

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

- CAPTION: MARK H. ORING, Petitioner V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
- CASE NO: 87-1224
- PLACE: WASHINGTON, D.C.
- DATE: January 10, 1989
- **PAGES:** 1 50

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY 20 F Street, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1 2 ----X 3 MARK H. ORING, : 4 Petitioner : 5 : No. 87-1224 ۷. 6 STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 7 -----x 8 Washington, D.C. 9 10 Tuesday, January 10, 1989 11 12 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 13 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 14 at 10:53 o'clock a.m. 15 APPEARANCES: 16 THEODORE A. COHEN, ESQ., Beverly Hills, Cal.; on behalf 17 18 of the Petitioner. DIANE C. YU, ESQ., San Francisco, Cal.; on behalf of the 19 20 Respondent. 21 22 23 24 25 1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

1	CONIENIS		
2	QRAL_ARGUMENI_QE		PAGE
3	THEODORE A. COHEN, ESQ.		
4	On behalf of the Petitioner		3
5	DIANE C. YU, ESQ.		
6	On behalf of the Respondent		24
7	THEODORE A. COHEN, ESQ.	-	
8	On behalf of the Petitioner - reputtal	-	43
9		-	
10		-	
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:53 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST; We'll hear argument
4	next in No. 87-1224, Mark Oring versus The State Bar of
5	California.
6	Mr. Cohen, you may proceed whenever you're
7	ready.
8	ORAL ARGUMENT OF THEODORE A. COHEN, ESQ.
9	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
10	MR. COHEN: Mr. Chief Justice and may It
11	please the Court:
12	Mark Gring, a lawyer, was disciplined by the
13	State Bar of Callfornia for presenting a testimonial
14	radio communication which was never found to be false,
15	misleading, or deceptive. In fact, the State Bar of
16	California stipulated that the advertisement was true.
17	The basis for the discipline was a presumption
18	that testimonial advertisement is presumed to be faise,
19	misleading, or deceptive. Under this Court's prior
20	decisions, such a presumption placing the burden on the
21	speaker to prove the protected nature of the speech,
22	thus effectively banning any testimonial advertisement,
23	is unconstitutional.
24	The constitutional ground rules governing this
25	area we believe to be crystal clear. Again last term in
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Shapero versus Kentucky Bar, this Court reiterated the well-established standard that state rules designed to prevent the potential for deception and confusion may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the perceived evil.

We feel that the State Bar itself has recognized that its legitimate goal of preventing deceptive advertising can in fact be met by a less stringent and restrictive rule.

10 To bring the case up to date, in November, or 11 on November 28th of 1988, the California Supreme Court 12 acopted the State Bar's proposed rule, which we have set 13 forth in our briefs and in our appendix. So the California Supreme Court has now formally adopted the 14 15 State Bar's proposed rule which removes that presumption so long as the advertisement or testimonial 16 17 advertisement contains a disclaimer which states that it 18 Is not a guarantee or prediction regarding the outcome 19 of the potential client's case.

QUESTION: In your view, is that a constitutional rule? Does that comport with the First Arrendment?

23 MR. COHEN: Well, I would say that I think 24 that it at least meets the objections or, not objections 25 rather, but at least meets the standards that I think

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this Court suggested in Bates and in R.M.J.

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QUESTION: Well so, in your view, for purposes of our argument we an assume that that is a constitutional requirement?

5 MR. CCHEN: I don't say at this point that I 6 think even requiring a disclaimer would be 7 constitutional, because I don't know that testimonial 8 advertisements should be treated any differently than 9 advertisements in general.

Apparently the Federal Trade Commission doesn't feel that they have to be treated any differently, and they feel sufficiently secure that they can test each ad on its own merits.

14 QUESTION: You don't think the disclaimer ads 15 to the truth of the statement?

MR. CCHEN: I don't. As a matter of fact,
there has been a law review article, I believe in the
Buffalo Law Review -- I hope we've set it forth in our
brief -- by Professor Devine indicating that disclaimers
may tend to be more confusing.

QLESTION: why wouldn't it add to the truth of the statement? I mean, it's surely true that if you had somebody saying, this was one pleased client, of course this doesn't necessarily mean that you'll be pleased or that all clients are always pleased, that ads to the

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1 truth of it, doesn't it?

2	I should think your argument is that you have
3	no right to require somebody to add to the truth. Isn't
4	that your basic argument, that you can't require
5	scmebody to put in something he doesn't want to say?
6	MR. CCHEN; Yes.
7	QUESTION: That the First Amendment prevents
8	making somebody say something, as well as preventing
9	scmebody from saying something?
10	MR. COHEN: That is correct, Your Honor,
11	Justice.
12	QUESTION: Mr. Cohen, I hope before you're
13	through you will tell us why you haven't stipulated your
14	case away.
15	MR. COHEN; Yes, if I may address that, Your
16	Honor. I think very clearly and we've set these
17	forth in both our opening and reply briefs the
18	agreement initially made with the State Bar was for an
19	admonition. That is what we stipulated to, an
20	acmonition.
21	What the State Bar imposed upon Mr. Oring was
22	a public reproval. Now, a public reproval is a more
23	QUESTION: I thought your client stipulated to
24	take whatever discipline his partner got.
25	MR. COHEN: He agreed to take whatever
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discipline. I think that was really a word of art that we used during the State Bar hearings to indicate a lid on what should happen to Mr. Oring.

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The intention of everyone -- and I would like to quote if I may from the actual reporter's transcript here, where I think Mr. Markle, who represented the State Bar, himself clearly understood that, in the event that the entire stipulation were not accepted, that it would be of no force or effect.

10 But I think that we placed a cap on the discipline so that Mr. Oring's and Mr. Grey's case could 11 be litigated. And since they had been partners and 12 since It was just a single advertisement that had been 13 14 run by both of them, we didn't want one body or one 15 group of referees to perhaps impose one form of 16 discipline on Mr. Grey and then a different form of 17 discipline on Mr. Oring.

So I think it was everyone's intent that both should receive the same discipline. However, the discipline that was stipulated to was an admonition, and our opening brief is wrong insofar as it sets forth that we stipulated to a public reproval, because we did not stipulate to a public reproval.

24 QUESTION: I suppose it might have been 25 implicit you stipulate to the same discipline, provided

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1 it could be legally imposed.

2	MR. COHEN: Yes, we certainly did not
3	stipulate that discipline which was not imposed
4	according to constitutional standards should just be
5	non-appealable and non-reviewable. As a matter of fact,
6	the State Bar in its letter of reprimand to Mr. Oring
7	not only enclosed a copy of the rules governing appeals
8	to the Supreme Court, but specifically stated that this
9	may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
10	QUESTION: But you aidn't challenge the action
11	below on the ground that it exceeded the stipulation,
12	did you?
13	MR. COHEN; We challenged the action below
14	that is in the petition to the California Supreme
15	Court?
16	QUESTION: Yes.
17	MR. COHEN: We challenged the action below on
18	the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional.
19	QUESTION: But not that the stipulation was
20	exceeded.
21	MR. COHEN: I don't believe that that was
22	raised in the brief. I do not believe that that was
23	raised in the brief. Because the California Supreme
24	Court
	QLESTION: You see, you put us in the position
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of stipulating that you'll follow the other case, and then the other case is one in which these issues are not raised and it's not before us.

MR. CCHEN: Your Honor, I think that what we
stipulated to was that no greater discipline should be
imposed upon Mr. Oring than upon Mr. Grey, because Mr.
Oring, having left the case, was not in a position to
participate in the Grey case, and we wanted to receive
nc greater ciscipline.

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If I may, I'll go to the record.

11 QUESTION: But essentially, you stipulated on 12 the merits that you'd be bound by the first case.

MR. CCHEN; No, we did not. We stipulated on
the merits that we would be bound by the discipline,
degree of discipline that would be imposed. But a
stipulation as to degree of discipline or as to facts is
not a stipulation that we do not have rights to review.

QUESTION: Well, as you understand the stipulations then, if the discipline had been the same you would still have been entitled to bring an argument on the merits here?

MR. COHEN: Yes, we would have been able to bring an argument on the merits, because under California law the stipulation as to facts, as to facts only --

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1 QUESTION: Is there some place in the record, 2 to which perhaps you were going, where we can actually 3 see what was stipulated to? 4 MR. COHEN: Yes. As a matter of fact, Your 5 Honor, in the reporter's transcript, which is -- it's 6 page 3, I believe. 7 QUESTION: The joint appendix? 8 MR. COHEN: Of the joint appendix. 9 At page 4, by Mr. Markle, if I may quote: "In 10 the event that the Hearing Panel makes a finding of culpability" --11 12 QUESTION: Where are you reading from? 13 MR. CCHEN: I'm reading from on page 4 of the 14 joint appendix. It's a statement by Mr. Markle, 15 representing the State Bar. 16 QUESTION: Ckay. Thank you. MR. CCHEN: "In the event that the Hearing 17 18 Panel makes a finding of culpability, then it's the 19 position of the parties, in particular the State Bar, 20 Mr. Cohen, and Mr. Oring, that the stipulation that we 21 would lodge tonight would then become effective as the 22 parties' stipulated recommended disposition, which 23 obviously the Hearing Panel can approve or disapprove." 24 And then he goes on: "In the event that this 25 Hearing Panel finds that there is no culpability, then 10

it's the parties' understanding that the stipulation would have no force and effect whatsoever."

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New, the Hearing Panel found no culpability, and we submit that therefore that stipulation is of no force or effect. The three-member Hearing Panel found that there was no culpability because the presumption was unconstitutional.

And therefore, by the State Bar's own statement, we submit that that stipulation was no longer of any force or effect. As a matter of fact, the preliminary hearing referee initially who first heard this matter dismissed the matter on constitutional grounds.

QUESTION: What you're saying to me, Mr. Cohen -- you know, usually a stipulation, in fact usually any contract, there's something in it for both sides. And what you're saying, you've told us what was in it for your client. That is, your client couldn't get any sentence higher than the one given to the other attorney.

MR. CCHEN: Yes, Your Honor.

QUESTION: what was quid for that quo? Or they just gave you that?

24 MR. CCHEN: Well, I can say, and perhaps I may 25 be going outside the record, Mr. Dring just did not have

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the wherewithal at that point in time to litigate something that we felt would be litigated by Mr. Grey.

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QLESTION: If that was the case, then he simply wouldn't have litigated the second one. But a stipulation usually means you have agreed to one thing in exchange for the other party agreeing to something else.

8 I read the stipulation to mean that you agreed
9 to be bound by the factual determination, in exchange
10 for which they promised, won't give you any higher
11 sentence.

12 MR. COHEN: By the factual determination, Your Honor, not by the legal determination. Because under 13 14 California rules as I understand them to be, a 15 stipulation as to facts and discipline is always 16 reviewable by the California Supreme Court. We cannot 17 stipulate away the right to review, because Mr. Oring 18 did not know at the time of entering into this 19 stipulation what the discipline would be.

20 You see, we might have stipulated to nothing 21 higher than an admonition.

QLESTION: Well, maybe I misspoke. What were the facts ir dispute that you were stipulating to? MR. COHEN: There were no facts in dispute whatsoever.

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1 QLESTION: So in fact, the other side got 2 nothing from this stipulation? Just out of the goodness 3 of their heart, they promised that your client wouldn't 4 get any higher? That doesn't make sense to me. 5 It seems to me you were --6 MR. COHEN: Well, it was the same radio 7 acvertisement that was involved, and really there was 8 nothing more to be added to the case --9 QUESTION: Exactly. 10 MR. COHEN: By having two parties litigate 11 It. QUESTION: So the stipulation makes no sense 12 13 to me unless you agreed to be bound by the outcome of the earlier case, not just factual. 14 MR. COHEN: If I may, Justice Scalla, the 15 16 stipulation doesn't say that at all. It says that we agree to be bound by the factual determination and we 17 agreed to an admonition. 18 19 New, an admonition is not a matter of record. It doesn't blemish the lawyer's record. It doesn't 20 21 prevent him from perhaps receiving a judicial 22 appointment later on. 23 Whereas, the State Bar ultimately did not impose this admonition. It went further and it imposed 24 25 a public reproval, which is a blemish on Mr. Oring's 13

1 record.

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QUESTION: In any event, whatever the stipulation meant, it disappeared once the Hearing Panel found no culpability.

MR. CCHEN: That's my understanding, because that was even Mr. Markle's statement to the Hearing Panel, that the stipulation was going to be of no force or effect if the Hearing Panel found no culpability. And indeed, the Hearing Panel found no culpability.

QUESTION: Yes, but it wasn't just a stipulation of facts. It was a stipulation as to recommended discipline.

MR. COHEN: As to recommended discipline,
which was not followed by the State Bar. And we submit
that therefore on that ground also --

QUESTION: There's another thing that puzzled me about this. I don't have it in front of me, but I thought the Hearing Panel at some stage of the case, they'd advised your client that the case was over and that they would just stipulate to dismiss it, and your client insisted, or maybe it was his partner, that the matter be reviewed at a higher level.

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1 State Bar did nothing for about 20 months. 2 QUESTION: Right. 3 MR. CCHEN: And then Mr. Grey went to the 4 California Supreme Court, and the court ordered that the 5 bar either proceed or dismiss. 6 QUESTION: But who initiated that request 7 after 20 months? 8 MR. COHEN: Mr. Grey. 9 QUESTION: Mr. Grey is the partner of your 10 client? MR. COHEN: Yes, former partner of Mr. Oring. 11 12 QUESTION: So he was the one that was not satisfled with the victory. He was a total victor at 13 14 that point. MR. COHEN: Well, no. He was -- you see, the 15 sword was hanging over his head for 20 months. 16 He didn't know whether he could go ahead with advertising 17 or not go ahead with advertising, apparently. In other 18 words, the case --19 QUESTION: He kind of wanted a declaratory 20 21 judgment. MR. COHEN: It was still lieing there and, 22 yes, he wanted to know whether it was over or not; and 23 apparently not being able to get any definitive word on 24 that, asked the California Supreme Court, who them 25 15 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

ordered the bar to either proceed or cismiss.

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See, that preliminary hearing determination was not binding. As a matter of fact, the State Bar contended, I believe in the Grey case --

GUESTION: Well, it was binding in the sense, as I understand you, that's what terminated the stipulation, the fact that he prevailed at that hearing.

9 MR. COHEN: Well, no. What we feel terminated 10 the stipulation was the three-member panel which found 11 no culpability, because it was before that three-member 12 panel that Mr. Markle on behalf of the State Bar stated 13 that that stipulation would be of no force or effect if 14 that panel found no culpability, and they did find no 15 culpability.

We feel that equally offensive to the First Amendment principles that this Court has elaborated in cases which we feel are analogous to this one is the presumption under the regulation that communications are false, misleading, or deceptive.

The general rule from Speiser versus Randall and Friedman versus Maryland, under those cases the speaker may not be allocated the burden of proving the protected nature of the communication.

QUESTION: Mr. Cohen, do you agree that it is

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possible under the First Amenament for the State Bar to prohibit advertising that it believes is misleading?

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MR. COHEN: That it believes is misleading. I
think, yes, I think of course the State Bar has an
obligation, and I think that we lawyers expect the State
Bar to prohibit advertising that is misleading. Indeed,
this Court --

8 QUESTION: Do you think that a testimonial 9 which focuses, of course, as it did here, only on one 10 client's experience, without explaining the nature of 11 the cause of action or the fact that it was just her 12 individual experience under a bad faith claim -- it 13 wasn't even explained that it was a bad faith claim, 14 apparently -- was somehow misleading --

> MR. COHEN: I don't, Justice O'Connor. QUESTION: -- to the average listener?

MR. COHEN: If I may, number one, I don't think that the general public would -- I think it would be more misleading to use the word "bad faith" in an ad acdressed to the general public. We lawyers may know what that means, but I don't think the public does.

I think that what this ad did, and I think why an ad in this type of a case differs from a general advertisement, is that the advertisement here did not seek retention of the law firm. And unlike an ad for

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the sale of a product, it didn't ask the listener or viewer to gc to the store and buy the soap or makeup without further --

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QUESTION: But the ad didn't further explain. The testimonial did not explain the nature of the claim for which relief was obtained or the circumstances, just a broad statement that, I got relief and I'm happy.

MR. COHEN: No, If I may, Justice O'Connor,
the ad said specifically: "I was rear-ended on the San
Diego Freeway and my medical bills were piling up." So
It did, I believe, state the nature of the cause of
action and what had happened to this individual.

QUESTION: Well, my impression is that it may have been quite misleading in not explaining the nature of the cause of action and the relief. And I wonder whether the First Amendment doesn't permit a state bar to just prohibit testimonials in general.

MR. CCHEN: In general? We feel that the 18 19 Federal Trade Commission -- and we've cited those 20 matters in our brief -- the Federal Trade Commission 21 dcesn't feel that testimonials ought to be treated any 22 differently than any other form of advertising. 23 We believe that the public is not --QUESTION: Do you think that attorneys occupy 24 25 any special role in the professions and in the

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1 hierarchy, and so that we ought to be a little more 2 ccncerned --3 MR. CCHEN: I think sc. 4 QUESTION: -- about their advertising? 5 MR. COHEN: Yes, and I think lawyers have 6 always been regulated perhaps a little more strictly than the other businesses. 7 8 QUESTION: Wasn't there a finding here that 9 this advertisement was misleading? 10 MR. CCHEN: Never, sir. There was never a 11 finding anywhere in this case that the ad was 12 misleading, false, or deceptive. 13 QUESTION: was there some indication that it 14 was not? MR. CCHEN: I believe that a stipulation that 15 16 the ad was truthful would at least lend some inference 17 to the belief that it was not false or misleading. I 18 think that once an advertisement has been shown to be 19 truthful, what more could the lawyer establish? QUESTION: But in any event, there was no 20 finding that it was misleading or that anybody else 21 thought it was? 22 MR. COHEN: At no time, and it did not arise 23 24 out of a complaint by any consumer. This was a State 25 Bar-Initiated complaint. 19

I feel also that what this --

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2 QUESTION: Excuse me. There was no finding 3 that anything special about this testimonial made it 4 deceptive. But isn't there inherent in the State Bar 5 decision that all testimonials are deceptive? That was 6 the basis of their decision, right? 7 MR. CCHEN: The basis for creating the 8 presumption was the belief that all testimonials were 9 inherently misleading. 10 QLESTION: So they effectively find that this is deceptive because it's a testimonial. 11 12 MR. COHEN: They have found all testimonials. QUESTION: That's right. So it's no more 13 deceptive than all testimonials. But they have found 14 15 this, being a testimonial, is deceptive. 16 MR. CCHEN: That is correct. 17 QUESTION: And that's sort of the issue, isn't 18 it, whether testimonials are ceceptive? 19 MR. CCHEN: I may say that that finding --20 there has been absolutely no basis shown for that 21 finding. It was in our opinion just a baid conclusion, 22 not based upon any evidence at all. 23 QUESTION: But that finding, if that's the 24 basis for their rule, it's also a finding that there 25 can't be any testimorial that is not misleading. 20

MR. CCHEN: Yes, that is correct, Justice 1 2 White. 3 QUESTION: As part of your answer, I believe, 4 to Justice C'Connor, I thought you had indicated that 5 there was no recommendation here that this firm be 6 retained. Is that what you were about to say? 7 MR. COHEN: Yes. Well, if I may say it this 8 way, what the ad said is that there is no fee for a 9 consultation. So I think that we have to take the 10 conduct --11 QUESTION: well, but it concludes by saying: 12 "If I had any legal problem, car accident or anything, I 13 would definitely go back to Greg & Oring. I certainly 14 do believe that." And they give the phone number thice. 15 Ycu can't really tell us that this wasn't 16 intended to be used to solicit the firm. Otherwise, 17 they were wasting their money. 18 MR. CCHEN: Well, of course it was meant to 19 solicit the firm, surely, surely, Justice Kennedy. I 20 think --21 QLESTION: Didn't this rule really mean that 22 anybody who is using a testimonial has the burden of 23 showing that it is not misleading? 24 MR. CCHEN: That is correct. 25 21 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

1 QUESTION: And wasn't the ultimate conclusion 2 that your client failed to prove that it was not 3 misleading? MR. CCHEN: That is correct, Justice. 4 5 QUESTION: And you say, I suppose, that 6 shifting the burden like that violates the First 7 Arendment. 8 MR. CCHEN: Yes. 9 QUESTION: Is that your argument? 10 MR. CCHEN: That is our position, Justice, 11 that it ought to be the one who seeks to regulate the 12 speech to have the burden of proof. 13 I think that when the client or potential client is acvised that they may come in for a free 14 15 consultation, I think that it is at that point that the 16 lawyer has the obligation to answer any questions, to 17 explain the law fully. 18 And it is at that point when time can be taken 19 to go into the facts of the case and go into the law of the case. I don't believe that any type of an 20 21 advertisement can completely tell all there is to tell. 22 And so because this ad did not solicit retention 23 immediately -- when I say it did not ask them to come 24 into the office and then they would be charged for the 25 consultation, it was a free consultation.

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1 And I think at that point the client could ask 2 any questions that they wanted to, and the lawyer I 3 think was obligated as a lawyer to give truthful and full answers and supply full information. I think if 4 5 following that the lawyer did not act professionally, 6 then he or she should be subject to discipline, but not 7 by the mere fact of the ad itself. 8 Unless the Court has any further questions --9 QUESTION: May I ask one other question that I may have missed earlier. Under the rule they recently 10 11 acopted, which requires a disclaimer in this kind of 12 announcement, what exactly does the disclaimer have to 13 say? MR. CGHEN: The new rule, it says: "A 14 15 communication which contains testimonials about or 16 endorsements of a member, unless such communication also 17 contains an express disclaimer, such as 'This testimonial or endorsement does not constitute a 18 19 guarantee, warranty, or prediction regarding the outcome 20 of your legal matter."" 21 If it doesn't contain that, it is presumed, 22 just as the old rule presumed, that the ad is false, 23 misleading, and deceptive. QUESTION: Thank you. 24 25 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr. 23 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

1	C chen.
2	Ms. Yu.
3	ORAL ARGUMENT OF DIANE C. YU, ESQ.
4	ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
5	MS. YU: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and if
6	it may please the Court:
7	Before I begin, I'd like to correct or clarify
8	a few of the comments that have been raised in the
9	context of this last discussion with my opponent. First
10	of all, the Federal Trade Commission, contrary to what
11	he indicates, does in fact have a special standard for
12	endorsements and testimonials.
13	Their regulations, Regulation No. 255.1 and
14	255.2, which are clted in our brief, do clearly indicate
15	that they understand "that an advertisement employing an
16	endorsement reflecting the experience of an individual
17	or a group of consumers on a central or key attribute of
18	the product or service will be interpreted as
19	representing that the endorser's experience is
20	representative of what consumers will generally achieve
21	with the advertised product in actual, albeit variable,
22	conditions of use."
23	Therefore, unless
24	QUESTION: what are you reading from?
25	MS. YU: I'm reading from the Federal Trade
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1 Commission Regulation No. 255.2, which indicates they 2 state that the advertiser, unless he or she can 3 adequately substantiate these representations, should 4 either clearly and conspicuously disclose what the 5 generally expected performance would be or clearly and 6 conspicuously disclose the limited applicability of the 7 erdorser's experience to what consumers may generally 8 expect to achieve.

So in fact the Federal Trade Commission does recognize that testimonials and endorsements carry with them special risks in terms of misleading or deceiving the public, and the answer is disclosure and disclaimer in order to solve that problem and eliminate the deceptive or misleading content. That is what we have been saying all along.

A second point that was raised were the stipulations, and I can certainly understand some of the confusion. We contend that the two stipulations should be read in context with the colloquy which is found in the joint appendix, pages 4 to 6.

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MS. YU: They're in the jurisdictional

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1 statement, appendixes D and E. If you read those two 2 stipulations together, nowhere, contrary to what 3 Appellant says, does it say, if the Hearing Panel finds no culpability, Mr. Oring is scot-free or he is off. 4 In 5 fact, what it says, it understands that these 6 stipulations are subject to approval by the review 7 department, which is our appellate level in the State 8 Bar court, and also the California Supreme Court.

9 Moreover, in the discussion before the Hearing 10 Panel, which Mr. Cohen himself participated in and in 11 fact was active in producing the stipulations that are 12 before you, he states in page 5 of the joint appendix: 13 "In other words, our intent is that whatever happens to 14 Mr. Grey would happen to Mr. Oring."

15 And he later goes on to say that he 16 understands there is a possibility that the discipline 17 might be increased, because he says: "For example, supposing, which this doesn't apply, but supposing there 18 19 were a situation where it was a stipulated suspension of 20 30 days. What we're saying is that would not go into 21 effect with respect to Mr. Oring any sooner than it 22 would go into effect for Mr. Grey."

He later says: "In other words, we will leave
Mr. Grey and his able counsel to litigate."

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So in response to your question, Justice

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1 Scalia, what the State Bar got out of this, we thought, 2 was that he -- we were closing the case against Mr. Oring, and we were going to let Mr. Grey and the State Bar litigate.

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In other words, Mr. Grey was going to be the 5 6 designated litigator, Mr. Oring would take a back seat, 7 and when discipline was officially and finally imposed 8 against Mr. Grey, If any, it would be imposed against 9 Mr. Oring.

10 QLESTION: That's how I read it, toc. But now 11 do you explain the colloquy on page 4, the statements of 12 Mr. Markle on page 4 that Mr. Cohen brought to our 13 attention?

MS. YU: It's definitely true there are a 14 15 number of confusing and somewhat irregular items in this 16 particular record. That's an understatement, I'm sure.

17 With respect to what Mr. Markle is stating, he 18 understood that the Hearing Panel was going to rule in 19 effect on the constitutionality, and that is what the 20 parties believed was going to happen in the Grey 21 matter.

I think it's clear that the intent, 22 23 notwithstanding his comments about the culpability 24 aspect, is not borne out at all by the stipulations 25 themselves, but that the comments of Mr. Cohen, who

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1 drafted the stipulation as to force and effect of the first stipulation -- it's very clear that he understood 2 3 that his client would, if disciplined at all, would not 4 receive a greater discipline than Mr. Grey, and that he 5 was backing out. They were leaving the case to Mr. Grey 6 to take over. 7 Sc that is -- it is somewhat --8 QUESTION: But where does that leave us in 9 terms of the stipulation? What do we have before us 10 ncw? 11 MS. YU: Well, under California law --12 QUESTION: Is the Petitioner out of court? 13 MS. YU: Under California law, our position is 14 that the stipulations take him out of the as-applied 15 category and that all he has is a facial attack. It is 16 somewhat unusual, and we understand that the California 17 Supreme Court in denying him review in effect has upheld 18 the decision in the State Bar and is holding him to the 19 stipulations. 20 And we would certainly urge this Court not to 21 free him from his obligations, because that would have 22 Impact far greater than this one discipline case, if

parties can so readily back out of agreements they make and other parties have reiled upon in good faith.

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QUESTION: You don't think it's a permissible

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reading of the stipulation that he would simply accept the discipline imposed by the State Bar, but retain leave to appeal perhaps to the Supreme Court of California cr at least to this Court if he thought it were unconstitutional?

MS. YU: That was not our understanding. The understanding was Mr. Grey was going to take the ball and run with it. Mr. Grey did. He lost. The discipline was imposed against him. And Mr. Gring, we urderstood and thought, was also going to accept that.

11 QUESTION: Mr. Grey I take it could have 12 appealed to this Court had he so chosen.

MS. YU: That's correct. He did file and
certiorari was denied as to his case.

QUESTION: Ms. Yu, let me take one more stab at it. I don't want to prolong this thing too long, but It is sort of a jurisolctional problem.

18 That statement of Mr. Markle on page 4, "In 19 the event that this Hearing Panel finds" -- this is the 20 problematic one -- "this Hearing Panel finds that there 21 is no culpability, then it's the parties' understanding that the stipulation would have no force and effect 22 23 whatever, and that whatever decision the hearing Panel reaches, that decision would apply, if the decision 24 25 included a finding of no culpability, that decision

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1 would apply to both Mr. Oring and Mr. Grey." 2 MS. YU: Right. That is irregular, because 3 Mr. Markle I guess we should say should have understood -- everybody uncerstood, although it's not expressed 4 5 here, that the Hearing Panel is not the final word on 6 the discipline of an attorney. It goes automatically 7 from the Hearing Panel to the review department. 8 QUESTION: Even if the Hearing Panel finds no 9 culpability? 10 MS. YU: That's correct. The review 11 department has authority to review the matter on its own, which in fact it did. And in this case, the State 12 13 Bar did apply to the review department for review. And the decision of the Hearing Panel was overruled there 14 15 and the decision later of the California Supreme Court 16 in denying review upheld the review department's 17 determination that there was culpability and there ought to be discipline imposed. 18 19 QLESTION: Thank you, Ms. Yu. 1 give up. QLESTION: Did you say a while ago that there 20 21 is some part of this case that is fairly before us or 22 not? 23 MS. YU: We understand before us would be the 24 constitutionality of the presumption. 25 QUESTION: well, why is that even before us? 30 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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1 MS. YU: Well, that is actually a question we 2 have wondered about. But we've briefed it. he 3 urderstand that there is some concern on the part of the 4 Court with respect to lawyer advertising and where it's 5 going. 6 In fact, we welcome this opportunity to urge 7 the Court to draw a line. 8 QUESTION: So you say at least the facial 9 validity of this rule is before us, is that it? 10 MS. YU: That would be correct. 11 QUESTION: well, but I really don't understand 12 that. If this man has stipulated to the discipline and 13 the ultimate outcome is giving the discipline regardless 14 of what we decide on the constitutionality, it's just 15 like somebody walking in off the street and saying, I'd 16 like to have you rule on the facial validity of this 17 rule. 18 MS. YU: As I said, we feel he goesn't have 19 the right personally to benefit from whatever ruling 20 might come from this Court. 21 QUESTION: It's a classic case of no case or 22 controversy. 23 MS. YU: well, I hesitated to raise that, but we did have some concern about how this case and why 24 25 this case is here. But as I said, we are prepared to 31 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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1	answer any questions that you have about it.
2	I did want to also
3	QLESTION: Are you standing on the
4	stipulation? You're not waiving the stipulation?
5	MS. YU: No, we're not waiving the
6	stipulation, and we certainly are not conceding any of
7	the factual points that he raised, including the fact
8	that we think this testimonial is misleading and
9	deceptive, as all testimonials are, although the State
10	of Callfornia does have a provision that, if you can
11	show the testimonial is not deceptive and misleading,
12	that the attorney may run it.
13	We think that's a fair balance between the
14	competing interests at stake. We think it's a
15	reasonable and constitutional way to get at the very
16	serious problem of deceptive and misleading advertising
17	in the lawyer context.
18	There was another point I believe Justice
19	Scalla raised with respect to whether the State Bar
20	could require an attorney to present more information
21	than he or she might be inclined to do. And I would
22	understand that the ruling the Zauderer case would
23	suggest that in some instances even truthful statements
24	may carry with them inherently deceptive or misleading
25	impressions or connotations with them, such that the
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State may permissibly require them to disclose more than they might initially be inclined to state.

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QUESTION: Do you take the position that all testimonial ads are inherently misleading?

5 MS. YU: Yes. We also believe that the 6 reasons for that are well-known and sound. They have 7 four components that make them inherently misleading and 8 deceptive. They constitute claims as to quality, which 9 this Court in Bates has indicated is not protected -- is 10 not something that can be verified or measured in any 11 real way.

They also constitute promises or inferences that certair results will obtain, and that's what the FTC regulations are aiming at. This particular ad also contains material omissions of fact, half-truths, in it, such that you have a truthful statement which is nonetheless --

18 QUESTION: Yes, but what if it didn't? What 19 If it Just said, what if the testimonial merely said 20 that they have a very fine-looking office and a polite 21 receptionist who answers the telephone courteously and 22 you will receive courteous treatment if you come into 23 our office, and everybody who ever went to the office 24 qualified that way?

What would be misleading about that?

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1	MS. YU: Those sort of client satisfaction
2	testimonials would be unlikely to produce the kind of
3	investigation that this one did.
4	QUESTION: Yes, but it would be a violation of
5	your rule.
6	MS. YU: But we have the presumption that says
7	an attorney may show that those statements are in fact
8	not just true, but also not deceptive or misleading. In
9	that case, if he could meet his burden fairly readily,
10	he would be allowed to run that type of advertisement,
11	because those are the kinds of things
12	QUESTION: But isn't the presumption
13	irrational as applied to that kind of a testimonial?
14	MS. YU: No, we feel that the form of
15	acvertising itself carries with it such inherent
16	capabilities for abuse that
17	QUESTION: Even the ad I described?
18	MS. YU: Pardon me?
19	QUESTION: Even the ad I described?
20	MS. YU: Well
21	QUESTION: It gives very limited information,
22	but everything it says is easily verifiable, 100 percent
23	true, and experienced by every client or potential
24	client who ever went into that office.
25	MS. YU: My response would be simply that the
	34
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1 form of advertising itself is what is dangerous, because 2 it has an emotional appeal and it is not relying on the 3 content of the message, but the credibility of the speaker.

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5 Sc I think we would say the presumption would 6 fairly operate there. But we also would concede in that 7 particular case, where the client is testifying as to 8 things he or she can observe and can in fact be 9 verified, that we don't have the same problem we do 10 here, where the testimonial misrepresents entirely the 11 basis of a cause of action for bad faith.

We find it quite amazing that --

13 QUESTION: Well, why does it misrepresent? It said the insurance company was giving her a hard time, 14 15 was harassing her, bills were piling up. That's the elements of bad faith. 16

17 MS. YU: Not entirely. We find it quite anazing that he does say he's trying to ecucate the 18 19 public, because never once in the ad are the words "bad faith, "insurance bad faith claim," "breach of covenant 20 21 of good faith" --

22 QUESTION: well, the words "tort" and 23 "contributory negligence" aren't used, either, because 24 those put people to sleep.

[Laughter.]

MS. YU: Well, in this particular instance 1 2 mere harassment or not liking the way your insurance 3 company treats you may not at all form the basis for a 4 bad faith claim. 5 What is misleading here in addition to the 6 failure to mention those items is the fact that the 7 dcuble recovery doesn't come from the auto accident, 8 even though that keeps being stressed, as, if I have a 9 problem with an auto accident, if you have an auto 10 accident you need a lawyer. 11 The clear intent of this particular 12 testimonial is to imply that from a simple fender-bender 13 you may get a double recovery if you don't happen or ycur lawyer, this lawyer, doesn't happen to like your 14 15 insurance company. And that simply is not true. QLESTION: But in any event, if you want to 16 17 publish any testimonial you have to get consent in 18 advance. 19 MS. YU: well, we don't have a procedure for pre-screening, if that's what you --20 21 QUESTION: So you just have to take your 22 risk? 23 MS. YU: That's correct in some respect, although we think in this case that is an important 24 25 point to make, because here he seems to make a virtue of 36 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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1 the fact --

2 QUESTION: So there's no way, there's no way 3 for him to get permission in advance, or not? 4 MS. YU: We don't currently have the resources 5 to do that. With 120,000 lawyers, it's somewhat 6 difficult. But we do have, as I was going to say, we do 7 have here the representation that it is somehow a virtue 8 that he didn't --9 QLESTION: well, would you be making the same 10 argument if, instead of this being a testimonial ad by some client, the lawyer himself said, I had this case 11 where there was this, one of my clients had this kind of 12 an experience? He just said the same thing on his own 13 behalf. 14 15 Would you still be making this kind of an 16 argument, that it was misleading? 17 MS. YU: Well, it certainly could be, because it could still be truthful and yet deceptive. I could 18 tell you in all candor, I have never lost a drunk 19 driving case. But if the facts were I had only tried 20 one and fortunately won, it would be true, but it would 21 be very misleading. 22 QUESTION: would you think a State Bar rule 23 24 that says that every ad like this, where it's the lawyer

²⁵ himself saying what happened, is misleading, would that

37

1	be constitutional, the lawyer advertising?
2	MS. YU: It's not entirely before you. I
3	would imagine that it may have some of the same
4	problems. In fact, the American Bar Association
5	condemns most of these self-laudatory ads, whether the
6	lawyer said it or whether the client is saying it.
7	QLESTION: Well, it may be the American Bar
8	did, but how about the constitutionality?
9	MS. YU: If it has the same elements of deceit
10	and misleading information in it, it would still violate
11	our rule. So I would say that we would believe it would
12	be constitutional to regulate that type of speech.
13	It is important that in this particular case
14	the Appellant says almost as a virtue that he didn't
15	have anything to do with the writing of this ad, that It
16	was his client's statements.
17	Well, that belies his contention that he was
18	trying to educate the public. If he were trying to
19	ecucate the public about the nature of bad faith claims,
20	he wouldn't have a lay person try to explain what had
21	happened to her. That simply doesn't make sense.
22	In other words, he abdicated his role as a
23	professional to try to ensure that the information that
24	got out to the public was truthful and not deceptive.
25	We feel that this particular advertisement by itself is
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¹ misleading under any context, and that it is inherently ² misleading because of these results that are being ³ promised, the misrepresentations as to information about ⁴ the basis of the cause of action, the quality claim that ⁵ she's not in a position to judge and cannot be ⁶ measured.

QLESTION: You seem to be arguing it as an
 as-applied challenge. I thought you said all that was
 before us was the facial challenge.

MS. YU: We are prepared to argue on all of these bases. We do feel, though, that the stipulation takes him out. But should the Court be entertaining a view that it may wish to look at the presumption and its validity, we felt that we had to prepare for any guestions that you had.

16 QUESTION: But why in dealing with the 17 presumption would we distinguish between an as-applied 18 challenge and a facial challenge?

MS. YU: Well, it would be entirely with respect to the facts that he claims or the situation that applies to him in terms of any relief he may get. I mean, if the statute, which we believe ought to be accorded proper deference, is in fact constitutional, then he obviously has no recourse or relief.

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QUESTION: But do you see the stipulation as

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1	distinguishing between as-applied and facial?
2	MS. YU: Yes.
3	QLESTION: Why?
4	MS. YU: Because he himself, he and the State
5	Bar have already negotiated and settled whatever their
6	agreements and understandings were about how his case
7	was going to be handled. We feel that he doesn't now
8	have the opportunity to bring it before you on the
9	merits.
10	QLESTION: But why should he have any more
11	opportunity to bring a facial challenge before us on the
12	merits than an as-applied challenge?
13	MS. YU: Because of some of the unusual
14	aspects of the case, which the record may reflect in
15	terms of the challenge he brought in the California
16	Supreme Court and then coming here on appeal, it does
17	create a somewhat irregular context for the case. But
18	we were prepared, as I said, to deal with it.
19	As we said, we feel that this presumption is a
20	reasonable accommodation between the competing interests
21	that the Court has indicated, the need for the public to
22	get appropriate, informative information this
23	advertisement does not give that type of informed
24	information.
25	It has half-truths in it, it has omission, and
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therefore it has a misleading impression for the public, who is not going to understand the difference between a bad faith claim and how that could produce a recovery, let alone a double recovery, and a simple car accident claim.

We also feel that the advertisement by itself standing alone, with or without the presumption, is misleading and cught to have been regulated. And we feel that certainly the stipulation should take him out of this case altogether.

Finally, we would like to make an argument that the professionalism and public needs of the community do demand that a strong stand be made with respect to the types of forms of advertising, such as this testimonial, which have inherently misleading and deceptive qualities to them.

17 This is a time when the public is demanding more and not less truth and candor, more and not less 18 19 ethical behavior on the part of lawyers. With 120,000 20 lawyers in California and a very serious discipline 21 problem, we take our job, we take it very seriously. 22 And we do hope that the ruling that comes from this 23 Court will speak out in favor of allowing misleading and deceptive advertising in the form of testimonials to be 24 25 regulated in a reasonable way.

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41

1QLESTION: But you just a minute ago told us2we didn't have anything.

MS. YU: Well, as I said, this is an unusual case, and the situation as to how it got here is quite exceptional.

GUESTION: May I ask one other question about the amended rule that now requires a disclaimer. Is it your understanding that that was adopted in more or less a contingent fashion, depending on the outcome of this case? Or is that part of the rule no matter what we do? Do you know?

MS. YU: It has been adopted by the California Supreme Court. It would be operative on May 27th of Obvicusly, a ruling from this Court that had a direct bearing on it would cause us to revisit it. But it will otherwise go into effect.

QUESTION: So that are there a whole backlog of discipline cases that are backed up awaiting the outcome of this case, or is this the only one that really is pending under the old rule?

21 MS. YU: We don't have a real specific count 22 on the number of testimonial cases.

QUESTION: See, what seems to me is we may be deciding the facial validity of a rule that doesn't apply to anybody except for the litigant here, who has

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1 nc interest in the outcome because he stipulated the 2 case away. 3 MS. YU: Right. That in fact has occurred to 4 us. 5 QLESTION: It's really a big case, in other 6 words. 7 MS. YU: Right, a very weighty case. Well, 8 that has occurred to us. In fact, this new rule doesn't 9 even help the Appellant, because he didn't have a 10 disclaimer of any kind. 11 QUESTION: I understand. 12 MS. YU: In short, 1 appreciate your attention 13 and thank you. 14 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Ms. Yu. 15 Mr. Cohen, you have six minutes remaining. REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF 16 17 THEODORE A. COHEN, ESQ. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 18 19 MR. CCHEN: Thank you. May it please the Court: 20 21 At the outset, I'd like to say that I don't 22 take credit for the creation of that stipulation at 23 all. I think it occurred before Ms. Yu was employed by the State Bar and I don't take credit for the creation 24 25 of that.

43

1	What Mr. Oring bargained for was an
2	acmonition, and he received something more horrendous.
3	Supposing he had bargained for an admonition and the
4	review department determined to disbar him.
5	QUESTION: well, but the stipulation said the
6	Supreme Court of California can increase the
7	discipline.
8	MR. COHEN: Exactly, and that is why exactly
9	one cannot we claim that one cannot stipulate away
10	the right to review before we even know what is going to
11	happen.
12	QUESTION: I don't know why you can't. I
13	don't know why you can't agree you'll be bound by
14	scmebody else's outcome. It happens all the time.
15	MR. CCHEN: I think that the intent of
16	everyone, and it's evidenced by Mr. Markle's statement,
17	was that this would be a cap, so that, in other words,
18	there would not be aifferent alscipline imposed upon Mr.
19	Grey than was imposed on Mr. Oring. That was at least
20	the intention as I uncerstood it to be.
21	QUESTION: If we rule the way you want, what
22	benefit will that be to the law in California, the
23	United States, or anyplace else?
24	MR. CCHEN: Well, I think, Your Honor, what it
25	would say is that the State Bar must use the least
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1 onerous means. This Court has said that. 2 New, I think that the claim that the State Bar 3 makes that it doesn't have the resources to permit 4 pre-submission of this ad as the Kentucky Bar did is 5 really not well-founded. The State Bar of California to 6 my understanding is spending \$35 million for discipline 7 this year. Their dues I believe are the highest in the 8 country. 9 I'm sorry, Your Honor. QUESTION: That doesn't speak too well of the 10 11 bar. MR. CCHEN: It doesn't, Your Honor. 12 13 And I don't argue with the fact that they need to do those things. I think all of us in the legal 14 15 profession are concerned with the quality of --16 QUESTION: will this case stop that? 17 MR. CCHEN: Pardon me, Your Honor? QUESTION: If we rule with you on this case, 18 19 will that stop what they're doing now? MR. COHEN: Well, I hope it would. I hope 20 that the State Bar of California would --21 22 QLESTION: Will this decision in this case 23 benefit anybody but your client? 24 MR. CCHEN: I think it would, Your Fonor. 25 QUESTION: How? 45


1	MR. COHEN: Well, of course I don't know what
2	the Court is going to hold or what dicta may be in the
3	Court's opinion. But I think that any decision from
4	this Court, of course, benefits all of us in the legal
5	profession because we get guidance on how to proceed,
6	and I think that the State Bar would receive guidance
7	from this Court.
8	
	QUESTION: What in particular would it do?
9	MR. CCHEN: In this case?
10	QUESTION: Yes.
11	MR. COHEN: As to anyone except Mr. Oring?
12	QUESTION: Yes.
13	MR. CCHEN: I suppose that it would determine,
14	and I hope it might determine, whether or not a
15	disclaimer would be permissible, or whether there was
16	some less onerous method of dealing with this
17	situation.
18	QUESTION: That would deal with the procedure
19	In Callfornia?
20	MR. CCHEN: Yes, or whether a testimonial may
21	be
22	QUESTION: which doesn't interest us at all.
23	MR. COHEN: I would say, Justice Marshall,
24	that perhaps the decision would determine whether
25	testimonials might be treated differently than any
	46
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1 other. 2 QUESTION: But you feel that you have been 3 aggrieved and you just want to have something done about 4 It. MR. CCHEN: Well, that is the reason that Mr. 5 6 Oring Is here. 7 QUESTION: And I just don't know what you 8 want. 9 MR. COHEN: I think what happens is that we 10 have a man who bargained for an admonition which does 11 not affect his record publicly and he received something 12 which now is a blemish upon his record. I think that's 13 why he came here, of course. 14 But I think that the State Bar's position really doesn't meet with the requirements that this 15 16 Court laid down in its previous lawyer advertising cases, to use the least heinous means available. 17 California coulc have provided for pre-submission of 18 this ad. 19 I don't feel that a lawyer ought to risk his 20 21 license without knowing ahead of time whether what he is 22 doing is permissible. QUESTION: Is that involved in this case? 23 24 MR. COHEN: I believe it is, I believe it is, 25 because, they had to run the ad. 47

1 QUESTION: He's going to lose his license? 2 MR. COHEN: Well, it's not lose his license, 3 but he --4 QUESTION: That's what you said. 5 MR. COHEN: Yes, but Your Honor, under the 6 presumption as it existed a lawyer could risk losing his 7 license, because we don't know what discipline would be 8 imposed. So the lawyer must risk the discipline in order to find out whether the ad is permissible or not. 9 10 QUESTION: I still don't know what you want. MR. COHEN: Well, of course we would want a 11 12 reversal of the case, Your Honor, and a determination 13 14 QLESTION: Just say the case is reversed, 15 period? We have to write an opinion, do we? 16 MR. CCHEN: I suppose so, Your Honor, if you 17 choose to. QLESTION: Cr could we dismiss it as 18 19 improvidently grantec? MR. COHEN: Yes, I suppose this Court could do 20 21 that. 22 QUESTION: You think we could do that? 23 MR. COHEN: I think this Court could do 24 whatever it chooses to do, Your Honor. 25 [Laughter.] 48 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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1	MR. COHEN: We would feel that the issue
2	before the Court is not a question of whether the state
3	can prohibit or punish false and misleading
4	acvertisements by lawyers. Of course it can. But we
5	feel that the Issue here is whether the state can
6	relieve itself of the burden of showing that an ad is
7	constitutionally protected, by enacting a presumption,
8	as it did here, that all testimonials are presumed to be
9	false and misleading and thereby making the person
10	exercising the right of free speech to bear the burden
11	of proving that the speech is in fact constitutionally
12	protected.
13	QUESTION: It says that in First Amendment
14	cases you can't shift the burden to the defendant to
15	prove a justification?
16	MR. COHEN: Well, I believe the Speiser versus
17	Randall case indicates that, Your Honor, and the
18	Friedman case.
19	QUESTION: Are those your closest cases?
20	MR. COHEN: Those are some of them, Your
21	Henor.
22	CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr.
23	Cohen.
24	The case is submitted.
25	[whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the case in the
	49
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CERTIFICATION


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NO. 87-1224 - MARK H. ORING, Petitioner V. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

and that these attached pages constitutes the original transcript of the proceedings for the records of the court.

BY alan friedman

(REPORTER)



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