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
Supreme Court of the United States

DONALD PAUL HODEL, ACTING SECRETARY) OF THE INTERIOR,) APPELLANT,) V.	No. 79-1538
VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMA-) TION ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.,)	
and)	
VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMA-) TION ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.,)	
APPELLANTS,)	
v.)	No. 79-1596
DONALD PAUL HODEL, ACTING SECRETARY) OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.)	

Washington, D.C. February 23, 1981

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202/544-1144

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 3 DONALD PAUL HODEL, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, Appellant, 4 No. 79-1538 : V. 5 VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLA-MATION ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., 6 and 7 VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLA-8 MATION ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., 9 Appellants, : No. 79-1596 • v. 10 DONALD PAUL HODEL, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL. 11 12 13 Washington, D. C. 14 Monday, February 23, 1981 15 The above-entitled matters came on for oral ar-16 gument before the Supreme Court of the United States 17 at 1:09 o'clock p.m. 18 **APPEARANCES:** 19 PETER BUSCEMI, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor 20 General, U. S. Department of Justice, Wasington, D.C. 20530; on behalf of Appellant (No. 79-1538) 21 and of Appellees (No. 79-1596). 22 J. MARSHALL COLEMAN, ESQ., Attorney General of Virginia, 1100 East Broad Street, Richmond, Vir-23 ginia 23219; on behalf of Appellees (No. 79-1538) and of Appellants (No. 79-1596). 24 25

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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will hear arguments
ext in Secretary of Interior v. The Surface Mining Company
nd the related case. Mr. Buscemi.
ORAL ARGUMENT OF PETER BUSCEMI, ESQ.,
ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT IN NO. 79-1538 &
ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEES IN NO. 79-1596
MR. BUSCEMI: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may
t please the Court:
This case, like the one that follows it, involves
everal challenges to the constitutionality of the Surface
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statute is Title V which is entitled, "Control of Environ-1 mental Impacts of Surface Coal Mining." Section 501 of the 2 Act establishes a two-stage program for the regulation of 3 surface mining. During the initial stage, also called the 4 interim stage in the Secretary's regulations, mine operators 5 are required to comply with only some of the performance 6 standards set up by the Act. Among the ones applicable dur-7 ing this interim stage are the so-called steep slope provi-8 sions in Section 515(d). They apply to surface mining on 9 slopes greater than 20 degrees. They require mine operators 10 11 to avoid the placement of debris, spoil material, or aban-12 doned equipment on the downslope beneath the mining cut. 13 They further require restoration of the mining site to its approximate original contour after mining is completed, and 14 complete coverage of the so-called high wall, which is the 15 vertical face of the mine cut. 16

Another portion of the Act that becomes immediately effective during the interim period is Section 522(e), particularly 522(e)(4) and -(5), which with various qualifications and exceptions prohibit surface mining altogether within specified distances of roads, schools, churches, parks, public buildings, and cemeteries.

23 During the interim period the Secretary of the
24 Interior is primarily responsible for enforcing the Act. The
25 interim regulatory program remains in effect in each state

until a permanent program has been established in that state. 1 States wishing to assume primary responsibility for regulation 2 of surface coal mining during the permanent phase must submit 3 to the Secretary a proposed permanent program demonstrating, 4 first, that the state legislature has adopted the necessary 5 laws implementing the environmental protection standards es-6 tablished by the Act. And second, that the state has the 7 administrative and the technological capability to enforce 8 9 those standards.

Mr. Buscemi, supposing that that statute 10 QUESTION: 11 at the phase you now describe didn't talk about coal at all, it simply talked about the desirability of zoning on a na-12 tional level, and Congress passed a law saying that for any 13 state that doesn't zone land and keep a certain amount of 14 prime farm land in existence that is now in existence, we 15 will supersede that state's regulatory power with our own 16 17 zoning act. Do you think it has the power under the Commerce Clause to do that? 18

MR. BUSCEMI: Well, I'm not sure that I completely appreciate the question, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, because I'm not sure that I understand the factual underpinning that Congress would have for that sort of regulation. My answer to that question and hypotheticals of that kind is essentially that if Congress finds, and has a rational basis for finding, that a particular situation that exists in the states is

affecting interstate commerce. And if Congress devises a method that's rationally related to the protection of the regulation of interstate commerce, the statute is constitutional. I'm not sure what the justification would be for the statute that you've just suggested, but I think that the test would be the same as it is here.

QUESTION: Well, in Chief Justice Hughes' opinion 7 in Jones & Laughlin v. NLRB, when he was upholding the 8 National Labor Relations statute, he said that, regarding 9 the Commerce Clause, "Undoubtedly the scope of this power 10 must be considered in the light of our dual system of govern-11 ment and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon 12 interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace 13 them in view of our complex society would effectually oblit-14 erate the distinction between what is national and what is 15 local and create a completely centralized government." 16

Now, does the Government take the position that the
law has gone so much beyond that that that is no longer the
limit on the Commerce Clause?

MR. BUSCEMI: Well, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, I think that the Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery establishes that there is some impact of the federal system of government, our state system, the Tenth Amendment, or the federal system of government generally, however you want to characterize that decision, on the exercise of the

 commerce power. And so I don't think that Mr. Chief Justice
 Hughes' statement that you've just read can be completely disavowed. We don't take that position here.

QUESTION: Then, do you think that Congress after reciting the history of surface farm lands in Oklahoma being blown over into Kansas and other places, back in the '30s, could require under the Commerce Clause that all farmers plough their land with contour plowing as distinguished from straight line plowing?

MR. BUSCEMI: Well, Mr. Chief Justice, again, my answer to that question is essentially the same as it was to Mr. Justice Rehnquist.

QUESTION: My question gives you a concrete, speci-14 fic statute, though.

MR. BUSCEMI: Well, I have to confess ignorance as to the situation in the Dust Bowl in the '30s, and as to the impact of contour plowing as opposed to some other kind of plowing --

QUESTION: Well, assuming -- add to it the congressional recital that scientific research and practice has demonstrated that contour plowing will preserve the soil for future generations.

MR. BUSCEMI: I assume, Mr. Chief Justice, that if
Congress rationally found that the failure to adopt a particular method of plowing or a particular method of cultivating

farmlands had an adverse effect on interstate commerce and
if Congress further rationally concluded that regulation of
the method of plowing would help to alleviate that effect,
that Congress could regulate that sort of agricultural activity, just as Congress has in fact regulated agricultural
cultivation, for example, with the pricing regulations and
also with the farm subsidy laws.

8 QUESTION: Well, but they've done that by use of 9 the power of the purse, granting subsidies if farmers com-10 plied with certain regulations. I'm talking about a flat 11 requirement that all farmers on certain findings engage in 12 contour plowing. Do you think they might be able to do it?

MR. BUSCEMI: Well, Mr. Chief Justice, I think that 13 the findings are critical. That is not the sort of thing that 14 15 can be so lightly assumed in the hypothetical, because Congress here, in the Surface Mining Act, as it has in the other 16 17 Commerce Clause legislation that the Court has sustained, has very carefully examined exactly the situation that did 18 19 prevail and has determined that particular adverse effect on interstate commerce did exist. And I think that if you are 20 willing to assume that Congress has made all the necessary 21 findings and Congress has determined that there is a rational 22 23 relationship between --

QUESTION: The word necessary presupposes the answer a little bit, doesn't it?

MR. BUSCEMI: That's essentially what I'm trying to say, Mr. Chief Justice. I think that once you make that assumption you are presupposing the answer. The question really is, what is the basis for the congressional action, and that's something that, you know, we can only talk about in connection --

7 QUESTION: The basis would be that the United States
8 Department of Agriculture says it knows more about farming
9 and soil conservation than the states do, and Congress accepts
10 that.

11 MR. BUSCEMI: But, Mr. Chief Justice, that's not 12 the situation we have here. We have a very careful, detailed, 13 lengthy investigation by Congress into surface mining and its 14 adverse effects on commerce, and we have the legislative his-15 tory that we've set out in the Appendix of our brief in this case which demonstrates, I think, that Congress has taken a 16 17 very close look at surface mining and its effects on inter-18 state commerce, and I don't --

QUESTION: Mr. Buscemi, what does that investigation show the effect on commerce is or may be if there is surface mining of coal without restoring the -- say, the high wall?

MR. BUSCEMI: Well, I think, Mr. Justice White - QUESTION: I can understand why surface mining might
 be said to affect commerce, but that wouldn't mean that

anything that Congress said, ordered with respect to surface mining would have an effect on commerce.

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MR. BUSCEMI: I think that's correct, Mr. Justice
White, but I think in particular the high wall regulation
that you, or the high wall statutory provision that you refer
to is very closely connected to preventing adverse environmental effects from surface mining. I think that the --

8 QUESTION: Well, you mean anything that affects9 the environment affects commerce? Is that your suggestion?

MR. BUSCEMI: Well, I think that that is one of the kinds of effects on commerce that Congress can consider, and I think that in this case that Congress has found that there is substantial environmental damage caused by surface mining.

QUESTION: Well, what if -- what if Virginia had a law that required, when you surface mine on these steep areas, that when you're through mining you flatten them and cover them. Now, you suggest that the United States would be empowered to say, because of its effect on commerce, would be empowered to say, no, you may not flatten them, you must rebuild them and reestablish their original contour?

MR. BUSCEMI: Subject, of course, to the test that
it would have to bear a rational relationship.

QUESTION: Well, I'm asking you what that is. What difference does it make to commerce whether they flatten the

1 land and cover it or restore it to the contour? That's what
2 I'm asking you.

MR. BUSCEMI: I understand, Mr. Justice White, but in point of fact, in this statute, under Section 515, it is permissible to flatten the land. The mountaintop removal method is specifically authorized by the statute so that Congress has not prevented that sort of activity.

8 QUESTION: So you suggest that if miners want to 9 not restore its original contour in these steep places, they 10 need not?

MR. BUSCEMI: That's correct. They can use the mountaintop removal method of mining which essentially slices off the peak of the mountain rather than gouging out strips along the side of the mountain.

QUESTION: Well, so you're not answering my question, again. Suppose that Virginia says, go ahead and gouge out and strip mine the way you're doing it, but then flatten it. Instead of recontouring the area, flatten it out, just flatten, make it flat, and cover it. Now, the United States could nevertheless require that they restore the contour under the Commerce Clause?

MR. BUSCEMI: I'm not sure specifically what you mean by flattening it and covering it, but in fact, again with respect to the strip mining, the surface mining on the side of the mountain, the steep slope provisions do provide

variances that will allow the maintenance of flat benchland 1 if that is necessary for public use or a higher economic use. 2 QUESTION: Well, you still haven't suggested to me 3 what the effect on commerce is. 4 MR. BUSCEMI: What the effect on commerce is of 5 strip mining? 6 QUESTION: No, of not restoring the contour but 7 flattening it and covering it some other way. 8 MR. BUSCEMI: Well, Mr. Justice White, I refer you 9 to the findings that Congress made in Section 101 of the 10 statute. 11 QUESTION: Well, don't refer me, I want to ask --12 you can tell me what --13 QUESTION: We have no way of reviewing those 14 findings. 15 MR. BUSCEMI: Well, that's precisely my point, 16 Mr. Justice Rehnquist. Section 101 of the statute contains 17 Congress's findings with respect to the environmental impact 18 that surface mining has. 19 QUESTION: Well, you go ahead and tell me what 20 impact on commerce it has. That's what I'm asking you. 21 MR. BUSCEMI: In Section 101 of the statute 22 Congress has found that coal mining operations contribute 23 significantly to the nation's energy requirements, that sur-24 face mining results in disturbance of surface areas, that 25

burden and adversely affect commerce by destroying and 1 diminishing the utility of land for commercial, industrial, 2 residential, recreational, agricultural, and forestry pur-3 poses by causing erosion and landslides, by contributing to 4 floods, by polluting the water, by destroying fish and wild-5 life habitats, by impairing natural beauty, by damaging the 6 property of citizens, by creating hazards dangerous to life 7 and property --8

9 QUESTION: I can understand all of that but I still 10 don't identify in that listing any specific impact on commerce 11 by a failure to restore the original contour when these 12 steep places are mined.

MR. BUSCEMI: Well, I think, Mr. Justice White, the question is not whether every individual failure to restore a particular surface mine to its approximate original contour has a substantial effect on commerce. Rather, the question is whether Congress can regulate this entire activity that has a substantial effect on commerce.

QUESTION: So your answer to me is that it doesn't make any difference whether this particular phase that's regulated has any effect on commerce, as long as strip mining is subject to regulation, that's the end of the --?

MR. BUSCEMI: Well, it certainly doesn't make any difference whether you can point to a particular mine and identify the particular effect on commerce from that mine. 1 That is certainly correct.

2	QUESTION: Well, I'm still a little puzzled. Do you
3	take the position that the general practice for mines as a
4	whole of requiring the restoration of the slope does in fact
5	have some impact on commerce by preventing the various things
6	that Congress found, such as erosion and floods and so forth
7	and so on? Do you take that position?
8	MR. BUSCEMI: Yes.
9	QUESTION: Or are you taking the more extreme posi-
10	tion that you don't even have to have that as long as the
11	activity is regulated, is subject to regulation?
12	MR. BUSCEMI: Well, I think that with respect to
13	the form of regulation that Congress chooses, there must be a
14	rational relationship between that regulation and the protec-
15	tion and the regulation of commerce. I don't think Congress
16	is free to say surface mining is subject to regulation
17	QUESTION: What your answer to Mr. Justice White,
18	then, is, is that some of the things that you read are in
19	fact, looking at the class of activity as a whole, related to
20	commerce.
21	MR. BUSCEMI: Yes.
22	QUESTION: Which is different from the all right.
23	MR. BUSCEMI: Now, I want to make the point
24	QUESTION: Can you give us an example or two of
25	what would be the negative impact on commerce? Flush that out
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a little.

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2	MR. BUSCEMI: I really don't know how to respond to
3	that except by saying that the list that I just read, I think,
4	indicates that there is a substantial effect on commerce.
5	Certainly
6	QUESTION: Well, because Congress says so doesn't
7	make it true, necessarily. I'm asking you for illustrations,
8	concrete illustrations, as to what you think Congress was
9	driving at.
10	MR. BUSCEMI: Well, I think, Mr. Chief Justice, for
11	example, the Buffalo Creek flood disaster, which we've cited
12	or mentioned in one of the briefs and which is mentioned in
13	the congressional reports, is the kind of disaster that Con-
14	gress is trying to avert through regulating surface mining,
15	and I think that where hundreds of lives are lost, there's no
16	question of the
17	QUESTION: That's not a Commerce Clause issue, is
18	it? The loss of lives?
19	MR. BUSCEMI: I think, for example, that if you look
20	at the child labor legislation that this Court upheld under
21	the Commerce Clause in Darby, there's no question that Con-
22	gress can try to pursue other ends in the exercise of its
23	Commerce Clause power.
24	I want to make the point that as far as I can under-
25	stand their argument, plaintiffs don't disagree with any of
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1 what we've been saying so far. Their point is that the 2 Surface Mining Act affects land use and land use is something that is committed exclusively by the Constitution to the 3 states, and that that's why this statute exceeds the 4 5 Commerce Clause. And they cite this Court to the decision in McCready v. Virginia in 1877, and they talk about the separa-6 7 tion of production and commerce. But, as the Court held in 8 Darby and in Jones & Laughlin which Mr. Justice Rehnquist re-9 ferred to, and in Wickard v. Filburn, and Brightwood Dairy and a 10 host of other cases, that the rigid separation of production and 11 commerce is no longer the rule that's followed by this Court.

QUESTION: But if there is no rigid separation, then it seems to me you're just pushing it to the outer edge and saying that Congress can supersede any state authority by simply a set of findings which are unreviewable in this Court, or any other court.

17 MR. BUSCEMI: Mr. Justice Rehnquist, I think that, 18 for example, in your dissent in this Court in Fry v. United 19 States, you make the point that there is a very broad discre-20 tion in Congress to make findings, and that's part of what 21 Congress is entitled to do, and you made that point, I be-22 lieve, in the connection of United States v. California, which 23 you specifically said you thought was a correct decision be-24 cause Congress had made certain findings about the impact of 25 railroad hazards on public safety and on commerce. It is true

that Congress does have an extremely broad factfinding capa-1 bility and discretion, but I don't -- that does not mean that 2 there is no review whatsoever. There must be a rational basis 3 for a factual finding that Congress has made, and I think 4 that the legislative record in this case, which includes 5 volumes and volumes of hearings and evidence of the negative 6 effects that surface mining has had, demonstrates that there 7 8 is a basis for the congressional findings.

9 Now, there are, by the way, a number of federal statutes that affect land use. I don't think there can be 10 11 any question about that, and I'm not sure exactly what the 12 district court and what appellees mean when they say that 13 Congress is not free to effect land use, because, for example, 14 the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, the historical preservation statutes in the Federal Code that we discussed 15 16 in the Grand Central Station brief, the Wild and Scenic Rivers 17 Act, a number of these statutes have effects on land use, and 18 plaintiffs, I don't believe, contend that all of those sta-19 tutes go beyond the Commerce Clause. There's nothing about 20 the phrase "land use" that's sacrosanct under the Constitution. I mean, the Constitution does not say that states are the 21 22 only governmental entities entitled to regulate land use.

QUESTION: There was something about powers not
 expressly granted having been reserved, isn't there somewhere?
 MR. BUSCEMI: That's true, Mr. Chief Justice, but

here the Commerce Clause power is expressly granted. That's precisely the point.

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QUESTION: Well, we've been trying, I think, several of us to get a specific focus on just how it affects interstate commerce.

MR. BUSCEMI: Well, Mr. Chief Justice, I think I've
given my best answer to that question. I think that Congress
has found that it affects interstate commerce in several
ways and I think that those findings are rational findings
and they're supported by the evidence in the legislative record,
in the committee reports, in the hearings, and so on.

I think, Mr. Chief Justice, even the record in the district court in this case provides several examples of -the district court's own opinion says that in the absence of this legislation, or if this legislation is invalidated, there will be negative consequences, not only for coal mining itself, but also for the safety and the health of the people in mining communities. Now, of course --

19 QUESTION: On this issue, you're the respondent, 20 aren't you?

MR. BUSCEMI: That's exactly right. That's exactly the point I was just about to make, because from this point --

QUESTION: The Court of Appeals held in your favor on this issue?

MR. BUSCEMI: -- the district court ruled in our 1 favor. That's not true in the Indiana case, but the district 2 court here sustained the statute on the Commerce Clause 3 ground. Now, admittedly, this Commerce Clause-Tenth Amendment 4 or Federal System argument emerges to some extent in -- this 5 Court in National League of Cities said that the statute 6 there was unquestionably valid under the Commerce Clause, 7 but that the Tenth Amendment or the state-federal relation-8 ship in our constitutional system imposed some limitations on 9 Congress's power to exercise the Commerce Clause delegated 10 11 power. So that that was -- even in National League of Cities there was no question that the Commerce Clause power alone 12 was sufficient to justify the congressional action. The 13 question is whether there was some additional limit. 14

15 And that brings me to the first point on which the 16 district court ruled against the Secretary, and that is on this Tenth Amendment argument. But this statute is far dif-17 18 ferent from the one that the Court considered in National League of Cities, and the reaffirmation of the decision in 19 20 United States v. California, in National League of Cities, I 21 think is very instructive because there, in California, we 22 had a federal statute that was being applied directly to the 23 states. This statute does not apply directly to the states in 24 any way. This statute applies only to coal mine operators. 25 The Federal Government does not require the states to

undertake any measures whatsoever. If the states do not 1 wish to participate in the regulatory program that the federal 2 statute establishes, they need not do so. If they wish to do 3 so, they can submit a proposed program to the Secretary and 4 -- by the way, there is a substantial amount of discretion 5 left to the states in those proposed programs. In fact, in 6 Section 101(f) of the Act Congress itself stated that because 8 of the diversity in terrain and climate, chemical and other physical conditions, the primary governmental responsibility 9 should rest with the states. That was Congress' whole plan 10 under this statute. And the Court of Appeals for the District 11 12 of Columbia Circuit in reviewing a request for preliminary 13 injunction in the rule, the regulation review proceeding that's going on there right now, denied the preliminary in-14 15 junction and in an opinion by the court -- the panel included Judge Tamm, Judge McKinnon, and District Judge Greene -- an-16 17 nounced that this statute was truly an exemplary piece of 18 federalist legislation because of the interaction between the state and the federal governments. 19

And I think that Congress has tried to strike the balance in a fair way here between the state and the federal government without requiring the states to do anything. The states may -- there is a substantial amount of leeway in framing these proposed permanent programs, and several of those proposed programs have already been approved, including

one by the State of West Virginia.

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QUESTION: But a state is not free to decide that it will have no program?

MR. BUSCEMI: Well, a state, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, is free to decide that it will not regulate surface mining at all, but in that event the Federal Government will regulate surface mining.

QUESTION: Under the Commerce Clause?

9 MR. BUSCEMI: Under the Commerce Clause. That's 10 correct. And myonly point, at this stage, is that the Tenth 11 Amendment does not restrict the congressional decision to do 12 that because, as this Court recognized in National League of 13 Cities, there is nothing in the Tenth Amendment that prohi-14 bits regulation of individual entrepreneurs in private busi-15 ness. That distinction was expressly preserved.

I think that I would like to reserve the balance of my time for rebuttal at this point, and I think I will address the taking questions in connection with the Indiana case, since they are exactly the same. Thank you.

20 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Very well. Mr. Attorney 21 General.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF J. MARSHALL COLEMAN, ESQ., ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEES IN NO. 79-1538 & ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS IN NO. 79-1596 MR. COLEMAN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please

1 the Court:

2	In this case we are really talking about the idea of
3	a state. This is not a question of whether something is too
4	local to be reached by the Congress through the exercise of
5	its authority under the Commerce Clause. That is settled.
6	It's not even a case that involves whether the Congress can
7	do things that affect state functions, because that is also
8	settled. Environmental laws have some impact on that.
9	Here we're talking, on the other hand, about a
10	wholesale displacement of integral state functions, because
11	the Act in question results in the abridgment of state power
12	to shape its communities and to shape its future.
13	QUESTION: Is this, then, a matter of the extent
14	of the commerce power, or is it a matter of an impediment,
15	in this case a constitutional impediment, erected by the Ninth
16	and Tenth Amendments, perhaps, to the exercise by Congress
17	of the commerce power?
18	MR. COLEMAN: Well, you know, the district court
19	found that it was not the first, that the commerce power was
20	sufficient. I would urge to the Court that taking the com-
21	merce power this far would stretch it to the breaking point,
22	and I am sympathetic with counsel
23	QUESTION: As I understand the National League of
24	Cities, which is a case cited a good deal by both sides, at
25	least in their briefs and relied on considerably by you, as I

1	understand that case, it didn't go to the scope of the
2	commerce power
3	MR. COLEMAN: That's right.
4	QUESTION: But rather to an impediment to the exer-
5	cise of the commerce power.
6	MR. COLEMAN: That's right. And that's what I want
7	to focus on, because that was the holding of the court, and
8	it's the
9	QUESTION: In this case.
10	MR. COLEMAN: in this case. I think that
11	QUESTION: I mean, in other words, nobody could
12	quarrel with the scope of the commerce power. If Congress
13	passed a law regulating newspapers, that some of them go
14	to two or three or more states, but it might run directly
15	afoul of the First Amendment.
16	MR. COLEMAN: Well, that's right, and I'm not going
17	to concede that the commerce power can be stretched this far.
18	But even if it were found that it could
19	QUESTION: As the Court of Appeals did find.
20	MR. COLEMAN: As the court has said
21	QUESTION: The district court.
22	MR. COLEMAN: it still collides with the idea of
23	federalism, which is the essence of American democracy. The
24	idea that the people speak not just through the Congress but
25	that they speak through the Constitution, which means that
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there is a role that exists, that's real, that's tangible, that's reserved to the states and cannot be abridged.

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The flaw in this case is not that it touches land 3 use, because this Court has held that Congress can provide 4 who must be served in restaurants, how much can be 5 grown on property, who it can be sold to. But this decision 6 of the Congress erodes the whole power of self-determination 7 because it prohibits to a community from saying what goes 8 where. No one will contest but that the state is free to 9 say where its capital will be located, where its county seat 10 11 is to be located, and until this hour, it has not been seriously contested that the question of community planning 12 to determine the layout of the community, its shape, its face, 13 its map, is integral to the authority and the integrity of 14 a system of state responsibilities in a constitutional frame-15 work. 16

QUESTION: Of course at the time the Constitution
was adopted, I suppose there would have been a considerable
doubt about the power of a state to regulate or determine that.

MR. COLEMAN: That may be true; in the last 80 years, I suppose, it's become a traditional function of state government, recognized time and time again by this Court as recently as last term that the state does have considerable authority in community planning. And even in earlier times it was the state, after all, that mapped out the roads and

streets and the confines --

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QUESTION: There were no zoning laws. 2 MR. COLEMAN: There were no zoning laws. I think 3 the first zoning law was a 20th century development. But 4 it's not the question of the period of time, how long it's 5 been in effect, whether it's a traditional function or not, 6 it's how important it is, and how much of it is deepseated 7 in the way states operate today. 8 QUESTION: Well, are you saying that whatever may 9 have been the rights at that time, they were not granted to 10 the federal government? 11 MR. COLEMAN: They were not. And there has been 12 no change since that time: 13 QUESTION: I think that's a different argument. 14 A minute ago you said there was plenty of power in the 15 federal government, but there's an independent curtailment 16 of the exercise of that power. 17 MR. COLEMAN: Right. 18 QUESTION: If there weren't this independent doctrine 19 that you could identify for us, there would be ample federal 20 power, you don't concede, under the district court's reasoning --21 MR. COLEMAN: Well, I don't concede that --22 23 QUESTION: Arguendo, you say? QUESTION: Arguendo. 24 25 MR. COLEMAN: Arguendo, and I think that --

I understood the Chief Justice to talk about whether or not 1 this power had been given rise to by the states, or exercised 2 by the states themselves. And It probably wasn't in as 3 thoroughgoing a manner as it is now, but I think there was al-4 ways the idea of community planning. After all, Justice Chase 5 told us in these two 1869 cases that a state is really de-6 fined as territory, people, and government, and that the over-7 riding idea is the idea of a community. 8

9 And what we're arguing here is not some doctrinaire 10 view of localism but the idea of self-determination, that 11 this is really a promoter of democracy.

QUESTION: Well, wasn't the theory at any rate of people who framed the Constitution the idea that the powers of government resided in the states to innovate as they would or would not and they delegated certain powers to Congress? MR. COLEMAN: That was; yes.

QUESTION: The Federal Government, although perhaps
somewhat fictionally in the last 30 or 40 years, has been
referred to as a government of limited powers.

20 MR. COLEMAN: Well, that's one of the happy bypro-21 ducts of the Tenth Amendment and the entire structure that 22 one state, as Justice Brandeis says, is free to experiment 23 and not put the whole nation in peril, that legislation that 24 is novel can be tried in one state. If it works well there 25 it can be adopted other places, but it doesn't run the risk

of making a national, a mistake that's hard to rectify and
doesn't take into account the differences from locality to
locality. I think that this Act of Congress is a quantum
leap into the vitals of the Tenth Amendment. Because it does
preempt essential attributes of state sovereignty and the
scheme is exceedingly intrusive.

We're not talking here about extractive techniques, 7 we're not talking about how you transport coal once it has 8 9 been mined, we're not talking about pollution control. We're talking about the shape of a community. And I think in answer 10 11 to the question put to counsel before I arose, Chief Justice Marshall has told us that this Court is not bound by Con-12 13 gressional findings, if those findings in fact are a pretext 14 for taking on authority that it doesn't have.

The character of a community really is founded in land. Now, I don't contest that indirectly Congress can reach local uses, that it can in some ways affect the private use of land. But here it is taking away from a community the control over its own map.

The Congress can pass clearly and constitutionally a whole range of regulations to affect all manner of subjects, but not to displace as it does here reserved powers to the state. This is really, if I might say, and I hope it will be, a Usery II, because --

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QUESTION: Mr. Attorney General, may I just ask, to

be sure I understand your contention, supposing Congress expressly found that the failure to restore the slope to the
original contour would result in numerous floods of interstate
waterways. It has the power to do that. Would you say the
doctrine you describe would prevent Congress from enacting
the statute based on such a finding?

7 MR. COLEMAN: Well, I'd say, first, that the find8 ings of Congress are not conclusive.

9 QUESTION: No, but assume that there was adequate
10 support for such a finding. I'm just trying to get the legal
11 position you're taking.

MR. COLEMAN: If there was such a finding, I would believe that the law should be in that case that if the means for effectuating the end of an abating clause is so intrusive of state powers, that the Usery opinion would come into effect and would prohibit the means. In effect, it would be a kind of balance.

18 QUESTION: In other words, this law would still be 19 unconstitutional?

MR. COLEMAN: That's right.

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QUESTION: Because you say that requiring the restoration of the slopes is intrusive of some inherent state power?

MR. COLEMAN: It's intrusive, and of course, as
the Court knows, the district court found as a matter of law

that these slopes did not themselves cause floods. In south-1 2 west Virginia, Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the Court, in Buchanan and Dickenson and Russell and Lee and Scott and 3 Tazewell and Wise Counties, so much land is so steep-sloped 4 5 that if this Act is upheld, those communities in the State of Virginia are going to lose control of their destiny. And 6 7 I think that this case draws into question our whole system of local governance. 8 9 Land use planning is an integral part of statehood, just as fire protection, police protection, sanitation, parks 10 11 and recreation. 12 QUESTION: And the enforcement of local criminal 13 law. 14 MR. COLEMAN: And taxation. 15 QUESTION: And yet, how do you reconcile a case 16 like Perez v. the United States? 17 MR. COLEMAN: Is it necessary for me to reconcile 18 that too? 19 QUESTION: Well, I'd succeed -- as you know, I 20 dissented in that case, but I was alone. 21 MR. COLEMAN: Well, I think you were on the right 22 track in your -- It's clear, Mr. Chief Justice, and the 23 state and its people --24 QUESTION: No, I'm serious in my question. It seems 25 to me that that case runs exactly against everything you've

been arguing to us.

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MR. COLEMAN: Well, I think it does too; and I've been before the Court on previous occasions to urge that much of our criminal law is being usurped by the writ of the habeas corpus, but you've told me about that and I won't raise it again. But I think it's a serious question.

I just believe that it is appropriate to urge be-7 fore the Court today that the Congress can't zone the whole 8 character of a community. Now, it's clear that while there are 9 other significant issues in this case, the diminution of value 10 to the property as the result of the original approximate 11 contour requirement is a serious question of constitutional 12 dimensions, because investment-backed expectations have been 13 from time out of mind that decisions about land use, certainly 14 in the 20th century, if they're made by anybody except the 15 people themselves, will be made by the state and not by 16 the Federal Government. 17

OUESTION: One other question, Mr. Attorney 18 The Virginia steep slope provision, unlike the General. 19 Indiana case, where there's a farmland, has a variance 20 authorization for the Secretary of the Interior. If in fact 21 the statute were administered in a way that frequently 22 resulted in variances in this part of the country where steep 23 slopes are so common, would it still have the same impact, 24 or are we perhaps getting to this question before we have to, 25

until we know how often the -- ?

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MR. COLEMAN: Well, I think -- I can say this about 2 it, that it has no benefit to Virginia, first of all, fac-3 tually, because the high wall must still be filled back in; 4 there still must be backfilling. So a variance is of no 5 benefit to us at all. We still have to comply with the law 6 of gravity which really overrules the law in this case, be-7 cause we can't fill it back and make it stay. These slopes 8 are so extremely steep that when you put the fill material 9 back in at an angle like this, the sedimentation just -- it 10 won't hold; it won't bind to the rock, and it will drift 11 away, and it makes it impossible, as the district court has 12 13 found, to do that. But the question of if it were administered in a manner not to intrude upon the Tenth Amendment and 14 the authority of the states to be masters of their own des-15 tiny, it would be an open question. I would think it would 16 still be so intrusive to say to Virginia, you could only have 17 coal mined and the land taken care of at all if you do it ac-18 cording to the federal law. 19

QUESTION: I must have misunderstood. You're saying that there is no authority for -- a variance would not relieve the miner of the obligation to restore to the original contour?

MR. COLEMAN: That's right. The original approximate contour permits of a variation, on the face of the

statute, but another provision requires that the high wall must still be backfilled in. And so, as the court has said on page 36-A of the Appendix, "For all practical purposes the backfilling stipulation destroys the usefulness of the variance, since the high wall must still be covered."

QUESTION: I don't understand those terms and I
can't visualize that.

8 MR. COLEMAN: Contour mining is involved in these 9 counties in the following manner. Someone goes into the side 10 of a mountain where you have these veins of coal that are 11 maybe two to three feet in depth and they outcrop all the way 12 up the mountain. They go in and cut their initial cut, which 13 leaves a bench and a high wall. And according to the Act, 14 the overburden, the material that's dug out --

15 QUESTION: High wall is a vertical wall? MR. COLEMAN: It's like a cliff. They'll just dig 16 17 straight into it till they come to a 90-degree angle. The 18 overburden is then required, under the Act, to be put back 19 down in a valley and you go all the way around the mountain. 20 The way it works in southwest Virginia, you contour right 21 around the side of the mountain. We don't really have, as 22 the court has found, any of this top of the mountain mining. 23 It's not practical down there.

Then, after you get started, under the Act, you
take the overburden which is at the bottom of the valley and

put it back up on your bench, and then you backfill all the way around, and the high wall under the Act has to be covered up completely, even though the Act says there is a variance under the original approximate contour, if you have to fill the back wall up.

6 QUESTION: Well, the requirement of filling up the 7 high wall completely cancels out the variance?

MR. COLEMAN: That's right.

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QUESTION: As a practical matter?

MR. COLEMAN: That's right. Mr. Chief Justice, 10 as I have said before, the people, territory, and government 11 add up to a state, and the primary concept is a community. 12 13 There are certain functions that have been recognized by this Court to be essential to the separate and independent exis-14 tence of a state. Nothing permits the direct abridgment of 15 certain powers. The Act in question displaces the state's 16 freedom to structure its integral operations of traditional 17 government functions, and this law clearly does not comport 18 with a federal system which is the essence of our 19 system of democracy. 20

Chief Justice Chase's words are perhaps best on this point when he said that our republic is founded in a Constitution which in all of its provisions looks to an indestructible union composed of indestructible states. The questions raised in this case are serious and of constitutional

1	moment because if those communities in the State of Virginia
2	cannot determine what the face and shape and map of those
3	communities are going to be, then we have no limits to the
4	commerce power anywhere in the Constitution, and to cabin and
5	to curb it someday in the future will be even more difficult.
6	This is the best case that the Court now has before it to
7	make plain what has been thought for a long time, that there are
8	limits to the commerce power, that those limits are contained
9	in the Constitution itself, and that when the commerce power
10	is exercised in a way to undo the right of a state or locality
11	to be master of its destiny, they are not constitutional.
12	The question of taking has been amply brought out
13	in the brief. The Court has found, and in this case the
14	Court I know will give due deference to the findings of the
15	court in this case which finds that the land is of no benefit
16	to the landowners except that it can be surface-mined. It is
	to the fundowners except that it can be sufface mental
17	so steep and of so little value that this Act in effect con-
17 18	
	so steep and of so little value that this Act in effect con-
18	so steep and of so little value that this Act in effect con- stitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
18 19	so steep and of so little value that this Act in effect con- stitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment. QUESTION: Well, Mr. Attorney General, I take it,
18 19 20	so steep and of so little value that this Act in effect con- stitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment. QUESTION: Well, Mr. Attorney General, I take it, I think I did read something in the brief or in the papers
18 19 20 21	so steep and of so little value that this Act in effect con- stitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment. QUESTION: Well, Mr. Attorney General, I take it, I think I did read something in the brief or in the papers somewhere that if the land could be flattened instead of

QUESTION: Now, I suppose that even if you didn't

mine it and flattened it, it would be of considerable value? 1 MR. COLEMAN: That's right. And there's an anomaly 2 here, because if I own a mountain and decide to flatten it, 3 and built a school in the exact countours that the man who 4 owns the mountain next to me does, but first takes the coal 5 out, I can do it, I can put my school or shopping center 6 there, but he can't. 7 8 QUESTION: Well, I take it the Federal Government, this law wouldn't forbid the next day after you've restored 9 all these contours and all these high -- and covered all the 10 high walls, if for some other reason you decided to flatten 11 12 the land? 13 MR. COLEMAN: Not tomorrow, because the regulations that have been promulgated say that the bond has to remain in 14 effect for five years. 15 16 QUESTION: Five years. MR. COLEMAN: So you sit there and wait for five 17 18 years and then you can come back and remove the overburden 19 all over --QUESTION: What happens if you didn't mine it in 20 21 the first place? You could just --22 MR. COLEMAN: Exactly. 23 QUESTION: -- take the whole mountain away and since -- and have it --24 25 MR. COLEMAN: Dump it down the hill.

1	QUESTION: And develop your land that way? Rather
2	than taking the coal out first?
3	MR. COLEMAN: That's correct, Your Honor. But if
4	you take the coal out first you're prohibited for a period of
5	five years from putting that land to its only economical
6	use, which is a flat land on which a school or a hospital or
7	a shopping center or an industrial development can be
8	constructed.
9	QUESTION: Well, what the only taking there can
10	possibly be, then, I suppose, is in the sense that it forbids
11	you from taking the coal? Because you could now go ahead and
12	flatten the land and build a school or a factory on it
13	without mining it.
14	MR. COLEMAN: It would be very expensive to do that
15	if you weren't going to get paid for getting the coal out
16	first.
17	QUESTION: Oh, I know, but if you believe your alle-
18	gation that if you flatten the land it's of great value?
19	MR. COLEMAN: That's right.
20	QUESTION: Which you do say so.
21	MR. COLEMAN: That's right.
22	QUESTION: I suppose you wouldn't need to mine it
23	to have it be of value if you flattened it?
24	MR. COLEMAN: But I think that the Court recog-
25	nizes still that one of the important factors in taking is

the diminution of value. Obviously the diminution of value 1 is pretty large if you've got valuable coal in your mountain 2 and you can't take it out because you can't afford to put it 3 back --4 QUESTION: Well, I take it that you would say that 5 either under the Tenth Amendment or under the Fifth or both, 6 the Federal Government could not forbid --7 MR. COLEMAN: That's right. 8 QUESTION: The strip mining of this land, just flat. 9 Just an outright ban on strip mining? 10 MR. COLEMAN: I would guess that it could. No --11 I agree with you. Mr. Chief Justice, thank you very much. 12 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: You have four minutes 13 remaining. Do you wish to exercise that as rebuttal in this 14 case? 15 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PETER BUSCEMI, ESQ., 16 ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT IN NO. 79-1538 & ON BEHALF 17 OF THE APPELLEES IN NO. 79-1596 -- REBUTTAL 18 MR. BUSCEMI: Mr. Chief Justice, I'd like to say 19 just a couple of things in connection with this Tenth Amend-20 ment Commerce Clause argument. 21 First of all, this is not a zoning statute in the 22 way that expression is ordinarily used. This is not an 23 attempt by the Federal Government to change the communities' 24 25 maps in the State of Virginia.

QUESTION:	What	about	the	prime	farmland	regulation?	
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2	MR. BUSCEMI: Well, that is in the next case,
3	Mr. Justice Rehnquist, but I will say that, again, there is
4	nothing in the prime farmland regulations that attempts to
5	tell a local community how to use its land or what areas are
6	to be used for residential purposes or commercial purpose or
7	anything. All of this goes only to surface mining. And more-
8	over it's not a prohibition on surface mining. It's just a
9	statutory provision that says that if you're going to surface
10	mine, you've got to do it in this way, and you've got to
11	restore the land so you don't cause damage.

QUESTION: Yes, but it does say that if a state wants to permit, or private owners want to strip mine and then use it for something besides farmland, the Federal Government says you may not do that, at least without first making it back into farmland.

MR. BUSCEMI: That's correct, Mr. Justice White.
And the purpose of that is to preserve the productive capacity of the farmland.

20 QUESTION: And is it, as the Attorney General sug-21 gested, is there a five year hiatus?

MR. BUSCEMI: Well, the bond, the full amount of the bond, and if I understand Section 519 of the Act, is not released until after five years, but 60 percent of the bond is released in a much shorter time, as soon as the approximate

original contour is restored. I think Section 519 will make 1 that quite clear. And moreover, I do want to respond to this 2 business about covering the high wall, because Mr. Coleman --3 QUESTION: What's the consequence? 4 MR. BUSCEMI: Oh, well, the consequence is that 5 there's only a small amount of the bond is retained for that 6 full five-year period, and if the mine operator or the owner 7 of the land believes that the financial --8 9 QUESTION: What may the owner do within the five years? 10 MR. BUSCEMI: Oh, within the five years the owner 11 may put the land back into a flattened state if necessary, 12 if he wishes to do so, if the financial rewards are as 13 great as they are supposed to be on the basis of 14 QUESTION: Well, he puts it into a flattened state. 15 May he build on it within five years? 16 MR. BUSCEMI: Yes. Yes. 17 QUESTION: By sacrificing his bond. 18 MR. BUSCEMI: Perhaps, Mr. Justice White, by sacri-19 ficing part of the bond. But this is how Mr. Justice Stewart's 20 question connects to yours, Mr. Justice Brennan. There is 21 nothing in the variance procedure that prohibits the cover-22 ing of the high wall and still leaving of a substantial amount 23 of flat benchland. All Congress was trying to do with re-24 25 spect to covering the high wall is to prevent the open

vertical face from still showing. Once there is land that is 1 placed back against that and sloped down and restabilized, 2 flat benchland can still be left and still comply with that. 3 Now, there's no --4 QUESTION: What's benchland? 5 MR. BUSCEMI: Oh, benchland is the horizontal por-6 tion. 7 QUESTION: So why not just call it flat land? 8 9 MR. BUSCEMI: The word bench is designed to indicate that it's up above, it's on the mountainside. 10 QUESTION: It's a plateau? 11 MR. BUSCEMI: Well, it's the horizontal portion of 12 the cut into the side of the mountain. When the mountain 13 started out it was just one straight line and then they cut 14 out at the corner, as they go around the mountain. And the 15 flat part is called a bench. 16 QUESTION: I get you. 17 QUESTION: Yes, but the Attorney General says that 18 that's just a piece of rock and you can't put anything on it, 19 it won't stand that. 20 MR. BUSCEMI: Well, Mr. Justice Marshall, I think 21 that if you look at the pictures, for example, here in the 22 23 committee reports, you will see that it has been done. Pennsylvania and Ohio have both had statutes requiring this 24 25 similar kind of restoration and it is practical, and Congress

1 found that it was so.

2	QUESTION: This argument, would you just respond to
3	this for me, because I'm still a little puzzled. His argu-
4	ment, as I understand it, is that the slopes are so steep
5	that if you pile the stuff back up against the wall there's
6	no room for a bench.
7	MR. BUSCEMI: Mr. Justice Stevens, I think that
8	that may well be his argument, but I think that Congress has
9	found that that is not so, and I think that many of these
10	benches are wide enough
11	QUESTION: But didn't the district court findings
12	support what he says?
13	MR. BUSCEMI: The district court also said that
14	compliance with the approximate original contour requirement
15	was physically impossible. But we know from the pictures
16	in the legislative record that it's not, because it's been
17	done. It seems to me
18	QUESTION: It's been done in Ohio and Pennsylvania,
19	and presumably the mountains there are just as steep as they
20	are ?
21	MR. BUSCEMI: Well, the State of West Virginia has
22	had no problem in complying with this statute. They have in
23	fact submitted an acceptable program to the Secretary which
24	has just been approved, and I think that the topographical
25	conditions there are very similar to what they are in

the western district of --QUESTION: Well, where -- are the rocks in Pennsyl-vania different from the rocks in Virginia? MR. BUSCEMI: I don't think they are. QUESTION: I don't think we're going to be able to solve this problem. QUESTION: One last question. Do you rely on the variance as necessary to support this application of the statute in Virginia? MR. BUSCEMI: I would say not, Mr. Justice Stevens, but it is in the statute, and so we're telling you about it. But I don't think it's absolutely necessary. Thank you. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, gentlemen. This case is submitted. (Whereupon, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. the case in the above-entitled matter was submitted.)

CERTIFICATE

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2	North American Reporting hereby certifies that the
3	attached pages represent an accurate transcript of electronic
4	sound recording of the oral argument before the Supreme Court
5	of the United States in the matter of:
6	No. 79-1538 DONALD PAUL HODEL, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
7	V. VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION
8	ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.
9	No. 79-1596 VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION ASSN., INC., ET AL. V.
10	DONALD PAUL HODEL, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.
11	and that these pages constitute the original transcript of the
12	proceedings for the records of the Court.
13	BY: Lill J. Lihon
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