In the

Supreme Court of the United States

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ET AL.,

PETITIONERS,

No. 80-429

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
V.

ALBERTA GUNTHER ET AL.

Washington, D.C. March 23, 1981

Pages 1 thru 50





202/544-1144

1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	:
3	COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ET AL., :
4	Petitioners, :
5	v. : No. 80-429
6	ALBERTA GUNTHER ET AL.
7	:
8	Washington, D. C.
9	Monday, March 23, 1981
10	The above-entitled matter came on for oral ar-
11	gument before the Supreme Court of the United States
12	at 11:00 o'clock a.m.
13	APPEARANCES:
14	
15	LAWRENCE R. DERR, ESQ., Weiss, Derr & DesCamp, Norton House, 33 N.W. First Avenue, Portland,
16	Oregon 97209; on behalf of the Petitioners.
17	MRS. CAROL A. HEWITT, ESQ., Lindsay, Hart, Neil & Weigler, 700 Columbia Square, 111 S.W. Columbia,
18	Portland, Oregon 97201; on behalf of the Respondents.
19	BARRY SULLIVAN, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington,
20	D.C. 20530; on behalf of the United States et al. as amici curiae.
21	MILLERS RAILS
22	TO TERMONTON
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24	CONDITION CONTENT
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will hear arguments
3	next in County of Washington v. Gunther. Mr. Derr, you may
4	proceed when you are ready.
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF LAWRENCE R. DERR, ESQ.,
6	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
7	MR. DERR: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please
8	the Court:
9	This case presents the question of whether sex-based
10	wage discrimination claims are subject to a different stan-
11	dard of proof when such claims are asserted under Title VII
12	of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 than the equal pay for equal
13	work standard of the Equal Pay Act of 1963.
14	The respondents are former employees of the
15	petitioner, Washington County. The respondents were jail
16	matrons who guarded female prisoners in the county jail and
17	had other clerical duties. The male prisoners were guarded
18	by deputy sheriffs and later by corrections officers.
19	The respondents filed this case in the federal district
20	court alleging that they had received compensation lower
21	than that received by their male counterparts doing substan-
22	tially the same work. They also raised a claim that their
23	jobs had been terminated in retaliation for making that equal
24	pay claim and that they had been refused the right to be
25	rehired, also in retaliation.

The trial court found that the jobs were substantially dissimilar on the facts, and therefore denied the equal pay claim. It also found that there was no retaliatory reaction, that there were good business reasons for the fact that the jobs were terminated. And those had to do with providing additional space in the jail to respond to an overcrowding problem, an ACLU suit.

In a post-trial brief after the facts were in, the respondents raised for the first time the claim that even if the jobs were not equal, that the great differential in pay between the comparison jobs could only be at least partially explained by sex discrimination. The only evidence pointed to were the very pay scales which caused the source of the comparison.

The trial court held on the basis of the laws that existed prior to this case that since the Equal Pay Act standards applied and since the jobs were substantially dissimilar, that is, not substantially equal, that the judge had no authority to override the wage rates set by the employer and the union in this case.

The respondents appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and raised one other point of fact found in the record, and that was a statement by the sheriff of the county that at one point in time he felt that the matrons, the respondents here, should have been paid more than they were

being paid. No other evidence was asserted as supporting
this comparison of jobs as opposed -- unequal jobs as opposed
to equal jobs.

One other assertion was made for the first time on 4 appeal to the 9th Circuit by the respondents, and that is 5 that they were prevented during the trial from introducing 6 additional information to support their comparable job claim. 7 However, they have never pointed to what that evidence was 8 9 nor anyplace in the record where they were denied that right. And, in fact, it's hard to understand how that could be the 10 case since the claim was first raised in post-trial briefing, 11 not in the complaint or the pre-trial order. 12

QUESTION: Mr. Derr, one thing that bothers me about this case is the extent to which we are talking about kind of an abstract distinction which may not boil down to too much when it comes to actual application. What in your view is the difference between equal work and comparable work?

MR. DERR: Comparable work is simply the tip of the iceberg of an open-ended interpretation of Title VII in the area of sex discrimination. The concept of equal work is one that is defined by the statute and through case refinements, that's a concept that's understood. But if that limitation that started in the Equal Pay Act is not applied as well to Title VII, then any theory is available to a plaintiff

or a claimant to attempt to show that there was discrimina-1 tion based on sex. Comparable work is one of those theories 2 and there are many versions and explanations of it. In es-3 sence, it amounts to comparing the value of different jobs to 4 the employer, then comparing the wages, and drawing a deduc-5 tion from a difference between value and wages that sex dis-6 7 crimination is the motivation, and I think by the explanation --8

9 QUESTION: In that area you could -- I'm sure your
10 sister will disagree with this, or the extent of this, but
11 in the extreme logic of it you could compare the wage rights
12 of truck drivers with that of secretaries, for example.

MR. DERR: Very definitely. There's absolutely no 13 limitation upon the comparisons that can be drawn, only in 14 the ability of the analysis to make any rational connection. 15 And of course, this Court is well aware of the method of 16 proof that it has outlined and recently described in the 17 Texas v. Burdine case. The burden of proof, although it in-18 volves intent, is initially on the plaintiff only to show 19 a prima facie case, to show a set of circumstances that 20 create an inference that there may have been discriminatory 21 22 motive. At that threshold level the courts will already be into the type of a situation which Congress did not intend 23 them to get into, and that's attempting to evaluate different 24 jobs and the relative value of those jobs. 25

In other words, at the very threshold level of determining whether there is a prima facie case in these 2 comparison-of-unequal-job sort of cases, the courts will have 3 to make an analysis, a subjective analysis that Congress did 4 not intend. But you --5 QUESTION: I was just going to ask Mr. Derr, I ga-6 7 ther on the Equal Pay Act where we deal, I suppose, with something 8 like identical jobs in the sense, for example, of an airline 9 steward, it doesn't matter whether they are male or female, they do exactly the same thing. Here, I gather, there are 10 differences in the job duties of the female guards and the 11 male guards, are there? 12 13 MR. DERR: That's correct. That issue was --14 QUESTION: To that extent there's no identity of 15 duty between the male and female jobs here, as there would 16 be in my hypothetical of the airline steward? MR. DERR: That's correct, Your Honor. This case 17 18 presents the issue squarely, because --19 QUESTION: That was a finding of the district court, 20 was it not? 21 MR. DERR: And that was upheld by the 9th Circuit 22 Court of Appeals. 23 QUESTION: And the Court of Appeals did not change 24 it. 25 MR. DERR: And that's not contested by respondents.

QUESTION: And the claim isn't that women are put in these jobs, and men put in these, discriminatorily? The claim is just on the pay?

MR. DERR: That's correct. There is no claim of
denial of access, and in fact there is a finding in the
record by the trial courts and I believe noted by the 9th
Circuit that there was access to the higher paid jobs. These
respondents are claiming larger pay for the jobs that they
were in and not disputing the fact that they had access to
the higher paying jobs.

QUESTION: And your position would be that even if you didn't have to rely on inference to prove intention, even if they had the employer cold, so to speak, that there would be no Title VII liability?

MR. DERR: No, that hypothetical was raised by the 9th Circuit. They stated it as though the employer would say to a female employee, if you were a man I would pay you more. The 9th Circuit felt that that would not be covered by the Equal Pay Act and we disagreed. Judge Van Dusen in the dissenting opinion in the 3rd Circuit in the IUE v. Westinghouse case disagreed that the fault --

QUESTION: Well, isn't it your position now, Mr. Derr, that unless the guards have a case under the Equal Pay Act, they have none under Title VII?

Yes.

OUESTION:

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MR. DERR: For wage-based sex discrimination. 1 2 QUESTION: For anything, whether intentional or not. MR. DERR: The Equal Pay Act is an intentional 3 It does require an attempt to discriminate on the basis act. 4 of sex, and that's true because one of the defenses is that if 5 the discrimination is based on --6 QUESTION: I know, but the case doesn't get off the 7 ground unless the jobs are identical? 8 MR. DERR: That's correct. 9 10 QUESTION: Unless they're like my hypothetical of the airline steward's job? 11 12 MR. DERR: That's correct. QUESTION: Unless it's like that -- and since the 13 14 finding here by two courts is, it's not, you say there's no Title VII claim? 15 16 MR. DERR: That's correct, Your Honor, but if I may 17 respond to the hypothetical, there are remedies and one of them 18 is an improper interpretation of the Equal Pay Act. The 9th Circuit, I believe, felt that unless there was an 19 incumbent in the male job that was being used for compari-20 son, there could be no Equal Pay Act violation. The Depart-21 ment of Labor has since the early days of the Equal Pay Act 22

23 had a regulation -- I believe it's 29 CFR 800.114(c) -- which

24 clearly indicates that you may look to successors and prede-

cessors in the job, and --

25

QUESTION: Even though your current force is 100 percent female?

MR. DERR: That's right. The best example is a 3 situation where there was just one person holding the job. 4 If the person is a female and is terminated or leaves and a 5 male comes into that particular job, it's possible to make 6 that comparison. That's consistent with the interpretation 7 of the Department of Labor and there are cases that have held. 8 9 The thing that takes the next step and makes the Equal Pay Act the sort of remedy that it should be is to recognize that 10 if the employer hypothesizes a male employee as perhaps the 11 next incumbent, that should be no different than having to 12 13 wait until the time that that next incumbent comes along.

And so that the employer who makes the statement that I would pay a man more, or, I will pay you less than I would a man, has made a comparison of necessity and by definition to equal work and has shown a violation of the Equal Pay Act.

QUESTION: Is it true, then, Mr. Derr, that the problem presented by this case only affects those job categories that are bona fide gender-based classifications? Because if you have a history of passed male or female in the opposite sex category, you can always find your remedy under the Equal Pay Act, if I understand you? So that --MR. DERR: I'm sorry, I'm not sure if I understand

the relationship of bona fide qualification, Your Honor. 1 2 QUESTION: Well, the problem that you're addressing in this case is one in which there's a separate female cate-3 gory of jobs and a separate male category of jobs, entirely 4 separate, and then -- you assume it won't be changed in the 5 future, and it's always been that way, in both categories? 6 QUESTION: Oh, I thought you said there was access 7 to the higher jobs? 8 MR. DERR: Yes, definitely. 9 10 QUESTION: Well, at least the category that we're talking about here is an exclusively female category? 11 12 QUESTION: No. 13 MR. DERR: The matron's job was an exclusively female category of job. But the higher-paying jobs were open 14 to the females. 15 16 QUESTION: You mean the matrons might have had 17 access to the males' jobs? MR. DERR: That's correct. 18 19 QUESTION: Of superintending male prisoners? 20 MR. DERR: Yes. 21 QUESTION: Are there any? 22 MR. DERR: The jobs do not exist -- well, the 23 matrons' jobs do not exist. The deputy sheriffs, there are 24 female incumbents in those jobs. I'm not certain whether 25 there are any female corrections officers at the moment.

There were not during this period of time. 1 QUESTION: But they are open? 2 MR. DERR: But they are definitely open; that was a 3 finding of the case --4 QUESTION: Has there ever been one? A female cor-5 rections officer? 6 MR. DERR: A corrections officer? 7 QUESTION: That's really the comparison here, isn't 8 it? 9 And the deputy sheriffs, because this 10 MR. DERR: covers a period of time when the deputies in a rotation were 11 doing the jail guarding and later when the corrections offi-12 cers were doing it exclusively. 13 QUESTION: Then there have been -- ? 14 MR. DERR: There are deputy sheriffs who are female. 15 I do not know whether there are any corrections officers. 16 There were not in the period of less than a year that that 17 was pertinent in this case. The reason that --18 QUESTION: But this would be a perfectly straight-19 forward Title VII case if there were no access. 20 MR. DERR: That's true, but under another provision 21 of Title VII which is unaffected by the Equal Pay Act. 22 23 QUESTION: Yes. QUESTION: Let me just ask one here. Assume that, 24 instead of this being a pay case, that they were complaining 25

they had to work Saturdays instead of -- and the corrections officers did not, or they had to work till 6 o'clock and 2 - they only had to work till five, omsething like that. That 3 would clearly violate Title VII, wouldn't it? If it's 4 5 anything but pay? It would present a case that could be MR. DERR: 6 7 brought under Title VII. QUESTION: "Whiteapple." 8 9 MR. DERR: Yes; if it had to deal with conditions of employment. 10 11 QUESTION: Well, supposing they said they get paid 12 for overtime if they're male but they don't if they're female, 13 in the two categories? MR. DERR: That appears to me to be a compensation 14 case and most likely would be a case that could be brought 15 under the Equal Pay Act standard and therefore must be. 16 QUESTION: Only under Equal Pay, if they said the 17 18 men get overtime and the females do not? That would not violate Title VII, in your judgment? 19 20 MR. DERR: Well, that would present a question whe-21 ther it involved some other factor other than wages and com-22 pensation, and I would prefer not to venture a guess as to 23 how that might be interpreted by a court, but to the extent that it was interpreted to be a legal question, it would not. 24 25 QUESTION: Well, what would your position be?

MR. DERR: On an overtime pay?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. DERR: It appears to me that that would be
directly related to wages, and if they were denied the oppor-
tunity to work the overtime it would affect wages.
QUESTION: Denied payment for the overtime? If the
males are paid time and a half and the females are paid
straight time for overtime? That's the only difference.
MR. DERR: That appears to me to be a wage case.
QUESTION: And so there would be no recovery under
Title VII? And they're in different categories, as they are
here. So you have no right under the Wage Act, under my
hypothesis. And I'm asking you, is there a right under Title
VII in that hypothetical case?
MR. DERR: I don't believe so, Your Honor, any more
than the truck driver and the secretary situation.
QUESTION: Of course, the truck driver-secretary
wouldn't qualify under the 9th Circuit opinion either, because
those jobs are not substantially equal.
MR. DERR: Well
QUESTION: They don't have to be; that's the point.
QUESTION: The 9th Circuit says they do.
MR. DERR: The 9th Circuit is reading the substan-
tially equal limitation out of Title VII, which Congress in-
tended to be there as carrying into it from the Equal Pay Act.
14

We're talking about comparison of jobs that are not substantially equal.

h at Beach

QUESTION: That's the comparable, is it not? They don't use the comparable standard. They definitely disavow it in the supplemental opinion.

MR. DERR: Your Honor, they attempt to. QUESTION: Well --

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MR. DERR: They eliminate the equal pay standard, 8 and having done that they leave no standard other than sex-9 based wage discrimination. The 9th Circuit attempts to dis-10 tinguish by saying that it would not be sufficient to compare 11 jobs, as they understand it, without other evidence. The only 12 other evidence would be evidence of intent and we submit that 13 the claimants will say that intent is inferred from the 14 comparisons that we draw, and they'd certainly be entitled to 15 raise that as a claim and will raise it as a claim, and that 16 will then be a decision for the court to make as to whether 17 or not it's sufficient to present a prima facie case. 18

But the distinction drawn by the 9th Circuit to say that they are not allowing cases based on comparison of comparable but not equal jobs is simply not warranted by the position they've taken. The 9th Circuit certainly has no ability to rewrite the statute and there's nothing to be found in the statute that would say that.

QUESTION: Mr. Derr, do you think the 9th Circuit would

permit a "comparison" between the wages paid secretaries and the wages paid salesmen, by the same corporation, in terms of one puts in 40 hours and another puts in 40 hours, and therefore we have to decide which is harder work, or which is more difficult work, and that sort of thing?

MR. DERR: Yes, I do, Your Honor. That and any even more disparate sort of comparison that you might choose to make because they've said that there is no such limitation.

9 QUESTION: Another criterion would be the economic 10 contribution made by the job.

MR. DERR: Certainly. One of the problems, of 11 course, with the comparable work question which the 9th Cir-12 cuit's interpretation opens the door to is that there is no 13 clear understanding of what sort of economic or professional 14 valuation methods would be used to apply it. And I am not 15 here prepared to explain to the Court how it would be done 16 because, frankly, I do not know. But I do know that those 17 claims would be available. 18

QUESTION: How? I presume the court would have to take testimony, and make its own decision as a question of fact.

MR. DERR: That's correct. The important point to remember in understanding why Congress chose this to be the state of affairs, that is, that sex-based wage discriminations would be limited to the standards of the Equal Pay Act, is

that it considered these questions in 1962 and 1963. The evi-1 dence was presented to Congress in great detail that there 2 were allegations of dual standards of pay between males and 3 females, that there was avowed intentional sex discrimina-4 tion; Congress was well aware of that. Secretary of Labor 5 Arthur Goldberg and his assistant, Esther Peterson, represen-6 tatives of the unions, presented that information to Congress 7 and urged that a comparable work standard, which was in the 8 original proposal before Congress, be adopted. 9

10

QUESTION: What was that standard?

MR. DERR: The standard was first worded as requir-11 ing that comparable pay be made for comparable work. That was 12 the bare bones initial statement that evolved to add some 13 modifiers as to skill. Congress had great concern with that, 14 and moved to the equal pay for equal work standard and in so 15 doing also added definitions and eliminated the per se or the 16 strict liability character of the Act by adding, as a defense, 17 that if the pay, even though for equal jobs, was disequal, 18 unequal, but if there was any factor other than sex involved, 19 20 then it would not violate the Equal Pay Act.

Congress didn't do that because it didn't see the problems because the problems were not pointed out to it; they were. It did it because it saw greater problems in getting the Department of Labor, the Federal Government, and the courts into the sort of evaluations of employers' wage

schedules, that the Court has addressed its questions to here 1 today. That's a policy question. We're not here arguing a 2 policy. We're simply saying that Congress in 1962 and 1963 3 addressed that policy question and decided it. 4 QUESTION: Has the EEOC changed its position on the 5 matter? 6 MR. DERR: Your Honor, it has. The EEOC, of course, 7 8 is not authorized to issue binding regulations --9 QUESTION: No. 10 MR. DERR: -- but it does issue guidelines --11 QUESTION: Guidelines. 12 MR. DERR: -- and it did issue a contemporaneous 13 guideline in 1965 which we have reprinted in the Appendix to 14 Petitioners' Brief at page 4a. 15 QUESTION: Then how has it evidenced its change of 16 position if it has? 17 MR. DERR: The guideline and the subsequent opinion 18 letters which are also reprinted in the Appendix make it very 19 clear that the EEOC at that time felt that the equal pay for 20 equal work standard was incorporated. The position of the 21 EEOC which it's arguing in its amicus brief and will be pre-22 senting to the Court in a moment is clearly to the contrary. 23 QUESTION: But how has it evidenced it other than 24 filing this brief? 25 MR. DERR: It has evidenced it in later opinion letters.

ALLA FALLE

QUESTION: Has it changed its guideline?

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MR. DERR: The guideline was changed in 1972 to omit
the language that makes it clear that the Equal Pay Standard
was incorporated.

5 QUESTION: And then it issued some opinion letters 6 contrary to the earlier one?

MR. DERR: And both before and after that '72 7 guideline there had been opinion letters issued directly con-8 9 trary, so that there's no question but what there has been a complete reversal of the position, and of course the peti-10 tioners rely upon this Court's analysis in General Electric v. 11 Gilbert that to the extent that the opinions and the guide-12 lines of the EEOC are entitled to deference, it's the con-13 temporaneous opinions. And certainly where they accord with 14 the express legislative intent, that should have the control-15 16 ling effect.

17 QUESTION: What of the Bennett amendment, 18 Mr. Derr?

MR. DERR: Your Honor, if I may respond to that byone word of introduction?

QUESTION: Take your time.

MR. DERR: When Title VII, of course, was before Congress there was concern expressed, initially by others and finally by Senator Bennett, that the decision reached in the Equal Pay Act of 1963 might be abrogated or nullified in some way by the broad sweep of Title VII, at the time that sex was introduced as a protected classification.

3 QUESTION: That was almost a happenstance, as I 4 recall, wasn't it?

2

5 MR. DERR: It came after committee hearings had ended in the House, while there was debate on the House floor. 6 It appeared in a proposed amendment by Representative Smith 7 8 and in the same afternoon was adopted with limited debate. 9 When the bill went to the Senate it never went through 10 committee hearing, it went straight to the Senate for debate, 11 and so there was very little really substantive discussion 12 of the sex amendment.

13 Senator Clark expressed the concern of others that by so doing -- and since the coverage of Title VII is of 14 course, as we have mentioned, broader than the Equal Pay Act. 15 It covers such things as conditions of employment and access 16 17 to jobs -- that it would have the effect of overreaching the Equal Pay Act and of reading out of it the equal pay for 18 19 equal work limitation. And so Senator Clark responded to 20 that concern by his understanding of the doctrine of in pari 21 materia construction which was simply to say that the subse-22 quent enactment would not have that effect. There was nothing 23 in Title VII as it was then before Congress that expressly 24 said that. And that's why I say that Senator Clark must 25 necessarily have been relying on in pari materia construction.

However, Senator Bennett apparently was not comfortable with leaving it at that, and so introduced an amendment. Unfortunately for the benefit of legislative history, that amendment came after cloture had been invoked on the Senate floor so that, for one thing, the date was extremely limited, and for another, it was styled as a technical amendment.

7 That of course was consistent with what Senator
8 Bennett was doing, which was clarifying, not, as has been sug9 gested by other parties, narrowing the scope of Title VII, but
10 clarifying what Congress expected to be the narrow scope.

The Bennett Amendment refers to Section 6(d) which 11 was the Equal Pay Act Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards 12 Act. And it states in essence that it is not a violation of 13 Title VII to differentiate and pay on the basis of sex if 14 it's authorized by the Equal Pay Act. There have been three 15 16 interpretations put forth for what the Bennett Amendment The most narrow and I think one not strongly urged 17 means. by any party as this time is that all it did was incorporate 18 four defenses that are found as a part of the Equal Pay Act. 19 The reason that that can be discounted fairly simply is that 20 21 those four defenses already existed in Title VII as it was 22 The first three existed in a sentence immediately proposed. 23 preceding the insertion of the Bennett Amendment in Section 24 703(h). The other one, any other factor other than sex, is 25 implicit in Title VII itself, which only creates a violation

1 for discrimination based upon sex.

MILLERS FALLS

2	The second interpretation, and the one that's being
3 urgeo	d by the EEOC, is that they recognized that certainly
4 Senat	tor Bennett and Congress intended more than the four de-
5 fense	es. They refer to the entire Equal Pay Act, not just the
6 defer	nses. And so they say that what he meant to do was simply
7 say f	that anytime an equal pay claim is raised, that the equal
8 work	standard applies. But that is just as illogical, taken
9 in th	ne context of what Congress had just finished doing the
o year	prior and I would point out, the same Congress in
adopt	ting the Equal Pay Act.
2	QUESTION: And that this upset Dirksen, while you're
3 at it	t, on that same point?
4	MR. DERR: Your Honor
5	QUESTION: Where he said specifically that it was
6 for t	the purpose of taking care of the exceptions? Didn't he?
7	MR. DERR: He uses the word "exception" and in the
8 conte	ext in which he uses it, Your Honor, it's not clear what
9 he re	eferred to. The only way that we can interpret it to make
o any s	sense is that he intended to incorporate the equal pay
1 for e	equal work standard, all of Section 6(d), and used the
2 term	"exception." It's also possible that what he meant to
3 inclu	ude was the entire Fair Labor Standards Act, which would
4 inclu	ide the narrow employee and employer exemptions.
	QUESTION: Well, what should we do, Mr. Derr?
2 term 3 inclu	"exception." It's also possible that what he mean ude was the entire Fair Labor Standards Act, which

What weight should we give Senator Bennett's 1965 clarifica-1 tion? 2 MR. DERR: The 1965 clarification, although it comes 3 later -- and of course that raises some questions --4 That was two, three years later, wasn't it? QUESTION: 5 MR. DERR: One year later. 6 QUESTION: One year later. 7 MR. DERR: The Bennett Amendment was adopted in 8 1964; the clarification came in 1965. It's entitled to weight. 9 It attempts to show why the Amendment came in the limited form 10 that it did, because of the cloture situation. It comes from 11 the author and sponsor of the amendment, it comes relatively 12 contemporaneously, it was agreed to by Senator Dirksen, who 13 also was instrumental in the adoption of Title VII. And a 14 bit later, several weeks later, Senator Clark, who took excep-15 tion to a limited portion of it, namely the question of 16 coverage, agreed with the essence of it, which was the incor-17 poration of the Equal Pay Act. So three of the pivotal 18 people --19 QUESTION: You haven't mentioned Senator Humphrey, 20 who commented. 21 MR. DERR: Senator Humphrey was commenting about a 22 different topic. His comments were, as I remember them, 23 directed at the equal pay for equal work standard. 24 QUESTION: Do you think Senator Humphrey would be 25

LLERS.

in accord with your interpretation? 1 MR. DERR: Yes, I do. 2 QUESTION: What do you think Senator Bennett meant 3 when he referred to a "proper technical correction" of the 4 5 bill? MR. DERR: I believe that it's appropriate to view 6 7 the Bennett Amendment as a technical correction because it was a clarifying amendment. It was not a narrowing of the scope of 8 9 Title VII in the area of sex-based wage discrimination, it was an explanation of Congress' intent and expectation that 10 Title VII would be that narrow. 11 12 QUESTION: It's true, isn't it, that the '65 comment 13 by Senator Bennett was never heard by the 97 other Senators, or 99 other Senators, who had already enacted the bill into 14 15 law? That's correct, Your Honor. 16 MR. DERR: The reason 17 that it has relevance and weight is that there is nothing in 18 the legislative history to indicate to the contrary that that 19 was not the sense and intent of Congress when it was adopted. 20 QUESTION: Yes, but Mr. Derr --21 MR. DERR: Everything in the record is consistent. 22 QUESTION: But haven't we quite frequently suggested 23 that you have to proceed very cautiously in giving any weight to post-enactment statements of what he meant by even spon-24 25 sors of legislation?

MR. DERR: Your Honor, that's very true, and it 1 certainly goes to an evaluation of the weight of the comments. 2 and we are not relying solely on that comment, although all 3 of the evaluative criteria that the Court has mentioned would 4 require that weight be given to it in this case. 5 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mrs. Hewitt. 6 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MRS. CAROL A. HEWITT, ESQ., 7 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 8 MS. HEWITT: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please 9 the Court: 10 The plaintiffs in this case at trial sought to prove 11 that the defendants had established the appropriate pay for 12 13 the job of jail matron and then paid the women incumbents less. The sheriff, who is one of the defendants and deter-14 mined by the trial court to be an employer, testified that the 15 appropriate way to pay the jail matrons was to pay them five 16 percent less than corrections officers. He had previously 17 testified in depositions that he thought it appropriate that 18 they be paid at the rate of the deputy sheriffs who, at one 19 time, were the persons performing services in the male section 20 21 of the jail. 22 At trial we sought to pursue this matter further. 23 The court terminated the line of questioning about any pay

MILLIFRS FALLS

24 differential with the comment that, if the jobs are not 25 equal, the degree of pay differential or the reason therefor

has no relevance. That is at pages 69 and 70 of the record. 1 The court also terminated testimony of two other 2 witnesses because he preferred to focus on other issues. 3 On the appeal, the 9th Circuit --4 QUESTION: Did you make a proffer of what you 5 were going to prove? 6 MS. HEWITT: No, I did not, Your Honor. The judge 7 QUESTION: That's usually the best way to preserve 8 a point like that, isn't it? 9 MS. HEWITT: That is certainly true. This was a 10 calculated risk in this case. The judge was impatient, and 11 we felt confident we were going to win on other grounds. 12 I did not do it. It was obviously an error, in hindsight. 13 The Court of Appeals remanded the case after re-14 15 versing, stating that there should be further proceedings on the question of what kind of proof there was of this claim. 16 Therefore, the question that is being reviewed is whether 17 Title VII prohibits wage discrimination for women by an 18 employer paying less than the rate that he has determined to 19 be appropriate for a job. 20 I think it's important in this case that the only 21 issue of comparability comes because the employer sought to 22 determine the appropriateness of wages within the jail setting 23 24 by comparing one job to another and also by looking to

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outside sources. So it's the employer's system that we are

looking to, and we are saying, if the employer follows this system and determines an appropriate rate of pay, then he cannot lower that rate of pay because the incumbents are women.

5 QUESTION: Mrs. Hewitt, in a case where the employer 6 has established a system of pay and set a certain rate for 7 secretaries and a certain rate for outside salesmen and the 8 outside salesmen's rate is higher or at any rate their gross 9 income is higher, do you think that could be attacked under 10 Title VII?

MS. HEWITT: It could be attacked if there were some reason to indicate that there were sex factors being taken into account in setting the wage rate, not --

QUESTION: Well, let's say all the salesmen were men and all the secretaries were women.

16 MS. HEWITT: I don't think that that in itself es-17 tablishes any kind of intent because we have that situation 18 in this case. We have the matron's job which by state statute 19 was required to be filled by women, and we have de facto segre-20 gation on the corrections officer side. There were never any 21 female corrections officers. There's evidence in the record 22 that women were discouraged from applying and, in fact, there 23 might well have been a male BFOQ for that job, but that was 24 not litigated.

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QUESTION: These are clearly different jobs,

1 secretary and salesman. And --

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2	MS. HEWITT: That is correct. Now, you can't pre-
3	sume discrimination just because they're different jobs, be-
4	cause, obviously, there are some jobs, where women are the
5	predominant or the sole occupants
6	QUESTION: But your point is that there can be dis-
7	crimination even though the jobs are quite different?
8	MS. HEWITT: Certainly. And a classic example is
9	if the employer uses a system, the Hay system, the McKenzie
10	system, or any of those nationally known ones, determines what
11	the worth of the job is, and then pays the men that level and
12	pays the women something less simply because they're women.
13	QUESTION: They equal. But not for the
14	same job? da?
15	MS. HEWITT: That's correct. They are not the same
16	job and that's why we're in this court today, because
17	QUESTION: It pays the jobs differently, even
18	though and it turns out that in one job category 100 per-
19	cent of the occupants are female and in the other 100 percent
20	are male. Now, that would be a prima facie case, woudln't it?
21	MS. HEWITT: Yes, but
22	QUESTION: But you would be here if half the cor-
23	rections officers were women and half men if your claim still
24	was that the exclusively female category was paid on a dis-
25	criminatory basis?
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MS. HEWITT: That's correct. There are kinds of 1 discrimination under Title VII in wages where there is no 2 job comparison at all. The example would be a single sex 3 occupant where the employer says, without reference to anyone 4 else, if you were a male I would pay you less; a situation 5 such as the Manhart situation where you have a differential 6 in take-home pay because of the sex of the employee but it's 7 not with comparison to any other job. 8

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QUESTION: Well, what if you take a situation which 9 I think has arisen in connection with the airlines where you 10 have male flight attendants and female stewardesses -- I 11 guess they're all called attendants now. And that 12 group brings a Title VII action on the grounds or an equal 13 pay action, on the grounds that the attendants, although 14 they've put in the same number of hours, are not being paid 15 the same amount as the pilots. Do you think that a court can 16 then evaluate the number of hours and the training and the 17 capacity and ability required of attendants as opposed to 18 pilots? 19

MS. HEWITT: My view of that is that that fact alone would not state a prima facie case, because what Title VII prohibits is discrimination because of sex, and the mere fact that the plaintiff is a woman and she's comparing herself to a man doesn't create any inference that there's discrimination on the basis of sex. The most obvious reason is discrimination

1 because the jobs are different.

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QUESTION: But your argument says, tells us, that 2 there could be a case of a discrimination even though the 3 jobs are quite different. Isn't that it? 4 MS. HEWITT: There certainly could be. There 5 certainly could be. And the question that will have to be --6 QUESTION: And how much you have to prove is really 7 not here, is it? 8 MS. HEWITT: Yes; that's correct. That's not here 9 in this case. 10 QUESTION: But what would be a hypothetical exam-11 ple? 12 QUESTION: This one. 13 MS. HEWITT: Of a prima facie case? 14 QUESTION: Yes. 15 QUESTION: This case. Isn't that what you say? 16 MS. HEWITT: All right. In this case -- The county 17 in this case has established a system for determining the 18 value of jobs. That system in this particular case consisted 19 of looking to outside markets and then doing an internal 20 evaluation of what one person did versus another. Based on 21 22 that they determined that the appropriate rate of pay for corrections officers was one rate and for matrons was one 23 class below that, which was a five percent differential. 24 They then paid the women 35 percent less than they paid the 25

corrections officers. Now, I think it's quite possible in 1 this case that that raises an inference that there might have 2 been discrimination involved, given the fact that all the 3 matrons are women and all the corrections officers are men, 4 and it's somewhat unusual for an employer to go to the prob-5 lem of, go to the trouble of evaluating a job, determining 6 the appropriate rate of pay, and then pay one group who are 7 all women less and not men. But that may not be enough. 8 That -- it's possible that you have to come in and say --9 and I've got the sworn testimony of the employer that says, 10 yes, I did it, just because that person is a woman. 11

Now, there's a great variance in what might might be sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination but comparing it to the standards for discrimination in hiring or promotion, the McDonnell-Douglas type of standards, the threshold is relatively low, and the Court has found that an inference of discrimination --

QUESTION: Are you saying that here, for example, they priced the corrections officer, a male job, at \$500 a month; they priced the women's, matron's job at \$400 a month, but then they paid the corrections officers five but the women 350?

23 MS. HEWITT: Exactly.

QUESTION: That's what you say this case is? MS. HEWITT: That's exactly correct. Yes, sir.

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1	Now, the county can come back, certainly, and say, well, the
2	reason we paid the matrons less was something having nothing
3	to do with their sex. They can certainly rebut the presump-
4	tion, but it would seem to me that that would create a
5	threshold level, raising an inference at this point?
6	QUESTION: In a prima facie case?
7	MS. HEWITT: Yes.
8	QUESTION: You mean to rebut the prima facie case?
9	Not a presumption? There's no presumption there.
10	MS. HEWITT: No. Excuse me. That's very correct.
11	Rebutting the prima facie case.
12	QUESTION: What if both the matrons' guard force
13	were made up of both men and women and paid equally, and the
14	deputy sheriff force were made up of men and women, and paid
15	at a higher rate, but paid equally? Do you think a matron or
16	a guard, a male, could bring a challenge to that sort of
17	system?
18	MS. HEWITT: I think the system is challengeable but
19	they're going to have to show something that would lead you to
20	believe, even on a prima facie case, that discrimination was
21	involved. The problem you have with
22	QUESTION: Well, you answered me a while ago that
23	the matron could certainly make out a case on that basis, if
24	you and that you could make your proffer of proof and make a
25	prima facie case.

MS. HEWITT: Well, as I understand the difference in 1 the situation, in the matron situation we have two factors: 2 one, it's totally sex-segregated, and two, you have a level 3 of pay which is then determined and then the women are paid 4 less, so that's determined. Now, as I understand, in your 5 hypothetical, you've got a mixture of men and women in both 6 jobs. Now --7 QUESTION: Right. 8 9 QUESTION: Are you saying that both are prima facie? MS. HEWITT: I think it's more questionable whether 10 you have a prima facie case when you have a mix of males and 11 females and you're paying that particular job category less. 12 I'm not saying you can't do it, but I'm not sure that it's 13 as clear that sex may have played a factor in the different 14 way in which the two groups are treated. 15 But the matrons in my brother Rehnquist's QUESTION: 16 example would have as strong a case there as they do here, 17 if they exclusively --? 18 MS. HEWITT: That's correct. 19 QUESTION: Yes. 20 MS. HEWITT: There is nothing magical about a pay 21 case under Title VII as compared to any other kind of a dis-22 crimination case under it. Obviously there are difficult 23 problems of comparisons and this does not limit itself to 24 pay cases in either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII. There are 25

difficult factual questions to be determined and anytime when you're dealing with motivation I think it's important that --

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QUESTION: But you do reject the argument of your
brother that there can't be a Title VII case unless you can
prove an equal pay violation?

MS. HEWITT: Absolutely. I do not think that 7 there's anything in the Bennett Amendment which can possibly 8 be construed to have such a broad result. The only legisla-9 tive history on the Bennett Amendment that is relevant is that 10 which was at the same time it was enacted, and that was 11 Bennett's proposal, that it was being introduced as a techni-12 cal correction in order to avoid conflicts between the Equal 13 Pay Act and Title VII, and Dirksen's comment that this was 14 a good idea because it incorporated the exceptions, and all it 15 did was incorporate the exceptions of the Equal Pay Act into 16 Title VII. There was no debate. It was voted on and enacted 17 on that basis. 18

And furthermore, even the language of the Bennett Amendment only says that it is not an unlawful employment practice for an employer to differentiate in compensation on sex if such differentiation is authorized by the Equal Pay Act. I think it's very important to look at what the Equal Pay Act authorizes.

When Congress was considering the Equal Pay Act it

1 thought about two things. It thought about creating a stan-2 dard requiring that there be equal pay for equal work, or in the alternative that there be equal pay for comparable work. 3 And that was all it considered. And in both of those alterna-4 5 tives it had in mind a plaintiff coming in and being able to say, I make less than this person over here, and he's a 6 7 man and he does either exactly the same thing or is compara-8 ble. Therefore, I am entitled to recover unless the employer 9 comes in and proves that his conduct is because of one of the 10 four affirmative defenses. Now that is a different kind of situation than is 11 12 required under Title VII. 13 QUESTION: Well, then, is your position that the

14 Bennett Act -+ rather, that the Equal Pay Act, in effect, 15 authorized nothing?

MS. HEWITT: I think the Equal Pay Act authorized the payment of different wages for the same job in four instances which are the four affirmative defenses, seniority system, merit system, productivity and quantity or any factor other than sex. And that's what it authorized.

QUESTION: What's your response, then, to your
opponent's argument that that was already in the Act?
MS. HEWITT: The first three, the seniority system
and the merit system, and the quantity or quality of production, are already in Section 703(h) of Title VII. The fourth

one, any factor other than sex, is not. And the petitioner 1 has said that that doesn't really mean anything because it's 2 just surplus verbiage, but that was certainly not the intent 3 of the law. 4 QUESTION: Well, it wouldn't be a violation of 5 Title VII if the alleged discrimination was based on a factor 6 other than sex -- race or --7 MS. HEWITT: That's correct. 8 9 QUESTION: Any other statutory criterion. MS. HEWITT: It's interesting that the defense of 10 any factor other than sex came out of the Equal Pay Act and 11 the Equal Pay Act says the same thing. You don't have a vio-12 lation of the Equal Pay Act unless it's sex, and then they 13 go on to say, but it's a defense if it's in effect the other -14 QUESTION: It's surplusage in those cases, is the 15 16 argument. MS. HEWITT: So they obviously thought it meant 17 something, and it must mean the same thing --18 QUESTION: What do you think it means? 19 MS. HEWITT: And it has been -- well, it has been 20 21 used --22 QUESTION: What do you think it means if it says "there shall be no violation of this Act if there is no 23 violation of this Act"? 24 25 MS. HEWITT: Well, I think it's been interpreted to

bear on the burden of going forward for the parties, and the inference of sex being a factor created in a prima facie case can be rebutted by showing that it's some factor other than sex, under either Title VII or under the Equal Pay Act.

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QUESTION: And that would be true whether or not
that statutory provision were there or not.

7 MS. HEWITT: But, I agree -- I think that in the 8 drafting of both statutes that there are some words that may 9 not have needed to be there, but I don't think that there's 10 anything that indicates that Congress intended the wholesale 11 change of Title VII which the petitioners' construction would 12 have. Now, there are lots and lots of kinds of instances 13 of discrimination which should by the clear language of 14 703(a) be precoverable under Title VII, but I'm sure Congress 15 never thought of that in the Equal Pay Act, and if they 16 thought about them they were not trying to deal with them, 17 and certainly not at the time they incorporated the Bennett 18 Amendment. And bear in mind that these types of discrimina-19 tion would only affect women, and I don't think Congress 20 intended to completely change Title VII to so limit the rights 21 for women and to provide protections for other protected 22 groups.

QUESTION: Do you attach any significance to the
 fact that the provision banning discrimination on the basis
 of sex in Title VII was introduced by Congressman Howard Smith

1 from Virginia?

2	MS. HEWITT: I subscribe fully to the theory that
3	he had in mind that he wanted the bill not to be enacted
4	because sex was included, but that isn't what happened, and I
5	don't think that too much can be put for that now at this
6	time. I am sure that Congress had in mind that women would
7	receive the same benefits under Title VII as any other pro-
8	tected class.
9	QUESTION: Well, except that women, you concede,
10	are the only group protected by Title VII, where, for whom
11	there's a BFOQ?
12	MS. HEWITT: That's correct.
13	QUESTION: And also, I think, since I've already
14	interrupted you, as I understand your colleague's argument,
15	it is that the Equal Pay Act is the sole criterion only when
16	the claim is a differential in compensation, not where the
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17	claim is something else, a promotion, or hiring, or whatever?
17 18	claim is something else, a promotion, or hiring, or whatever? MS. HEWITT: That's correct. The Equal Pay Act
18	MS. HEWITT: That's correct. The Equal Pay Act
18 19	MS. HEWITT: That's correct. The Equal Pay Act clearly speaks only to pay differentials.
18 19 20	MS. HEWITT: That's correct. The Equal Pay Act clearly speaks only to pay differentials. QUESTION: And your colleague's argument, even at
18 19 20 21	MS. HEWITT: That's correct. The Equal Pay Act clearly speaks only to pay differentials. QUESTION: And your colleague's argument, even at its broadest extent, would tell us that the Title VII is
18 19 20 21 22	MS. HEWITT: That's correct. The Equal Pay Act clearly speaks only to pay differentials. QUESTION: And your colleague's argument, even at its broadest extent, would tell us that the Title VII is satisfied if the Equal Pay Act is satisfied in a claim devoted

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this is a prime example, because they are sex-segregated jobs and they can't just go out and find either a male comparator in their own job or, in this case, even go to the corrections officers' position.

QUESTION: Incidentaly, Mrs. Hewitt, I thought you -- did you not say earlier, there's not ever been a female in the corrections officer's job? But what about your brother's suggestion to us, however, that access to corrections officers' jobs is available to females?

MS. HEWITT: Our contention is that access is illussory. We did not pursue that in the trial because it was not really an issue, but the fact is that there never had been one that really discouraged --

QUESTION: Well, is there any finding by either of the lower courts that there is access to the corrections officer's -- ?

MS. HEWITT: It was noted, yes, in the court, thatthe corrections officer's position was open to women.

19 QUESTION: As a finding?

20 MS. HEWITT: As a finding.

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QUESTION: By whom, the district court?

MS. HEWITT: By the district court. That's correct.
QUESTION: And there have been, or are, women deputy
sheriffs?

MS. HEWITT: There are women deputy sheriffs, but

now that the deputy sheriffs for a time were in the jail doing the corrections officers'job. There were no women at that time, so there have never been any women on the male side of the jail, but there are now women who are deputies who do the general police patrol work.

I think it's important to keep in mind in this case 6 the kinds of discrimination in pay which Title VII would pro-7 hibit if the petitioners' contention were correct. And that 8 includes the situation that even he mentioned, which is some-9 one saying to an employee, I'm not going to pay you as much 10 as if you're a man. It includes a lot of situations where 11 you would have a discriminatory impact. For instance, if an 12 employer determined that he was going to pay extra pay for 13 combat experience, which obviously would prejudice women, 14 under the analysis of the petitioner, that would be perfectly 15 all right. In the Phillips v. Martin Marietta situation, you 16 couldn't hire somebody on a sex-plus theory if they had pre-17 school age children, but you could pay them less because they 18 did. You could pay a head of household more, which would 19 impact against women. All of these kinds of cases have no 20 bearing whatever on comparing one job to another. It's clear 21 22 that in Congress's contemplation of the Equal Pay Act, what they were worried about was, as they expressed it, legions of 23 government bureaucrats coming into businesses and telling 24 them how much one job was worth versus another. We don't 25

1	have that situation in this case because we're relying on the
2	county's own system of valuing jobs for a starting point, and
3	then what they did to discount that.
4	Also, that is not the situation in most of what I
5	have described as the pay discrimination.
6	MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Sullivan.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF BARRY SULLIVAN, ESQ.,
8	ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., AS AMICI CURIAE
9	MR. SULLIVAN: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please
10	the Court:
11	I'd like to state the Government's interest in this
12	issue, but before I do I'd like to pick up on Mr. Justice
13	Stewart's question about the BFOQ. And it seems to me that
14	the BFOQ analogy doesn't carry you very far in this area be-
15	cause
16	QUESTION: Well, really, I agree with you, and the
17	only reason I raised that was to qualify the claim that women
18	are treated exactly like every other protected group under
19	Title VII. And there's certainly a very explicit exception
20	to that generalized statement in the BFOQ, which is applicable
21	only to women. And that was the only purpose
22	MR. SULLIVAN: Well, I believe it's also applicable
23	to members of religious groups, and I thinks that the ration-
24	ale is that there are some legitimate purposes that Congress
25	QUESTION: Right. And there are not

MR. SULLIVAN: -- wanted to protect, as there --QUESTION: Statutorily, for the other groups protected.

MR. SULLIVAN: -- such as pay discrimination. 4 The Government's interest here rests on the district 5 court's holding that sex-based compensation discrimination 6 is actionable under Title VII only if the particular acts of 7 discrimination would also be actionable under the Equal Pay 8 Act. In other words, an employer could admit to a woman 9 employee that he would pay her at a higher rate if she were 10 not a woman, or he could give a bonus that had absolutely 11 nothing to do with work to only male employees, or he could 12 13 give a cost of living increase that bore no relationship to the duties performed only to male employees. And this would 14 not violate Title VII in petitioners' view. The effect of 15 this theory --16 QUESTION: Because it would not violate the Equal 17 18 Pay Act? MR. SULLIVAN: That's correct. 19 20 QUESTION: And why wouldn't it violate the Equal Pay

21 Act, that latter example?

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MR. SULLIVAN: Well, it would violate the Equal Pay Act only in those circumstances in which a male and a female were doing exactly the same job --

QUESTION: Exactly.

MR. SULLIVAN: -- within the definition. However, 1 as to --2 QUESTION: Exactly. And you can't give the same 3 base pay to women and men, but give the bonuses only to men 4 under the Equal Pay Act, can you? 5 MR. SULLIVAN: That's right. But if you assume that 6 work forces are not made up of people who all have the same 7 jobs, as the Court assumed in Manhart --8 Right. QUESTION: 9 MR. SULLIVAN: -- then the point is that a good deal 10 of discrimination could be allowed to occur simply because 11 the jobs were not equal under the Equal Pay Act. And if 12 you assumed that the factor that is causing this discrimina-13 tion is a factor that has absolutely nothing to do with the 14 duties that are being performed by the various people who are 15 working here, then it clearly would violate Title VII in our 16 view, but it would not violate the Equal Pay Act. 17 QUESTION: Mr. Sullivan, as I understand Mrs. 18 Hewitt's argument, she says that for her purposes she is 19

taking the scale, wage scale, already set by the county and
simply seeking to show that there has been discrimination on
the basis of sex under Title VII in it; and that that would
not require the courts to evaluate the relative worth of
the flight attendant's job versus the pilot's job, and that
sort of thing. Now, is that your submission also, or do you

think that courts under the comparability theory can evaluate quite widely varying jobs?

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MR. SULLIVAN: Well, the Government has not taken a position as to that question in our brief. And the reason that we haven't is that we believe that, quite frankly, we don't understand what this comparability theory is.

7 QUESTION: Well, what if we don't either? How are 8 we supposed to write the opinion?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, the 9 theory of our brief does not depend on the comparability 10 issue. The theory of our brief is that as a matter of statu-11 tory construction what petitioners say the Bennett Amendment 12 means is simply not persuasive. And once that has been de-13 cided, then the lower federal courts will have an opportunity 14 to determine such questions as whether particular kinds of 15 proof are relevant in these cases, which I think is the 16 thrust of your question. 17

QUESTION: To prove intentional sex discrimination, 19 is that it?

20 MR. SULLIVAN: To prove sex discrimination within 21 the meaning of Section 703(a) of Title VII.

QUESTION: And really, your argument is simply that there can be a violation of Title VII with respect to compensation even though there's no violation of the Equal Pay Act? MR. SULLIVAN: That's correct.

QUESTION: And that's really the broad issue, isn't

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MR. SULLIVAN: That's correct.

4 QUESTION: Are you defending the Court of Appeals' 5 opinion? Certainly you are his judgment.

MR. SULLIVAN: That's correct. And I don't think 6 that there is anything inconsistent in the 9th Circuit's 7 opinion with what I've said. Essentially, the 9th Circuit 8 has said that the case should be remanded for further develop-9 ment of the factual record. And I might add that the other 10 decisions of the courts of appeals that have been rendered 11 on this question are not particularly helpful in that they 12 either reject the notion that 703(a) is left intact after the 13 Bennett Amendment or they accept that. And there isn't really 14 15 very much discussion, despite the number of cases that are cited in the briefs, on this --16

QUESTION: Well there's one that we don't understand at this moment what purpose much further discussion would serve since nobody seems to understand what would be involved.

20 MR. SULLIVAN: I'm not sure I understand the 21 comment --

QUESTION: Well, that's -- the real issue is the one you stated, isn't it? Whether -- what effect the Bennett Amendment had, and did it serve to say that there can be a violation of Title VII in this context only if there is a violation of the Equal Pay Act, or did it not? And that, you say, is what the courts have decided. And that's what you're asking us to decide.

MR. SULLIVAN: I think that's the issue that's --4 that's correct. But what I'm saying is that with respect to 5 what constitutes a prima facie case, if you accept our con-6 struction of the Bennett Amendment, in a situation where there 7 is no violation of the Equal Pay Act alleged, but we would submit 8 there would be a violation of Title VII. But that is a prob-9 lem. 10 QUESTION: But you want us to leave it to further 11 development in the district courts and the courts of appeals? 12

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MR. SULLIVAN: That's correct.

QUESTION: But is that what this Court ordinarily does? Aren't we supposed to lay down rules of law rather than simply say, go back and develop some more facts and then we'll tell you whether you've made a case or not?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, I think that in the Teamsters 18 decision the Court said that despite all of the work that 19 gone into McDonnell-Douglas, that McDonnell-Douglas was 20 simply one paradigm for proving a prima facie case of dis-21 crimination, and that there were other ways of proving a 22 prima facie case of discrimination. And that's simply all 23 we're saying here, is that that's essentially a fact-bound 24 question in every case. Some facts may be persuasive in one 25

case; they may create a strong inference of discrimination in 1 the circumstances of one case, and without any factual record 2 to speak of in this case --3 QUESTION: Well, didn't we limit the grant in this 4 case to just the one question? Or, isn't there just one 5 question involved, whether or not you must allege and prove 6 an Equal Pay Act violation in order to prove it Title VII? 7 MR. SULLIVAN: I think that is correct. That is 8 not the --9 QUESTION: That is the issue, and if we decide 10 against you the case is over, if we disagree with your ver-11 sion of the Bennett Amendment. 12 MR. SULLIVAN: I believe that would be correct. 13 QUESTION: But if we agree with you we don't reach 14 any other question, do we? 15 MR. SULLIVAN: No. We submit that the question 16 that the Government has raised here is the threshold question 17 that must be addressed in any event. 18 QUESTION: Is it your view that the term "comparable 19 work" is the same as "equal work"? 20 MR. SULLIVAN: No. That's not my view. 21 QUESTION: I got the impression that that was your 22 view being advanced at some time here. You think that they 23 do not mean the same thing? 24 MR. SULLIVAN: I think, ordinarily, they don't. 25 47

I'm not sure what the context the Chief Justice is suggesting 1 might be. 2 QUESTION: Well, in a law firm, the young lawyers 3 do work that's comparable to what the senior partners do, 4 but they don't do equal work and they surely don't get equal 5 pay. Is that right? 6 MR. SULLIVAN: I have been personally aware of that. 7 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will resume there at 8 one o'clock. 9 (Recess) 10 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Has the Solicitor 11 General completed his time, Mr. Taggart? 12 MR. TAGGART: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice. 13 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Do you have anything 14 further, counsel? You have about two minutes remaining. 15 ORAL ARGUMENT OF LAWRENCE R. DERR, ESQ., 16 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -- REBUTTAL 17 MR. DERR: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 18 please the Court: 19 20 I will not attempt in the time that I have to address all of the comments of the respondents and the 21 Government with which I don't agree. I believe that with one 22 exception those have all been covered in the brief and I 23 would ask that my silence not be taken as consent to them. 24 25 The one point, however, that was raised goes to the

1 question of how this case would be proven if it was returned 2 to the county. I would like to point out that the employer's 3 wage scales prior to the time of collective bargaining were set by the studies and the wages that were produced by those 4 5 studies were the ones paid. Subsequent to the time of collective bargaining, of course, they were set by bargaining be-6 tween the union and the employer rather than the impression 7 8 created by the respondent that they were manipulated by the 9 employer.

The real question, however, is that the respondents and the Government have not provided the answer to this Court of what will be the standard to determine sex-based wage discrimination. The answer is --

QUESTION: Mr. Derr, could I ask you, just to be sure I have your legal position, what about their hypothetical about a cost-of-living increase for the male category but no such increase for the females?

18 MR. DERR: A cost-of-living increase for the males 19 only?

QUESTION: Yes, or a bonus for them of, say, ten percent at the end of the year?

MR. DERR: If it comes within one of the other protected areas of Title VII, it obviously is a violation. If it is a matter of wage discrimination and is not a matter in which there can be found a comparison job, even a hypothetical

job, which will be the case in almost every instance, then it would not violate Title VII because it does not violate the Equal Pay Act.

4 QUESTION: Specifically, in this case, it would not 5 violate either statute?

MR. DERR: That's correct. And the reason that we 6 take that position and the reason that that is the correct 7 position is not necessarily because that that's the policy 8 that we espouse or anyone else espouses, but Congress, Con-9 gress fully considered that possibility and others, it looked 10 at the comparative worth, the comparative value, and it 11 decided in the Equal Pay Act that the equal pay standard was 12 the one to apply. 13

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, counsel.15 The case is submitted.

16 (Whereupon, at 1:02 o'clock p.m. the case in the 17 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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CERTIFICATE

2	North American Reporting hereby certifies that the
3	attached pages represent an accurate transcript of electronic
4	sound recording of the oral argument before the Supreme Court
5	of the United States in the matter of:
6	No. 80-429
7	COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ET AL.
8	ν.
9	ALBERTA GUNTHER ET AL.
10	
11	and that these pages constitute the original transcript of the
12	proceedings for the records of the Court.
13	BY: Cillian J. Cillion
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