

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DKT/CASE NO. 81-1983
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner v. CARMEN CAMPBELL
PLACE Washington, D. C.
DATE February 28, 1983
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(202) 628-9300 440 FIRST STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - x 3 RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, SECRETARY : OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, : 4 Petitioner 5 : 6 : No. 81-1983 V . 7 CARMEN CAMPBELL : 8 - - - x 9 Washington, D.C. 10 Monday, February 28, 1983 The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument 11 before the Supreme Court of the United States at 12 13 10:05 a.m. APPEARANCES: 14 JOHN H. GARVEY, ESQ., Office of the Solicitor General, 15 Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the Petitioner. 16 RUBEN NAZARIO, ESQ., Brooklyn, New York; on behalf of the 17 Respondent 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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1 PROCEEDINGS CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will hear argument 2 3 first this morning in Schweiker against Campbell. 4 Mr. Garvey, you may proceed whenever you are 5 ready. ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN H. GARVEY, ESQ., 6 7 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER MR. GARVEY: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please 8 the Court, the issue in this case is the validity of 9 regulations governing claims under the Social Security 10 Act for disability in cases that can't be decided on the 11 12 basis of medical evidence alone. In 1979, the respondent who was then 51 years 13 old applied for disability benefits under Title II 14 claiming a back problem and high blood pressure. 15 QUESTION: Total impairment? 16 MR. GARVEY: I believe so. 17 She had been born in Panama where she was 18 educated through the sixth grade, and moved to the 19 United States in 1964. Between that time and the time 20 of filing her claim, she had worked as a maid in a hotel 21 and as a seamstress and had injured her back moving a 22 laundry truck. 23 Her claim was denied initially and on 24 reconsideration by the State agency, and she then 25

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requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.
 The Administrative Law Judge took evidence on her
 medical claims, on her back impairment and her other
 claims, and concluded that she was capable of doing
 light work as that term is defined in the regulations
 which are at issue in this case.

7 The Administrative Law Judge also took 8 evidence on respondent's age and education, and on her 9 work experience and training, and after consulting the 10 guidelines in Appendix 2 of the regulations, concluded 11 that she was not disabled.

12 The respondent then sought review in the 13 District Court which upheld the Secretary's 14 determinations and respondent then appealed to the 15 Second Circuit which reversed.

16 The Second Circuit held that in cases which 17 can't be decided on the basis of medical evidence alone 18 where the claimant is incapable of doing her prior work, 19 the Secretary is required to show two things in order to 20 find the claimant not disabled.

The first thing the court said the Secretary must demonstrate is what the claimant can do, that is to say, what kinds of physical activities like lifting and walking, and what sort of skills she may have acquired in her past work. With respect to that issue, the Court

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of Appeals concluded that the Secretary's determination
 that respondent was capable of doing light work was
 supported by substantial evidence.

The Court of Appeals said that the Secretary must also introduce evidence on a second question. The Court said that the Secretary must show what kinds of jobs are available for a person who is capable of doing what the claimant is capable of doing.

OUESTION: Mr. Garvey, do you interpret the 9 Court of Appeals' decision as perhaps being based on 10 some kind of due process, lack of notice requirement? 11 MR. GARVEY: I find it difficult to understand 12 the Court of Appeals as having said that, because it 13 made no mention of the due process clause. Respondent 14 contends that the Court of Appeals was concerned about 15 giving notice to claimants of the issues which are at 16 stake in disability hearings. The Secretary understands 17 the Court of Appeals to have done something more radical 18 than that. 19

20 QUESTION: Short of a due process requirement 21 of notice, what other requirement would there be? 22 MR. GARVEY: What other requirement might the 23 Court --24 QUESTION: For notice.

25 MR. GARVEY: There is also a statutory --

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1 QUESTION: -- as far as this Court is
2 concerned?

3 MR. GARVEY: There is a statutory requirement of notice in Section 205(b) of the Social Security Act 4 that provides that the Secretary must give notice and 5 reasonable opportunity for a hearing, and the Secretary 6 7 has in fact implemented that notice requirement by regulations, and there are a couple in particular. 8 In 20 CFR 404.938, the Secretary has provided 9 that notice of a hearing will be mailed or served at 10 least ten days before the hearing. It will contain a 11 statement of the specific issues to be decided and tell 12 you that you may designate a person to represent you 13 during the proceedings. 14

15 The regulations then go on to provide that 16 once the hearing has begun, the Administrative Law Judge 17 may consider a new issue at the hearing, that is to say, 18 an issue not raised at the initial or reconsideration 19 stage.

20 QUESTION: Mr. Garvey, the Court of Appeals 21 didn't mention that section that you have just quoted at 22 all.

23 MR. GARVEY: No, it did not.
24 QUESTION: As I understand it, we have a
25 statute here and we have regulations issued pursuant to

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1 the Secretary's authority under 405(a), and the Court of 2 Appeals could decide against the Secretary in this case 3 only if it either decided that the regulation wasn't 4 authorized by the statute or that the statute had some 5 sort of constitutional infirmity in it.

6 MR. GARVEY: That is the Secretary's7 contention in this case, that is correct.

8 QUESTION: What do you understand to have been 9 the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, if it had any? 10 MR. GARVEY: As I understand the Court of 11 Appeals, what it was concerned about was that the 12 Secretary had not complied with the procedures which the 13 Courts had used to interpret the statutory term before 14 these regulations had been passed.

Before the regulations were enacted, at disability hearings, the statute provided that where the case can't be decided on the basis of medical evidence alone, the Secretary was required to consider, under Section 223, the claimant's age, education, and work experience.

21 That job of considering those vocational 22 factors, along with the claimant's medical impairment, 23 in order to decide what kinds of jobs are available for 24 the claimant, had been performed largely with the 25 assistance of vocational experts.

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1 These were people who were rehabilitation 2 counsellors or directors of employment agencies, and under contract with the Social Security Administration. 3 They would take the stand, after all of the evidence 4 5 about the claimant's medical factors and vocational characteristics had been taken, and would be asked 6 7 hypothetical questions by the Administrative Law Judge about what sorts of jobs would be available for such a 8 9 claimant if the Court determined that he was able of doing light work. 10

11 The Court of Appeals, as I understand it, said 12 in this case that the Secretary was required to continue 13 to do that in order to give the claimant an opportunity 14 to dispute the suitability and the availability of the 15 jobs that were noticed.

I think the Court's decision is very much 16 like, in fact I think it is identical to claims raised 17 under 405(g) decided by the First, Third, Fifth, 18 Seventh, and 11th Circuits. In each of those cases, 19 what the claimant contended was that the Secretary's 20 decision wasn't supported by substantial evidence if the 21 22 Secretary didn't put on evidence about what kinds of jobs were out there that were suitable for a claimant of 23 24 this sort.

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QUESTION: Is this a substantial evidence case

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1 for us, then?

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Your cert petition treats it as though the Court had invalidated the grid system in some kind of regulations promulgated by the Secretary, and yet the Court didn't expressly do that. Are you telling us, then, that it really is a case of sufficiency of the revidence?

MR. GARVEY: No, it is not.

9 You will notice in the Court of Appeals'
10 opinion that at page 7-A it says, on the question of
11 what this claimant can do, the record as a whole
12 supports the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Ms.
13 Campbell had the residual functional capacity to perform
14 light work.

15 Then the Court goes on to say that there is a 16 second question which must be decided, that is to say, 17 what kinds of jobs are out there and what their demands 18 are. With respect to that, the Court said the 19 Secretary's decision was not supported by substantial 20 evidence because he had not introduced any evidence on 21 that question.

But what the Secretary contends in this Court is that it is unnecessary for him to introduce any evidence on that question because the issue has already been resolved by the regulations.

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QUESTION: Maybe you are arguing that the grid
 system is evidence.

3 MR. GARVEY: But it is evidence only in the 4 sense in which any kind of regulation is evidence. What 5 the tables and the guidelines actually do is to make 6 unnecessary the introduction of evidence on what kinds 7 of jobs.

8 QUESTION: It really dispenses with the need 9 for this sort of a proof that the Court of Appeals 10 thought was required.

11 MR. GARVEY: That is correct. What the 12 Secretary concluded was that those issues are really 13 legislative facts most appropriately determined in the 14 course of rulemaking proceedings. I might add that that 15 conclusion corresponds to what this Court said in 16 Matthews against Eldridge.

17 What the Court there said was, resolution of 18 the inquiry as to the types of employment opportunities 19 that exist in the national economy for a physically 20 impaired worker with a particular set of skills would 21 not necessarily be advanced by an evidentiary hearing. 22 Then the Court went on to quote a passage from Professor 23 Davis's treatise dealing with legislative facts.

24 Then the Court concluded that the statistical 25 information relevant to this judgment is more amenable

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1 to written than to oral presentation.

2 QUESTION: At the top of page 9-A of the 3 opinion, is it possible that that material where the 4 Court refers to the fact that before and after these 5 guidelines that the Court of Appeals had had some pretty 6 specific notions as to what the standard should be. 7 Does that suggest that they perhaps are not giving 8 enough weight to the guidelines?

9 MR. GARVEY: I think that is exactly correct. At the top of 9-A what the Court says is that in future 10 cases, in past -- before and after adoption of the 11 guidelines, this Court has required the Secretary to 12 identify specific alternative occupations, supported by 13 a job description clarifying the nature of the job and 14 demonstrating that the job does not require exertion or 15 skills not possessed by the claimant. The Court then 16 goes on to say that in the past this has been done 17 largely through the use of vocational testimony. 18

19 Then the Court says at the top of page 10-A 20 that if the Secretary is going to dispense with the use 21 of vocational experts, what he has got to do is provide 22 a similar degree of specificity, and concludes "the key 23 consideration in the administrative proceeding must be 24 that the claimant be given adequate opportunity to 25 challenge the suitability or availability of the jobs

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1 noticed."

If the Secretary is in fact required to do
that, then the regulations are effectively useless,
because --

5 QUESTION: Is there anything in the 6 regulations that deals with the burden of proof and this 7 possible shifting of the burden of proof here?

8 MR. GARVEY: What the regulations say is that 9 in cases which are specifically described by the 10 guidelines, by the tables in Appendix 2, that under 11 those circumstances if the findings of fact are the same 12 as the rule, we use that rule to decide whether a person 13 is disabled.

On the question of burden of proof with 14 respect to the suitability or availability of jobs for 15 people who meet the requirements in the tables, the 16 question of burden of proof is irrelevant for the same 17 reason as the substantial evidence guestion is 18 irrelevant, because that issue about whether such jobs 19 are available is no longer litigated in these 20 proceedings. It has been decided by rulemaking. 21 I should add that with respect to all of the 22

23 facts that are unique to any given claimant with respect 24 to the claimant's medical condition, physical 25 impairments, mental impairments, the claimant's age,

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what kind of training the claimant has, what kind of 1 education she has got, what work she has done in the 2 3 past, on all of those guestions, once the disability inquiry reaches the last stage, the Secretary still 4 maintains or still shoulders the burden of proof showing 5 6 that the claimant is capable of engaging in activity, 7 all of that notwithstanding, and the regulations 8 specifically provide that all of those issues are open to rebuttal at the hearing. 9

10 It might be useful for me just to describe 11 briefly the reason for adopting these regulations and 12 say a few words about the way they work, and then say a 13 little bit more about what it was that the Secretary 14 believes the Court of Appeals decided.

Until 1978, before these regulations were 15 adopted, indeed today, most disability cases can be 16 decided on the basis of medical evidence alone. It will 17 either show that the claimant is so impaired that she is 18 unable to do any work regardless of what her vocational 19 characteristics are, or it will show that the claimant's 20 impairment is not sufficiently severe to warrant further 21 inquiry. 22

In cases which can't be decided simply on the basis of medical evidence, the promulgation of the regulations was designed to displace the use of

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vocational experts at hearings in determining the
 question of what kinds of jobs were available and
 suitable for claimants who are described by the
 regulations.

The general theme of the regulations is this: 5 For claimants whose impairments are not sufficiently 6 7 severe to warrant the conclusion of the question right there, among people who have similar impairments, what 8 the regulations do is to say that the older you are, the 9 more likely it is that you will be impaired, that you 10 will be disabled. Or, the less education you have, or 11 the less training you have, for people who have similar 12 impairments, the ones who are less educated, less 13 well-trained, have no skills, it is those people who 14 have an easier time proving disability under the 15 regulations which are at stake in this case. 16

What the tables -- At the conclusion in 17 Appendix 2, what those tables do is to classify jobs 18 according to their gross physical demands. For example, 19 the table that deals with light work in this case 20 assumes that people who are able to do light work are 21 able to undertake such activities as carrying more than 22 ten pounds frequently, and occasionally 20 pounds, that 23 they are able to do a good deal of walking or standing 24 or, if the job involves sitting, they are able to do 25

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such things as pushing or pulling of arm and leg
 controls.

3 For people whose impairment is only of that sort, only in the kinds of gross physical demands of 4 5 which the tables take notice, the Secretary has said that for those who are capable of doing light work, that 6 there are some 1600 jobs, different types of occupations 7 in the national economy, which can be performed by 8 people of that sort. These are simple jobs that anybody 9 can learn to do in less than 30 days. They are jobs 10 like --11

12 QUESTION: Well, suppose one of the things 13 that the tables say is that light work includes the 14 ability to lift up to 20 pounds or 15, whatever it is, 15 may the claimant dispute whether or not he or she in 16 fact may lift up to 15 pounds?

MR. GARVEY: Indeed. In fact, the respondent in this case disputed that she was unable to lift 20 pounds on at least two occasions. At her hearing, she introduced evidence from her doctor, Dr. Lowenthal, on a form which the Social Security Administration has designed to address just that question, the Joint Appendix on page 32.

24 QUESTION: Then what happens, Mr. Garvey? She 25 testifies, "No, I can't lift more than ten pounds."

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1 What then must the ALJ do when the table says that if 2 you are capable of doing light work and must lift up to 3 15? Does this necessarily require a determination that 4 no, she can't do light work?

5 MR. GARVEY: No, not necessarily. What 6 happens is what has always happened in these disability 7 cases, the Administrative Law Judge considers her 8 evidence along with the contrary evidence which is 9 introduced --

10 QUESTION: And makes a finding.

MR. GARVEY: -- and makes a finding with
respect to how many pounds she is able to lift.

Had the Administrative Law Judge in this case concluded that she was not capable of lifting that weight, then he wouldn't have been able to apply Table 2. He would have been required, at a minimum, to apply Table 1 which would have determined that she was disabled in this case.

19 QUESTION: Of course, in advance of the 20 hearing, does she get any kind of notice to indicate 21 that one of the issues will be whether she can or cannot 22 lift 15 pounds?

23 MR. GARVEY: The notice which she gets in 24 advance of the hearing appears in the administrative 25 record, and it says that "the issues at your hearing

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1 will be how severe your impairment is. The impairment 2 must be so severe as to prevent you from not only not 3 engaging in your usual work, but considering your age, education and work experience, prevent you from engaging 4 in any other kind of substantial gainful work." 5 QUESTION: Does she get a copy of the 6 guidelines at all? 7 MR. GARVEY: She does not get a copy of the 8 guidelines. Claimants do get a copy --9 QUESTION: Excuse me, Mr. Garvey. If she 10 doesn't get a copy of the guidelines, how does she know 11 the issue of whether she can lift 15 pounds or not will 12 arise at the hearing? 13 MR. GARVEY: She is told that the guidelines 14 will apply. 15 QUESTION: How does she get access to the 16 guidelines? 17 MR. GARVEY: The guidelines are available at 18 19 Social Security Administration Branch offices. She is also told at the beginning of the hearing, as she was in 20 this case by the ALJ, that the issue will be how much --21 the issue will be your ability to stand, sit, lift, 22 walk, carry, and similar facts of that sort. 23 On page 37 of the Joint Appendix, the 24 Administrative Law Judge said: "What we are interested 25

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in is your capacity to engage in sedantary, light,
 medium, or heavy work. What we're taking into account
 is your ability to walk, stand, sit, lift, push, pull,
 carry --

5 QUESTION: Now I gather she is entitled to 6 assistance with a counsel, is she not, if she wants to 7 bring someone?

8 MR. GARVEY: Yes, she is.

9 QUESTION: But if she does not bring someone,10 none is provided for her?

MR. GARVEY: That's correct, although it is important to emphasize that the Administrative Law Judge at these hearings does not represent the Secretary. The Administrative Law Judge is charged under the regulations with fully bringing out both the claimant's side of the case and the Secretary's side of the case.

We think that the transcript of the hearing in 17 this case in fact demonstrates the Administrative Law 18 Judge questioned the respondent on each of these 19 characteristics which are made relevant by the tables. 20 QUESTION: Mr. Garvey, I still am not 21 certain. When is she told about 15 pounds? 22 MR. CARVEY: She is not specifically told in 23 any of the notices which are mailed to her that the 24 question will be whether she can lift 15 pounds. 25

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1 QUESTION: My question is, when is she told, 2 ever?

3 MR. GARVEY: She can be told at the hearing,
4 in fact, it is guite proper --

5 QUESTION: When was this particular party told 6 that she is going to be measured by whether or not she 7 can lift 15 pounds?

8 MR. GARVEY: She was not told that she would9 be measured at any time.

10 QUESTION: She was never told?

11 MR. GARVEY: No.

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She was told that she would be measured by how much she could lift, whether she could lift weight, and she testified that she was unable to lift anything. She introduced a form which her doctor had given her saying that she was unable to lift more than ten pounds. So it is not a question of her having been unable to meet the evidence.

As you stress, it's appropriate, in fact perhaps desirable, for the Administrative Law Judge to bring to the claimant's attention that the question at diability hearings is what you can lift, what you can carry, how far you can walk, how long you can stand. The Office of Hearings and Appeals has

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designed, in the training of Administrative Law Judges,

and has circulated a kind of manual which tells them how
they ought to conduct these hearings. The statements
that are made by the Administrative Law Judge at the
beginning of this hearing on pages 36, 37, 38, and 39,
are taken almost verbatim from those instructions to
Administrative Law Judges about how to conduct the
hearing, about what to tell the claimant.

8 The Administrative Law Judge in this case, as 9 the manual provided, said that "What we are concerned 10 about is not only whether you can do your own job, but 11 whether you can do other jobs. In deciding that, what 12 we want to know is what your age is, what education you 13 have, what work experience you've got."

He then goes to say, we are also going to ask whether you can do sedantary, or light or medium work. In deciding that question, what we want to know is your ability to walk, stand, sit, lift, push, pull or carry. He told her all of those things at the beginning of her hearing.

20 QUESTION: May I ask you a question? 21 Maybe it is unrealistic with 1600 jobs that 22 are available for this physical impairment, but 23 supposing she was familiar with the regulation and she 24 wanted to prove that all the jobs in the category 25 required some skill, such as speaking English, or

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1 reading, or something that she did not have, and 2 therefore, she couldn't perform any of them. Assume she 3 was successful in that kind of proof for some reason 4 other reason other than physical impairment, would she 5 then prevail?

6 MR. GARVEY: What she would then have 7 succeeded in proving was that that was the wrong table 8 to apply to her, or that for some reason the tables 9 didn't apply.

In cases where the claimant is unable to In perform these kinds of jobs because she can't see or because she has difficulty hearing, or because she has some problem with fine motor skills, arthritis in the fingers, for example, or she's got epilepsy, or she's got an allergy to dust and is unable to work outdoors, in those kinds of cases the tables do not apply.

In those kinds of cases the regulations 17 specifically say, if you look at Section 200(e) of 18 Appendix 2 which appears on page 56-A, Section 200(e)(1) 19 says, in the evaluation of disability, where the 20 individual has solely a non-exertional type of 21 impairment -- that is sight, hearing, fine motor skills 22 -- the rules do not direct factual conclusions of 23 disabled or not disabled. 24

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So all of the evidence which you mention would

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be perfectly appropriate, and indeed that sort of
 question is asked by the Administrative Law Judge before
 first deciding whether the tables can be applied at
 all.

5 QUESTION: I am still not clear what happens 6 if she proves that even though he has correctly 7 described her physical condition, she can't perform any 8 of the 1600 jobs.

9 What happens in the proceeding? Does she 10 win?

MR. GARVEY: I would suppose so. I presume 11 12 that in that case what she would have proved is that the kinds of occupations of which the Secretary took notice 13 in the rulemaking proceeding don't in fact exist. What 14 she would have proved is that the regulations are 15 arbitrary and capricious in that case, but there is no --16 QUESTION: I wouldn't necessarily think that 17 they would be arbitrary and capricious in all cases, it 18 is just that she has some particular incapacity for --19 Of course, I admit, it is a hard case to assume, with 20 1600 jobs, presumably she ought to be able to perform 21 some of them. 22

But I suppose and the Second Circuit's view is, they could forestall that by telling her -- the ALJ merely has to tell her, here are 10 or 15 jobs that

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under the schedule you can perform, and give her a
 chance to prove otherwise.

MR. GARVEY: I should emphasize again QUESTION: If I understand you view, there are
cases in which the regulations, at least theoretically,
might not be dispositive if she --

7 MR. GARVEY: Absolutely, there are many such
8 cases. There are many such cases.

9 QUESTION: So is it correct that one could 10 interpret the Second Circuit as holding, as just imposing a requirement on the hearing officer to be sure 11 that this isn't one of those cases. To give the 12 claimant an opportunity to say, "Well, here is a 13 representative group of 1600 jobs. Is there any reason 14 why you can't perform these jobs?" Is that all that the 15 Second Circuit requires? 16

MR. GARVEY: I don't believe so, because the Second Circuit continually said that what the Secretary had failed to do was to introduce evidence about these kinds of jobs to show (a) that they were available and (b) that they were suitable for somebody who, the Second Circuit had already said, was capable of doing light work.

24 QUESTION: If one were to construe the Second 25 Circuit opinion in the way I suggested it might be read,

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1 how big a problem would it be for the Secretary? Are there many cases like this one in the 2 Second Circuit? 3 MR. GARVEY: There are many cases in which the 4 5 tables cannot be applied because the claimant has some 6 other disability which doesn't fit within the 7 description of light work. OUESTION: That is true regardless of whether 8 you follow the Second Circuit or not. 9 MR. GARVEY: That is correct. 10 It doesn't seem as though it would be a great 11 burden, but the problem with construing it as simply a 12 kind of notice as respondent was due in this case, is 13 14 that it focuses on what is absolutely the most esoteric point about the whole disability determination process. 15 If you tell somebody, who has been a 16 seamstress or a hotel maid most of her life, that she is 17 capable of operating a pinking machine or cutting 18 newspaper clippings for a business service, it really 19 tells her very little that she is interested in 20 knowing. It tells her very little about the issues in 21 the disability hearing. 22 OUESTION: But it does tell her more than 23 handing her a card with 1600 jobs on it, doesn't it? 24 MR. GARVEY: Certainly, although it tells them 25

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2 What the Secretary is really interested in in 3 this case is not whether she is capable of operating a pinking machine, but whether she is capable of doing --4 what her impairments are. How much is she capable of 5 6 lifting, carrying, how far she can walk or stand, and whether she has any other kinds of physical impairments, 7 what her age and education are. With respect to those 8 questions, the mere mention of jobs like operating a 9 10 pinking machine tells you very little. If there are no further questions, I would 11 12 like to reserve the remainder of my time for rebuttal. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Nazario, you may 13 proceed whenever you are ready. 14 ORAL ARGUMENT OF RUBEN NAZARIO, ESQ., 15 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 16 MR. NAZARIO: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 17 please the Court, the issue presented by this case is 18 not whether the Secretary has the authority to 19 promulgate regulations to determine disability. 20 The issue in this case is whether the 21 Secretary's failure to give an unrepresented and 22 uneducated claimant notice of the medical and vocational 23 factors which he has to determine prior to applying the 24 grid violated the claimant's procedural rights to a full 25

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1 and fair hearing.

2 QUESTION: What is the source of those3 procedural rights, Mr. Nazario?

4 MR. NAZARIO: First of all, Your Honor, the 5 claimant has the right under the regulations to present 6 all the evidence relevant to her case. The claimant has 7 the right under the statute to present all her relevant 8 evidence and the statute imposes on the Secretary the 9 reguirement that he base his decisions on evidence 10 adduced at the hearing.

But more importantly, this right is premised on the Secretary's own regulations which require the ALJ, especially where the claimant is not represented, to help the claimant present her case to --

15 QUESTION: Did the Court of Appeals cite each 16 of those regulations or statutory provisions that you 17 have just mentioned?

MR. NAZARIO: No, Your Honor. The Court of 18 Appeals just made reference to the -- in general to the 19 claimant's right to present evidence at the hearing. 20 Precisely the holding of the Court of Appeals was that 21 the claimant was not given the chance to present the 22 relevant evidence in this case. They did not cite the 23 authority for the holding, but the holding is clearly 24 that the claimant did not have the right to present her 25

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case because the Secretary failed to give her notice of
 the issues.

The Second Circuit clearly did not evalute the 3 medical and vocational regulations. All the Circuit did 4 was a factual determination that Mrs. Campbell did not 5 have this fair opportunity to present this case which is 6 7 given to her by the statute, and which the Secretary --QUESTION: Are the regulations which you're 8 relying on contained here in the petition or the 9 appendix or something, and if so where? 10 MR. NAZARIO: I believe the specific 11 regulation is cited in our brief, and it is cited also 12 in the Secretary's brief. It is the regulation which 13 imposes on the Secretary, or rather on the ALJ the duty 14 to look fully into all the matters at issue in order to 15 take the testimony of the claimant, to make the relevant 16 questions to the claimant. 17 This regulation has been interpreted by most 18 19 Courts --QUESTION: Which regulation is it, and is it 20 set forth any place in the papers that we have before 21 us? 22 MR. NAZARIO: Yes, Your Honor, it is. 23 (Pause.) 24 QUESTION: Don't let me interrupt your 25

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1 argument.

MR. NAZARIO: The regulation appears at 30 CFR
3 44.944.

4 QUESTION: Where are they in your briefs, what 5 page?

6 MR. NAZARIO: We discuss that regulation on 7 page 11 of our brief, the second paragraph there.

8 The case law, in fact, imposes on an ALJ a 9 duty to go beyond the classic prehearing notice. It 10 imposes on the ALJ the duty to make sure that the 11 claimant present all the relevant evidence in disability 12 hearings. It was precisely this opportunity which was 13 denied to Mrs. Campbell.

The Secretary, through Mr. Garvey, has emphasized to this Court that the medical and vocational regulations should not come into play until the claimant has had a full opportunity to testify about the issues which they leave open for litigation.

19 QUESTION: May I ask, Mr. Nazario, are you 20 making any constitutional argument, B of your brief 21 suggests you may. If you are making a constitutional 22 argument, what is it?

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MR. NAZARIO: I say --

24 QUESTION: You say the regulations entitle her 25 to the kind of hearing you say she did not get. Is your

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1 case then premised on a violation by the Secretary of2 his own regulation; is that it?

3 MR. NAZARIO: Yes, Your Honor. The case is
4 premised on a violation of the Secretary's regulation.

5 QUESTION: What constitutional violation? 6 MR. NAZARIO: The constitutional -- The right 7 of a claimant to testify at the hearing is premised not 8 only in the Secretary's regulation, but also in the 9 Social Security statute which requires notice and the 10 right --

11 QUESTION: So this is a statutory and under12 the regulations.

13 MR. NAZARIO: The regulation, and also a 14 constitutional claim because the claimant has a right 15 under the Fifth Amendment, under the due process clause 16 of the Fifth Amendment to introduce all the -- to have a 17 full and fair hearing in determining her entitlement to 18 disability benefits.

19 QUESTION: Do we have to reach the 20 constitutional claim, if you are right that the statute 21 and regulations entitled her to something which she 22 didn't get?

23 MR. NAZARIO: That is not the issue in the 24 case, Your Honor. The issue is whether the Secretary 25 complied with all the due process requirements of notice

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and of full and fair hearing to this specific claimant.
 QUESTION: You mean due process requirements
 as expressed in the regulations and the statute?
 MR. NAZARIO: Yes, Your Honor.

5 QUESTION: Mr. Nazario, the Court of Appeals 6 in its opinion, as I read it, made no mention of any 7 constitutional claim that you asserted under the Federal 8 Constitution. Did you raise your constitutional claim 9 before the Court of Appeals?

10 MR. NAZARIO: Well, Your Honor, the Court of 11 Appeals assumed that Mrs. Campbell had had due process. 12 They didn't --

QUESTION: I asked you a question. Did you
raise your constitutional claim in your argument to the
Court of Appeals?

16 MR. NAZARIO: We argued before the Court of 17 Appeals that Mrs. Campbell had not been given adequate 18 notice and an adequate hearing and an adequate 19 opportunity to present her evidence because the ALJ 20 failed to inform her of the --

21 QUESTION: Did you phrase that in terms of a 22 constitutional violation in the Court of Appeals?

23 MR. NAZARIO: No, Your Honor, we did not, and 24 the Court of Appeals did not take it in terms of a 25 constitutional violation.

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1 It assumed, without discussion, that Mrs. 2 Campbell was entitled to a hearing, to a full 3 opportunity to present her evidence. But there is no 4 discussion of the statutory or constitutional basis for 5 this requirement, maybe because it is so clear. The 6 facts in the record of Mrs. Campbell clearly demonstrate 7 that she did not have the minimum pre-notice which is 8 required by the law.

9 Mrs. Campbell, as has been stated, has only a
10 sixth education. She has some difficulties expressing
11 herself in English, and she was misled by the
12 Secretary's original denial of benefits. The Secretary
13 stated that she was not entitled to benefits because she
14 could return to her usual occupation as a maid.

Mrs. Campbell came to the hearing prepared to discuss that issue, and as a matter of fact, she spent most of her efforts at her hearing testifying to why she la could not perform the duties required by her former occupations.

At no time did the Secretary tell Mrs. Campbell that he was going to deny benefits based on the rule which required the finding that she could lift over 15 or over 20 pounds and that, therefore, she should address that issue at the hearing.

Mrs. Campbell presented the Secretary with

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several letters from her doctor which stated that she
 could not perform -- that she could not lift any
 weight. The Secretary or the ALJ never made any effort
 to ascertain what that said and meant by heavy work.

5 Of course, this finding about the specific 6 number of pounds which Mrs. Campbell could lift was 7 critical. If she had been found unable to lift over ten 8 pounds, she would have established that she was disabled 9 under the Act. She was never given the opportunity to 10 present this evidence to the Secretary.

QUESTION: May I ask you a question here. Do 11 you read the Second Circuit opinion as holding that if 12 the Administrative Law Judge had, just before he or she 13 ruled, said: Now there are 15 jobs here on this list 14 that people who are capable of doing light work can 15 perform, and under the regulations you can perform 16 these. If he had just said that to her, so she could 17 have put in evidence that she couldn't perform those 15 18 jobs, would that have been all that the ALJ had to do? 19 MR. NAZARIO: In this particular case. 20

21 QUESTION: This particular case.

22 MR. NAZARIO: In Mrs. Campbell's case, we 23 believe so. If the ALJ had told her examples of the 24 jobs which she was assuming --

25 QUESTION: These ten or 15.

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MR. NAZARIO: Under this process, Mrs.
 Campbell would have probably been able to address the
 issue at the hearing.

QUESTION: Supposing that instead of doing that, the ALJ had said: The Secretary has a regulation that lists 1600 jobs that people who can do light work can do. Here is a copy of that regulation. Then he let her take an hour to look at it and then if she wanted to, try to prove she couldn't peform any of those jobs. Would that have satisfied your position?

MR. NAZARIO: In the case of some claimants it
probably would have, but not in the case of this
claimant.

14 QUESTION: In this case.

MR. NAZARIO: I don't think that this claimant
Would have been able to understand the Secretary's
regulations.

18 Frankly, there is nothing in the record to 19 indicate that Mrs. Campbell was told that she had the 20 right, or that she had the obligation, or that she 21 should --

22 QUESTION: What I am really trying to find 23 out. You seem to agree that if the ALJ had said: Here 24 are 15 jobs that you should be able to perform, if 25 instead of that he had listed or read all 1600 --

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MR. NAZARIO: Your Honor, but the problem is that the regulations do not contain a list of the jobs, and that's the problem. In order to find out what jobs the Secretary is assuming that a claimant who fits a grid structure can perform, the claimant would have to go to other more difficult and less available sources, such as the Dictionary for Occupational Titles, and several publications of several agencies.

9 So even if the claimant is told that her claim 10 will be decided under the medical and vocational 11 regulations, and that she should read those regulations, 12 assuming that the claimant can't understand the 13 regulations and can't travel to the District Office, the 14 claimant would not know what jobs the Secretary is 15 assuming that she or he can perform.

16 Your Honor was absolutely right earlier in 17 this argument when he said that the claimant should be 18 given an opportunity to testify about those factors 19 which limit the grid applicability, and the Secretary 20 stated in his argument that grids come into play only 21 where claimant has limitations in terms of his or her 22 ability to meet strength requirements.

23 They do not come into play if the claimant has 24 a significant non-exertional limitation. If the 25 claimant has significant visual or auditory problems,

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problems in terms of environmental conditions, if
 inability to tolerate gases, fumes, anything, any
 limitation that is not measured out in terms of strength
 would limit the application of the grid to that
 claimant.

In this case, Mrs. Campbell was not told that 6 7 she had to testify about these types of limitations because they would be relevant in determining whether 8 the grid was applicable to her. So that this record, 9 even less the evidence which was necessary for a 10 determination of whether the grid was applicable at all, 11 12 the determination by the Second Circuit that Mrs. Campbell did not have an meaningful chance to present 13 her evidence because the Secretary had not given her 14 notice, I think is entitled to affirmance. It is a 15 factual determination that is amply supported in the 16 record of this case. 17

18 QUESTION: What is the amount of benefit she 19 receives?

20 MR. NAZARIO: She is currently receiving about
21 only \$250 a month.

QUESTION: Of course, the amount is not relevant to any of the legal issues here, but I was interested in terms of why she appeared at this hearing without any legal assistance.

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MR. NAZARIO: I understand she tried to get 1 legal assistance but she was unable to because the 2 private attorneys which she contacted charged a sum 3 which was too high for her means at that time, and she 4 could not get the service of a free legal 5 representative. 6 The Secretary --7 QUESTION: She later did get services of the 8 9 Legal Aid, did she not? MR. NAZARIO: No, Your Honor, not until she 10 filed the case in the District Court. 11 QUESTION: Was it the Legal Aid who wanted to 12 charge her \$35? 13 MR. NAZARIO: No, Your Honor. 14 QUESTION: That was a private attorney? 15 MR. NAZARIO: That was a private attorney. 16 OUESTION: I see. 17 MR. NAZARIO: That is correct, it was a 18 19 private attorney. The Secretary argues in this case that Mrs. 20 Campbell had notice because, first of all, the 21 procedures for determining disability under the 22 regulations are spelled out in the regulations, and he 23 claims that this notice by regulation meets the 24 requirements of adequate notice. 25

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QUESTION: Is there any procedure under Social
 Security to which the claimant could go to get
 instruction on how to present a case like this?

4 MR. NAZARIC: Not to my knowledge, Your 5 Honor. The ALJ -- The only recourse that the claimant 6 would have is if the ALJ fulfills his duties under the 7 regulations and makes all the relevant questions at the 8 hearing, then the claimant would ideally be informed of 9 what the issues are, but certainly that did not happen 10 in this case.

11 QUESTION: Is information available on the 12 procedures and requirements and the regulation at the 13 branch offices of the Social Security?

14 MR. NAZARIO: I believe that a copy of the CFR 15 -- a copy of the regulations would be made available to 16 the claimant if the claimant goes to the office and 17 inguires about it.

18 QUESTION: Yes, and presumably there would be19 staff present to explain.

20 MR. NAZARIO: That I do not know, Your Honor. 21 That I do not know. But nothing in the record of this 22 case indicates that Mrs. Campbell was advised of the 23 availability of those regulations, and nothing in this 24 case indicates that all the claimants are advised of the 25 availability and importance of those regulations.

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QUESTION: Isn't she obligated to do a little
 something for herself, if she is depending on benefits,
 if she is trying to get benefits?

MR. NAZARIO: Well, Your Honor, in this case I think she did as much as she could, considering that she had a sixth grade education, that she was unrepresented at her hearing, and that she was misled by the Secretary's initial denial of benefits.

9 QUESTION: You don't think she could have been10 expected to go to the district office?

11 MR. NAZARIO: She did went to the District 12 Office, that's where she filed the initial claim for 13 benefits, that is where she filed the claim for 14 reconsideration of the original denial, and that is 15 where she filed the request for the hearing.

But when she filed the request for the hearing, she wasn't informed of the availability of the regulations. There is nothing in the record to indicate that.

20 QUESTION: But they were available there? 21 MR. NAZARIC: Presumably they were available, 22 but she was not informed of their availability.

23 QUESTION: Mr. Nazario, there is some 24 indication, is there not, that Congress has pressed the 25 Secretary to promulgate a grid system or regulations

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such as those that are employed here, is there not?
 MR. NAZARIO: Yes, Your Honor, there is.
 QUESTION: Basically, the Secretary in
 promulgating this system is carrying out the wishes of
 Congress; is that right?

6 MR. NAZARIO: Yes, Your Honor, that is right. 7 But what is at issue in this case, again, is not whether 8 the Secretary has the authority to promulgate this 9 regulation. The issue in this case is whether the 10 regulations were properly applied to Mrs. Campbell.

11 The issue in this case is whether the 12 Secretary met the requirements in his own regulations, 13 where the Secretary failed his obligation to make sure 14 that the claimant presented all the relevant evidence 15 which is required prior to the application of the 16 medical and vocational regulations.

17 QUESTION: The Court of Appeals certainly did 18 not state that the Secretary had failed to apply his own 19 regulation, did it?

20 MR. NAZARIO: Well, the Court of Appeals did 21 not state that in so many words, but the holding of the 22 Court of Appeals is clear. It remanded the case of Mrs. 23 Campbell to the Secretary for consideration of her claim 24 after she was adequately informed of what the issues of 25 the hearing were.

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1 The holding of the Court of Appeals is clear 2 in requiring proper application of the medical and 3 vocational regulations. The Court of Appeals did not 4 discuss at all the issue of the validity of the medical 5 and vocational regulations.

6 It did not discuss any of the arguments which 7 have been made against the validity of the medical and 8 vocational regulations. It limited its holding to a 9 factual determination that Mrs. Campbell did not have 10 notice and, therefore, she was unable to present the 11 evidence which was required.

12 QUESTION: Mr. Nazario, may I ask another13 question.

On page 37 of the Joint Appendix there is a 14 transcript of what the ALJ said to her at the beginning 15 of the hearing. He did say that the evidence about her 16 ability to do other kinds of work, as well as her past 17 work. He asked about her ability to walk, stand, sit, 18 lift, push, pull or carry. Then he goes on and says: 19 "I will take evidence and consider any mental, skin, 20 sensory or environmental impairment that might limit 21 your capacity to work." 22

23 Isn't that pretty good notice of the fact that 24 any other disability would also be considered? Why 25 isn't that notice adequate under the regulations?

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MR. NAZARIC: Well, Your Honor, if the ALJ had 1 followed up on this statement, if the ALJ had made the 2 statement while Mrs. Campbell was testifying, then 3 probably Mrs. Campbell would have been able to present 4 her relevant evidence. But this statement was made by 5 the ALJ at the beginning of the hearing when he was 6 explaining to Mrs. Campbell all the relevant procedures 7 -- all the relevant Social Security procedures. 8

9 He explained her appeals right. He explained 10 her right to be represented. He explained her right to 11 object to the medical evidence which had been 12 incorporated in the record. He did not follow up on 13 this statement at the stage of the hearing where Mrs. 14 Campbell was testifying about her capacities.

In fact, if you look further down -QUESTION: Are you saying that if he had
repeated this statement while she was testifying, then
you really wouldn't have a case?

19 MR. NAZARIO: If he had repeated this 20 statement in terms of questions, and if Mrs. Campbell 21 had been therefore able to put in evidence on each of 22 these factors, then Mrs. Campbell would have established 23 that she was disabled under the grid and, of course, she 24 would have had no need to appeal on the Secretary's 25 decision.

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If you look at the record of the transcript where Mrs. Campbell is in fact testifying about her capacities, that is only two pages in the transcript, it appears on page -- basically on page 50 and the first half of page 51, she, for example, stated: "I cannot sit too long. I cannot stand too long." That is at the bottom of page 49.

Instead of the ALJ asking her, how long can 8 you sit? How many pounds can you lift? -- because that 9 was critical to the determination of her claim, the ALJ 10 changed the line of her testimony by asking "Can you 11 bend?" "I cannot bend. The doctor warned me not to 12 lift weights." There the ALJ again changes the line of 13 her testimony and says, "I notice that you have stood up 14 several times." 15

Further down the page, she is again testifying about her limitations, and she is saying: "I cannot raise. I can't do anything too much." The ALJ instead of trying to elicit her testimony with any specificity, which was required for application of the grid, the ALJ again changed around her testimony by asking about her medical treatment.

23 This record clearly establishes that Mrs.
24 Campbell did not put into the record the evidence which
25 was necessary for the determination of her claim under

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the grid, and that she did not present her evidence
 because the Secretary never informed her of what it was
 that she needed to prove.

4 I would like to clarify a statement by the Court of Appeals which has been relied on by the 5 Secretary in his papers. The Secretary says that the 6 7 finding by the Court of Appeals that there was 8 substantial evidence to support the finding that Mrs. 9 Campbell could perform light work is very important, and 10 in fact shows that Mrs. Campbell was in -- that Mrs. Campbell's ability to work was properly considered by 11 the Secretary. 12

13 It should be pointed out that there are two 14 different purposes for judicial review in disability 15 determinations. One is whether the Secretary's 16 determination is supported by substantial evidence. The 17 other one is whether the Secretary followed proper 18 procedures in determining the claimant's application for 19 benefits.

By saying that considering whatever evidence was already in the record of Mrs. Campbell's proceeding, the determination that she could perform light work may have found some support, the Secretary was not sanctioning the way in which the ALJ arrived at that determination.

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1 On several occasions the Second Circuit has 2 remanded cases to the Secretary despite finding the 3 determinations, the specific determination supported by 4 substantial evidence precisely because the claimant was 5 not given an opportunity to introduce contrary 6 evidence.

All that the Second Circuit did in this case 7 was to determine factually that Mrs. Campbell did not 8 9 have notice and did not have the opportunity to present evidence. That determination is amply supported by the 10 record of the case, and should be affirmed by this 11 Court. Furthermore, the determination -- the direction 12 to the Secretary that he has to give meaningful and 13 informative knowledge to Mrs. Campbell on the remanded 14 hearing is consistent with the Secretary's own 15 regulations, with the Secretary's own argument, and 16 should also be affirmed by this Court. 17

I thank you very much.

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19 CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Do you have anything
20 further, Mr. Garvey? You have two minutes remaining.
21 REBUTTAL ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN H. GARVEY, ESQ.,
22 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONFR
23 MR. GARVEY: I have a couple of brief points.
24 The first is with respect to the contention that the
25 respondent had no opportunity to put on evidence

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regarding her non-exertional impairments. As Justice
Stevens pointed out, at the beginning of the hearing,
the ALJ informed respondent that any non-exertional
impairments that she might have would be issues in the
hearing. In our reply brief, at pages 11 to 14, in the
notes we indicate the passages at which each of those
contentions was addressed.

8 I should add that in those kinds of cases 9 where non-exertional impairments are present, then the 10 question is what kind of work somebody can do. The 11 tables are not used, as I emphasized before. What will 12 happen in those kinds of cases most often is that the 13 Secretary will call a vocational expert to see what kind 14 of work is available for people who can do that.

With the respect to the question of her 15 representation by counsel, I might just add a point 16 which does not appear in our brief. A Senate Finance 17 Committee report, CP-9716, issued just in August of '82, 18 19 indicates that, contrary to what Professor Davis thinks, in disability cases, 71 percent of claimants are in fact 20 represented by counsel. I might add that for those 21 claimants who are not represented by counsel, the notice 22 which they receive in advance of hearing tells them, as 23 they told respondent in this case, that "The people at 24 your local Social Security Office will continue to 25

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1 assist you in obtaining any evidence you may wish to 2 submit."

3 QUESTION: What does that mean, Mr. Garvey, as4 a practial matter?

5 MR. GARVEY: As a practical matter, what it 6 means is that they may go to the Social Security Office 7 and ask what kinds of evidence will help them to bolster 8 their claim.

9 QUESTION: Are they told about the10 guidelines?

MR. GARVEY: They are told -- If they went to the Social Security Office and inquired about the guidelines, they would be told about the guidelines. The Secretary does not resist telling claimants about the guidelines. The respondent in this case was informed by the ALJ that the regulations in Appendix 2 would be applied.

18 There is a notice -- I am sorry, my time has 19 run.

20 CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: You may finish your 21 response.

MR. GARVEY: If I may just finish that sentence. The notice of hearing which appears at the end of the Secretary's brief, this Form HA-4607, does not appear in respondent's record as it does not appear

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1 in any records. These kinds of forms which don't pertain to individual claimants simply are not stuck 3 into the record. They are sent along with any mailings 4 that the claimant gets, and it informs them that the regulations in Appendix 2 will be applied. You will notice that the notice of hearing respondent got indicates that there was an enclosure, and it is likely that form. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, gentlemen. The case is submitted. (Whereupon, at 11:01 a.m., the case in the above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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