# Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1970

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APR 15 1971

Docket No. 727

In the Matter of:

WILLIAM P. SAILER, et al.,

Appellants

VS.

ELSIE MARY JANE LEGER AND BERYL JERVIS,

Appelless

SUPREME COURTINUS MARSHAL'S OFFICE

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Place Washington, D. C.

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#### NHAM

#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

#### OCTOBER TERM 1970

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WILLIAM P. SAILER, ET AL.,

Appellants

No. 727 VS

ELSIE MARY JANE LEGER AND BERYL JERVIS,

Appellees

The above-entitled matter came on for argument at 1:00 o'clock p.m. on Monday, March 22, 1971.

#### BEFORE:

WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice

#### APPEARANCES:

JOSEPH P. WORK Assistant Attorney General State of Pennsylvania Harrisburg, Pennsylvania On behalf of Appellants

JONATHAN M. STEIN, ESQ. 313 South Juniper Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107 (pro hac vice) On behalf of Appellees

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## PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will hear arguments next in Number 727: Sailer against Leger and Jervis.

Mr. Work.

ORAL ARGUMENT BY JOSEPH P. WORK, ESQ.

#### ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

MR. WORK: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court:

I move for leave to permit Mr. Jonathan Mr. Stein a member of the Pennsylvania Bar to argue pro hac vice on behalf of the Appellees in this case.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Your motion is granted.
We will be glad to hear from Mr. Stein.

MR. WORK: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honors, this case comes before you on direct appeal from a decision of a three-judge statutory court convened in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the decision of which court was rendered on July 13, 1970; and which decision held Section 432(2) of the Pennsylvania Welfare Code unconstitutional.

And that in denying general assistance to aliens who are residents of the Commonwealth it violated the precepts of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.

The facts of the case, Your Honors, is relatively simple. The Appellee, Elsie Mary Jane Leger immigrated to

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this country from Scotland on May 18, 1965 and undertook employment in which she remained for a period of four years. She applied for general assistance, together with her common-law husband shortly prior to December 9, 1969 and she was denied assistance at that time solely on the grounds that she is an alien.

She commenced her action in the Federal District Court on December 9, 1969. The Court subsequently permitted amendment of the action to add Mrs. Jervis as a party plaintiff and to permit the action to continue as a class action.

Mrs. Beryl Jervis, who is the other party plaintiff to this action, immigrated to the United States from

Panama on March 1, 1968 and after working for two years, ceased her employment because of illness and applied for assistance.

She, too, was denied assistance solely on the basis of our statute which prohibits the dispensing of assistance to aliens.

I perhaps said that wrong; it doesn't prohibit it; it doesn't provide for it.

Presently there are two assistance programs in Pennsylvania. One, of course, is the categorical assistance, which provides Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Aged, Aid to the Totally and Permanently Disabled and Aid to Families with Dependent Children. These are all Federally-supported categories of assistance in which we receive slightly over one-half of the funds from the Federal Government.

Neither of the named parties here are qualified for any of the Federal assistance categories. The other assistance program which we have in Pennsylvania is our so-called General Assistance Program, which is wholly statefinanced and which provides aid to all other persons who are citizens of the United States for whom no aid is provided under the categorical assistance program.

I am going to be completely frank with this

Court, as I was with the lower court and state that there is

no question but what this statute draws a distinction between

citizens and aliens. And if the special public interest

doctrine had been overruled, sub silencio, as the lower court

found that it was, then I am going to have a very difficult

task indeed in justifying the distinction.

However, if the Court will bear with me for a few short moments, I should like to discuss just briefly the two cases by which the lower court found that this Court had overruled the special public interest doctrine.

The first of these, of course is the Truax case, which involved the employment or failure to employ a person as a clerk in the State of Arizona because of the fact that the Arizona statute provided that employment had to be 80 percent citizens.

Justice Hughes in that case, however, specifically noted that the special public interest doctrine was an

"This discrimination defined by the act does not pertain to
the regulation or distribution of the public domain or of
common property and resources of the people of the state, the
enjoyment of which may be limited to citizens, as against both
aliens and citizens of other states."

We will, of course, admit immediately, Your

Honors, that we realize that this doctrine has been somewhat

changed by your decision in the Shapiro case, with respect at

least to citizens of other states.

We submit, however, that it retains full vitality insofar as application to aliens is concerned. Thirty-two years later in the Takahashi case this Court also said, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, that the special public interest doctrine was still in existence; although this Court specifically denied the claim that the preservation of fish within its three-mile border was a special public interest for the State of California.

One thing I think, however, Your Honors, is very important to note in the Takahashi case, and that is, if I understand the case correctly the statute there also discriminated among aliens, in that those who would have been denied the right to apply for the fishing permit would have been those who would not have been eligible for citizenship in the United States and therefore it would have applied only to orientals.

1 While the Court didnot make a great deal of this fact, I do think that there was a very important distinction 2 between that case and the case that we are talking about here. 3 Finally --13 Well, in what respect do you think it makes 5 a difference? 6 I think, Your Honor, that we have agreed 7 thatthere is no doubt that the 14th Amendment applies to 8 aliens, with, of course, the so-called "judicially-created" 9 exceptions. I think it does apply and equal protection. It 10 would therefore follow that you cannot discriminate among 11 aliens because the judicially-created exceptions are between 12 aliens and citizens. 13 So you say that you think the discrimina-10 tion isn't on race or national origin, but on citizenship? 15 Correct, Your Honor. In our particular 16 case here it applies to aliens, regardless of --17 Oh, you think it might make a difference 18 in the test that would be required to a discrimination? 19 I think it certainly should, Your Honor, 20 because if the 14th Amendment applies to all it would cer-21 tainly apply to say that you cannot discriminate and aliens. 22 I mean you would have to have some com-23 pelling state interest? 24 A I really think that it would go beyond 25

that, Your Honor. I don't think a compelling state interest is justified, particularly not in the language of this Court in Dandridge versus Williams. I rather doubt that there could be a compelling state interest to justify discrimination among aliens, as between one class of aliens and another class.

Q In other words, Pennsylvania couldn't give welfare to everybody except Mexicans?

A Correct, Your Honor.

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Finally, this Court has intimated, I submit, in those cases, such as Tashahashi and Truax, that the cases involved the right to earn a livelihood. And the courts have gone one step further and said that if the right to enter and abide as granted to aliens under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, it would be meaningless if they didn't have the right to employment.

And I for one, Your Honors, am just old fashioned enough to believe that there is still a distinction in our law between the right to earn a livelihood and the right to receive public largesse.

Q Could I be old fashioned enough to suggest that both of them involve the right to eat?

A I would accept Your Honor's statement completely and I think, if I may at this time, just by departing
a little bit, refer to a question which Your Honor asked in the
previous case. I think in that respect, Your Honor, we get to

the question of responsibility. And whose responsibility it is, and of course I'm getting a little ahead in my argument, but if the Federal Government has the complete right to regulate aliens then of course I might answer Your Honor that the responsibility for these persons, if it lies anywhere, lies with the Federal Government, and not with the states.

- Q Here is somebody who has been living in your state for 14 years and paid taxes and contributed just as much to the state as you did, but he can't make it.
- Q Does this record show whether these parties or either of them ever paid any taxes or --
- A Yes, Your Honor. I think that the record does disclose that both of them paid at least sales tax and income taxes within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
- Q And the person was employed for four years; wasn't it?
  - A Yes, Your Honor; four years.
  - Q So she paid all of the taxes.
  - A Yes, Your Honor.
- Q Well, since you reminded me of the other question I asked, what's the interest of the State of Pennsylvania, other than money?
- A The interest of the State of Pennsylvania, to be completely frank, Your Honor, is the conservation of assets for its citizens.

Q That's money; that's money.

- A It is money; yes. It is not necessarily the state -- due to the fact that we can perhaps conserve assets for our citizens we were recently able to go to 100 percent of the Federal level. Had we granted it to aliens -- I'm not saying we couldn't have-- there is a possibility we perhaps couldn't have gone to that 100 percent.
  - Q But anyhow it's money?
  - A It is money; yes, Your Honor.
  - Q And that's all.
  - A That is correct, Your Honor.
  - Q Are you in here with just general assistance?
- A Yes, Your Honor. That's completely statefinanced general assistance program.
- Q The Federal Government contributes nothing to this program?
  - A Absolutely nothing.
- We do, by the way, in the course of our information we do in our Federal categories, we do grant assistance to aliens under --
  - Q Why do you do that?
- A Well, honestly, Your Honor, it was a mistake. The Department of Welfare --
- Q Which was a mistake: to cut them out or to let them have it?

A The mistake was occasioned by the fact that when the Federal statute first came out our Department felt that they were required by that statute to grant assistance under the Federal categories. That appears in the transcript of the hearing before the lower court.

Going to the second phase of Appellees' argument, which, of course, was the contention that — important in the lower court's decision, but it was alluded to there and of course was raised again before this Court on appeal, and that is the alien's right to travel for which position the Appellee placed great reliance on this Court's decision in Shapiro versus Thompson.

Honors, is the fact that this Court found the right of citizens to travel derived from several provisions of the constitution, and from the very nature of the \_\_\_\_\_\_himself. The Court did not, however, according to my understanding of that case, say the right was derived solely from the 14th Amendment, which of course, had been conceded applies equally to aliens, except for the judicially created exception which we are advancing to this Court at this point with respect to the public interest doctrine.

We would further point out, Your Honors, that the right to enter and abide, we feel, by virtue of the decisions of this Court, are not on the same footing as the citizen's

right to travel.

In the Truax case, for example, this Court noted that the alien's right to enter and abide stemmed from Federal law and not from the 14th Amendment. And such right might, therefore, be retracted by a Federal statute.

It would seem to follow, therefore, that an infringement upon this right which we would deny was brought about by the statute here in question, might be invalid under the Federal statute; it might be invalid by virtue of the supremacy clause, but it certainly would not be invalid by virtue of the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

We come, therefore, to the final issue raised by the brief, and that is whether this statute from Pennsylvania is an obstruction of Federal law dealing with immigration and naturalization; or, an intent on the part of the state to regulate aliens.

We concede that in the decision of this Court in

Hines versus Davidowitz, the state can only do this within very

narrow limits. Any regulations, Your Honors, under the

decision of this Court in the Hines case, must be construed

very, very strictly and within the very narrow limits.

However, as Judge Wood appropriately noted in his dissent in the lower court: if Pennsylvania had no general assistance program at all Federal laws dealing with aliens would not be obstructed. It is therefore difficult to see

how Federal laws are any more obstructed because the state decides to give welfare payments to its citizens.

Furthermore, insofar as attempting to regulate aliens is concerned, how can a statute which grants assistance to citizens be said to regulate aliens any more than a statute which would grant assistance to persons over 65 can be said to be regulating persons under 65?

And to take it one step further: let us assume that the statute grants assistance to all persons over 65, alien or citizen. Can an alien then come in and challenge the statute as being discriminatory in violation of the 14th Amendment and in violation of the supremacy clause because it attempts to regulate him?

We respectfully submit that to state that proposition indicates its absurdity.

Appellees in their brief, assert that the state denial of general assistance to aliens may have some effect on the decision of an alien to settle in Pennsylvania, or it may cause them to remove elsewhere. Of course, the same thing might be said of Pennsylvania's six percent sales tax or its liquor tax, which is the second highest in the nation, or its cigarette tax, which is also somewhere near the highest.

No one, we submit, however, Your Honors, would seriously contend that these statutes are invalid as an attempt to regulate aliens because they might cause them to remove

elsewhere.

Furthermore, we would submit --

Q Well you might have a little different problem if the cigarette tax was imposed only if the purchaser of the cigarettes were an alien that were not imposed on a citizen of Pennsylvania. That's the analogy with this case; isn't it?

stand the Appellees' argument the test that they are trying to assert to ask this Court to determine whether or not we are violating the supremacy clause in regulating aliens is whether or not this statute does have some effect on their decision to locate elsewhere, or not to locate within the State of Pennsylvania. And any of these things could certainly have an effect on that decision.

We would also submit, Your Honors, that because of the Federal statute and the Federal scheme of intent, which isindicated by that statute and the requirement that aliens entering in this country be able to demonstrate their ability to earn a livelihood, we sincerely doubt that this factor was given much, if any consideration at the time of entry. That is the fact of whether or not Pennsylvania grants assistance to aliens or not.

And finally, Your Honors, I would point out, and I think it has come up in the Arizona argument: the Federal

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assistance to aliens. In fact, even in the Federal assistance categories the statute leaves it open to the states and would not cause the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to hold a state plan invalid where it does discriminate against aliens.

We would further submit in this regard that the statutory intent and scheme as set forth in the Federal statutes on immigration and naturalization, particularly in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) -- 1182(a) (7), 1182(8), 1182(15), 1183 and 1251, would lead one to presume that the Congressional intent was to relieve both the states and the Federal Government of the burden of aliens who might become public charges.

We submit, therefore, that it is difficult to see how the State's decision could grant an affirmative benefit to citizens of the United States residing in Pennsylvania conflicts with this scheme of Federal regulation of aliens.

We had an allegation which I think, Your Honors, that I have to specifically respond to in the brief, and that was that this statute, according to the Appellees' position, was enacted as a result of war hysteria.

I wanted to point out to the Court that in the lower court transcript which the Court has before it, there is only one minute quantity of proof and this was submitted by one man's opinion in writing on the scheme of assistance in

Pennsylvania, which said that this was enacted as a result of war hysteria. There is absolutely no legislative history to support that assertion. There is absolutely no other credible evidence to support the charge, except the opinion of the one author.

We submit, Your Honors, it would be just as logical and more in keeping with the presumption that the legislature has a proper motive in enacting legislation to assume that after the enactment of the Federal Social Security law of 1935 and after four years of trial and error basis, the states could see a vast area of persons who were not encompassed within the Federal statutory scheme and they enacted a general assistance statute to take care of these particular persons.

We would not say that they did not at that time have the special public interest doctrine much in mind when they did not provide for aliens under that same scheme.

In summary, therefore, Your Honors, we would submit, and we will admit that these laws which create a distinction between aliens and citizens which have evolved in the formulation of the special public interest rules, are based upon the assumption that aliens hold allegiance to foreign nations.

We respectfully submit, however, that if the Court is ready to say that this distinction violates the

precept of the 14th Amendment we would also submit that this

Court may in the very near future be ready to say that denial

of the right to vote and the denial of the right to hold

public office are also rights which may not be denied to

aliens for the same reasons.

- Q Would you think -- did Takahashi say --
- A Did they say that, Your Honor?
- Q Yes.

A In the Takahashi case the Court specifically noted that there was such a doctrine as the special public interest doctrine. They denied --

Q But do you think the provision that only citizens and not aliens may be employed on public projects.

Do you think that kind of a rule could survive Takahashi?

A No, Your Honor, for the reason that I expressed --

Q Well, neither Crane nor Heim survived Takahashi?

A Right, Your Honor. There is the right to earn a livelihood; I think the Court has specifically said and they spell out --

Q Do you think Crane has already been overruled?

A To the extent that a state may attempt to deny a person's right to earn a livelihood; yes. I still

No; I don't think you could, because that, again, would be attempting to regulate the right to earn a living.

Q You couldn't put any additional tax on him for anything; could you?

A I believe you are right, Your Honor; yes.

Q Why not?

A Again, I think that the special public interest doctrine, if it has vitality today, as I submit that it still does, it has been at least watered down, to use the term, by this Court to the extent that if it involves the right to earn a livelihood, this Court has said that is inconsistent with the Federal rights granted to enter and abide.

Q So that you can't discriminate against him in putting money into the treasury of the state?

A That is correct, Your Honor.

Q But you can discriminate against him on taking the money out?

A It would presumably be so, Your Honor, for the same reasons, if I may submit, that he is denied the right to vote and that he is denied the right to hold public office.

The taxes which the alien pays go to hold public elections; they go to print the ballots upon which the elections are held; they go to pay the officeholders who are elected to those offices --

Q Except I'm not there yet.

I beg Your Honor -- I'm sorry, Your Honor. 9 I don't have the right to vote before me. 2 I have the right for the man to share in the tax load that he 3 contributed to equally with everyone else. That's all I see 3 in this case. Is there something else here? 53 Not in this case, Your Honor. I think 6 there is, however, the logical extension of this case. 7 Oh, I think we could try this case without 8 deciding that. 9 A I presume you could, Your Honor. 10 I have nothing further, Mr. Chief Justice. 11 Thank you. 12 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you Mr. Work. 13 Mr. Stein. 14 ORAL ARGUMENT BY JONATHAN M. STEIN, ESQ. 15 ON BEHALF OF APPELLEES 16 MR. STEIN: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please 17 the Court: 18 We have before us today a case of alien discrim-19 ination which is rooted in the prejudice and ill will of an 20 earlier year in Pennsylvania. The fact that this was passed 21 at a time of war hysteria and anti-alien feelings in Pennsyl-22 vania, it was made clear in a memorandum study commissioned by 23 the state, by the welfare department, which is part of the 24 record.

was passed within five days of the State Alien Registration

Act, which this Court struck down in Hines v. Davidowitz.

And, in a sense the motivations behind a citizenship requirement are not unlike the motivations behind a residency requirement as in Shapiro v. Thompson. Both basically rest in a basic distrust and dislike, perhaps a fear of the foreigner; of the out-of-state person.

Q Do you thank the limitations the state places on voters and holding a public office is rooted in some of the same kinds of hostility?

A It may be, Your Honor, but I think the voting area and this political public office area is very much distinguishable from this area before the Court today. While the government has much wider latitude in acting to protect the political processes, the governmental processes and they don't have that latitude in the area which is before us today, of social or economic benefits which are based upon a classification on aliens. That is the that they are

That's the teaching of Takahashi, which says that a state is limited, is very much limited in making a classification based on alienage.

I might point out in response to the Commonwealth's argument that Takahashi wasn't an alienage case. That the provision of the Federal -- of the state law based upon a

Federal citizenship requirement does not mention any racial exclusion and footnotes both in Takahashi and Oyama point to Japanese and other groups which were affected by that provision. Moreover, this Court had an opportunity in Takahashi to view this as a racial case, as a Japanese case; in fact, the option was made clear by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justices Rutledge and Murphy, who perhaps would have preferred to view it as an anti-Japanese case, but that's not the way the majority of the Court viewed the case.

The majority of the Court viewed the case and equated alienage with color as both being impermissible bases for classification both under the 14th Amendment and both under the Civil Rights Act.

I might add that --

Q Mr. Stein, is your fundamental position here on the Equal Protection Clause?

A Yes, it is.

Q If it is, why isn't it as much on a fortiorari, why isn't the Pennsylvania law in conflict with Section 1981?

A Well, we add, Your Honor, that it is in conflict both with the Equal Protection argument and those statutes that have put that clause, in effect, that Section 1981 like the like the inception of 2000(d) in 42 USC, which promulgate with that principle of equality between citizens

and aliens.

We have -- the named plaintiffs in this case are aliens; are permanent resident aliens of Pennsylvania who have had a history of productive and sustained work before becoming ill and requiring public assistance. The classification established is one between two indistinguishable classes: needy residents of Pennsylvania on the one hand who are citizens; needy residents of the state who are not U. S. citizens and we maintain that on either of the two equal protection tests this classification must fall, either on the basis that there is simply no rational relationship to a constitutionally permissible legislative purpose or on such an equally applicable test that the state must meet a heavy burden of justification in validating justifying this discrimination.

The latter test, we suggest, is applicable because we are dealing with a suspect criteria. Suspect because history has shown that when this criterion is used to base a classification it's often been master of simply irrational prejudice against that particular group.

I might add: in addition we are dealing with a group which is an insular minority, disenfranchised and which it's politically defenseless and can't rely upon the political processes for redress of grievances. This is an additional reason why we suggest that a special scrutiny test is applicable.

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can protect their interests?

Well, we suggest, Your Honor, that that realm of political activity and that realm of holding public office and voting, does involve the government's attempts to protect the integrity of its processes. Perhaps --

Q Isn't that a good argument for giving all

Protect it from what?

Well, you know, perhaps a concern about loyalty to another country. It may well be that that may not be that rational a basis. This Court in Oyama, in the concurring opinion in Oyama Mr. Justices Murphy and Rutledge suggested that, assuming a priori the disloyalty of aliens cannot be done. But we are just suggesting now that because this is an area of political concern involving the integrity of the political processes that the government had much wider latitude to legislate to regulate in this particular area.

But as soon as you use a term like "protec-0 ting the integrity of the process," haven't you established an invidious category for the people against whom that wall is erected?

Not necessarily. There are certain exigencies as certain wartime concerns where national securities may be not unrelated to voting and holding public office --

> These aren't wartime, these measures that --0

A That's right.

Q -- that have reference to voting and holding office are not war measures. Most states have had these since time immemorial; haven't they?

A Yes, but the -- but voting can involve questions of national security, of political questions which the government, in our view, has much greater latitude in regulating them than they do in the fishing license, welfare benefits scheme.

What is really, I think at issue here in terms of what the basis of the Pennsylvania is is really the assumption that these aliens are less deserving than citizens. And it has been judicially recognized, both by the court below; both by the Furdy Fitzpatrick California Supreme Court opinion and in the concurring opinion in Cyama, that aliens have contributed their energies and their tax dollars to this country. They have often been long domiciled in this country with a history of productive contributing to the state and to the nation. They have established families and reared children. They have entered into the social and religious fabric of this nation and of course they have obligations to serve in the armed forces.

Q Can't you make exactly the same argument with respect to voting? Exactly the same argument?

A I think one could and that's why the -- and

that's why I would only suggest that the two are distinguishable, but it may well be that certain voting rights, as my colleague from Arizona and Mr. Ching suggested, that voting privileges may be those privileges which are and should be extended to aliens. I'm not closing my mind to that --

Q Well, that's what I suspect, and I assume if this case is affirmed you will be back here next year with a voting case and I'd like to get your definitive answer to that, particularly if the office for which the voting case comes up is for local sheriff or city council.

A My answer there is that since there is wide latitude for state governments to regulate in the area of political concerns that right now aliens do not have that right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause.

Q Right now they don't have the right that you are arguing for as yet; do they?

A Well, Your Honor, in fact they do in terms of how the Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted in its application to aliens. This case in one sense presents a stronger factual pattern than does the Shapiro v. Thompson residency case; in terms of whether there is a rational basis for this classification.

In the residency case you had newcomers to the state; people living in the state less than one year. In our case you have people who have been in the state for many years,

who have clearly made contributions to the state and to the nation.

Q Yes, but at the same time haven't they chosen not to become naturalized?

A No, Your Honor; in many cases, as the record shows, many resident aliens cannot become naturalized simply because they can't pass the literacy test.

Q Well, then they have chosen not to become naturalized by becoming literate.

A Well, if that is a choice of volition, a question of volition I would say that for people, at least literacy is not always for everyone a voluntary act. I mean there are people who haven't been literate and can't speak English or they may be quite literate in Russian or Spanish, due to no fault of their own. And so that aspect —

Q Well, take the other case where let's assume could have become a citizen, was quite literate and just chose not to. What would you suggest then?

A I think that's really an irrelevant concern because the Equal Protection Clause does apply to aliens, irrespective to their desire to become naturalized, irrespective of their literacy qualifications.

The Pennsylvania, in a sense, is saying that they are trying to save money for their own people. Well, but through this citizenship bar they are, in fact, denying

And for that reason we suggest that there is no rational basis to this classification.

The conservation of funds argument we maintain also comes down to the post hac rationalization for what has amouted to a quite casual and pointless discrimination. The Court below questioned the fiscal concernwhen they pointed out that about 65 or 70 people each year are denied general assistance in Pennsylvania, in a state where there are over 700,000 people on assistance.

In addition, Pennsylvania, although saying that they are saving money for U. S. citizens and denying it to aliens, is giving money to aliens in the Federal categories.

Q But on your arguments don't we have to resolve the constitutional issues precisely as though 600,000 of the 700,000 were aliens? Does it make any difference how many or how few aliens are involved?

A No, It doesn't, Your Honor. It only makes a difference as to the State's argument in suggesting a rational basis in a fiscal concern. The Court below said where is the fiscal concern really, when merely 65 or 70 people are at issue?

- Q How is that relevant?
- A Well, I mean to say --
- Q It's unconstitutional.
- A Well, it is not relevant in the abstract to

basis for justification resides in the conserving of state funds one has to scrutinize that solution and see it for what it is, which is, we suggest, a fiction in this case, because there is really no fiscal concern here. This was an argument which is a post hac rationalization for a discrimination made 30-odd years ago, when prejudice and ill will against aliens was really the motivation for this statute.

Q But if you have in the State of Pennsylvania, setting aside, let us say arbitrarily \$600 million for this program and 600 of the 700,000 total eligible people were aliens would that not work a hardship to the reduction of the amount paid to the citizens if we accept your argument?

A Your Honor, the clear holding of this Court in Shapiro v. Thompson established that the saving of welfare costs, if that's what the state is concerned with --

Q Well, I'm not talking about the saving; I was talking about the sharing, the division of it.

A Well, I can't -- well, I don't think that the number is relevant to the constitutional question of whether the state can base a classification upon alienage, whether there are 60, whether there are 600 --

Ω Shapiro didn't have anything to dowith aliens, did it?

A Shapiro didn't have anything to do with

aliens did it?

A No, Your Honor; there was a fundamental freedom there of interstate travel which established the basis for the compelling state interest test. We're suggesting in this case that the inherently suspect criterion of alienage would justify application of that test, but even if one doesn't apply that test, even the traditional test of a rational relationship to a constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose, this law fails.

In fact, Shapiro itself suggested that the residency requirement would seem to fail even on the test of the rational relationship test.

Q If the alien receiving this benefit, spent six months of the year in some other country, his native country or any other country, do you -- what would you think would happen to his rights, the right that you argue for to receive that benefit?

A I would not think he would have a right to receive welfare in Panama or Great Britain as the two named plaintiffs here did. Residents in the state, without being a durational residency requirement, would be a valid requirement because that cuts equally for U. S. citizens or for aliens and so that you know, the fact that a state can — we maintain a state could and could validly set residence in the state as a bona fide constitutional requirement for receiving assistance.

Q They could only receive the assistance for the days and months that they spent within the state; is that your limitation?

A Well, if these people are in the state they would be eligible like other U. S. citizens in Pennsylvania to receive assistance, they bouldn't go someplace else and ask for benefits when they are not residing in Pennsylvania.

support in Dandridge v. Williams, a recent decision of this

Court. And that case is clearly distinguishable in this case;

that case did not deal with inherently suspect criteria such

as aliens. In fact the argument used of saving the welfare

costs really cuts quite far so that we can justify a variety

of discriminations, invidious discriminations which are clearly

not permissible by the 14th Amendment.

I wish to further suggest that the -- I wish to point out that the distinghishing facts drawn on Takahashi, that earning a livelihood really is not a distinguishing factor in this case. Both Takahashi and both this case deal with access to the necessities of life.

In fact, there is a stronger argument in our case for that point because at least in Takahashi there was a bar to one aspect of employment. And conceivably those fishermen could have had access to some other occupation.

Q Takahashi didn't support the -- did it?

22 23

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Well, Crane, I think is quite -- on its own grounds. I think the underlying doctrine, the special public interest doctrine is something which Takahashi, at least very seriously questions, if not overrules. The special public interest doctrine itself which the state does rely upon really is not applicable to this case because there is no special public interest in tax dollars. Where you have aliens themselves contributing to the tax dollars, to that resource and a whole rationale of early cases of somehow a property interest among the members of the state just doesn't hold when those members of the state who are aliens contributed to that resource, of resources.

Well, what do you think about a law of the United States which said that no alien may become a citizen who, at the time when he applies for citizenship, is a public charge?

Well, that is a different case precisely, because the Federal Government has plenary powers in that instance of regulating, express powers of the constitution of regulating immigration and naturalization.

Well, what if the Congress also went on and said: "No welfare benefits shall be paid to anyone, to any alien until after he becomes a citizen, at which time he is no longer an alien?"

> A The constitution would grant that power to

Congress if Congress was employing their immigration and naturalization powers; if they did this as part of an immigration and naturalization scheme so that they could justify the --

Q But you mean powers under the Equal Protection Clause?

A Through the Fifth Amendment the Equal

Protection -- through the Due Process Clause --

Q Through the Due Process Clause -- isn't that the Federal counterpart --

A It is, and there obviously would be a balancing between the Equal Protection principles through the Due Process Clause and these plenary powers.

I would suggest that the Congress would probably have thatppower in terms of that balance between those --

Q Well, why can't it then say -- why can't it
by the same token affirmatively permit a state to bar aliens
from welfare benefits?

Thompson did state that Congress could not authorize states to deny Equal Protection to a class discriminated against and of course we do have in this instance, express immigration powers given to Congress. What might be reasonable and constitutional for Congress to do may not be constitutionally reasonable for the state to do.

The -- I might go into this but continuing my argument that the same scrutiny which the Equal Protection Clause does require of this legislation is also required because this is an area that has been preempted by the Federal Government, and as Hines states, must be in that it confines the narrowest limits to state regulation.

B

There is clear conflict with Federal policy in law. There is a whole scheme, a very complex scheme of Federal regulation in this area which does exclude paupers from the country and does provide for deportation in a very limited case where the person becomes a public charge within five years from reasons which predated entry.

But, there is also a humane aspect to that provision of the law that once you are legally admitted into a country you must -- and you have a right to enter and abide in a state you have a right to live under all equal privileges of citizens under nondiscriminatory laws.

The Pennsylvania doctrine in this case, irrespective of whether the person has been here five years, irrespective of what the cause of indigency was; in addition, the effects of their act, as was stipulated below, the effect of Pennsylvania's act is to discourage continued residence on Pennsylvania and force needy resident aliens out of Pennsylvania into other states that would be hospitable to them, to meet their needs.

Q I suppose that by the same token residents of Scotland or Panama or elsewhere would be discouraged from coming to Pennsylvania in the first instance compared with other states which do not draw this line.

A It well might be, although the record doesn't suggest that fact. And the record --

Q Well, isn't it just as much true? It's an economic impulse.

Mell, there may well be some aliens who might think that, although they would probably be people who would be excluded because the Federal law really almost ensures — and this is where the state interest is really ensured by Federal law — that those admitted into the country will be productive citizens.

The named plaintiffs in this case had Secretary of Labor approval for the jobs they had, so there is a very real screening process to prevent those people who states might consider a burden, from coming into the United States.

But this aspect of segregating poor aliens into other states merely flies in the face of our concept of the Federal Union. The Edwards v. California case established that interstate migration of poor people is an aspect of national concern which doesn't admit a diverse treatment of the states and this is precisely what Pennsylvania is doing by denying resident aliens their rights, the Federal privileges

of entrance and abode in Pennsylvania.

q

Q Well, does your argument mean that every state must have the same, must meet a certain standard of welfare payments?

A No. I think the --

Q Well, if Florida gives twice as much as

Indiana, doesn't that fall right within the framework of your

argument?

A Well, if the basis of their giving different payments is based upon alienage --

Ω No; I'm just talking about the urge to go
to Florida would be twice as great for people who are on
relief as it is to go to Indiana? You're not talking about —
you were addressing yourself to this right to travel, the
movement argument, as I understood you.

A Well, yes, but as an aspect of a Federallyconferred privilege under Truax and Takahashi, which state
clearly that the alien has the right to enter and abide, to
live among the community and perhaps among his ethnic or
religious fellows and can't be forced out of the state as what
is happening here in Pennsylvania, where it's clear it's not
speculation; it's a stipulated fact below that the poor aliens
are being forced out of the state as a result of this requirement.

I might further add, in terms of conflict with

Federal laws a number of the civil rights statutes have been cited and I don't think they require further elaboration at this point. But there are other conflicts of Federal law. Six months state residence is a requirement of naturalization to become a U. S. citizen and for that alien who is forced out of a particular state and who wishes to become naturalized, that six months period of naturalization is terminated and is interrupted.

I might also, in terms of embroiling ourselves with other nations, both Panama and Great Britain grant public benefits to aliens; to U. S. citizens in Panama and Great Britain and if either of these states were to retaliate against Americans they wouldn't retaliate against Pennsylvanians but --

Q What is the assistance in Panama? How much is it?

A Well, I believe Panama gives gives social security benefits and hospital benefits to aliens in the country.

Q Well, do they give welfare benefits?

A I don't think they do. Great Britain does, though, and U. S. citizens in Great Britain are eligible for supplementary benefits.

I'd like to say in conclusion that we are, as President Kennedy's book set forth: "a nation of immigrants," with a tradition and I guess the strengths of our history reside in the fact that when immigrants have come to our shores and to live among us they have been afforded equal treatment. This tradition has often required the protection and vigilance of this Court when such immigrants have been met with ill will and prejudice when they have come to this shore.

And Appellees stand before this Court today seeking this protection and respectfully request that the Court affirm the decision below.

Thank you.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mr. Stein.

You have four minutes left, Mr. Work, if you
wish it.

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT BY JOSEPH P. WORK, ESQ.

### ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

MR. WORK: Mr. Chief Justice I have nothing further unless the Court has some specific questions.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you Mr. Work.

- Q May I ask you one question?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q What do you do with the language of the 14th Amendment itself, which draws a distinction in certain places, between citizens and aliens?

A I find nothing in the amendment itself,

Your Honor, which draws that distinction.

Description of the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." "Not deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Doesn't that signify some difference?

A I think that there is some difference; however, Your Honor, if I understood the decisions of this Court correctly with respect to the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment it is my understanding that this Court had already said that the Equal Protection Clause did apply to aliens, as well as citizens.

Q Yes. Well, it was under the language of it

A Right. The only distinction that I see,
Your Honor, and the only, perhaps as I stated in the beginning
my whole position in being here is based upon the fact that
there are judicially-created exceptions to the overall applicability of the Equal Protection Clause, one of them being the
special public interest doctrine.

Q What?

des The special public interest doctrine. What do you mean by that? 2 That the state has the right in the conservation of its assets for its own citizens to draw a distinc-1 tion between aliens and citizens. 5 But the amendment says in reference to any 6 person they shall not be denied equal protection of the laws. 7 I fully appreciate that, Your Honor. 8 And grants no authority it seems, to treat 9 them differently than you are treating the other citizens of 10 the state. 11 I would, in all humility, say to His Honor, 12 that if I were reciting the case at this time perhaps I would 13 decide it differently, but it is my understanding of the 14 decisions of this Court that they have said there are judi-15 cially-created exceptions to that specific thing. 16 As to aliens, but not as to other people 17 who are permitted to live there under the laws of the United 18 States. 19 Right. But only as to aliens. 20 And you agree, do you not, that the Supreme 21 Law of the United States says they have a right to live in 22 Arizona like anybody else or Pennsylvania? 23 A Correct. 24 And be treated like other people. 25 39

A To the extent that this Court has not drawn a distinction; yes.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you Mr. Work. Thank you, MR. Stein. The case is submitted.

(Whereupon, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. the argument in the above-entitled matter was concluded)