ORIGINAL

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ETSI PIPELINE PROJECT,

Petitioner,

v.

MISSOURI, ET AL.;

and

DONALD P. HODEL, SECRETARY OF

THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

A HOLE

MISSOURI, ET AL.

LIBRARY SUPREME COURT, U.S. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543

No. 86-939

No. 86-941

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1 2 -----X ETSI PIPELINE PROJECT, 3 : Petitioner, 4 : No. 86-939 5 v. : MISSOURI, ET AL,; 6 : 7 and 8 DONALD P. HODEL, SECRETARY OF : 9 THE INTERIOR, ET AL., : 10 Petitioners, : 11 v. No. 86-941 : MISSOURI, ET AL. 12 : 13 -----X 14 Washington, D.C. Tuesday, November 3, 1987 15 The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument 16 17 before the Supreme Court of the United States at 11:01 a.m. **18 APPEARANCES:** 19 JEFFREY P. MINEAR, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor General, 20 Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the 21 Petitioners. 22 ELIZABETH M. OSENBAUGH, ESQ., Deputy Attorney General of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa; on behalf of the Respondents. 23 24 25 1

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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(11:01 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Mr. Minear, you may proceed
4	whenever you are ready.
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY P. MINEAR, ESQ.
6	ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS
7	MR. MINEAR: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
8	please the Court:
9	Section 9 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 approved
10	the Pick-Sloan Plan, a comprehensive multiple purpose program,
11	jointly administered by the Army and the Interior Department,
12	for the development of the Missouri River Basin's water
13	resources.
14	The question here is whether the Secretary of the
15	Interior may enter into a contract pursuant to the federal
16	reclamation laws to supply a portion of the program's unneeded
17	irrigation waters for ETSI Pipeline Project's state-approved
18	industrial use.
19	I would like to begin by briefly describing the Pick-
20	Sloan Plan. Pick-Sloan represents a comprehensive yet flexible
21	response to the needs of a vast and varied river basin. It
22	combines the flood control features of the Army's proposed Pick
23	plan and the reclamation features of the Interior's proposed

24 Sloan plan into a unified inter-agency program designed to 25 provide maximum basin-wide benefits.

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1 Under this plan, the arid upper basin states 2 dedicated a great expanse of productive lands for construction 3 of the massive main steam reservoirs that would protect the 4 lower basin states from disastrous seasonal floods. In return, 5 the upper basin states received assurances that water stored in 6 these reservoirs located within their borders would be 7 available for irrigation and other needs.

8 The main stem reservoirs have now been completed, and 9 the lower basin states are secured from the once devastating 10 flood waters, but the upper basin states anticipated irrigation 11 needs have not yet fully materialized and those states wish to 12 put this water which presently inundates their territory to 13 other beneficial applications.

The dispute here centers on Lake Oahe, a main stem reservoir that was central to both the Pick and the Sloan plans. The Army originally proposed two small flood control reservoirs at this location. Interior, by contrast, recommended one large reservoir with much greater capacity to meet the upper basin states' reclamation needs.

The Army and Interior ultimately agreed that Interior's proposal with its massive reclamation storage capacity would best serve the needs of the basin. However, it became clear in the early 1970s that the upper basin states' irrigation needs were not developing as quickly as expected. The Interior Department, with the cooperation of the Army,

1 therefore agreed to market the resulting unneeded irrigation
2 water at Lake Oahe and other reservoirs for state-approved
3 applications.

4 QUESTION: Mr. Minear, have the two agencies, 5 Interior and the Army, always agreed consistently on the proper 6 interpretation of the Flood Control Act?

7 MR. MINEAR: Yes, Your Honor, I think that they have.
8 This agreement has been --

9 QUESTION: There was some suggestion certainly by the 10 Respondents that they have not always agreed that the Army had 11 maintained at one time that the Secretary of the Interior could 12 not market water from Army reservoirs independently.

MR. MINEAR: The Army General Counsel, at the time MR. MINEAR: The Army General Counsel, at the time that this proposal was first made, indicated that the statute appeared somewhat ambiguous but, nevertheless, agreed to cooperate with the Interior Department's proposal, deferring to the Interior Department's expertise in supplying industrial water.

QUESTION: Well, has there been some uncertainty of the position of the two agencies in the past? I have-apparently they have come together for purposes of this litigation, but I'm trying to get a candid assessment of what their position was before.

24 MR. MINEAR: I think at the highest levels of the 25 Army, with the Secretary of the Army and the General Counsel of

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1 the Army, who are in a position to make these determinations 2 under the Flood Control Act, there has been substantial 3 agreement between the two agencies throughout this program.

The Respondents cite several memoranda, internal memoranda, obtained through discovery, that express some doubts at lower levels. However, the Army General Counsel has been quite consistent in his approach to this matter throughout--since -- essentially since 1974.

9 QUESTION: Since I have you interrupted, let me ask 10 you one other thing. Under Section 6, now, the Corps can 11 market surplus water.

12 MR. MINEAR: That is correct.

13 QUESTION: Now, unused irrigation storage water can 14 be marketed by Interior.

15 MR. MINEAR: Yes, that is correct, also.

QUESTION: Now, can it be the same water? What is surplus water as opposed to unused irrigation storage water? Is it the same water we're talking about?

19 MR. MINEAR: Not necessarily.

20 QUESTION: Could it be? Could it be the same?

21 MR. MINEAR: Usually not. For instance, I would think 22 that the water that now -- the ETSI contract, this particular 23 20,000 acre feet of water, would not be treated as surplus 24 water by the Army.

25 QUESTION: Why not?

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MR. MINEAR: Because it is being put to a use by the Interior Department. It's being put to a use in accordance with the federal reclamation laws.

4 QUESTION: Am I mistaken then in thinking that the 5 Corps has changed its position so it now believes that it could 6 have marketed the water in this case as surplus water?

7 MR. MINEAR: I believe the Army's present position, 8 which is presently being formulated at this point, it is still 9 under evolution, would be that it would not be able to market 10 the ETSI water, and the reason is this: let me go back, first, 11 to 1974.

12 The Army made a determination at that point that it 13 probably could not market unutilized irrigation water in these circumstances because it would run through the hydro-powered 14 turbines and would, therefore, serve a beneficial use. The 15 Army has found that this interpretation, in fact, has resulted 16 in some very harsh applications. In particular, with small 17 towns, for instance, Parshall, North Dakota, was the example 18 used here. 19

20 The town requested a very small amount of water, 323 21 acre feet, for its municipal uses. The town almost adjoins the 22 reservoir and was in need of water. The Army's initial 23 determination was that perhaps it could not supply this water 24 because the water could be used to go through the turbine. The 25 Army has attempted to ameliorate that policy by, in fact,

making this water -- by concluding that when the water can be 1 made available to a municipal application without interfering 2 3 with other project purposes, that it then can supply the water. 4 This is really what the Army's policy is designed 5 for. 6 QUESTION: And supply it why? Because it becomes 7 surplus? 8 MR. MINEAR: They have decided to treat that type of 9 water as surplus. 10 QUESTION: Well, that's nice, but what does surplus 11 water mean? I thought it meant spill-over. 12 MR. MINEAR: Traditionally, that's how the Army 13 defined it. Water that would, in fact, pass over the spillway, 14 that would not be used for any other purpose. 15 QUESTION: What else could it possibly mean? 16 MR. MINEAR: Well, in this case, take the example 17 here where the water, in fact, the water is being used to produce hydro-power, and that is the only purpose that this 18

19 water can serve at all. If, in this case, a small town, in 20 this case, Parshall, is willing to pay enough for that water, 21 in fact, recoup the lost hydro-power purposes, then it fulfills 22 the ultimate objective of the reservoir.

23 QUESTION: Well, that's very desirable, but does that 24 transform it into surplus water? That's the issue.

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MR. MINEAR: It depends. It appears that that was,

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in fact, what Congress meant when, in fact, it adopted these
 surplus water provisions here in the Flood Control Act, Section
 6, that it was, at that time, addressing these types of
 problems.

5 QUESTION: Well, it was addressing one aspect of 6 problems of water that is not being used and making that water 7 usable, but only one type of water that wasn't being used; that 8 is, surplus water, which means spill-over water, that is not 9 being reserved for irrigation, is not being reserved for any 10 other use.

MR. MINEAR: Well, Your Honor, I think, in any event, 12 --

QUESTION: You know, that's meeting one aspect of that problem, but to say you meet one aspect of the problem is not to say you intend to meet all aspects, including water reserved for irrigation that is not being used. You would not consider that surplus water, would you?

MR. MINEAR: No, Your Honor. But, Your Honor, I think what's important to remember here is the Army's authority is not what is in question here. Instead, it's the Interior Department's authority. That is what has been challenged and is the subject of this dispute.

QUESTION: But the meaning of surplus water is quite relevant to the entire case, whether it -- because it pertains not just to the Army's position but to what the two agencies

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1 can do.

2 MR. MINEAR: And I think what the two agencies have 3 reached a reconciled position to, based on their two definitions, that, in fact, --4 5 QUESTION: You represent both agencies. 6 MR. MINEAR: That is correct. 7 QUESTION: Mr. Minear, --8 QUESTION: Very ingenious position to be in. MR. MINEAR: Yes, Your Honor. 9 I share Justice O'Connor's historical 10 QUESTION: 11 concerns. It seemed to me that for awhile this was a turf 12 battle between the Army and the Interior until it got under the jurisdiction of the Solicitor General and brought them 13 together. 14 Let me read one sentence from Judge Bright's dissent. 15 "It leaves the irrigation water stored in the main stem 16 reservoirs without a governing agency or law." Do you agree 17 with that, are you defending that, or is Judge Bright 18 19 completely wrong? 20 MR. MINEAR: I think that Judge Bright is partially 21 correct. 22 Partially correct. QUESTION: The Army simply cannot market all of the 23 MR. MINEAR: 24 water that's available in this reservoir as surplus water. 25 It's simply -- you must remember the Army's mission is 10 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888

primarily flood control and navigation protection. Their supply of surplus water is simply an ancillary power that has been given to them by Congress to assure maximum utilization of these reservoirs.

5 Congress' ultimate objective in these cases is to 6 assure that these reservoirs do the most good for the most 7 people. That point is repeated throughout the legislative 8 history. It's the guiding principle of the Pick Plan and the 9 Sloan Plan, and that is what the Army and Interior Department 10 are attempting to do here.

QUESTION: Of course, it's a strange thing that the A sth Circuit panel divided upper basin against lower basin Judges, too.

14 MR. MINEAR: Yes, Your Honor.

15 QUESTION: Well, wasn't this -- this reservoir was 16 designed to have -- and built to include irrigation water?

17 MR. MINEAR: That is correct, Your Honor.

18 QUESTION: Quite a lot of it.

19 MR. MINEAR: Yes, it was designed so.

QUESTION: And the Secretary of Interior has found that that water -- none of that water or at least all of that water is not needed for irrigation.

23 MR. MINEAR: Not at the present. That's correct. 24 QUESTION: And, so, there the water sits unused for 25 irrigation anyway, and your claim is, I take it, that the

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Secretary of Interior has the power to use that water for some
 other purpose.

3 MR. MINEAR: To make that water available to states. 4 QUESTION: So, it's unused irrigation water. 5 MR. MINEAR: Yes. 6 QUESTION: For a coal slurry in Wyoming. 7 MR. MINEAR: Yes, that is right. QUESTION: Mr. Minear, getting back just for a moment 8 to this business of the relationship between the Secretary of 9 10 the Army and the Secretary of the Interior, certainly if the 11 Secretary of the Army had joined in signing this contract, 12 there wouldn't be any lawsuit at all, would there? 13 MR. MINEAR: Oh, I'm not so sure about that at all. 14 The Respondents, the states, have challenged the Army's authority as well as Interior's authority. 15 In any event, this authority was executed under the 16 17 Interior's power, under the reclamation laws. So, whether the Army signed the contract or not is probably not relevant given 18 the authority that was asserted. 19 20 QUESTION: Well, it certainly would have answered the 21 theory of the Court of Appeals decision, --MR. MINEAR: 22 Yes. 23 QUESTION: -- which was that it's a joint responsibility rather than a single responsibility. 24 But, in fact, they did cooperate here. 25 MR. MINEAR: 12 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888

1 In fact, the contract states that.

2 QUESTION: But they didn't sign it, did they? 3 MR. MINEAR: No. The contract --QUESTION: This lawsuit would be over if the 4 Secretary of the Army had signed this contract. 5 MR. MINEAR: I respectfully disagree with you, Your 6 7 Honor. QUESTION: Certainly, the Court of Appeals decision 8

9 wouldn't have been written the way it was.

MR. MINEAR: Perhaps it would have been written differently.

QUESTION: Perhaps. But what was the vise in the agreement according to them that they didn't have the approval of the Army? That's the only vise according to the Court of Appeals.

MR. MINEAR: Your Honor, I don't think that that is rorrect. I think because -- remember, the water service scontract was executed under the reclamation laws pursuant to a state water right that ETSI now holds.

Now, the Army is generally not involved with the application of the reclamation laws in these cases.

QUESTION: Do you think that the case would have been the same if the Army had endorsed the contracts, we ratify and approve everything that's being done here?

MR. MINEAR: Oh, I think there still would --

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1 QUESTION: And then the states would make the same 2 claim?

3 MR. MINEAR: It's likely that there still would have
4 been a lawsuit in this case.

5 QUESTION: Well, some other ground, certainly. But 6 you're telling us that the Secretary of the Army agrees that 7 the Secretary of the Interior has this authority but isn't 8 willing to sign these papers. That's what the lawsuit is all 9 about.

MR. MINEAR: But, Your Honor, it was not necessary for the Secretary of the Army to sign these papers.

QUESTION: Well, whether it was necessary or not, they could have avoided a lawsuit and a lot of judicial time if they had signed the contract.

MR. MINEAR: Yes, Your Honor. The contract even specifies that the Army, in fact, was consulted on this and approved this -- not approved, but, in fact, --

18 QUESTION: Is there any legal significance to their 19 having been consulted and approved?

20 MR. MINEAR: I think that there is legal significance 21 because the --

22 QUESTION: Then, the Secretary of the Interior does 23 not have the authority to act independently.

24 MR. MINEAR: Well, in terms of acting independently, 25 I think it's important to get this point straight, and that is,

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that under the Pick-Sloan Plan, the Army and Interior
constantly consult on all of these matters because what one
does affects the other. So, I think that it is true that there
is an obligation for consultation and coordination. That took
place in this case.
QUESTION: What if, after the consultation, the Army

7 says I've heard everything you've consulted me about, but I 8 just think you're all wrong, I'd like to use this water for 9 down stream purposes?

MR. MINEAR: Then, that can be resolved within the Executive Branch.

12 QUESTION: Then, the Secretary of Interior could not 13 act independently?

MR. MINEAR: That is right. If the Secretary of the 15 ==

16 QUESTION: The Secretary of the Interior can act 17 independently unless the Army objects?

18 MR. MINEAR: That is right.

19 QUESTION: Strange law.

QUESTION: Mr. Minear, the Secretary of the Army couldn't have signed this contract, could he, purporting to act under the Reclamation Act?

23 MR. MINEAR: Yes, Your Honor. That is the point.

QUESTION: He has no authority under the provision under which the contract purported to be executed.

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MR. MINEAR: That is absolutely correct, Your Honor. 1 QUESTION: Nor is it clear that he had any authority 2 3 nor is it clear that he even asserts to have any such authority under the surplus water provision of the Act which he is in 4 5 control of. MR. MINEAR: Every one of those points is correct, 6 7 Your Honor. 8 QUESTION: So, there's no possible basis on which he could conscientiously have signed the contract. 9 10 MR. MINEAR: I agree completely, Your Honor. 11 QUESTION: The most he could do --12 QUESTION: The Army ---13 QUESTION: -- would be to agree with Interior that it 14 was a good idea to do it, which he did. MR. MINEAR: Yes, that is correct. 15 QUESTION: 16 Even if the Army decided that it had 17 authority to execute a contract like this on its own, it would be pursuant to a completely different set of rules. 18 19 MR. MINEAR: That is correct, also. Which is of fundamental importance, I 20 QUESTION: 21 would think. MR. MINEAR: Yes, that is right. 22 23 The Army doesn't assert anything here QUESTION: 24 because the Army is not here. 25 MR. MINEAR: Your Honor, the Army did sign our brief, 16

but this is primarily --1 2 QUESTION: Is the Army here? MR. MINEAR: Pardon? 3 QUESTION: Is the Army here? 4 5 MR. MINEAR: In what respect, Your Honor? The Army 6 was sued in this case, yes. 7 QUESTION: Do you represent the Army? 8 MR. MINEAR: Yes, Your Honor. And the Interior? 9 QUESTION: 10 That is right, Your Honor. MR. MINEAR: 11 QUESTION: Well, which side should I take? 12 MR. MINEAR: You should take the side of the United 13 States. We speak with one voice in this case, Your Honor.

14 As I was saying, the water marketing program advanced 15 three important objectives in this case. First, it permitted 16 the upper basin states to apply some of their presently 17 unneeded irrigation water to other beneficial uses. Second, it 18 allowed the Interior Department to recoup some of the costs 19 incurred in providing irrigation storage, and, third, it secured water for alternative energy sources at the height of 20 21 the Arab oil embargo.

Now, we submit that Section 9 of the Flood Control Act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to enter into the FC contract. Our legal position is quite straightforward. Section (a) of the Flood Control Act approves the Pick-Sloan

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Plan, which, in turn, designates the Secretary of the Interior
 as the appropriate authority to manage the reclamation aspects
 of the main stem reservoirs.

Section 9(c) then identifies the body of law, namely 4 federal reclamation law, that governs how the Secretary shall 5 exercise that authority. The Secretary may, therefore, enter 6 into contracts to supply unutilized irrigation water from a 7 8 main stem reservoir, in this case, Lake Oahe, in accordance with the provisions of the Reclamation Project Act, a federal 9 reclamation law that permits the Secretary of the Interior to 10 11 provide unneeded irrigation water for miscellaneous purposes.

There are two points here that bear special emphasis. First, the Pick-Sloan Plan sets forth the basic policy for the systematic development of the river basin, and it expressly recognizes that the Secretary of the Interior shall have authority over irrigation storage at the main stem reservoirs.

17 It naturally follows under this functional division 18 of authority that the Secretary is authorized to administer the 19 application of irrigation waters not presently needed for 20 irrigation use.

Second, when Section 9(c) instructs that the reclamation developments to be undertaken by the Secretary shall be governed by the reclamation laws, it is referring to the Secretary's reclamation activities and not merely the physical work constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation.

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1 Thus, Section 9(c) makes clear that the reclamation 2 laws shall govern the Secretary's entire reclamation program 3 beginning with his initial assessment of irrigation storage 4 requirements, continuing through to final repayment of costs, 5 and including in his determination what should be done with 6 unneeded irrigation water.

7 Respondents have only modest quarrels with our 8 construction of Section 9. They principally contend that two 9 other provisions of the Flood Control Act, Section 6 and 8, 10 override Section 9 in the functional division of authority set 11 forth in the Pick-Sloan Plan.

12 The reply briefs filed in this case explain in 13 considerable detail why Respondents are wrong. I will simply 14 summarize our answer here.

First, Respondents observe that Section 6 gives the Army general authority to market surplus water from Army flood control projects. They then surmise that the Army must have exclusive authority to market water from the Pick-Sloan Program to main stem reservoirs.

Claiming Respondents' logic does not follow, Section does not purport to give the Army exclusive water marketing authority, nor does it indicate how that authority should be exercised in hybrid facilities, which combine both flood control and reclamation features.

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There is no basis for interpreting Section 6 to

override the functional division of authority expressly set
 forth in the Pick-Sloan Plan.

3 Second, Respondents suggest that Section 8, which 4 specifies the general procedure for adding reclamation features 5 to Army flood control projects, provides the only avenue by 6 which Interior can exercise reclamation responsibilities at 7 Army projects.

8 Respondents' Section 8 argument is also untenable. 9 Section 8 deals with how to add reclamation features to flood 10 control projects. The section has no application here where 11 Interior is attempting to assure that Lake Oahe's pre-eminent 12 and existing reclamation feature, namely its massive irrigation 13 storage capacity, is optimally applied to a permissible 14 reclamation use.

Respondents also contend that the Secretary's interpretation is not entitled to deference. However, this is precisely the type of case where deference is appropriate.

First and foremost, the Secretary's construction of Section 9 is certainly reasonable. The most that Respondents can argue is the statute may be ambiguous, in which event the Secretary's reasonable interpretation --

22 QUESTION: Wasn't even ambiguous. I thought it was 23 so clear that there was no room for doubt.

24 MR. MINEAR: But the Court of Appeals relied on 25 Section 6 and Section 8, which, as I've indicated, really have

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no relevance here. They simply read the wrong sections of the
 statute. They saw perfect plainness in the wrong provisions.

3 Second, the Flood Control Act is written in unusually 4 broad language that indicates Congress' intention that the 5 responsible agencies would fill in the gaps in this 6 legislation.

Furthermore, the Interior Department was intimately involved in the formulation of this legislative program and its interpretations are, therefore, particularly persuasive.

10 QUESTION: Can I ask one other question before you 11 get any farther into your deference argument?

12 MR. MINEAR: Yes, Your Honor.

QUESTION: What is the status of the contract right now? As I understand it, the project is not going to be used for the originally-intended purpose.

MR. MINEAR: The contract, in essence, has been mainly held up. There are still obligations that are owed by ETSI under the contract, and we continue to have an obligation to provide that water.

The contract has been enjoined. Performance has been enjoined and, therefore, neither of these activities are taking place.

QUESTION: But I thought ETSI had cancelled. MR. MINEAR: No. ETSI has not cancelled the contract. They have essentially shelved their project, but the

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1 contract remains a tangible asset of theirs, which they are 2 free to assign under certain conditions.

3 QUESTION: Is it a matter of indifference to the 4 Secretary of Interior what use the water is put to? Do you 5 care what they do with the water?

6 MR. MINEAR: Yes, we do care what they do with the 7 water.

8 QUESTION: But you don't know what they're going to 9 do with the water?

MR. MINEAR: Well, the water, they can only apply the water in accordance with a state permit. Now, they obtained a state permit. I believe the permit has since lapsed because they are obligated to make a very large payment.

14 QUESTION: They were going to use it in some kind of 15 coal slurry, weren't they?

16 MR. MINEAR: Yes.

17 QUESTION: And that purpose was approved, but you 18 don't know what they really will do with it now?

MR. MINEAR: No, we don't, Your Honor, but if it went outside of the terms of the contract, the understanding of the contract, I'm sure that the Secretary would object. We did supply this water for a particular purpose in this case.

23 QUESTION: What are the terms? So, it would have to 24 be used for coal slurry.

25 MR. MINEAR: It is for industrial purposes, I 22

1 believe. I think this would be a matter of really contract 2 interpretation. I'm not sure I'm well enough versed on the 3 contract to make that determination.

4 QUESTION: That's a matter entirely within the 5 authority of the Secretary of Interior to approve of the 6 purpose or disapprove?

7 MR. MINEAR: Yes, and, of course, there would be 8 consultation with the Army once again about this.

9 QUESTION: Is there an obligation to consult with the 10 Army now?

MR. MINEAR: We believe that there is an obligation for the two agencies to consult in the activities that take place at the Pick-Sloan reservoirs, given the nature of their hybrid facilities.

As I was saying before, I think that the Secretary's interpretation is certainly entitled to deference here, particularly because the question here is complex and requires specialized knowledge of a vast water resources program that has been committed to the care of expert agencies.

Furthermore, the Interior Department has consistently adhered to its present interpretation throughout the life of this contract and to the same --

QUESTION: If I may ask one other question. I hate to keep interrupting. But supposing there was a dispute as to a given quantity of water, whether it was surplus water the

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1 Army had jurisdiction over, or unutilized irrigation water, to 2 whom would we defer on that -- on resolving such a dispute?

3 MR. MINEAR: That dispute would be resolved within 4 the Executive Branch, mostly likely would not be answered by 5 the courts. Instead, the determination would be made between 6 the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Army.

QUESTION: That could be resolved in the Executive
8 Branch if this one can't be?

9 MR. MINEAR: Pardon?

10 QUESTION: I'm not sure why that dispute is 11 resolvable within the Executive Branch any more than this one 12 is.

MR. MINEAR: Well, it is because both of those agencies ultimately are answerable to the President, and, in fact, when this project was originally formulated, it's clear that President Roosevelt was very active in determining the hybrid nature of these facilities.

So, there is an answer in the Executive Branch for any inter-agency dispute that might exist here.

20 QUESTION: And you're telling me that in this case, 21 you wouldn't have solved the dispute by resolving that dispute 22 and having the President of the United States tell them both, I 23 think this water should be used for that purpose, I'd like you 24 both to sign this contract? We'd still have this lawsuit? 25 MR. MINEAR: Well, again, I think as Justice Scalia

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1 mentioned earlier, the contract was executed under the 2 reclamation laws, after consultation with the Army. The Army 3 had no --

QUESTION: Well, another whereas clause, by virtue of authority given by that statute and by the authority given by Section 6 to the Army, we sell you this water.

7 MR. MINEAR: Yes, but Section 6 wasn't mentioned. I
8 think it's useful to know exactly --

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QUESTION: I know it wasn't mentioned.

MR. MINEAR: -- what statutes these waters are being
applied because they might have different repercussions.

QUESTION: I was puzzled as to what disputes are resolvable within the Executive Branch and why you have to come to us about them.

MR. MINEAR: I think that the disputes between agencies are resolvable within the Executive Branch, but this is not a dispute really between agencies; this is a dispute between the upper and lower basin states over the use of this water.

QUESTION: Yes, but Justice Stevens obviously would be correct if it were clear and if you acknowledged that the Army had authority, if it had jurisdiction over this water, to dispose of it, but that isn't clear.

24 MR. MINEAR: Yes, that's right, it is not clear.

25 QUESTION: And that not being clear, the only way to

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1 do it with assurance of lawfulness was through Interior. 2 MR. MINEAR: That is correct, Your Honor. 3 QUESTION: Yes, but it's perfectly clear that one or 4 the other or both had the authority to dispose of this water, is it not? 5 6 MR. MINEAR: I'm sorry? QUESTION: Either the Army or the Secretary or both 7 8 clearly had the authority by virtue of a combination of Section 6 of one Act and Section 9. 9 MR. MINEAR: Our position is that Interior clearly 10 11 has a --12 QUESTION: I understand that's your position, but 13 nobody could contest the power to sell this water if they both 14 agreed and invoked both statutes, that we won't try to define 15 the water as either surplus or irrigation, because whatever it 16 is, we want to dispose of it for this purpose. MR. MINEAR: In terms of contesting, I'm quite 17 confident that we would still have a lawsuit here today, Your 18 19 Honor, even if Army had signed that contract. 20 I would like to reserve the remainder of my time for 21 rebuttal. 22 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Very well, Mr. Minear. 23 I will hear now from you, Ms. Osenbaugh. 24 25

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ORAL ARGUMENT OF ELIZABETH M. OSENBAUGH, ESQ.
 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS
 MS. OSENBAUGH: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please
 the Court:

5 The question here is what law governs industrial use 6 of water stored in Army reservoirs on the Missouri River.

7 Respondents submit that the courts below very 8 properly held that the Secretary of the Interior may not claim 9 unilateral marketing authority over waters in Army reservoirs 10 for industrial use. Instead, Section 6 of the Act expressly 11 provides the terms which govern industrial use of this Army 12 reservoir.

13 Section 6 provides that the Secretary of the Army 14 makes the decision whether water is available for industrial 15 use and Section 6 also very specifically protects other uses of 16 the water. It establishes the terms and conditions for 17 industrial use of water at Army reservoirs.

QUESTION: Would you help me with the problem I've had with your adversary? Would you agree that if the Secretary of the Army had said, well, we're not sure whether it's surplus water or irrigation water, but we join in the contract, would you still have an objection to this transaction?

MS. OSENBAUGH: There would be two issues if the Secretary of the Army had joined in the contract. There would not be the issue, I'm sorry, of which agency can market the

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water. Then, the question would simply be whether the
 Secretary of the Army complied with the terms of Section 6.

QUESTION: In other words, would you take the position that if you win this lawsuit, the Secretary of the Interior can't dispose of this water, then they said, well, we will now classify it as surplus water rather than that, you'd say they can't, and would you also say they couldn't sell it then either?

9 MS. OSENBAUGH: Then, the issue would be the 10 reasonableness of Army's interpretation of Section 6. As is 11 shown by Army --

12 QUESTION: So, the answer is you would be opposed to 13 that sale, too?

MS. OSENBAUGH: No, I'm not saying that, Your Honor, 15 but I am saying that Section 6 does impose substantive 16 protections of other uses.

QUESTION: Well, let me ask you another -- put it a different way. Say the President of the United States thinks we ought to sell this water and he calls in the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Interior and says, how can we do it, and they do all the paper work in the world on it, would you find any objection to their power to dispose of this water, if they all agreed they wanted to do it?

MS. OSENBAUGH: No. We'd agree that they would have power to make the decision whether to dispose of the water, and

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1 the Army General Counsel's opinion indicates that Army does 2 have authority to determine whether this water is available for 3 industrial use and to determine that a certain portion of that 4 water is surplus, even though it may reduce the power generated 5 at the reservoir.

6 The difference, though, between Army's current 7 position and the position of the Secretary of the Interior is 8 still quite significant.

9 QUESTION: Well, I'm trying to get your position. 10 MS. OSENBAUGH: Yes.

QUESTION: What would you -- would you have any objection to a contract that was signed by both the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Interior and sought its authority in both statutes, said we don't want to worry about Which -- whether to classify it as surplus or extra irrigation water, we just want to dispose of this water for this purpose, would you say they had no power to do that?

MS. OSENBAUGH: No, I would not say they had no 18 19 power. I would say that provided that they did reasonably 20 accommodate other project purposes and meet the requirements--21 QUESTION: They didn't do anything except what 22 they've done here. They've accommodated nothing else. They have 23 all this very large amount of water in this particular reservoir. Would you say that given the facts we all know are 24 25 true as of now and just recited them all in the contract, both

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the Army and the Interior signed the contract, would you have
 any valid objection to the contract, to the sale of the water?
 MS. OSENBAUGH: If they did not adequately protect
 other uses.

5 QUESTION: Well, they gave precisely the same 6 protection that this contract gives.

7 QUESTION: Well, if I understood it, if Interior 8 markets it, all interior has to be concerned about is whether 9 other irrigation needs are met, and it's not necessary for 10 Interior to think about down stream users at all if they aren't 11 using it for irrigation.

Now, if the Army sells it as surplus, then it's my understanding that consideration must be given to the flood control and other possible power uses and other uses of down stream users above and beyond irrigation use, is that correct?

16 MS. OSENBAUGH: That is correct, Your Honor.

QUESTION: And under this contract, the consideration to down stream users was not given because Interior was considering only irrigation and there wasn't any irrigation, isn't that right?

21 MS. OSENBAUGH: That is correct.

22 QUESTION: Okay.

MS. OSENBAUGH: Interior takes the position that the Reclamation Projects Act requires that it not only -- that it need consider only the effect on irrigation and not even just

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1 the effect on irrigation, but only its own irrigation units.

So, we have challenged the adequacy of theirconsideration.

QUESTION: But they can only -- they only purport to reach that part of a reservoir's capacity that has been set aside for irrigation.

7 MS. OSENBAUGH: There is no specific block of water 8 set aside for irrigation. That is, the water is in multi-9 purpose storage where it is used for all the purposes that 10 Congress envisioned.

11 QUESTION: I know, but if the lake hadn't been built 12 to irrigate also, it wouldn't have been built the way it was.

MS. OSENBAUGH: That is correct. It was built for a variety of purposes.

15 QUESTION: It was built to have a specific amount of 16 irrigation water capacity.

MS. OSENBAUGH: There is no defined specific amount. It was clear that Congress contemplated that there would be significant irrigation development and that the reservoirs --

20 QUESTION: May I'm wrong. I thought I read that it 21 was agreed between the two agencies that what the capacity of 22 the lake would be, this reservoir would be, and that a specific 23 amount of it was for irrigation.

24 MS. OSENBAUGH: Well, I don't believe --

25 QUESTION: Is that right or wrong?

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MS. OSENBAUGH: -- that they've ever shown a specific amount for the irrigation. The agencies did agree and the capacity of the reservoir was established in the documents that coordinate the plans.

5 The district courts specifically noted that the only 6 thing, function, Interior has ever had at the reservoir was, 7 other than marketing hydro-power, which was the power taken 8 away, was to -- the language in the Senate documents indicating 9 that the two agencies would agree on the reservoir capacity.

10 QUESTION: Let me ask you. Do you think there's 11 water available for irrigation in this reservoir?

MS. OSENBAUGH: Yes, there is water.

13 QUESTION: And if there was a need for it, Interior 14 could go ahead and sell it for that purpose?

15 MS. OSENBAUGH: Yes. Section 8 --

16 QUESTION: Without anybody's consent? I mean, 17 without the Army's consent?

MS. OSENBAUGH: Under Section 8, for them to develop any irrigation works to utilize the water, congressional authorization would be required.

21 QUESTION: Well, yes, but not Army's?

MS. OSENBAUGH: For them to construct the work, there an advanced determination requirement by Army, but the Section 8 has been construed to indicate that reclamation law and Interior would have irrigation purposes.

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1 QUESTION: They have control. There is irrigation 2 water in that reservoir, and Interior has a responsibility for 3 that water. It says it doesn't need it now.

MS. OSENBAUGH: No, Your Honor. The reservoir was placed under Army control. The entire reservoir of the Pick-Sloan Plan. There's water in that reservoir which could be used for irrigation. Section 8 provides for Interior to carry out that irrigation function, and Section 6 provides for Army to carry out the industrial use provision.

10 QUESTION: Right, exactly.

MS. OSENBAUGH: So, Interior -- water could be provided for irrigation, but nothing in the Act or in the Pick-Sloan Plan gives Interior jurisdiction over the block of storage or for the use of that water for industrial purposes.

QUESTION: Well, so, you're saying -- you're really saying, which is not what the Court of Appeals said, that Interior would never have any power to sell any water for industrial purposes?

MS. OSENBAUGH: No, Your Honor. I'm saying that 20 Section --

21 QUESTION: You just said that.

MS. OSENBAUGH: I don't believe so. Interior has no authority to dip directly into the reservoir and say this block of water is under our control, we are going to divert that for industrial use. Interior does have authority, if the

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1 procedures in Section 8 are followed, to operate separate 2 irrigation works. If it operates separate irrigation works, it 3 has incidental powers under the reclamation law, including 4 power to provide water for municipal --

5 QUESTION: So, if they had irrigation works here, 6 they needed water for irrigation and they developed whatever 7 works were necessary and were using the water for irrigation 8 but they said, well, there's a lot of other water that could be 9 used for irrigation, could they sell that for industrial 10 purposes?

MS. OSENBAUGH: Only if it was incidental to the irrigation function.

13QUESTION: Well, that's a completely different14rationale than the Court of Appeals, which may be quite right.

MS. OSENBAUGH: Well, I -- perhaps I'm misunderstanding the question or misstating it because I believe the Court of Appeals specifically talked about --

QUESTION: What you're saying is, as I understand it, that the Interior has got no power whatsoever to sell unused irrigation water for industrial purposes.

21 MS. OSENBAUGH: Directly from an Army reservoir in 22 the absence of a work authorized by Congress.

QUESTION: Exactly, exactly. But it's got power to take -- to develop and use that water for irrigation right out of the Army reservoir, and I don't know that -- and you would

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say that the only purpose that it can divert water from that
 reservoir is for irrigation. That may be right.

MS. OSENBAUGH: The question would arise if Interior had a congressionally-authorized irrigation work, as to what incidental functions it could carry out through that work, but directly from the reservoir, --

QUESTION: But you certainly wouldn't say that this kind of a project would be incidental to any kind of irrigation, would you?

10 MS. OSENBAUGH: It's very unlikely.

11 QUESTION: So, you do have quite a different 12 approach, and it may be quite right.

13 MS. OSENBAUGH: The significant difference between 14 Section 6 and the reclamation law is that Section 6 does 15 protect other uses of the water. Congress placed the Missouri River reservoirs under the control of the Secretary of the Army 16 because of their peculiarly-close relationship with flood 17 18 control and navigation. That is, their dominant purpose was 19 flood control and navigation and not irrigation, and the water 20 is contained in multi-purpose storage where it is used for a 21 variety of purposes, including navigation, flood control and 22 hydro-powered generation.

Because Army manages the reservoir and Army has control over all the waters in that reservoir, it is the logical entity to determine what water is surplus to the

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1 functions and the purposes of the reservoir.

Interior carries out no function at Oahe Reservoir. 2 3 It has no interest in protecting other uses of the water. Additionally, its Bureau of Reclamation, which is the entity of 4 the Department of the Interior involved in this case, has 5 limited geographic reach. It has no interest in the States of 6 Iowa, Missouri or Minnesota, three of the ten Missouri Basin 7 8 states. By contract, it is a national agency that represents all interests in the inter-state river. 9

10 It is incongruous to take the position of the 11 Secretary of the Interior that two agencies can market the 12 same water for the same use, we're talking only about 13 industrial use, on different terms. It encourages form 14 shopping for entities, such as ETSI, that seek to exempt 15 themselves from the limitations Congress directly imposed in 16 Section 6.

Now, when ETSI approved this contract in 1982, it was 17 its first assertion of unilateral authority to market the water 18 19 and it asserted that it would market a million acre feet of 20 water annually for energy or industrial use without further 21 consideration of other uses. In so doing, it relied on the reclamation law. It did not rely on Section 6 or Army authority 22 23 because Army had terminated the memorandum of understanding by 24 which they had jointly provided a temporary solution from 1975 25 to 1978.

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During that time period, Army made a number of statements, including one by the Secretary of the Army, that the memorandum of understanding was only a temporary solution, that there was concern about statutory authority, and that modifications would be brought back to Congress if desired, and at no time did the agencies obtain congressional approval, and Army terminated the memorandum of understanding.

Army specifically did not approve the ETSI contract 9 under Section 6. The Court of Appeals asked for further 10 information on that point and the federal defendants stated 11 that Army did not approve the contract under Section 6. It was 12 entirely dependent upon the authority of the Secretary of the 13 Interior.

Now, they argue that, first, there is a block of irrigation water and it's unutilized irrigation water, but concede that there is no specific block of water there that is not under Army control. It's clear from the Army General Counsel's opinion --

QUESTION: Ms. Osenbaugh, when you say under Army control, you don't mean day-to-day management; you mean under Army jurisdiction under the statute?

MS. OSENBAUGH: I mean, Army has jurisdiction over the entire reservoir that this water is contained in. It's clear from the Pick-Sloan Plan, Army controls the main stem reservoir. It manages it for all functions.

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QUESTION: But what are the consequences of that control that you're referring to, so far as Interior's right to dispense water for -- to use surplus?

MS. OSENBAUGH: Well, Section 8 establishes the terms 4 under which Interior utilizes Army reservoirs for an irrigation 5 6 purpose. The Secretary of the Interior does not rely on 7 Section 8. They do not contend that Section 8 would justify 8 their action here. In fact, they argue that the general sections of the Act, such as 8, which provides for the 9 irrigation function at Army reservoirs, and Section 6 don't 10 apply to the Secretary of the Interior on the Missouri River. 11

And, so, their entire claim of authority is certain statements and legislative history that Interior would adopt regulations for the use of storage available for irrigation at Army reservoirs. However, Congress specifically rejected that approach when it rejected the language like that in the House bill and instead adopted present Section 8.

So, Section 8 is limited to irrigation purposes and irrigation works.

Army, however, physically operates the reservoir and it not -- so, it operates and has control over all the water. It doesn't just have jurisdiction over surplus water. Surplus water is the water that can be made available for industrial use. But Army has jurisdiction to determine what is surplus and, thus, the Army has taken the position, as is shown in the

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1986 General Counsel's opinion, that it does have authority 1 over the water which is stored in multi-purpose storage in the 2 reservoir, even though that water would be available for 3 4 irrigation, if needed. It is not a separate block that reclamation law controls this block of storage in the reservoir 5 6 and Army controls the rest. Instead, all the water is subject 7 to Army control with Section 6 defining when the water can be 8 made available.

And the Secretary of the Interior concedes that in 9 both industrial use at this Army reservoir and the reservoir 10 itself and that this water are within the scope of Section 6. 11 12 Section 6 clearly sets forth the terms on which the water can 13 be used. The Army General Counsel's opinion shows that it's a 14 reasoned construction, that they've abandoned the position of 15 the dissent below, that all water would be locked up and could not be used for any purpose, or even that there would be no 16 water available for industrial use. 17

18 The current position of the Secretary of the Army is 19 clear that some water could be made available for industrial 20 use at Oahe under Section 6.

Now, there's nothing in the Act that says that Interior controls industrial use of water at Army reservoirs. To the contrary. They cannot cite anything in either the Act or the Pick-Sloan Plan that says --

25 QUESTION: It says in the Pick Plan, the Pick Plan, I

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believe, utilization, utilization of storage reserved for
 irrigation in all multi-purpose reservoirs should be in
 accordance with regulations prescribed by Interior.

Now, this is certainly utilization of storage 4 reserved for irrigation. Now, -- at least it's, you know, 5 6 close enough for government work. It's certainly a reasonable 7 meaning of that phrase and that's the meaning that Interior and 8 Army have both chosen to give it. Why shouldn't we accept that? Because Congress did not. 9 MS. OSENBAUGH: That language, that identical language, was in Section 6 of the 10 House bill. Congress and the Conference Committee rejected 11 12 Section 6 of the House bill and instead adopted Section 8, 13 which speaks in separate irrigation works and irrigation 14 purposes.

15 QUESTION: But 6 and 8 don't just apply to this dam; 16 they apply to everything, right?

17 MS. OSENBAUGH: Right.

QUESTION: But this Pick Plan only applies to this one facility and for this one facility, Congress did approve in the statute the Pick Plan. The broad outlines of it and it seems to me that's a broad outline, that utilization of storage reserve for irrigation shall be in accordance with the regulations prescribed by Interior.

MS. OSENBAUGH: Well, all right. First, it's in the transmittal letters. It's not an integral part of the plan

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1 itself that was adopted by Congress.

2 Second, even if that section did become law for the 3 Missouri River and only for the Secretary of the Interior's 4 actions on the Missouri River, because they agreed that 5 Sections 6 and 8 applied to Army's use of the Missouri River, 6 it would only mean that Interior would adopt regulations for 7 the use of that storage for irrigation purposes.

Army would still operate the reservoir. Army would 9 still enter into the contracts. Interior has never adopted 10 regulations governing the use of this storage. So that 11 Interior has not acted as if it believed that that language in 12 the transmittal letters became law.

QUESTION: I agree. I can see arguments pro and con, both, but, you know, I don't think that either of them is so over-powering that I'm willing to ride over what both Interior and Army agree should be the accepted meaning of it.

MS. OSENBAUGH: Well, Army's litigation position in this Court is only -- is a very guarded statement that Interior's position is acceptable so long as it does not interfere with Army's duties.

21 QUESTION: The Solicitor General submits.

22 MS. OSENBAUGH: Well, I'm referring to the statements 23 in the Solicitor General's brief.

QUESTION: Well, isn't the Solicitor General representing the Army here?

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Yes, Your Honor. 1 MS. OSENBAUGH: QUESTION: So, do you question his statement of what 2 3 the Army's position is? MS. OSENBAUGH: No. I was merely stating that their 4 description of what Army's position is does not --5 QUESTION: Well, I still don't understand --6 MS. OSENBAUGH: -- give us Army's interpretation. 7 8 QUESTION: -- why if this water is so much under the control of the Army, how would Interior ever go about, without 9 getting Army's consent, to utilizing this water for irrigation? 10 MS. OSENBAUGH: They would follow the procedure in 11 12 Section 8. Section 8, the Act, does specifically provide for use of Army reservoirs for irrigation purposes. 13 In practice, irrigation from the Missouri River reservoirs is not pursuant 14 15 to Interior contracts, but, instead, --16 QUESTION: That isn't what I asked you. I asked you how would Interior ever use the water for irrigation without 17 18 Army's consent under your position? 19 MS. OSENBAUGH: Well, I think that Section 8 does 20 provide the procedure. I think irrigation is clearly an authorized purpose of the reservoir and that under Section 8--21 That may be. So, that wouldn't require any 22 OUESTION: 23 thing from the Army. 24 MS. OSENBAUGH: It requires coordination with Army 25 because Section 8 begins with the requirement of the --42

1 QUESTION: So, you're telling me that Interior cannot 2 without Army's coordination use the water for irrigation 3 purposes.

4 MS. OSENBAUGH: I think that Section 8 establishes 5 the procedure. Now, --

6 QUESTION: Well, the SG says we look to Section 9(a), 7 not 8, that 8 is something else, and that Interior can proceed 8 under Section 9(a) by administering reclamation aspects of the 9 program, isn't that right?

MS. OSENBAUGH: Yes, and it is clear that the Pick-Sloan Plans did contemplate an irrigation purpose. It is clear that nothing in the Pick-Sloan plan gives the Secretary of the Interior authority over industrial use at Army reservoirs.

14 Irrigation clearly can be provided and is not affected by the issue in this case, which involves industrial 15 16 use, and Section 8 had been construed so that the Secretary of the Interior can -- that reclamation law would apply to 17 irrigation use of Army reservoirs even in the absence of works. 18 19 Now, Congress has rejected the applicability of the 20 requirements of reclamation law even to irrigation, which undercuts the theory that reclamation law can be the source of 21 authority for industrial use. I think it's clear that Oahe can 22 23 be made available for irrigation use under Section 8 and that industrial use is under Section 6. 24

QUESTION: May I just ask another stupid question,

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1 probably? But is it your position that the water that would be 2 supplied pursuant to this contract is surplus water within the 3 meaning of Section 6?

MS. OSENBAUGH: It is our position that the Secretary of the Army makes the determination as to whether it is surplus water and the Secretary of the Army has, and the Army General Counsel's opinion indicates, that they have determined that they can define the term "surplus water" to make water available for industrial use from the reservoirs.

10 QUESTION: So, the answer is yes?

MS. OSENBAUGH: Yes. It is also our position that the term "surplus water" defines what water is available for industrial use. It does not limit the Army's jurisdiction over the water for multiple purposes.

QUESTION: Where does it go if the Interior lets the contract as opposed to the Army? The money the Army gets from it goes into the Treasury. Isn't there some other disposition if the Interior Department sells the water?

MS. OSENBAUGH: On appeal, the contention has been made by the Secretary of the Interior that it should be paid into the reclamation fund and that Section 6 provides for deposit in the Treasury as miscellaneous --

QUESTION: Right. Do you contest that, that there's a different disposition depending on which agency has it? MS. OSENBAUGH: It's -- no. I would only point out

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1 that Interior in discussing power revenues, which was a matter 2 that they clearly had authority over the marketing of power at 3 Army reservoirs until '77, that they could not find a basis in 4 the reclamation law to place power revenues from the Missouri 5 River for developments in the reclamation fund and that was 6 resolved by subsequent congressional action that's not involved 7 here.

8 So, where the money went could not have been a basis 9 for the Congress in 1944 to have decided whether Interior could 10 market any of this water for industrial use.

11 There's amendments in the Pick-Sloan Plan regarding 12 the utilization of reservoirs for irrigation storage was 13 specifically rejected by Congress, and Congress also rejected 14 amendments to Section 6 that would have specifically given the 15 Secretary of the Interior authority over industrial use of Army 16 reservoirs, and at that time, the Secretary of the Interior in 1944 specifically stated in asking for that authority that he 17 18 recognized that industrial use in Section 6 in no way involves 19 reclamation but sought it for purposes of administrative 20 efficiency. Congress did not adopt those amendments to Section 21 6 and Congress adopted the version of Section 8 which gives 22 Interior authority over separate irrigation works and gives 23 Interior authority over irrigation purposes but not over 24 industrial use.

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I believe that the Secretary of the Interior's

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decision is not entitled to deference because the very question
here is what law applies to industrial use at Oahe. Deference
assumes that Congress has delegated authority to the agency to
decide a question, and in this case, that is the issue.
Congress did not delegate to the Secretary of the Interior the
decision whether it would be Interior or Army or whether
Section 6 would apply.

8 QUESTION: Well, maybe not to Interior. If the SG 9 were here just representing Interior, I might agree with you, 10 but certainly Congress delegated to Interior and Army the 11 decision of what their respective jurisdictions are as an 12 initial matter. I mean, it's always ours in the last analysis, 13 but as an initial matter, surely the division of jurisdiction 14 between Army and Interior is a matter for Army and Interior to 15 decide.

MS. OSENBAUGH: No, Your Honor. I believe Congress did address it in Section 6. Rather than saying Army and Interior shall decide how to run these reservoirs, Congress specifically provided for specific uses, such as industrial use.

QUESTION: Well, the theory always is that there is some real jurisdiction, but the initial decision as to what that real jurisdiction is is for Interior and Army, not Interior alone. If you said that, I'd agree with you. Interior might be impinging on Army's ground, but, here, you have both

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Army and Interior saying this is how we think the jurisdiction
 comes out.

Now, it may be absolutely wrong, but at least you've got to say that that's the initial cut at it and that cut should be given some deference, shouldn't it?

MS. OSENBAUGH: No. They make the decision initially, but Congress didn't give them any discretion as to the factors used in making that decision. Congress specified the terms in Section 6, and it's a pure question of law as to whether the Secretary of the Interior can do it.

11 QUESTION: We give no deference on pure questions of 12 law.

MS. OSENBAUGH: If Congress has spoken and it's ascertainable by principles of statutory construction and Congress did not in the statute delegation discretion to the agency on that, then, no, I don't believe this Court should give deference.

I think this differs from cases in which Congress 18 clearly indicated that an agency shall develop rules for its 19 jurisdiction over counter claims or the agency shall determine 20 21 whether this is a flood claim so that permits are required. In 22 each of those, the Court makes the initial determination, we've 23 delegated -- that Congress has delegated the law-making function, the discretion to the agency, to consider matters of 24 25 policy and to resolve it.

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In this statute, under Section 6, under their argument, it is a question of did Congress delegate a decision. It's a question of construction. Section 6 versus their suggestion that Congress silently created an exception for the Missouri River to the positions of the Act.

6 The Missouri River Basin was clearly a major focus of 7 the debate on the Flood Control Act of 1944, but questions of 8 jurisdiction were resolved in the debate over Section 8 and the debate over Section 6, and in both of those debates, what 9 10 happened was that Congress rejected the approach that the 11 Secretary of the Interior is asserting here today and every official position of the Secretary of the Army indicate that 12 13 they cannot rely on the authority of Army under Section 6.

We believe that Interior's position ignores the legislative history and the protections that Congress imposed in the Act for other uses. Our protection by contrast protects all uses as provided in Section 6. Interior has no authority to correct flaws that it perceives --

QUESTION: Would you like us to affirm or would you
 like us to embrace all the reasoning of the Court of Appeals?
 MS. OSENBAUGH: I believe that the decision of the
 Court of Appeals is correct, Your Honor.

23 QUESTION: And the reason for it, that this is just 24 not a reclamation project?

25 MS. OSENBAUGH: I think clearly they have not 48

established the threshold requirement for their contention that
 reclamation law applies, which is that it must be a reclamation
 development to be undertaken by the Secretary of the Interior
 under the Pick-Sloan Plans.

5 It is not. Oahe is currently undertaken by Army and 6 not Interior.

7 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Ms. Osenbaugh.
8 Mr. Minear, you have five minutes remaining.
9 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY P. MINEAR, ESQ.
10 ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS - REBUTTAL
11 MR. MINEAR: Thank you, Your Honor.

First, to answer Justice O'Connor's question about whether or not existing uses were taken into account, under Joint Appendix Page 226, the contract is set out, and I'd like to read what was said in the contract.

"The Secretary of the Interior, after consultation 16 with the Secretary of the Army, has determined that providing 17 water service for industrial use to ETSI for 20,000 acre feet 18 19 of water annually will not impair the efficiency of the product 20 period, project for irrigation, interfere with the operation of 21 the project for flood control nor adversely affect existing 22 uses of water, and is a beneficial consumptive use of water." 23 QUESTION: What page?

24 MR. MINEAR: This is on page 226 of the Joint 25 Appendix, paragraph D.

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1 QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. MINEAR: Next, I would like to just note some of 2 3 the incongruities in Respondents' position. If, in fact, Section 9(c) requires that physical 4 irrigation work must be completed before the Secretary of the 5 Army --6 QUESTION: I'm sorry. I've got to go back to that 7 8 finding. That finding was not necessary, though, under your theory of the case. 9 10 MR. MINEAR: Indirectly, it was, Your Honor. We believe the consultation between Interior and Army is necessary 11 12 as part of the Pick-Sloan Plan, and it's important to focus. 13 The question here is what Pick-Sloan Plan requires, which is set forth in Section 9. 14 15 So, insofar as it's required, yes, that consultation, we believe, is required, and that is the fruit of that 16 consultation. 17 18 QUESTION: And it's not only consultation, but a 19 finding similar to that requirement, no adverse effect down 20 stream? 21 MR. MINEAR: I'm not certain about that, but I think it might well be. 22 23 As I was saying, there are certain incongruities that come from Respondents' position. If Section 9(c) requires a 24 25 physical irrigation work must be completed before the Secretary 50

1 of the Interior can invoke the reclamation laws, then the 2 Secretary could not follow his standard practice of entering 3 into reclamation contracts with irrigators prior to completing 4 irrigation works. Notably, he entered into such a contract 5 here with South Dakota's Oahe Conservancy District at the time 6 he initiated the construction of the now-suspended Oahe 7 irrigation works.

8 These works were in progress at the time that the 9 contract, the ETSI contract, was entered into. Furthermore, 10 the Secretary is wrong in construing Section 9 to establish a 11 functional division of authority of these reservoirs. In his 12 determination of hydro-powered cost allocations for the entire 13 Midwest, --

QUESTION: Mr. Minear, what is your short answer or is it a long answer to why Section 8 is not applicable? Where it just says that if the Secretary of Interior decides that there's irrigation water available and if the Secretary determines.

MR. MINEAR: Yes, Your Honor, because those works-there has already been authorization for those works. This is for adding irrigation works to flood control projects that only have flood control features.

23 The Sloan Plan was, in fact, fulfilled.

24 QUESTION: And this particular reservoir was the 25 result of that kind of a consultation?

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MR. MINEAR: Exactly. Those steps were followed in
 this case at the time the project was authorized.

3 Finally, there's some question whether Interior's reclamation activities in Pick-Sloan, in fact, Interior's quite 4 active or has been quite active in participating in the 5 determination of reclamation storage requirements here. It 6 conducted extensive surveys of irrigation needs. 7 It entered into a reclamation contract. It secured water rights for 8 reclamation purposes. It obtained -- it continues to coordinate 9 10 its main stem and tributary activities with the Army.

11 So, it's simply not accurate to say that Interior is 12 not active in the Oahe reservoir.

13 Finally, I would like to address the practical 14 considerations that lie at the very heart of this dispute. 15 Congress approved the Pick-Sloan Plan to serve the needs of the 16 entire Missouri River Basin. The congressionally-approved plan 17 was carefully formulated and coordinated by the Corps and Bureau Engineers to provide a fair and efficient distribution 18 of the Missouri River resources to all states within the Basin. 19 20 The upper basin states now seek a reasonable and, 21 indeed, a reasonably anticipated benefit from their support of 22 the program. The opportunity to put a portion of the waters 23 stored within these reservoirs to a beneficial use. The lower basin states, which already have far greater water resources 24 25 than their northern neighbors, show no persuasive reason for

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1 their unwillingness to share --

Well, is the only basis for your saying 2 **QUESTION:** the Interior has the power to sell water for industrial use 3 that provision in the reclamation law that says it may sell for 4 5 irrigation and miscellaneous purposes? MR. MINEAR: In conjunction with Section 9 of the 6 7 Flood Control Act. The Flood Control Act gave Interior 8 responsibility for these reservoirs, to exercise its authority under the reclamation laws, and this particular reclamation 9 10 law, 9(c) of the Reclamation Project Act, gives the Secretary 11 express authority in this case. 12 QUESTION: To do what? 13 To provide irrigation -- unneeded MR. MINEAR: 14 irrigation water for miscellaneous purposes as discerned 15 throughout the --QUESTION: And this industrial use is a miscellaneous 16 17 purpose? 18 MR. MINEAR: That is correct. 19 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr. Minear. 20 The case is submitted. 21 (Whereupon, at 12:01 o'clock p.m., the above-entitled 22 matter was submitted.) 23 24 25

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