Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1970


In the Matter of:

UNITED STATES,

Petitioner

VS.

DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF EAGLE, STATE OF COLORADO, et al.



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Washington, D. C. Place

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1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	OCTOBER TERM, 1970
3	MID 6700 ears PTD 000 ears 043 cas cas 600 cas 600 cas cas cas are 200 cas 600 cas 600 cas 600 cas
4	UNITED STATES,
5	Petitioner :
6	
7	vs. No. 87
8	
9	DISTRICT COURT INAAND FOR THE
10	COUNTY OF EAGLE, STATE OF COLORADO, : ET AL., :
11	Respondent
12	500 MM NO
13	Washington, D.C. Tuesday, March 2, 1971
14	The above entitled matter came on for
15	
16	discussion at 10:35 a.m.
17	BEFORE:
18	WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice
19	WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice
20	BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice HENRY BLACKMUN, Associate Justice
21	
22	
23	
24	
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Qua.	APPEARANCES:
2	
3	
A,	WALTER KIECHEL, JR., ESQ. Land and Natural Resources Division
5	Department of Justice Washington, D.C.
6	On behalf of Petitioner
7	
8	KENNETH BALCOMB, ESQ. Glenwood Springs, Colorado On behalf of Respondent
9	on benair or Respondent
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PROCEEDINGS

27.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We'll proceed now with argument in No. 87, United States against the District Court of Eagle County, Colorado. Mr. Kiechel, you may proceed whenever you're ready.

ARGUMENT OF WALTER KIECHEL, JR., ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. KIECHEL: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court.

This case comes from the Supreme Court of Colorado, and presents 2 questions important to the proper administration and conservation of the water resources of Colorado and nationally.

First, whether Congress, by enacting the so-called (McCaren) Amdnement, codified in 45 USC 666, intended to consent to a suit against the United States for adjudication of its water rights, in one of 70 water districts of the State of Colorado.

And secondly, whether in the absence of any expressly stated intent to subject reserved rights of the United States, two state court adjudication, such intent can be implied.

I plan to discuss preliminarily and briefly the nature of water adjudication to the west and specifically the proceeding here involving Colorado, then address the threshold

question of the application of the rule of this Courts opinion in Dugan v. Rank, 372, US, holding that the consent applied only to general adjudications, then discuss the legislative history of the consent statute, and lastly, the nature and extent of reserved water rights and the ability of the state courts of Colorado to adjudicate them.

Historically, water rights were judicially determined in the western states by a quiet title action initiated by one or more water users. The other claimants to water rights on the stream system were joined, each party affirmatively presented its claim and contested the claims of others.

And this proceding resulted in a determination by quantity and priority of the rights of the parties inter sese. There has developed, in most of the western states, statutory modifications of this proceedure, whereby the State Engineer, or some other official, initiates the proceeding and presents the evidence in first instance, but in essence, it remains the same.

A determination by the Court of all the rights of all the parties on the stream system inter sese. This proceeding was initiated in 1967 in Water District 37, which, at that time, was one of 70 Water Districts of the State of Wolorado. These Districts are established on watershed lines. District No. 37 being the watershed of the Eagle River, the Eagle River being a tributary of the Colorado River.

and A

This was a supplemental proceeding, there being a number of adjudications in Water District 37 over the years.

The first one over 80 years ago, and the last one as recently as 1966, the year before the instant proceeding was initiated.

Now a significant attribute of a supplemental proceeding under Colorado law, is that the earliest priority decreed in such an adjudication must be later than the last priority date decreed in the preceding adjudication. Or stated otherwise, all rights awarded in a new supplemental proceeding, such as the one before the Court, are necessarily junior, by operation of Colorado law, to those decreed in previous adjudications.

This supplemental proceeding was initiated by the Colorado River Water Conservation District, which asks for an adjudication and decree of certain of its claimed water rights, other claimants appeared, and the Conservation District sought to join the United States as a party.

asserting, among other things, that this was not the type of proceeding to which this Congress has consented. The motion was denied by the Bistrict Court of Colorado for Eagle County, and the United States sought a Written the Supreme Court of Colorado to prohibit the District Court from asserting jurisdiction over the Supreme Court of Colorado determined that the motion to dismiss was properly denied and rendered an extensive opinion in which it held first, that Congress had intended to include

the water adjudication proceedure of Colorado among the suits to which it had consented.

Secondly, the Colorado Supreme Court had held that notwithstanding this Courts interpretation of the consent statute in Dugan v. Rank, that the statute permits joinder of the United States in a supplemental proceeding involving only a tributary watershed.

With respect to reserve water rights of the United States, the Colorado Supreme Court strongly suggested that the United States had no water rights in Colorado, except those arising under state law.

The court said that the decisions of this Court, including Arizona v. California in 373 US, were not determinative indeed, the Colorado Supreme Court said that the only decision that might be determinative of this question was one of its own, and that if it, the Colorado Supreme Court, determined that the United States has reserve rights in Colorado streams, that that decision would, that determination would require the overruling of its previous decision.

And in that previous decision, upon which the Colorado Supreme Court relies, and refers to in the course of its opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court had said that by admitting Colorado into the Union, with a provision in its Constitution declaring unappropriated waters within the state to be the property of and subject to approporation by the people of the

state, that the United States lost any rights to assert water 1 rights in Colorado, except those acquired by appropriation 2 subject to state law. 3 And in its ultimate holding, here for review, the 1 Colorado Supreme Court held that whatever water rights the 5 United States has, such rights , including reserve rights can 6 be recognized and adequately adjudicated by the Colorado District 7 Court. 8 The Colorado Court didnot undertake to de-9 cide whether or not the United States did or did not have 10 reserve rights, did it? 99 That is correct, it did not. A 12 Is that question necessary to reach in this 23 case? 14 Yes, Your Honor, if the, with respect to A 15 the Congressional intent of the application of the consent 16 statute, it is necessary to decide whether those rights were 17 included within the waiveroof sovereigh immunity, that Congres 18 enacted in McCarran Amendment. 19 Now as a matter of construction of the 20 McCarran Act? 21 Yes, Your Honor. And---22 Some of these water rights are rights of 23 appropriation, are they not? 24 Yes, Mr. Justice Douglas, that's quite

The United States is an appropriated ---0 It is, indeed. 3 A Roughly what percentage? B 0 I wouldn't know the percentage, the record ' 5 A of the case shows that many of the water rights of the United 6 States arise on national forests, and dthose are claimed as 7 reserve rights. 8 Others are appropriative rights by other agencies 9 of the federal government. I suppose that the great majority 20 of the water rights claimed by the United States in Water 23 District 37 are reserve rights. 12 Insofar as the statute is concerned Λ (2) 13 would seem to explicitly cover rights gained by appropriation, 14 wouldn't it? 15 Yes, sir. Yes, indeed, that is our position 16 that the statute was intended to cover the rights of --- of 87 state law. And that was the specification of the terms of the 18 statute. 19 Do I understand that you are, even so the 20 state court has no jurisdiction? 21 We say that because, with respect to rights 22 acquired under state law, this is not a general adjudication in 23 the terms of this Courts rule in Dugan v. Rank. 24

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correct.

In that case, if Your Honor, please, it involved part

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of the San Joachim River of California, and there the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had dismissed the United States as a party, the United States having been joined there under the authority of the consent statute 43 US 666.

Well that's just a matter of who was a

No, sir it's a matter of the scope of the proceeding to which Congress intended the United States could

The Ninth Circuit had said, and I'm quoting from this Courts opinion in 372 US 617, this Court stated that, "We go directly to the question of joinder of the United States as a party. We agree with the Court of Appeals on this issue and therefore do not consider the contention at length."

Now the Court of Appeals had said that the type of suit Congress had in mind was a quasi-public proceeding known as a general adjudication of a stream system.

One in which the rights of all claimants on a stream system, as between themselves, are ascertained and officially

What's wrong with this particular proceeding

It is---

You think just because it presents --- ?

In part, Your Honor. It's neither a river

system, a general adjudication geographically, not is it a To the general adjudication with respect to having all parties before 2 the Court. 3 Let's assume that the Eagle River is a 1. river system, which you don't think it is. 5 Not within the contemplation of the consent A 6 statute. 7 Yes, but even with respect to the Eagle 0 8 River system, you think this is not a general adjudication? 9 No, Your Honor, Mr. Justice White. The 10 reason that I state it is not a general adjudication is that 11 not all of the parties are before the Court, having rights, 12 furthermore, the Colorado law, which bars the assertion and 13 decree, has not barred the assertion but has barred the decree 14 of any earlier rights, that is, rights earlier than the sup-15 plemental proceeding, precludes the general adjudication. 16 It prevents a party joined in the supplemental pro-17 ceeding in 1967 from asserting its priority of 1905, as many 18 of the rights of the United States are in this case. 19 Let's put aside reserved rights, let's just 20 talk about the United States appropriated rights. In the Eagle 21 River. 22 Yes, Your Honor. 23 Do you still think the same thing? 24

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The Supreme Court of Coloredo said that

their lower courts have the plenary power to accomodate the award of earlier priority as to, asserted in a supplemental proceeding.

Q In an appropriated right.

A Well, they said it as to both.

Q Well, let's---

rights, and I was responding to it. So that if the Supreme

Court of Colorado is correct, and they gave no specific direction or instruction to the lower court, they just said that, that the local court can accomodate, somehow, and modify or ammeliorate this provision of Colorado law which says no priority earlier than the supplemental proceeding, then, if Water District 37 were a river system in the terms of the statute, then the state acquired rights, or the rights acquired under state law could be adjudicated, in my opinion, assuming that all parties that had rights were joined. All parties on that river system.

And this is not the nature of this proceeding, Mr.

Justice White. I think that outside of the Colorado Conservation

District, that is one of the intervenors, the zinc company,

and several other claimants, that certainly it's far from having before the Water District Court, the Court for Eagle County

all the claimants in the Eagle system.

Q Well that pretty well makes a shambles out

1.

of the whole statute, doesn't it? In terms of consent. Can you imagine one where at the outset that every single party known to man might possibly be there?

B.

A That is --- yes, I can imagine one, Mr.

Justice White. That is the traditional adjudication. That is the way in which water rights in the West have been historically determined, to have all the parties before it.

And I say that that was the type of adjudication that Congress had in mind. This is very clear from the Senate report which is referred to in the Courts opinion in Dugan v.

Rank. The Senate report 755, which was the report by which the Senate Judiciary Committee reported favorably the McClaren Bill.

And that report shows unmistakably that it was this general adjudication in which all parties were present, that was the type that Congress had in mind in their consent.

Q But you're going also to our view, I suppose, that this isn't a general adjudication because the Eagle River is a tributary.

A I do argue that, Your Honor.

Q So to qualify to the statute you have to have the entire Colorado River system?

A I say that to qualify under the statute, in this Courts view in Dugan v. Rank, you would have to have all of the tributaries and the main stream of the Colorado River--

of the last	Q	And all of the people
2	A	In the state of Colorado.
3	Ω	And all of the people on the eastern slope
Ą	that are taking adv	antage of the Colorado River?
5	A	If they're claimants to water rights, on
6	the Colorado River,	yes.
7	Q	Especially if somebody is claiming earlier
8	date, they'd have to	have all of them, too?
9	A	If they are claiming rights to use water
10	from the Colorado R	iver or its tributaries in the state of
200	Cplorado, yes, I be	lieve that that is within this Courts decision
12	in Dugan v. Rank.	
13	Ω	There wouldn't be a court room big enough to
14	hold the lawyers, th	nen, would there?
15	A	Well, Mr. Justice Douglas, water right ad-
16	judications are by	nature prolonged, cumbersome, and multi-
17	party. This is noth	ing new.
18	Congress 1	nad this certainly in mind when they en-
19	acted the consent s	tatute.
20	Q	But when some state comes along and attempts
21	to modernize its sta	atutes and its adjudications to make some
22	sense out of them,	do you think Congress, do you think this
23	consent just ends?	this consent for just one single type of
24	adjudication, and the	hat's it?

Well, when you use the word one single type,

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I would agree that it is the general type, the historic type the of determinations judicially, of water rights which Congress was consenting.

Q Well you don't suggest that the present Colorado system is unconstitutional, do you.

But I was answering your question as to Congressional intent,
and I think that not only the Senate report, the discussion
on the floor, all of those things with respect to the legislative history of the Amendment show that Congress
had in mind the traditional type of water adjudications, had
in mind rights acquired under state law.

under state law, purportive rights, and it wants to assert ft,
assert those rights, you nevertheless say that the United States
can just sit back and use the water and until and unless it
wants to go into a court and establish those rights there's
nothing anybody can do about it.

A I say, if Your Honor please, that if the United States is to be joined in an adjudication under the consent statute, that the prerequisites of that joinder must be satisfied by those who are joined.

Q How about my question? Do you believe that the United States---

A No, Mr. Justice White, I don't think there's

any defiance by the United States.

B

I'm not suggesting defiance, I'm just saying that until and unless you want to go to Court you can just
use the water.

A Well, if we're talking about rights under state law, still, and I would suggest that those Congress had in mind could be adjudicated, in a state court.

Q Well, yes, but---

A And I responded to your earlier question
by saying that if the Eagle River were a river system, and if
the Colorado District Court could accomodate this bar date, that
I saw no reason why the United States couldn't be joined, and
be required to assert its rights acquired by appropriation
under state law, and be subject to the decree of the state
court of Colorado.

Meanwhile the United States could just use the water --- without anything more, until and unless Colorado institutes a proceeding qualifying, under your statute the United States---

A Well, I'm not sure that that, there's no lack of water adjudications past and in process in the state of Colorado. The Water Colorado Conservation District sought to bring the United States in this case so that it is a matter at the instance of the Plaintiff, or the Petitioner, to join the United States, and if in the absence of joinder, or in the

gias	absence of satis	faction of the requirements of the statute,
2	the United State	s is not a party to these proceednings, then
3	Q	Does the United States know what its claims
4	are, its appropr	iated claims are? Under state law? I suppose
5	it does.	
6	A	Yes, they're many, and they have them
7	assembled, and I	believe that the United States
8	Q	Do you have any idea what reserved rights
9	you're claiming?	
10	A	Yes, Your Honor. This is set forth in the
Proft gust	record of the ca	se, and the record shows that
12	Q	Would these reserved claims mean whatever
13	you may need in	the future?
14	A	The reserve right dockrine says that the
15	quantum of the r	ight is that amount of water necessary to ful-
16	full the purpose	s of the reservation. Arizona v. California.
27	Q	And that would be as far as you could go
18	in quantifying y	our reserve right chaim.
19	A	No, Mr. Justice White, they can be quanti-
20	fied. There is n	othing saying that they cannot be quantified.
29	The record shows	on page
22	Ω	Well, that's all right.
23	A	I have the reference to the record
24	Ω	That's all right.
25	A	It shows that the record, as I said in earl-

ier answer to Mr. Justice Douglas, that most of the rights to be asserted in Water District 37 are reserve rights on national 2 forests. But with respect to your question as to whether they 3 can be quantified, they can be quantified. 1 Well when, if you win this case, how would 5 the United States plan to establish their reserve rights? 6 Just by, would you bring some proceeding ---7 They are established, no, there would be 8 no contemplation of establishment, they are, by operation of 9 the doctrine and the rule of law, established by the creation 10 of the reservation, but as far as the quantification, consider-11 able effort has been done to an inventory and catalogue of 12 those rights, and they are determined by amount and location ---13 But that would just be by administrative 14 action---15 Yes. 16 You would never anticipate subjecting, or 17 submitting those quantifications to a court. 18 Not as party defendant joined under 42 USC 19 666, because we think there is no authority to do so. 20 Well, I understand that, but you would 21 never anticipate either yourself taking these claims to court-22 There have been instances in which those 23 rights have been asserted affirmatively by the United States 24

as Plaintiff, but---

But in Colorado specifically, in this District specifically, you would have no plans to precipitate any
judicial proceeding to clarify the amount of your reserve right.

Well, when you say no plans, there is
considerable activity of inventorying the rights, the Department

considerable activity of inventorying the rights, the Department of Justice made certain proposals to the public Land Law Review Commission with respect to a means by which these rights can be more, in a more orderly way, identified and quantified.

Q Administrated.

A No, the proposals of the Department of

Justice which are reflected in the Public Land Law Review

Commission in its report shows that an administrative determination which would be subject to judicial review, but not within this consent statute.

I would want to make one qualification of my earlier question, which I do not change, that they can be quantified, but there is always a certain open endedness or flexibility to a reserve right because of the nature of it.

Inherent in that right, is the need, or the requirement to meet the purposes, to fulfill the purposes of the reservation. And that by definition includes a certain flexibility in the right.

Q Mr. Kiechel perhaps you said it and I missed it, but let me ask you. Since the passage of the McCarran Amendment, has the government ever been in the posture it's now

group g	in, in this case in	a state court?
2	A	Yes, Your Honor.
3	Q	Where you've participated and not raised
D.	jurisdic tional obj	ections?
5	A	Well, we are participating, have participated
6	in a number of wate	r adjudication proceedings, in some, perhaps
7	all, we have raised	certain jurisdic tional defenses, but they
8	have been, the prob	lems in those instances, in other states,
9	I might say, have be	een overcome and the United States had ad-
10	judicated and has p	resented for adjudication its rights pursuant
diam's	to this statute.	
12	Q	How do you waive your sovereign immunity?
13	The McGarranAct do	esn't permit it.
14	A	Can we?
15	Q	How could you?
16	A	We can not. That is quite correct.
17	Q	But the Chief Justice has just asked the
18	question have you p	articipated in some of these proceedings.
19	A	Well, there have been determinations, well,
20	we have, as I indic	ated earlier, as Plaintiff in the celebrated
21	(Colbrook) case in	southern California, but with, in response
22	to your question, M	r. Chief Justice, there have been determin-
23	ations by the State	Court
24	Ω	With your consent.
25	A	Over our objection

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Over objection.

That it was a river system. And in that case there was not this problem of adjudicating and going back and giving a true priority to our rights acquired under state

In fact, I think one of the amicus briefs, the state of Washingon, presents its litigation program, a number of cases that it has brought inthat state, in which the United States has been joined pursuant to this statute. And they include one of the decrees which shows that the state court recognized the reserve right, and decreed it, in certain quantity, with the provision, a proviso that if at a later time there should be additional need for additional water to fulfill the purposes of the reservation this was the contemplation of the decree.

And your position from your standpoint then is beyond the jurisdiction of the state court?

We took no appeal from that decision of the lower Washington Court, Your Honor.

I know, but your view is --- that that court was without jurisdication to adjudicate your reserve rights.

Reserve rights were not involved in that A case.

I thought you said that the court did take, did recognize the reserve rights.

A Yes, you're quite right, I'm sorry.

Your position here, that that court had
 no jurisdic tion to reach reserve rights, ---

A That is correct.

B

Q Even if you consented because you have no power to consent.

A That is correct.

Q But the Washington State adjudications did not entail the entire Columbia River system---

A No, indeed, sir. They did entail what was determined to be a river system, the Chillowist Creek river system, but there was not this problem in that case, in that state of the bar date of the priority, and I might say, Mr. Justice Blackmun, in all candor, I think that the United States, and I want to admit that they have asserted reserve rights in state court adjudications because this Court has not spoken on this matter and until that determination is made that an abundance of --- as an advocate does those rights are asserted, notwithstanding our position here.

And I might say in further answer to your question that we are very concerned about the statements of the Supreme Court of Colorado which go at the existence of reserve rights in the state of Colorado. And we are asking this Court to declare, to reaffirm the reserve right doctrine with specific application to the state of Colorado.

The same I don't see how we're required to do it in this case, even if we held for you. All we'd have to say is if there were reserved rights there's no jurisdiction --- . 3 Well, if Your Honor please, the Supreme A Ag Court of ---5 It would be easy for you to get the issue 6 0 here, if you wanted to, not easy for us, but---Well, we've asserted ---8 A -- precipitate some litigation. 9 We ve asserted and made known those re-10 serve rights, they are before the Court. Those are rights 18 which we will assert in Water District 37 if we're required 12 to proceed. 13 I know, but if you win the case, that 14 reserve right is out of the case. 15 That's correct. 16 And if you're worried about that issue, 17 you, if you wanted to establish, why you could easily have it 18 established by an affirmative action, precipitating the liti-10 gation yourself. 20 A I don't know how easily, but it could be 21 done as a party Plaintiff, yes. 22 The legislative history of the Act is common to both 23 of these cases, and I will treat it in the later case, as my 24

time has expired.

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4	description of the second

Q Very well, Mr. Kiechel. Mr. Balcomb.

ARGUMENT OF KENNETH BALCOMB, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MR. BALCOMB: Mr. Chief Justice

and may it please the Court.

My client, the Colorado River Water Conservation
District is a state organization, by statute, obligated to
protect the waters of the Colorado River for the state of
Colorado, that is, the waters of the Colorado River and its
tributaries within the state.

And it was in pursuit of this goal that I, as Counsel for the District, in the adjudication proceedings, in Water District No. 37, caused the United States of America to be served, because, as is indicated, they not only have substantial what I would call rights under state law, but substantial rights that they denominate as reserved rights.

Now this Water District No.37, encompasses the entire Eagle River and its tributaries and is a rather substantial stream. You might say small by comparison to the Colorado River as a whole, nonetheless, is a compact adjudicational administration unit.

It is, incidentally, included within the area that is involved in the second case, No. 812, the Division 5 case, by reason of subsequent Colorado law amendments.

Q I wonder if it could be disturbing to you if

you could state at least for my benefit in capsule form what you concieve to be the issue.

A I view the main and principle issue in this case, Your Honor, to be whether or not the state courts in state adjudicatory proceedures have jurisdiction over the United States if they comply with the service requirements of the Mclaren Amendment.

Q A question of jurisdiction?

A Yes, sir. Which we deemed was granted by the Mclaren amendment over the United States upon compliance with that Act.

As to whether you have to break this out, and I do not believe you have to do, between the classes of rights the United States says it claims, we do not believe this to be necessary, because once you're over the jurisdictional problem, it looks like to me it was the intent of the Act to catch all rights.

Otherwise, there was no point in joining the United
States at all. If they only have to bring in part of their
bucket of water, the balance of the bucket of water still being
hidden, the whole purpose of the Amendment is lost,
I believe.

q Your claim rests on the Amendment?

A The claim of jurisdiction does, yes, sir.

I would like to touch briefly, in at least partial

response to some of the questions asked by Mr. Justice White on just exactly what an adjudication is under Colorado law.

Seed.

B

And if I correctly understand the laws of the other involved states, primarily the 17 western arid and semi-arid states, Colorado has a really somewhat different system in the balance, or had, at least, under the 1943 Act, and it was purely judicial, --- not an involvement of a state officer in it.

Monetheless it was a state sponsored or a, the Pacific Livestock Case decided by this Court said was a quasi-judicial proceeding, sponsored by the public, quasi-public.

At the time that the ... Amendment was passed by I would say, though I don't know this precisely that of the 70 Water Districts referred to by Counsel, probably all but 2 or 3 had already had but not one, the original proceeding, possibly had half a dozen others or more denominated supplementray adjudications.

And I justdon't believe it can be possible that

Congress intended in passing this law, knowing full well that

all the states that it recognized had long had this type of

system intended to waste its time by passing an amendment which

would not allow the joining of the United States because the

proceedings were denominated as in this case supplemental.

Now the subject matter of an adjudication proceeding is not people, it is the river itself. The race is the water.

It is a kind of an action in rem, and it is a continuing action

because its purpose is to establish in order of priority the rights of those persons and entities claiming the right to use water out of the particular stream involved.

So though you use supplementary when you start an action similar to the one that was started in Eagle County involved here, nonetheless, in terms, in addition to, a continuation of the original proceeding commenced in that county a great many years before, and serves as the method and the means of not only quantifying the water right, but putting it on the water rights ladder in its proper order.

And that is all, if I correctly read the Pacific
Livestock case, that any western water adjudication proceeding
does. It's established under the appropriation doctrine, it's
attempts to establish a comprehensive expeditious, economical
scheme to provide for the fixing of water rights and their
distribution, it determines who is first and who is last,
it provides all the way through it for at least if not initially
in the final appeal to the court to establish all these rights.

Now, questions have been asked of Counsel for the United States regarding of whether or not the United States---

Q Was there a general adjudication prior to this proceeding --- water --- ?

A Yes, thereewas, yes, sir. I drafted the petition, I should know, but my guess would be as early as 1885.

71	And there	were probably 10 or 12 supplementary
2	after that:	
3	Q	I see, and has the United States been party
4	to any of those?	
5	A	Not in Water District 37 to my knowledge,
6	YourHonor.	
7	Q	Although it had appropriated rights surely
8	before this supplement	ental
9	A	Yes, it did, but I doubt that they go back
10	prior to 1900.	
de de	Q	But they were, why wouldn't they have
12	been in suppleme	entals?
13	A	Some of the supplemental proceedings that
14	were after the passa	age of the Mclaren Amendment? Well, it
15	wasn't until, as we	view it, at least as I
16	Q	Your
17	A	Sir?
18	Q	Ten or 12 supplementals in this proceeding?
19	Since 1885?	
20	A	Yes, and more, I'm not even sure of that.
21	Q	Why was not the United States joined in
22	any of them?	
23	A	Until 1952 they could not be joined, because
24	they had not raised	sovereign immunity.
25	Q	Could now have, after 1952?

2. 5

A I don't believe that the people of most of the western states that were initiating, starting this kind of a proceeding could have been particularly concerned about this so called reserve right problem until this Court announced that decision.

Q How about appropriated rights? Apparently there had mever been any adjudication of the appropriative rights of the United States --- ---.

A This is correct, Your Honor.

Q There has been some adjudication since 1952, in the state courts, why wasn't the United States joined in those proceedings?

A Well, under the Colorado system, primarily the person or the applicant delivers the adjudication proceeding might not even be conscious of the Amendment or have any concerb about the rights of the federal government.

It is the people more interested in protecting the over-all state rights who, after Arizona v. California, realized that the government in Colorado could, if she pursued her approach that was used in Arizona v. California, dry up the river. It's just as simple as that.

And so they began then to be concerned and to worry about whether the United States should be brought in.

Q I take it that in the supplemental proceeding after 1952 brought by some person to establish his right, which I take it is what happened ---

A Yes, sir.

A

Q ---people, other people who weren't served are not bound? Or not?

A Yes, they are bound. They have limitation statutes that compel to be binding.

Q If you win this case, would the United States be bound by all of the supplemental adjudication since 1952?

A I would say if Your Honor is asking me to make a strict guess, that I would say no. I might observe that---

Q Why not?

This problem is raised by the United States itself, and not by anyone else. And citing the previous Arizona v. California case, to the Supreme Court of Colorado, they said we have never been a party in the action. The United States says you can't bind us until youhave been properly partied, and therefore the prior proceedings cannot cut off the right of the United States.

And as I understand the discretion of this problem by Mr. Justice (Groves) of the Colorado Supreme Court. He was reciting, in effect the position of the parties. He only made one decidion for the Court, and that was that Colorado Courts are capable of adjudicating water rights of the United States just like anybody else.

He didn't reach the question of whether or not they could add a prior decree but added that they probably could.

A variety of questions he mentioned in passing but he didn't necessarily reach them.

Now, I would like to, if I could, touch very briefly on some of the cases in which, in one way or another, the United States has been involved affecting water rights on particular streams in particular atates, and whether or not they took this attitude that they now take in this one.

believe that I do, page 10 of the Washington brief, I believe that I do, page 10 of the Washington brief, in re Chiliwist Creek in Okannogan County is cited, and it is in case to which Counsel has reffered. It is just one of nine streams in which the State of Washington has caused the United States to be joined, and their names would indicate to me that they are certainly no larger or more prominent than the Eagle River, in re Bonaparte Creek, in re Harvey Creek, in re Magee Creek, and this kind of a matter, and in only one of those does the United STates raise the question of whether or not a river system was involved, raised this before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, and apparently lost the matter on remand.

The other case mentioned by Counsel involves Utah, there have been several there, the most principal case involving this particular section is the in re (Griminer) case

decided by Judge (Chilson) and the question there is whether the United Stated Federal District Court had jurisdiction to conduct adjudication for the benefit of the United States, rather than this question of the stream system being involved.

Now we have kind of I beleive exhausted the brief
this problem of what the statute intended to cover at the time
of its passage, we think it very clear as has been indicated
by answers to questions here that it was intended to be allowed
if the Uneted States had one appropriative righton the stream
to join the United STates with any actions

Certainly as a minimum this is what the McCarran Ammendment was intended to reach.

Q Mr. Balcomb, I don't believe I've heard either Counsel as yet speak specifically of the language of the McCarran Ammendment, and I have in mind the language reading "Water rights by appropriation under state law by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise." I'm interested in those words "or otherwise" unless unless you tell me that they are of no significance whatsoever.

A I believe at the time, Your Honor, that this particular act was passed, this question about the utilization of the word "reserved" in connection with water rights was not in too common parlance. Not even the government itself.

It had come up only as an implied reservation, in conmection with Indian reservations and was not considered to be particularly serious.

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I do think that it was the intention of the Congress in passing the McCarran Amendment in utilizing the word "otherwise" was to avoid a long listing of such things as condemnation a variety of subjects and certainly was not intended by the use of that word to exclude reserved rights, it was, I believe, intended to catch everything.

So that you do feel the words "or otherwise" have significance in the present context?

Yes, sir, and they certainly did at the time in the mind of the Department of Interior witnesses who testified as well as the Department of Justice witnesses who testified who pointed out that this language that you're using is a general waiver and if the --- will have to proove that point all of our rights, our Indian rights, our military rights, things of this mature, and they then did not call them reserved rights, they were specific by naming those rights, and I think that the lawyers from Justice and from the Interior Department show very clearly that they were concerned that the waiver was too broad, and in both letters made the suggestion that the waiver should be confined to state appropriative tights.

And as the Committee report 755 notes, they considered this and rejected it. Considering that the ---

Was there any particular episode that gave

rise, gave impetus to the statute of the McCarran Amendment?

A As I understand the legislative history,

Your Honor, it was a combination apparently, of circumstances
an inability in Senator McCarrans home state to properly administer a little stream called the Quinn River, which had some

75 rights adjudicated out of it, 3 of which
the government had purchased, there was the two pending cases
in the United States District Court, one of them which has
not been in judgement, concerning the Truckee and the Carson
River and the rights of the Union, and the reclamation project
there, which apparently ---

There was the Fallbrook cases which the government mentioned that were bothering young Senator Nixon, and Senator Moland, there was a variety of these kinds of things, even the Colorado Senators mentioned the problem that existed in connection with the Blue River which has been pending in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.

Q Then the opposition to the legislation came from the Executive Branch, the Justice Department, and the Department of Interior, it also came in the Congress from such people as Congressman Moody, what would explain---?

A I think he, his warning to Congress of the step that they were about to take exemplifies their thought, that it covered all water rights, does not relate it to expense items which --- the government, or anything like that, it was

1 considered by the people who sponsored the absolutely necessary
2 through certainty into the field of water rights in the West.

And the ppposition from Congress came from those who were concerned about the expense that might be caused to the Justice Department?

B.

A That's correct. You'd have to have a District Attorney in every county in the western United States.

I might say your suggestion of course well why doesn't this Court give the fustice Department and the other federal agencies time to make a list and put it somewhere? --- 1952 this was part of the legislation in rejected. And they've hadl18 years since then --- this suit was really growing, and they haven't made the list yet, until they were brought into Court.

And when they were brought into Court, as the Appendix indicates they were able to detail with particularity their uses, not only appropriative but also reserves within the area of the Eagle River.

I wanted to touch, if I might, briefly upon some 11 to 12 or 13 cases, at least that we've been able to find the reported decisions, that relate to or refer to this particular Section 666.

Counsel has mentioned the older one, I believe it has been in this Court for direct decision on it. There were 2 cases at the time, that's Dugan v. Rank.

1 2 th 3 th 4 ha 5 no 6 fo 7 ac 8 wh

And I would like to call the Courts attention to the fact that every time this Court of the Circuit Court for the Ninth Circuit, or for practical matters, any other court, has held that 666 does not confer jurisdiction, that it was not a quasi-public suit that was involved, it was a request for declaratory relief, injunctions, sometimes an --- class action, and the court said in every circumstance that is not what's involved, because it is not the quasi-public proceeding called a general adjudication in ---.

And the only case that --- reaches this point is the very first one on the list, and that's the in re (Griminer) case that Judge Christensen decided in Utah.

And he thoroughly discusses the legislative fhistory, finds that it was intended that the United States be joined, does not concern himself with a difference in kinds of rights, but merely said go back to the state court, they have the machinerey, I've noted that sometimes in an adjudication in Utah they go on for years, and there are thousands of people involved and the federal court just doesn't have time to take care of this.

It's got to go back to the state court that has appropriate machinery.

I'd like to touch on another point, it is this attitude of the government today and the attitude that has changed
ower the years at various times, and brings, I think, monumental

g l	confusion for the of	ther departments of the government that
2	don't know what to	do. The regulations concerning what they
3	are to do change tir	me and again, various, it ends up that if
4	enough space is not	held into this action, there's only one
5	kind of right that r	must be acquired according to state law,
6	and that would be yo	our reclamation rights, by reason of Section
7	(a).	
8	I think th	nat the principle problem is is not whether
9	or not a reserved r	ight exists, but if it does in fact exist,
10	what eccasion, when	does it reserve?
91	Q	What is the derivation of reserved rights?
12	A	What is the derivation?
13	Q	Yes.
94	A	I believe it commenced with rivers, and
15	progressed there the	cough various Indian reservation matters
16	until finally colmin	nating in Arizona v. California.
17	Q	The Colorado Supreme Court has said there
18	isn't such thing as	a reserved right, hasn't it? Or Not?
19	A	No, sir, I don't opinion.
20	Q	You don't?
21	A	No.
22	Q	You don't so read the prior opinion?
23	A	the case below? No, sir I do not, In
24	fact I thank that Ju	ustice (Groves) refused to reach the opin-

ion.

9 Yes, but how about a prior case? In the Colorado Supreme Court, to which your collegue here referred. Stockman v. Leddy? As reaching the reser-3 ved right question? That reached the date of appropriation 13 question, I believe, Your Honor. 5 6 The reserved right question, to my knowledge, has not been reached in Colorado. 7 8 And your idea would be that the reserved right question is relative to anything else should be submitted 10 in a proceeding like is now before the Court, and that it should go in through the state courts, you agree that's a 98 federal question, don't you? 12 Whether or not there is a reserved right? 13 A Yes. 14 I do . A 15 And subject to review here? 0 16 Subject to review here, and that's the A 17 right of the government, if the Colorado Courts as they're 18 afraid will not follow the law, but I submit that I suggest 19 that the Colorado courts will follow the law, both federal 20 and state law. 29 --- the determination of reserved rights, 22 it would extend that any federal court could get into it, I 23 gather under your submission. It would be only this Court 24

under review of the Colorado Supreme Court. If there were an

Part .	adjudication of a reserved right issue
2	A That's the way I read the statute, yes,
3	Your Honor.
4	Q Did your pleadings in this case, take
5	the position or have your clients take the position that the
6	United States has no reserved rights?
7	A Have I I have not, no sir.
8	In fact as I give recognition to them, I only inquire
9	as to what the quality is, and what is the date.
10	Ω Do you think they're subject to date? Do
11	you think they're subject to the Colorado appropriation law?
12	A Yes, sir. I don't think there's any dif-
13	ference, just because you denominate legislation between that
14	and the appropriations.
15	Q So you don't think there's really any
16	reserved rights, that
17	A I don't think
18	Q that's any different from appropriative
19	uses.
20	A That's correct. I think that the United
21	States would be entitled to the extent that it can show its
22	right to whatever date it was that they
23	Q And it might be a right subordinate to some
24	other right, is that it ?
25	A It might be subordinate to some, but came

into existence ahead of those rights of the United STates. 9 So you could---0 ---it would be senior to the others. 3 You 're just saying that the United States 2 either has appropriative rights in Colorado law, or it doesn't. 5 And reserved rights are no different from any other rights. 6 What I'm trying to say, Your Monor, is that 7 I recognize that the United States does have appropriative 8 rights under state law, and likewise has appropriative rights under federal law. --- you choose to call it reserved 10 rights under federal law. 77 Those are implied. They have to be found. 12 Do you agree or disagree with the adjudi-93 caiton in Arizona v Colorado, these so-called reserved rights? 14 Do I agree with them? A 15 Yes. 16 I don't know anything about the facts as A 17 to quality, but I certainly agree withthe theory---18 That's what I mean. 19 Yes, sir I don. I don't think I have very 20 much choice in that regard, anyway. 21 Well, I mean is it a principle that you 22 think would generally apply, in this litigation. 23 I think that ---A 24 The point is that I'm after, is the setting 25

Count	aside of the Indian reservation carried with it implication
2	the right to use water, because otherwise you wouldn't have
3	a viable reservation.
4	A We agree with that whole heartedly, Your
5	Honor.
6	Q And yet I gather from what you answered
7	me earlier, it may be even as to those rights there are super-
8	ior rights.
9	A Unquestionably if the Indian reservation
10	were on the forest was withdrawm in 1900, and there were
11	a variety of water rights acquired thereto, they would be like-
12	wise entitled to a priority date. That is the appropriation
13	system.
14	Q And you say reserve rights can't override
15	that?
16	A They can't go back at when they came into
17	existence, Your Honor, that is what I say.
18	Q But the governments claim is to the contrary.
19	A I don't believe so, no
20	Q You don't think so.
21	A No, because the government's claiming 1905
22	not 1877.
23	Q Appropriation right couldn't override a
24	reserve right? I mean the government sets aside and then the
25	appropriators come in. Sets aside a federal tract like the White

River course.

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I agree with the position that the govern-A ment takes that they're entitled to show their --- and go back to it. Unquestionably. And to the extent that this takes out 50 ther appropriative rights I quess that's just the way the game is played, but that's the purpose of the system.

But do you say that when the government sets aside a national forest or something else or a new Indian reservation that it s appropriative right is limited by what it actually is using then, or can the right expand as the need expands in the future?

I think I can answer the question in this way, Your Honor, it was about 1897, I believe, that the Organic Act set up the forcets, and largely they were timber reserves and they were spicifically for the purpose of timber.

Now I would say in that original withdrawal, this is the purpose for which the water was drawn, and whatever the United States could show it needed for this purpose, it would be entitled to reserve.

That's it?

Yes, sir. The 1960, I believe it was, the A act concerning multiple use of federal lands when they dumped all these other things in on top of it as a purpose for the forest.

And it might be a court would hold that as to some of

g.	these rights the United States claims they would have to come
2.	clear up to 1960.
3	Q So the reserved right in your book would hav
A	no open end?
5	A No what, Your Honor?
6	Q No open end, it would n't be open ended to
7	cover future need, except to the extent that there was water
8	available.
9	A I can certainly understand that some of
10	them would be so deminimous that there would be no point in
11	wasting time, but the governments in a better position to say
12	then we, what that's going to be. That's the problem.
13	Q Nobody knows what these reserve rights are.
14	q A I think they don, Your Honor, they were
15	perfectly able to list them in Eagle County.
16	Q I know, but in terms of cubic feet per se-
37	cond, is what
18	A They were able to do that there, also.
19	They spoke of the general reserve rights and then
20	spoke of these things that they were going to claim specifically
21	which as I view it is a double claim for the same
22	Q They have never been adjudicated, have
23	they?
24	A Sir?
25	Q They have never bean adjudicated, have

they?

A No, sir. They have not offered them for adjudication. And that's all we ask them to do, and all we ask this Court to do, is direct them to do so.

Q Is to do what?

A To direct the government to offer its claims for adjudication. And as is indicated, if the Colorado courts, the Utah Courts, the Washington courts, go astray this Court is still here to straighten that problem out.

But I don't think it's fair to assume that state courts are not going to follow federal law. When they are specifically enjoined to follow it.

Q Well, then if they don't I suppose that there are ways of dealing with that problem, aren't there?

What is right and what is wrong? Is it wrong to allow the government to stand out here and with this open ended mortgage, or is it right to make them go ahead and bring that open ended mortgage into court and declare their rights?

It's an equitable way to proceed, as I view it. I might mention, that my time is about to expire, that there is, I will have an opportunity, of course after Mr. Kiechel speaks concerning 1812, that there is an amazing similarity between these cases, and I think that the result probably should be the same.

que Thank you very much. Q Thank you, Mr. Balcomb, thank you, Mr. Kiechel, 87 is submitted.