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OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DKT/CASE NO. 86-511

TITLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner V. PETER R. FINK, ET UX.

PLACE Washington, D. C.

DATE April 27, 1987

PAGES 1 thru 54



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1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL :
4	REVENUE,
5	Petitioner :
6	v. : No. 85-511
7	PETER R. FINK, ET UX.
8	x
9	
10	Washington, D.C.
11	Monday, April 27, 1987
12	
13	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
14	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
15	at 10:03 o'clock p.m.
16	
17	APPEARANCES:
18	ALAN I. HOROWITZ, ESQ., Washington, D.C.;
19	on behalf of Petitioner
20	MATTHEW J. ZINN, ESQ., Washington, D.C.;
21	on behalf of Respondent
22	

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PROCEEDINGS

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We will arguments first this morning in No. 86-511, Commissioner of Internal Revenue versus Peter Fink.

Mr. Horowitz, you may proceed whenever you're ready.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF

ALAN I. HOROWITZ, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. HOROWITZ: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court:

The issue in this case is whether a shareholder can create immediately deductible tax loss by surrendering a portion of his shares to the corporation he controls.

The underlying facts are as follows.

Respondents were the principal shareholders of Travco, a company engaged in the manufacture of recreational vehicles. When the corporation encountered financial difficulties in the mid-seventies, Respondents voluntarily surrendered a portion of their shares to the corporation, stating explicitly that the purpose of the surrender was to improve the financial condition of the company.

They surrendered slightly less than 200,000

Respondents claimed the amount of their basis in the surrendered shares, totaling about \$389,000, as ordinary loss deductions on their federal income tax returns. The Commissioner disallowed the claimed deductions on the ground that such a voluntary contribution to the corporation to advance its interests must be capitalized and therefore cannot give rise to an immediately deductible loss.

The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's determination, but the Court of Appeals reversed and approved Respondents' efforts to take an immediate loss in the amount of their basis in the surrendered shares.

QUESTION: Now, its position had not been consistent over the years, had it?

MR. HOROWITZ: The Government's position?

QUESTION: The Tax Court's.

MR. HOROWITZ: The Tax Court's, no. The Tax

Court's cases have been all over the lot. There were a

series of cases back in the twenties and thirties in

which they pretty much reached different results on

similar facts.

Since the thirties, up until cases in the last couple of years, the Tax Court had pretty much taken the position that Respondents advance here, which is that one can take an immediately deductible loss for a surrender, non-pro rata surrender of shares.

Now, in the Frantz case, which was decided at the same time as this case, the Tax Court reconsidered that line of cases and took the position that the Government is now urging.

QUESTION: And it was a reviewed decision?

MR. HOROWITZ: Yes.

QUESTION: Dissents?

MR. HOROWITZ: There were a couple dissents.

Judge Parker dissented and was joined by a couple other judges.

QUESTION: Would it make a difference if the percentage had been greater than it was?

MR. HOROWITZ: We don't think it would make a difference, depending on what the percentage is.

Certainly, the greater the percentage is, the weaker the claim for a loss is, because a 99 percent shareholder who makes a surrender or makes a contribution to capital, almost all of that money is coming back to that shareholder who makes the surrender, because they still own a very large percentage of the corporation.

To take a pretty extreme example, suppose a shareholder held 99 percent of the shares in a corporation. The corporation has 1,000 shares that were issued at ten dollars a share — say 100 shares, and one shareholder subscribes to 99 of those shares at ten dollars each, for \$990.

The other shareholder, the minority shareholder, holds one share, having invested ten dollars in the corporation.

QUESTION: Mr. Horowitz, may I ask, in light of what you are now saying, what advantage did these shareholders think they were achieving in terms of inducing others to invest in the corporation by surrendering these shares?

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, their testimony was that the corporation needed an injection of new capital and they hoped to attract outside investors to the corporation. They were going to issue \$700,000 in preferred shares that they hoped a new investor would subscribe to and convert into common stock.

QUESTION: They did give up mathematical control?

MR. HOROWITZ: No, they did not give up mathematical --

QUESTION: They aid not?

MR. HOROWITZ: They gave up the potential for giving up mathematical control in the event the new investor subscribed to these new shares, which in fact never happened. But the surrender itself just reduced their percentage by this small amount of 72 to 68.

QUESTION: But didn't they have 52 plus percent prior to the surrender and less than that afterwards, less than 50 percent? Maybe I have the figures wrong.

MR. HOROWITZ: No. They began with 72 and went down to 68.

This is a husband and wife who made the surrenders. If you looked at the husband in isolation, for a very small period of time his interest went from above 50 to below 50, during the two-week period before his wife made the surrender.

The surrenders were made -- the husband made a surrender in late December of 1976, the wife made her surrender in early January of 1977.

QUESTION: But the surrender did not increase

any of the assets of the corporation?

MR. HOROWITZ: No, it neither increased nor decreased — it did not increase the total amount of assets of the corporation in the normal accounting sense, that's true.

QUESTION: It had just as many real assets afterwards as before, didn't it?

MR. HOROWITZ: That's correct.

But what the surrender -- all the surrender accomplished was to slightly -- was to make a slight shift in the percentage interest in the corporation, a very small shift. But no money that the shareholders had invested in the corporation was taken out by virtue of the surrender.

QUESTION: But it did give the Finks a smaller interest in the corporation than they had had before, didn't it?

MR. HOROWITZ: Slightly smaller. They continued to maintain complete control of the corporation, but they had — maybe I should get back to my example, because I think it might clear some things up.

QUESTION: Mr. Horowitz, had there been a prorata, across the board surrender, we would have no problem at all, I take it?

MR. HOROWITZ: That's clear. The Respondents concede that there is no loss in any kind of a pro rata surrender. And one reason that the case is much easier with a very shareholder is that a surrender that has the effect of taking one's percentage interest, say, from 99 down to 98.5 is the practical equivalent to a pro rat surrender.

And that's one reason that some of the courts have taken the view that the percentage interest — miniscule change in the percentage interest essentially means that it should be treated the same as a pro rata surrender.

But even apart from that, even to the extent that there is some change in the interest and that the shareholder in some sense gives something up by making a surrender, it is our position that what he gives up cannot be taken as an immediately deductible loss, but it must be capitalized.

about contribution to capital. There really isn't any contribution to capital here, is there? The corporation is in the same position it was before as such?

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, contribution to capital has been used as a shorthand term here. It's just one form of a capital expenditure. Mayberit's more correct

to talk about capital expenditure.

But what's happening here -- all that the Commissioner is saying is that the Respondents' basis in their shares, which reflects money that they invested in the corporation in real assets, that they contributed to the corporation, all the Commissioner is saying is that that money is still in the corporation.

He hasn't taken any of that money out. He hasn't lost any of that money. So there's no reason for him to be taking a loss. All ne has done is taken away some shares.

So that money which was contributed to capital and which represents the real assets should just be reallocated amongst the remaining shares in the corporation.

QUESTION: Well, Mr. Horowitz, the taxpayers wanted to take an ordinary loss deduction.

MR. HOROWITZ: That's correct.

QUESTION: And the Commissioner is taking the position that they're entitled to no deduction at all.

I wondered, since they have reduced their ownership by about four percent of the company, why aren't they entitled to at least a capital loss of that portion of the company that they've permanently lost, that is the four percent?

MR. HOROWITZ: well, the general rule is that a percentage decline in one's interest in a corporation does not give rise to an immediately deductible loss. For example, I was talking to Justice Powell before about this new investor who was possibly going to come in and take over some of the shares of the corporation.

If such a new investor had appeared and had bought those shares, he would have reduced the Finks' interest even below 50 percent. It would have been a much larger percentage reduction. But they would not have gotten any loss for that, that's clear.

The general rule under the --

QUESTION: I'm just curious why under these circumstances they might not be entitled to at least a capital --

QUESTION: Well, is there any sale or exchange?

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, it's not apparent that there's a sale or exchage, but there's really no loss. If the Court were to find that there were a loss, I suppose some commentators have argued that they would have to impute that there was a sale or exchange. I think that's an issue the Court doesn't have to reach now, whether any such loss would be capital or ordinary.

Our position is that there should not be any loss.

QUESTION: You say if it's a loss, it should be a capital loss? Don't you argue that?

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, I'm not sure we've taken a position on that. I think if the Court were to find there were a loss, the Commissioner would certainly be better off if it were a capital loss.

It would eliminate the possibilities for tax avoidance that we talk about at the end of our brief, where shareholders would be induced to make a surrender just before the stock became worthless in order to avoid ordinary loss treatment.

But I think we would have to decide whether in fact there was a real argument that it could be a capital loss.

I'm not sure I finished answering Justice

O'Connor's question --

QUESTION: But the question would be whether there's a taxable event?

MR. HOROWITZ: That's right. There's no event that happens now that gives rise to the realization of a loss.

Now, what you're talking about a far as the reduction in the percentage interest in the corporation,

Respondents have pointed out in their brief that that may have some collateral effects down the road. They will have a reduction in dividends, perhaps, down the road, have a reduction in their rights in liquidation.

These things are all taken into account when they happen, and the reallocation of basis reflects what the Respondents have given up. It just doesn't give them the right to take the loss right now.

QUESTION: So you agree that they're entitled to adjust their basis?

MR. HOROWITZ: That's right, they are entitled to adjust their basis. And down the road, that will come.

Now, if they were to liquidate the corporation the next day, they would have lost something in the amount of this small percentage that their reduction went down, and they would get credit for that loss at that time because of the adjustment of basis.

But it's silly to look at this case from the perspective of whether they would liquidate the corporation the next day. The fact is that they assert that the reason for this surrender is to improve the long-term prospects of the corporation; this is a long-term investment, and that's the way the Code would normally treat it.

at each of these one by one to see what the purpose of the contribution is? Is that the rule?

QUESTION: Well, are you inviting us to look

MR. HOROWITZ: No, no. Every case that comes up like this is going to have the asserted purpose of improving the financial fortunes of the corporation.

There's no conceivable purpose that could possibly give rise to a loss.

I mean, either they're trying to improve the corporation, in which case it's an investment, or otherwise it's just a gift, I suppose, to the shareholders. In this case everyone agrees that it's not a gift.

But if it were a gift, that wouldn't give rise to a loss either.

QUESTION: And what would the tax treatment have been if it had been a non-pro rata sale for a small amount of money to the corporation?

MR. HOROWITZ: A sale to this corporation?

QUESTION: Right.

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, a sale of the snares, in other words a transfer of shares in this corporation to the corporation in exchange for money, is what is called a redemption. And as we discuss in our brief, that would not give rise to a loss.

And in fact, even if they had sold it to a different corporation, if it was another corporation that was controlled by the shareholders, they also could not get a loss, because there's a special Section 267 of the Code that doesn't allow shareholders to take a loss on sales to corporations that they control.

So they're really trying to find a loophole here in a sea of principles that don't allow them a loss for this kind of a transaction.

QUESTION: What if they gave a piece of personal property to the corporation, a truck for example?

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, our position is that this case is no different from if they gave a piece of personal property to the corporation. If they gave a truck to the corporation, they would in some sense be giving something up, because they had a truck that they owned 100 percent and once they give it to the corporation they only own 72 percent of it, and in a sense they've given 28 percent of it to the other shareholders.

So they have given something up. But they don't get a loss for that. What they get is what is called contribution to capital treatment, capitalization treatment.

QUESTION: Don't they get a loss -- or suppose the truck had increased in value over what they bought it for and then they gave it to the corporation. Don't they get some tax --

MR. HOROWITZ: They don't, no. It's not a taxable event.

QUESTION: What if they sold it to the corporation at a "loss," sold it for half its cost or half its fair market value? You wouldn't have your redemption analogy then.

MR. HOROWITZ: I'm sorry? If the corporation sold?

dUESTION: No, no. Say the shareholder owns a truck and, instead of giving it to the corporation, he sells it to it for half its value. Would that not constitute a loss on the truck?

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, first of all, as I said before, under Section 267 he can't take a loss for a sale to a corporation he controls.

QUESTION: Of personal property?

MR. HOROWITZ: Anything.

QUESTION: I see.

MR. HOROWITZ: Assets. That's to curb the kind of abuses that can be -- and you have to be very careful when you have shareholders dealing with

If it were not to a corporation ne controls and Section 267 didn't come into play, I still don't think he gets a loss if he sells it to the corporation for below market value. I think some of it would be treated as a gift to the extent that there was a bargain element in there and some of it will be treated as a sale.

But we don't have a sale here.

QUESTION: Why don't you finish telling us your 100 share example. I was kind of interested in it and you never finished.

MR. HOROWITZ: All right.

QUESTION: I thought you were finished with it. It was a very simple example. I got the facts, but

MR. HOROWITZ: I didn't quite finish. In fact, I don't remember it any more, so I'm going to start at the beginning.

But if you start with a corporation that has

100 shares and one shareholder subscribes to 99 of

those, say for ten dollars apiece, he's invested \$990 in

the corporation and the other shareholder has invested

ten.

Now, suppose the majority shareholder surrendered more than half of his shares, surrendered 50 shares, in a surrender just like the one that we have in this case. Respondents would claim that he is entitled to a \$500 loss there, that he has really lost something.

But if you look at what's happened, he has lost very little. He has gone from a 99 percent shareholder, holding 99 of the 100 shares, to a shareholder who holds 49 of 50 shares left in the corporation. He's gone to being a 98 percent shareholder.

And the corporation's still got the \$1,000 in it that was originally invested. That hasn't gone anywhere. That hasn't been lost. And if the corporation were to liquidate the next day, he would still take 980 of those dollars out.

QUESTION: Yes, but the difference, I suppose, is that in the interval between the time they formed the

So you're really merging, it seems to me, two points in time, as though it happened simultaneously, because this stock is not really worth what he paid for it.

MR. HOROWITZ: No, this stock -- the testimony is this stock had depreciated.

But as far as -- the point that I'm trying to make is that you have to -- when you're talking about what he gives to the corporation, you have to keep in mind that so long as he's the controlling shareholder, most of what he has given to the corporation is really just taking from one pocket and putting it in another pocket.

and the only part that's even arguably given up or lost is this small diminution in percentage interest that he gives up. Now, so I think the Sixth Circuit's decision that he's entitled to the entire amount of his basis that he contributes is completely indefensible.

I think the only thing that can be argued

QUESTION: Well, isn't it true that over a period of years he suffered a very substantial economic loss, in the sense that what he now has is worth a great deal less than what he bought originally? He's parting with part of what remains to him and trying to in effect treat for tax purposes —

MR. HOROWITZ: That's what's usually called a paper loss. You have to have some event that enables you to realize that loss, which is he could have sold these shares to someone else and then, if they had depreciated, he could take the loss.

And he'll still have that loss available to him after the readjstment of basis, and in fact he'll get a greater loss. The effect of the surrender is not loss.

QUESTION: So the real issue here is when may he take the loss?

MR. HOROWITZ: That's right.

QUESTION: Not wnether he'll ever take it.

MR. HOROWITZ: Respondents at one point in their brief suggest, quoting an opinion by Judge Hand, that this is a now or never issue: Can they ever take the loss if they're giving up a percentage interest, now or never?

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And that's not right. It's really a now or later issue. And all the principles in the Code --

QUESTION: If the corporation does well and recovers and the value of the stock goes up, there may never be a loss.

MR. HOROWITZ: No, there may never be a loss, although he'll still get credit for what he surrendered, because he'll have less gain later on, because of the basis adjustment.

Now, I think all the general principles that underlie the Code suggest that this should be treated as a contribution to capital. It's really no different from a contribution of any other form of property, and Respondents have conceded that if he had donated a truck or cash or anything else that that would be --

QUESTION: But it's different in this sense, that it doesn't change the balance sheet. There's no increase in the net worth of the company, whereas in all these other examples there is.

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, that --

QUESTION: Maybe that doesn't make any difference.

MR. HOROWITZ: It's hard to see why that should make a difference. I mean, that's a real semantic point in calling it --

QUESTION: Except that they say here you've got to capitalize this. How do you capitalize this?

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, all you're capitalizing is what he had already put into the corporation. After all, we're not suggesting that his basis be increased by some new contribution. All we're saying is that the \$1,000 or whatever that had originally been injected into the corporation and that everyone agrees ought to be capitalized should remain.

QUESTION: Yes, but what do you -- I thought there was some discussion of capitalizing this transaction. But there is no change in the capital structure at all, as I see it.

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, maybe it's more accurate to say that we don't want to allow Respondents to avoid capitalization of the investment that they made earlier. What they're seeking to do is to take out some of this money that should have been capitalized and to take an immediate loss for it now, even though they invested it in the corporation and it's still in the corporation.

And they haven't lost their investment.

Normally, if you sell a share to some outside purchaser, the money that you invested in that share is then lost in the sale, and it's appropriate to realize the gain or

loss at the time of that transaction.

But here they really haven't done anything.

All they've done is taken some shares out. Suppose they turned around and bought these shares back the next day. What would really — say for the same price, for the price that's reflected in the basis that they're trying to take a loss for.

Now they have exactly the same interest in the corporation that they had before. The only change would be that they have really made an additional contribution at that point in the amount that they paid for the new shares.

well, under our analysis that's exactly how it would be reflected. They would still have all their entire original investment, plus this new contribution, distributed amongst all their shares.

QUESTION: Yes, but instead of giving some relatively valueless stock, they would have given some cash, which is a rather different economic transaction.

what does -- does the record tell us what the market value is for this stock?

MR. HOROWITZ: Mr. Fink testified that he thought the market value was about five cents a share.

QUESTION: And what was the price per share in their basis? I know the total was \$190,000.

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, yes. It seems like they surrendered the highest basis shares that they had, so I think they paid 25 cents a share for them.

dollar. What you're saying, the comparable transaction would have been putting in five times as much money as they put in here, though.

MR. HOROWITZ: No.

QUESTION: They would have put in real dollars, and here they're putting in stocks.

MR. HOROWITZ: It doesn't matter how much they put. I'm willing for them to put in less if you like. But the point is, under their — if they turned around and bought the shares back the next day, under their analysis they would have gotten a loss somewhere, even though they haven't lost anything.

And what they would still have as basis reflected in the shares would be less than what their investment is in the corporation. And you're not supposed to be able to do that. If you make an investment, it's supposed to be capitalized and stay capitalized.

And what they're doing here, it's a way of electively taking out money that they had invested in the corporation and that is still there and should

remain subject to capital treatment.

event that the shares had appreciated in value, the company had done well, and in the unlikely event that they made a contribution of some of those shares, you wouldn't try to hit them with a gain either, would you?

MR. HOROWITZ: No, that's right. No, our position is just that there's no realization event here.

And I should point out that this is not only directed by common sense, but it's also reflected in the treatment of other similar transactions in the Code. There are two other sections of the Code, Section 83 and Section 302, in which Congress, to deal with the particular problem, has separated transactions into two component parts.

maybe I'll just choose one of these and focus on redemptions. A redemption is an exchange by a shareholder of his shares in the corporation in exchange for cash. Congress determined that in some situations that should not be given sale or exchange treatment, where the shareholder remains in control of the corporation, and instead it's divided into two parts.

It's treated as a surrender by the shareholder of his shares to the corporation and then a distribution

of a dividend by the corporation. Now, the regulations provide — and Respondents do not dispute — that the way that this surrender is accounted for is by adjusting the shareholder's basis in his remaining shares in the amount of his basis in the surrendered shares, exactly the treatment that we argue for here.

And it's exactly the same thing under Section 83, which is a sale of stock from a shareholder to an employee as part of his compensation. Again, the Code breaks that into two parts. It treats it as a surrender by the shareholder of his share to the corporation and then the payment of the stock by the corporation to the employee, for which the corporation is entitled to a deduction.

And again, the regulations provide -- and Respondents agree -- that the appropriate treatment is for the surrender to be reflected in an adjustment of basis in the corporation.

I actually should note that our brief is inaccurate in describing Section 83. We talk about that the bargain element of the sale should be allocated to the basis, and it should be allocated to the basis in his remaining shares, and it's really the basis in the surrendered shares which should be allocated.

I think I'd like to save the rest of my time

for rebuttal.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr. Horowitz.

we'll hear now from you, Mr. Zinn.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF

MATTHEW J. ZINN, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

MR. ZINN: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court:

In order for the Respondents to prevail in this case, we must establish two points: first, that their surrender of shares resulted in a loss within the meaning of Sections 165 and 1001 of the Internal Revenue Code; and second, that they didn't constitute non-deductible capital expenditures under Section 263.

On the first issue, it's important to recognize at the outset that the term "loss" is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code, so ordinary usage applies. And under ordinary usage, it is simply a diminution in amount or value.

So if a shareholder buys stock and it goes down in value, that shareholder has a loss. But he's not automatically able to deduct the loss unless he realizes it, unless some event occurs that fixes the loss.

So we disagree with Mr. Horowitz when he says that there was no realization event in this case. There very clearly was a realization event when Mr. and Mrs. Fink surrendered their shares.

Those surrenders were substantial, 116,000 of Mr. Fink's 802,000 shares and 80,000 of Mrs. Fink's 311,000 shares. We think it's perfectly clear that they lost something when they surrendered these shares. They lost a four percent interest in their stock ownership.

If they had sold shares to a third party and had a four percent reduction in interest, there would be no question that they had sustained a loss. We think it's equally clear that they have sustained a loss in this case.

Mr. Horowitz has said a good deal in the course of his argument about the amount of the loss.

But I would point out to the Court that the Commissioner never raised the issue of the amount of the loss in this case.

The sole question presented in his petition

for certiorari, and it's repeated in his brief on the merits, is whether there's a loss, not the amount. If he wants to raise that issue in another case, he's free to do so, but it would seem that he can't raise it here.

Mr. Horowitz also didn't fully respond, I think, to the question of the nature of the loss in this case. Again, that's not an issue here. If this Court finds that there is a loss, the way we think it should, the loss necessarily is an ordinary loss.

On page 21 of the Government's brief in this case, it is stated: "This case does not involve a sale or exchange." If it doesn't involve a sale or exchange, the only kind of loss it can be is an ordinary loss, because Section 1211 and Section 1222 require a sale or exchange in order for a loss to be a capital loss.

That's not an issue before the Court.

QUESTION: You say that there must be a sale or exchange for it to be a capital loss?

MR. ZINN: That's right.

QUESTION: But there need not be a sale or exchange for it to be an ordinary loss?

MR. ZINN: Exactly. And in this case, the Government has conceded, as I just read from page 21 of their brief, that there was no sale or exchange. And

question: Well, Mr. Zinn, it would seem, frankly, that if any taxable event is recognized at all, that at best it ought to be treated as some kind of a proportionate capital loss. And I just don't understand how the taxpayer can legitimately expect to get to deduct the full 400,000 as an ordinary loss.

MR. ZINN: I think, Justice O'Connor, that's precisely what the statute requires in these circumstances. The Government is here arguing the loss rules when it perhaps ought to be arguing the question of capital versus ordinary and the amount across the street in the Congress.

There is just no question under the provisions of the Code that you cannot have a capital loss without a sale or exchange, and the Government concedes that there's no sale or exchange.

QUESTION: Well, I guess some courts might have thought that it should be deemed a sale or exchange, if anything.

MR. ZINN: No court has ever deemed it to be in a situation like this one, Justice O'Connor, where the surrender is made directly by the shareholder to the corporation. That would be a giant leap and one that we

don't think this Court should take.

The Government has litigated this case,

Justice O'Connor, on an all or nothing basis. They

argue that you shouldn't allow a loss because the loss
is sizable, you shouldn't allow a loss because the loss
is ordinary, you shouldn't allow a loss because it's

difficult to calculate.

We don't think that the conclusion that there's no loss follows from any of those premises. So we think that this --

QUESTION: Now, if it had been surrendered in exchange for a payment of some very small sum, clearly there would be no recognized loss.

MR. ZINN: We would then agree with Mr.

Horowitz that, under Section 302, the taxpayers would

not be entitled to any loss. But that's not this case.

And as we pointed out --

QUESTION: Well, it is kind of odd, though, to think that there would be different results, isn't it?

MR. ZINN: As we pointed out in our brief, all sorts of provisions of the Internal Revenue Code go off on the most modest sums. And in most of those cases where there are cliffs and traps, it's taxpayers who go over them or into them.

In this particular case, it works the other

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And the Government told the Court in that case: This is the way the Code is written, and this is the way you have to decide it, and you ought to let the chips fall where they map. And we think that taxpayers are entitled to the same result when the chips fall on the other side of the line.

Now, we disagree also with Mr. Horowitz's point that this case is the same as Justice Scalia's used truck case. In the used truck case, the corporation has more assets and a greater net worth after the truck is contributed to the corporation than it had before.

In this case, as Justice Stevens pointed out, the assets of the corporation are exactly the same before and after. Now, in the truck case it seems to me that it would be a perfectly rational system for Congress or some legislative body to say you would allow the loss even in the truck case, because the taxpayer, to rephrase it, has surrendered the truck and he has a lesser interest in it than he had before.

But that's not what Congress did. In Section 263 of the Code, Congress said when you have a contribution to capital we're not going to allow you to take the loss right away. If you make a new investment in the corporation, we're going to make you wait and see how that investment turns out.

In this particular case, there is no new investment in the corporation. The investment is the same before as it was after.

QUESTION: Well, the Government says this is a contribution to capital. Why do you say it isn't?

MR. ZINN: Because the capital is the same.

before and after, Mr. Chief Justice. The capital of the corporation is its net worth.

QUESTION: Is there a definition in the Code somewhere of contribution to capital?

MR. ZINN: Well, the word "contribution to capital" has an accepted meaning, I think, in an accounting sense, in a legal sense. There is no precise definition in the Code, but I think it's universally accepted that a corporation's capital is its net worth.

And we're not adopting any formalistic statement, such as is suggested in the Government's brief, that we're confining ourselves to the stated capital or the par value of the stock. The

And in the truck case, it's going to have more after the truck. And in the stock surrender case, it's going to have exactly the same amount.

So we think that we're relying on exactly what it is that's real. If this -- if the surrender of stock is a contribution to capital, then it seems to us that the words have lost any meaning whatsoever.

This goes to the very essence of what a corporation's capital is. What's really involved --

QUESTION: Mr. Zinn, granting that, could you still lose the case?

MR. ZINN: Well, the Government I think is shifting ground now. I think they recognize that it's not a contribution to capital, and Mr. Horowitz said, well, maybe it's some other kind of non-deductible capital expenditure.

But we don't think it is. The real guts of this case, Justice Blackmun, is that in the truck case a shareholder is making an additional commitment to his investment in the corporation, and that's a capital expenditure or a contribution to capital. In this case, when the shareholder surrenders his stock he is shrinking his investment in the corporation. He is

reducing it.

This is an anti-expenditure. This is not a capital expenditure.

QUESTION: Well, he is not reducing it by very much if he still has the majority interest in the corporation.

MR. ZINN: Exactly so, Justice Scalia.

QUESTION: But you say that goes to the

amount.

MR. ZINN: This case involves principle, not price. The Government never raised that issue in the lower courts, let alone in this Court.

QUESTION: Well, I understand, but I'd be inclined to be pushed in one direction if I thought that the deduction was going to be the whole value of the stock and in quite another one if I thought the deduction was only going to be the two percent reduction in the shareholder's interest in the corporation.

MR. ZINN: I could understand that, Justice Scalia.

QUESTION: So why don't we talk a little bit about what that amount ought to be, then, if you can understand that.

MR. ZINN: I don't think that the Code admits of that interpretation. The Code requires quite clearly

that the starting point for determining a loss is the adjusted basis of the shares, and it doesn't go by proportionate interest.

And in this particular case, the Sixth Circuit reduced that loss by the increase in value of the retained shares. Now, that ameliorates the problem.

QUESTION: That doesn't go together with the argument you were just making, that here there has been a real loss. You say first here there has been a real loss, but then you say but the Code doesn't really matter whether there's been a real loss.

MR. ZINN: I say here there's a real loss and the Code says this is the way you value it, and the two do not work together as well as they might. But we don't think that it's open to this Court to make up new rules on how you determine loss.

QUESTION: But the loss you're identifying is not the loss that you're valuing. You're identifying one loss and evaluating another one.

MR. ZINN: I would say it's part of the same

QUESTION: If they don't fit together, that may be a reflection on your earlier, the strength of your earlier sollogism.

MR. ZINN: I don't think so. I think that on

the first point it's very clear that there's a loss.

And the Code has one set of rules for determining whether there's a loss.

In this particular circumstance, it has another set of rules for determining the amount of the loss, which are different. And that's simply the way it works.

QUESTION: Your assertion that there is a loss is that the value of his remaining shares has gone down, is that it?

MR. ZINN: Well, the value of his percentage interest has gone down.

QUESTION: Well, what does that mean?

MR. ZINN: That means he has less rights to dividends.

QUESTION: The value of what he would get out of the corporation is now less.

MR. ZINN: Well, except that we're measuring the loss by reference to the adjusted basis. I admit that there's a discontinuity, Justice White, between the question of whether there's a loss --

QUESTIGN: How do you know there's a loss right now?

MR. ZINN: Well, they have a reduction in their interest in the corporation. They've surrendered

those shares and they haven't gotten any consideration for it.

QUESTION: Well, but it may be that this event will -- maybe they'll have a profit.

MR. ZINN: That's true.

QUESTION: And then they never will have a loss.

MR. ZINN: That's true. But they have reduced their interest in the corporation, and it seems to us that fixes a loss.

QUESTION: I know it seems to you, but I don't know. What would you do then if you had this loss and then the corporation recovers and --

MR. ZINN: There'll be a larger gain when it recovers. But the time for fixing this loss is the time of the disposition of this stock.

QUESTION: Well, why do you think the Code requires recognizing this event as a realizing loss?

MR. ZINN: Because the Code refers to a sale or other disposition, and we think this fits within the concept of other disposition. And the Code says that's a realization event.

QUESTION: May I go back to Justice Blackmun's procedure, which I'm not sure you squarely answered. He asked you, even if we assume that you've convinced us

And the one thing that makes this case superficially at least different from a lot of other loss cases is this is sort of a self-inflicted wound. The owner of the property decided voluntarily to enter into this transaction and incur the economic detriment.

MR. ZINN: Well, I would say that whenever a taxpayer has depreciated property and he disposes of it it's a self-inflicted wound.

QUESTION: But normally he sells it. Normally in those cases it's sold. Are there any other cases in which a taxpayer disposes for no consideration, voluntarily disposes of property for no consideration, and thereby suffers a loss?

MR. ZINN: Abandonment. A taxpayer may abandon property in a particular case and he then gets a loss.

QUESTION: I see. But doesn't he have to then establish that it's of no value?

MR. ZINN: No. I think he can just walk away from it as long as he does the right things. We cited an abandonment case in our brief as another example of this.

QUESTION: Well, what if he burnt a few of his shares?

MR. ZINN: Burns the pieces of paper?

QUESTION: Yes, burned them up. He says: I

don't want them any more. That's just an abandonment?

MR. ZINN: I don't think that would be an

MR. ZINN: I don't think that would be an abandonment, Justice.

MR. ZINN: Well, in this particular — with regard to shares, the only way you can abandon them is by surrendering them. I don't think you can abandon them by burning them. I don't think they're bearer documents.

QUESTION: And an abandonment is not a loss?

MR. ZINN: An abandonment of some other kind

of property, where you can abandon it, would be a loss.

But in this particular case, I don't think burning the

shares would be a loss.

One other point that I would like to take up

QUESTION: Just, if we could go one step further. This really wouldn't be an abandonment, because he is retaining an interest in his other shares, and he's doing it because he looks to --

MR. ZINN: But he's abandoning these shares.

-- if he gave them to a third party or a church or something, that might be, of course, an event. But this, somehow the concept of an abandonment -- is that your closest analogy?

MR. ZINN: It is, it is my closest.

I'd like to --

QUESTION: But again, he's abandoning two percent or whatever.

MR. ZINN: Right, he's abandoning two percent.

QUESTION: But you want the loss for the whole value of the stock.

MR. ZINN: That's precisely what we want and that's precisely what we think the Code requires.

QUESTION: Mr. Zinn, I have a complete lapse of memory. You've referred to sale or other distribution several times. Where exactly in the Code is that language?

MR. ZINN: Section 1001(a) of the Code,
Justice Blackmun.

QUESTION: In what?

MR. ZINN: 1001(a) of the Code.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. ZINN: One other point that Mr. Horowitz made that I wanted to get into was what the state of the law has been in the Tax Court over the course of the past 60 years. For 50 years, as we discussed in our brief, the rule was clear that stock surrenders of this sort give rise to ordinary losses.

And during that entire period, despite the considerations that have been raised about the character of the loss and the amount of the loss, never once, so far as we are aware, did Congress ever think that this was a loophole, as Mr. Horowitz put it, that needed to be taken care of.

Indeed, and never once did the Treasury ever suggest that. Indeed, the Treasury acquiesced in this precise rule for 35 years, and Congress and Treasury never ever looked at it.

The Government has made no mention of the 50 year precedence in its reply brief. And I would point out, in response to the question of where the Tax Court was, Justice Blackmun, that you put, this went to Tax Court conference seven or eight times before this case. And in each of those occasions, the Tax Court held that there was a loss.

And the Tax Court has now abandoned its

position after so holding in a conference seven or eight times. We think that's highly irregular and that, given that history, again, the best place to get this fixed is not here, but in the Congress.

We also think that there's a significant omission from the Government's petition for certiorari in this case. The Government asserts that this is a recurring and important issue, but there is absent from the Government's petition any statement of how many cases like this are pending before the district directors of internal revenue, how many cases are pending —

QUESTION: Did you raise that in your response?

MR. ZINN: In the brief in opposition?

QUESTION: Brief in opposition.

MR. ZINN: The point was made, yes.

Any --

QUESTION: well, what's the reason for raising it now?

MR. ZINN: Well, I raise it now because we don't believe that the tax avoidance that the Government has held up here, Mr. Chief Justice, and in the lower courts is all that clear.

I don't think the Government's taking into

account human nature in looking at these cases. It's true that people that are involved in close corporations are interested in tax deductions, but they're also not anxious to give away their shares by surrender or any other means when the corporation is in dire financial straits.

what they want to do is to turn the corporation around, and that was the purpose of the surrender in this case and the Tax Court squarely so found. And this is a built-in check against the kind of rampant tax avoidance that Mr. Horowitz has suggested.

QUESTION: Well, what did these people really have to lose in a business sense by reducing their control from 72 percent to 68 percent?

MR. ZINN: Well, if their plan had worked they would have wound up with 33 percent of the stock. And regrettably, it cidn't work. They were unable to attract outside capital.

But the only way you're going to attract outside capital is to offer the possibility of a change of control.

QUESTION: Yes, but here that had not gone this far. What the loss we're talking about here, it went from 72 percent to 68 percent.

MR. ZINN: That's correct.

QUESTION: What did they lose by that in a practical sense?

MR. ZINN: They lost four percent? I mean, that's what they lost.

QUESTION: But is this the sort of thing that they're not going to want to do because it means giving up so much?

MR. ZINN: I think it does. I think that the record, historical record in this area, undercuts the Government's argument of rampant tax avoidance. I think it doesn't take account of human nature.

I would also point out that the Tax Court specifically found as a fact in this case that tax avoidance was not the primary purpose, that there was a valid business purpose.

QUESTION: You don't urge that -- I think it's the same question as I asked earlier. That wouldn't matter to you? I mean, you don't urge that each one of these cases has to be examined one by one to see whether the purpose was the same purpose there it was here, to get the corporation back going?

MR. ZINN: I think the question of tax avoidance would always be present, Justice Scalia, even if this Court were to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

QUESTION: I don't understand what you mean by tax avoidance. You say you're entitled to it.

MR. ZINN: If tax avoidance was a primary purpose --

QUESTION: Suppose you abandon other kinds of property, you walk away from it, and you say, I'm walking away from it because, you know, I'll get the tax break. Can you not take it?

MR. ZINN: If tax avoidance is the primary purpose of the abandonment or the surrender, then I don't think that you would be allowed the loss even if this Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, because the common law tax doctrines always would apply.

And that was pointed out. We rely heavily on Judge Parker's dissenting opinion in the Frantz case. She pointed out that that doctrine would be available, as would the step transaction doctrine.

Mr. Horowitz gave an example of a surrender followed by putting the money — putting the shares back in. Now, that would be considered a step transaction and would be disallowed, even if this Court were to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The principal vice here, as Justice O'Connor pointed out, is a conversion of capital loss into

ordinary loss. And if ever there was a case that didn't involve conversion, it's this case, because in this case the surrenders were made in December 1976 and January 1977, and this corporation kept going until 1980.

This is not a case where the shareholders surrendered stock and turned around and then liquidated the corporation. And that is a conversion case that I think that the Government could get at regardless of the disposition of this case.

If there are no other Respondents, Mr. Chief Justice, I have nothing further.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr. Zinn.

Mr. Horowitz, you have six minutes remaining.

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF

ALAN I. HOROWITZ, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. HOROWITZ: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

I have several points I would like to make.

One is, Respondents continually assert that
the loss here is their percentage decline in their
interest in the corporation and, as I think we pointed
out in our reply brief, in no other situation does a
percentage decline in one's interest in the corporation
give rise to a loss.

QUESTION: Mr. Horowitz, can I ask you to comment on the argument that he makes that for 35 years apparently the Treasury Department was satisfied with this rule and didn't challenge it, and there were eight or nine times when the Tax Court went to conference and agreed on it.

And is it correct as a matter of fact that the law appeared to be settled for a long period of time and only recently the Government decided to re-examine the issue?

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, I think that's somewhat exaggerated, although it is true that we did acquiesce in this case in 1941 and the Commissioner never got around to removing his acquiescence until the mid-seventies.

But in fact this issue has been continually litigated during those years. There is the Downer case in the mid-sixties, which is during this period when supposedly the Government was acquiescing in this, where we were litigating the exact issue.

QUESTION: In the sixties. Now, there's one.

MR. HOROWITZ: I don't think there are many reported cases between the early forties and the sixtles.

QUESTION: And there was no Congressional action and no change in Treasury regulations that precipitated this?

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, one thing that certainly precipitated the most recent set of events was the enactment of Section 83, where Congress specifically dealt with the situation of sales of stock, bargain sales of stock from a shareholder to an employee. And the regulations thereunder stated that under normal tax principles — and also there was some legislative history — that this surrender should be treated as a contribution to capital on the shareholder's part.

And that was also litigated in the Tilford case, and the Sixth Circuit in fact upheld the Commissioner's view there.

So -- and Respondents have agreed that that treatment there is right. So they agree that a stock surrender, at least from the employee compensation

context, can be treated as what we call a contribution to capital or, if you prefer it, to just call it an adjustment of basis.

And they really don't explain why the treatment should be any different in this context.

QUESTION: Well, except they say this was the law for about 30 or 40 years, and generally speaking citizens can rely on settled law without having to worry about the Government changing its meaning.

MR. HOROWITZ: well, I don't understand them to be making a reliance argument here. I mean, certainly --

QUESTION: Not particularly, but there is a certain — there certainly is an interest in letting the law be understood by people who engage in these complicated transactions.

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, I understand.

QUESTION: But you don't think that's of any
-- the Section 83 that you referred to was enacted
when? When was that? Section 83 was when?

MR. HOROWITZ: That was enacted in *68, I think, or *69.

Now, there were some developments in this

Court that made it clear that this should be treated as

a contribution to capital after these early Tax Court

decisions.

QUESTION: Let me just ask you, are you still maintaining it's a contribution to capital, or are you now maintaining the position you take in your reply brief, which it doesn't really matter whether it's a contribution to capital?

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, I guess we maintain both. I mean, I don't think it really matters, but I think the proper treatment of it is as a contribution to capital.

That's just a shorthand term that is used to reflect this kind of expenditure by, for no consideration in return, an expenditure by a shareholder in order to advance the purposes of the corporation and to enhance the value of his remaining shares. That's the purpose of the surrender, that's the purpose of all these capital contributions.

QUESTION: But certainly from the viewpoint of the corporation not a dime has been added to it.

MR. HOROWITZ: And not a dime has been taken out of it, Justice Blackmun, also.

We're not trying to add anything to his total basis in the corporation as a result of the surrender. He has made a certain investment in the corporation that up until now had always been reflected in the basis of

his shares. Now what he has done is just taken some shares out of the calculation.

And our position is that his investment in the corporation remains there and it should just be reallocated to the remaining shares.

QUESTION: I understand all that, but I think this constant reference to contribution to capital is a little fuzzy, really.

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, it's just an accounting semantic point. I mean, I'm willing to call it adjustment to basis if you like. It just seems to me that the effect of what he has done is essentially the same as what happens with any other capital contribution.

And I'd also like to talk briefly about this statutory point about other disposition of property. It really proves too much to read the words that way, because under Respondents' theory any contribution to capital, if you will, Justice Scalia's example of a truck, would also have to be treated as a loss.

I mean, that truck is disposed of when it's given to the corporation in the same sense that these shares that are surrendered.

QUESTION: Well, maybe it would have to be if everything was perfectly logical in the Tax Code. But

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, if you read the darn thing, Justice Stevens, Section 165 requires that there be an actual loss, and our view is, for many of the reasons I've discussed, that there is no loss here. And Section 263 in any event overrides all of these sections. It says if there is a capital expenditure it must be capitalized.

And there was a capital expenditure -- if
you're not satisfied that the surrender itself looked at
it microscopically should be treated as a capital
expenditure, there's no question that the amounts
involved, the amounts that are being allocated to the
basis, were capital expenditures when they were made.

And there's nothing that has happened in the interim that should entitle Respondents to take a loss. They just have not lost that investment at all. It's still their corporation and the money is still in there.

QUESTION: Well, except the stock's gone down substantially in value and they decided to get rid of

some of it.

MR. HOROWITZ: Well, they have to sell it.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr.

Horowitz.

The case is submitted.

(Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the above-entitled case was submitted.)

CERTIFICATION

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#86-511 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner V.

Peter R. Fink, ET UX

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BY Paul A. Richardon

SUPREME COURT, U.S. MARSHALL'S OFFICE

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