Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1970

In the Matter of:

Supreme Court, U. S.

DEC 19 1970

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Docket No. 92

EDGAR D. WHITCOMB, GOVERNOR
OF THE STATE OF INDIANA
Appellant,
vs.

PATRICK CHAVIS, ET AL.
Appellees.

SUPPREME COURT, U.S. SUPPREME

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Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

December 8, 1970

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| 5 | OF THE STATE OF INDIANA, : | |
| 6 | Appellant, : | |
| 7 | vs. : No. 92 | |
| 8 | PATRICK CHAVIS, ET AL., | |
| 9 | Appellees. : | |
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| 10 | Washington, D. C., | |
| Ged Ged | Tuesday, December 8, 1970. | |
| 12 | The above-entitled matter came on for argument at | |
| 13 | 1:57 o'clock p.m. | |
| 14 | BEFORE: | |
| 15 | WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice | |
| 16 | WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice | |
| 17 | JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice | |
| 18 | POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice | |
| 19 | THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice HENRY BLACKMUN, Associate Justice | |
| 20 | APPEARANCES: | |
| 21 | WILLIAM F. THOMPSON, ESQ., | |
| 22 | Assistant Attorney General Counsel for Appellant | |
| Singuistre 1 | | |
| | WILLIAM J. SCOTT. ESO | |
| 23 | WILLIAM J. SCOTT, ESQ., Attorney General of the State of Illinois | |
| | | |

PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will hear arguments in Whitcomb vs. Chavis, No. 92.

Mr. Attorney General, you may proceed whenever you're ready.

ARGUMENT OF WILLIAM F. THOMPSON, ESQ.,

A.

ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT

MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

Mr. Chief Justice, Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, may it please the Court, my name is William F. Thompson, and I am Assistant Attorney General for the State of Indiana.

This afternoon I will argue in behalf of the appellants, the Governor of the State of Indiana. I am accompanied this afternoon at counsel table by Theodore I. Sendak, Attorney General for the State of Indiana, and Richard C. Johnson, his Chief Deputy.

In our brief in this case we presented this Court with six issues. This afternoon the state will concentrate its argument on two of those issues. The first issue is whether the Constitution permits or requires that a racial socio-economic group be proportionately represented in the State Legislature by representatives elected from that group.

Secondly, whether the Constitution requires all State legislative districts to be the same size. If time allows, the state will discuss the remaining issues or would

be glad to answer any questions this Court may have regarding them.

This action began as an action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court. It was brought by Negro residents of Marion County, Indiana. Marion County is one of ninety-two counties in Indiana. The plaintiffs, however, challenged the constitutionality of the nine-county multi-member districting scheme. Marion County provides for the at-large election of 17 representatives to the House and 8 Senators to the -- strike that, it is 15 members of the House of Representatives, and 8 members of the Senate.

This action does not involve congressional districting, is limited solely to state legislative districts. Following this Court's decision in Baker vs. Carr, Indiana began
long-range reapportionment.

In 1963 it reapportioned. In 1965 it again reapportioned. The 1965 Act was declared unconstitutional by the District Court in the case of Stout vs. Bottorff. That is the first District Court case.

A special session of the '65 Legislature was called and they again enacted an apportionment act. That was the apportionment act of 1965, and that is the subject of this litigation.

It is interesting to note that one of the plaintiffs in this action was a member of the '65 Legislature that enacted

the '65 Act, that he voted for that Act, and that he now attacks that Act.

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There were six plaintiffs in the court below. One was a resident of White County, another county in Indiana, five of the plaintiffs were residents of Marion County. The District: Court found in favor of only one of the plaintiffs from Marion County. Only one plaintiff in this case was found by the District Court to be entitled to relief. That was Mason Bryant. Mason Bryant was a resident of an area within Marion County which the District Court denominated as the Center Township Ghetto. He was a resident of the Center Township Chetto.

Marion County. It is approximately in the center of the county the other townships are arranged around. The Center Township Ghetto is approximately the northern half of the Center Township. The area designated by the court as the ghetto is predominantly populated by Negroes who are poor and less well educated than the rest of the county.

I might point out that the term "ghetto" is a term used by the appellee and by the District Court. The area to which this refers is not regarded in the community as a ghetto. It is not called that in the community. And to a certain extent it is nondescriptive of the area involved.

From the rest of the county, the District Court selected an area, Washington Township, and compared the number of legislators who were residents of Washington Township to the number of residents who were -- to the number of legislators who were residents of the Center Township Ghetto. In absolute numbers, Washington Township had more Senators than the Center Township Negroes.

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The court computed ratios and found that Washington

Township ratio was greater than the Center Township ratio. On

this basis, the District Court declared that the Center Township Negroes were deleted and cancelled out by the nine-county
multi-member district.

County, the District Court ordered the reapportionment of the entire state. Although the court appeared to rely upon the straight one-man, one-vote analysis of Reynolds, the true basis for requiring the reapportionment of the entire state was the testimony of John Banzhaf. John Banzhaf is Associate Professor of Law at George Washington University and has written some articles regarding multi-member districts and testified at this trial, at the hearing in this case.

He testified that apportionment plan providing for districts of different sizes, a mix system of multi-member districts and single-member districts created inherent inequities and was unconstitutional per se. On this basis and on the basis of political considerations, political factors which the District Court felt existed within the county, the District

Court required that when the state reapportioned that all districts be the same size.

On July 28 the District Court declared the 1965

Apportionment Act unconstitutional, as to the multi-member

districting provisions, relating to Marion County. The District

Court gave the state until October 1st to reapportion.

The Legislature was not in session at the time that the Act was declared unconstitutional. We had at that time biennial sessions. The Legislature would not reconvene until January of 1971. Accordingly, the state did not reapportion.

On October 15, the court reconvened and invited plans from the parties, the plaintiffs, the defendants, intervening defendants, legislative leaders, and interested parties in general.

On October 17, the District Court announced the minimal guidelines. The 1960 Census data would be used.

Single-member districts would be preferred over multi-member districts. County and township lines would be crossed when necessary, contrary to provisions of the Indiana Constitution. And that the District Court would take cognizance of the existence and location of the Center Township Negroes.

The plan adopted by the court was the court's plan, supplemented by the plans submitted by the appellees in this case. The appellees submitted a plan pertaining only to Marion County.

The court's plan, as adopted, did rely on the '60 Census, did cross some county and township lines, did take cognizance of the existence and location of the Center Township Negro area. It is interesting to note in this regard that one of the plans submitted by the intervening defendants had variances that were substantially the same as the variances in the plan provided by the appellees.

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The District Court rejected that plan because in its estimation it did not take cognizance of the Center Township Negro area.

On December 15 the District Court announced that its plan would be the plan for the apportionment scheme of for the 1970 elections. It enjoined also the election officials permanently for enforcing the provisions of the 1965 Act. It mandated all state election officials to conduct the 1970 election in accordance with the court's plan.

Furthermore, the District Court retained jurisdic-18tion, permanent jurisdiction apparently, to pass on any future claims that the plaintiffs might have regarding any future plan of apportionment which the Legislature might draft, sort of a super legislative veto.

The State of Indiana appealed on January 6. The Governor moved the District Court to stay its judgment. The District Court refused. The state on January -- the next day, began their reply to this Court for a stay of the judgment of

of the District Court. On February 2 this Court granted the Governor's application for a stay. The 1970 election was conducted under the 1965 Act. This is the act that was specifically submitted to the District Court in the second stat case, the District Court specifically approved the constitutionality of that Act, the District Court in that case specifically found that the 1965 Act met the standards laid down by this Court.

Turning to the first issue, the state submits that the Constitution does not in fact require racial socio-economic groups be proportionately represented in the state legislature by representatives elected from that ethnic group.

The District Court's judgment in this case that the residents of the Center Township area, that the vote of the residents of the Center Township area was cancelled out, was based on purely erroneous assumptions. First, that the Center Township Negro area was clear on this record to exist as a distinct and cohesive area apart from the rest of the county.

The second erroneous assumption upon which the

District Court based its judgment is that fewer legislators per

person resided in the Center Township area than in the

Washington Township area, the adjoining area.

- Q Didn't they reapportion the whole state?
- A Yes, Your Honor.
- Q Why did it find it necessary to do that in this situation in this one area?

A Well, that is a matter of some speculation, Your Honor. The primary holding in this case -- well, first of all, you have the District Court's decision in '65 which had already passed on the constitutionality of the '65 Act under the oneman one-vote principle of Reynolds.

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Now, along came this case five years -- four years later and the court looks at it and says, "Well, first of all, this court has changed its standards; secondly, we now have a new theory, the Banzhaf analysis that multi-member and single-member districts inherently are unconstitutional.

The court went from the finding that these defendants, these plaintiffs were invidiously discriminated against, they went from that finding to the conclusion that the entire state had to be reapportioned. There is a complete gap in there as to why the whole state had to be reapportioned. The District Court specifically said when one Marion County is subdistricted there will be unallowable variances. But that is — either it was now apportioned — well, you have legislators per persons on there, it is going to be the same after you reapportion as it was before. Either it was okay before or it wasn't. But the District Court already said it was.

Q Well, wasn't the theory that as illustrated by the Marion County situation, multi-member districts, the court concluded were invalid constitutionally, and that is what led it to reapportion the entire state?

6000 Yes, that is exactly the way they went. 2 Again, by seeing the effect of the multi-member 3 Marion County district effect on this ghetto area --13. Yes, Your Honor. -- and that led to the conclusion, the District 5 0 Court conclusion that multi-member districts generally were 6 constitutionally invalid, and that in turn led it to look to T the rest of the state, and it found that in Lake County and 8 elsewhere there were multi-member districts and that is what . 9 10 led it to the statewide reapportionment. That's right. 11 A Wasn't that it or have I got it wrong? 12 0 I think that is what happened. 13 12 I thought the court would have reached the same result and redistrict the whole state even if it had not found, 85 looking at Marion County along, that the multi-member district 16 cancelled out the voting power of some group. 17 A Well --18 I though the court would have said multi-member 19 districts as multi-member districts give multi-member districts 20 too much power. 21 22 A Right. Compared to single-member districts. 23 24 A Right.

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So they could have reached reapportioning the

whole state result without identifying any particular group within Marion County as having been disenfranchised.

A That would have been a reason to reapportion the entire state. That would not have been a reason to sub-district necessarily --well, I guess it follows that Marion County would have to be sub-districted because it is the largest district in the state.

- Q All multi-member districts would have had to be taken apart.
 - A Right. One of the problems --
 - Q Did the court go that route or not?

esting point of that position is that the court only found in favor of Mason Bryant, who was a member of the multi-member district. There was no member -- the court didn't -- if the court is going to find that someone's rights have been violated, it has to have the man before it whose rights have been violated. Mason Bryant, under the court's analysis, was over-represented. The court had no -- well, the court has found in favor of no before it in terms of having being under-represented. The court went both ways.

In the invidious discrimination argument, breaking up the Marion County district, the court found that Mason Bryant was under-represented. Applying the Banzhaf analysis, the court found that Marion County was over-represented. They tried

to have it both ways.

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Marion County multi-member district, it had to first section off a distinct area, and then it had to provide some means or basis to compare that area to another area. To do that, it conducted what it called statistical analysis which I won't treat here because I feel that I have adequately treated it in the brief. But I feel that the statistical analysis that the court applied amounts to gross speculation, that the Center Township Negro area amounts to a separate distinct area within the county.

The second step which the court used was to compare the ratios, the ratio of legislator per person of the Center Township Negro area to the Washington Township area. To do this, the township lines, the township boundaries, these areas that are being compared have to have some political significance.

Implied in the court's decision is that somehow residents in Washington should be better represented but a legislator from Washington Township doesn't represent all of the legislators in the county, but somehow only represents the residents in Washington Township. Somehow the residents of Washington Township are specially benefited by having legislators elected from there, that somehow Washington Township legislators do not represent residents of the Center Township Negro area.

The record repeats those conclusions. All the plaintiffs in this case, Mr. Chavis was a resident of Washington

Township. He testified that when he was in the legislature he
represented the interests of the Center Township Negro. The
record in this case shows that a legislator living outside of
the Center Township Negro area can represent the interests of
the Center Township Negro.

Q Was there any testimony before the court contradicting Mr. Chavis' testimony?

A In that regard, Your Honor?

Q Yes.

A No, Your Honor, none at all.

Q Is there any evidence in the record of discriminatory purpose in this legislation?

A None.

Q Racial discrimination?

A None, no discrimination, Your Honor. As a matter of fact, the record in this case, Mr. Chavis testified that in at least two areas the laws were perfectly adequate, in the areas of welfare and unemployment compensation. He said the laws are adequate. The problem is with the attitudes of the people that are administering those laws.

Well, that is not a problem of discrimination, that is not this kind of problem of discrimination. That is another kind of problem. Our concern here is whether these people are

represented in the Legislature.

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In this same regard, Chavis also testified that the interests of the Center Township Negro were served, with counted with the residents of the rest of the county, with the residents of the rest of the state, that it was counted with Negroes living in areas outside of the Center Township area.

The significance of this is that if the interests of the Negroes living in Center Township are not being served or pushed along, fully being taken care of, neither the interests of the citizens of other areas of the state.

In this same regard, we have only to look at the statutes of the State of Indiana, the welfare laws, some consumer protection laws, unemployment compensation, any interests that you can think of that the plaintiffs in this case claimed they had, that the law provided for that, that the law provided for it.

I think that is an example of the fact that their interests have not been ignored in the Legislature.

- Q The law provided for what? I didn't hear you.
- A Well, the District Court says that the Center Township Negroes have compelling interests in things like urban renewal and welfare legislation, law and order, schooling, education, health, and so on and so forth. These were the compelling interests of the Center Township Negroes. These are interests that we share with those people in common. It is

1 an interest we have in common. And there are laws on the books that attempt to regulate or in some way take care of these in-2 terests, and I think this is an example of the fact that their 3 interests are not ignored. 1 5 Q Mr. Thompson, do you take the position or is it 6 true in Indiana that the Legislature has nothing to do with 7 how the laws are administered in the state? 8 A Well, sir, yes and no. Generall speaking, no. Your Honor, the Legislature enacts the laws and they are carried 9 10 out by some other body. Q And the legislature has nothing to do about it 99 12 at all? A Except to change the law. For instance, they 13 14 don't appoint the department heads. Take the Welfare Department and look how that is broken down. You have the State Director, 25 you have --16 Well, don't you have committees of the legisla-17 ture for each one of these departments? 18 19 A No, there --20 There is just --0 21 -- there are few standing committees, Your Honor. A 22 Yes, I thought so. 0 Few, very few. 23 A I thought so. 24 0

Okay.

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- 1 Q So there is some control?
 - A But not --

- Q Who contributes the money to these agencies, who fixes that, the Legislature?
 - A Yes, Your Honor.
 - Q The Legislature has a little control, doesn't it?
 - A Yes, Your Honor.
 - Q So they do have some control?
 - A Oh, yes, that is --
 - Q Well, that is the only question I asked.
 - A I'm sorry, Your Honor, I didn't understand it.
- Q Would you say that the control is a different kind or of a different character than control of Congress, that Congress exercises over the execution of laws? I am trying to get --
 - A Sure.
 - Q Different in what respect?
- A I wouldn't say it is different, Your Honor. I would say it is the same sort of control that Congress would have, or probably less so because of the fact that we only meet biennially. There are few standing committees. But the characteristics between the two, I think, are parallel.

One other example, the fact that -- one other factor shows that the legislative interest of the Center Township Negroes are not ignored, is the tax money that is appropriated

for the very things that the District Court said they were most interested in, urban renewal, schools, education, health, welfare, unemployment compensation. The tax money was appropriated that goes into this area is disproportionately large as to the money that is going into the rest of the county.

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The only corrected dilution which the District Court found to exist in Marion County was the sub-district in Marion County. The state admits that this is a retreat to the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy vs. Ferguson in requiring that the districts, that the Center Township Negro areas be separately districted, the District Court was saying let's make them separate but equal.

If the decision of the District Court is allowed to stand, districts must be drawn to separate and segregate citizens on the basis of race, color, creed, economic conditions and other special interests. It wouldn't be unreasonable, to carry out a step further, if we are going to have ethnic or proportional representation, perhaps the next suit will be a suit against the state to increase the size of its legislature so that these interests can be represented with some degree of precision.

In the final analysis, I think what we are dealing with here is a special interest group. The Center Township Negroes in this case claim to have special interests. Well, we all do. As a lawyer, I have special interests. As a citizen,

my interests may differ from someone else, but I have special interests. Taken to its logical conclusion, the District Court would require that every special interest have its own representative, may they be a lawyers' representative, a school representative -- heretofore we called these people lobbyists, but we haven't given them a representative to represent them in the Legislature.

Q Can you state in a nutshell -- if you can't, why, just forget the question -- how did the District Court go about exercising this function of reapportioning the whole state?

Who did he consult? Who did he have?

A Well, with the Marion County --

Q Did the legislative, did the political powers, the political ranks of the government participate in it at all?

A To this extent, Your Honor, the legislative leaders were invited to submit a plan. As a matter of fact, I think they were given several days in which to do that. And I believe --

Q How long?

A Pardon me?

Q How long?

A Several days. And I believe they did submit a plan, and the plans were invited, the plants of plaintiffs were invited, the plaintiffs were invited to submit plans to the District Court.

Q Were the legislators that you refer to parties to the action?

A No, no. They were just legislative lawyers.

That is one of the committees. I can't really say how it is that these people came together to submit this plan, but they did. The Legislature was not in session.

Q Well, the record is perfectly clear, is it, that they were not parties to this action?

A Oh, yes, quite clear.

Q Were they ordered or requested to submit plans?

A Well, as the action started out, it was initiated against the -- against all of the legislators.

Q I see.

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A But then the Governor was added and the Legislature was dropped and the Governor was left in the action. The Governor was the only defendant, appellant now, left in this action on behalf of the state.

In conclusion, with respect to this proportionate representation issue, the decimation of the Center Township Negro area implies the singling out on the basis of race and color, you can't single this area out without looking at the race of the people living there, their economic condition and so on.

Separately districting Marion County -- no, separately districting the Center Township Negroes is a singling out on

the basis of race and color, you can't draw the lines around it unless you look at them and determine in advance before you draw those lines what is their race, what is their color, what is their creed, and so on and so forth.

This Court has uniformally condemned all such attempts and should do so in this case by reversing the decision of the District Court.

Banzhaf issue, the striking down all multi-member districts unconstitutional per se. It has always been thought, it has been implied and accepted that although a voter in a multi-member district has an advantage because he had more representatives from which to -- for whom to vote, that this advantage was offset by the fact that he was part of a larger electorate competing with him, to vote for these individuals.

This has been challenged by John Banzhaf and others.

Banzhaf's analysis briefly is that voters in the Marion County

multi-member district were over-represented vis-a-vis smaller

multi-member districts and single-member districts within the

state. There was an inherent disparity, and it was based on

rather complex mathematical equations which he devised. It was

on the basis of this that the Court required the -- the District

Court required the state to reapportion the entire state.

The parallel of Banzhaf's theory is that first of all, as it relates to this case, no independent study was

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made of Indiana. The figures, maps, exhibits, and so on and so forth that were used by Banzhaf in this case were those supplied him by the plaintiffs.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: I think your time has been consumed now, Counsel.

MR. THOMPSON: I thank you, Your Honor.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Manahan?

ARGUMENT OF JAMES MANAHAN, ESQ.,

ON BEHALF OF APPELLEES

MR. MANAHAN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. I will, I believe, have to recapitulate what did occur in this case, because I believe some confusion has resulted from the presentation which has been made by the appellant as to what took place.

A complaint was filed in the District Court by residents of Marion County and Lake County seeking only the single-member districting of Marion County, Indiana on the basis of this Court's prior guidelines in Fortson vs. Dorsey and in Burns vs. Richardson.

Q Marion County and Lake County?

A No, plaintiffs from Marion and Lake County, but seeking only the single-member districting of Marion County, Indiana. The plaintiffs from Lake County being for purposes of supporting the Banzhaf theory, for the purpose of breaking up the Marion County district only.

9 What is the biggest city in Marion County? A Pardon me? 3 0 What is the biggest city --1 Indianapolis, Indiana. A What is the city in Lake County? 0 6 Gary and Hammond, Indiana. 7 And both had multi-member districts, didn't they? 8 There were numerous multi-member districts in A 9 Indiana and both of those were the largest two. 10 Yes. 79 Immediately after the complaint was filed, re-12 quests for admissions, 118 in number, were filed. The complaint itself, is a 69-page document, which is set forth in full in 13 14 the Appendix, and the request submissions were likewise 15 lengthy. 16 Before the trial, all of these requests for admissions 17 which covered every aspect of the complaint were admitted. And 18 at the trial the admitted requests were admitted into evidence 19 without objection. Also during the trial, numerous other docu-20 ments from the state library were available and the court had

justifying the sub-districting of Marion County, Indiana.

an abundance of evidence before it, all of which was admitted

and was uncontradicted and, as we will outline, did present a

full case under Fortson vs. Dorsey and Burns vs. Richardson

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But something else took place before the trial in

7 this court. The Kirkpatrick vs. Preisler decision was rendered, 2 and with the result that at the very beginning of the trial, 3 and it appears at page 133 of the Appendix, Justice Kerner, the presiding judge, took -- stated that the court was taking B judicial notice of the fact that the State of Indiana is mal-5 6 apportioned and thus the court had little choice but to do 7 as it developed that the State of Indiana's districts, one of 8 which was before the court, were at that time malapportioned so bad they had greater divergencies of population than even 9 10 the dissenting opinions in Kirkpatrick vs. Preisler indicated 11 would be allowable.

Q Now, let's see: That is forgetting the single multi-member district --

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A Completely forgetting the single multi-member district --

Q There were more representatives from Marion County than they were entitled to on the basis of --

A There were more Senators from Marion County than they were entitled to.

Q Well, more legislators of one kind or another.

A And exactly the right amount of representatives. They had one-half of a full Senate seat too much. The same was true in Lake County. And before it reached its findings, the District Court, and the tables at the end of their July 28 opinion reflect it — they too are in the Appendix at page 382

1 and 383 -- the divergencies between districts and malapportion-2 ment of a traditional kind, involving all the counties of the State of Indiana. 3 Q If this law suit had not been pending, what 4 would the impact of the 1970 Census have had on the State of 5 6 Indiana in reapportionment --The normal impact. They would now be preparing 7 to reapportion, as they are, if this law suit had not --8 Q The court decided that it should have this ac-9 celerated reapportionment, what was the date --10 The court's stay order in this cause has now A 11 made the state-wide malapportionment of Indiana no longer a 12 matter of consequence since Indiana will be reapportioned be-13 fore there is another election. 94 15 You're speaking of this Court's stay order? 16 A Yes. 17 I am speaking of the District Court. What do 18 you suggest led the District Court to try to reapportion the 19 State of Indiana six months or so before it was going to begin 20 on the normal schedule? To begin a new reapportionment? 21 22 Yes. They were not scheduled to begin a new reappor-23 tionment until this coming January, next month, and they were 24 scheduled to hold an election, as they did, in the meantime. 25

Q At any rate, they were quite close to --

A Yes. There was only one more election to be held before there would be a reapportionment or attempted reapportionment in normal course. The State of Indiana also has a notable record for having a great deal of difficulty for its legislators to agree upon apportionment. In this case, they gave the State of Indiana an adequate length of time to hold a general assembly session and reapportion itself before they acted.

Q Mr. Manahan, in the posture in this case as it now presents itself to us, I was wondering why it hadn't become moot. The 1970 election in Indiana was held under the former apportionment system, was it not?

A Yes, it was, Your Honor.

Q And you just told us that early next year there is going to be and will be a reapportionment based on the 1970 Census.

A Early next year there is scheduled to be an attempted --

Q And there will be no general elections in Indianal I guess until that has become effective, so this thing is just in limbo and has no applicability to any election. It did not apply to the 1970 election, it will not apply to any elections after early next year.

A The court's plan could not conceivably ever

apply to any election, no.

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Q So why isn't this moot?

A The court, the lower court has stated that the Marion County, Indiana must sub-districted to have a constitutional plan. It also has said that there is a preumption --

Q The court didn't need to state that. We all know that. Any apportionment has to conform with the United States Constitution.

A Yes, but sub-districting, Your Honor, and sub-districting is not allowable under the Indiana Constitution except under the supremacy clause, and so it was necessary for a federal court to find, also the state court, for a court to find under the 14th Amendment, the 15th Amendment, and the supremacy clause, that Marion County, Indiana must be sub-districted. Otherwise it will not be sub-districted in the next apportionment, and the entire case which was tried will be there again.

Q I see. So that the remaining significance of this three-judge district court decision is that if it is affirmed, it remains undisturbed, the Indiana Legislature will be obligated not to create any multi-member districts?

A They can create all the multi-member -- they can create multi-member districts, definitely. The District Court's opinion only stated that there is a presumption favoring uniform districts and this cites the Banzhaf theory as

well as other matters to show that a natural one-man one-vote violation does result from having multi-member district of differing size, but the single-member districting is in no way called for by the lower court's opinion.

Q Now, then, why isn't this moot? If it doesn't even have that much effect, why isn't it moot?

A The lower court says there must be uniform districting and there is anything but uniform districting in Indiana, and it says they must be small enough such that the vote of the ghetto area, which they found to exist as a fact, would not be diluted or cancelled out.

Q You mean by that that in such districts they must have single representatives?

A Not single, they must be small enough in number, and the court indicated that three-man districts would be small enough in number, not single, or perhaps even four-man districts.

Q. Let me see how far this goes. Suppose you had an area where it was demonstrated, that an area just as big as the one you have here, the same size, the same shape, the same people who were preserving, let us say, Germanic culture, and they perpetually spoke German, they had bilingual services in churches, both Catholic and Protestant, and preserved many, many indicia of their own culture. Would this court's order say that they must put a line around these people with Germanic

origins and let them elect their separate representative?

A No. Your Honor.

- Q And what is it based --
- A What is the difference?
- Q What distinguishes that from this?

A Your Honor, we didn't -- we did submit proof though in six elements which we believe were necessary under Fortson vs. Dorsey and Burns vs. Richardson to require a subdistricting of the large multi-member districts. We did in this case prove the existence of a minority group of the type you describe. We also proved that they lived in a contiguous compact area, so that a difference in districting could make a difference.

We also proved, and we think the proof is very substantial, that they were sufficient in population in these areas to affect the election or non-election of representatives of them if there were an impartial districting of smaller districts, not a district drawn calculated to enhance their vote but simply impartially drawn smaller districts.

Finally, we also proved that they had substantive interests --

- Q Is the smaller district drawn to identify a particular group?
- A Absolutely not. The district which the court drew did nothing of the kind. They are squares which totally

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ignore what they found to be the ghetto area. And at the back of appellees motion to dismiss or affirm, it does appear — there does appear an illustration of what is found to be the ghetto area, and the district line which the court drew. There is no — the district lines are in no sense coterminous with the boundaries of the ghetto area. They are a series of squares and near squares which cut through the ghetto area ignoring its existence. As the District Court said in its original opinion, district lines must be drawn with an eye that is colorblind.

Q Is that to say that what you have just been showing us in those squares, there may or may not be multi-member --

A No. This is the court's plan for Marion County,
Indiana.

Q Well, does it permit or not multi-member representation in those squares?

A Oh, these squares happen to be single-member districts, 15 single-member districts.

Q They must all be single, is that it?

A Well, this is not the court's original decision.

This is the court's final order. After the State of Indiana refused to district, these are districts which the court drew.

Q Then presently, under this judgment, in Marion County they are all single-member districts, are they?

7 The court drew nothing but single-member dis-2 tricts throughout the state. 3 Which is to say under the court's plan they have 1 to be single-member districts? Under the court's drawn plan. 6 And the only reason that wasn't effective for 7 the last November election is our stay, right? That's correct. 8 A Now, what is there about the court's judgment 9 setting up single-member districts in Marion County under that 10 97 plan which means that the legislature may not set up multi-12 member districts in Marion County in the 1970 reapportionment? A 1971. 23 14 Q What in the District Court's judgment prevents that? 95 Only they are taking continuing jurisdiction. 16 A I know, but wouldn't there have to be a brand 17 new case? I gather you brought the whole case under Fortson 18 and Burns on the ground that multi-member districting, in 19 20 Marion County at least, was operating in a manner that minimized or cancelled out the voting strength of a racial group. 21 Wasn't that primarily the --22 That was the only theory --23 That was the only theory. All right. 24 and you prevailed as to that? 25

And that is why you got the relief you did? 0 Well, we got the ruling we did. 3 Well, you got a lot more, I guess, than you 1 asked for. But the point is, what I am trying to get to, what 5 is there about that determination as related to the 1960 and 6 7 '65 figures at the time you tried the case which means that there is any obstacle whatever to the Indiana Legislature re-8 apportioning under a plan precisely like that one which in 9 this instance, for Marion County at least, the District Court 10 struck down? 11 You mean multi-member districts are different A 12 size. 13 14 0 Yes. So for the court's declaratory judgment in ef-15 fect that sub-districts do have an invidious effect and do 16 dilute the vote --17 In other words, it is not the factual record, 18 it is the Banzhaf theory, is that it? 19 No, this is the court's finding specifically 20 that multi-member districting of Marion County has an invidious 21 effect which dilutes the vote. 22 Did at that time, at the time of the trial? 23 At the time of the trial, yes. 24 Who is to know that that would be so under the 25

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Yes, Your Honor.

reapportionment base of the 1970 Census?

A The likelihood of any -- they carried their findings beyond the 1960 Census in their decision. Their decision also encompasses social statistics as late as 1967, and there is no indication that there will be any such --

Q Isn't there a whole new ball game on reapportionment in Indiana and every other state based on the 1970 Census?

A On the matter of a minority group existing within a county where we have statistics as late as 1967 --

Q You would say not?

A -- I would say not.

Q Well, would anybody be violating any court injunction if he enforced or passed or enforced a multi-member district system in Marion County under the new census?

A It would not.

Are you saying that in the face of this judgment, in the face of this decision, legislators just won't establish the multi-member districts in Marion County?

A I said they would not be violating an injunction if they did establish a multi-member district in Marion County, and under the Indiana Constitution without a judgment against them, they will have to have a multi-member Senate district in Marion County, Indiana. They cannot sub-district a county for the state Senate under the Indiana Constitution.

Q What about the House? 2 This they can. A 3 Well, will legislators or will they not feel 1 bound by this decision not to establish a multi-member House 5 district in Marion County? They will feel very much guided by this Court's 6 7 decision, and if there is no decision and if the state simply remains in effect in the lower court, there they will take 8 their chances on the multi-member districts. 9 Well, of course if this Court's decision is that 10 11 this case should become moot, the consequence would be, as I 12 remember it, that we would vacate the judgment of the District Court and that would be the end of it, wouldn't it? 13 That would be the end of the case. 14 A Why isn't it moot? I still don't understand the 15 0 answer to my question. 16 The District Court --17 A Why isn't it moot? 18 19 The District Court did render a declaratory judgment to the effect that there is in Marion County, Indiana, 20 based on 1967 statistics, a ghetto area with a minority group 21 22 residing therein which has substantive interests which diverge significantly from those of the county as a whole, and 23 that as a response to those interests it engages in a vote 24 25 pattern which diverges significantly from that of the county

as a whole, and that the size of the county, the size of the small multi-member district is so great that it dilutes and cancels out that significant vote by that group of significant substantive interest.

That declaratory judgment was rendered by the lower court and it is very significant what type of districting will be drawn in forthcoming General Assembly whether or not that declaratory judgment is upheld in this Court.

Q Well, but it made that finding only in connection with the complaint that asks relief by way of reapportionment, at least of Marion County, looking toward elections that have now taken place?

- A And hopefully --
- Q And then why isn't it moot?
- A And to all future elections.
- Q Well, now -- oh, no, you told us that in future elections the Legislature is under an obligation next month, based on brand new figures, the 1970 Census figures, to reapportion the entire state.
 - . A Yes, and --
 - Q For all future elections.
- A -- and in Marion County they are obligated either, under the Indiana Constitution, to have a multi-member Senate district --
 - Q Yes.

dies.

A Yes, Your Honor.

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Q And the Constitution, the evil that the difficulties that the three-judge District Court found existed, would be repeated?

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A It would have to be repeated, yes.

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Q And only a federal decree can --

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A Yes, Your Honor.

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Q What happens to the rest of the state?

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A In the rest of the state they would be allowed to break up no county for purposes of drawing Senate seats under the Indiana Constitution.

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Q In other words, what the federal decree does

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is preserve the ground rules for the one-man one-vote rule,

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the principal rule per se?

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problem under this for them to draw Senate seats without

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crossing county lines, but they could certainly draw multi-

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member district Senate seats without breaking up counties.

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And unless the supremacy clause requires the breaking up of

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counties in the Indiana Senate, there will be multi-member

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districts in Marion County, in Lake County of different size

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Q May I ask again, Mr. Manahan. I gather under

A Yes, Your Honor. Also there would be a great

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the court's plan, you say each of those sub-districts would

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have had but one what, Senator?

in the Indiana Senate.

| q | A One representative and each of them was numbere |
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| 2 | 1 through 100 statewide, and the odd numbers were paired with |
| 3 | even numbers to create Senate seats. |
| 4 | Q And in the Senate seat case there are what, |
| 5 | districts with |
| 6 | A No. |
| 7 | Q one Senator? |
| 8 | A There is one Senator. |
| 9 | Q One Senator. |
| 10 | A Consisting of two legislative representative |
| 11 | districts. There would be 50 Senators and 100 representatives |
| 12 | Q Well, here is my confusion: You have got two |
| 13 | houses. |
| 14 | A Yes, sir. |
| 15 | Q Now, what under the court's plan is to be the |
| 16 | representation? In every instance, a Senatorial district has |
| 17 | but one Senator? |
| 18 | A Right, and |
| 19 | Q And in every instance what is the lower hous |
| 20 | called? |
| 21 | A The House of Representatives. |
| 22 | Q And in the House of Representatives, every dis- |
| 23 | trict has but one representative? |
| 24 | A But one representative, and every Senatorial |
| 25 | district is made up of two representative districts. |

0 Yes, but there is only one Senator? 2 Right. A 3 Which means that if we were to affirm what the 4 District Court did, then is it your position that for the 1970 5 reapportionment there could be no compliance whatever with the Indiana Constitution provision for multi-member districts 6 7 either in the House of Representatives or in the Senate? 8 There are no requirements with respect to the A House of Representatives. 9 10 0 I see. With respect to the Senate --11 Well, how about with respect to the House of 12 Representatives? Could there be, if we affirm, could there be 13 14 throughout the state in the 1970 reapportionment any multi-15 member districts? 16 There could be multi-member districts, but they would have to be all uniform throughout the state if you 17 13 affirm. 19 By which you mean that there might be a number of multi-member districts if the multi members means two or 20 three, that there will have to be two or three in every dis-21 trict? 22 A Yes, Your Honor. 23 But you could still have some single-member 24 districts? 25

A No ---

Q You say there could not be single-member districts, they would all have to be multi-member districts.

A Yes, uniform districts.

- Q The District Court held that the only practical remedy for the unconstitutional deprivation that it found in Marion County was to create single-member districts in Marion County, so it is there for the future, that this is the only constitutional way of districting Marion County?
 - A No. Your Honor. What they drew --
 - Q I am just reading from the judgment.
 - A Yes, but there we are drawing up a plan.
 - Q Oh, this was even before you drew up a plan.
 - A On what page, Your Honor?
- apportionment statute, deprive this group, the ghetto area people of equal protection of the law, and it says hence those portions of the present legislative apportionment statute relating to Marion County relating to both Senate and House are unconstitutional and void. The court finds that the only practical remedy for such unconstitutional deprivation of voting strength is the elimination of the large multi-member House and Senate districts in Marion County.

A Yes, but not necessarily replacing them with single-member districts.

Q Now what do you think it means? A This says that the districts are too large, and 2 they must be smaller. 3 A Q And he goes on and says that they will be single-5 member districts. No, in fact they even suggest that three-man and 6 7 two-man districts in this opinion. And when they came to discuss plans of their own, it was all single. 9 10 A There is a good reason for that, Your Honor, They wanted to give every legislator --11 12 Q There may be good reason, but the fact is that you are suggesting that the holding was that, if I get from 13 14 what you just said, the legislature is still free to construct multi-member districts so long as they are a smaller number of 15 members from each district. 16 17 A Yes, and so long as they are uniform. 18 0 Throughout the state. 19 Right. 20 But when they came around however constructing 21 your own plan for Marion County --22 No, for the entire state they did single-member 23 districts. Is what the court plan --24 25 Is what they did, yes.

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Q And you say there is an explanation for that?

A Yes, they wanted to set up rules in advance so that different groups could participate and propose plans. The needed rules such that a comparison could be made between plans, so they made the lease political decision and just said all single-member districts and we will take the plan that is best that has the least operation deviation, which is what they did. The operation deviation turned out to be less than one percent throughout the state, and that was the purpose of it.

And I would like to turn immediately to the question of uniform districts and why we believe they are constitutionally required in Indiana. There is a very strong presentation in the lower court, it was uncontradicted and both sides affirmatively presented affirmative proof that when they are in the Indiana General Assembly, multi-member district delegations, at least that one from Marion County, vote en bloc at the behest of the party organization, and that they do not vote on their own, and that there are very few variances.

It also was proven that they are elected en bloc, that during the past forty years only twice has a member of a party which lost generally in an election got elected to the Indiana General Assembly from Marion County, Indiana. During the other elections, with those two exceptions, either one party slate or the other was elected.

The evidence also shows that during all primary elections in recent memory, the official party organization slate was nominated to run for the Indiana General Assembly, and that persons not supported by the organization slate were not nominated in such primaries.

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The evidence also shows that those persons who became on the organization's slate were thoroughly controlled by the central committee of the party organization, and so in effect this multi-member district delegation which is and has historically been elected from Marion County is a unit rule delegation controlled at one source.

This has two results. This demonstrates that
parochial interests, such as those of a ghetto area, could not
realistically be represented. And Pat Davis, the plaintiff,
who had been the sole black Senator in the Indiana General
Assembly, during the past ten years, represented that he
could not effectively represent his people because he had to
do each time on each vote what his county chairman wanted him
to do. And we presented evidence showing what present and
past members have done on rollcalls, voting constantly en bloc.

This is pertinent to the dilution of black people in the ghetto area of Marion County, Indiana and is also pertinent to the District Court's finding that multi-member districts of differing size can be inherently unconstitutional.

What it amounted to was that the proof showed that

| time | the multi-member district delegation is the same as if you had |
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| 2 | weighted voting, because they voted as one in Marion County. |
| 3 | It is the same as having one representative with 15 votes, |
| 4 | and one from Lake county was 11. |
| 5 | Q Is there any claiming or finding in this case |
| 6 | of racial discrimination as such? |
| 7 | A No. The history is that we have never had |
| 8 | single-member districts and have never broken up any county |
| 9 | for any districting of any kind in the General Assembly in the |
| 10 | history of the State of Indiana. So necessarily there could |
| The Care | not be proof that there was a deliberate design in multi- |
| 12 | member districting. It came out before there were black peopl |
| 13 | in Indiana, multi-member districting existed. |
| 14 | C So there is not a claim, let alone a finding of |
| 15 | racial discrimination? |
| 16 | A We did make a claim but we did not present very |
| 17 | substantial evidence, and there was no finding. |
| 18 | Q This isn't Gomillion vs. Lightfoot kind of cas |
| 19 | is it? |
| 20 | A There was no Gomillion finding. |
| 21 | Q I gather what you relied on was I forget, |
| 22 | Fortson or Burns or |
| 23 | A Yes, both cases. |
| 24 | Q But that decidedly or otherwise |
| 25 | A Or otherwise. |

- Qual.

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- Q -- having that effect. Wasn't that it?
- A Yes, Your Honor.
- Q And you tried to prove decidedly that but you didn't succeed but it doesn't matter.

A No, we did prove otherwise and we didn't try very hard to prove design.

acial discrimination as such, our cases have held that the sort of considerations that entered into the district court's decision were not only not required by the Constitution but that they were prohibited by the Constitution. I am thinking of cases such as Harrington vs. Rash, that you couldn't regulate the franchise, depending upon your prediction as to how people were going to vote. I am thinking about Wells vs. Rockefeller, that said New York couldn't constitutionally try to justify its reapportionment scheme by showing any community of interest, that it had to be all a matter of mathematics. Am I mistaken in my reading of those cases?

A No, that is what those cases say, and I will quote Burns vs. Richardson and we brought this entire action based upon what those two, the majority opinion of this Court and almost unanimous opinions in one case, said, and those are the two decisions we are specifically relying on, their language and what they said would count as a good redistricting case.

| 911 | Q If the poor blacks or the poor ghetto people |
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| 2 | in Indianapolis were scattered evenly throughout the city, |
| 3 | you would have no case? |
| 4 | A That is correct. |
| 5 | Q Even though they would nevertheless have the |
| 6 | same interests that they now have? The only thing is there |
| 7 | wouldn't be anything you could do about it? |
| 8 | A There would be no invidious effect because the |
| 9 | would be no effect. The districting would not affect their |
| 10 | interests at all. |
| 11 | Q Yes, but their interests may not be effected. |
| 12 | I mean their interests wouldn't be any more effectively repre |
| 13 | sented than they are now. |
| 14 | A That is correct, so there would be no remedy |
| 15 | to us and we would have no case. That is why we did have to |
| 16 | show that they were compact. |
| 17 | I see my time is expired, and I thank the Court for |
| 18 | hearing the cause. |
| 19 | MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: And your time is fully |
| 20 | consumed, Mr. Thompson. |
| 21 | Q I would like to ask the state, if I may, Mr. |
| 22 | Chief Justice, its views on this question of mootness in this |
| 23 | case. |
| 24 | ARGUMENT OF WILLIAM P. THOMPSON, ESQ., |
| 25 | ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT RESUTTAL |

qua Q Do you have cited any suits or cases in your 2 brief? 3 Yes, Your Honor. Let me say this: The District 1 Court in its December 15 order retained primary jurisdiction 5 in the case. They said all future claims by these plaintiffs against all future legislative acts. That is number one. 6 7 Number two, the state has been permanently enjoined from enforcing the '65 Act. As a technical matter, that is 8 the only apportionment act we have at this time. The legis-9 10 lature --But there is no election under that act? 88 12 I wouldn't expect one. 13 With or without this court order? 14 I would not expect one, Your Honor. Do you think it is moot or not? 15 0 16 No, Your Honor, I don't. I definitely don't 17 think it is moot. The legislature, because of this decision in the District Court, the legislature is, to use the phrase, 18 19 under the gun. They have to break up the Marion County multimember district --20 21 Why wouldn't it? 22 Pardon me? Why wouldn't it? 23 0 Why would they? 24 A 25 Yes.

8 Your Honor, it is --If you reapportion and we were to set aside 2 3 this -- vacate it as moot, and wip it off the books, why would 2 the legislature be hampered in its reapportionment on the '70 Census? 5 A Because they could very well expect the plain-6 7 tiffs to go back to the District Court, the very same District 8 Court, and obtain the very same thing that they obtained in 9 this case. 10 Well, they might attack it but they might not succeed. 11 A Well, Your Honor, in the state's view of it, 12 the record in this case was so thin that if they could do it 13 on that, they can do it on anything. 14 Q I don't see how this judgment of the court in 15 this particular reapportionment could supplant the constitu-16 tional requirement for reapportionment every ten years by the 17 legislative body. 13 Now, wait a minute. Would you repeat that, 19 20 Your Honor? I don't understand the question. 21 Well, as I understand it, the Constitution requires reapportionment, doesn't it? 22 23 Yes, Your Honor. A 24 When? Well, the Constitution as interpreted by this 25

2 portionment ought to be adequate, constitutional reapportion-3 ment ought to be adequate. 1 But isn't it required in the Constitution, that 5 there be a reapportionment based on each Census? 6 Well, that is the congressional districts. 7 0 What? Congressional districts, Your Honor. Yes? 0 10 But I don't think that pertains --11 Well, what does your state constitution pro0 12 vide about reapportionment? 13 Well, I cannot answer that question, Your Honor, 14 I don't know. I don't know what the state constitution pro-15 vides in that respect. Well, I would assume whatever occurs that we 16 would set this aside. I don't say we should or will, but we 17 ought to set it aside as moot and vacate the judgment. The 18 legislature wouldn't feel bound by the court's holdings with 19 reference to future apportionment, would it? 20 Well, no, in the sense of being bound, they --21 22 They would give somebody an argument. Well, as a practical matter, Your Honor, the 23 state can expect to be back in court on the same issues, the 24 same District Court, on the same issues, and if they don't, 25 48

Court in Reynolds where this Court says that decennial reap-

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9 if they provide essentially the same plan, complying with 2 Reynolds --Q Do you think however we decide this case, the 3 state is going to be out of court? 4 5 A I would like to think, Your Honor, that we would not be back in court on Banzhaf's analysis and --6 7 When is the next election, the next legislative 8 election? A Well, we have just had an election for the 9 10 Legislature --11 0 When is the next one? The next one is in --12 In 1972. 13 14 A -- in '72, sure. So you have got ample time to have a new appor-15 tionment statute. 16 Well, yes, Your Honor. Of course --17 Your Legislature hasn't been very good at 18 19 agreeing on one, has it? 20 Let me say this, Your Honor, the Legislature 21 meets in January of '71. This action was started in January 22 of '69, and to conduct the '70 election we had to get a stay. So if the Court were to say it was moot and we would be back 23 where we were, two years from now we will be back on the 24 same problem. 25

1 Well, on the same or some other one. Q Well, somebody might. You can't tell yet. You 2 don't know what the Legislature will do, do you? 3 Right, Your Honor, we don't know. 1 Do you think it is of any significance that the 5 mootness problem arises from the stay this Court granted? 6 No, I don't -- it is my position, the state's 7 position that the case isn't moot, but --8 Q Isn't moot? 9 Right -- but -- right, okay. 10 Q Well, you don't want to go through the litiga-11 tion again. That is your argument, as I understand it. 12 Yes, Your Honor, and we would have to if this 13 14 Court didn't decide these issues. Q It would be on a different case. They might 15 never bring a case. Maybe your Legislature will see the day-16 light. 87 The District Court said it would, in its A 18 December 15th order. 19 I would imagine the Legislature would know 20 enough about that and would try in some way to wipe out the 21 alleged inefficiencies and defects in the reapportionment. 22 Well, Your Honor, as the state interprets the 23 decisions of this Court, a multi-member district in Marion 24 25 County is okay, it meets constitutional muster, and that

districts of different sizes within the state meets constitutional muster. But that is not what the District Court says.

Q But, as Justice Black said before, if we should vacate and set it aside as moot, then what the District Court has said is not very relevant to anything, is it?

A At the point that this Court vacates or decides that the case is moot, it has no significance.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: I think that is all. Thank you, gentlemen. The case is submitted.

(Whereupon, at 3:00 o'clock p.m., argument in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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