# Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1970

In the Matter of:

UNITED STATES

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APR 2 1971

Docket No. 812

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THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE WATER DIVISION NO. 5, STATE OF COLORADO, et al.

SUPREME COURT, U.S. MARSHAL'S OFFICE

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Place Washington, D. C.

Date March 2, 1971

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Qua. ARGUMENT OF: PAGE: WALTER KIECHEL, JUR. ESQ. On behalf of Petitooner KENNETH BALCOMB, ESQ. On behalf of Respondent REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF: WALTER KIECHEL, JR. ESQ. On behalf of Petitioner \*\*\*\* 

1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OFF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1970
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3	NA NO 100 NO
4	UNITED STATES,
5	Petitioner :
6	
7	vs. : No. 812
8	
9	THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE WATER DIVISION NO. 5, STATE OF : COLORADO, ET AL., :
10	
11	Respondent :
12	
13	Washington, D.C. Tuesday, March 2, 1971
14	The above ensitled matter came on for
15	argument at 11:35 a.m.
16	BEFORE:
17	BEFORE:
18	WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice
19	WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice
20	JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice WILLIAM J. BRENNAM, JR. Associate Justice
21	POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice
22	HENRY BLACKMUN, Associate Justice
23	
24	
25	

(tod)	APPEARANCES:
2	
3	WALTER KIECHEL, JR., ESQ.
Ą	Land and Natural Resources Division Department of Justice
5	Washington, D.C. On behalf of Petitioner
6	
7	KENNETH BALCOMB, ESQ. Glenwood Springs, Colorado
8	On behalf of Respondent
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10	TO NO THE REE TO
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### PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We'll hear arguments next in No. 812, Untied States against the District Court of Eagle County of Water Division No. 5. Mr. Kiechel, you may proceed whenever you're ready.

MR. KIECHEL: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court.

Under the Colorado Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, the 70 water districts were replaced with 7 water divisions, Water division 5 included the area drained by the Colorado River and its tributaries excluding the Gunnison River, and this includes the former water district 37, in the Eagle River Watershed.

In February of last year the Attorney General retieved by mail a paper signed by the Water Clerk of Water Division 5, directed to all persons interested in water applications in that division and supplying a list of water right applications filed in that office.

The paper concluded with the statement that the recipient had until the last day of March, 1970, that was the month thereafter that he recieved the notice, to file with the Water Clerk a verified statement of opposition to any such application.

Similar notices have been . recieved by the At-

torney General listing Water Right Applications filed during
each month thereafter in Water Division 5, and in Water Divisons 4 and 6 as well.

In response to the 1969 December 1969 notice the United States filed a motion to quash, this was denied, the writ was applied for in the Colorado Supreme Court which was denied.

As in the Eagle County case affected by the proceedings in Water Division 5 are federal water rights of two types, appropriative rights acquired under state law, and the reserved and other rights based on federal law.

Because of its size, Water Division 5 contains a multitude of federal rights to demonstrate their magnitude and nature we have prepared a map on which has been delineated the boundaries of Water Division 5, and shows the various federal reserved areas within that Division 5.

The four national parks or forests thereof, in green, the Naval Oil Share REserve in black, the national park, part of the Rocky Hountain National Park on that side of the divide in red---

Q Would you mind waiting until we get the map?

A I'm sorry, sir.

Q While we're waiting will you give some thought to, then suggest any reason why the Colorado Courts

will not follow federal law, if that's part of the --- of your position.

En

A Yes. Your Honor, we are concerned about the opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court to that extent. In that respect. To the extent that the Colorado Supreme Court discussed the question they said that the decisions of this Court reviewing Winters v. United, States, in 1908 which announced the reserved right doctrine, Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 and Arizona v. California in 1963, 373, were not determinative of the question.

Q Would that determination of the Colorado

Supreme Court be reviewable here at the instance of the United

States?

A Yes, Your Monor, I believe it is.

So you do get a review in a federal Court, here.

A Yes, our position is that this is reviewable and the Supreme Court which held that the decision, in effect the Supreme Court of Colorado said that when this matter was presented to them that they would decide it on the basis of Colorado law.

And they referred to the Stockman v. Leddy case which Justice White referred to, in their opinion and said that they would have to overrule that decision if they found that there were reserved rights of the United States in the

state of Colorado.

A

AF

A Well, Leddy---

Q Or just that under Colorado law there were not---

A Leddy relies upon the enabling of the Congress---

Q I see.

A And it---

Q If the United States didn't reserve any

They said that by admitting Colorado into the Union with a constitutional provision, a state constitutional provision that said that all water rights of the state of Colorado were the property of the people and subject to appropriation under state lzw , that the United States is precluded from asserting a claim of reserved rights, within Colorado.

Our response to that, if Your Honor please, is that the enabling statute, requires in Section 4 that the people of the territory of Colorado recognize and disclaim any right to the public lands within that territory and recognize that that is a matter for the sole and exclusive disposition of the United States.

This was a specific provision of the Enabling Act, and that act was, and that provision was referred to once again when the President proclaimed in his Presidential Proclamation after the Colorado Constitution was adopted that Colorado was a state.

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So that we say that by this provision of the enabling act, Congress reserved to itself the right to the dispose of public lands, except for the school lands which were granted to the territory and certain other lands in specified amounts for public buildings.

And we say there, in furtherance of that,
that thereafter, when the United States reserved from the
public domain for a specified purpose, land it reserved as
well it reserved the appurtant water rights, to fulfill the
purposes of that reservation, and that carried with it the
priority of the date of the creation of the reservation subject,
and I wish to point out, subject to rights vested at the
time of its creation.

The matter of the legislative history I would discuss, I'm Justice Harlan asked if there were some specific episode which triggered off the enactment of that statute. And I think Mr. Balcomb has referred to a specific episode which did.

It was a proceeding in the home state of Senator

McCarran, the sponsor of the act, in Nevada on the Quinn River.

And it involved a suit for administration of water rights, al-

ready having been adjudicated under state courts.

And there the United States had purchased, had applied by purchase certain water rights on the Quinn River. And this is the primary concern of Senator McCarran.

This is demonstrated by his statements on the floor of the Senate, the fact that he says it's to allow the United States its own right, or as a trustee, those were acquired for Indian purposes, to have a better right than the former owner, is not fair and just as to the other water users on the stream.

And of course the terms of the statute, I might point out refers to appropriation under state law, and in an appropriative right state, such as Nevada or Colorado, the state here involved, the only way a private citizen can acquire water right is by the application of the water to a beneficial use.

And that water right becomes fixed in amount and quantity by that act.

Another characteristic of an appropriative right is that it is subject to loss through abandonment or of non-use. Now considering the legal characteristics of an appropriative right, the second things of the McCarran Act, which I would refer the Courts attention to, is consistent with the first.

Only if the consent to sue is restricted to rights

acquired under state law. The second sentence of the McCarran Amendment says, "The United States, when a party to any such suit, one shall be deemed to a waive any right to plead state law inapplicable, or that the United States is not amenable, thereto by reason of its sovereighty, and thereto shall be subject to the judgements, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances."

THE STREET

Q There is no provision in the statute, obviously, that relates reserve rights, makes an exception, or to use a different phasse, to appropriateve rights stem from federal laws. Nothing in the statute of that kind.

Aq That is correct, Your Honor.

Q Was there any effort made to put in such language?

A There was not. The express terms of the statute refer to rights acquired under state law ,appropriated under state law.

Q Then it has that canchacatch-all phrase, "or otherwise".

A That's correct, Your Honor, but what I'm saying is that the terms of the statute by appropriation under state law, by purchase, exchange, or otherwise is the means by which a private individual can acquire the water right.

And it was that type of right which the United

States had acquired in the Quinn River situation that Senator

McCarann was concerned about being subject to adjudication

or in that case, administration, by the state court of Nev
ada.

Too!

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Of course, as was suggested earlier, how in argument at the time of the enactment of the McCarran Amendment the concept of the reserved rights hadn't matured, or become quite so clarified as it is now, perhaps.

There had been the one case involving an Indian reservation, but the passage of that legislation long antedated the decision of this Court in Arizona v. California.

A That is correct, Your Honor.

Q Primarily in that case--

A But the Winters v. United States was a landmark decision that this Court---

Q Having to do with Indian reservations.

A Yes indeed, and it was not until Arizona
v. California that it was extended to other federal reservations.

But the concept of a right other than an appropriative right, a right rising by creation of a federal reservation was well known in the water law of the West at the time of the enactment of the McCarran Amendment

Now keeping in mind the intent of the sponsor, that
is, Senator McCarran, to subject equally the federal government
and private citizens to adjudication of water rights acquired
under state law, and the express terms of the statute designed
to carry out that intent, in sharp distinction and contrast,
are reserve rights.

Reserved rights, as I have said arise by creation of reservations automatically. They don't require the application of water to use, the priority dates from the date of withdrawal, and applies to future as well as existing use.

And the, in summary with respect to the legislative intent, I would say that would be no --- provision in terms of the statute, in putting reserve rights, nor any specific intent by the sponsor of the amendment.

If follows that it was not within the contemplation of Congress that they be included within state court adjudication.

Q Excuse me. The section that distinguishes between the adjudication of rights and the administration of---

A Yes?

Q on the---

A They provide for the joinder of the United Staates in either or both of those.

Q It distinguishes between the two.

9	A Yes, Your Monor.		
2	Q And on the adjudication part it says for		
3	the adjudication, that the United States may be enjoined in any		
4	suit rights of the use of the water or river system		
5	Now would you think that that would be consent for someone		
6	to sue the United States in a federal District Court for a		
7	declaratory judgement as to whether or not the United States		
8	has any reserved rights in the Colorado River system?		
9	A No, Your Honor, it's a two party suit,		
10	Whichman		
74	Q Well, let's assume he has satisfied		
12	He's brought in everybody in the state of Golorado, that is		
13			
14	A I'm not suggesting that that's necessary,		
15	Q I know, but let's assume that		
16	A Your question is whether if in a federal		
17	court		
18	Q Or any other court. A declaratory		
19	judgement		
20	A I like the hypothetical You mentioned		
21	because it does permit me to say that the federal Distric		
22	Court would of course apply ther reserved right as a matter		
23	of federal law.		
24	Q I don't know, but how about consent to the		
25	suit? Has the United States consented to that suit?		

gan With respect to a single Plaintiff, single 2 person asking that the rights of the United States be declared --3 --- serve as a defendant anybody that they 4 think ought to be served. Including the United States. My 5 question is does this statute give consent for such a suit? It seems like it would, right in paragraph one, here. 6 7 If it's a general adjudication, if it A 8 does have the geographic and other characteristics of a general adjudication ---9 10 Q You don't say that this at least determined 11 the adjudication of rights part. You would n't say thatthe 12 United States has not given consent to adjudicative reserve rights. 13 14 Oh, yes, I do. I think that the language of appropriation under state law applies to both the admin-15 istration and the adjudication parts of the statute. 16 So you don't think that there would be 17 jurisdiction in a federal court --- . 18 I believe that the reserve rights were 19 witheld by Congress, yes, Your Honor. 20 Q Let me see if I get that. Then you take 21 the language where it appears that the United States is the 22 owner of or is about to --- more rights by appropriation under 23 state law as modifying both the adjudication right and the 24

administrative right.

Great Service You say what? That the legislative history Q 2 supports that? 3 Yes, Your Honor. 4 Well that's a crude way to construct a 5 statute, isn't it? No, ---6 It's talking about in paragraph 2, it The says for the administration of rights where it appears the 8 United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring 9 rights by appropriation. Add that on to paragraph 1 and see 10 where you get. For the adjudicaiton of rights to the use of 11 the water of a river system. Where it appears that the United 12 States is the owner of or is in the process of getting water 13 rights. 94 That doesn t make very good sense, does it? Well, 15 I won't take up your time. 16 Yes, I think it does make sense. The adjud-27 ication of rights acquired under state law, or in the process 18 of being acquired. My difficulty with your earlier question, Mr. 19 Justice White, is that you characterize it as a declaratory 20 judgement and I thank that would not be a general adjudication 21 because it would not permit the assertion of contesting of the 22

The---

water right.

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Q At least the point is that the govern-

ment is not lost this state could exercise jurisdiction ---. 2 A I beg your pardon? 3 Q Basically, why does the government really object to the state court exercising jurisdiction under this 5 Act? A Well, the proceedure involved is not such 6 that we think it permits a general adjudication. There just 7 isn't, it just isn't within the terms of the type of proceeding 8 to which Congress consented. 9 And we are also very concerned about the Supreme 10 Court of Colorado and its opinion with respect to the 11 existence of reserve rights, which as I pointed to on the 12 map are a matter of great magnitude in both of these cases in 13 Water Division 5, which certainly includes a great part of the 84 area of that area of Colorado. 15 If it didn't recognize the United States' 16 rights, then the United States could bring the case up here 37 to us. 18 A Yes, Your Honor. 19 But what would be --- in that? 20 A Easier said than done, if I might suggest. 21 I personally have been working with this statute since 22 about the time of its enactment and this is the first time 23 in which it has been able to bring it before this Court. The 24

25

Green River decision Mr. Balcomb refers to was a remand decision

under the federal statute, a remand by a federal District Court to a state court is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise, so that the answer to your quesition is yes, it can be, Dugan v.

Rank is probably the classic example of how long it takes.

That case was started on the San Joachim River in 1947, lengthy proceedings were had, the United States was joined to the party. It went to the Court of Appeals and finally gets to this Court in 1963. And the court held that it was all for nought.

Nought having been jurisdiction over the United States.

Q Couldn't the United States have brought one of these Okanogan cases from the state of Washington here?

Where it lost?

A The united States may bring a suit and does bring suits for quieting its right---

Q Under the Wasnington State proceedure, suit, or in the eastern part of the state, as I remember.

A Yes, the United States could initiate a suit as party Plaintiff.

O So if they were a party, and they lost in a state case, they could appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, then on here by Certiorari, couldn't they?

A Yes, Your Honor, as to that case, and in that case, that is correct, I agree.

The proceedure in Colorado underthe Water Division

system now is quite different. It has a monthly determination.

Monthly, these lists are rendered to the various interested persons, a person under the Colorado statute being defined to include the United States.

Now although the continued inability of the Colorado law to consider in a court rightful priorities is perhaps its most basic deficiency, it's by no means the only one.

When the matter of adjudicating federal water rights is considered, these deficiencies and the burdensome nature of the proceedure can best be demonstrated by a consideration of the steps which I'd like to run over very quickly.

First, the Water Clerk, no later than the 5th of each month sends out this resume, and then he publishes it by the 10th of that month. If anyone wishes to oppose a particular application within the resume, must file with the Water Clerk a verified statement of opposition, setting forth facts why it should not be granted, or it should be granted only conditionally.

By the last day of the second month following the month in which the application was filed, the Water Referee is Water Division 5, or a Water Division, then would start conducting a formal hearing investigates the truth of the application and the opposition, and within the month following the month in which the opposition was filed rules on the application.

This is mailed by the Water Clark to all persons who filed either a statement or an opposition, and it becomes effective upon entry subject only to judicial review.

So that the statute notices only those parties who are interested in the applications filed in a particular month, the only water rights that are before the Water Referee are those to which an application has been filed, and the only parties are those who must take an affirmative action to be heard, and so that even though the Referees proceedures are extremely limited, and involove only a part of the water rights in the Water Division, the burden on the United States, I submit is tremendous.

Q Is it in any different position than anybody else that has water rights?

A Except it's bigger.

Within the two month period allowed by the statute the United States must investigate all of these water rights, within Water Division 5, and evaluate the impact of these applications and that monthly resume upon those water rights.

And that is a rather considerable task. And I submit that perhaps the United States, because of the shortage of time may be result to protective opposition, for lack of knowledge or time, and certainly this would not contribute to the orderly proceedute.

So that the new statute does provide certain compli-

1 cations.

2 Well resume arguments after lunch, Mr.

3 | Kiechel.

gen PROCEEDINGS 2 Afternoon Session 3 A ARGUMENT OF WALTER KIECHEL, JR. ESQ. 5 ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 6 (RESUMED) MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Kiechel? 7 8 MR. KIECHEL: I will reserve the remainder of my time. 9 10 Very well. Hr. Balcomb? ARGUMENT OF KENNETH BALCIMB, ESQ. 99 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT 12 MR. BALCOMB: Mr. Chief Justice, and may 13 it please the Court. 91 I think one of the most interesting and novel things 15 about the second case is that we say that they are identical, 16 and I think I can establish that the proceedures involved in 17 adjudication under the old and the new law are identical. 18 It is the presence or absence of the judgement below 19 that is an opinion that can be interpreted. I don't believe that 20 it's Judge (Darrells) opinion to which I will refer later on, 21 the trial judge that is here, I just believe it is Mr. Justice 22 (Groves) opinion in K (7) that is probably the subject matter 23 in the discussion here likewise. 24

It is interesting to note that under the old statute,

the primary objection to the government to being bound by the proceedings for at least their state adjudicatory rights related to the size of the stream system or source of the water.

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And this, oddly enough, is the situation where it has never bothered them when they wanted to be Plaintiff, and now it only bothers them when they do not wish to articulate, and do not wish to qualify their rights.

There are several circumstances that I know of where the United States has come in, I could point to the ones, two in Nevada, one of which was before this Court on a separate point a week ago yesterday, to the extent that Certiorari was denied, that was the Carson River case in Nevada.

Q Have they ever brought one in Colorado?

In Colorado? Yes, sir. They, about the time that the United States decided that they did not want to subject themselves to state adjudicating proceedures, there was pending in the District Court for Summit County, located at Breckenridge, two parallel adjudication proceedures, one to adjudicate rights for irrigation, and another one to adjudicate rights other than irrigation under the statute which proceeded the 1943 Act which brought those two kinds of things all into one action.

And then the Colorado Supreme Court ultimately held that the government had made a voluntary appearance in those

proceedings and could therby be bound.

The United STates elected to bring an action which in this, for lack of anything better to call it, in the nature of a quiet title action. In other words, assume an equity to determine the governments rights to a reclamation project, the Colorado --- project.

This had not, by then, been completely submitted to the Court at Breckenridge. Now the Elue River is a little bit larger than the Eagle River, but it's the same kind of a system and it ends up by running into the Colorado River.

a general adjudication, because they were very choosy about who they joined. They even considered --- involved northern Colorado the city and county of Denver, Colorado Springs, and everyone else who got into that action.

Q How long ago was that?

The suit was initiated in about 1952, I believe, and went to decree by stipulation in 1955, and was been amended a couple of times since them.

---the way it became a gemeral proceeding was that the United States removed the then pending adjudication proce-edures from the Breckenridge Courts, in Summit County, and thereby brought in our view everybody on the Colorado River, even though it was said to be supplemental there, it was a supplemental general adjudication pending in Summit County,

they brought it into the federal court and thereby joined the users of the entire river and I'm satisfied that they considered 3 that they had decrees for the Green Mountain Reservoir, that 1 the Colorado --- systems, and the right to transport this 5 water through the mountains. 6 Is that, that was tantamount to an asser-

tion by them that the Colorado Court had jurisdiction,

Yes, Ibelieve so. A

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They recognize ---0

---by removal. And although nobody in Colorado seems to know the answer they appear at least in part still to be removed.

It has created a little bit of confusion.

You said a decree by stipulation. Is this to say settled? Is that case settled?

Yes, sir, and the United STates was given the right of initiation of construction --- 1935.

Q Mr. Balcomb, I asked before lunch, but I'd like to pursue just one question further. In connection with reserved rights which you seem so say, your mind is closed against, anyway, would the regular rules of appropriations apply to those reserved rights in terms of what kind of conduct it takes to cmoamount to an appropriation for beneficial use?

You mean something open, ---, something of that nature, Your Honor? I judge not. I don't wish to quarrel with Your Honor, about not liking the word reserved, I just say that it's another way of saying the initiation of a water right.

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And in this case If I am interpreting it correctly, the Congress initiates the reserved right for an Indian reservation, a forest reservation, a wild life refuge by making the withdrawal of the land and the water.

Q Yes, but they aren't using the water for anything at the moment.

A Neither is the city and county of Denver,
Your Honor. And they claim water rights that they don't expect
to put into operation until the year 200---.

Q I've never heard that they -- that took some doing, didn't it?

A They got it done.

Q As far as the Western --- were concerned.

A Well, yes, in some respects. But there's nothing in the law which prohibits the acquisition of the right currently for use in the far distant future if you can show the need.

The eventual need; as the Colorado Supreme

Court held, the Court could not question Denvers projection

about population. Nor do I think that the trial Court really

questioned the allegations and proof by the United States that

of the exentual need for water on their reservation.

Ω That would just be a matter, I suppose, to be properly governed by federal law?

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A Yes, and in reality, I think they'd have little problem with most of them, because in almost every circumstante, the water and the water right involved are totally within the federal reservation.

You would have to have their permission to do anything anybody else did, here with it, and they have complete control.

As I say, the objection in 87, relating to size of the water course, and yet in every situation, for practical purposes except Arizona v. California, where the United States has been involved, there has been almost a comparable water course involved, and created no real problem to them there.

In the instant case it seems to relate to how much trouble they would be put to to read a monthly resume and appear once every 60 days, if indeed they have to. That it's kind of an administrative rather than judicial proceeding, and not within the contemplation of the amendment.

#### I would observe that ---

Q Mr. Balcomb, could I ask you another question, please? If the United States wanted to remove, let's assume that you're right about this.

A Yes, sir.

The United States then wanted to remove
the case to the federal Court.

A There are several decisions in whichin

A

some cases they held that the right of removal was not present, in some they said the right of removal was exercised as a premature exercise, but might come back after a clear federal question arises in the state court---

Q What if it's a reserved right that you're arguing about? The United States asks to have removed the adjudication of its federal right to water.

The in re (Grainer) case in Utah, went back on remand by judge Christensen because he felt more under the threat of comity than anything else, I think, the Colorado State Court had the proceedures adjudicate it there, if the Untied States found it could not get fairness with regard to some of its rights, then it might move it --- back.

On the face of the statute it is a removable issue, isn't it?

A On the face of the statute it is.

Q Yes.

A If you study the legislative history, you might draw an opposite conclusion, but on the face of the statute it is not forbidden. I'll say that.

Q There was a removable provision inthe bill,

in one state, at least---

EL ST

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A Yes, sir, and I think in that connection the Special Assistant Attorney General testifying about it pointed out that the difficulties involved for people on the far western slope to have to come clear to Denver, Colorado.

Q Yes.

A They thought then, the justice thought that the removable provision was bad.

Q Mr. Balcomb, what's your answer to the governments submission that both the adjudication and the administration forces are qualified by the provision as to appropriative rights?

A It speaks of the United States in two categories, I believe, one is the owner of the water rights, and the second category is the acquisition of these other methods in acquiring ownership of water rights.

And when the United States is owner, they can be joined.

Q Well, what I had reference to, though, is that, as I understand the argument, reserved rights are not embraced by the consent statute. And because I thought that your collegue argued that both cause one, the adjudication rights, and cause two the administration of such rights, are qualified by the provision where it appears that the United States is the owner of and is in the process of acquiring water

the said	rights by appropriation, under state law.		
2		A	I think this does have a possible
3		Q	Do you agree with that?
4		A	I agree with the governments position?
5		Q	Yes.
6		A	I think that it covers everything, is my
7	position,	Your Honor	
8		Q .	That it covers reserved rights, too?
9		A	That's correct.
10	in an agreement of the second	Q	Whatever
11		A	name we might call it.
12		Q	You say it covers everything. You mean
13	both claus	ses one and	two cover everything, or only clause one
14	covers eve	erything?	
15		A	Both of them.
16		Q	You mean the consent statute covers both
17	of them.		
18		A	Yes.
19		A	That's what you're talking about.
20		A	Yes, sir. It would do no good to require
21	the United States to come in and adjudicate a reserved right		
22	if they th	nen try to	take out a priority which is the admin-
23	istration	system, and	nd not be able to reach tin the second
24		Q	Yes, but I thought the governments argument
25	was that	the adjudic	cation of rights does not include the adjud-

1 ication of reserved rights. 2 I know---3 This, because the clause dealing with 1 the administration of therights, the government argues, is limited to water rights by appropriation under state law. 5 Well the first one is meaninglass. I think 6 I read two circumstances: either the United States is the 7 owner and there is an adjudication in progress or the United 8 States is the owner and like in the --- situation, there is 9 an administrative process. 10 Whatever the right is---11 Whatever the right might be, irrespective-12 ---, appropriative, or anything else. What 13 does the administration mean, what's the difference between 14 adjudication and administration of rights? 15 Adjudication as we understand it in the 16 Western states is the legal court process through which you 17 go to establish your position on the ladder of rights. 18 Your priority. Q 19 Yes. 20 Administration is the physical act by the Division 21 Engineer, the State Engineer or one of his employees opening 22 and lclosing headgates, saying you can take your water now, 23

your reservoir is full, the various items involved in the

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distribution of water.

50 2 to establish the rights. 3 The rights, yes. B. 0 That's correct. 13 A 6 7 8 9 10 34 12 to say so. 13 12 15 16 17

This proceeding we have going here is

It's whether a right exists or not.

This is an adjudicative ---

That's right. It determines only that you may turn so much water on at a certain time into your headgate, if we reduce it simply to the irrigation thing.

And I might further say that if Congress had really thought well we should not adjudicate Indian rights, or we should not adjudicate Forest Service rights, it was too simple

Because it was called to their attention that over the 3 year periodthat this was involved again and again and again that by government witnesses, by letters to the committee eachtime concerned about the breadth of the waiver. They wanted it limited every time, and Congress ignored all of this and left it wide because I thinkCongress recognized that it was just as important to the citizens of those states that they have a certainty of water rights, and they could not have that certainty if the government wasn't there.

And likewise it was most important to the United States to have certainty as to its water rights. I think one of the examples of this, that I'd like to call the cCourts

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attention to is a case which isn't mentioned too much by anyone, it's also captioned in re (Grimler) adjudication vs. the United States, and it's in the Supreme Court ofUtah in 1965.

It answers in part this problem did the state court award you reserved rights and what did you do about it if they didn't.

This case is a successor to the federal court case cited by Judge Christensen when directed remand of the adjudication proceedings in Daggett County, Utah.

This is a relatively small area, also. In this proceeding after the United States got back in the state court, it had no reluctance to present for adjudication by the state court some 715 water rights. Oddly enough they were apparently the type of thing that is the spring for watering stock, matters of this nature, which, if we understand what they did in Eagle County in '87 are the subject of a reservation.

But they are there adjudicated as though they were state rights. At the very tail end of the proceedings they asked the trial judge to put some language into the decree indication all of the rights which were awarded by virtue of this decree would be subject to the general unspecified reservation of the United States for the (Ashley) National Forest.

And the trial judge declined to do so. They took the matter to the Supreme Court of Utah, the Supreme Court of Utah

likewise declined to do so, pointing out that the United 1 2 States had volunteered into the suit, in effect, by consenting 3 to be sued, they had prooved up on 715 rights and they were not going to allow them to have an unarticulated, unspecified 5 unquantified right. They sat on top of the whole adjudication and made 6 everybody elses rights uncertain. That is clearly what this case 7 does hold, the United States did not elect to bring that to 8 this Count, had they wished to change that result. 9 Mr. Balcomb, did the consent pass as it 10 was introduced, or did it go through some modifications? 99 there was some modification. There is 12 the provision added to it that it does not consent to the 13 joinder of the United States in suits between states, like 82 so often happens in this Court. 15 There was first put in it, a tabulation which the 16 government now talks about and then that was eliminated. 17 How about the first sentence, was that 18 changed, or was that passed as it was introduced? That's 19 the one with the consent given the join, 1) for adjudication 20 and 2) for administration. 21 A Punthuation only was added, I believe. 22 And that was the subject of a second report from 23 the Senate committee. 24

Now the United States has said and brought with it

a map, but this is a tremendously big job, if you say that we've got to go and adjudicate that we've got to do, and as I said in my discussion that was brought out in connection with questions in my discussion in this matter of it costing money and being a big job was thoroughly discussed with the committee, and this was overlooked.

I submit, however, that irrespective of the size of the job, it's the obligation of the federal government in a situation of this nature for the benefit of all of its citizens to articulate, because the citizens need to know.

They can't develop a state without knowing what vast growth the United States may have now, to the water which arises in the states. And irrespective of size, they owe the obligation to the citizen to come in and tell him withink his framework exactly what it is they hope to claim, and when they expect to claim it.

O Do you have in Colorado any priorities other than time of appropriation. Do you have any priorities with respect to the type of use?

A They are all adjudicated for a purpose, as well as time and quantity.

Q But assume there's a conflict. I mean, the people for industrial use, against irrigation, or as against municipal use.

A The highest and best use by the Constitution

A

is domestic, the second is agricultural, the third, of course, is manufacture and industrial, it doesn't mean that a domestic user can go and take the water, he's got to condemn and pay for it. Right. And---Once it's adjudicated, they own it until somebody condems it. That's right. I don't think the United States, Your Honor, though, is in quite that position, as Dugan would indicate. 

Q No.

A In theory, they condemn at least domestic rights for agricultural purposes, on the basis of federal law was paramount.

Q I see---

I would like to conclude, if the Court please, with the, a comparison, so to speak, of the new statute, which I view to be identical for practical purposes to the '43 Act, and the '43 Act is characterized in Mr. Clarks work on water rights, as being the same Colorado system that's been in existence since 1879 when it first started, in this fashion.

Court will remember Pacific Livestock, and in discussing what a statute of this nature does, said that that statute provided for notice, that is the Oregon statute, our statute provides for notice, it is as the proceeding ahead of it was, an in rem proceeding, still dealing with the stream, still putting on the ladder of appropriations an order of priority everybody's rights.

Great Street

A sworn statement in the Oregon case was made, and that statement was open to the public, and opposition could be made as to that statement, that's the identical proceedures we now have in our court, the statement is filed with the Water Clerk, and is referred to the Referee. You may protest it, you may have hearings, you may do all of those things.

The Board, In Oregon, made findings and referred the matter back to the Court. And in under our new statute, the Referse does this. In other words, the Referee---

Q What is this, is this an administrative proceeding? What is the Referee? Is he a judicial officer, or---

A Yes, sir. YesHe's appointed by the Code.

Q What is it, is he like a Master?

A I would say, yes, sir. It's a special proceeding, but it's nonetheless---

Q Who makes the final adjudication? The Judge?

A The Judge does.

Q I see.

Coop	A	He enters , there is a little bit of	
2	difference about th	is in Colorado, but primarily, he is sup-	
3	posed to enter semi-	-annually a Master Decree, covering all	
4	the matters of		
5	Q	Well how is the whole proceeding initiated?	
6	By something that is	s filed in the Court?	
7	A	Sommone goes in and files a claim, for	
3	lack of a better wo	rd, they ask for the determination of a	
9	water right.		
10	Q	Where does he file it?	
99	λ	With the Water Clerk, who is a clerk of	
12	the court, and the	court governs the whole division.	
13	Q	Oh, he's the clerk	
14	A	of the Court.	
15	Q	I see. So it's actually a proceeding that	
16	is initiated and pro	ogresses through the Court.	
17	A	Yes.	
18	Q	I see.	
19	A	Of course, if there is a big fight below	
20	in the Referees hands he refers it back to the Court for		
21	determination, and	whatever the Court does is to be done under	
22	onr rules of givil	proceedure.	
23	Q	When is it subject to removal of the federal	
24	court? The time the	initial claim is filed with the Water	
(2100	Clarks		

A I think as soon as United States could show that its rights are being interfered with.

Q Yes.

9 9

A And that the trial state court if it--might have to go ahead and handle it. They make the point,
you understand, Your Honor, that the statute allows for protest
but not for application. That is, the United States has no
change to urge its rights.

And this is strictly not true. The United States, anytime it wants to, under this proceeding, files its rights,

Q In that proceeding?

A In that year. With the same Clerk, and go before the same Referee and gets the same judged under the descee.

And he will then insert, or direct the insertion of the state engineer of their rights, governed under the ladder of priority.

And they have the right of appeal. And everyone does to the State Supreme Court. In other words, we have a judicial system, and as I say, we have taken this onus burden of digging out the evidence off the court and giving it to the Referee to save the court time. Courts are far too busy to spend days and months on adjudication proceedures.

I would like to say, in final conclusion, thatunless

there are other statements, that in a true sense of the word, as using Pacific Livestock, as used the word general adjudication, as used in Dugan, and Miller v. Jennings and the like, there never really has been a true adjudication of water rights in Colorodo or any of the other Western states when the United States is not a party.

And they have picked the word general, out of the opinions of this Court, and out of the opinions of other courts, and say that they don't have a general proceedure there because they do not have everyone before them.

And the reason, if it please the Court, that everyone is not before them, is because the United States will not join. They're the one party these adjudication procedures in Colorado and the United States, that keeps it from being a general adjudication.

And it keeps the certainty of water rights out of the law entirely, because, as they indicate, we have large areas which are shown on the map, and we're entitled to use the water certain ways, and we want to keep it a secret until such time as we decide to put it to work, and in the meantime no one else can do anything with the water at all with any certainty.

Thank you, Your Honor.

Q Thank you, Mr. Baccomb. Mr. Kiechel, you have 7 minutes left.

Ç.		REBUTTAL .	ARGUMENT OF WALTER KIECHEL, JR., ESQ.
2			ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
3			
a.			MR. KIECHEL: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
5		Q	What about this removal thing? Do you
6	agree that	: it might	be
7		A	There
8		Ω	removed as quickly as Mr. Balcomb says ?
9		A	I wish I could be as confident is saying
10	elementario contrato de la contrato del contrato de la contrato del contrato de la contrato del la contrato de la contrato del la contrato de	Q	Have you ever tried it?
d da	enter martin and	A	Yes, we have, Your Honor, it was tried
12	in the in	re Green	River case, and there, in a lengthy opinion,
13	Judge Chri	stensen,	in that court held it not to be removable.
14		There was	, in the legislative history, as has been
15	pointed ou	t, a spec	ific right of removal, which was stricken.
16		Q	What were the rights claimed by the United
17	States in	that litie	gation?
18		λ	Those were rights, including reserved
19	rights		
20		Q	Including reserved rights.
21		A	on federal forests, national forests.
22		And there	has been, I can't, there have been certain
23	cases remo	ved,	under this statute, but most of those have
24	been where	the gover	rnment officers have been joined. Of course
25	under the	Federal Re	emoval Statute, there is a fair right to

remove one in which a government officer is a party defendant.

With respect to the proceedure in Colorado, the monthly proceedure under the 1969 Act, Mr. Balcomb makes a point that it is subject to judicial review, and I would point out, however, that this requirement which is continuted, or this prohibition, which is continued in Colorado law, where by no prior right, can be awarded in a supplemental, ongoing adjudication applies to the judge, as well as it does to the Referee.

And it's not just the burdensome nature of that monthly proceedute that is of concern with respect to the legislative intent on 666, it is relevant to that.

But it is the fact that it is more administrative than judicial. Now I think its quite clear that Congress in enacting the statute, saying that the United States could be joined had that in mind, a judicial proceeding.

And so I would say, with respect to that question about the conduct of the United States as Plaintiff, that what the United States does as Plaintiff is not despositive of the issue before the Court, that is, what kind of a proceeding Congress consented to the joinder of the united States as party defendant.

I will say, however, that in addition to that, that
the United States found out the hard way about a general
adjudication. That it did; in the Fallbrook litigation I referred

to earlier on the Santa Marguerita River, undertake to bring the kind of an action Mr. Justice White embodied in a question earlier.

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and it was there determined, this is not a 666 case, this is a case brought by the United States as a Plaintiff, but the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit told us very loudly and clearly, that they way in which adjudication could be done was to join all water users on that water system and have a contest a determination among all users.

Are you suggesting that we have to decide in this case whether the Colorado proceedute is a judicial or an administrative proceedure?

A I'm saying---

Q In order to decide the --- consent statute

A I'm saying, Mr. Justice Brennan, that Congress intended to consent to the joinder of the United States only in judicial proceedings.

Q Well, now, accepting that premise, are you suggesting that we have to decide whether this Colorado proceedure, in this case was or was not a judicial proceedure?

A Yes, I think that you can decide by reference to the Colorado Act, it is an administrative proceedure.

Q But you're suggesting that we have to

decide whether it is or it isn't. A judicial proceeding.

A Yes, in---

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Q If we accept your oremise that Congress meant the consent statute to apply only in judicial proceedings.

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q By what means would you think that you might prevail in one case, and not in the other? You might prevail in the case you're now arguing, and lose the other one.

A No, I think there are good and sufficient reasons, different reasons for prevailing in both cases, if Your Honor please, the first case as was discussed involved the matter of the lriver system, that is not involved in the second case---

Q I realize that, but as far as the administrative part of your argument is concerned, we regard this case as different from the other case.

Well, I think that the common demominfor with respect to Colorado law, that is, that the Colorado
Water Court, whether it be Water Division 5, or Water District #37, cannot accord the United States its true priority,
its rightful priority for its water rights, is a good and
sufficient basis for concluding that Congress could not
have intended to subject the United States to either such

Edit property	proceedur	e.	
2		Ω	So inoother words, putting my brother
3	Harlans q	uestion a	little different way, if you prevailin the
£.	first cas	e on the b	asic arguments, then you also prevail in
5	the secon	d case, an	d we need not reach any question of whether
6	it's judi	cial or a	dministrative. Right?
7		A	Yes, Your Honor.
8		Q	May I ask you to state exactly what the
9	governmen	t has at s	take if it looses this case?
10		A	If the government looses
11		Q	If the government looses
12		A	This case
13		Q	What does it lose?
14		0	It looses the, under our view, the Colorado
15	Supreme C	ourt opini	on, possibly its right to present, submit,
16	and proov	e up on re	served rights of the United States.
17		Q	You mean they could cut off your rights?
18		A	That's quite strongly suggested by the
19	Colorado	Supreme Co	urt.
20		0	That depends on what we hold as an opinion.
21	A Comment of the Comm	A	Yes, Your Honor.
22		Q	Mr. Balcomb didn't seem to think you would
23	lose that	right. He	and you do not quite agree on the reading
24	of the Co.	lorado Sup	reme Court opinion of that
25		A	I'm quite concerned, if it please Mr. Chief

I	Justice that the Supreme Court of Colorado has referred to the			
2	reserved rights of the United States as mysterious and causing			
3	chaos and in other words which indicates certainly hostility			
4	toward those rights.			
5	Q Well, they are rather mysterious.			
6	A No, Your Honor, they are not.			
7	Q Well they were until you sat down and quan-			
8	tified them.			
9	A Well, they were quantified in λrizona v.			
10	California, and			
const disease	Q Well, I know, but could you find up unfil			
12	this time any quantification of your rights, what you say			
13	your reserved rights are in the Eagle River system?			
14	A Well, sir, until there is a determination			
15	or science permits a determination of how oil shale can be			
16	recovered or how oil can be recovered b=ffrom shale in con-			
17	mercial quantities it's not known how much water will be			
78	required for that reserve.			
19	Q Maybe mysterious isn't the word, but			
20	A Undetermined.			
21	That's a very good example but it is a very,			
22	an unknown.			
23	A Undetermined in certain instances.			
24	Q That's right.			
25	Q If they had used terms like "uncertain" and			

"undetermined" in court, you wouldn't be quite as disturbed as by the invidious implications that you get out of mysterious, would you? A A I agree. Very well, thank you, Mr. Kiechel, thank you Mr. Balcomb, the case is submitted.