# Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1970

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In the Matter of:

Docket No. 835

ROBERT KENNETH DEWEY,

Petitioner

VS

REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY,

Respondent

SUPREME COURT, U.S.
MARSHAL'S OFFICE
HAY 27 3 07 PM '7

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Place

WASHINGTON D.C.

Date

April 20, 1971

# ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

300 Seventh Street, S. W.

Washington, D. C.

NA 8-2345

#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM 1970

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No. 835

REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY,

Respondent

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The above-entitled matter came on for argument

at 2:50 o'clock p.m. on Tuesday, April 20, 1971.

BEFORE:

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WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice

BONARA F. ODSTRIFTONE, NGO

JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice 15

WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice

POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice

THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice

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#### APPEARANCES:

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DONALD F. OOSTERHOUSE, ESQ. 950 Union Bank Building Grand Rapids, Michigan 49502 On behalf of Petitioner

LAWRENCE G. WALLACE, ESQ. Office of the Solicitor General Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530 On behalf of the United States as amicus curiae

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# APPEARANCES: (Continued)

WILLIAM A. COUGHLIN, JR., ESQ. 4200 Penobscot Building Detroit, Michigan 48226 On behalf of Respondent

### PROCEEDINGS

A.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will hear arguments next in Number 835, Dewey against Reynolds Metals Company.

Mr. Oosterhouse you may start whenever you are ready.

ORAL ARGUMENT BY DONALD F. OOSTERHOUSE, ESQ.
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. OOSTERHOUSE: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court:

This case involves an interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as it applies to discharge of an employee because of his religion. The case also involves the question of election of remedies where an employee proceeds to arbitration under the labor contract and also seeks to assert his rights under the Civil Rights Act, including suit in Federal Court.

After 15 years of employment by Reynolds Metals

Company, Petitioner Robert Dewey was progressively disciplined

and discharged for refusing to work on assigned Sundays. There

were three Sundays involved in 1966: August 28, September 4,

and September 11.

Dewey's refusal to work on those Sundays was based on his stipulated religious beliefs which prohibited him from working on Sunday. He had communicated these beliefs to Reynolds sometime prior to any of the Sundays in question.

Dewey's stipulated religious beliefs also forbade him from asking another person to work in his place and this religious belief also had been communicated to Reynolds prior to any of the Sundays in question.

Q Do I correctly understand that his religious beliefs, however, did not prevent the company from getting somebody else in his place?

A This is surely true, Your Honors.

Q As long as he's not doing it.

A That's correct; the question boils down to who must ask the employee to work.

Q Is that the line of distinction, as to who must ask?

A It is certainly our position that with these stipulated religious beliefs the duty falls on Reynolds to ask another employee to work in Mr. Dewey's place.

Q I thought the record shows, Mr.

Oosterhouse, that your client, Mr. Dewey, had, in fact, asked others to work in his place.

A He had prior to this time asked others to work in his place. The religious conviction against doing that apparently developed and matured later as he was in this situation.

Q Suppose an employer in a particular small enterprise has all of his employees who share this belief.

What does he do about that? And no one will work on Sunday.

The same

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A Well, that obviously presents a difficult situation in terms of the Commission's guidelines and it might well be in that kind of a situation that undue hardship upon the employer would exist.

There are many possible variations here and I would think if the employer schedules Sunday work as a regular full-time day this is reasonably within his discretion.

Which the employer has no choice about it: a public utility, electric power company, telephone company. Let's assume that it a situation in which the employer has no choice. He has a franchise which requires him to give 24 hours service, seven days a week, at all times, and then alter it a little bit.

Suppose he has ten employees and five of those assert this privilege as was suggested, I think, in one of the briefs and all of the Sunday work falls on the other five who are not observant of the Sabbath?

has to be in terms of the undue hardship. And I would like to point out that, while hypotheticals of much more difficult situations can be easily imagined, the facts are in this case that on each of the three Sundays involved, substantially less than all of the employees in Mr. Dewey's classification were called upon to work.

And further, that there were two employees out of the classification who were nonetheless, qualified to work.

On one of the days in question Reynolds, in fact, asked one of these employees to work in Dewey's place. That is, one of the employees outside of the classification and he didn't work.

And none of the horrible consequences which we read about and predicted in Reynolds' brief, actually happened, even though on that Sunday Reynolds did accommodate, as we say they should. However, on that day they still disciplined Mr. Dewey.

Now, if Reynolds had scheduled Sunday as a whole shift day regularly we would have a different situation. We would need evidence from Reynolds, which we do not have in this case, as to attempts to accommodate Dewey's religious beliefs in other ways.

Would it be possible, for example, to schedule extra overtime on Saturdays and on Mondays for Dewey. This would be a factual question as to whether this would be a reasonable solution to get the work done.

Now, if you take an example where every single person in a classification objects to working on Sunday I suppose the employer would experience undue hardship, although again, this might bear some further investigation as to possible ways to get this work done within the requirements of the company by late Saturday overtime and early Monday overtime or any one of a number of possibilities which might be

arrived at, without undue hardship.

When Mr. Dewey was discharged he pursued his rights both under the Civil Rights Act of '64, starting by filing a charge with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission and following the timely procedures of filing with the EEOC and ultimately starting action in the District Court in the Western District of Michigan.

Almost simultaneously he also started the grievance procedure under the contract. This contract had a provision for binding arbitration. His grievance was processed through arbitration prior to the time he had begun suit in the Western District of Michigan and the ruling of the arbitrator gave him no relief. The ruling of the arbitrator was based on language in the contract which is not similar to the language in the Civil Rights Act, and he found that while this language was intended to provide for occasional circumstances, it was not intended to exempt an employee from every Sunday working.

In the arbitration hearing Mr. Dewey was represented by his union and not by an attorney. Reynolds was represented by Attorney William Coughlin, and while Reynolds filed a post-hearing brief, the union did not.

The arbitration opinion, I think, makes clear that the Civil Rights Act was not, in fact, considered by the arbitrator.

The applicant language of the statute: Section

703(a)(1) ---

Q Do you think that --

A No, it was not.

Q Do you feel that if the arbitrator had looked into the statute that it would be outside of the --

A Well, of course, the arbitrators have different views of how much they will look into statutes.

I would think the correct view of the relations between this statute and arbitration is that even if he had discussed the Civil Rights Act the arbitration should not be considered as binding.

Q Well, let's assume there is an --

A Do you mean not under disputes arising under the contract, Your Honor? I would say that that clause if agreed to by the union, is going beyond its power in bargaining away an individual employee's rights under the Civil Rights Act --

Q (Inaudible)

A I do think that this is the best interpretation, Your Honor, although I recognize it is possible to
use a Speilberg type approach in taking a look at the
arbitration to see what actually happened and to see whether
proper conditions were met.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will resume at 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Counsel.

(Whereupon, at 3:00 o'clock p.m. the argument in the above-entitled matter was recessed to be resumed at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on Wednesday, April 21, 1971.)