

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CAPTION:	KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL., Petitioners V. JAMES M. THOMPSON, ET AL.
CASE NO:	87-1815
PLACE:	WASHINGTON, D.C.
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1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 X 3 KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF : 4 CORRECTIONS, ET AL., 5 Petitioners : 6 No. 87-1815 : v. 7 JAMES M. THOMPSON, ET AL. : 8 X 9 Washington, D.C. 10 Wednesday, January 18, 1989 11 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 12 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 13 at 12:59 o'clock p.m. 14 APPEARANCES: 15 BARBARA WILLETT JONES, ESQ., General Counsel, 16 Corrections Cabinet, Frankfort, Kentucky; 17 on behalf of the Petitioners. 18 JOSEPH S. ELDER, II, ESQ., Louisville, Kentucky; 19 on behalf of the Respondents. 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

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PROCEEDINGS

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2	(12:59 p.m.
3	CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We'll hear argument
4	now in Number 87-1815; the Kentucky Department of
5	Corrections v. James M. Thompson.
6	Mrs. Jones, you may proceed.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF BARBARA WILLETT JONES
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
9	MRS. JONES: Thank you, Mr. Chlef Justice, and
10	may it please the Court:
11	This case was brought by the Commonwealth
12	because the Sixth Circuit ruled that state procedures
13	written for staff use in the operation of visitation
14	program created a constitutionally-protected right.
15	In 1980 the Commonwealth signed a consent
16	decree. In that decree the Commonwealth agreed to
17	continue to operate certain programs, at least at their
18	current level, and the continuation of open visitation
19	was one of those programs.
20	In 1986, the Respondents filed a request with
21	the district court, through appropriate motions, asking
22	the court to direct the Commonwealth to implement due
23	process procedures before it restricted visitation or
24	visitors from the institution.
25	Respondents argued that the Commonwealth's
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failure to implement these due process procedures was in violation of the consent decree and the due process clause.

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4 The district court concluded that no 5 violations of the consent decree had occurred, but ruled 6 that the language of the consent decree itself, which 7 addressed the visitation programs, were so mandatory in 8 character that it gave rise to a liberty interest 9 requiring the implementation of due process procedures. 10 And the Court directed that the Commonwealth implement 11 those kinds of procedures recommended by this Court in 12 Hewitt v. Helms before visitation was suspended or 13 revoked, and that is a notice opportunity to be --14 opportunity to respond.

¹⁵ On appeal, the Sixth Circuit concluded that ¹⁶ the procedures themselves were mandatory in character, ¹⁷ substantively limited the discretion of the state ¹⁸ official by enumerating particularized standards or ¹⁹ criteria, and created to protect the liberty interest, ²⁰ thus requiring the implementation of due process ²¹ procedures.

The Sixth Circuit then remanded the case back to the district court for directions in accordance with its mandate.

When determining whether state procedures

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1 create a -- protect the liberty interest, the 2 Commonwealth is urging that this Court draw a line 3 between those procedures which affect the daily 4 management of a prison from those procedures which 5 affect length of confinement, release from confinement, 6 or those procedures which dramatically alter the very 7 nature of confinement. 8 When state procedures are drafted which 9 affect ---10 QUESTION: What do you include in that last 11 category? It isn't clear to me what you have in mind --12 MRS. JONES: The kinds --13 QUESTION: -- with the nature of confinement. 14 MRS. JONES: The kinds of things that we see 15 in terms of nature of confinement are the kinds of -- I 16 could reference the Court to the cases where we think 17 fall within that definition. And that would be this 18 Court's decisions in Vitek v. Jones, which address 19 mental involuntary commitment to a mental facility; 20 Hewitt v. Helms, where there was incarceration --21 QUESTION: Solitary confinement? 22 MRS. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. We're saying 23 that that dramatically alters the nature of confinement, 24 and when that's written in conjunction with due process 25 procedure -- our procedures are very limiting in the 5

discretion of the officials, that that would meet that standard.

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GUESTION: Well, I suppose the argument of the
 other side is that having family visitors is so vitally
 important in terms of a prisoner's existence, that it
 alters the nature of the confinement.

7 MRS. JONES: We would view that as a condition 8 of confinement, and this Court has ruled that in Olim 9 and in other cases, but I think Olim addressed the 10 question, although that was not the ruling and the 11 holding of the case -- this Court recognized in Olim 12 that a transfer from Hawaii to California, which would 13 subject an individual to not having access to family or 14 friends, did not implicate any serious interest and 15 denial of visits and visitors is a very normal type of 16 limit of confinement that is expected in penal settings.

QUESTION: What if the denial were totally
 arbitrary? The guard doesn't like prisoner X and says,
 "I'm just not going to let you have any visitors."

MRS. JONES: I think that's clearly protected
 under the cruel and unusual punishment clause or
 unreasonable and arbitrary harassment that state
 officials cannot act in that manner towards - QUESTION: So, you concede that some
 deprivation of visitors could arise or could amount to

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1 an Eighth Amendment violation?

2 MRS. JONES: I think some conduct of state 3 officials, if they've singled out an inmate, not 4 necessarily for visiting, but any -- whatever it is, 5 visiting, denying him access to a library -- if it is so 6 arbitrary and unreasonable that It could reach the level 7 of an Eighth Amendment claim --8 QUESTION: So -- so cruel and unusual 9 punishment covers more ground than due process? 10 MRS. JONES: I don't see that. I don't think 11 that's what I'm suggesting. I'm suggesting that I think 12 that this Court has ruled -- and I think it was in 13 Whitley v. Albers -- that there are -- that an inmate is 14 not totally unprotected from -- no, I'm sorry, I believe 15 It's in the Daniels v. WIIIIams and Davidson v. Cannon 16 where this Court said inmates are not totally 17 unprotected from arbitrary and unreasonable conduct by 18 state officials and cannot be -- harassed. And I 19 believe that is within the Eighth Amendment, and I think 20 this Court has recognized that in those decisions. 21 QUESTION: Mrs. Jones --22 QUESTION: What you're talking about here is 23 really state-created rights, isn't it, and not rights 24 that stem from the Constitution themselves? 25 MRS. JONES: That's correct. And our point 7

here is you have state-created rights. And this Court 2 has found in most of its decisions that address a penal 3 setting, and in particular Greenholtz, that every 4 executive decision made by an executive branch member is 5 not guaranteed to be error-free.

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6 And we are suggesting that when you find state 7 -- if you define procedures that just address daily 8 policy programs between those procedures which affect 9 substantive areas of incarceration, then you're allowing 10 the state to draft procedures that are very directory in 11 nature to run their programs, but you're not subjecting 12 them to federal liability at every turn when they're 13 trying to run a program or a facility to protect the 14 institution and the community.

15 QUESTION: Mrs. Jones, why do you have to use 16 the cruel and unusual punishment clause to answer 17 Justice O'Connor's problem? Why wouldn't the equal 18 protection clause cover that situation if the rules are 19 intentionally applied in a -- in an unreasonable manner 20 against a particular prisoner?

21 MRS. JONES: The way I understand the 22 decisions in the equal protection clause is the 23 individual is going to have to be a member of the 24 suspect class first. And I don't think an inmate is a 25 member of a suspect class.

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QUESTION: Is that right? The state can do anything it wants to me and treat me differently from the rest of society unless I'm a member of a suspect class? I didn't understand that. I hope it's not true.

⁵ MRS. JONES: I may be misunderstanding the ⁶ equal protection clause. I'm thinking in terms -- well, ⁷ I think the -- as I recollect the cases, the Court has ⁸ only held that equal protection applies in a prison ⁹ setting when you're dealing with a suspect class, that ¹⁰ you couldn't separate inmates on the basis of race alone.

And, although this Court has not addressed sex discrimination cases, those are the only cases that I'm familiar with as they address in a penal setting. Maybe I im too broadly interpreting the equal protection clause, but that's the way I understand it.

Now, I think the other thing that is
 Important, Your Honor, is that the inmate is not without
 administrative or state law remedies in a situation
 where state officials don't conform themselves with
 their own state policies and procedures.

In the Commonwealth, and I think it's very typical in other states, there are mandamus actions that individuals can bring if the dutles that are set out in the state regulation or state law are so ministerial in nature that it -- that a state official must be required

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to conform himself.

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QUESTION: Oh, but is that true of the particular rights at stake in this case?

⁴ MRS. JONES: I don't think these procedures
 ⁵ are so ministerial in nature --

GUESTION: Isn't that your position that the -- if the prison officials want to do so, they can just deny, say, the inmate's mother or his wife or some friend visiting privileges and never even tell the inmate.

¹¹ MRS. JONES: Absolutely. I don't think we
 ¹² have to even have visitation. I think the responsible ---

QUESTION: And you -- and you don't even have to give the inmate notice that -- telling him whether or not his wife has tried to see him or not. You just -it's just one of those minor details of prison management the prisoner has no rights in.

¹⁸ MRS. JONES: Your Honor, I don't think we're
 ¹⁹ taking that broad a position.

QUESTION: Well, I think you are. You're saying there no constitutional right at all.

MRS. JONES: Well, that's correct, we are saying --

QUESTION: And you're saying you have a right to promulgate no regulations at all. Therefore, the

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1 rights you're seeking to vindicate -- is one to simply 2 say I'm sorry, I know you're curious, but we're not 3 going to tell you. 4 MRS. JONES: That is what the position is --5 QUESTION: Yeah. 6 That's MRS. JONES: -- In its broadest term. 7 correct. Practically speaking I, Your Honor --8 QUESTION: Yeah, unless it becomes cruel and 9 unusual and violates the Eighth Amendment. That's the 10 limitation? 11 MRS. JONES: That's correct. But what we're 12 also suggesting to this Court is this principle of law 13 that was applied by the Sixth Circuit to this fact 14 situation, carried to its logical conclusion, will 15 require every procedure that addresses the daily 16 operation of a prison to create federally protected 17 rights, so that the state is going to have to implement 18 some kind of due process almost in every situation. 19 And the examples that we have given the Court 20 are those library procedures that are even more 21 mandatory if you're going to interpret our procedures as 22 mandatory. 23 The library procedures say that we will not 24 deny an inmate access to the library unless he doesn't 25 return the books. That has a shall/unless combination

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that has pretty much been looked upon by the courts 2 below as the mandatory-type language that creates these 3 rights.

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4 And we're saying that if we don't -- if the 5 Court doesn't draw a line and make a distinction between 6 procedures that are daily management-type procedures 7 versus procedures which affect certain areas of 8 incarceration, then we've got a very serious problem, 9 and the state only has two choices: They can accept 10 that ruling and continue to operate with very detailed mandatory directory procedures, or they can choose to 11 12 write no procedures at all, which is not the choice of 13 state officials.

14 QUESTION: Well, Mrs. Jones, isn't there a 15 possible third solution, like in your library -- to 16 simply reword the regulation so that it's -- it's --17 gives some more discretion to the officials. Maybe this 18 isn't what you really want to do, but certainly that 19 would avoid the conclusion that It creates a liberty 20 interest.

21 MRS. JONES: Certainly the state can reword 22 the procedures. What happens when you reword the 23 procedure to allow total discretion, you have deluded 24 one of the purposes of the procedures.

The purpose of the procedure is to cirect

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staff so that they can operate the program. It allows for control and discipline to maintain security in the institution.

If you allow total -- If you diluted the procedure to such an extent that you've allowed total discretion, then I don't think you've served the purpose of -- of the prison --

⁸ QUESTION: And probably not the purpose of the ⁹ consent decree.

MRS. JONES: That's correct. In this
 instance, it wouldn't serve the purpose of the consent
 decree. But you've also allowed the state officials to
 carve out the contours of a federally protected right,
 just by semantical or mechanical word change.

¹⁵ QUESTION: Well, but -- you're talking about a ¹⁶ federally protected right. Are we still talking about a ¹⁷ right created by these regulations?

QUESTION: Yes.

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MRS. JONES: They could be, yes.

QUESTION: Well, then, it's not -- it's not really a federally created right.

MRS. JONES: Well, if I'm using it in an
 Improper term, I apologize. But what we're saying is by
 the way they're written, they are interpreted as being a
 liberty interest protected by the due process clause,

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and maybe that's a shorthand term.

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2 QUESTION: But I take it you would like to 3 carve out some of these and get less federal supervision. 4 MRS. JONES: We would like to have a line 5 drawn and distinctions made between certain procedures 6 so that's -- I'm sorry -- so that the state could feel 7 free to write very directory-specific procedures that 8 acdress daily management problems and if they affect 9 certain areas and they want it to be very 10 nondiscretionary in nature, they are accepting llability 11 for a fallure to conform in conjunction with that. 12 QUESTION: So, you don't want it limited to 13 rules and regulations that affect the basic type of 14 incarceration or the time, the length of incarceration? 15 MRS. JONES: That would -- those would be 16 included. Those procedures that --17 QUESTION: What else? 18 MRS. JONES: Good time, those type of 19 procedures like Wolff v. McDonnell. 20 QUESTION: That -- that affects the length of 21 time? 22 MRS. JONES: Right. And then the other areas 23 that we would suggest -- one way that I think I could 24 suggest to you that may be visually easier to understand 25 is, we would -- it's like a prison door-type situation, 14

1 and the parole -- very easily to see that the parole 2 cases and the release from confinement or the good time 3 credits, they gc out the prison door. 4 And the administrative segregation, the inmate 5 goes from a more -- a general population-type situation 6 through the prison door to a more restricted-type 7 setting. 8 In a mental health-type situation in Vitek, 9 they are going from the institution to another 10 institution involuntary. 11 In another example that hasn't been addressed 12 by ---13 QUESTION: How about the door between the 14 visitors' room and the general population? 15 MRS. JONES: Your Honor --16 QUESTION: That's a different kind of prison 17 door. 18 MRS. JONES: That's a different kind of prison 19 door, and basically this is more addressed to the 20 visitor than it is to the inmate, although the inmate is 21 affected. He is not restricted totally from 22 visitation. He is restricted from one visitor or 23 several visitors at a time. 24 QUESTION: Yeah, but you could -- you must 25 acknowledge some visitors are more important than others. 15

1	MRS. JONES: In some inmates' minds. In some
2	inmates' minds, visitation is not important at all.
3	QUESTION: You could send in a prison guard to
4	visit with them for a little while, then, I suppose.
5	MRS. JONES: I'll have to admit that there are
6	more important visitors than others, Your Honor. But,
7	similarly, in that same veln, there are a percentage of
8	inmates who never have visitors, whose canteen
9	privileges are access to the general library or the T.V.
10	or inmate organizations are equally as important as
11	visitors are to inmates.
12	So, what we're asking
13	QUESTION: Isn't that administrative
14	segregation? I mean, I thought that's what
15	administrative segregation was, where you put somebody
16	off where he couldn't have visitor privileges at all
17	even to see other I mean, solltary confinement, for
18	example.
19	MRS. JONES: Administrative segregation
20	doesn't totally restrict an individual from visiting.
21	They administrative segregation just maybe limits the
22	conditions under which they visit. They might go from
23	contact and non-contact.
24	QUESTION: .And you acknowledge that, that,
25	that you have to give a hearing for that?
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MRS. JONES: Yeah -- if -- if the state procedures are very mandatory in style and very -- like the Hewitt decision -- if there is a combination of facts that there is an area that's affected that is not a daily management procedure and the state has drafted procedures that are very mandatory in nature and limit the circumstances --

⁸ QUESTION: But I thought you were trying to
 ⁹ give us a subject matter line, a clear subject matter
 ¹⁰ line that related to doors or whatever.

¹¹ MRS. JONES: Weil, the best example I can give ¹² to fit the cases that we are suggesting -- we think it's ¹³ a very narrow line, and it is a subject line, and the ¹⁴ best example to articulate or demonstrate the kind of ¹⁵ cases we're talking about that would give rise to this ¹⁶ analysis for liberty interests would be the prison ¹⁷ door-type analysis.

QUESTION: Mrs. Jones, does the visitor have a
 liberty interest?

MRS. JONES: No, Your Honor. The visitor
 doesn't have any interest and has no right to visit the
 facility, and this Court's ruled on that in Jones v.
 North Carolina.

That, as the Court knows, was the press
 wanting access to the institution, and this Court has

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clearly ruled that. And I believe this Court reaffirmed the position on visitors with respect to the Olim decision, although, again, that was not the holding.

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More recently, Block v. Rutherford, although it was not -- It was not denial of total visitation, it was a visitation case that dealt with a non-contact versus contact visitation. And I think this Court has made it very clear that visitation and restriction of visitation is very clearly within the normal range of limits. That aspect is expected in a penal facility.

¹¹ QUESTION: So, your distinction -- you began ¹² with this -- something that affects the nature of the ¹³ confinement, as opposed to routine administration?

MRS. JONES: That's correct. We would like - QUESTION: What's the constitutional principle
 or premise that underlies that distinction?

¹⁷ MRS. JONES: Well, we're trying -- I think it
 ¹⁸ arises --

¹⁹ QUESTION: Just the important versus ²⁰ unimportant or --

MRS. JONES: I think it arises from this
Court's decisions where this Court has continually in
the prison cases in the penal area have recognized
there's a need to give deference to the prison
administrator, not be continually involved in the daily

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1 operations of a prison setting, and I think some of the 2 language in the Hewitt decision has -- has been 3 concerned that this analysis could create a problem for 4 prison administrators by maybe not creating exception 5 for procedures that are just daily management procedures 6 that affect programs that are just the daily 7 restricted-type programs that involve a way to operate a 8 prison.

9 And if I state official cannot write 10 procedures running the program that are very directory 11 In nature and mandatory in style and premise 12 participation in that program or the denial of 13 participation in that program on whether that individual 14 or whether that visitor is going to constitute a threat 15 to the security of the institution, which is the primary 16 purpose of the institution, and that's the primary 17 purpose of the pollcles and procedures is to maintain 18 the security of the institution, then the state really 19 can't write any kind of procedures that direct any of 20 its staff in order to maintain control or discipline 21 over its facility.

And we don't think that the proposition that we're offering this Court is -- is not inconsistent with this Court's opinions.

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If, if you review the Court's parole cases,

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there the Court found no inherent right to parole, but 2 the Court found that the state statutes which were 3 drafted which affected parole were very limited in 4 nature, very -- they will not be denied parole or they 5 will not be revoked -- their parole would not be revoked 6 unless certain conditions existed.

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7 You had a two-pronged analysis. You had the 8 nature of the interest at stake affected release from 9 confinement, and you had mandatory procedures that were 10 very, very specific and conditioned on certain factors.

11 Similarly, in the Wolff v. McDonnell case, the 12 Court clearly recognized that there was no right to the 13 establishment of good time credits, but once the state 14 created that right to good time credits, the denial of 15 good time credits or the forfeiture of good time credits 16 again was conditioned on a varied set of circumstances, 17 a very specific set of circumstances, major misconduct, 18 and they would not be forfeited but for those set of 19 circumstances.

20 So, again, you had a very serious nature of 21 interests created by the state law, which affected the 22 release from confinement, and you had very specific 23 procedures which directed the state not to take away 24 that good time, unless certain conditions existed. 25 Then in the Vitek cases, which we would

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¹ identify to the Court as the type of cases that affect ² the very nature of confinement, in Vitek in this Court's ³ affirmance of Wright v. Enomoto and then the Fewitt v. ⁴ Helms decision, I think you're addressing the kind of ⁵ nature of confinement cases the Commonwealth is ⁶ suggesting to the Court the line that ought to be drawn.

7 We would recommend another type of nature of 8 confinement subject that might be involved in this area 9 would be forced medication. Forced medication has not 10 been addressed by this Court, but it's the same kind of 11 nature, very substantive nature of a prison's 12 confinement that addresses very serious areas that could 13 affect them adversely and sort of fits within the prison 14 door concept for an explanation.

And in those decisions that --

QUESTION: I don't --

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QUESTION: Well, this isn't an easy line to
 draw. You're -- it boils down to what's serious or not
 serious, and I'm not sure how we'derive that from the
 language of the due process clause.

MRS. JONES: I agree completely with Your
 Honor that it's not a very easy line to draw. The
 problem that's been created by the decisions in the
 courts below and in the district court, and I think the
 record clearly demonstrates that, is that if we don't

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draw a line, there's a very serious problem for state 2 officials to operate their facilities.

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3 QUESTION: Your line seems to wavy. I mean, 4 how -- why does forced medication once you've been 5 committed to prison affect the nature and duration of 6 the sentence or the confinement?

7 MRS. JONES: Well, there's three -- three 8 areas we're suggesting fall within this line: duration, 9 release from confinement, and then the very nature of 10 confinement. And it's -- I agree with you that we are 11 -- it's --

12 QUESTION: Why do you go into the very nature 13 of confinement? I mean, there you're just getting a lot 14 of judgment calls, it seems to me. You know, forced 15 medication is worse than being denied visitors? Who can 16 say?

17 MRS. JONES: well, I think forced medication 18 falls very much in line with Vitek where an individual 19 who does not want to receive medication for a physical 20 problem is very much like an individual who does not 21 want to see -- received medical treatment for a mental 22 health problem, and that's why we follow those -- feel 23 like those fall within those kind of areas. 24 QUESTION: Oh, we understand why you've 25 adopted It. I mean, it very nicely brings all existing

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cases within your role. We're just asking whether it's a line that makes any sense.

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3 MRS. JONES: Well, I think the only 4 alternative, Your Honor, if we don't do that, in order 5 to aid the states, is we would have to take a very 6 restrictive, even more narrow rule unless the state 7 drafts policles that affect substantive rights that have 8 already been recognized as this Court protected by the 9 Constitution itself. To me that's the only other 10 alternative that exists. 11 QUESTION: Well, that would do away with the

¹² Roth case and the whole idea of liberty and interests
 ¹³ created by state legislation.

Why not limit yourself to the duration or the
 confinement?

MRS. JONES: Just the release from confinement? QUESTION: Yeah.

¹⁸ MRS: JONES: I would have -- we -- the state
 ¹⁹ would have no objection to limiting that.

QUESTION: No, I'm sure they wouldn't.

QUESTION: May I -- may I go back for a second
 to this particular case.

²³ Under the order of the Court of Appeals here, ²⁴ if you -- you're supposed to draft regulations covering ²⁵ this problem. If your regulations -- if you drafted a

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1 regulation that sald whenever a particular person is 2 going to be denied the privilege of visiting inmates, 3 the inmate shall receive notice, written notice of that 4 fact and an explanation of the reason, period. Do you 5 think that would satisfy the Court of Appeals? 6 MRS. JONES: If we did that, what you said? 7 QUESTION: Yeah, you just set a regulation. 8 Whenever we deny somebody visitation privileges, we'll 9 tell the inmate and tell them why? 10 MRS. JONES: That would satisfy the Court of 11 Appeals. 12 QUESTION: But it's too much of a burden on 13 the state, I gather, is that correct? 14 MRS. JONES: Well, there's two burdens that 15 exist there. One is the administrative burden, but I 16 think, you know, that is a --17 QUESTION: It doesn't seem very serious to me. 18 MRS. JONES: Well, we're not going to say 19 that's the most serious burden there is. 20 QUESTION: You're afraid he might -- if you 21 deny him library privilege, you might have to write him 22 a note and say we denied you library privileges because 23 you didn't return that book or something like that? 24 MRS. JONES: I don't think we're saying that's 25 the most serious burden that's concerning the state 24

1 officials here. It is a burden, and we will say that it 2 is. But I think we've demonstrated, correctly 3 demonstrated to this Court over the hears, whatever this 4 Court wants us to do, we can accommodate them. I mean --5 QUESTION: Yeah. 6 MRS. JONES: -- Wolff v. -- I beg your pardon? 7 QUESTION: It isn't serious? 8 MRS. JONES: The burden is that this kind of 9 ruling subjects state officials to 1983 civil rights 10 damage llability cases in every instance. It creates a 11 civil rights cause of action against the state officials. 12 And I think this court can take judicial 13 notice of the fact that when a right is created for a 14 sentenced felon, it is pursued very actively by the 15 inmate, and because of the liberal interpretation that 16 is applied to pro se complaints, the state official are 17 going to have to defend whether or not they provided the 18 notice that was required by the Court. 19 I think it's very clear that the litigation 20 that arose --21 QUESTION: I think they made a mistake there. 22 QUESTION: Have we ever held that regulations 23 promulgated pursuant to a consent decree can create 24 liberty Interests? 25 MRS. JONES: No, Your Honor, and I don't think 25

that's the question that's presented.

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2	QUESTION: well, why didn't you present it? I
3	mean, why do you accept the conclusion of the Sixth
4	Circuit that regulations promulgated pursuant to a
5	consent decree can create the same sort of liberty
6	interests that regulations voluntarily promulgated by
7	the state can create.
8	MRS. JONES: We didn't interpret the Sixth
9	Circuit as finding that at all. We interpreted the
10	Sixth Circuit decision as finding the procedures
11	themselves, created the protected interest.
12	I don't think that the Sixth Circuit ruled
13	that the consent decree created that right.
14	QUESTION: Well, but the procedures were
15	promulgated pursuant to the consent decree, weren't they?
16	MRS. JONES: No, Your Honor, the procedures
17	were already in place prior to the implementation of the
18	consent decree, and that's in the record in the joint
19	appendix.
20	And they were just revised throughout the
21	years. But they were not promulgated pursuant to the
22	consent decree. We would agree to continue those.
23	QUESTION: You did get a
24	QUESTION: .That was part of the consent
25	decree, wasn't it, that you you agreed to continue

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1 those? 2 MRS. JONES: That's correct. 3 QUESTION: So you weren't -- you weren't very 4 -- in very good shape to change them? 5 MRS. JONES: We can change them, as long as we 6 don't substantively change them so that we deny inmates 7 visits at those two Institutions. 8 If I may, I'd like to reserve the remainder --9 QUESTION: Just one question. Assume for the 10 moment that we hold that a constitutionally protected 11 right in visitation can be created. 12 Did this regulation have sufficiently specific 13 and mandatory regulation to do that? 14 MRS. JONES: No, Your Honor. We don't think 15 that it does, and we would advise the Court that the 16 Respondents didn't think it did when they filed their 17 motion in District Court. 18 If you read the Respondents' motion in 19 District Court, they argued that the procedures were so 20 vague, they allowed absolute discretion. 21 And our position is if you have a procedure 22 that limits discretion just because you want to protect 23 the security of the institution is not so mandatory in 24 nature that it's limited its discretion to the extent 25 that it's created an interest.

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1 QUESTION: who were the plaintlffs in this 2 case? 3 MRS. JONES: A plaintiff class of inmates at 4 the Kentucky State Reformatory. 5 QUESTION: And was the remand -- was there any 6 doubt that this rule applied to that, to the reformatory? 7 MRS. JONES: Not -- not with respect to the 8 It applied to the reformatory. partles. 9 QUESTION: So, the remand doesn't really 10 concern these people? 11 MRS. JONES: It concerns the reformatory 12 inmates. It applies to them, the inmates at the 13 reformatory. 14 QUESTION: Thank you, Mrs. Jones. 15 Mr. Elder. 16 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOSEPH S. ELDER, II 17 CN BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 18 MR. ELDER: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please 19 the Court: 20 This portion of the Kentucky prison litigation 21 was filed by inmate James "Shorty" Thompson in 1976 and 22 became known as the case of Thompson v. Bland. 23 QUESTION: Is this a class action? 24 MR. ELDER: A class action, yes, ma'am. 25 QUESTION: And are any of the named plaintliffs 28

still incarcerated?

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2	MR. ELDER: At the Kentucky State
3	Reformatory? I do not believe so. Some of them are
4	still in the Kentucky Corrections System and in other
5	corrections systems. I'm not aware as to whether or not
6	any of the named initial named plaintiffs are still
7	at their former reformatory.
8	QUESTION: Is it possible, then, that this is
9	mcot?
10	MR. ELDER: No, ma'am. It was settled as a
11	class action, and the consent decree was settled in a
12	manner to bind the Kentucky Corrections Cabinet in the
13	future.
14	A far-reaching consent decree settling that
15	litigation as continued
16	QUESTION: And so that the right here does
17	arise out of the consent decree?
18	MR. ELDER: It arises, I believe, out of the
19	consent decree and the regulations that were in place
20	both prior and after the consent decree. I think that
21	the opinion of the Sixth Circuit is trifle bit unclear
22	in that at the close of the opinion they say we do not
23	reach the issue of whether a consent decree alone can
24	give rise to a due process case.
25	I think the consent decree supplies a portion
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1 of the mandatory language required by Hewitt v. Helms. 2 QUESTION: what's the consent decree got to do 3 with the possible mootness problem? 4 MR. ELDER: Well, the mootness would be -- the 5 consent because it is a portion of the mandatory 6 language that the Sixth Circuit found --7 QUESTION: Well, I know, but these -- the 8 Plaintiffs here were -- were claiming that these 9 regulations which were in place before the decree and 10 after the decree are being administered in a way that is 11 unconstitutional. 12 And here the Plaintiff -- suppose it hadn't 13 been a class action and the plaintiff had died? 14 MR. ELDER: It might possibly be moot, Your 15 Honor, but it Isn't. It is a class action. 16 QUESTION: well, I know, but here's -- here's 17 a -- suppose it hadn't been a class action and the 18 single plaintiff had been -- was out of prison? 19 MR. ELDER: The --20 QUESTION: And all he'd wanted was an 21 Injunction. 22 MR. ELDER: The regulation applies to all 23 inmates incarcerated at that institution. It was a 24 class action. It was a consent decree. It might not 25 apply be -- if that single plaintiff was out of prison, 30

although it is an issue, 1 think, clearly capable of 2 evading review because of the problem of, an inmate 3 being out of prison --

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QUESTION: So, it is a class action?

MR. ELDER: It is a class action.

6 QUESTION: But it has to be capable of evading 7 review with respect to these particular people, not with 8 respect -- just with respect to other plaintiff.

9 MR. ELDER: That's correct, Your Honor. But 10 in this case it is a class action. There is class-based 11 relief on the consent decree.

12 QUESTION: Supposing that all the named 13 members of the class were now walking the streets of 14 Frankfort or Lexington or Louisville, out of prison. 15 The consent decree would no longer bind, would it?

16 MR. ELDER: No, sir, the consent decree when 17 it was settled was settled to bind the future.

18 QUESTION: But you can't -- you can't bind in, 19 in a decree where there are individual plaintiffs or 20 plaintiffs representing a class. You have a consent 21 decreg, and all those plaintiffs eventually disappear, 22 isn't that end of the decree?

23 MR. ELDER: The class action -- it was a 24 certified class action and settled after the class 25 action was certified for -- and by its terms, the

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consent decree by its terms, was to bind the defendants in the future.

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I don't think the Defendants would take the position that this consent decree does not bind them. It bound them through --

QUESTION: But if it's moot under our case
 law, whether the Defendants think it binds them really
 doesn't make any difference.

9 MR. ELDER: Your Honor, it's not moot because 10 there are members of the class of inmates incarcerated 11 at the reformatory who were given the protection of the 12 consent decree and as a portion of the certified class, 13 the class being all people incarcerated now or 14 Incarcerated in the future at the Kentucky State 15 Reformatory. That's not in this particular record, but 16 that was the class that Judge Johnstone certified the 17 District Court level.

The consent decree was intended to protect the
 inmates incarcerated and all those incarcerated in the
 future.

QUESTION: That was moot --

QUESTION: The class can include the future?
 MR. ELDER: All inmates incarcerated in the
 Kentucky State Reformatory.

QUESTION: In the future?

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1 MR. ELDER: Yes, sir. 2 QUESTION: I don't think the decree --3 MR. ELDER: These things are --4 QUESTION: There's no lives in being plus 21 5 years kind of limitation to these consent decrees? They 6 just go on and on and on --7 (Laughter) 8 MR. ELDER: Just Johnstone once asked me how 9 long --10 QUESTION: -- like the Mississippi? 11 MR. ELDER: -- I was going to be one this 12 I said probably as long as I practice law in the case. 13 Western District. 14 (Laughter) 15 QUESTION: Well --16 MR. ELDER: It's not in the record, but there 17 has been a substantial compliance trial, and the judge 18 has indicated that the defendants are in substantial 19 compliance with the consent decree and has moved the 20 case from his active to his inactive status at this 21 point on his inactive docket. 22 He has indicated that there's a contractual 23 right of all the inmates, as I read it, in perpetuity, 24 to enforce this consent decree in the future, should he 25 dismiss the case.

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1 The case is not yet dismissed. Mootness might 2 be a possibility after he dismisses the case. 3 QUESTION: But why don't you take the position 4 that under the rules and the information that we have on 5 recidivism that one of them, at least, is back in there? 6 MR. ELDER: Probably a good chance, Your 7 I sort of lost track. I've lost track of some Honor. 8 of the inmates. One of them may be back in the 9 reformatory at this time. 10 There was an inmate named Wilgus Hattox and 11 you don't know where Wilgus is on any given day, except 12 he's probably somewhere in the Kentucky Corrections 13 System. 14 (Laughter) 15 This consent -- one of the important parts of 16 this case is that this consent decree was the result of 17 four years of vigorous litigation by highly skilled 18 counsel, including myself, Mrs. Jones, and 19 representatives of the United States Justice Department 20 as litigating amicus curiae. 21 When the case was settled, no fewer than 13 22 lawyers signed the consent decree. This gives ample 23 evidence of when a state official, after that kind of 24 intensive litigation, signs a consent decree, that it is

²⁵ the volitional act of those state officials.

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Prior to the Kentucky correctional policies
 and procedures being promulgated, there was a prior
 procedure called the internal management directives.
 The internal management directives concerning visitation
 are quite similar to what was later issued post-consent
 decree.

A case by the name of Bills v. Henderson, a
 8 Sixth Circuit case, indicated in 1980 that a consent
 9 that a liberty interest could be created in the Sixth
 10 Circuit "in the forfeiture or benefit of favorable
 11 Living conditions."

This case was decided prior to the reissue of -- of the procedures by the State of Kentucky. There was a second set of procedures issued at the institution level at a later date.

QUESTION: well, is -- is some part -- is some part of your case here saying that these hearings should take place on remand, these procedures, based on the consent decree?

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MR. ELDER: Based on --

21QUESTION: You've said -- it was in part --22you said, the Sixth Circuit was?

²³ MR. ELDER: The Sixth Circuit found the ²⁴ mandatory language necessary under Hewitt v. Felms to ²⁵ exist partially in the consent decree and partially in

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1 the regulations that were issued --2 QUESTION: Have we ever held that a consent --3 regulations issued pursuant to a consent decree or a 4 consent decree itself can create a so-called liberty 5 interest? 6 MR. ELDER: I don't think so, Your Honor, and 7 then the Sixth Circuit said, standing alone, we're not 8 going to reach that issue. 9 Judge Johnstone Indicated in his opinion at 10 the District Court that the "open visitation language in 11 the consent decree in and of itself created the liberty 12 Interest." 13 The Sixth Circuit then came along and said 14 it's the consent decree, plus the regulations. 15 QUESTION: If you got it entirely out of the 16 consent decree, I suppose you wouldn't have to worry 17 about a liberty interest or something like that if the 18 consent decree binds all the parties, and it says this 19 is what you'll do, you'll go ahead and do it unless you 20 get the consent decree set aside. 21 MR. ELDER: Sure. 22 QUESTION: That isn't the way the Sixth 23 Circuit looked at it. 24 MR. ELDER: . No, and that isn't -- the Sixth 25 Circuit, again, Judge Johnstone found that the 36

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defendants were in compliance wit the consent decree. 2 What Judge Johnstone and the Sixth Circuit said was the, "open visitation language and the Sixth Circuit, later 4 the regulations issued, gave the inmates an entitlement 5 to continue open visitation."

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6 And at that point, it had its basis in the 7 consent decree, but the right for the hearing arises 8 from the Fourteenth Amendment because the state has 9 taken the volitional act. The state has extended the 10 right, the state has created this right, and then, 11 therefore, once they create the right and fetter their 12 own discretion, the Fourteenth Amendment comes into play.

> QUESTION: How did the state create this right? MR. ELDER: They created this right three

15 by issuing -- by signing the consent decree and ways: 16 by putting the open visitational language in the consent 17 decree, and by issuing the correctional policies and 18 procedures which are statewide, and the Kentucky State 19 Reformatory policies and procedures, which are 20 institutionwide.

21 And in -- through each -- throughout each of 22 these there is the mandatory language required by 23 Hewitt, with the substantive predicates to follow. 24 And in two portions of the regulations a 25 nonexhaustive listing of criteria for the officer to

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follow.

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Counsel for the defendants has indicated these
 are for staff goals alone. They're also to assist the
 Inmate in learning what conduct is sufficient within an
 Institution that's going to get you your visitation
 denied.

And one of the reasons that a prison's
supposed to promulgate regulations, according to the
American Correctional Association, is so that the inmate
knows what's to be expected of him. It's not only for
staff benefit but, by its own very nature, is to tell
the inmate what limits are to be expected.

I think one of the keys is the fact that
 through the regulations, there is repeated use of
 mandatory language. There is the mandatory language of
 the consent decree. There's also the substantive
 predicates required in the Hewitt v. Heims.

18 I think if you look at the regulations that 19 are attached to the Petitioners' brief, the regulations 20 that are going to create the monster, that is going to 21 create the day-to-day problem for the Corrections 22 Cabinet in their opinion of dealing with the Sixth 23 Circuit's opinion is that the mandatory language 24 followed by substantive predicate is simply not there 25 with the possible exception of the library card.

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I think this Court could draw a line about
 library cards. I believe that failure to return a
 library book and therefore having your library
 privileges denied could be dealt with by a part of the
 Hewitt opinion.

One of the thing the Hewitt opinion says in its later stages is that the hearing should create some benefit to the institution and some benefit in dealing with the problem at hand.

For example, would a hearing over whether or not your ilbrary privileges be returned be of any benefit to the institution or to the inmate? I think the Court could draw that line.

QUESTION: To get that in real life. I mean, if the library decides to revoke your library privileges, you don't necessarily get a hearing.

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MR. ELDER: That's right, Your Honor.

QUESTION: Why should you get one in prison?

¹⁹ MR. ELDER: I don't think you should, Your
 ²⁰ Honor. I think it's of the nature that this Court -- I
 ²¹ think this Court can draw a line. This Court obviously
 ²² has to draw some line.

If some state was misfortunate enough to have
 drafted a shall/unless policy about how many pleces of
 silverware an inmate got on his table at night, I don't

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1 think that would give rise to a due process hearing 2 about why he's missing a knife tonight unless -- I think 3 the Court can draw a --4 QUESTION: Well, under your theory it would, 5 though. 6 MR. ELDER: Please? 7 QUESTION: Under your theory, as we understand 8 it, it would create exactly that, a 1983 cause of 9 action, attorneys' fees, and the whole bit. 10 MR. ELDER: I think you can. As I said, if --11 If you look to whether or not the hearing in and of 12 Itself would create any benefit for the inmate or 13 benefit In determining why he doesn't have his spoon 14 today. No hearing is going -- is going to create that 15 sort of benefit, nor is any hearing going to create any 16 real benefit for the inmate. 17 QUESTION: well, is that -- is that the test 18 of our cases, that a -- hearings are granted when they 19 create some ancillary benefit? 20 MR. ELDER: That is one of the --21 QUESTION: I thought it was a predicate right 22 that the hearing was designed to enforce. 23 MR. ELDER: It is a predicate right. I'm 24 attempting to address the issue of if somebody does 25 create a predicate right in an absolutely minor matter 40

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1 -- for example, the case 1 cited in my brief of the 2 United States v. State of Michigan, which deals with whether or not you have the right to food versus a food 4 loaf.

5 There is no question in that case that the 6 food loaf was adequately nutrition -- was adequately 7 nutritious for the inmate in that situation. It didn't taste as good, basically, was a problem.

9 The court, in that case, found that you had an 10 entitlement to not having food loaf to having regular 11 food, and then basically at that point dismissed whether 12 or not a hearing had to be held.

13 It's unclear exactly what standard the court 14 applied in that case. That is only a minor matter. I 15 think this Court could draw it and say a minor matter or 16 a situation where a hearing would have no benefit either 17 to the cabinet or to the inmate.

18 In the case at bar, as I understand what the 19 Sixth Circuit did on remand, what they put in their 20 remand, was that the hearing does not have to be on the 21 spot. We are not telling the correctional officer at 22 the institution who is standing at a visitation denial 23 for possibly a reason of violence or contraband that 24 they have to stop at that moment and have a hearing. 25 The Sixth Circuit, I believe, would require

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1 and the district court a hearing within a reasonable 2 I believe that a hearing within a reasonable time time. 3 In which an inmate has some ability to rebut, in essence, the Corrections Cabinet's evidence.

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5 Justice Stevens asked what would be sufficient 6 for the Sixth Circuit, whether or not just a note was 7 sufficient. The Sixth Circuit said -- went one little 8 step further, which is an opportunity to be heard, did 9 not interpret it as requiring a hearing as in court 10 calls Kentucky State Reformatory, or face to face but, 11 essentially, paper.

12 The State of Kentucky drops the inmate a note 13 saying your mother brought contraband to the prison last 14 week. We're going to suspend her visitation. The 15 Inmate write it back and says, I'm sorry, that was 16 inmate Jones' mother and not mine. If you'll check your 17 records, you've made a mistake.

18 That's all the Sixth Circuit requires. I 19 cannot see how that --

QUESTION: Does that satisfy you?

21 MR. ELDER: That would satisfy me. That's all 22 the Sixth Circuit requires. It's all that Judge 23 Johnstone requires.

24 QUESTION: And if you found out the warden was 25 just taking that note and not even reading it, chucking

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it in the wastebasket you wouldn't be back here saying new walt a minute. You have to -- you have to consider the note, don't you?

MR. ELDER: I think --

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⁵ QUESTION: And don't you have to investigate ⁶ whether it's correct that it was so and so instead of --⁷ right?

8 MR. ELDER: Part of the answer to that 9 question is Superintendent v. Wolpole which has said 10 that any evidence is sufficient for court call. 1 11 suspect if I came back to this court questioning whether 12 there was sufficient evidence in a Hewitt v. Heims 13 hearing, that would get substantially similar treatment 14 to of Superintendent v. Wolpole, that there would be in 15 any evidence a sufficient standard to sustain the warden.

QUESTION: Ch, but he'd have to look into the matter. Wouldn't the warden have to look into the matter?

¹⁹ MR. ELDER: I think he has some good faith ²⁰ duty to do something with --

QUESTION: Legal duty.

MR. ELDER: Some legal duty to do something
 with the note rather than just put it in his round file
 next to his desk?

QUESTION: Ch, it's not nothing.

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¹ ² MR. ELDER: It's not nothing. And neither is ² visitation.

One of the things that's important to remember is the potential that could affect the inmate. If an inmate's visits are suspended for, say, six months with his mother, this potentially is as many as 72 visits. The regulations which the state has promulgated say that in case of contraband, it could be indefinitely.

Now, if a man's serving 30 years and his wife
brings contraband to the institution and the warden says
indefinitely, that's where we're at. That could be for
the rest of that inmate's time. And that is an
extremely serious matter, indeed.

¹⁴ QUESTION: Well, but the prison doesn't have ¹⁵ to allow any visits.

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¹⁶ MR. ELDER: Not on a constitutional basis.
 ¹⁷ They -- under the Kentucky consent decree, visitation
 ¹⁸ has to be at the same level as when the consent decree
 ¹⁹ was entered.

If tomorrow they cut off all vision at the consent decree tomorrow afternoon, I'll be back in front of Judge Johnston saying, wait a minute, Judge Johnston, they're in contempt of the consent decree.

QUESTION: .well, why dia Judge Johnstone enter a decree that wasn't based on the Constitution?

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1	MR. ELDER: Because it concretized existing
2	procedure at the reformatory. It says that visitation
3	shall be as at least kept at the level as of entry of
4	the consent decree.
5	QUESTION: What provision of the Constitution
6	authorized that?
7	MR. ELDER: Your Honor, I don't think any
8	provision of the Constitution authorized that.
9	QUESTION: Well, then, what was how did it
10	ever get included in a decree that presumably is based
11	solely on the Constitution?
12	MR. ELDER: Your Honor, because that's what
13	the parties settled on.
14	QUESTION: Well
15	MR. ELDER: I'm not going to sign a consent
16	decree in a prison situation that allows for no
17	visitation whatsoever. My clients would sue me and have
18	me fired within seconds of signing, and I don't think
19	the Court would approve a consent decree under those
20	circumstances. This was a give and take procedure.
21	QUESTION: You regard the consent decree kind
22	of as just a basic decree trying to create a good prison
23	atmosphere and apply good penal principles?
24	MR. ELDER: It addressed unconstitutional
25	conditions at the Kentucky State Reformatory. But,
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because of the nature of the consent decree that was settled eventually, it encompassed -- any consent decree does in an institutional illigation -- the whole aspect of life at the reformatory. When we settled with the State of Kentucky, we

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⁶ gave them this and they gave us other things. That's ⁷ part of settling lawsuits and negotiating consent ⁸ decrees.

And sometimes you will get more than you're
 entitled to on a constitutional basis because you've
 given up something else somewhere else.

QUESTION: It's an interesting theory.

QUESTION: Mr. Elder, could you tell me whether you agree with Mrs. Jones about what happens if --- if a particular inmate -- let's assume there's no due process hearing, but a particular inmate belleves that, in fact, he's being picked on. For some reason, he has been singled out. Would he have any constitutional remedy at all?

²⁰ MR. ELDER: Being harassed by a guard,
 ²¹ Intentionally harassed?

QUESTION: Intentionally with regard to visitation. He alone is not allowed to see any of his relatives. What, what --

MR. ELDER: I think he would have at least an

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1 arguable protection case, I think, if they singled out 2 this inmate alone. I don't think that would meet a 3 rational basis test under equal protection. I'm not 4 familiar -- I'm not guite sure that's the test in a 5 prison situation, but clearly if that is a test rational 6 basis, there's no rational basis to deny Joe Jones his 7 visitation.

8 Now, if Joe Jones is on death row or if Joe 9 Jones has done this or that and there is some rational 10 basis, obvicusly if they deny one class of inmates 11 visitation on race -- on race grounds, that would 12 present a suspect category problem.

QUESTION: May I ask another question about 14 her submission. She's concerned and correctly so in 15 view of the 1983 litigation possibilities of liability 16 by a guard who might have forgotten to give notice or 17 something like that.

18 Would you -- what would your view be on the 19 question of whether if you set up these procedures, very 20 minimal procedures, and then nobody did give an inmate 21 notice that his mother couldn't visit for the next six 22 months, would be be able to recover damages?

23 MR. ELDER: I think he might possibly be able 24 to recover damages if there was a total failure of the 25 process. If it got down to a question of whether or not

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it was an -- it was a -- the decision was correct, I 2 think this Court would clearly apply a Superintendent v. Wolpole-type standard to that situation.

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4 I think a total failure of the process, it 5 might go as to whether or not it would be a qualified 6 immunity question at that point. I think a total 7 fallure of the process would clearly be actionable.

8 One of the problems, I believe, with the 9 analysis of the state is that it takes -- in, in -- and 10 in a due process analysis, first, I think, in an 11 analysis such as this, you look to the Constitution to 12 see whether or not there is a constitutional right to 13 visitation. It is clear there is no constitutional 14 right to visitation.

15 Then you look to the actions of the state 16 officials to see whether or not the state officials have 17 created any sort of right. What the state is asking us 18 to do at that point is to come back, if you will, on the 19 back end of substantive -- of derivative due process and 20 impose on the back side, in essence, a substantive due 21 process theory that it would be only in matters of some 22 sort of critical importance.

23 I think that is beyond the scope of what 24 derivative due process is all about. I believe you have 25 to look to what did the state officials intend. And I

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think clearly in this case there is ample evidence, both because of the consent decree and of the regulations that were issued, that they knew exactly what they were doing.

5 QUESTION: But, now, let me ask you one more question along the lines that I was asking you before. 7 Basically any federal court decree laying down rules for a federal prison is based on the Constitution, isn't it?

MR. ELDER: Yes, sir.

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10 QUESTION: And what business does any court 11 decree have laying down rules for the operation of a 12 prison in a federal court that isn't based on a -- some 13 sort of constitutional right of the prisoners?

14 MR. ELDER: Clearly -- clearly, initially --15 the initial litigation is based on constitutional 16 premises, but I think nothing prohibits the State of 17 Kentucky volitionally granting additional rights, 18 particularly in a consent decree context.

19 Consent decrees often will -- will literally 20 give the state a road map on how to run its prison for 21 the next 20 years.

22 QUESTION: What's, what's the basis for that? 23 MR. ELDER: The give and take for that is that 24 any party when negotiating a consent decree gives up 25 certain things because they want a consent decree.

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¹ QUESTION: Doesn't the judge have to look at ² the decree, though, and make sure that it's the kind of ³ thing he has jurisdiction to enter?

MR. ELDER: Yes, sir. I think under the -- I believe that even though you may step beyond what is constitutional, the court can still have authority over that consent decree, even for visitation. I don't think there's any requirement that this Court, that I'm aware of, that only constitutional issues be brought up in a consent decree. They are -- they're wide ranging.

QUESTION: What about in a litigated decree?
 MR. ELDER: In a litigated decree if the judge
 was to step beyond and accept independent state action,
 there would be a problem that would be subject to
 reversal by the court. The partles have agreed that,
 yes, we're going to do this in return for this.

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17 For example, one of the things that they 18 agreed to do was to have the prison population of the 19 Kentucky State Reformatory at a certain level within so 20 many years. Possibly if I had gone to trial and settled 21 the case, Judge Johnstone might have ordered a quicker 22 timetable to bring the -- the population down to a level 23 where it would be constitutional. Of course, population 24 In and of Itself is not a constitutional question, it's 25 a totality, population being only one of the factors.

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1 QUESTION: Of course, in this case we're 2 talking about procedural due process, are we not? 3 MR. ELDER: Yes, sir. 4 QUESTION: And I thought the rationale of 5 those cases was that the state is omitting the 6 constitutional duty if it doesn't provide a procedure. 7 MR. ELDER: That's correct. That's --8 QUESTION: But doesn't the consent decree 9 automatically have its own procedure? 10 MR. ELDER: For a violation of the consent 11 decree, and that would be the traditional contempt 12 powers of the judicial court. 13 QUESTION: Well, didn't you allege a violation 14 of the consent decree here? 15 MR. ELDER: All right, at the initial District 16 Court, yes, sir. 17 QUESTION: Well, you were in the consent 18 decree hearings, weren't you? 19 MR. ELDER: This was done separately, not a 20 part of substantial compliance. I think about a year 21 prior, Your Honor. 22 QUESTION: Well --23 MR. ELDER: This was a more or less routine 24 motion during my monitoring of --25 QUESTION: This wasn't a separate 1983 suit? 51

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¹ MR. ELDER: No, sir. It was as a portion of ² the Court's monitoring of the consent decree. The Court ³ said --

QUESTION: But the Court then -- you -- you're
invoking a mechanism which has very sophisticated
procedure, so I don't see how the state is -- has
omitted a duty by failing to provide some other
procedure.

MR. ELDER: The consent decree --

QUESTION: You don't have to go before a prison official. You can go before a United States district judge.

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13 MR. ELDER: He indicated that the procedures 14 there were constitutional. Your Honor's question is 15 whether or not if an inmate were to tomorrow be denied 16 prison -- be denied his "open visitation," could I then 17 not go back and request that the judge put the case back 18 on a -- on active status and request that the judge hold 19 the state in contempt because this inmate did not have a 20 -- his visitational, open visitation was being denied. 21 That is correct.

However, I think that the Sixth Circuit in saying that we're not going to make this a consent decree matter, that a consent decree is only a portion of it. A consent decree, in and of itself, was only a

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portion of the mandatory language required to reach the -- to give an entitlement to due process. I believe that probably, standing alone, the regulations would have been sufficient absent a consent decree.

5 But, because of the nature of the beast, so to 6 speak, that mandatory language is there. It buttresses 7 the consent decree, and I believe because of, in 8 essence, the double mandatory language gives this Court 9 a stronger basis to say that in this case there was a 10 liberty interest created by the mandatory language of 11 the consent decree, by the correctional policies and 12 procedures and the language therein.

Thank you.

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I believe this Court should affirm the Sixth
 Circuit.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Elder.

Mrs. Jones, you have three minutes remaining. REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF BARBARA WILLETT JONES

¹⁹ MRS. JONES: Your Honor, I think it's ²⁰ important to point out that in the consent decree, ²¹ although the parties dld agree to continue open ²² visitation and maintain visitation at their current ²³ level, the parties -- the attorneys for the Respondents ²⁴ agreed to the procedures that were in place at the ²⁵ time. The procedures that were in place at the time

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were not changed for over six years until the motion was filed. Never required any kind of hearing when we denied a visitor. And I think that's very important.

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That was also in place at the signing of the consent decree. So, there was no requirement agreed to by the parties to have a due process hearing before any party was denied visiting at the institution, and that was in place at the time we signed the consent decree, and that was agreed to by parties on both sides.

10 This did not come up until six years later 11 after the consent decree was signed. The Court of 12 Appeals did not rule that the consent decree was the 13 motivating force for the finding of the mandatory 14 procedures that gave rise to the rights. The Court of 15 Appeals found that it was the procedures themselves that 16 contained the language that gave rise to the liberty 17 interests that requires the implementation of the due 18 process clause.

And I think, more importantly, it is necessary for this Court to draw the line because of the burden that is going to be imposed on state officials if this analysis is continued in the manner in which it's being applied below now.

QUESTION: Just as -- I'm curious. When a visitor wants to come and visit, do they just show up?

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MRS. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.

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QUESTION: They just show up? There's no writing or anything else?

MRS. JONES: That's correct.

GUESTION: And who -- and who passes on
 whether the visitor gets in?


MRS. JONES: There's a staff person, a line
officer there. If the staff person believes that there
is some problem, then he notifies the duty officer and
the duty officer makes the decision on whether to deny
the visit. But there is no list of permissible
visitors. That's what open visitation is. Anyone can
come during those hours to visit that inmate.

14 I think it's limited by numbers and numbers of 15 adults and unlimited children, but they may show up 16 during the hours of visiting. Therefore, we request 17 that this Court seriously consider drawing some 18 distinctions between daily management procedures and 19 those procedures which affect substantive nature of 20 confinement, release from confinement and the very 21 duration of confinement.

Thank you, Your Honor.

²³ CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mrs.
 ²⁴ Jones.

The case is submitted.



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
CERTIFICATION

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc., hereby certifies that the attached pages represents an accurate transcription of electronic sound recording of the oral argument before the Supreme Court of The United States in the Matter of: No. 87-1815 - KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL., Petitioners V.

JAMES M. THOMPSON, ET AL.

and that these attached pages constitutes the original transcript of the proceedings for the records of the court.

BY JUDY Freilicher (REPORTER)



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