OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DKT/CASE NO. 6-509 & 86-564

TITLE OTIS R. BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Appellant V. BEATY MAE GILLIARD, ET AL.; and DAVID T. FLAHERTY, SECRETARY, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, ET AL.; Appellants V. BEATY MAE GILLIARD, ET AL. PLACE Washington, D. C.

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- DATE April 22, 1987
- PAGES 1 thru 56



(202) 628-9300

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1 -x 2 OTIS R. BOWEN, SECRETARY OF : 3 4 HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, : Appellant : 5 : No. 86-509 6 ٧. BEATY MAE GILLIARD, ET AL. : 7 and : 8 DAVID T. FLAHERTY, SECRETARY, 9 : NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF 10 : 11 HUMAN RESOURCES, ET AL., : Appellants 12 : ٧. : No. 86-564 13 BEATY MAE GILLIARD, ET AL. : 14 -x 15 Washington, D.C. 16 Wednesday, April 22, 1987 17 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 18 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 19 at 11:14 o'clock a.m. 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

1	APPEARANCES
2	ALBERT G. LAUBER, JR., ESQ., Deputy Solicitor
3	General, Department of Justice, Washington,
4	D.C.; on behalf of the appellant in No-86-509.
5	MS. CATHERINE C. McLAMB, ESQ., Assistant Attorney
6	General of North Carolina, Raleigh, North
7	Carolina; on behalf of the appellants in
8	No. 86-564.
9	MS. JANE R. WETTACH, ESQ., Raleigh, North Carolina;
10	on behalf of the appellees.
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1	CONIENIS	
2	QRAL_ARGUMENI_DE PA	AGE
3	ALBERT G. LAUBER, JR., ESQ.,	
4	on behalf of the Appellant in No-86-509	3
5	MS. CATHERINE C. McLAMB, ESQ.,	
6	on behalf of the Appellants in No. 86-564	23
7	MS. JANE R. WETTACH, ESQ.,	
8	on behalf of the Appellees	31
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We will hear
3	arguments next in two consolidated cases, No. 86-509,
4	Bowen against Billiard, and No. 86-564, Flaherty against
5	Gilliard.
6	Mr. Flauber, you may proceed whenever you're
7	ready.
8	ORAL ARGUMENT OF ALBERT G. LAUBER, JR., ESQ.,
9	ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT IN NO. 86-509
10	MR. LAUBER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
11	please the Court:
12	The question here involves the validity of an
13	amendment to the AFDC program that Congress enacted in
14	1984, a provision I shall refer to as the standard
15	filing unit provision.
16	This amendment was one of many budget cutting
17	steps that Congress took in that year, and it was
18	designed to close what Congress viewed as a loophole in
19	the AFDC scheme.
20	Under prior law, a family applying for AFDC
21	could try to maximize its AFDC grant by excluding from
22	the filing unit certain family members, typically
23	children who had other sources of income, such as Social
24	Security benefits, child support, or accountable
25	earnings from employment.
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This enabled the family to get the maximum AFDC grant for the members in the unit, plus keep all of the other income of the members who were left out of the unit.

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In 1984 Congress decided to eliminate this benefit maximizing option by enacting the provision challenged here. It requires that when a family applies for AFDC, all members of the family who live together must be included in the filing unit, and that the income of all those family members must be added up to figure out how needy the family is for public assistance.

Congress based this amendment on the belief that family members who live near the poverty level and who live together tend to share their income and expenses; and that therefore the most rellable index of the family's need for public assistance was the total income of the family members.

Thus, rather than simply cutting AFDC to families across the board, Congress sought to target the benefit cuts in 1984 to those families that were, because of the members separate income, less needy.

Now, appellees, of course, have no constitutional right to a permanently fixed level of AFDC benefits, and they therefore recognize that they could not bring a constitutional challenge to a decision

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1 by Congress simply to cut benefit levels without more. 2 What they argue, therefore, is that Congress 3 did not really cut AFDC benefits here, but rather took 4 property away from the children who are required to be 5 newly included in the filing unit. 6 Appellees focus on child support income, and 7 especially on the assignment provision enacted in 1975 which requires a mother who applies for AFDC to assign 8 9 to the state any right to support that she or her child 10 may have. 11 This provision was designed to improve 12 collection of delinquent child support by transferring the burden of collection from the abandoned mother to 13 the state with its greater enforcement resources. 14 Now, the assignment provision by itself works 15 no hardship on the family, because for every dollar of 16 17 support assigned to the state, one dollar of AFDC comes 18 back to the family. 19 Moreover, a family that assigns child support 20 also receives an extra \$50 a month from the state by virtue of the child support disregard provision. 21 22 QUESTION: Well, it comes back to the family -- you say it works no hardship; it works no hardship on 23 24 the family.

MR. LAUBER: That's right.

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QUESTION: But one of the contentions here is 1 that it does work a hardship on the child for whom the 2 support is destined. 3 MR. LAUBER: That's right. That's appellee's 4 theory, that the effect of the assignment provision is 5 to take the property of the child --6 7 QUESTION: And give it to the family. MR. LAUBER: -- and transmute that into AFDC 8 and give it to the whole family. 9 QUESTION: That's right. Now why is that 10 wrong? 11 MR. LAUBER: Why is their theory wrong? Well, 12 we think their theory, their taking theory, is wrong for 13 14 several reasons. First of all, the premise of their theory --15 QUESTION: (Inaudible) taking. Let's not get 16 into the refinement of takings. 17 Is it -- is the substance of what happens 18 wrong? Under -- can -- can a mother who receives AFDC 19 in theory distribute it among her children anyway she 20 wants? 21 Could she continue to give -- let's say she 22 gets -- she has \$250 support payment for Joey. Could 23 she get \$300 from AFDC and decide, I'm going to spend 24 \$200 of this on Joey? 25

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1 MR. LAUBER: She could. She is required to spend the money in the best interests of all her 2 3 children, and she could decide that --4 QUESTION: She's required to spend it in the 5 best interest of all her children? 6 MR. LAUBER: I think the AFDC program also 7 imposes obligations on mothers with respect to how they 8 spend it. QUESTION: But she's not giving \$200 to Joey 9 10 because she thinks that's in the best interest of all 11 her children. It assuredly isn't. She wished she could 12 spread that among all the children. But she figures 13 this \$200 is Joey's. 14 MR. LAUBER: It could be Joey, she thinks, is more needy than other children. 15 16 QUESTION: No, that's not the reason. In 17 fact, given her druthers, she'd distribute it evenly 18 among all of them, as I think any mother would. 19 But she figures she is getting this \$200 from 20 her ex-husband for Joey, and that's been converted into 21 an AFDC payment; she is going to continue to spend \$200 22 on Joey, even though in her view that's not in the best interest of all the children. 23 would that violate the AFDC rules? 24 25 MR. LAUBER: I don't think it would. It would 8

depend on what the other children needed. I mean, the 1 way the mother spends the AFDC money --2 QUESTION: It would depend on what the other 3 children needed. So if the other children needed more, 4 and she continued to give \$200 to Joey, that would 5 violate AFDC? 6 MR. LAUBER: With all probability, the money, 7 the \$200, would be going to pay things that are common 8 expenses, like rent, utilities, gas and light. 9 QUESTION: I know, but just take my 10 hypothetical. That's not the case. She gives the 200 11 bucks to Joev. 12 MR. LAUBER: I can't say that would absolutely 13 violate the AFDC law. I don't think it's clear. It 14 depends ---15 QUESTION: It could? 16 MR. LAUBER: -- on the family situation. 17 QUESTION: It isn't clear that she can do that 18 without violating the AFDC law? 19 MR. LAUBER: It is clear that some use of that 20 money could violate the AFDC reasons governing the 21 duties of the custodial parent. 22 And I don't think you can say without knowing 23 all the facts of the case. 24 QUESTION: Mr. Lauber, tell us again, now if a 25 9 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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child support payment has been ordered for one of the children in the family and not the others, in the amount of let's say \$200 a month, not all of the \$200 a month that must be assigned to the state would come back to the family, would it?

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MR. LAUBER: No, all of it would come back to the family, plus \$50 extra.

QUESTION: Oh, that wasn't my understanding at all. I thought the \$50 came out of the child support payment, and was only paid if the child support payment were made.

MR. LAUBER: The \$200 comes to the family in a different form. It doesn't come qua child support; it comes qua AFDC benefits.

But they get the same \$200 from a different source, as it were. Plus, if the state actually collects the child support, they get \$50 more.

So the bottom line is, they have \$250, although it comes from a different place, rather than \$200 if they just got the child support.

21 QUESTION: I thought the \$50 was never given 22 back to the family unless the parent ordered to pay the 23 support in fact paid the support?

MR. LAUBER: That's correct. But of course, if the parent doesn't pay, and there had been no

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assignment, the family would have gotten nothing 1 whatsoever. 2 If the parent doesn't pay, at least they get 3 the \$200 in AFDC benefit by virtue of the assignment. 4 QUESTION: Well, they get AFDC benefits. It 5 may not be that \$200. 6 MR. LAUBER: It would be \$200 of it --7 QUESTION: And indeed, the amount of money 8 9 received by, or attributed, in AFDC to the child for whom the support payment was made is less than the \$200. 10 11 MR. LAUBER: That's correct. The child's pro rata share, as it were --12 QUESTION: I mean, if you look at the child's 13 pro rata share, it's substantially less than the \$200 14 for whom the support has been ordered? 15 MR. LAUBER: That's right. If you look at --16 QUESTION: And the whole basis of the father's 17 18 support obligation in that example would be his obligation to that child that he fathered, is that not 19 so? 20 MR. LAUBER: Well, that raises a question 21 under state law. And this is the first reason we --22 QUESTION: Well, isn't that correct, that when 23 state courts order child support, that they are ordering 24 it on the basis of the father's obligation to the child 25 11

1 he fathered? MR. LAUBER: That's correct. The father's 2 3 obligation to pay support runs to his child, and the 4 amount he pays is determined both by the child's need, 5 his ability to pay, his wealth --6 QUESTION: Isn't under state law, in this 7 case, didn't the mother have an obligation to spend the 8 child support only on the one child. 9 MR. LAUBER: We think that's not correct. 10 That's what the other side contends. 11 QUESTION: What if it were? 12 MR. LAUBER: If the mother had an obligation 13 to pay it only --14 QUESTION: To use the child support that's given her for this child to spend it on that child; for 15 16 the benefit of that child. 17 MR. LAUBER: Well, for the benefit of the 18 child is different from giving him the cash. 19 QUESTION: All right. 20 MR. LAUBER: And here, the state law clearly 21 permits the mother to assign child support in order to 22 get AFDC for the entire family. So it's clear that here 23 state law does permit the mother, in the best interests 24 of that child to support -- to assign the support money 25 to the state.

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QUESTION: Not only permits it; it seems to 1 require it. 2 MR. LAUBER: It does require it, in fact, 3 that's right. 4 QUESTION: But Mr. Lauber, you could certainly 5 have situations where a local state judge awards child 6 7 support on the theory, for example, that a particular child needs orthodontic treatment, and orders child 8 support in an amount to cover that. 9 MR. LAUBER: Well, that would --10 QUESTION: And the father felt obligated to 11 pay it for that purpose. Now if AFDC law requires that 12 all of that be assigned to the state, and it isn't all 13 then available for that child, why shouldn't the father 14 be able to go back to state court and say, look what the 15 federal government has done, judge? Now, reduce my 16 child support, because what I'm paying is going to the 17 18 family, not Johnny, who needed the orthodontic treatment. MR. LAUBER: Well, that raises a guestion 19 20 about how the support is paid. The AFDC statute permits states to either include or exclude in-kind payments 21 22 from income for purposes of AFDC eligibility. Now if the father -- in the support decree it 23 said the father would pay the dentist bills himself, 24 that would -- rather than pay money to the mother, have 25 13 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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her pay the bills, that would be treated, I think by North Carolina, as an in-kind payment that wouldn't count.

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QUESTION: Well, I thought we had examples in this record where North Carolina brought charges against fathers for making some in-kind contributions of diapers and so forth.

MR. LAUBER: Well, let me co-counsel respond to that. I don't know all the North Carolina cases. But I believe North Carolina has exercised the option not to count in-kind payments as income.

So the key thing under North Carolina law is whether the money comes in cash to the mother, to use at her discretion.

If it does not, if it comes in kind, or if it is paid to a third party by the parent, that would not count as income.

QUESTION: Mr. Lauber, may I just follow up on Justice O'Connor's example of the orthodontic special need of one child for whom the support money is designated?

Supposing it's not done in kind, but is just the reason the judge fixed the support amount at that amount. And then it goes through the AFDC and comes back to the mother.

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Would it violate the AFDC rules for the mother to use the money for the purpose intended by the judge, in other words, giving a disproportionate share to the child for whom the support money was paid?

MR. LAUBER: I don't believe it would. I think it would depend on how the -- what the judge keyed the money to. If he keyed it to --

QUESTION: Well, it would depend on what the need of the other children were. It would depend on what the need of the other children was.

QUESTION: Say there were three children. They all had the same orthodontic problem. And they'd like to spend money on all three, but the money is there because of the orthodontic problem of the child of the father providing the money.

Could the mother, without violating AFDC rules, prefer one of the three children who is the source of the money?

MR. LAUBER: I think for something very quasi-optional or a cosmetic thing like that, she probably could prefer one child over another, as any mother could in deciding which kid is going to have braces.

QUESTION: Even though the three have the same needs? That's my assumption: the three have the same

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1 needs, but the need of one is what produced the money. And that would not violate AFDC? 2 3 MR. LAUBER: I think a mother always has the 4 option of deciding how you are going to allocate a fixed 5 -- a small fixed pot of money. But beyond the AFDC --QUESTION: Your answer is, it would not 6 7 violate AFDC law? 8 MR. LAUBER: I don't believe it would for 9 orthodontics. But beyond --10 QUESTION: Mr. Lauber --11 QUESTION: Well, for anything. Would it for 12 anything? Maybe we've picked a bad --13 MR. LAUBER: It would depend on the need. If 14 it were kind of a critical life-threatening need, it would be a different judgment. 15 16 QUESTION: Well, of all three, three critical life-threatening needs, but the source of the money is 17 18 because of the support for the one. Could the mother --19 would it -- is there an AFDC rule that the mother must 20 treat the needy children equally, despite the fact that one of them produces the money? 21 22 MR. LAUBER: I don't think there's any rule 23 that she has to treat them absolutely equally. There 24 has -- there's a range of reasonableness. 25 QUESTION: Gathering from your answer to 16 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia earlier, is there a fairly elaborate AFDC code of how the mother shall distribute the money to these various children?

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MR. LAUBER: No, there is not. The whole point of it is, let the mother act like a mother, and any other mother, and decide how best to use this money for her children.

And beyond the AFDC, there is also Medicaid assistance available.

QUESTION: Mr. Lauber, I'll give you an easier question that I think will make it even clearer. It isn't they all three have the same orthodontic need. Two of them need food, and she gets back the money from AFDC. Could she use it for the orthodontic purpose for which it was originally contributed by the husband instead of buying food for the other two?

MR. LAUBER: I think she probably could not. I think it would be real hard to justify that.

But in the case of orthodonture, I'd like to point out again that the Medicaid is available to all the children in the filing unit automatically. That's one benefit a child receives by virtue of the assignment, is that he then qualifies for Medicaid immediately, and that could well cover some of these medical expenses.

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Let me get back to the Constitution. There has to be some kind of constitutional problem with the statute, or it cannot be declared invalid.

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And as I point out, the first problem with the other side's theory is, under state law, a child does not really have an absolute property right to child support.

What he has is a right to have the money used in his best interest. State law permits, and indeed, requires the assignment of support to get AFDC for the family. And state law therefore contemplates that it can be in the child's best interest to have his support money assigned to get AFDC for the family.

QUESTION: Well, there may be individual examples where it isn't in the child's best interest, though.

MR. LAUBER: It's possible --

18 QUESTION: And there certainly are examples in this record where the burden of this arrangement has 19 20 been so great that it has caused families to split up, 21 and send children to live with someone else, so that 22 they can have the benefit of that child's support. That's a pretty heavy burden, isn't it? 23 MR. LAUBER: But that would follow from any 24 decision by Congress to include the -- any kind --25

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wouldn't have to supporting him -- any kind of income of a child, in determining the need of the family.

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If the child earned money working at MacDonald's, and he lived with the family, that money would be included as family income, and it might be better to him to live with his father, and have it not be included.

But I think it's inevitable if you have a family-based grant, as AFDC is, you've got to look at the income of the people who live in the family to see how needy the family is.

And it could be that that would give an incentive, an economic incentive, for people to live in another way. But that's an inevitable consequence of this family grant provision Congress has set up.

The second reason we think their taking theory doesn't work is that the participation in the AFDC program is entirely voluntary. If the mother does not want to assign child support, she need not take part in the AFDC program.

It is simply one of the many conditions for eligibility for getting public benefits.

QUESTION: But they're not arguing that it's being taken from the mother. It's being taken from the child. It's not voluntary on te part of the child. The

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1 mother says, I'm going to chuck in your child support in order to get more money for the family as a whole. 2 MR. LAUBER: The Congress has made the family 3 4 unit the applicant. 5 QUESTION: Well, that's very nice, but it 6 doesn't say anything about whether it's a taking from 7 the child or not. MR. LAUBER: But if the child doesn't want to 8 9 have his support assigned, he can tell his mother and 10 she cannot assign the support. 11 I mean, the children depend on their --12 monetarily depend on their mother to make decisions in 13 their best interest. 14 QUESTION: So you say -- you suggest that if the child had a guardian, secured a guardian ad litem, 15 16 talked to his or her uncle and said, mother is giving 17 away my child support, let's sue her, do you think they 18 could an injunction against her signing that? They say, this is mine. My father is giving it to my mother for 19 20 me, and she is breaching her trust. 21 MR. LAUBER: We think under state law they 22 couldn't get that injunction, because it's not the child's absolute property. The mother has to use it in 23 24 his best interest, and she can convince --QUESTION: So this case really then turns on 25 20 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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the state law? 1 MR. LAUBER: I think ultimately it does. 2 QUESTION: And if -- if we thought that --3 that this payment belonged to the child, then there must 4 be a taking. 5 MR. LAUBER: No, that doesn't follow. You 6 have to have -- first --7 QUESTION: All right. What must there be, 8 then? 9 MR. LAUBER: Well, first there's got to be 10 property to be taken. 11 QUESTION: Yes? 12 MR. LAUBER: Okay, then beyond that, you have 13 to consider that going into the program is entirely 14 voluntary to begin with. 15 QUESTION: Well, the child say, I'm 16 involuntary. I don't want any part of the program. I'm 17 going -- the law makes my mother put me in, but I don't 18 want my mother to do it. That's part of the case. 19 MR. LAUBER: But if the child is wrong, and 20 the mother in his best interest --21 QUESTION: What do you mean wrong? How can --22 if under the state law it's his money, and he doesn't 23 want any part of the program --24 MR. LAUBER: Well, if you're right about that, 25 21 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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1 then she could be enjoined from going into the program. QUESTION: All right. And how about a taking? 2 3 MR. LAUBER: Well, there would be no taking if 4 she weren't in the program. QUESTION: All right, so you say --5 6 MR. LAUBER: Well, the point is, if he really 7 has property --8 QUESTION: You say that the remedy is the 9 in.junction? MR. LAUBER: Right. If he really has property 10 11 and she -- but state law permits her to assign it, so 12 it's hard to see how --13 QUESTION: The guardian ad litem didn't come 14 along until six months afterwards. So he gets an injunction but he wants back pay; I mean he wants to get 15 16 the support back. And it's a taking, there's been a 17 taking. 18 MR. LAUBER: Well, I don't --19 QUESTION: I mean, that seems to me what the 20 case is all about. 21 MR. LAUBER: Well, if there is -- if the child 22 does have property such as you describe --23 QUESTION: There isn't any case at all unless 24 the child has some property under the state law. 25 MR. LAUBER: Well, that's the first problem 22

with their argument. But there are other problems beyond that as we showed in our brief.

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CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr. Lauber.

> We will hear now from you, Ms. McLamb. ORAL ARGUMENT OF MS. CATHERINE C. McLAMB, ESQ., ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT IN NO. 86-564

MS. McLAMB: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:

The State of North Carolina administers its AFDC program in conformity with Federal law as explained by the Solicitor General and as stated in the briefs for the Appellant.

I would like to make two points to this Court. First, the District Court below found an unconstitutional taking based upon its erroneous interpretation of North Carolina law regarding child support.

Secondly, the court committed a fundamental error in ordering retroactive benefits in this case.

QUESTION: Do we have to disagree with the District Court's -- or with the court's construction of North Carolina for you to prevail?

MS. McLAMB: No. I don't believe there is a taking in this case because this is a voluntary

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decision; this is an eligibility requirement. You don't 1 2 really get to the taking of property. It's a voluntary 3 decision on the mother's part. 4 QUESTION: What's the error -- what's the error in North Carolina law that --5 6 MS. McLAMB: In -- Judge McMillan found that 7 because these children lived together, and they must apply for AFDC as a family unit, and therefore, by law, 8 9 assignment -- there must be an assignment of child 10 support rights. He found that certain property interests were 11 12 But the property interest -taken. QUESTION: Of the child? 13 MS. McLAMB: Of the child. The property 14 interest he explained in his opinion was that child 15 16 support is an exclusive property right in North 17 Carolina. The other right that I could glean from the 18 opinion is that he says that the child has an absolute 19 exclusive right to enforce the obligation of the 20 21 custodial parent; and in this case, I'm just going to use mother, that's a little easier, to enforce the --22 QUESTION: Will we have to change that 23 24 interpretation that the judge made of North Carolina law? 25 MS. McLAMB: What I would like to show you is, 24

that is an erroneous interpretation. It is not correct. 1 QUESTION: We normally of course accept the 2 interpretation of the lower Federal court on matters of 3 state law. don't we? 4 MS. McLAMB: You should, unless it is -- I 5 6 would not think that this Court would accept the interpretation of state law if it is clearly shown to be 7 incorrect, and that is what I would like to show you 8 today. q QUESTION: And your opposition will show us 10 just to the contrary. 11 MS. McLAMB: They will attempt to do the exact 12 opposite. 13 The second property right that Judge McMillan 14 found was taken was, as he described it, the exclusive 15 right of the child to enforce the obligation of the 16 parent to spend child support money only on that child. 17 What our -- this is simply not the law of 18 North Carolina. What our statutes read is that child 19 support is ordered, the primary obligation is placed 20 upon the mother and the father. 21 Child support is ordered to meet the 22 reasonable needs of the child. Then child support is 23 paid to the custodial parent for the benefit of the 24 child. 25 25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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1 In North Carolina, the child does have the 2 right to enforce the obligation of the mother to use 3 child support for his or her benefit. North Carolina 4 has, by statute, passed -- passed a law that deems the 5 assignment of child support rights, the obligation to 6 receive support, upon the acceptance of public 7 assistance. 8 This is a statute that has been enacted in 9 North Carolina. 10 The rationale of Judge McMillan below --11 QUESTION: Maybe that statute was a taking? 12 MS. McLAMB: It was not so considered by the legislature of North Carolina, nor the courts of North 13 14 Carolina, which has considered -- which has passed upon this statute. 15 16 And I would say that this is an area of family 17 law in North Carolina. 18 The rationale of --19 QUESTION: How did the court below deal with 20 that particular statute? 21 MS. McLAMB: The court below ignored it. It 22 was not mentioned in his opinion. It was raised --QUESTION: But you had raised that with the 23 24 court? 25 MS. McLAMB: Pardon? 26

QUESTION: You had argued and presented to the

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MS. McLAMB: This was raised to the court below. The briefs are in the record, the docket that has been sent to you, on page 32 of the appellees¹ memorandum for motion for further relief. This was filed May 30th, 1985.

This very statute, the provision -- this is contained in Chapter 110 of the North Carolina general statutes. This was brought to the court's attention.

In order to reach his opinion of this exclusive property right, you have to ignore that statute because --

QUESTION: You think that whatever -- any property right the child might have had was modified by that statute, or it just couldn't have come about in the face of that statute?

MS. McLAMB: You have to read the North Carolina child support law in conjunction with the statutes. These statutes have to be read together. Judge McMillan's rationale --

QUESTION: Which one prevails? I mean how do you read them together?

MS. McLAMB: There is no statute in North Carolina that says, child support is an exclusive

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property right of the child.

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North Carolina law places primary emphasis on the obligation of a parent to support his child. That is the right that the child has, is to enforce that obligation.

Reading the statutes again, the child has the right --

QUESTION: Well, would the mother be breaking the child support law if she received child support and just didn't spend it on the child?

MS. McLAMB: And didn't -- that would be that the mother was not spending the money for the benefit of the child.

This is, to me, another fundamental error in Judge McMillan®s opinion.

QUESTION: Well, what if the mother took the money and spent it on another child, all of it on another child, that she thought needed it more?

MS. McLAMB: She is breaking -- in that case, she is breaking her fiduciary to that child, if this -if she is leaving her child --

QUESTION: But she -- you think if she was receiving child support and she wasn't on AFDC at all, she just received \$250 a month, and she just split it three ways among her three children.

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MS. McLAMB: And this was her only income? QUESTION: No, this was child support income.

MS. McLAMB: In your hypothetical, is that the only income that is coming into that family, is \$250 child support for one child?

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In that case, the mother -- it would be within the mother's discretion -- these are not easy decisions, but it would be within the mother's discretion to determine what is the best interest of that child.

She receives child support under our statutes. The statute does not read, child support shall be received to be spent to benefit that child. Child support is received for the custodial parent to be used for the minor child's benefit.

QUESTION: And so she can use it for the benefit of all of her children?

MS. McLAMB: It would be a decision that would be within the discretion of the mother.

QUESTION: Yes or no? The answer is yes, I suppose.

MS. McLAMB: The answer is yes if she, within her discretion, determines that that would best benefit her child.

That, to me, is a fundamental problem with Judge McMillan's analysis in this case, because he is

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undermining well established law in North Carolina that the custodial parent has great flexibility in determining what is in the best interest.

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A parent may not profit at the expense of her child. If this is determined to be the case, an action may be brought on the child's behalf in order to compel the mother to act in his best interest.

QUESTION: Well, what if the mother believes that it isn't at all in the best interests of the child for whom the support is paid that her other children are going to starve to death if she doesn't use that money?

MS. McLAMB: Then that is her choice. Participation in the AFDC program is a voluntary decision. This is within the discretion of the mother, once again. If she decides that it is not in that child's best interest that it -- for whatever reason, she decides that Johnny should have every bit of that money, no matter what, she has a voluntary decision that she can make that she will not participate --

QUESTION: And starve to death?

MS. McLAMB: This is a decision that she can make. It is a hard decision. I am not saying that these are easy decisions.

But these are decisions that are within the discretion of the parent and authorized under North

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Carolina law.

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Ms. Wettach, we'll hear from you now. You 2 will be able to make your entire argument. The Court 3 won't rise to lunch until this case is submitted. 4 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MS. JANE R. WETTACH, ESQ., 5 ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEES 6 MS. WETTACH: The actual, palpable, financial 7 loss to the plaintiff children in this case is quite 8 9 apparent from the evidence. The two daughters of Joyce Miles, for example, 10 11 lost \$95 every month of their child support. Similar amounts of money were lost every month 12 by other children in this case. 13 I think it would be helpful if we just walked 14 through an example of how this practice actually works 15 in North Carolina at this time. 16 For example, Joyce Miles has five children. 17 Two of them, the oldest two, are of a different father. 18 The three younger ones, they have separate fathers. 19 The two oldest girls are the beneficiaries of 20 a \$189 a month child support payment. It was ordered by 21 the state court judge, who made a decision about the 22 reasonable needs of those children and ordered this 23 24 father to pay. Prior to 1984, when the rule was imposed, the 25

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mother did not receive AFDC assistance for those children; they were separated from the grant.

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She had three younger who were not as fortunate to have a father who chose to support them, and she received \$244 in AFDC for those children.

In October of 1984 she received a letter from the State Department of Human Resources, which said, in order to continue receiving AFDC for those children for whom you are getting it, you must add the other children to the grant, and as a part of that, you must make their support available to the state. The state will take that money, keep the money; it will return \$50 because there is now a \$50 disregard; and we'll give you AFDC benefits.

QUESTION: And you think prior to that time she was pretty careful to spend -- how much was it?

MS. WETTACH: She had \$189 to support the two
older girls.

19 QUESTION: And she used to spend that \$189 for 20 those two, and how much did she get from AFDC for the 21 other three?

MS. WETTACH: \$244 for the other three.k QUESTION: So they got \$80 apiece, and the other ones got how much apiece?

MS. WETTACH: \$95 apiece.

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QUESTION: Do you think she was really careful to make sure that the family's -- the child support money she was getting from the husband went to those two children?

Is it a real world we're talking about when we're talking about a mother who has, let's say, five children, one of whom has support money, spending that money -- that allotment, on that child? Is that a real world out there?

I mean, we have these Cinderellas in reverse, one child of five, who has a lot of money, and the other four don't?

MS. WETTACH: Well, in most of these cases, the amounts of money were not significantly different. In that case, as we said, the difference between \$80 and \$95 is not a lot, and the evidence in the case that she was spending more money on the children who were the recipients of that child support.

She mentioned that -- those were two teenage girls; she tended to spend more money on them. And --

QUESTION: Because they were teenagers; not because that's where the support money was -- the reality that Congress was addressing in this statute is a reality in which a mother spends whatever money she has for all of the children she's taking care of; isn't

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MS. WETTACH: We don't think there's any evidence to show that mothers routinely are violating their court award. She has a court order. It tells her that she's got to spend the money in a certain way.

And there's no evidence that nationwide these mothers --

QUESTION: Do you know of any case in which a parent has been sued for spending the money on the wrong children? I mean, I've never even heard of such a suit.

MS. WETTACH: I'm not aware of any suit that a mother was actually sued --

QUESTION: And you think that's because everybody is really keeping close track of how much money they're spending on each of their children?

MS. WETTACH: Actually, I would like to take that back. There was the case from which the District Court found much of its law of North Carolina, where a father sued the mother for misusing the child support he was spending, and the court said -- actually dismissed the case because the father was the wrong party, and said, the child support money belongs to the children. The father could only bring the suit as next friend. And implicitly authorized the father to be able to sue for that reason, if there were a substantial misuse of

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the money by the mother, then I think that would be 1 cognizable under state law, under trust theory. 2 QUESTION: What about the North Carolina law 3 on the right of the child? That case that you were just 4 talking about turns around the right of the child, I 5 take it. 6 MS. WETTACH: Yes. 7 QUESTION: Is that --8 MS. WETTACH: We feel that --9 QUESTION: What about that law? 10 MS. WETTACH: We feel that --11 QUESTION: Judge McMillan thought there was a 12 property right in the child? 13 MS. WETTACH: We feel there is no reason that 14 this Court should depart from the lower court's analysis 15 of North Carolina law. 16 QUESTION: Well, I know, but what about the --17 is there some other evidence besides the judge here as 18 to what ---19 MS. WETTACH: Well, there's certainly --20 there's all the case law. 21 QUESTION: -- what North Carolina law is? 22 MS. WETTACH: There's the case law that Judge 23 McMillan of course relied on. There's also the 24 statutes. For the benefit of the child is not a 25 35

particularly difficult concept.

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QUESTION: But how do you ignore the state statute permitting the mother to make the assignment?

MS. WETTACH: If -- the assignment --

QUESTION: Doesn't that sort of undercut the notion that the child has his or her own right to the money?

MS. WETTACH: No, I don't think it does. I think when -- when participation in the program vis-a-vis the child who is receiving child support is voluntary, the mother can certainly make the choice that the child support that she is getting is inadequate to meet those needs, and therefore, she would like to apply for AFDC, and the condition of eligibility is that she make this assignment and the state take over the responsibility of collecting that support.

But when this involuntariness becomes a part of it, that changes how that assignment provision works.

QUESTION: Yes, but the state statute permits her to do it, but it doesn't say that when she is -- if she would choose, because it's not in the best interest of the child not to do it; but she can't make -- that's the problem with the Federal law. It deprives her of being able to voluntarily choose to apply for AFDC for that child, or not apply for AFDC for that child,

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because the assignment provision would end up not being 1 in the best interest. 2 The assignment provision doesn't change 3 anything about that -- when money is paid, it is paid 4 for the best interests of a particular child. 5 QUESTION: Your opponent I understood to argue 6 differently, that the North Carolina assignment law 7 supersedes, to the extent it's inconsistent with some of 8 the very strict you've been reciting. 9 MS. WETTACH: I think that's just incorrect. 10 When -- if the mother -- that whole provision of state 11 law was written when it was a voluntary matter to apply 12 for AFDC. 13 QUESTION: (Inaudible) voluntary, isn't it? 14 She is not forced to apply for AFDC? 15 MS. WETTACH: She is forced to apply for AFDC 16 for particular children --17 QUESTION: By what law is she forced to apply 18 for AFDC? 19 MS. WETTACH: As a condition of getting AFDC 20 for some children, she is forced to apply for all 21 22 children. QUESTION: Oh. it's a condition. 23 MS. WETTACH: It's a -- right. Right. She's 24 not -- of course, nobody is rounding her up and telling 25 37 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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1 her to apply. 2 QUESTION: (Inaudible) deal with the 3 assignment statute? 4 MS. WETTACH: Judge McMillan talked at length 5 about the assignment provision and how it is the 6 procedural mechanism by which the state --7 QUESTION: Yes, but did he consider it in the 8 process of determining whether the child has a property 9 right? 10 MS. WETTACH: He was certainly --11 QUESTION: He didn't consider the state law 12 that says if you assign the child support to get AFDC 13 that it's deemed to be for the benefit of the child, did 14 he? 15 MS. WETTACH: Well, of course, the assignment 16 law in state law doesn't say, and then it is deemed to 17 be in the benefit of the child. 18 The assignment provision simply says, if you 19 apply for AFDC, you are deemed to have made an 20 assignment of your child support to the state. That's 21 all it said. 22 It doesn't say anything about, for the benefit of the children, or transforming the income from the 23 benefit of one to --24 25 QUESTION: But if that's what the state law 38 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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says, doesn't that do something to the child's property right?

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MS. WETTACH: I don't see how it would in any sense. When you assign your money you are allowing the state to take it in, but it gives it back when you are on the grant and you make the decision to -- you use the assignment provision almost as a trade. You will trade in your child support of \$50, because \$50 isn't adequate to meet a child's needs, so that you can get \$100 in AFDC back.

But that -- when the figures are different, when they say, assign in \$100 and get \$50 back, that's a very different sort of situation, and a very different sort of choice.

QUESTION: But isn't it true that you always get at least the amount you assign back, and sometimes plus \$50? You example of \$189 of child support and \$244 they had before, a total of \$400 and something; what did they get after she made the assignment?

MS. WETTACH: They got \$280 in AFDC and \$50 of the support, so there was a net loss of \$95.

QUESTION: So they only got -- I see.

MS. WETTACH: So that's where the loss. And of course, the AFDC hasn't gone done; it is the child support that they --

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QUESTION: They always get back more than the child support that they're trading in; but they don't get back more than the would have gotten had they had the child support plus their former AFDC without that child counted in?

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MS. WETTACH: If you look at the whole family as a total family unit, the mathematics work out that way.

Of course, our position is that the constitutional rights belong to the children who own the money for whom it is paid.

QUESTION: I just want to be sure about one thing. Assume there's child support for just a second, and assume that the \$189 was income from working at MacDonald's, and that was it, and we didn't have a child support in this case at all.

Would it still be unconstitutional -- program still be unconstitutional to require them to count all the money in one pool.

MS. WETTACH: It depends on whose \$189 it is. QUESTION: It's the teenage daughter. Two teenage daughters, both work, and they earned \$189, and they'd like to spend it on themselves. But under the new rule, they must count that as part of the family pool, and the result of it is to reduce the total

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amounut they get.

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Is that unconstitutional?

MS. WETTACH: I think you would nave to look at what the state law says about that type of income. My recollection is that earned income under common law is to be owned by the parents and at their discretion.

QUESTION: You think that depends as a matter of -- on state law whether that program is bad or not?

MS. WETTACH: I think it depends as a matter of state law what the nature of the \$189 is. Now, I think that is a different case than when the mother receives it in a fiduciary and trust capacity.

QUESTION: My bottom line question was, would you challenge the constitutionality of this basic arrangement if the child support were not a part of it, if it just applied to income that the children earned?

MS. WETTACH: Well, that wouldn't be the case. That would not be the case that is in front of the Court --

QUESTION: Even though it might have precisely the same economic consequences?

MS. WETTACH: Again, I think you would have to look at the nature of the income that you're talking aout.

QUESTION: Well, I don't know anything about

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state law. I'm just looking at the economics and the burden on these people who have trouble making ends meet.

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It would economically be precisely the same situation. Why wouldn't it be precisely the same legal situation as a matter of constitutional law?

MS. WETTACH: If in fact what was happening was that money was being taken from a child who had no obligation to support other children, then I think it would be precisely the same legal situation. If the money is restricted in that way.

QUESTION: Isn't the logic of your position not only that the 1984 amendment is no good, but that the whole -- even if a mother voluntarily wants to include a child who is entitled to child support in the AFDC program, because, let's say, the father is in fact not paying it, and she'd rather have the government try to pursue the father, assign it to the government and get back AFDC for it, even that would be invalid, wouldn't it?

MS. WETTACH: Not if --

QUESTION: She's giving away the --

MS. WETTACH: -- she's not losing anything for the child.

QUESTION: Oh, but she's not -- when she gets

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it back, she's not going to just spend it on that child, she's going to have to abide by the AFDC regulations, and spend it on all the children.

But that money should go just to that one child, shouldn[®]t it?

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QUESTION: And if the government collects it, it keeps it.

MS. WETTACH: It keeps it all but the first \$50 of it, that's correct.

QUESTION: So that would be bad too, wouldn't it? And so would including in the AFDC the earnings of -- well, the earnings of a child that he earns all on his own, and he has no obligation to support any other children.

MS. WETTACH: That's a difficult example, because those are not counted for AFDC purposes anyway becaue --

QUESTION: They're not counted. Well, just take the child support where the mother wants to assign it to the government; you couldn't do that?

MS. WETTACH: If it were in -- if it were in the best interests of that child, because it was only coming in, say, once every six months, then spread out, she's probably not violating any duty she has.

QUESTION: Oh, I see; one-fifth of something

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1 is better than a hundred percent of nothing. I guess 2 that would be right, if she wasn't collecting a thing. 3 QUESTION: Mr. Wettach, let me ask you a 4 pragmatic question. Do you know of any case in North Carolina 5 6 where all of this has driven the more fortunate child 7 out of the home to live elsewhere? MS. WETTACH: Yes, Justice Blackmun, there is 8 9 an example of that exact situation among the five named 10 parties that are the moving parties in this case, where 11 a child has received --QUESTION: Well, I thought there were, but I 12 13 haven't heard it mentioned all morning. And I --MS. WETTACH: In the Medland family, there was 14 a child, and she was entitled to \$200 -- her father was 15 16 paying \$200 worth of child support for her, and her 17 mother and father decided, between the two of them, that 18 she should move out of the house, because otherwise she 19 would have to be included in the grant, and her standard 20 of living would go down, and they did not wish that to 21 occur. 22 QUESTION: Or if a guardian ad litem came into 23 the picture, he might well take that position? 24 MS. WETTACH: Indeed. And we think that's a 25 very serious consequence of the regulation, that that --44 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

QUESTION: Where did the child move to? Did she move with her father, or to somewhere else?

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MS. WETTACH: In that particular case, she moved with her father. And of course, it could have been in any number of situations.k

QUESTION: Ms. Wettach, I suppose in your view we would have to make a case-by-case determination of how child support payments were used in each household to know whether the Federal provision could be applied or not?

MS. WETTACH: It seems that it would make more sense for the Court and the Congress to determine -- to make a presumption that people were obeying their court orders, in the absence of some evidence to the contrary.

I mean, the presumption makes sense that people obey the law, as opposed to, that people don't obey the law. And if -- now, of course, under AFDC law, there is an inquiry in every single case of every single applicant about what money they have in the household, and where it is.

They send in a monthly report every month, and they have to describe these things. Of course, if there were money being spent, then there may well be accounting for that money, and that's the way it would be -- really under current law, there would be that

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situation, where if she were actually making income available, it would be counted.

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QUESTION: Ms. Wettach, wouldn't you say that one of the -- one of the benefits that a child could receive, and one of the purposes for which a mother may use -- or a father may use the child's support money is to enable the child to live with brothers and sisters?

I mean, let's assume -- let's assume a mother is getting support money for one child, and she has a couple of other children, she says, I want this child to be brought up with his brothers and sisters.

In order to do that, rather than sending the other children away to the poor house or somewhere, I'm going to have to spend some of this support money for them.

Wouldn't you think that that would be considered spending that money for the benefit of the child?

MS. WETTACH: There may be individual circumstances where that might be the case. As a general rule, though --

QUESTION: Wouldn't that be every circumstance in which the mother decides to trade in the support -the support money for AFDC benefits, which will be slightly more than the support money and enable her to

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keep the family together.

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Can't that be considered to be in the benefit of the child who was entitled to the support money, even if he doesn't get dollar for dollar what he used to? He's getting his brothers and sisters?

MS. WETTACH: There may well be some benefits there, and there may well be circumstances. But to say as a matter of law, which we have here, that the mother must make that choice is the difficulty with it.

QUESTION: That's a different question, though. That's not the takings question. That's the question of whether there is excessive coercion on a fundamental right or something of that sort.

But as to whether there has been a taking or not, can't you say that indeed the mother has traded in for value the child's support money? She has gotten back for it the company of the brothers and sisters?

> MS. WETTACH: Again, that may be --QUESTION: The family unit as a whole.

MS. WETTACH: -- that would have to be made on an individual basis as to what is in the best interest. And perhaps somebody could prove to a court -- a state court in a -- in a hearing on it that it was or it wasn't in the best interest of that particular child. But on its face, to take money from one child

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and spend it on the other child takes away from the state -- state court order that says, this \$200 is to be used for a particular child; it takes away from the father's expectation that he will support his children, and not be expected to offset expenditures made by the AFDC program for other children to whom he is unrelated.

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And that disruption is a significant problem. QUESTION: I don't know. I just expect that if I had before me a suit involving an allegation that support money wasn't being spent entirely for the child for whom it was destined by the mother, and that she was using some of it to buy bare necessities for the other children just to keep the family together, I doubt that I'd find that mother to be in violation of her trust obligation.

MS. WETTACH: But that may be because there -she's being put under this unconstitutional condition that she has to do that. And maybe given an unconstitutional condition on this program, once decisions about what's in the best interest, may have to be different.

But should the government be putting her in the position of having to make that choice?

QUESTION: (Inaudible) though. That's not the takings point.

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MS. WETTACH: Well, it certainly --

2 QUESTION: I think I'm right about that. That 3 is your separate point.

MS. WETTACH: That is a separate -- that's right. And it's another theory of liability for the government.

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QUESTION: Ms. Wettach, have you found examples of state court judges who have reduced child support orders because of the impact of this program on the use of the money for the child for whom support was originally ordered?

MS. WETTACH: Yes, Justice O'Conor, there was 12 one which was cited in our brief that we were aware of 13 because it was local, and the state -- it was a 14 situation where the father was providing a certain 15 amount of support, and he went in and said, look, this 16 is what's happening and what happened in that case is, 17 the state judge ordered that the family be severed for 18 AFDC purpose, and he ordered the county to continue to 19 pay AFDC for the other children, and allowed the father 20 to make in-kind payments to off -- so that they wouldn't 21 be counted. 22

And there was another situation that was presented by this case where the father was paying \$200 a month voluntarily without a court order. When the

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benefits were assigned, and he went -- and the county brought suit against him, they reduced the amount to \$87 a month.

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So that in fact, they -- when you worked out the figures, he didn't lose that much by being on AFDC, but of course, the father was willing and able to pay much more for his support.

But it wouldn't have mattered. His child would have stayed at the same standard of living of an AFDC family, regardless of how much the father had paid; and so the support was reduced.

The state has not talked too much about the remedy that was imposed. But I'd like to say just a few words about that as it is presented by this case.

The state has mentioned in its brief that the remedy was incorrect in this case for a number of reasons. We think it's quite clear from the procedural posture of this case that there was a violation of an injunction.

The injunction was entered in 1971, and it was clearly -- it was to remedy the exact same thing that was going on in 1971 as part of the state program. At that point it did not have the cloak of Federal authorization as it claims to have now. But it was in fact --

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QUESTION: There's not doubt it has that, it 1 has Federal authorization now, is there? 2 MS. WETTACH: It has Federal statutory 3 4 authorization under their theory of the statute. QUESTION: I thought your case was purely a 5 constitutional case here, since the passage of the more 6 recent AFDC amendment. 7 Do you still claim that it's not authorized by 8 statute? 9 MS. WETTACH: We have in our brief suggested 10 that the statute can be read in a different way which 11 would not cause the constitutional problems that are 12 caused by the application as it's been given by 13 Secretary Bowen. 14 QUESTION: But the District Court didn't agree 15 with you on that point? 16 17 MS. WETTACH: That's correct. That's correct. But in this case, there has -- there was the 18 same activity by the Welfare Department in 1971. That 19 activity was enjoined. 20 And in 1984, it was flouted by the state. The 21 injunction was simply ignored, and the state made a 22 decision to proceed as it had been before 1971, and 23 24 before it was enjoined. The state has argued that the remedy that the 25 51 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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lower court ordered, which was to pay back all the child
 support money that it had taken, and pay back any AFDC
 benefits which were withheld, or for families that were
 terminated as a result of this, would violate the
 Eleventh Amendment.

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We think there is no question that it would not violate the Eleventh Amendment for a number of reasons.

> First of all, of course, it is --QUESTION: (Inaudible). MS. WETTACH: Yes.

12 QUESTION: Has this been preserved below, the 13 Eleventh Amendment?

MS. WETTACH: Yes. Yes, it was argued below, and it was -- the theory was rejected by the lower court, and we would ask this Court to affirm on that issue as well.

What had been argued, and is argued here in their briefs, is that the Eleventh Amendment would bar it because this was effectively retroactive benefits.

The error in that position is the language of Edelman v. Jordan, which says that the date for determining prospective and retrospective relief is the date of a court-ordered obligation to act otherwise. This court order was entered in 1971. And

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from then they had to act accordingly. That was a prospective order, and that was not barred in any way by the Eleventh Amendment.

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The state's position appears to be that as soon as it violated the injunction, anything that it didn't pay was transformed into retroactive payments, and therefore, were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

And we think that that position doesn't make sense, and is not consistent with this court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.

QUESTION: Ms. Wettach, before you leave, what -- what would you suggest the Federal Government have done instead? Assuming that its finding was correct, 13 the legislative finding, that families use all of the money that they get on all of its -- on all of their members for the best interests of the whole family group, including money from support payments.k 17

And they -- the Federal Government says, we 18 have to -- we're -- we have to pay out less. We have to 19 20 reduce the amount. It makes sense to us to reduce the amount to those families that have \$800 coming in. 21

And we know as a matter of fact, never mind 22 that theoretically they're supposed to be spent on only 23 two of the children; we know that that family has \$800 24 which is being used for the whole family. 25

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1 This other family over here only has \$200 2 that's being used for the whole family. Now, I want the 3 cut to hit the family with the \$800 and not the family 4 from the \$200. How could the Federal Government have done it lawfully? 5

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6 MS. WETTACH: We think it would be quite 7 reasonable for the Federal Government, and constitutional, to have looked at that family, looked at the AFDC recipients, and determined how much their need was actually reduced by the fact that someone else in the household may have been sharing the burden of the 12 joint expenses.

13 This is particularly set out in our brief when 14 we talk about an economy of scale reduction that could 15 be made in an AFDC payment.

16 For example, if there -- well, there's a chart 17 that talks about, what's the individual's standard of 18 need in a family. And we all know that that individual goes down as the household gets larger, because you need 19 20 -- if you have an apartment that --

21 QUESTION: But you wouldn't allow the support 22 payments to be counted in at all?

23 MS. WETTACH: It's not that they're counted. 24 They're not counted at all. All they're doing is, you 25 recognize that the need of the AFDC recipients is less

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because they don't have to share the whole -- they don't have to pay for -- for example, they don't have to pay for all of the rent, or all of the utilities, the shared expenses, because there's someone else with income who is sharing.

So maybe there's a quarter of it that is paid by someone who is not in the unit, so they only have to pay for three-quarters of it. So their need is a little bit less.

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10 QUESTION: But that's not the reality that 11 Congress has found. I don't care what your chart is, if 12 you assume in theory that the mother is spending the 13 money for the house which other people use and whatnot.

The reality that Congress perceived was that all the money that comes into the family unit is distributed among all the family members on the basis of how they need it, period.

And Congress wants to take that factor into 19 account. You just told me that there's no way that 20 Congress can do that?

MS. WETTACH: No, I think I told you that there is a way that they can do it. And they can do it in either of the two ways we suggested. Actually, they can do it by an economy of scale reduction of the AFDC recipients, or they can do it by an individual analysis

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1 of what is going on in a family, and if money is 2 actually being transferred, they might count it. 3 Let's take an example where there are three 4 people in a household. The child support child gets \$100, the other two get \$200 in AFDC. The mother uses 5 6 all the money the same. Their need is the same. To say -- then 7 there's no transfer, and that's when Congress can't take 8 9 it into account. 10 But to say that these two need a little less 11 because there's a person outside the unit who is also 12 contributing is reasonable, and Congress coul cut in that matter. 13 14 And we think that's constitutional, and we would have no complaints with that. 15 16 If there are no further questions. 17 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Ms. 18 Wettach. 19 The case is submitted. 20 (Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the case in the above-entitled matter was submitted.) 21 22 23 24 25 56 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

CERTIFICATION

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc., hereby certifies that the attached pages represents an accurate transcription of electronic sound recording of the oral argument before the Supreme Court of The United States in the Matter of: #86-509 - OTIS R. BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Appellant V. BEATY MAE GILLIARD, ET AL.; and

#86-564 - DAVID T. FLAHERTY, SECRETARY OF NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES,

ET AL., Appellants V. BEATY MAE GILLIARD, ET AL. and that these attached pages constitutes the original transcript of the proceedings for the records of the court.

BY Paul A. Kichardon

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