

ORIGINAL official transcript proceedings before

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CAPTION:	SHELL OIL COMPANY, Appellant, IOWA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE	ν.
CASE NO:	87-984	
PLACE:	WASHINGTON, D.C.	
DATE:	October 4, 1988	
PAGES:	1 - 45	

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES SHELL OIL COMPANY Appellant ٧. 87-984 No. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE Washington, D.C. Tuesday, October 4, 1988 The above-titled matter came on for oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 11:00 o'clock a.m. ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

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7	on behalf of the Appellee.
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10	Washington, D.C., on behalf of the United States,
11	as amicus curiae, in support of Appellee.
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1	(11:00 a.m.)
2	PROCEEDINGS
3	CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We'll hear argument
4	next on Number 87-984, Shell Dil Company versus the lowa
5	Department of Revenue.
6	We'll wait just a moment, Mr. Geller.
7	Very well. You may proceed whenever you're
8	ready.
9	ORAL ARGUMENT OF KENNETH S. GELLER
10	ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
11	MR. GELLER: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and
12	may it please the Court, the issue in this case is
13	whether the State of Iowa may tax the income earned by
14	Shell Oll Company in the extraction of oil and gas from
15	the cuter continental shelf.
16	Simply stated, Iowa requires Shell to take its
17	OCS earnings into account in figuring out its Iowa
18	income tax liablilty, with the result being that the
19	more money Shell earns on the outer continental shelf,
20	the more Icwa income tax it generally pays.
21	It's our position that State taxation of this
22	sort is prohibited by the language, the legislative
23	history, and the purposes and policies of the Outer
24	Continental Shelf Lands Act, which demonstrate, we
25	believe, that Congress meant to prohibit the States from
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1 taxing any portion of OCS revenue.

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2 Iowa, on the other hand, contends that the Act contains an implied exception for apportioned income taxes.

5 Let me begin by briefly explaining the background of this dispute. Shell engages in 6 substantial exploration for oil and gas on the outer 7 continental shelf, pursuant to Federal leases. Now, 8 it's relatively easy for Shell to figure out its net 9 income from these OCS operations, because the oll and 10 11 gas has a definite and easily ascertainable fair market value at the wellhead, and Shell also knows what its 12 expenses are in extracting the oil and gas from the 13 shelf. 14

In fact, Shell has to figure out, make these 15 precise calculations for a number of Federal purposes, 16 such as the windfall profits tax, the oil depletion 17 allowances, and most importantly, in figuring out the 18 amount it owes to the Federal Government as royalties on 19 these Federal leases. 20

Now, Shell also does business in Iowa, and as 21 a result, it's subject to lowa's corporate income tax. 22 Now, Iowa, like virtually every State, determines the 23 24 income tax liability for a multi-state business through use of a formula apportionment method. It starts with 25

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the corporation's Federal income tax base, its net income for Federal income tax purposes, and it then subtracts from that Federal income tax amounts that it either can't Constitutionally tax, such as items that may not be part of the unitary business, or items that Congress by statute has prohibited it from taxing, such as, for example, the interest on Federal securities.

Now. what is left then is the Iowa income tax 8 base. Then multiplies that by a percentage -- in most 9 States, that percentage is based on three factors of 10 11 payroll, property and sales. As the Court is aware from its decision in Moorman, Iowa uses a one factor sales 12 formula with the numerator being sales in Iowa, and the 13 denominator being sales everywhere. Then multiplies 14 that Iowa income base by this fraction, and it comes up 15 with the corporation's Iowa taxable income. 16

Now, when Shell computed its Iowa Income for the years in question, it subtracted from its Federal income base the amounts it earned from the extraction of oil and gas from the outer continental shelf, and it did that based on the provisions of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which provide "State taxation laws shall not apply to the outer continental shelf." And as the Court will know from the table

And as the Court will know from the table reproduced at foctnote seven at page 10 of our brief,

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when Shell's OCS income was not subjected to the 1 provisions of Iowa's Income tax laws, it made a 2 substantial difference in Shell's Iowa Income tax 3 liability. 4 Now, the State challenged the way in which --5 QUESTION: Tell me again, Mr. Geller, how that 6 computation was made. Shell has certain income which, 7 from sales resulting from production in the DCS? 8 MR. GELLER: Not from sales, Mr. Chief Justice. 9 Shell has certain income that it earns on the 10 shelf from the very act of extracting the oll and gas 11 from the ocean floor and bringing it to the surface. It 12 has a wellhead value. And Shell also knows --13 QUESTION: But I wouldn't think that was 14 income in the ordinary sense. 15 MR. GELLER: Well, it's not realized income 16 for purposes of paying an income tax on it at that 17 moment, but it is treated as a sales equivalent or 18 income for a number of Federal purposes, as I said 19 earlier, including the windfall profits tax and 20 depletion allowances, and most importantly, figuring out .21 the royalties it owes to the Federal Government, which 22 is based not on any subsequent sales that may occur, but 23 on the net wellhead value. 24 QUESTION: On the value --25

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MR. GELLER: The value of the oil at the 1 shelf. That's correct. 2 That is the earning -- that is the amount that 3 4 Shell claims it earns from its OCS operations. The wellhead value less whatever expenses were incurred in 5 bringing that oil and gas to the surface. That is the 6 amount that it claims --7 QUESTION: So Iowa is telling it to figure 8 your Iowa tax by putting Iowa sales as the numerator and 9 all sales as a denominator? 10 MR. GELLER: Yes, and multiplying that by an 11 income base that includes the amounts that I just 12 referred to -- the amounts that Shell earns from the 13 extraction of oll and gas on the outer continental shelf. 14 It's crucial that we're talking here about the 15 income base -- what must be included in that base. 16 QUESTION: Okay, but if preparation of either 17 the numerator or the denominator, do those OCS figures --18 MR. GELLER: OCS -- well, as I said, Iowa uses 19 a one-factor formula --20 QUESTION: But listen to my question. 21 MR. GELLER& Yes, sir. 22 QUESTION: I'm asking you, in preparing the 23 numerator and the denominator of sales over sales, do 24 the OCS, outer continental shelf, values come into the 25

1	calculation of either of those two?
2	MR. GELLER: Yes, they do.
3	QUESTION: How?
4	MR. GELLER; They wouldn't come into the
5	numerator, which is Iowa sales. They come into the
6	denominator. Any sales that Shell makes on the shelf
7	itself and it sells a small quantity of oil and gas
8	on the shelf would be included in its everywhere
9	sales, which would be in the denominator. Of course, we
10	object to that as well, because we claim that what
11	Congress meant to do in passing the statute is to
12	require the States to simply ignore any OCS values.
13	QUESTION: But that isn't your primary
14	objection.
15	MR. GELLER: Our primary objection is the use
16	in the income base of the net wellhead value that Shell
17	earns from the extraction of oil and gas from the outer
18	continental shelf. That's what we object to.
19	QUESTION; And the net income base is Shell's
20	net income everywhere, is that right?
21	MR. GELLER: The income base is Shell's net
22	income everywhere, which we claim should not include its
23	net income on the outer continental shelf.
24	QUESTION: Does that include net income in the
25	East Indies and places like that?
	9

1	MR. GELLER: In those states that require
2	worldwide computations, it does, yes.
3	QUESTION: Even though there's no question, I
4	suppose, that Iowa could not directly tax something that
5	was produced in the East Indies.
6	MR. GELLER: That's correct.
7	On the other hand, there's no Federal statute,
8	either, that tells them they can't do that, and we claim
9	that there's a Federal statute here.
10	I think it's important in light of that
11	statement, Mr. Chief Justice, to begin by emphasizing
12	that this case is quite different from a number of other
13	State income tax cases that the Court has wrestled with
14	in recent years.
15	This case doesn't involve any Constitutional
16	challenge to Iowa's apportionment method. Therefore,
17	many of the arguments in Iowa's brief about nexus or
18	extraterritorial taxation or its citations and reliance
19	on cases like Moorman or Exxon v. Wisconsin are, we
20	think, quite irrelevant here.
21	Iowa may well have a Constitutional power to
22	tax the earnings that Shell makes on the outer
23	continental shelf.
24	QUESTION: Mr. Geller, let me just get one
25	little detail.
	10

You don't disagree with the proposition that these activities on the outer continental shelf are part of the unitary business?

4 MR. GELLER: We don't dispute that, Justice 5 Stevens.

6 What we contend is not that there's any 7 Constitutional restriction on Iowa's power to tax what 8 Shell earns on the outer continental shelf, but that 9 Congress has added an additional restriction by statute, 10 in order to protect and promote operations on an 11 exclusively Federal enclave, the outer continental shelf.

We believe that this conclusion follows from three crucial pleces of evidence. And the first, of course, is the language of the statute itself. And As I mentioned a moment ago, Section 1333(a)(2) of Title 43 provides -- and I quote -- "State taxation laws shall not apply to the outer continental shelf."

And this language is reinforced by section 18 1333(a)(3) of the statute, which states that subsection 19 (a)(2), which I just read to you, shall never be 20 interpreted in such a way as to allow the States to .21 claim any share of the revenues from OCS mineral 22 production. But that of course is precisely what lowa 23 24 is trying to do here by insisting that Shell include its OCS earning in its Iowa income base. 25

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QUESTION: Well, I guess the concern, Mr. 1 Geller, is whether the statutory provisions are really 2 directed toward taxes within the jurisdiction of the 3 State, such as property taxes or excise taxes, severance 4 taxes, and so forth. 5 MR. GELLER: Right. That is the dispute 6 between us and Icwa. 7 QUESTION: Exactly. And it isn't all that 8 clear to me that Congress had in mind prohibiting any 9 reference in an apportionment formula to OCS weilhead 10 value gas. 11 MR. GELLER: Well, we think that Congress --12 QUESTION: For the objective of determining 13 what income was earned in lowa. 14 MR. GELLER: Well, we think, as I said, that 15 there are three reasons why Congress did Include a 16 comprehensive prohibition on State Income tax. The 17 first, as I was just referring to, is the language of 18 the statute, which is categorical. It talks about State 19 taxation laws. It doesn't make any distinctions between 20 jurisdiction based laws and apportioned income taxation. .21 It speaks generally of State taxation laws. 22 And I think that the legislative history bears 23 this out, Justice O'Connor. The legislative history is 24 quite long, and contentious, and we've cited it. We've 25 12 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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discussed it in our brief. Congress gave a lot of
 thought to what it was doing here. It seems to us that
 there are two salient points that bear repeating about
 the legislative history.

The first is that bill after bill after bill was introduced in Congress, during the course of the debates, to give the States some share of OCS revenues, no matter how modest. Every one of these attempts was rejected. Legislative leaders in both Houses --

10 QUESTION; All of the States, or just coastal 11 States?

MR. GELLER: Well, Justice Kennedy, the focus, obviously, was on the coastal States, because the coastal States had been the prime beneficiaries under the prior system, whereby the States viewed the outer continental shelf as their own land.

Decisions of this Court between 1947 and 1950 had held that the OCS was in fact not State land, but exclusively Federal land. And Therefore, much of the debates in the legislative history were attempts by the coastal States to reassert the jurisdiction that they had previously exercised. But every one of those attempts was beaten back.

And of course, If we are right that Congress comprehensively prohibited the States from imposing any

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Income tax, any tax whatsoever, including income tax,
 then of course it serves to reason that that prohibition
 would apply to all States, and not just the coastal
 States.

GUESTION: Well, but you say "the States", and these other States had perhaps a basis or a nexus for a direct tax, and not just including it in an apportionment formula.

MR. GELLER: That's correct.

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But it seems to us crucial that at no point in the legislative history -- at no point, and Iowa has not been able to cite to any -- was there a discussion only of jurisdiction based taxes.

Congress spoke of all State taxation, and in 14 fact the only mention in the legislative history that is 15 at all relevant to the question of apportioned income 16 taxation points cur way. Just as we pointed out in our 17 brief, Senator Long of Louisiana specifically said on a 18 number of occasions that if the statute passed as it was 19 drafted -- and it ultimately did pass as it was drafted 20 -- that would mean that the States could not impose a 21 tax on corporate profits. 22

He didn't --

24 QUESTION: That surely doesn't speak precisely 25 to this question.

14

MR. GELLER: Well, I think, Mr. Chief Justice, 1 2 that it's awfully close to this question. We^tre dealing here with a tax on corporate 3 profits. That's precisely what Iowa suggests is not 4 covered by the statute. 5 QUESTION: But that's probably why we first 6 turned to the language of the statue itself, and only as 7 a last resort to comments on the Floor, because they are 8 seldom very precise, and certainly this one does not 9 strike me as hitting the nall on the head. 10 MR. GELLER: Well, it does refer to a tax on 11 corporate profits, which is what we're dealing with 12 here, and which is what Iowa suggests is not covered. 13 QUESTION: Well, it was also made by an 14 opponent to the legislation, Mr. Geller. 15 MR. GELLER: It was made by someone who 16 opposed the legislation, that's true. 17 QUESTION: And we don't often place great 18 rellance on that kind of a remark. 19 MR. GELLER: Well, we're not asking the Court 20 to place great reliance on It. But it is the only .21 statement in the legislative history that focuses on the 22 precise issue in this case. And more important than 23 24 that, no Member of Congress expressed any disagreement with what Senator Long said. 25

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1QUESTION: In the metaphysics of the tax law,2this really isn't a tax on DCS profits, is it?

MR. GELLER: Well, in terms of Constitutional objections to apportioned income taxes, this Court has said that what an apportioned income tax attempts to do is to figure out how much money a corporation has made in the State and to that extent of the Constitutional matter, we're not suggesting it is a tax on the OCS.

9 But there are two things to be said about 10 that, justice Kennedy. The first is that the statue doesn't say "State taxation laws shall not apply on the 11 outer continental shelf", it says "State taxation laws 12 shall not apply to the outer continental shelf". It 13 seems to us that what Congress was getting at is that 14 15 they didn't want the States to tax any activities that occurred on the outer continental shelf, and in any 16 meaningful sense of the term, it seems to us, Congress 17 meant to say that if profits were made on the outer 18 continental -- after all, let me answer it this way. 19

Congress knew that profits were going -- at least hoped -- profits were going to be made on the outer continental shelf. That's how it attempted to encourage companies to go out and develop the outer continental shelf.

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Now, it's crystal clear from the legislative

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history -- and Icwa doesn't dispute this -- that
Congress said, we do not want the States to grab any
share of those profits, through a severance tax, through
a sales tax, through an excise tax, through a property
tax, or even through an unapportioned income tax.

6 So the question really becomes why would 7 Congress have meant to make an exception for apportioned 8 income taxes, if the result of allowing the States to 9 impose apportioned income taxes would be the same as 10 allowing them to impose these other types of taxes, 11 which is to make operations on the shelf less 12 profitable, which they clearly do.

It's undisputed in this case, as the figures I 13 referred to earlier suggest, that the more profit that a 14 company makes on the outer continental shelf, the more 15 State tax it has to pay. Therefore, operations on the 16 outer continental shelf are less profitable. If they're 17 less profitable because the States impose a severance 18 tax, or an excise tax, or a sales tax, Congress said 19 they can't do it. 20

The question remains, given the policies of the Act, which were to encourage development on the shelf, by in fact immunizing the income earned out there, and to maximize Federal revenues, why would Congress have meant to exclude this one type of

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taxation, apportioned income taxation, from the universe 1 of taxes that they meant to prohibit the States from 2 enforcing as to DCS revenues? 3 Now, Icwa never explains why. It never 4 explains why its theory is consistent with the 5 categorical language of the statute, which says State 6 taxation laws shall not apply to the outer continental 7 shelf --8 QUESTION: Well, its theory, of course, is 9 that it's only taxing income in the State. That's its 10 11 theory. MR. GELLER: That is its theory, Justice 12 C'Connor. And I think it's faulty for the reason that 13 it relies heavily on Constitutional notions. 14 we're not suggesting that Iowa is taxing 15 income on the shelf for purposes of some claim that they 16 don't have nexus, or it's an extraterritorial type of 17 taxation. But it seems to us that Iowa's playing word 18 games with the Court by saying it's not taxing income on 19 the shelf. It is unquestionably requiring all oil 20 companies to include OCS profits in figuring out its 21 State income tax. 22 when one considers what Congress intended to 23 do in this statute, it's inconceivable --24 QUESTION: Well, as a reference point to 25 18 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

determine what share belongs to Iowa, I guess.

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MR. GELLER: That's true.

Now, what apportioned income taxation does, in effect, is to treat all of the States as if they were a single taxing entity. And what apportioned income taxation does is to require all of the income of a multi-State corporation to be amassed in one pie, and what apportionment essentially says is what slice, what size slice of that pie is each State entitled to.

But the question here is the antecedent one of what is to gc into the pie. And we think what Congress clearly said is that this is an area of exclusive Federal concern. It's of no concern to the States, the profits that are made out there. None of that is to be included in the income pie that the States would then --

16 QUESTION: Mr. Geller, I guess under your 17 theory you're saying it doesn't get into the pie at all, 18 but it would at least be involved in the sense that the 19 sales of these petroleum products would go into 20 computing both --the percentage figure, because those 21 sales, when the stuff is ultimately sold, will be part 22 of sales everywhere, wouldn't they?

MR. GELLER: No, our position --

QUESTION: I thought your view was the percentage wouldn't change, you just want to take it out

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1	of the pie.
2	MR. GELLER: No, no, no. I thought I said in
3	answer to the Chief Justice's question that what we're
4	primarily concerned about is not including that amount
5	in the Income base.
6	QUESTION: I understand, income base.
7	MR. GELLER: For consistency, Justice Stevens,
8	our position also is that any sales that occur on the
9	shelf also have to be
10	QUESTION: Oh, on sales I'm not talking
11	about the sale on the shelf. I understand that's a
12	small part of it.
13	I understand the petroleum extracted on the
14	shelf, and then sent around the country, and ultimately
15	sold in Iowa and everyplace else in the United States
16	those sales would still be included in the calculation
17	of the percentage?
18	MR. GELLER: They would be included in the
19	denominator.
20	QUESTION: And you don't say the statutory
21	language forecloses that?
22	MR. GELLER: Not at all. And I think one of
23	the ways in which Iowa has attempted to discredit our
24	position is by grossly overstating it, to suggest that
25	we are saying that even those sales must be excluded
	20
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from the computations.

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I think -- we've never taken that position. QUESTION: I didn't take it as grossly overstating it. I took it as carrying it to its logical conclusion.

If you say that the objective was to prevent the States from cutting in on the exclusive Federal power to derive funds from the shelf, surely they cut in when whatever gas and oll you get from the shelf can be taxed as soon as it's sold on the mainland.

MR. GELLER: I don't think sc, Justice Scalla,
for the following reason. We have to look at what
Congress meant to do in the statute.

This section 1331(a)(3) is quite clear as to the extent of the immunity that Congress meant to grant here. And what they said is that the States are not to claim any interest in any revenues from the natural resources from the shelf.

Now, we think that means that when the profit
is earned by extracting the oil and gas from the shelf,
and income is earned, that is the amount that is
excluded from the State tax computations.

Now, Congress did not say -- and it wouldn't have been consistent with what it was trying to do here -- that this oil and gas would be given an immunity as

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it went through life, if it was turned into some other
 prcduct, like petroleum, and it was subject to some
 transaction in some State, and the transaction tax was
 generally imposed in that State, it would make no sense,
 given the purposes here, to carry the immunity that far.

GUESTION: The point is, that you're not drawing the line simply on the basis of what the economic reality is.

9 MR. GELLER: We are drawing the line on the 10 basis, we think, of what Congress meant to say, which is 11 if you earn income on the outer continental shelf, from 12 the extraction of oil and gas, that income is immunized 13 from State taxation.

Now, any amount earned by the sale by some
 unrelated third party in Montana or Missouri - QUESTION: Or by you, in Montana or Missouri

QUESTION: Or by you, in Montana or Missouri.

MR. GELLER: Or by us.

17

18 QUESTION: If you carted it yourself and sold 19 It in Montana, you'd still pay a sales tax?

20 MR. GELLER: We would still pay -- just like 21 anyone else, Justice Scalla would pay a sales tax in 22 that State for selling that product.

QUESTION: And the economic reality of that is that it renders the gas and oil that you take off the shelf somewhat less valuable than it otherwise would be.

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MR. GELLER: I would think it would be de minimus given what Congress was trying to -- first of all there would be severe bookkeeping problems because it is impossible to trace oll which is fungible.

But what Congress had in mind is that the 5 increment of income earned from the extraction of oil 6 and gas on the shelf -- which is easily determinable, 7 and it all accrues on the shelf itself -- is what is not 8 to be included in the State income tax base. All of 9 that income is earned on an exclusively Federal 10 enclave. It's not a transaction tax such as you're 11 referring to now, which the States generally can tax 12 because it occurs within their jurisdiction and they 13 generally tax transactions of that sort. 14

We're dealing with something quite different
here.

Now, Iowa's position, as I believe Justice
18 D'Connor referred to earlier, is to suggest that the
19 statute only involves jurisdiction-based taxes. Now,
20 there are a number of problems, we think, with that
21 position.

The first, of course, is that it render the statute largely superfluous and redundant. After all, there would have been no reason to pass a statute to prevent the States from imposing jurisdiction-based

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taxes on the OCS. This Court had held in a series of
cases between 1947 and 1950 that the OCS was an area of
exclusive Federal jurisdiction. Therefore, the Due
Process clause and the Commerce clause already prevented
the States from imposing any jurisdiction-based taxes on
the OCS.

So there really wouldn't have been any reason,
if that had been Congress' Intention, to pass a
separate, two separate statutory provisions providing
that the States could not impose jurisdiction based
taxes on the OCS.

The second point that Iowa makes is, as I said earlier, a bit of a linguistic point. They suggest that even if Section 1333(a)(2) means what it seems to say, which is that State taxation laws shall not apply to the outer continental shelf, that they are not really "applying" their State taxation laws to the outer continental shelf.

And for this, they rely, as I said earlier, on a series of decisions from this Court involving Constitutional or Due Process objections. Now it's true that this Court has said in a number of cases that apportioned taxation generally doesn't violate the due process clause, because it's really meant only to measure in-State taxation. There's no sort of

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1 extraterritorial taxation going on.

And we don't challenge Iowa's right to tax OCS revenues under the Constitution. We think Congress meant something more than that when it passed the statute.

We think that Congress didn't have to be
satisfied with the "rough approximations" that occur
under the Due Process laws when apportioned State income
taxation is attacked as violating rules against
extraterritorial taxation. Congress had something more
in mind.

We believe it could require, and in our view 12 it plainly did require, more precision than the 13 Constitution requires. It required that the States not 14 include any CCS values in figuring out their State 15 income taxes, just as, for example, Congress in passing 16 Section 3124(a) of Title 31 prohibited the States from 17 including any income earned from Federal securities in 18 the income base subject to State taxation. 19

20 GUESTION: Mr. Geller, does the Federal 21 Government have oil leases on property that it owns, 22 other than the OCS lands?

23MR. GELLER: I don't believe so.24QUESTION: No Government public lands are25subject to oil leases?

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MR. GELLER: Well, of course the OCS is 1 2 Government public lands. QUESTION: I know. 3 No other Government public lands? 4 MR. GELLER: I don't know of any others, Mr. 5 Chief Justice. 6 Now, as I said, there is to be this area of 7 Federally protected income from the States. Iowa 8 concedes it can't pass a severance tax, or a property 9 tax, or an excise tax, or an unapportioned income tax, 10 but it claims, though, that it can apply an apportioned 11 income tax to OCS income, even though it has the same 12 practical effect of making OCS operations --13 QUESTION: Well, come to think of it, what 14 about Elk Hills and Teapot Dome and some of those? 15 MR. GELLER: Those are lands within the United 16 States, and they're subject to a whole different series 17 of statues, Mr. Chief Justice, such as the Mineral 18 Leasing Act. 19 QUESTION: But in any of those, is there a 20 prohibition against -- that could be interpreted as 21 prohibiting the use of such -- profits from those such 22 as Iowa makes here? 23 MR. GELLER: No, Congress followed a totally 24 different scheme in those Federal area, Mr. Chief 25 26

1 Justice, because those are areas within the States, and 2 in many cases, the States had a legitimate claim to what went on in those areas. Some of those areas had been ceded to the Federal Government.

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Congress -- if one reads the legislative 5 history of the DCSLA, it's guite clear that Congress 6 wanted to take a totally different approach with the 7 OCS, because it was an area that had never been part of 8 the States. It was an exclusively Federal enclave. 9

And therefore, what Congress wanted to say is 10 that the State -- it is irrelevant to State tax laws 11 what happens out here. Money is going to be made out 12 here, we want to Immunize that from State taxation in 13 order to encourage development on the shelf, and in 14 orcer to maximize Federal revenues. 15

Now, Iowa never explains how its theory of 16 State taxation laws shall not apply to the outer 17 continental shelf is in any way consistent with those 18 purposes. I wa concedes that if money is made on the 19 shelf, that company's State tax income, State income tax 20 Hability goes up and therefore makes QCS operations 21 less profitable. 22

Iowa concedes that it can't make OCS 23 operations less profitable by imposing any other sort of 24 tax out there. But it never explains why it is 25

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consistent with the policies of the OCSLA to make OCS
 operations less profitable by imposing an apportioned
 income tax.

It really can't be seriously suggested here 4 that Iowa hasn't required Shell to include its OCS 5 6 income in figuring out its Iowa income tax liability. Iowa concedes that it requires Shell to include its OCS 7 profits in its Icwa income base, and the undisputed 8 figures that I referred to earlier show that Shell has 9 to pay more in Iowa income taxes simply because it's 10 making a profit on the shelf. 11

And we think the conclusion is therefore 12 inescapable that in any meaningful sense of the 13 statutory terms, Iowa has applied its income tax laws to 14 the OCS. Iowa dcesn't dispute that the more income 15 Shell makes on the OCS, it has to include the income in 16 its Iowa calculations for figuring out its Iowa income 17 tax, and as a result it has to pay more, ultimately, in 18 Iowa income tax. It's inconceivable that that would not 19 be within Congress' contemplation when it said that 20 State taxation laws shall not apply to the outer 21 continental shelf. 22

23 We therefore believe that the Court should
 24 reverse the judgement of the Iowa Supreme Court.
 25 If there are no further questions, I'd like to

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1 reserve the balance of my time.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr.
 Geller.

we'll hear now from you, Mr. Griger. 4 ORAL ARGUMENT OF HARRY M. GRIGER 5 ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEE 6 MR. GRIGER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 7 8 please the Court, my argument discusses three points as to why Iowa's apportioned tax is not in conflict with 9 the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 10 First, absent extraterritorial taxation that 11 violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause, 12 or the Commerce clause, State unitary apportioned 13 taxation is not the exercise of State political 14 jurisdiction outside the taxing State, but only inside. 15 Second, 43 U.S.C. Section 1331(a) which is 16

found on pages 94(a) to 95(a) of the appendix to the
jurisdictional statement precludes State political
jurisdiction in the outer continental shelf by a taxing
State, but not inside the taxing State.

And third, the 1978 Outer Continental Shelf. Amendments are inapplicable to this case.

With respect to my first point, the unitary
business formal apportionment method is a method for
division of multi-state unitary income within and

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without the State. It is designed to tax that income
 which is reasonably attributable to the taxing State as
 a result of the taxpayers' activities that occur there.

Unlike separate accounting, it recognizes that 4 there are uncuantiflable factors of profitability which 5 arise from the unitary business as a whole, rather than 6 from merely any particular segment, and that these 7 factors of profitability contribute as a whole to the 8 earnings of the entire unitary income. Its design is to 9 value the income-producing activities in the taxing 10 State, not outsice. 11

My second point is with respect to section 13 1333, subparagraph (a), which obviously is a key statute 14 in this case. We contend that the statute precludes 15 State political jurisdiction over the shelf, but not off 16 the shelf.

Section 1333(a), subparagraph (1) provides for exclusive Federal jurisdiction on the outer continental shelf, but such language does not preclude reasonable apportionment income attribution to the taxing State.

The second subsection, which is subsection (a), sub (2), sub (A), provides that applicable and not inconsistent adjacent State law is adopted as surrogate Federal law. Within the context of that paragraph that says that, the last sentence states that State taxation

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laws shall not apply to the outer continental shelf.

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Now, one who reads that for the first time could understandably get the impression that that simply means that adjacent State tax laws shall not be adopted s surrogate Federal law. However, one could also read the language to confirm that there is no State political jurisdiction to be exercised in the outer continental shelf.

9 The language does not preclude a State from 10 exercising its taxing jurisdiction off the shelf, which 11 has occurred in this case.

The legislative history with respect to this 12 taxation language denotes that there was a battle in the 13 Congress between proponents, primarily from Louisiana 14 and from Texas who wanted to extend their territorial 15 jurisdiction to the outer continental shelf to impose 16 primarily their severance taxes there, and opponents of 17 State taxation who resisted such extension as 18 unconstitutional extraterritorial taxation. 19

Senator Cordon in explaining the conference bill to the Senate, stated that the language (inaudible) State taxation laws do not apply to the outer continental shelf really added nothing to the bill. It was already covered in other provisions of the statute with respect to absence of State political jurisdiction

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1 on the outer continental shelf.

2	Indeed, this Court in the Gulf Offshore case
3	stated with respect to the third subsection here,
4	section 1333(a)(3), that provides that nothing in the
5	prior subsection, which provides for adoption of
6	adjacent State law as Federal law, can be used by a
7	State to exercise jurisdiction over the outer
8	continental shelf of itself precluded any State taxation
9	laws from being extended to the outer continental shelf.
10	Therefore, the language "State taxation laws
11	shall not apply to the outer continental shelf" really
12	added nothing to the bill, but according to Senator
13	Cordon, was insisted by the House conferees out of a
14	superabundance of caution.
15	And my third point is that the 1978 Cuter
16	Continental Shelf Act Amendments are simply inapplicable
17	to the issue in this case.
18	QUESTION: Excuse me, before you go on to the
19	next point, isn't there a better explanation than it's
20	just a superabundance of caution, to say it twice?
21	That phrase "State taxation laws shall not
22	apply to the outer continental shelf" comes at the end
23	of a paragraph that specifies at the beginning that the
24	civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State now in
25	effect or hereafter adopted are declared to be the law
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of the United States for that portion. 1 2 So It follows, one could argue, on the basis of that, that all laws are either civil or criminal, and 3 therefore the tax laws apply there. And it comes at the 4 5 end of that paragraph, and it says "State taxation laws shall not apply." 6 MR. GRIGER: That is certainly one 7 interpretation. 8 QUESTION: I wouldn't consider that 9 particularly redundant. I would consider it eliminating 10 what might otherwise be an implication of (2)(a) that 11 State taxation laws of the adjacent States could apply. 12 MR. GRIGER: That's certainly an 13 interpretation. 14 The language comes from a House amendment to 15 the House bill by Representative Keating. And he wanted 16 to confirm that the States will not extend their 17 territorial jurisdiction through taxation to the outer 18 continental shelf, and therefore he wanted that language 19 in the Act. And they chose to place it in that 20 particular paragraph. 21 QUESTION: Suppose the State didn't use an 22 apportionment formula, but they just arrived at the 23 24 income earned in the State by just counting up the actual sales of oll and gas in Iowa, and figuring out 25 33

1 what the income was from those sales. 2 And obviously, they would include in that 3 calculation oil and gas that originated on the outer continental shelf that was sold in, say, Iowa. 4 5 Would that be legal? Where they expressly 6 include DCS gas in figuring their, directly in figuring their income? 7 MR. GRIGER: I'm not sure I understand the 8 9 question. Do you mean if we had a separate accounting 10 computation of income in Iowa without regard to 11 apportionment, attributing income? QUESTION: Exactly. 12 MR. GRIGER: No, because we would be taxing 13 toc much. We would probably be arrogating income from 14 15 outside the State without apportionment. QUESTION: Well, that's one reason why It 16 17 wouldn't be good, but how about the statute? Would it violate the statute to do it that way? 18 MR. GRIGER: We would be extraterritorially 19 applying our tax laws --20 QUESTION: You're just taxing sales made in 21 22 Iowa. MR. GRIGER: Sorry, Your Honor. 23 If we just would tax sales made in -- I 24 25 misunderstood your original question. 34 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

If we just imposed a tax on sales made in 1 2 Iowa, there is no problem, in my opinion, with violating the Guter Continental Shelf Act. 3 QUESTION: Even though everybody agrees that a 4 large portion of the sales made in Iowa involved sales 5 of outer continental shelf oil or (inaudible)? 6 MR. GRIGER: No. I don't see the problem. 7 we could impose a property tax, for example, 8 on the storage of outer continental shelf oil or gas 9 stored in the State. We could impose a sales tax or 10 some sort of occupation tax on that particular oil and 11 12 gas sold. The key is don't discriminate against it. 13 AS long as we have a non-discriminatory tax, our 14 (inaudible) is not on the outer continental shelf, it's 15 in the State of Iowa. 16 QUESTION: If that's the case, you would think 17 that a state voir would be right in this case. 18 MR. GRIGER: I agree, your Honor. 19 As a matter of fact, Mr. Geller has conceded, 20 in page 6 of his reply brief, that Iowa could impose 21 such a property tax in Iowa, impose that on outer 22 continental shelf oll and gas. 23 The concepts are no different, because the 24 problem is, you have a unitary business. And because 25 35

it's a unitary business, formula apportionment is generally an acceptable way of attributing the income within the State, recognizing that activities from the entire business contribute to the earning of income.

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But what we are trying to do is simply attribute income in reasonable proportions to Sheli's activities in Iowa, and as Mr. Geller has stated, they don't contend that we've done ctherwise.

9 My third point is with respect to the 1978 OCS 10 amendments. Those amendments were designed to procure a 11 fair return to the Federal Government while at the same 12 time be fair to oil producers in increasing funds for 13 exploration.

Now, the problem that these amendments were 14 dealing with was the cash bonus, fixed royalty method of 15 leasing in the outer continental shelf by the Federal 16 Government with huge front-end payments. These payments 17 were so large that they literally kept down competition 18 in the shelf for lease bidding. Only a few of the major 19 oil companies could afford the bids, and indeed, the 20 legislative history shows at the Senate hearings they 21 complained -- even some of the majors complained, such 22 as Humble, Standard OII -- complained that the amounts 23 that they had to pay in terms of the front-end costs 24 were very high. 25

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It also led to low bids. There was an example in the legislative history where one company bid \$144,000 for a tract that had a potential value of \$20 million.

Finally, it kept small producers off the shelf entirely, because they couldn't afford the huge, front-end bids.

8 The Congressional response to that was to amend section 1337 to provide for alternative bidding, 9 which is discussed by this Court in the Watt case. Now 10 note that State taxes were never mentioned. They're not 11 mentioned in the statute, the 1978 amendments, they're 12 not mentioned in the legislative history, and OCS 13 producers at this time had been paying apportioned State 14 taxes. In fact, Shell had, as denoted on page 47 of 15 the Joint Appendix. 16

Therefore, in conclusion, Shell's challenge to the makeup of the unitary net income base subject to apportionment as in conflict with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act should be rejected, and the decision of the Iowa Supreme Court should be affirmed.

22 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr. 23 Griger.

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ORAL ARGUMENT BY LAWRENCE G. WALLACE

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AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE

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2 MR. WALLACE: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, our position in this case 3 is uncomplicated. In our view, the fundamental and 4 dispositive flaw in Petitioner's claim is that it is 5 based and was based in the State courts solely on a 6 Federal statute that does not address, and was not 7 intended to address, the subject matter of Petitioner's 8 claim. 9

Certainly none of the statutory language on 10 which Petitioner relies in terms speaks to the question 11 of apportionment methods in the State taxation of the 12 in-state income of a unitary business. We may assume, 13 for purposes of this case, that the language that 14 Congress enacted would suffice, and this is 15 questionable, but we may assume it would suffice, to 16 have some effect on that subject. 17

If the legislative history clearly showed that 18 that was what Congress intended -- but the conspicuous 19 thing about the legislative history, for our purposes, 20 is that no one discussed or even adverted to the 21 question of apportionment methods in determining the 22 amount of a unitary business' income that is properly 23 attributable to its in-state activities for State income 24 taxation. 25

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1QUESTION: Well, Mr. Wallace, I guess if the2langauge is clear on its face, we don't get to the3legislative history.

MR. WALLACE: If the language were clear on
its face in support of Petitioner's claim, that is
correct.

But the language does not, in our view, refer in any way in terms to the question of apportioning the income of the unitary business, for purposes of determining the amount attributable to its in-state activities. And that subject, having been omitted from the legislative history, it is a subject that the Court is familiar with.

14 QUESTION: Well, but it used broad language, 15 "State taxation laws shall not apply".

MR. WALLACE: Yes, but this Court's decisions 16 dealing with the subject of unitary taxation are all 17 premised on the notion that the taxes are not being 18 applied extraterritorially, to something outside the 19 State's borders. It is just a method of more accurately 20 determining how much of a unitary business' income is 21 properly attributable to its in-state activities, 22 because of what the Court has called the theoretical 23 weaknesses of separate geographical accounting in trying 24 to apportion the income of a unitary business, where it 25

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1 would be subject to imprecisions and manipulation -2 these are words that the Court has used -- were it not
3 considered as a unit and apportioned according to the
4 common apportioned formula methods.

Now, that is a subject that has occupied tens of pages in the United States Courts. It's a subject of some complexity, and no one discussed it in the course of the legislative history of this statute.

Instead, the entire controversy in the 9 evolution and enactment of the provisions of the Outer 10 Continental Shelf Lands Act, that are at issue here, 11 concern the question of the proper relation between 12 Federal law and the law of the immediately adjacent 13 State in territorial governance of the outer continental 14 shelf, a question to which Congress turned in the wake 15 of this Court's decisions, holding that that was 16 Federal, rather than State, territory. 17

And with respect to the particular subject of income taxation, the controversy before Congress never extended beyond the question whether the adjacent State should be allowed to tax income from activities on the outer continental shelf as if those activities had occurred within the State itself. That is not what Iowa has done, and is not the question here.

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And, I specifically include the one snippet of

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the legislative history that Shell particularly relies on --Senator Long's statement on the Floor -- and 1'm perfectly willing to look at it as quoted in the Appellant's blue brief, on the merits, page 31, at the bottom of the page of text.

Senator Long -- this is the fourth line from 6 the bottom of that page -- Senator Long recognized that 7 OCS lessees would be "subject neither to the State 8 severance tax, property tax, nor the tax on corporate 9 profits". For all that appears, all he was referring to 10 were three categories of tax that proponents of 11 alternative bills wanted the adjacent State to be able 12 to apply directly to the outer continental shelf, as if 13 that were part of their territory, as many States had 14 treated it prior to this Court's decisions holding it to 15 be Federal territory. 16

That was what the controversy was about --whether they should be allowed to exercise taxing jurisdiction over this territory by grant of that authority by Congress, whether the effect on the State power to tax that followed from this Court's decisions would be overruled by legislation. That was the controversy. It had nothing to do with the issue.

24 QUESTION: Mr. Wallace? Mr. Wallace, it is 25 true, is it not, that the Iowa tax, being enforced or

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1 imposed in this case, is a tax on Shell's corporate
2 profits?

3 MR. WALLACE: That is correct. But in context, there's nothing to incicate that Senator Long 4 was talking about anything other than a tax being 5 imposed by the adjacent State, either a severance tax, a 6 property tax, or an income tax, on the activities on the 7 shelf, as if those were still to be considered part of 8 the State's territory, subject to the State's 9 jurisdiction. 10

So, our conclusion is that the Iowa Supreme Court correctly held that the Federal statute does not address the apportionment issue that was before that court, and that that issue therefore continues to be governed only by this Court's decisions under the Due Process and Commerce clauses, and by State law.

And I might say, about State law, that many of 17 the States. Including Iowa and Florida, whose case is 18 being held for this one, in applying their apportionment 19 formulas start, in basing the total income subject to 20 the formula, with Federal taxable income. And that, we 21 know from the Internal Revenue Service, includes income 22 23 derived from all portions of United States territory, including Federal enclaves within the States. If oll is 24 produced on an Indian reservation or a Federal petroleum 25

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1	reserve, all of that would normally be included in the
2	apportionment formula, and income derived from
3	operations on the outer continental shelf would
4	ordinarily be included.
5	So, this statute, in our view, does not
6	adoress that question, and since no Constitutional claim
7	has been raised, the judgement of the Supreme Court of
8	Iowa should be affirmed.
9	CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr.
10	wallace.
11	Mr. Geller, you have two minutes remaining.
12	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT BY KENNETH S. GELLER
13	MR. GELLER: Just a few things, Mr. Chief
14	justice.
15	First, I'd like to address the statement that
16	Justice Scalia made earlier about the possible
17	interpretation of the phrase "State taxation laws shall
18	not apply to the outer continental sheif".
19	justice Scalla suggested that maybe that was
20	simply meant to exclude State tax laws from the State
21	laws that were being adopted as Federal law, as I
22	understand it. But I think that that makes absolutely
23	no sense, when you look at the legislative debates.
24	The whole purpose of the debates was over
25	whether the States would be able to share in any OCS
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1 revenues. That's crystal clear, that this was intended to be a restriction on the States. But if State tax laws had been adopted as Federal law, under the first part of Section 1333(a)(2), then the revenues from those State taxes would have gone to the Federal Government, not to the States, and those State taxes would have been administered by the Federal Government, not by the States.

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So therefore. I think that reading of the 9 State tax prohibition would make it a restriction on the 10 powers of the Federal Government, not on the powers of the States, which makes very little sense. Congress 12 must have had something more in mind than not adopting 13 State tax laws as Federal law, I believe, when it passed the State tax prohibition in section 1333(a)(2). 15

Now, I didn't hear anything in Iowa's 16 statements here today, or either from the Solicitor 17 General, explaining why it would make any sense, given 18 the policies and purposes of the Act, to allow the 19 States to clainish OCS profits through this one form of 20 State taxation. They have some arguments about there 21 being nothing on the face of the statute about 22 apportionment methods. Of course there's nothing on the 23 24 face of the statute that talks about property taxes or severance taxes either. 25

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1As Justice O'Connor said, Congress spoke quite2categorically. It said State taxation laws as a group.

QUESTION: Do you think a gross receipts tax in Iowa on all sales, including sales of petroleum and including petroleum from the DCS, would be valid under the --

7 MR. GELLER; Yes. We have said -- I think I 8 said earlier in response to Justice Scalia's question, 9 transaction-based taxes of this sort, that are imposed 10 well after any profits are earned on the OCS, are not 11 within the intent of Congress in passing this immunity. 12 We don't suggest the statute goes that far.

Thank you.

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14 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr. 15 Geller.

The case is submitted.

(Whereupon, at 11:50 o'clock a.m., the case in the above-titled matter was submitted.)

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CERTIFICATION

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc., hereby certifies that the attached pages represents an accurate transcription of electronic sound recording of the oral argument before the Supreme Court of The United States in the Matter of: #87-984 - SHELL OIL COMPANY, Appellant V. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

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