 brief, by the way? I thought that what you were relying 5 on was simply the distinction between regulation and the 6 common law.

7 MR. TRIBE: Well, I think that in candor, 8 Justice Scalia, the brief's emphasis and what I think is a 9 convincing and compelling reason to reject preemption are 10 not quite the same. The brief made the more ambitious 11 argument, that Congress didn't mean to encompass damage 12 actions at all, and that it's rather like the Smokeless 13 Tobacco Act.

14 QUESTION: I don't recall its making this 15 argument at all.

MR. TRIBE: I think it's implicit, but I can't cite chapter and verse precisely, Justice Scalia. But I do think that the law is not preempted with respect to deception.

Let me turn to duties to warn, affirmative duties. Like the much older duty not to make an affirmative misstatement, duties to warn also have fairly old roots in the common law, but they are a more recent development in their modern versions. They've grown some new branches.

17

1 QUESTION: Do you think that a suit on duty to 2 warn could have been successful, generally, in the various 3 states at the time this act was originally passed?

MR. TRIBE: Only under some fairly stringent circumstances. Even now it's hard to bring these suits, because one has to establish a number of things in terms that would trigger the duty.

And indeed, the main point I want to make, initially, about the duty to warn, is that though it's grown new branches, even now it hasn't grown a branch that would confer anything like, or impose anything like, a duty to transmit warning messages in the middle of a company's own advertisements and promotions. In effect, to interrupt a sales pitch with warning bells.

QUESTION: In a suit unfair to warn, could the tobacco companies argue to the jury that compliance with the Federal statute was evidence that the company was acting reasonably?

MR. TRIBE: I certainly think so, Justice Kennedy. I think they could go further. I think that they could ask for an instruction to make sure that the law is not violated, that the jury will not penalize them for the fact that in the specific places designated in the statute, namely the package, the advertising, and the promotion, all they did was what the Surgeon General's

18

1 warning said, and nothing more.

I do think, and that I think is a response in part to Justice Stevens' question, that the statute gives them some protection in the context of damage litigation.

5 Their main worry though, to get to your point, I 6 think isn't so much the advertising. And that's 7 principally because, as a realistic matter, very few 8 juries are going to say, even to a company that has 9 suddenly learned some disastrous thing, that what you 10 should do is put it in the middle of your advertising.

11 I think a very good example is what happened when Johnson & Johnson discovered that there was some 12 13 cyanide in the Tylenol. They didn't change all the advertising -- take Tylenol, watch out for the cyanide. 14 But they did do a great many things. That is they did set 15 16 up a -- sort of a very elaborate hot line. They did set 17 up a series of special ways of reaching people. They recalled some 83,000 copies, 83,000 of the Tylenol 18 19 bottles. It was a hot line with sort of free health 20 information. They contacted people around the country. 21 Two million messages went to health care professionals.

That's the sort of thing that I suspect cigarette companies are rather afraid of. That is, when you suddenly learn that it's more addictive than we thought, why didn't you put out a lot of information?

19

Of course, there is another concern, and that's the way in which duty to warn cases usually arise. They usually arise, as the National Association of Manufacturers' brief on the respondents' side of the case pointed out, they usually arise in the context of a complaint that a rather ample package didn't contain much information.

8 Now, obviously, cigarette packages are rather 9 small; there's not that much you can say on them. But the 10 principle point is under section 5(a), and with respect to 11 section 5(a), which talks about the package, we have no 12 doubt whatever that it would be impermissible to penalize 13 them for violating that provision. But when one --

14QUESTION: Penalize them for obeying that15provision?

MR. TRIBE: I'm sorry, penalize them for obeying
it and not going further.

18 But when this Court has a concern that perhaps a 19 jury, in some case, may go further, limiting instructions 20 would take care of the problem. It seems to me that what 21 the court of appeals did was reread the statute as though 22 it said that, with respect not only to advertising and 23 promotion and packages, you may not be subject to any 24 further duty to let people know when something happens, 25 but with respect to all modes of communication. So that

> ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W. SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202)289-2260 (800) FOR DEPO

the cigarette companies -- which now they have package inserts. When R.J. Reynolds, for example, learned about some fire problems, they put package inserts. Now it's Camel Cash redeemable coupons. They have their advertorials.

6 QUESTION: So could the jury be instructed that 7 the tobacco companies must rely on something other than 8 the ads themselves? Or, pardon me, that the plaintiffs 9 must rely on something other than the ads themselves.

MR. TRIBE: Well, certainly that the plaintiffs cannot rely solely on the ads. Perhaps that they must rely on something other than the ads themselves for the failure to warn claim.

14 . It seems to me, once that is done, there is nolonger any risk whatever. I mean, when this Court, in a 15 16 defamation action brought by, for example a -- you know, brought by a public official, public figure against a 17 magazine, is worried about the First Amendment, it doesn't 18 eliminate the cause of action in order to protect the 19 20 First Amendment. It just says the jury must be properly 21 charged.

And when this Court quite recently, in the --QUESTION: I hope you're not -- you're not using the defamation cases against public figures as a model for tort litigation generally.

21

MR. TRIBE: No, it's not that they're a model. But it's that the Cigarette Liability Act cannot be put on a higher plane than the First Amendment, and that there is no reason to eliminate, in the name of the Cigarette Liability Act, a complete cause of action because of some marginal thought that maybe a jury will impose the duty in the wrong place.

8 This statute does not establish a -- sort of a 9 cigarette communication act. It's Cigarette Labeling Act, 10 and that's the only place where no additional duties may 11 be imposed.

12

QUESTION: May I just --

MR. TRIBE: I'd like to reserve the remainder ofmy time.

15 QUESTION: Can I just ask one clear question?
16 MR. TRIBE: Sure.

QUESTION: When you talk about failure to warn, are you talking about failure to warn about information that's in the public domain or about information known only to the tobacco companies?

MR. TRIBE: Well, in most jurisdictions, including New Jersey, if it's completely in the public domain, the failure to warn claim is very unlikely to succeed. I think it must be shown that you knew something that other people didn't know. And in any event, there

22

are assumption of risk and other defenses that can be
 made.

But let me make one other point, I -- no, I 3 think I'd better reserve the time for rebuttal. 4 5 QUESTION: Very well, Mr. Tribe. 6 Mr. Farr, we'll hear from you. 7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF H. BARTON FARR, III ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 8 9 MR. FARR: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: 10

I believe that the basis for deciding this case 11 12 is to be found in three simple points, and I'd like 13 briefly to set them forth at the outset. The first is that the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act makes 14 15 clear that it does not contemplate the usual scheme of Federal action supplemented by State action. Instead, so 16 17 that Federal law could set the balance among competing 18 interests, Congress expressly barred the States from 19 imposing their own health-based requirements with respect 20 to labeling and advertising.

The second point is that under the usual preemption principles followed by this Court in Garmon and numerous other cases, including, of course, before the Cigarette and Labeling and Advertising Act was passed, preemption of State law typically includes State law in

23

any form, including tort, law because all State law has a
 regulatory effect.

7

The exception is when there is a savings clause in the act, indicating that Congress meant to separate part of State law from the rest of State law. But there is no savings clause in this act.

7 The third point involves the specific tort 8 claims at issue here. Each of them, in our view, is well 9 within the boundaries of the preempted area -- that is, 10 each specifically challenges something that the cigarette 11 companies either said or did not say with respect to 12 smoking and health.

13 The claims, to be specific, allege 14 misrepresentation about the effects of smoking on health, 15 conspiracy to misrepresent the effects of smoking on 16 health, failure to warn about the effects of smoking on 17 health, and express warranty about the effects of smoking 18 on health.

19 QUESTION: May I ask right on your description 20 of failure to warn claim, do you read it as failure to 21 warn about information that the tobacco companies knew and 22 the public did not know?

23 MR. FARR: I do not think it is limited to that. 24 I think it is intended to say that the tobacco companies 25 bore a duty of providing additional warning to consumers

24

than the warning that Congress provided, regardless of
 whether that information is known only to cigarette
 companies or not.

=)

4 QUESTION: Do you think at least analytically 5 one might break the two kinds of failure to warn claims 6 into two different parts for purposes of preemption 7 analysis?

MR. FARR: Your Honor, in the end I do not think 8 9 I think what Congress ultimately did here in the act SO. was to make a structural decision about whether Federal 10 law would ultimately be controlling or whether Federal law 11 would be supplemented by State law, and I think the 12 structural decision Congress made is that Federal law 13 would be controlling, and I think that applies in all 14 15 circumstances, so long as we are within the subject matter 16 of the act.

Now, I think it's important, in addressing the argument made by petitioner, to see that Congress has done here is somewhat unusual. It has to a great degree answered what is usually the most difficult question in a preemption case, and that is whether Congress intended to bar States from adding their own legal duties to those that have been imposed by Federal law.

In this particular act, in section 1334, the specific preemption provision, Congress has expressly,

25

explicitly, unmistakably barred the States from adding
 their own requirements and prohibitions with respect to
 labeling, advertising, and promotion.

4 And Congress did something additional. It 5 explained why it had done so. In the arguments made by 6 petitioner, there is not one mention of the statement of 7 policies and purposes in section 1331, which describes 8 Congress' intent to set a balance among competing interests and not to have that balance disturbed. 9 10 OUESTION: Where do we find section 1331 set out in the briefs, Mr. Farr? 11 12 MR. FARR: Your Honor, I'm not sure. It's in the appendix to one of the amicus briefs. 13 14 QUESTION: Is it petitioner's blue brief on page 2 that you are referring to? 15 QUESTION: Yes, there. The Declaration of 16 Policy section. 17 QUESTION: The Declaration of Policy section? 18 MR. FARR: That's correct. Thank you, Justice 19 20 O'Connor. That is where it's set out. 21 There -- what Congress did in 1965 and then 22 again reinforced in 1969 and again in 1984 is to address 23 the problem of a number of different proposals respecting 24 obligations that would be put on the cigarette companies, 25 proposals I might add that came at the Federal level and

26

at the State level. What Congress ultimately tried to do
 was to find a solution that balanced all of the competing
 interests.

The interest in having the companies themselves warn consumers, the interest in having the warning be uniform, and the interest in avoiding excessive harm to an important part of the economy. Congress did not want the obligations on the companies to be set on a State-by-State basis.

10 So what Congress did, essentially was that it 11 ordered the cigarette companies to put the warning on the 12 package, in a very unusual thing at the time, I might 13 point out, essentially cautioning consumers against use of 14 the very product that they were buying, but then left the 15 companies free to market on a national basis, so long as 16 they met Federal standards set and enforced by the Federal 17 Trade Commission.

18 The other thing that Congress did at this time 19 is that it made clear that it would continue to have the 20 ultimate control over this area because only it was in a 21 position to assure that all of these different interests 22 were taken into account. Thus it not only barred the 23 States from acting in this area, but it actually put the 24 Federal Trade Commission on a short leash, in 1965, 25 expressly barring them from taking certain action with

> ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W. SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202)289-2260 (800) FOR DEPO

respect to warnings and advertisements, and then in 1969 requiring the Commission to come back to Congress, before it could impose a rule again affecting warnings in advertisements.

5 So this is an unusually active role by Congress 6 in terms of supervising and seeing that this area is not 7 over-regulated.

8 Now, petitioner has tried to draw a line 9 throughout this case between different types of State law 10 saying that statutes and regulations are preempted but 11 that tort suits are not. And I would just point out that 12 this sort of judicial line-drawing has been rejected by 13 this court time and time again.

QUESTION: Mr. Farr, why is it not implicit in subsection 2B of the Declaration of Policy, which expressly states that it is the policy that commerce and the national economy not be impeded by diverse, et cetera, labeling and advertising regulations? Why isn't that some support there?

20 MR. FARR: Your Honor, I think the reason is 21 that the cases from this court, including cases decided 22 relatively shortly before the Cigarette Labeling Act, made 23 clear that tort law had a regulatory effect, just as 24 statutory law or administrative law has.

QUESTION: Well, it has a regulatory effect, but

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W. SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202)289-2260 (800) FOR DEPO

28

1 we -- do we normally refer it to standards of tort law as 2 regulations?

MR. FARR: I think that the natural meaning of 3 the terms, for example, "under State law," which is used 4 5 in 1334, would include tort law. And when Congress is 6 talking about, in the Statement of Policies and Purposes, regulations, I don't think that would be a limiting 7 8 construction of the language under State law in 1334. 9 I think the -- one would then ask properly, does State tort law have the same effects on uniformity, on the 10 national economy, as statutes or administrative 11 regulations do. And I think if the answer to that is, 12 13 yes, and I believe it quite clearly is in this case, then it seems to me the term would naturally include tort law 14 as well. 15 OUESTION: What is the case that is best for you 16 17 from this Court, in what you say disapproving the 18 distinction that you think petitioners are trying to draw? In 1959, Your Honor, 6 years before 19 MR. FARR: 20 this act was passed, the Court decided Garmon, in which --21 QUESTION: So I -- then your answer is that

22 Garmon is your best case?

0

23 MR. FARR: Garmon is the case that says that 24 explicitly, or is a case that says that explicitly, and I 25 use it here in particular as I say because it was decided

29

right before the act, or 5 or 6 years before the act, so that it would be perfectly natural for Congress to have an understanding that when it was preempting State law broadly and was concerned about the effects that this Court would not attribute to tort law a different effect on Federal law than it would other statutes.

•

Now the Court has adopted the same principle in cases since then, International Paper v. Ouellette, for example, the Court recognized that tort law would have a direct regulatory effect, contrary to Federal law, and indeed the Court did so just last term in Ingersoll-Rand, so I think all of those cases stand for the proposition generally.

Now as I've said, there is one exception to that rule, which is that where Congress itself has put a savings clause in the act, saying that it intends to make a distinction among different kinds of State law, this Court has, of course, honored that.

But what this Court has not done is itself create a judicial savings clause that puts tort law on different footing, even though it would have the same effect on the purposes that Congress intends to achieve in the act.

Now, one, I think, should notice that an effort
to try to distinguish tort law in a situation where

30

Congress has struck a balance seems particularly
 difficult to defend.

Again, turning to the purposes and policies, one 3 sees discussion there of not just the interest in 4 providing information to consumers -- an interest by the 5 way that Congress intended to serve not just as a -- in 6 7 some general, unspecified way, but in any particular way, by the inclusion of a warning drafted by Congress and 8 9 placed on the package. And the Statement of Policies and 10 Purposes indicates that is the method to be used.

But then Congress talks about the concerns, as 11 Justice Souter points out, about uniformity and also about 12 harm to the national economy. Certainly tort suits, with 13 the potential for damages in the millions of dollars, 14 including punitive damages which have been sought, have as 15 much if not more potential to disrupt uniformity, disrupt 16 the economy, than would a fine that was levied pursuant to 17 statute. And although the petitioners talk about the 18 interest in providing further notification to consumers or 19 further warnings, what they never talk about is any of the 20 other interests. 21

QUESTION: Mr. Farr, you say that lawsuits tend to disrupt the economy. I'm sure the American Bar Association would not agree with this.

(Laughter.)

25

31

1 MR. FARR: Well, indeed, the trial lawyers filed 2 a brief on the other side, Your Honor.

But I think that this Court has recognized that the effect of damages is one that controls behavior, that any business that is facing liability for violation of a particular duty, and the duties here are directly related to what is being said, will have to take that into account in governing its conduct.

9 QUESTION: So it's the effect of the lawsuits on 10 regulating behavior, not the amount of dollars that they 11 consume?

MR. FARR: That's correct, that that ultimately is the effect of them, and the Court has said that -- that what the Court looks at in preemption analysis is the effect of the regulation, not the particular form of the regulation.

17 QUESTION: Although you have spoken in terms of18 millions of dollars.

MR. FARR: Well, I certainly -- all I am saying is that there is a potential for that. One could not make a de minimis argument here and suggest that it could not be regulatory because of that reason.

Now, turning to the final point, of course, the particular State law to be preempted and the particular tort suits to be preempted must be within the subject

32

1 matter of the preempted field. We are not contending, as 2 we have said before, that every tort suit is necessarily 3 preempted.

1

But the claims here are very specific. As I mentioned at the beginning, they seek to require additional warnings about smoking and health, or they allege misrepresentations about the effects of smoking on health. If the State sought to impose exactly the same requirements by statute, it seems to us clear that they would be preempted. And so --

QUESTION: What if -- let me ask you the hard question. Supposing they passed a statute and says that if you find out that this stuff is poisonous and will kill people in 20 minutes, you have a duty to advise the public of that -- just something of that. Would that statute be preempted?

MR. FARR: Your Honor, again, I go back to the answer I gave before. I think when Congress addresses the issue of preemption, it does so in structural terms. It does not make its decisions about preemption --

QUESTION: Supposing my statute said with regard to any product and lists about 40 of them, including smoking, but just the part dealing with smoking would be preempted, and the rest of it would be -- would not be preempted.

33

1 MR. FARR: Ultimately, I think, when that is 2 applied to the State's own view about the relationship 3 between smoking and health, that still is a requirement or 4 prohibition that is based on smoking and health.

1

And, as I say, I think when Congress was 5 6 addressing this area, Congress was not looking at what is 7 obviously a troubling hypothetical in terms of conduct. 8 What I think Congress is looking at is saying, is this an 9 area that we believe should be governed exclusively by 10 Federal law, or is this an area in which we think there ought to be essentially concurrent jurisdiction, with the 11 12 States free to take their own views about smoking and health, whatever they may be, and impose them on the 13 cigarette companies by making the cigarette companies say 14 something on their packages, their advertising, or their 15 16 other materials, or tell them that they cannot say 17 something.

18 Justice Scalia earlier brought up --19 QUESTION: Just to make it clear, my 20 hypothetical didn't require them to say anything in 21 advertising, said they just had to write a letter to the 22 Federal Trade Commission if they found this information, 23 had this hypothetical situation. The statute, State 24 statute, says if you have this -- discover something that will poison the people next week, you have a duty to write 25

> ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W. SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202)289-2260 (800) FOR DEPO

1 a letter to the Governor, say, period.

2 MR. FARR: Well, Your Honor, that possibly moves 3 toward being outside the scope of the subject matter area 4 that we're talking about. What we are talking about, 5 essentially --

OUESTION: Well, then let's confine it to 6 7 cigarettes, then. The statute just related to cigarettes. MR. FARR: Well, even with cigarettes what we're 8 9 talking about, essentially, is communications, either forced or prohibited, in one sense, between the cigarette 10 11 companies, to use the term very loosely, and consumers and 12 the public. Now, if one is talking about a requirement of 13 notification to an agency, that conceivably would be 14 outside the particular scope of the statute.

But the claims in this case are all claims that the company, in its communications with consumers, either was incomplete or misleading. And so I think within that core element, the statute clearly does preempt all State law.

QUESTION: Mr. Farr, what do you do with the language that was in effect between 1966 and 1970? How does that -- how can that possibly cover a flat misrepresentation, not because something's omitted, but just because you lie?

25

1

A statement that cigarettes are good for you.

35

And prior to '70 it read no statement relating to smoking and health shall be required. The State is not requiring any statement; it's just saying don't lie.

4 MR. FARR: Well, Justice Scalia, if the only 5 provision in the act, from 1965 to '69, was 1334(b), I think that argument would be difficult to, or more 6 difficult to answer. The fact is, though, that from 1965 7 8 to 1969, even without the broader language that Congress 9 ultimately adopted and put in place for the rest of the 10 period of the suit, Congress still had a policy against State law that would create disuniformity, and would 11 create obstacles and burdens on the national economy. 12

13 Now, what happened, in fact, in the statute, is 14 that during the period from '65 to '69, the Federal 15 Communications Commission was addressing the question of 16 whether it could ban cigarette advertising on television and radio. And the FCC, itself, believed that the 17 18 language of 1334(b), supplemented by the statement of 19 purposes and policies in 1331, along with some legislative 20 history in 1965 which suggested that the States had simply 21 been barred -- States and Federal agencies had been barred 22 from the area of regulating advertising -- except for the FTC. 23

There's a specific exclusion in the 1965 act, which says we don't want this to be read as saying that

36

the FTC can't take its usual action in the realm of misleading advertising, with no mention that anyone else, including the States, could do so. And what I think in fact happened, is in 1969 Congress found itself forced to resolve that dispute, because there were views on the other side.

7 The court in Banzhaf, the D.C. Circuit, had 8 indicated that the act had to be read as if 1334(b) 9 essentially were the exclusive thing to look for for 10 preemption. And when Congress did address the question, 11 Congress chose the broadened meaning, clearly put that 12 into the statute.

And I think that this Court has said in cases like Red Lion and Seatrain, that the view about Congress -- of Congress about the meaning of a prior statute when it clarifies that, is to be given significant weight.

QUESTION: Mr. Farr, could a State legally pass and enforce a law that says, generally, no person shall import into this State any product that is dangerous, as defined in this statute -- and the State lists certain products in the statute and includes cigarettes -- and anybody who does is subject to damages?

23 MR. FARR: Justice White, the argument that I am 24 making this morning, and I want to -- be precise about 25 that, does not address that particular point.

37

QUESTION: I know it doesn't. (Laughter.)

3 MR. FARR: Because that obviously is outside the 4 immediate scope of preemption that 1334(b) addresses. I 5 will say --

6 QUESTION: That would not be -- you say that 7 that would not be preempted.

8 MR. FARR: I believe that we would -- we do 9 argue, in fact, that certain kinds of State regulation, 10 even of sale of cigarettes, might be preempted, but under 11 quite a different analysis than the analysis that I'm 12 making this morning.

Now, I would like to turn for a moment to an argument that seems to have achieved sudden prominence this morning, the use of the terms "based on" in section 1334(b). And I'd just like to make a couple of comments.

17 First of all, to return to Garmon for a second, 18 the Court in Garmon, and in other cases which are cited in our brief and in the amicus briefs, have consistently 19 20 rejected a distinction between general and specific law, at least in terms of applying preemption principles as a 21 22 normal matter. The Court has, I think quite properly, again, not looked to the particular form of the law, but 23 has looked to its effect on Federal law. 24

25

1

2

1

And looking at this particular statute, I think,

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W. SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202)289-2260 (800) FOR DEPO

38

there is no sound reason for thinking that Congress, having said it was concerned about particular effects, was perfectly happy to have those effects imposed on the cigarette companies, on the economy, have disuniform obligations throughout the 50 States, so long as essentially the States did it by a two-step process.

7 They just took a general law, made a specific 8 application with respect to cigarettes and smoking, 9 instead of simply passing a specific law that directly 10 attacks cigarettes and smoking itself. That would simply 11 leave all of that outside the area of preemption. And I 12 think that really doesn't follow from anything the 13 Congress has tried to do in the act.

The second point I would make about that is that 14 15 it doesn't even really make sense as a textual matter. 16 Quite apart from the language in section 1331, the words 17 "with respect to," it certainly suggests a broader scope. 18 In 1965, when I think everybody agrees that the preemption 19 provision, on its face, was now -- or 1334(b); 1334(b) 20 used the words "relating to" in 1965. To then say that 21 Congress, when it broadened the preemption provision in 1969 actually was at the same time narrowing it by some 22 23 sort of sleight of hand by --

24 QUESTION: You surprise me. Do you say that 25 they did broaden the provision in '69?

39

MR. FARR: Pardon me? 1 2 OUESTION: Did you just say they broadened the 3 package? 4 MR. FARR: They broadened the language. 5 QUESTION: You think the provision, as enacted 6 in '69, is broader than it was in '65. I thought before 7 you said they were exactly the same. That's what I --8 MR. FARR: Let me make sure that I'm clear about 9 this, because I think this is the second time I've been 10 unclear about it in two arguments. What -- I believe that 11 the language of the 1969 act is broader than the 1965 act. 12 I don't think anybody can reasonably read the two and not think that. 13 14 . I do not think the scope of preemption is 15 broader. I think the intent of the nine -- one of the intents of the 1969 provision was to indicate what the 16 17 intent of Congress had been all along, with respect to the scope of preemption. In 1965, I think, to get to that 18 19 point, one looks at the language of the provision, and 20 reads it in light of section 1331. 21 QUESTION: But you're saying that the broader 22 language has the same legal meaning, I think --23 MR. FARR: What I'm saying is --24 OUESTION: -- insofar as it's relevant to a 25 preemption issue. 40

MR. FARR: What I'm saying is, that the 1969 act and the 1965 act both had the same legal preemptive effect, but that the 1969 act can do that by the force of the language of 1334(b) alone, whereas in the 1965 act, I think it is necessary to read 1334(b) together with 1331 to reach that conclusion. And I think that's ultimately what Congress did, Your Honor.

8 Now, I'd just like to make one final point, 9 because petitioner has, throughout this case, argued that 10 the Labeling and Advertising Act effectively leaves him 11 without a remedy. And just in closing, I would like to 12 point out that that -- it is important to look at just 13 what that argument is.

14 What is at issue in this case, is a remedy for these particular claims, each one of which is based upon a 15 16 State law duty to say more about smoking and health in 17 your advertising and promotion, or perhaps to say less 18 about it if you believe that it is misleading. So that 19 the issue is not about remedies generally, but it is 20 simply whether the particular duties imposed by State law 21 may support a remedy.

And we think the general principles that the Court has followed, and that one would naturally follow, are that once Congress has preempted the power of the States to set the substantive duty, then Congress has

41

naturally preempted the power of the States to award 1 2 damages for breaching that duty, or in fact to provide any 3 other sanction for breaching that duty. And that is all that is involved in this particular case. 4 5 Thank you. OUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Farr. 6 7 Mr. Tribe, you have 5 minutes remaining. REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF LAURENCE H. TRIBE 8 9 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER MR. TRIBE: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. 10 Let me begin with this issue of whether the law 11 changed in 1969. Mr. Farr is really very clear in his 12 expositions; I just think the underlying proposition is 13 inherently clouded. If you look at the things cited in 14 his brief about the supposed reasons for the change, I do 15 not think they will support the picture he conveys. 16 In 1969, Congress had to deal with the fact that 17 18 no longer could it say that there shall be no statement related to smoking and health required in advertising, 19 20 because the FTC was being empowered to do just that. And it had to deal with prohibitions because, effective a 21 22 certain day in '71, they were going to prohibit electronic 23 advertising. 24 The language simply reflects the fact that now 25 requirements and prohibitions based on smoking and health

42

1 could only be ruled out with respect to advertising under State law. And if you look at the language in context, 2 it's not a matter of shifting between "based on" and 3 "related to" -- that is, the earlier language. 4 It's important to quote it in context. It said no statement 5 relating to smoking and health, just as the provision 6 about regulations says, in the preamble, cigarette 7 8 labeling and advertising regulations with respect to 9 smoking and health.

3

10 All of that is of a piece. What it means is that in 1965, and again in '69, Congress was asked by the 11 12 industry, and responded affirmatively, to give it protection from a special kind of targeted rule that told 13 14 it what to do in terms that were not simply an application to it of preexisting background norms. And it is simply 15 not true that in Garmon, which they say is their strongest 16 case, that in that whole line of cases this Court has 17 drawn no distinction. 18

QUESTION: Mr. Tribe, it isn't just preexisting background norms that your "based on" argument reaches. It reaches new regulations adopted by a State agency, so long as the regulation is phrased generally, so long as the regulation does not say cigarette advertisers shall point out the health disadvantages of their products, so long as the regulation says all advertisers shall point

> ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W. SUITE 400

> > WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202)289-2260 (800) FOR DEPO

43

1 out the health disadvantages of their product.

You would assert that that is not covered bythis language, isn't it?

4 MR. TRIBE: Justice Scalia, I think you've found 5 the very most difficult problem for me. I think the based 6 on --

7 QUESTION: It's most difficult for me, with your 8 position.

9

1

(Laughter.)

MR. TRIBE: My answer to it is this. My answer to it is that if there is with respect to, not what they call communications with consumers, but as the statute now says, with respect to advertising and promotion, a specific decision by a State, whether across the board or otherwise, then all advertising, there shall be listed the following kinds of things.

Then, even though it's not literally covered by the statute, as I understand "based on smoking and health," the tension between Congress' purpose of avoiding disuniformity, with respect to advertising and promotion and labeling, and this kind of authority, would become unbearable.

It's very important to recognize -QUESTION: Why should I rely on an
interpretation that requires me to intuit tensions,

44

instead of an interpretation that makes sense initially?
 MR. TRIBE: Well, Justice Scalia, the only thing
 I'm doing with respect to this additional hypothetical is
 saying that I would be prepared to see the act given
 broader preemptive effect.

What they are arguing, however, with respect to 6 7 "based on," is that this Court's decisions show that it 8 doesn't matter whether the law is general or particular. 9 And even in the labor field, New York Telephone Company has made the point, importantly, that a law of general 10 applicability is less likely to be preempted when the 11 12 problem that Congress addresses is regulation targeted at an industry. 13

And when the consequence of reading the "based on" language the way they read it is in, for example Justice Stevens' hypothetical, to say that the State cannot impose any obligation to let people know about the most recently discovered danger -- any obligation -that's an extraordinary reading. They call the act unusual. That's an understatement.

That is, one would want affirmative evidence in the words, that Congress had really decided, in the name of a statute that is trying to avoid disuniformity in the regulation of three specific things: package labeling, advertisement, and promotion. That in the name of that,

45

1	what they're doing is saying, that you may not, in any
2	circumstances, hold someone responsible
3	QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Tribe.
4	MR. TRIBE: Thank you.
5	CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: The case is submitted.
6	(Whereupon, at 11:00 a.m., the case in the
7	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

4

46

CERTIFICATION

1

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc., hereby certifies that the attached pages represents and accurate transcription of electronic sound recording of the oral argument before the Supreme Court of The United States in the Matter of:

NO. 90-1038 - THOMAS CIPOLLONE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ROSE D. CIPOLLONE, Petitioner V. LIGGETT GROUP, INC., et al.

and that these attached pages constitutes the original transcript of the proceedings for the records of the court.

Na. alsollo BY

(REPORTER)