OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DKT/CASE NO. 83-838 TITLE UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. PAUL B. LORENZETTI PLACE Washington, D. C. DATE April 23, 1984 PAGES 1-39



1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	UNITED STATES,
4	Petiticner :
5	v. Nc. 83-838
6	PAUL B. LORENZETTI
7	x
8	Washington, D.C.
9	Monday, April 23, 1984
10	The above-entitled matter came on for cral
11	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
12	at 1:41 p.m.
13	APPEAR ANCES:
14	MS. CARCLYN CORWIN, ESC., Office of the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.;
15	on behalf of the Petitioner.
15 16	
	cn behalf of the Petitioner. CHARLES SOVEL, ESQ., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; on
16	cn behalf of the Petitioner. CHARLES SOVEL, ESQ., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; on
16 17	cn behalf of the Petitioner. CHARLES SOVEL, ESQ., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; on
16 17 18	cn behalf of the Petitioner. CHARLES SOVEL, ESQ., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; on
16 17 18 19 20 21	cn behalf of the Petitioner. CHARLES SOVEL, ESQ., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; on
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	cn behalf of the Petitioner. CHARLES SOVEL, ESQ., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; on
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	cn behalf of the Petitioner. CHARLES SOVEL, ESQ., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; on
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	cn behalf of the Petitioner. CHARLES SOVEL, ESQ., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; on
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	cn behalf of the Petitioner. CHARLES SOVEL, ESQ., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; on
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	cn behalf of the Petitioner. CHARLES SOVEL, ESQ., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; on

1	CONTENTS	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	FAGE
3	MS. CAROLYN CORWIN, ESC.,	3
4	on behalf of the Fetitioner CHARLES SOVEL, ESQ.,	3
5	on behalf of the Respondent	26
6	MS. CARCLYN CORWIN, ESQ., on behalf of the Fetitioner rebuttal	39
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25	2	
	2	

PROCEEDINGS 1 CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Ms. Corwin, you may 2 proceed whenever you're ready. 3 ORAL ARGUMENT CF MS. CAROLYN CORWIN, ESQ., 4 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITICNER 5 MS. CORWIN: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and 6 may it please the Court: 7 The question raised in this case concerns the 8 interpretation of 5 U.S.C. 8132, the reimbursement 9 provision of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. 10 Under Section 8132, a federal employee who has 11 suffered a work-related injury, who has received FICA 12 benefits on account of that injury, and who sues and 13 recovers from a third party in connection with that 14 injury, must reimburse the federal government out of his 15 third party recovery. 16 The question here is whether that statutory 17 duty to reimburse exists when state law provides that 18 the third party recovery may not include damages for 19 medical expenses and lost wages. 20 Respondent is a government employee who was 21 injured in a work-related automobile accident. He 22 received FICA benefits in the amount of approximately 23 \$2,000 which allowed him to pay for his medical expenses 24 and made up for his lost wages. 25

Respondent then sued the driver of the other car and eventually settled for \$8,500. The Secretary of Labor sought reimbursement for the FICA benefits that had been paid out in the amcunt of approximately \$1,600, which represented the FICA benefits less a reasonable attorney's fee.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Even though Respondent's recovery was more than five times the amount that the Secretary of Labor was seeking to be reimbursed, Respondent took the position that he did not have a duty to reimburse because his settlement did not include amounts that represented medical expenses and lost wages.

That is because the Pennsylvania no-fault insurance statute abolishes tort liability for economic losses, including medical expenses and lost wages, that fall below the ceiling set by the Pennsylvania statute for no-fault coverage.

The district court held nevertheless that the 18 statute Section 8132 did require Respondent to 19 reimburse, citing the Ostrowski case from the Sixth 20 Circuit. The Third Circuit reversed and explicitly 21 rejected the Ostrowski case. In the Third Circuit's 22 view, the federal government was to be a model employer 23 and that that was Congress' intent underlying the 24 statute. 25

For that reason the Third Circuit thought that 1 Section 8132 ought to be interpreted so that a federal 2 employee would be at least as well cff as an employee 3 covered by the state workers' compensation system. 4 Because the Fennsylvania courts had held that under the 5 state workers' compensation law a compensation carrier 6 would not be subrogated to the rights of an employee in 7 a situation like that cf respondent, the ccurt concluded 8 that the Section 8132 of the federal statute should not 9 -- should be read in an analogous manner to the 10 Pennsylvania law. 11

Our position in this case is a straightforward one. First, we think that the language of Section 8132 on its face requires reimbursement from Respondent to the federal government. Second, we think that contrary to what the court of appeals believed, the result is consistent with the purposes that underlie the reimbursement provision.

Now, the language of Section 8132 seems
clearly to require reimbursement from anything that an
employee recovers from a third party on account of his
work-related injury. That is how the Secretary of Labor
has always read this statute.

24 Section 8132 refers to money or other property 25 an employee recovers --

QUESTION: What part of 8132 are you reading 1 from? 2 MS. CORWIN: Well, I'm referring to the 3 language that -- that talks about money or other 4 property, and that -- that comes within the first 5 sentence. You have to go down several lines. 6 QUESTION: That's guite a sentence. 7 MS. CORWIN: It is a long sentence. 8 QUESTION: Okay. It's six lines. I guess on 9 page 2A of the brief. 10 MS. CORWIN: Right. The money or other 11 property which an employee recovers in satisfaction of 12 the third party's liability. And there's a reference to 13 legal liability in that liability in --14 QUESTION: But it says "in satisfaction cf 15 that liability." And, of course, that language may 16 refer back to just to the FICA liability, which is 17 limited in nature to lost wages and medical benefits. 18 MS. CORWIN: Well, I think the legal liability 19 to which it refers is the liability of the third party. 20 Now, you can go back to the injury or death for which 21 compensation is payable, but I think in terms of the 22 damages or the money or other property, that refers to 23 the liability of the third party. 24 QUESTION: Well, it's not clear, in any 25

event.

1	event.
2	MS. CORWIN: Well, I I
3	QUESTION: I think you have to look at
4	something else to determine the meaning of it, don't you?
5	MS. CORWIN: Well, I I think that certainly
6	on its face the statute does not in any way distinguish
7	among the different sorts of damages you could have. It
8	it refers to the liability. It refers to injury cr
9	death for which compensation is payable, but it doesn't
10	
11	QUESTION: Well, I guess you wouldn't say that
12	recovery from a third party of property damage is going
13	to he payable over to the United States.
14	MS. CORWIN: No. And we've said in our reply
15	brief that's never been the position of the Secretary.
16	And I think if you look at the statute, it refers to
17	this injury or death for which compensation is payable.
18	Under the FICA system, FICA benefits take the place cf
19	damages for personal injury and not for property
20	injury. If someone if scmecne's damages property
21	is damaged in a work-related situation, there is a
22	separate provision in Title 31, Section 3721, I believe,
23	that allows you to present a claim for your property
24	damage.
	But in terms of the companyation scheme we're

25

But in terms of the compensation scheme we're

talking about here, which is the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, those benefits are designed to take the place of what you would ordinarily get for your personal injury as a result of a work-related accident.

QUESTION: Well, lost wages and medical expenses.

1

2

3

4

5

6

MS. CORWIN: Well, that -- that is how the 7 benefits are measured, but in terms of what they are 8 designed to replace or -- or represent, that is the 9 employee's exclusive remedy under the statutory scheme; 10 that is, those benefits are designed to -- to compensate 11 the employee for any sort of personal injury. That is 12 -- that is typical cf a statutory compensation scheme in 13 that respect. 14

15 QUESTION: FICA dcesn't include pain and 16 suffering.

MS. CORWIN: Well -- well, under FICA you --17 you receive benefits in place of any other damages you 18 might get. If -- if ycu are injured and there is rc 19 third party tort fees around, you get your FICA benefits 20 and that's all. They take the place of anything that 21 you would otherwise get in -- if you were allowed to 22 bring a tort suit against the United States, for 23 example. So in that sense, they really -- they take the 24 place of any sort of damages within the statutory 25

compensation scheme.

23

24

25

2	QUESTION: But is FICA set up so that it
3	includes not only elements for lost wages and medical
4	expenses, but also some sort of element for what would
5	be pain and suffering in a jury negligence trial?
6	MS. CORWIN: There no, there is no amount
7	that you receive that is denominated pain and suffering;
8	but when you look to the entire statutory scheme, the
9	FICA benefits that that are received by an employee
10	in effect take the place of any sort of damages you
11	might otherwise recover against your employer.
12	QUESTION: Well, I realize that's the case. I
13	was trying to find out whether the FICA statute is like
14	I understand many state workmen's compensation statutes
15	to be, kind of giving payment for things other than
16	than pain and suffering, or whether FICA is if ycu
17	took a FICA, the average actuarial value of a FICA,
18	would it look very much like the actuarial value of a
19	jury award in favor of a plaintiff?
20	MS. CORWIN: Well, no. I don't think so. And
21	I think if you're comparing it to state schemes, it
22	would be similar in the respect you've suggested; that

when you're measuring the amount an employee gets, you generally look to the medical expenses incurred; you look to perhaps a payment on a schedule for disability;

you look to some percentage of lost wages.

2	But but in terms of the balance that's been
3	struck by Congress, you have this this lower amount
4	of of benefits compared to what you might recover in
5	a tcrt situation. On the other hand, you get it you
6	get it guickly; you get it without regard to fault; you
7	get it withcut the need for litigation. So you strike
8	the same sort of balance that you do in the state
9	systems to which you refer.
10	Now, there's
11	QUESTION: Well, nothing is recovered for pain
12	and suffering. I mean that's clear, isn't it?
13	MS. CORWIN: There is no amount of FICA
14	benefits that is measured according to someone's
15	recovery for pain and suffering.
16	There is also there is no indication in the
17	language of either differentiation among different types
18	of damages cr any suggestion that the right of
19	reimbursement, the federal governments' right as against
20	the third party recovery of the employee, no suggestion
21	that that depends in any way on the substance or the
22	nature of the employee's cause of action.
23	The bottom line is when we read 8131 is that
24	anything you recover is then subject to this federal
25	right of reimbursement.

Now, Respondent has suggested that 8132 is merely an adjunct to Section 8131 which provides that the Secretary may require the employee to assign his right of action to the Secretary to the United States. In fact, we think the two sections create somewhat different kinds of rights. But even if you do look to Section 8131 for guidance, we think our interpretation ought to prevail.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

The Secretary may require an assignment of the 9 right of action, not just the employee's right to 10 recover for medical expenses and lost wages. The way 11 assignment would work is that the Secretary, if he 12 received an assignment, would recover any available 13 damages, and that would include not only medical 14 expenses and lost wages, but pain and suffering cr 15 punitive damages or anything else the employee himself 16 might recover. 17

Then at that point the Secretary would take away from the recovery the amount that was necessary to compensate the -- the fund for all the FICA benefits that had been paid out. And only after that if there were some excess left over would that amount be paid to the employee.

Now, that's -- that's qualified by the one-fifth provision that came in in 1966, but really the principle behind it is that the -- really the -- the reimbursement of the compensation fund comes first under either 8131 or 8132.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

24

25

Now, the court skipped over the language of the statute and moved directly to the legislative purposes. We don't think the court should have dismissed the language so summarily, but again, even if you do look at Congress' purposes. I think again they support our reading of the statute.

I don't think there can be any question that 10 the primary purpose of the provisions for third party 11 actions and for reimbursement under FICA are to shift a 12 part of the cost of the program to negligent third party 13 tort feasors; that is, Congress made the judgment that 14 if there was a negligent third party in the scene 15 whenever there was a work-related accident, it was that 16 tort feasor that ought to bear the costs of those 17 particular compensation benefits as opposed to the 18 taxrayers. 19

Now, various members of Congress expressed 20 concern about the expense of the program back in 1916. 21

QUESTION: May I ask a question right there? 22 As I understand the way this works out, the injured 23 employee bears at least four-fifths of the cost of the lost wages and medical benefits, and the third party

just bears the expense of the pain and suffering. 1 MS. CORWIN: Well, the -- the employee always 2 gets the FICA benefits. I mean that is a given within 3 the system. 4 QUESTION: Right. But he, in effect, has had 5 to pay four-fifths of those benefits to the government 6 out of the recovery he got for pain and suffering, is 7 that right? 8 MS. CORWIN: Well, depending on the situation, 9 depending on how the numbers worked out --10 QUESTION: Well -- well, in this case. 11 MS. CORWIN: No. Here the employee got more 12 than four-fifths of his own recovery. 13 QUESTION: No. But the \$8,500 was for pain 14 and suffering, wasn't it? 15 MS. CORWIN: That's correct. 16 QUESTION: And out of that amount he had to 17 reimburse the government for the wages and medical 18 expense. 19 MS. CORWIN: That's ccrrect. 20 QUESTION: So that he is the one who 21 ultimately bore the cost of the wages and medical 22 expense in this case. 23 MS. CORWIN: Well, of course -- of course, he 24 had received the FICA benefits before and was merely 25

paying them back. I mean the bottom line is he always gets an amount that's equal to the FICA benefits. He may or may not --

QUESTION: Well, but --

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

23

24

25

MS. CORWIN: He may or may not get the bonus on top of that. But as to the statutory compensation scheme, he always receives the FICA benefits.

QUESTION: Well, somebody had to pay the hospital bill to start with, and I assume he did.

MS. CORWIN: Well, I think he may have and the government reimbursed him through the FICA benefits.

QUESTION: Right. And then he reimbursed the government. So at the bottom line is that he paid them out of his own assets, and one of those assets was his recovery for pain and suffering, isn't that correct? I just want to be sure I understand it. I'm not trying to debate whether it's just or fair or anything. But that's what happened, isn't it?

MS. CORWIN: Well, in that that \$8,500 was denominated pain and suffering and yes, part of that went to recompense the FICA benefits. That still left him with guite a bit left over.

QUESTION: Does it also include loss of wages and special damages, other special damages -- the third party --

MS. CORWIN: The third party recovery in this case we have agreed represents pain and suffering, and that is because of the unusual situation that's created by the Pennsylvania no-fault statute.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

QUESTION: Well, my question was addressed to the general proposition. When the recovery is had against the third person, it is for the special damages; that is, medical expenses, loss of wages, pain and suffering. It's a whole range of things making up his total injury, is it not?

MS. CORWIN: In many cases that would be sc.

Now, the "unfairness" or anomaly that comes in here is created because on tcp of the federal scheme, the federal statutory compensation scheme, there is overlaid the state nc-fault insurance scheme, and within that scheme the state has chosen to abolish tort liability for these medical expenses and lost wages belcw a certain amcunt.

For that reason the settlement or a third party recovery in -- in the Pennsylvania situation would not include elements like medical expenses and lost wages. But -- but to the extent that there is something unusual or anomalous about that, I think it -- it's attributable to what the state has come along and done in the face of the established federal program.

QUESTION: Well, as I said, I wasn't debating 1 the fairness of it; but the net result of it is that he 2 pays his own hospital bill. 3 MS. CORWIN: Well, I -- it depends on -- cn --4 OUESTION: If he had one. 5 MS. CORWIN: I mean you can -- you can shift 6 arcund the money however you want. 7 QUESTION: Well, but it isn't shifting around, 8 because the \$8,500 I thought you stipulated none of that 9 is attributable to either wages or -- or medical 10 expense. I mean do we accept that or don't we? 11 MS. CORWIN: Well, we have accepted that. 12 QUESTION: And if we accept it, doesn't it 13 follow he paid his own hospital bill? 14 MS. CORWIN: One could regard it that way. 15 One could also say --16 QUESTION: Well, one must regard it, don't we? 17 MS. CORWIN: One could also say he came out 18 with -- with the medical expenses and the lost wages 19 plus something on top of that as a result of the third 20 party recovery. 21 QUESTION: Well, but only if you say the 22 \$8,500 includes medical expenses and lost wages. You're 23 assuming there's an element of profit in recovering on 24 pain and suffering. 25

MS. CORWIN: Well, I suggest that -- that 1 Congress when it was structuring the federal 2 compensation scheme was focusing on what was necessary 3 to be fair to the employee to give him a recovery for a 4 work-related injury, and that amount is measured by the 5 FICA benefits. 6 Now, if there's a third party tort feasor in 7 the picture, you may also get something, but the 8 condition within the statutory scheme is that you first 9 apply that to compensate the government. 10 QUESTION: Well, Ms. Corwin, what would be the 11 case if instead of \$8,500 it was \$1,500? 12 MS. CORWIN: Then --13 QUESTION: Then what's his obligation to 14 reimburse? 15 MS. CORWIN: His obligation under the plain 16 language of the statute is to reimburse the federal 17 government for the FICA benefits. 18 CUESTION: Well, the whole \$1,500 --19 MS. CORWIN: The whole \$1,600. 20 QUESTION: All right. The FICA benefits were 21 \$1,800 or \$1,600, was it? 22 MS. CORWIN: Sixteen hundred was the FICA 23 benefits. 21 QUESTION: Well, then, let me change that from 25

\$1,500 to \$1,600. So if it had been -- if he'd got --1 if the \$8,500 was \$1,600, he'd have to pay it back. 2 Then Justice Stevens' question would have to be answered 3 yes, he paid his own hcspital bills, wouldn't it? 4 MS. CORWIN: Well, I don't think so. I think 5 the government initially --6 QUESTION: Well, if he gave it back, he 7 wouldn't have anything, would he? 8 MS. CORWIN: He -- well, he would come out 9 with one-fifth, because in 1966 Congress provided that 10 the employee would always get at least one-fifth of some 11 third party recovery. 12 QUESTION: I see. 13 MS. CORWIN: So the bottom line is --14 QUESTION: So -- so he'd get \$300 odd dollars 15 or something. 16 MS. CORWIN: Well, yes. He -- he would get at 17 least one-fifth. Now, here he got plenty more than 18 one-fifth. 19 QUESTION: He's paid the \$1,600 hospital bill. 20 MS. CORWIN: Well, the government initially 21 paid it. 22 QUESTION: Yes. And then he got \$1,600 from 23 the government. Now he's giving back \$1,300, so he ends 24 up with a net of \$300. And he certainly pays the 25

difference, \$1,300 of the hospital bill, doesn't he?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

19

20

21

MS. CORWIN: Well, I think it's a matter cf characterization, and I think that one has to start cut from the premise that when Congress was setting up this federal compensation scheme that it felt that the -- the proper result was that the employee should get FICA benefits. Those were benefits that took the place cf a tort liability system. He got them quickly, he got them without regard to fault, he got them without litigation.

Now, to the extent that there was a third party in the picture, Congress concluded that that third party as opposed to the taxpayer to be bearing the cost of the compensation benefits paid out. And I think you have to assume that that is -- that is the primary purpose; that is the purpose reflected in the debates on this measure.

QUESTION: Well, if I were the injured employee, I'd still feel I was \$1,300 out of pocket.

MS. CORWIN: Well, I think that --

QUESTION: Well, he has the compensation payments. He doesn't have to disgorge those.

MS. CORWIN: Well, that's right, and that really is the basis of the scheme. The assumption is that if you're in a work-related injury situation that you get the compensation payments, you get the FICA

benefits, and that in itself is the solution under the statutory compensation scheme.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

25

Now -- ncw, as I say, if there's this third party, you may have something on top of that, but that's not necessarily so.

QUESTION: Ms. Ccrwin, perhaps your opponent can speak with more authority than you can on this, but under the Pennsylvania statute, granted you can only sue for basically pain and suffering, but isn't there some administrative provision or some provision for your own carrier, your own insurance carrier to pay lost wages and specials?

MS. CORWIN: There -- the way the Pennsylvania scheme works would prevent in this situation no-fault being -- benefits being paid. The way it works is that the -- any obligation of the no-fault, the first party no-fault insurer, Respondent's own insurer, is reduced by the amount of workers' compensation or other government benefits that the employee receives.

QUESTION: So an employee of a private employer here who couldn't claim workmen's compensation could have claimed something from the first insurer, but because he was covered, this guy was covered by FICA, this person couldn't.

MS. CORWIN: No. I don't think there's --

there's not a difference in the two situations you suggest. The individual whc's employed in the private system would -- would be forced first to get his workers' compensation, and the no-fault carrier wouldn't have to pay anything to the extent the workers' compensation carrier had done so under the state system.

QUESTION: But if it's an injury not arising out of in the course of employment and there is no workmen's compensation, no FICA, then under Pennsylvania law the first liability carrier has to ray specials?

7

8

9

10

21

-

MS. CORWIN: That is correct. Then -- then you would recover it from your first party insurer, that's correct.

QUESTION: Ms. Corwin, in a -- in a state without no-fault or without some system like Pennsylvania's and you sue the third party, you can recover anything you can get out of them. And if in Justice Brennan's example, if you recovered from a third party only \$1,500, and you'd only been paid \$1,500, you're going to have to refund the whole thing.

MS. CORWIN: Well, that -- that's correct.

QUESTION: I mean whether that's -- whatever the recovery is. And so this case, just because it involved recovery of pain and suffering, doesn't present any unique problem. MS. CORWIN: Well, it's not unique in that you may always end up having to pay everything back.

QUESTION: Yes.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

25

MS. CORWIN: That's a condition of -- of heing in the compensation system. You may also have situations like settling for less than you had claimed. QUESTION: Yes.

MS. CORWIN: Or being in a comparative 8 negligence state and having your recovery reduced in 9 which you -- you would have the reimbursement really go 10 into the other parts of your damages award. And that's 11 something I think that Congress was -- was clearly aware 12 of. I mean you didn't have no-fault back in 1916, but 13 you had things like there -- there was a specific 14 reference to settlement in the statute, so Congress was 15 clearly aware that you might end up with -- with less 16 than -- than all of your damages on each element. 17

There were -- in the Senate debates there were references to comparative negligence on several occasions, so they again recognized that that sort of principle might be at work. But there was -- there was no expression of concern about protecting those elements of damages like pain and suffering from this federal right to reimbursement.

Now, there -- there was some concern about

protecting the damages from any credit against compensation for some future injury. Congress said well, we don't -- we don't want a sword of Damcoles, is what they call it, hanging over the employee so that he would have to apply all of his recovery sometime in the future; but he didn't -- he didn't know it -- it would possibly happen to him some day.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

So they -- they put in some language that said this right of reimbursement doesn't extend beyond that same injury; but there was no effort to -- to protect any of these elements of damages from this -- what appears to be an absolute right of recovery.

Now, I'd just like to briefly mention another consideration we think underlies the statute, and that is, Congress' intent to create a -- a uniform and manageable system that can be administered on a nationwide basis.

We've pointed out in our brief the 18 administrative difficulties we think the sort of test 19 fashioned by the court of appeals would present. I 20 don't think that Congress has indicated anywhere that --21 that it anticipated that the Secretary would be making 22 this sort of state-by-state adjustment of federal 23 rights. And in the absence of that indication, I don't 24 think it's appropriate to read it into the statute. 25

Now, the court of appeals thought it was significant that reimbursement was not necessary here in order to prevent double recovery. I don't dispute that -- that Congress may have had this prevention of double recovery in mind as an effect of this reimbursement provision. That was not the only purpose of the provision, and I don't -- it was certainly not the decisive provision.

1

2

3

1

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

23

24

25

I think the point was to put the -- the loss of the compensation benefits on the tort feasor, not on the compensation system, whenever it was possible. If Congress had wanted to focus on this double recovery rationale, I think it could have drafted the statute in a much more limited manner.

Now, ultimately the court of appeals and 15 Respondent fall back on their cwn conceptions of 16 fairness to federal employees and on the -- the ideas 17 about parity between federal employees and others. I 18 think I've pointed out that in our view it is 19 Pennsylvania that has come along and imposed upon the 20 FICA system a different set cf adjustments cf rights and 21 has created this sort of situation. 22

It's within Fennsylvania's power to remedy this if they perceive it as unfair. Their legislature can do it. We think they could do it by construing

their statute in the ccurts. But to the extent that Pennsylvania doesn't take care of this, I think that it is the burden of Congress to adjust any rights if it perceives that this is an unfair situation.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

QUESTION: Ms. Corwin, may I just ask -- I'm not clear in my own mind. Supposing the injured person here had worked for a Fennsylvania employer and received benefits under their workmen's compensation program precisely equal to this. What would have happened? And then later sued and got the same recovery.

MS. CORWIN: Pennsylvania has construed its own workers' compensation system in the light of the no-fault scheme and has said in that case there -there's cnly a right of subrogation under the Pennsylvania scheme, not this right of reimbursement as defined in Section 8132.

But as to the subrogation right, the Pennsylvania courts have held that that -- construing the two statutes together, the workers' comp and the no-fault, that the workers' compensation carrier is not subrogated to the right, so the employee would get to keep the recovery for pain and suffering.

But here I'd point out you're not in a situation in which you're construing two statutes that have been passed by Congress together in trying to

reconcile them in the way that --

1

2

3

QUESTION: You get a federal statute and a state statute.

MS. CORWIN: Yeah. The way the Pennsylvania 4 court was trying to reconcile its two state statutes. 5 Here you have an existing federal system. You have 6 something changing from the outside. I think it's 7 similar to the Morrison-Knudsen situation. Here the 8 change from the outside is the Pennsylvania no-fault 9 statute; but I think it's up to Congress to readjust 10 rights within the federal system if it chooses to do so. 11 I'll reserve the remainder of my time. 12 CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Very well. 13 Mr. Sovel. 14 ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES SOVEL, ESQ., 15 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 16 MR. SOVEL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 17 please the Court: 18 Under the Pennsylvania no-fault system when a 19 person is injured, he's entitled to collect his basic 20 benefits from his own insurance carrier. Those basic 21 benefits are medical expenses and a portion of wage 22 loss. It goes up to 80 percent of the wage loss up to 23 \$1,000 a month. If the person is entitled to workmen's 24 compensation benefits, then he must take those workmen's 25

compensation benefits, and the amount paid by the no-fault carrier is reduced by the amount that the workmen's compensation carrier pays. In most instances the effect of that is to reduce the figure to zero so that the man receives his workmen's compensation wage loss and his medical expenses from his employer.

1

2

3

4

5

6

11

The statute specifically provides and the 7 courts of Pennsylvania have so held that the workmen's 8 compensation carrier cannot assert a right cf 9 subrogation in the third party action. The third rarty 10 action, therefore, is limited to items of damages nct covered by the no-fault benefit, and the no-fault 12 benefit in turn is the workmen's compensation benefit. 13

Ncw, in effect, ycu have a new type of 14 recovery for an injured person. Instead of what. 15 formerly was a single right to sue a third party to 16 recover what damages you were entitled to as medical 17 losses, wage losses and pain and suffering, you have a 18 two-pronged recovery: one of no-fault recovery and a 19 separate one for amounts nct covered by no-fault against 20 the third party if you can prove it. 21

The effect of the government's position here 22 is to deny the person that single recovery which is 23 contemplated by state law. The single recovery 24 contemplated by state law is a no-fault benefit plus a 25

right to sue a third party. The government is saying 1 out of that single right we're going to reduce that 2 single right of recovery by making you pay back the 3 medical expenses that you have received. 4 Now, when Congress enacted --5 QUESTION: Well, that's what the statute seems 6 to say . 7 MR. SOVEL: Well, it says that, if Your Honor 8 please, only if you interpret the word "damages" to mean 9 damages for pain -- for pain and suffering cnly. 10 QUESTION: Well, isn't that what this usually 11 refers to in a tort suit? 12 MR. SOVEL: No. 13 QUESTION: What dc ycu usually refer tc 14 recoveries for pain and suffering? 15 MR. SOVEL: I interpret the word "damages" in 16 the statute. The statute reads, "If an injury of death 17 for which compensation is payable under this subchapter 18 is caused under circumstances creating a legal liability 19 in a person other than the United States to pay damages." 20 Now, that can mean a whole panoply of damages 21 arising from that incident. 22 QUESTION: Including damages for pain and 23 suffering. 24 MR. SOVEL: And including property damage. 25

But no one would suggest that that would be the -- a reasonable interpretation of the statute. And that's why the plain meaning of the language -- the language has no plain meaning. "Damages" could mean any other types of damages that a -- the tort of one automobile hitting another might create. It would include property damage. And they admit that that would not be a reasonable interpretation of the statute.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 QUESTION: Well, but you say the reason why 10 it's nct reasonable is a reference to injury and death 11 necessarily limits it to the kinds of injuries or 12 damages you associate with personal injury rather than 13 property damage.

MR. SOVEL: I would suggest, Your Honor, that 14 that's not exactly how the statute reads. It says if 15 the circumstances under which compensation is payable --16 if an injury or death cccurs under circumstances where 17 there's an obligation to pay damages, one could say 18 damages for injury or death; but the statute doesn't say 19 that. The statute just says damages. And it could mean 20 damages, any damages recoverable under that particular 21 incident. 22

But I -- I think more important is to try to get a plain meaning for a statute that has been enacted and reenacted over the years when a no-fault program and the changes in no-fault were not contemplated. To try to read a plain meaning into that type of a statute would be unreasonable in terms of what Congress might have intended in this situation or did intend.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Congress certainly, in enacting the statute, did not attempt to prescribe the circumstances under which a third party recovery would be made.

QUESTION: Well, suppose this had come -- come in a state without a no-fault, and he sued the third party, and he sued him for lost wages, medical expenses, pain and suffering. He had a special verdict, and the jury came back and said nothing for -- no specials, no wages, no nothing except pain and suffering, and \$10,000 for pain and suffering.

Now, would you be making the same argument here?

MR. SOVEL: I would be making the same point I 17 made in my brief, Your Honor, in that his third party 18 recovery, whatever the jury found, that was his third 19 party recovery, and that's his single recovery that he's 20 entitled to the benefit of. He's not -- he wouldn't 21 have -- his third party recovery reduced by what he has 22 to pay back would still be the same amount for the third 23 party recovery. It does -- there's no saying that a 24 jury has to award a lot for pain and -- for pain and 25

suffering, or it might find that a different amount cf --1 QUESTION: Well, what's the answer to my 2 question? Would you be making the same argument here 3 today if -- if this had come up in a -- in a -- not --4 in another state without no-fault and the jury --5 MR. SOVEL: No. 6 QUESTION: -- Just happened to award --7 MR. SOVEL: No. I would --8 QUESTION: -- Damages only for pain and 9 suffering. 10 MR. SOVEL: I would not be making the same 11 argument. 12 QUESTION: Why not? 13 MR. SOVEL: He would be obligated to pay. 14 QUESTION: Why would he? 15 MR. SOVEL: Fecause his third party recovery 16 for damages included the right to prove in that third 17 party action his medical expenses and wage loss. 18 . OUESTION: Yes. 19 MR. SOVEL: The fact that the jury didn't 20 award --21 QUESTION: The only thing is -- the only thing 22 is he didn't prove any. 23 MR. SOVEL: Well, the jury didn't find --24 might have found other reasons why not. We don't -- you 25

never know what goes on in the jury's mind in awarding it. But nonetheless, you're not going to start impeaching a jury's verdict and trying to find out what they consider.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

13

14

15

16

24

25

QUESTION: You're not impeaching it at all. You're just -- you're just -- he just says well, look, all you ever reimbursed me for was for my loss of wages and medical expenses. Why should I have to repay you out of my damages for pain and suffering?

10 MR. SOVEL: Your Honor, I think that the 11 purpose of the right of action that is brought which 12 results in a man receiving a third party recovery --

QUESTION: So you think these -- these cases ought to come cut completely differently if they come out of Pennsylvania or other states with no-fault and states that don't have no-fault.

MR. SOVEL: Well, Your Honor, I think that Congress decided to rest on state law, and we're not going to prohibit the states from experimenting with different types of recovery. If one states wants to have comparative negligence and another wants to have contributory negligence, the result may well be different.

There might be a -- if a state had contributed

QUESTION: Well, not in terms of the 1 obligation to repay the government. 2 MR. SOVEL: Well, there might be no recovery 3 in a given case because --4 QUESTION: Well, maybe -- that may well he, 5 but -- but in terms of his chligation to pay, I don't 6 kncw -- I don't see why you wouldn't --7 MR. SOVEL: Because it results in him getting 8 less than whatever the single recovery was that the 9 state law contemplated that he would receive. There's 10 no indication that Congress intended to treat the 11 federal employee any different than any other state 12 employee injured under the same circumstances. If that 13 was his third party recovery, that's what he's supposed 14 to receive. It's not to be reduced by a benefit that he 15 did not receive in terms of having to ray back the 16 medical expenses or the wage losses. 17 In the third party action a man may recover a 18 given amount for pain and suffering. He may recover 19 less. He may recover his medical expenses, and he may 20 not. But he was allowed to prove them, and they were 21 part of his third party damage action. 22 In this case he was barred from proving his 23 medical expenses in the third party action. He was

barred from proving his wage losses. And it is on that

24

25

basis that he shouldn't have to pay back something that he was barred from being entitled to recover under the law.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

23

24

25

It was the Pennsylvania legislature's intention that he get those benefits as a matter of right; that they not be covered by his third party action. The government doesn't want to follow state law in this area, although it seems to be satisfied to follow state law in every other area.

QUESTION: Mr. Sovel, can I ask you a question I just don't quite understand?

Supposing the -- your client had been unemployed, say, and he had a \$1,500 hospital bill.

MR. SOVEL: Right.

QUESTION: And he -- I take it he would have had that paid out by the no-fault insurance carrier.

MR. SOVEL: Correct.

QUESTION: Because he was not paid by any compensation program.

20 Why can't your client now get that hospital 21 paid in that manner because the government is not paying 22 it?

MR. SOVEL: I didn't follow your last part. He can't bring the third party action for it. QUESTION: He brings the third party action

and gets the \$8,500 for pain and suffering. 1 MR. SOVEL: Right. 2 QUESTION: And he goes to his no-fault carrier 3 and says I had to give part of that money back to the 4 government, so I did not have it paid by the 5 government. They gave me the money and took it back. 6 So why can't I get it from my no-fault carrier? 7 MR. SOVEL: Because in this situation there is 8 no no-fault carrier. It's all the government. 9 QUESTION: There is no no-fault carrier? 10 MR. SOVEL: He was driving a government 11 vehicle. 12 Now, you see, in this situation his no-fault 13 carrier -- let's suppose he had a vehicle, and under 14 Pennsylvania law, if he had his own automobile and he --15 he would go to his own carrier for coverage, in that 16 situation the employer -- the carrier would not be 17 subrogated. They'd have to pay it, and he'd have no 18 right --19 QUESTION: The no-fault insurance is paid by 20 the driver himself. 21 MR. SOVEL: Yes. 22 QUESTION: He pays his own premium. 23 MR. SOVEL: Right. 24 QUESTION: What if he was from Maryland? I 25

)

just -- I'm --1 MR. SCVEI: Well, I'm not so sure I follow you 2 question. 3 QUESTION: Well, supposing he was not -- not 4 -- does -- say an out-of-state person, must he carry his 5 own no-fault insurance, or he just has no right at all, 6 is that it? 7 MR. SOVEL: Well, he would have his rights 8 under what his policy would be, and if he received no 9 no-fault benefits --10 QUESTION: He's just out of luck. 11 MR. SOVEL: Then no. Then he's not barred . 12 from suing it in the third party action under 13 Pennsylvania law. 14 OUESTION: Well, then, why can't he now say I 15 did not get any no-fault -- I'm not getting -- the net 16 result of my arrangement with the government is I get 17 nothing for my hospital bill, so I want to sue the third 18 party. 19 MR. SOVEL: Because the no-fault carrier is 20 entitled to say to him, in turn, you received 21 compensation benefits, and we're entitled to the credit 22 for that under Pennsylvania law. 23 QUESTION: But I received them, but I couldn't 24 keep them. 25

MR. SOVEL: Well, but that --

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

11

14

QUESTION: I just wonder. I must say I'm puzzled.

MR. SOVEL: Well, that -- that would really put you right around in a circle. The Pennsylvania legislature made a judgment as to what elements it was going to include in the fund that insurance premiums were to pay for.

QUESTION: Well, as I understand your 9 explanation of Pennsylvania law, it says that the third 10 party has to pay the hospital bill when the plaintiff has to pay it himself. And the net result of your 12 analysis is he's paying his own hospital bill. 13

MR. SOVEL: That's right.

QUESTION: Sc I would think he ought to be 15 able to get it from the third party. In other words, I 16 think that maybe there was a mistake of state law 17 created -- well, that's out of this. 18

MR. SOVEL: Well, I -- I think that for him to 19 go back to his own carrier now, I don't see how he cculd 20 do it in these circumstances, because the carrier would 21 also have the right to say we're entitled to get the 22 benefit of workmen's compensation, and therefore, there 23 is no nc-fault liability, and the state court would turn 24 around and say that's a correct interpretation of cur 25

statute.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

It really comes down to, I think, the -- the government -- the federal government always would seem to be satisfied to accept state law in this area. It's not intending to define the circumstances under which a third party recovery may be made.

Pennsylvania theoretically could totally abolish third party recovery and say we're not going to allow any third party recovery. You're only right is to receive workmen's compensation. The government would be out its compensation benefits, but under this statute it couldn't complain of that.

Now, that would be a different rule for one 13 state than in another state. Fut it seems that you're 14 dealing with a state -- a federal statute that is 15 incorporating by state law -- incorporating state law 16 and should be bound by the rights that that state law 17 creates for the individual. This is essentially a 18 subrogation provision. I do not accept the argument 19 that there's some sort of separate right against the 20 employee. 8132 just is another element of interpreting 21 the right of subrogation that is started 8131. It says 22 if the man makes recovery, he has to pay it back. And I 23 think that that would be the proper interpretation. It 24 treats all employees fairly and equally within the state 25

1	and treats all federal employees equally as compared to
2	the various states in which they are employed.
3	Thank you.
4	CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Do you have anything
5	further, Ms. Corwin?
6	ORAL ARGUMENT OF MS. CAROLYN CORWIN, ESQ.,
7	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER REBUTTAL
8	MS. CORWIN: Just one brief point. I'd like
9	to follow up with Justice Stevens' question.
10	This is this is something that can be
11	solved through a construction of state law. The Court
12	hasn't done it. Now it's open to them to do it. We've
13	suggested in our brief at page 39, note 25, that there
14	are ways that the courts could do this in Pennsylvania
15	if they're not willing to do it now, and they can solve
16	this problem if they perceive it to be one.
17	CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, counsel.
18	The case is submitted.
19	(Whereupon, at 2:20 p.m., the case in the
20	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
	39

CERTIFICATION

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc., hereby certifies that the attached pages represent an accurate transcription of electronic sound recording of the oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States in the Matter of:

#83-838-UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. PAUL B. LORENZETTI

and that these attached pages constitute the original transcript of the proceedings for the records of the court.

BY (REPORTER)

28:19 08 994 48. RECEIVED SUPREME COURT. U.S. RECEIVED

9

3