Supreme Court of the United States

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In the Matter of:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

70-8

Docket No. 577

Petitioner

Vs.

SANDRA DENISE JOHNSON

Respondent

SUPREME COURT, U.S. MARSHAL'S OFFICE

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Place Washington, D.C.

Date April 19 1971

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM 1970

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner

SANDRA DENISE JOHNSON,

No. 577

Dognandon

Respondent

The above-entitled matter came on for argument at 11:05 o'clock a.m. on Monday, April 19, 1971.

BEFORE:

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WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice
HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice
JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice
POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice
BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice
THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice
HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice

APPEARANCES:

JUDGE SAMUEL R. PIERCE, JR., General Counsel Department of the Treasury Washington, D. C. 20530 On behalf of Petitioner

HOWARD E. BECKLER, ESQ. 6922 Hollywood Boulevard Suite 201 Hollywood, California 90028 On behalf of Respondent

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Howard E. Beckler, Esq. on Behalf of Respondent		.20

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PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will hear arguments next in Number 577: United States against Johnson.

ORAL ARGUMENT BY SAMUEL R. PIERCE, JR.

GENERAL COUNSEL, TREASURY DEPARTMENT, ON

BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Pierce you may proceed whenever you are ready now.

MR. PIERCE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chief Justice, Associate Justices.

This case involves a customs search. The

Respondent, Sandra Denise Johnson, whom I shall occasionally

refer to as the Defendant, was convicted by the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California of

illegally concealing and transporting narcotics into the United

States.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, reversed the District Court. The case is here on certiorari. The question presented is whether the judges or customs inspector, based on suspicion, in the light of his experience, without more, is sufficient basis to require an individual seeking to enter the United States to disrobe in private so that his or her clothing may be searched for contraband.

Q What were the narcotics that were found?

A Heroin, Your Honor; two ounces -- five ounces -- two ounces.

The principal constitutional and statutory provisions involved are the Fourth Amendment and Sections 482 and 1582 of Title XIX of the United States Code. They are set forth in the Government's brief at pages 2 and 3.

The facts upon which this appeal is based are these:

On Sunday, August 18, 1968 Sandra Denise Johnson and a female traveling companion: one Geraldine Harris, crossed the Mexican-American border on foot at San Ysidro, California. Inspector McCown, who at that time had 27 years experience as a customs inspector at that port of entry: San Ysidro, observed Miss Johnson and her companion and questioned them. He thereupon became suspicious that they were carrying contraband so he arranged for a personal search to be conducted by a female inspector so that their clothes could be thoroughly searched. This type of search is frequently referred to as a "strip search."

The search in this case was conducted by Mrs. Netta Lohman. She searched each of the women separately in a secondary search room which was a completely closed, private room, with no window. Each of the women was asked to please remove all of her clothing and hand them to Mrs. Lohman. Mrs. Lohman's search of the Respondent's clothing disclosed two

bundles in the seat of her underpants. One bundle contained two ounces of heroin; the other librium and other unidentified capsules.

No contraband was found in Miss Harris's clothes and the women's bodies were neither searched nor touched. In the District Court a motion to suppress the evidence was made on behalf of the Defendant Johnson. Defense Counsel agreed with the District Court that the Defendant had the burden of proving the motion. The Defendant did not produce any witnesses or other evidence in support of the motion.

At thehearing the Government Attorney called Inspectors McCown and Lohman as witnesses. Inspector McCowan testified that after he saw and talked with the Defendant and her traveling companion he became suspicious and arranged for them to be personally searched. He was not asked and he did not state any other reasons as to why he became suspicious.

Mrs. Lohman testified as to the method and conditions of the search and what it revealed.

- Q Was the entry over the border or the port of entry --
 - A At the port of entry; yes, sir.
 - Q At the customs office?
 - A At the customs.

Defense Counsel cross-examined Mrs. Lohman but did not cross-examine Inspector McCown, stating by way of

explanation that the Government had to prove something more than mere suspicion and he said, and I quote: "He wasn't about to put his foot into it."

Defense Counsel, in essence, argued that a strip search was invalid under the Fourth Amendment, in the absence of an affirmative showing of objective grounds for real suspicion. The Government Attorney relied on the Ninth Circuit case of Witt v. United States, where a strip search revealted narcotics concealed in Defendant's brassiere and it was upheld on that basis on the basis that mere suspicion was enough to justify such a search.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress and rejected the defense claim that it was the Government's burden to establish on a motion to suppress reason for Inspector McCown's suspicions. The case was tried without a jury on the basis of the testimony of the two inspectors and certain stipulations. The court found for the Defendant — found the Defendant guilty and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court's ruling on the motion was erroneous in the light of that court — that's the Ninth Circuit Court decision in United States v. Guadalupe-Garza.

And, although the Guadalupe-Garze case involved a cavity as opposed to a strip search, the Ninth Circuit did define for the first time in that opinion the requirements, and I put in quotes: "Real suspicion." The court said that a strip

search cannot be conducted on mere suspicion, that something more was necessary, and this amounts to real suspicion.

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"Real suspicion justifying the initiation of a strip search is subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable facts which reasonably lead an experienced, prudent customs officer to suspect that a particular person seeking to cross our border is concealing something on his body for the purpose of transporting it into the United States, contrary to law.

The Court of Appeals held that the search in the instant case did not meet this standard since the Government could not prove that there were objective, articulable facts to support the inspector's suspicion.

The dissenting judge was of the view that Garza was distinguishable, since it dealt with a cavity search, which required a more stringent standard than a simple inspection of clothing. In his view the 'case was'on all fours' with Witt v. the United States, which ahad approved a personal search.

Parenthetically, the Garza case was decided on February 2, 1970, which was more than nine months after the District Court had decided the instant case.

We believe that the Court of Appeals should be reversed for at least three reasons. First, the statutory authority for a customs inspector to conduct a personal search on the basis of suspicion is clear and unequivocable. Second,

the great public need to stop the huge inflow of contraband, particularly narcotics, into this country, demands that the balancing of the governmental interest in inspection against the traveler's interest in minimizing inconvenience and embarrassment be resolved in favor of the government.

And third, that the Ninth Circuit's objective, articulable facts test is an impractical and unworkable one.

Now, the statute in question: 19 USC 482 clearly states that the customs officer may search any person on whom he shall suspect thereis contraband. Congress used a simple word "suspect." They do not qualify it; they did not use "real suspicion, "actual suspicion." There is every reason to believe what it meant simply that a personal search may be conducted solely on suspicion and if they had meant otherwise we think they would have stated it because in this statute, this very statute: 482, they set up two different standards of suspicion. One, the suspicion that we have been talking about with respect to the person and then another standard that relates to trunks or envelopes.

In that statute it says that a customs inspector may search any trunk or envelope wherever found in which he may have a reasonable cause to suspect there was merchandise which was imported contrary to law, which means that the Congress was well aware of the words that it was using.

Now, this statute is a very old one, over 150 years

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suspect.

in age. It dates back to 1815 when it was first enacted, and at that time they had the mere suspicion test in the statute; in fact it was an extension of an even older statute, going back to the First Congress of the United States.

Q Could I ask you: search of baggage, is there an unrestricted, absolute right to inspect baggage?

A As it comes over the border; yes, sir, but you will notice that this part of the statute says "wherever found," which means that it would go beyond the borders and if they could trace the baggage into the interior and therefore I think they wanted a higher standard once the baggage got into the interior.

Q Is there anything that deals with the border inspections of baggage?

A No, this is the only one. As a matter of fact, Judge, I think the courts have said that not even suspicion is necessary because people come through a baggage line and just one after another is taken and you search it, but there is --

- Q There is no statute on it?
- A There is no statute that says --
- Q Except this one?
 - A Except this one.
 - Q This one requires reasonable cause to

A That's right. That's whatit says.

A

Now, in the -- in 1815 when this statute was first enacted, and it contains this provision, I believe that, because of the kind of contraband that existed at that time, Congress must have thought that occasions could arise when a person would have to be stripped in order to search their clothing for contraband, but if there is any question about that, Congress laid it to rest in 1866 because Congress reenacted this law in 1866 and added a provision, a provision which provided that the Secretary of the Treasury would employ female inspectors for the purpose of examining and searching persons of their own sex, which means that they anticipated that there would be these kinds of personal searches.

Now, at this point I would like to draw a distinction between the strip search that I have been talking about and the cavity search. We well realize that people may argue that this statute would not apply for a cavity search, because the last time that the Congress enacted this law was in 1866 and at that time carrying contraband in the cavities of the body body certainly were not in vogue, and furthermore, medical science did not develop to the artest that somebody could take some contraband, put it in the stomach, later regurgitate it and still use it —

Q And there were no narcotic laws in 1866; were there?

A I don't believe so.

Q I think there were none.

A So, we distinguish between the two, a strip search on the one hand and a cavity search on the other. We certainly believe that as far as a strip search is concerned, certainly the law goes that far and does intend to include the strip search.

Q You are putting the strip search then in the same category as the search of baggage, I take it?

A I am putting it in the same category as the statute says, that a person is able to be searched upon suspicion. Those are the literal words of the statute and I'm saying that that statute means exactly what it says.

Q Well, the question between you is the constitutionality of all this; isn't it? There is no doubt as to the authority of the -- statutory authority to make this search, is there?

extend, seem to think there is. They seem to point out that

Congress doesn't mean suspicion in the ordinary sense; they

mean real suspicion and then it goes on — that's the Ninth

Circuit — goes on to define what they think real suspicion is.

I say that Congress, by its history of the statute means just

exactly what it says. It's a simple word, meaning that if the

officer has suspicion he has the right to make a personal search

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Q What's your idea of suspicion?

A Suspicion means an uncertainty about something, or I should say — I could tell you exactly what it is because I happen to have written it down, but I don't have it right handy. But, to me it means that a person believes that there is something wrong on the basis of little or no evidence.

Q Such as the person has shifty eyes?

A It could be one of many things; anything. It could be shifty eyes; it could be nervousness; it could be the way they sweat; it could be almost anything. Suspicion, to me is a -- means simply that you do not have proof that something is wrong but you believe something is wrong.

Q I thought you said you didn't believe; you just weren't sure.

A Well, that's true; there is uncertainty in that because you are not sure. You believe that there is something wrong but you are not absolutely certain because you don't have absolute proof. You have little or no proof. I believe that's the way the dictionary defines it.

Q I suppose you would include mental telepathy?

A Well, I don't know how far mental telepathy goes, Judge, but I would think that the suspicion that we are

talking about with respect to these customs agents is the suspicion that they get through their experience, long experience of having looked at thousands and thousands of people come through that line --

Q Well, have the Appellate opinions defined it that way, that -- I recall some language to the effect -- perhaps in this Court, among others, that it is not as it may be claimed, in the privacy of a library that, as seen through the eyes of a trained officer on duty in which he brings his experience to bear. Is not that the standard --

A Well, that is the standard that has been used and is exactly whatis meant when you apply the term "suspicion" to a customs officer as opposed to just a word "suspicion."

Q It can be mere intuition, based on experience?

A Yes.

Now, could it be this much -- somewhere, I think in this record, or maybe I read it elsewhere outside the record, that this particular port of entry, San Ysidro, if I'm pronouncing it correctly, is a port of entry where there evidently a great deal of illegal narcotics are smuggled across the border. Maybe to that extent that's assumed, to the extent that one out of every 15 people who come across the border at that particular point is smuggling narcotics. Could

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the service just decide ar bitrarily at random to have a personal search of every 15th person who comes across?

A I don't believe the service -- would do that, but I do think that the Congress --

Q But if my hypothesized facts are correct there is one chance in 15 that as to each person that comes across the border, that he's smuggling narcotics and that's enough for a suspicion, I suppose; isn't it?

A Well, you could argue that but I rather think that it would be better for theCongress to review the entire situation and set some rules that one out of every 15 people can be searched.

Well, if there is one chance out of every 15, statistically, then isn't that a ground for suspicion with respect to each person who comes across the border?

It would be a ground; in fact it's the ground I imagine that is used with respect to baggage; that's why they search every single person's baggage.

Well, with respect to checking on income tax returns, and so on. These are arbitrary random samplings, so I understand.

A But that's not so much suspicion as it is a random sampling.

Well, if it's known that one out of every 50 persons is likely to either cheat or make serious mistakes in his income tax returns, one way to get at it when you can't look at all the returns, is to randomly checkone out of every 50, with the suspicion that you will perhaps find either fraud or gross error.

A But I think that the statute here relates to a customs officer. He must have the suspicion. Infact there have been cases where the customs officer himself did not have the suspicion; the court ruled that the search was not proper.

Q Well, I would think, I would just merely suggest that it could be argued that if the customs officer has knowledge statistically, based on his experience at that parport of entry that one out of every 15 people were smuggling, then isn't there one chance out of 16 enough to suspect each person who comes in there?

A It could be argued; yes.

Q Do you think that Congress has the constitutional power to pass a statute saying that everybody coming back to this country from abroad must submit to a body
search?

A I would think that if Congress looked into the matter, held hearings and found out that the incidence of smuggling was so great that they could pass such a statute, because they have the basic responsibility for controlling foreign commerce and what is imported into the United States.

I think if they could make a case for this, that that could be allowed if one would pass such legislation.

Q That would be a national finding of probable cause, rather than a judicial finding of probable cause?

A Well, I think, frankly, Mr. Justice, that the Congress could probably be in a better position by holding hearings and being able to get so much more information than a court can get in a case-by-case basis that it would be a better way of doing it --

Q I'm not talking about whether it's better or not; I'm just thinking in terms of the Fourth Amendment.

Mell, I would think that the Fourth Amendment is grounded in reasonableness and I think if it could be shown that we are in such a difficult position — it is highly theoretical, because I don't think it would ever happen, but if it were such — if the Congress were able to show that almost every person were smuggling something into this country then I think they could go as far as passing alaw to that effect.

Q Well, as far as examination of baggage is concerned, apparently the routine custom inspection, which all of us have gone through, is beyond the statutory authority, from what you said.

- A That is true.
- Q Did anybody ever challenge it?

A Nope.

ALC:

Q Getting back to this particular case, if the officer had been a brand new officer of three days on duty, would your argument be the same?

A Would the argument be the same? No, sir --

Q Because, as I read the statute I don't think that the statute says that he has to have any other --

A It doesn't say you have to have any experience at all. But, I would think that if it happened with somebody with three days on duty -- first of all, I don't think it could possibly happen, Mr. Justice, because you see he would probably go to his superior, who would then not allow it to be done. But --

Q The statute doesn't require that.

A No; the statute does not require that.

Q Is there any regulation of the Treasury or Immigration which defines suspicion?

A No.

Q Well, how does the agent know what is suspicion? What he thinks is suspicion --

A Yes, he's told that -- we have a manual, sir.

Q Well, does it say what suspicion is in it?

A It does not say precisely what suspicion

is; no.

about a little bit more than the Fourth Amendment here, a matter of condition. For example: every person entering this building must open every piece of baggage he has or he doesn't get in. Now, that's a condition. It doesn't require any suspicion; it doesn't require any showing of reasonable grounds for probable cause. Is there not possibly some parallel to that in terms of putting a condition on every person who wants to cross our borders, that they meet the standards of the statute?

A Well, the courts have said that for a long time; they say that the border search is different from other kinds of search because a country has the right to set the terms and conditions for people entering the country and, though it's not the same as a search in the interior.

Q Do you know any country in the world that does not exercise the right to search the baggage of people who come into it if they want to?

A No, I do not know of any.

Q I suppose they haven't got written constitutions, do they? Do they ever have Fourth Amendments to their constitutions?

Q Some of them may have Fourth Amendments that read like they were originally read --

A Yes, sir.

Well, to continue, sirs: until recently the Ninth

Circuit — until a recent Ninth Circuit case the courts have generally agreed that a personal search could be made on mere suspicion at the border without violating the Fourth Amendment. In short, they followed the clear language of the statute.

And this was true, even in the Ninth Circuit, and I call the Court's attention to the case particularly of Bible v. United States, which is not in our brief, but which I came across during the time I was preparing for argument: 314 Fed. 2d, 106, decided in 1963. There, a person appeared to be nervous and this led to a strip search and a discovery of heroin and the court held that mere suspicion was enough to justify such a search.

Q 314 Fed. 2d?

A Yes; 106.

Ω 106?

A Yes, sir.

And cert was denied by this Court and in that case they cited the Witt versus United States case. It had reached a similar conclusion.

Q Do you go so far as to contend that the Fourth Amendment doesn't apply to border searches at all?

A No, sir; the Fourth Amendment does apply to border searches. It definitely does, but Congress, as far back as 1789 made a distinction between this search and other kinds of searches and they passed a law allowing vessels to be

searched totally on the basis of suspicion. And this statute is really an extension of that statute.

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Q I know this isn't before us, but what would you say as to the Court of Appeals test with respect to so-called "cavity searches?"

A The clear indication test of the Court of Appeals? I would say that there should be something more for a cavity search. I think that what we are talking about is a balancing of things --

Q A matter of degree.

A That's a matter of degree. There should be more for a cavity search. This kind of search just requires somebody to take off his clothes, hand the clothes to somebody so the clothes can be searched and they are given back.

A cavity search touches the body, intrudes upon the body and I think a higher standard is necessary. As I explained before, I don't think that Congress considered this, because the last time it enacted the statute was 1866.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: You are into your rebuttal time now, Mr. Pierce.

MR. PIERCE: Okay.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Beckler, you may proceed whenever you are ready.

ORAL ARGUMENT BY HOWARD E. BECKLER, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MR. BECKLER: Mr. Chief Justice, and if it may please the Court:

Moments in beginning my argument, because I heard some of the inquiries presented by this Honorable Court to my opponent: the Petitioner, and rather than reply directly to any of the Petitioner's argument, I think I have elected, and will do and proceed to what I believe to be the gravemen of this case; I believe to be the critical issue here. It's been raised by Your Honorable Court already this morning, and go on to some concluding remarks.

The first and foremost way Congress enacted the laws, border search law about vessels and travelers, it cannot be imagined they had in those days even a remote thought that a party coming into this country might be made naked at port of entry so the body could be even looked at.

The Government here enframes the issue that the reason a person is told to get nude is to look at their clothing. That's true. That is incidental to their remaining naked in a room as appears in the Government's brief, perhaps 15 minutes, while a customs inspector looks over his clothes.

In this day and age when every travel agency, when every port and every hotel suggest that our country travel; when travel is permeated to even the poor, the modest people to visit Canada or a trip shopping in Nogales, Arizona, or as is

correct, San Ysidro, California, it cannot be in the reasonable expectation of the public, it cannot be understandable to the public in terms that they can know that by crossing this border upon returning to this country or as an associate in the office says: "Coming home," will be told that on the mere suspicion of an officer, albeit it 27 years or one year, to go into a private room and remove your clothing —

Q Well, what about the requirement for you to leave this country, before you can get a passport, that you have to submit to having a smallpox innoculation, among others?

A Yes.

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Q And depending on where you are going, a great many other things. Now, these are frequently, to some people, less agreeable, more painful, more an invasion of privacy than simply disrobing, as a great many people do on the beach and in doctors' offices and other places.

Now, do you say that challenging, too, the right to protect our health in communicable disease matters, either in outgoing or incoming?

A No, I do not. I --

Q Well, what's the difference on a constitutional basis?

A I think the difference is twofold: one, in balancing the interest, as Your Honor, Mr. Chief Justice, made this morning, as to the search of the briefcase. In this day

and age when there are things to be concerned with, it's a minor intrusion that I open my attache case this morning; it's a minor intrusion in the courts of Los Angeles -- it's the same intrusion, and to enjoy the practice of my profession, I will submit to that.

But, to balance coming back in this country after a day, to be told to get maked, I don't think is a formality.

The privacy that Your Honor refers to in the doctor's office shall not be equated, and I might add: there are many people in this day and age that may not be considered puritanical, but do object to removing all of their clothing in a doctor's office. Teenagers, for example; even old women who have had their first illness, don't like to get maked in the doctor's office, but, if they had anticipated that one stranger: a customs officer, albeit it, of experience, has that power on an ______hunch or a guess, as Mr. Justice Marshall mentioned this morning: what is it? Can it be mental telepathy? Can it be skittish behavior and selected that person, and say: You go in and remove your clothing for a search.

Q What weight do you give to what is almost a matter of judicial notice -- at least we see it coming across our desks in these records all the time -- that one of the ways in which substantial amounts of narcotics are brought into this country are by a young woman, or women, particularly, concealed as these narcotics were?

A I have two answers. I think both of them are cogent. One appears in the Government's brief that they concede that only a small amount of narcotics comes into the country through the body cavity, or carried on the person.

Second of all --

Q I'm not talking about the body cavities at the moment.

A No; I'm talking in underwear. There is an article that appears in the March 29, 1971, Newsweek issue, and in this article they talk about the Government's fight against the white death, referring, of course, to heroin. In the article they refer to a port off of Marseilles, where 750 pounds of morphine base, the ultimate substance that is used to make heroin, was found by a fisherman accidently. They waited for someone to pick up this contraband and lo and behold, they captured a man named Tudeon(ph), a notorious narcotics smuggler.

Further in the article in <u>Newsweek</u> they reflect that from the Capital of Laos: Vientianne, through the United States mails to Saigon, 20 pounds of pure heroin was received by a suspect there.

But, the point is this: that we will not stop the major amount of smuggling in the country if we were to search arbitrarily 15 out of 15 and if a few ounces -- and I agree it's insipid; it's a hideous ailment, and I am a criminal

practitioner of thirteen and a half years and have dealt with it -- we still will find two ounces; we will find three ounces. The major amount of contraband in the country --

Q Suppose you found 50 here in a money belt around the torso of an apparently overweight man. What's the difference whether it's two, 20 or 200.

A I would say we have to balance the interests here.

Q As between two, 20 and 200?

A No; between the initiation of the search, and not the result. I think that if, by fortuitous — a customs agent got lucky and found 50 ounces I would not change my argument to say that if his search, if it was based on mere suspicion, as this one was, was any better at the outset. I would feel chagrined that 50 ounces of heroin came into the country.

Q Well, I have seen records of cases,

Counsel, where there was expert testimony undisputed, that a single person could carry \$50,000 worth of raw heroin on his person without having it be noticeable to any but the most alert and astute, trained observer and not even always then.

A If that right to search that person is given it should be based on an articulable, objective statement that the officer can explain to the tryor of the fact, why he wanted that person stopped. Now, the customs agents themselves,

it was asked this morning of Counsel for the Government what rules the Customs had to go by and in the brief for the Government, on page 35, there begins numerous of the Customs rules they have propagated themselves.

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Q What's a soundex list, do you know?

A Yes, that's like a make sheet, Mr. Justice, where they have had a history of experience with that person before. It is referred to as one of the circumstances objectively to stop a person, whether or not they appear in the soundex and that's an easy reference spindle, where they find a person has been there once before, who has had contraband and has been arrested as a suspect.

Some of the other things indicated in the Customs Manual, which was not followed in the case at bar, are: hypodermic outfits found in the baggage, which I concede, should be searched carte blanc; eyes glassy or under the influence. Numerous things like that that indicate an objective standard rather than the uncanny feeling that a customs officer may have about a person.

In my brief I raise that a person can manifest numerous reasons for even being nervous: a later babysitter, a tragic accident they may have seen in Mexico, personal problems of their own. Nervousness cannot be articulated by a Government official.

Q Mr. Beckler, what if, instead of one in 15,

what if the hard statistical facts were, c the basis of a long period of training that one out of every two travelers who crossed the border at this particular point was a smuggler?

A I would probably not be arguing; I would concede to Your Honor that that would be fair enough.

Q Then everybody could be given a personal search.

h The batting average there is 500. The batting average in this case as appears by the Government's own brief on page 25, 4,811 people were searched in 1969. Of that 3,500 were proved negative. Thirty-five-hundred citizens of this country came into the port of entry at San Ysidro, were told to get naked, absolutely naked in a room alone with a stranger and their clothing was searched —

Q And one out of every four they found contraband.

A That is correct, and in my opinion that is not --

Now, where do you find in the constitutional that one out of four is not constitutional, but one out of two is constitutional?

A I don't find that. I would then relate to the balancing of the interest. I think that if such an incidence of 50 percent of the people coming into the country

at San Ysidro, were carriers of contraband, then I would have to yield and say that there is exception engrafted on the Fourth Amendment as to border searches in this day and age when such a thing wasn't possible, or a hundred years ago and I would concede that this is an evil that must be stopped, the Fourth Amendment notwithstanding.

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But now, I urge the reasonableness of the amendment. I can't help but think of the Terry Court where you talked about something of a hip-slap, as referred to, where a gun was obtained and it was approved, but there, Officer McFadden walking the streets of Cleveland, Ohio, articulated 12 trips to a men's store window, a suspicious conduct of some several hours. Whereas in Seberon(?) plain talking to a bunch of narcotics addicts did not meet the standard, again arguing a case-by-case method, a case-by-case basis for argument. I can remember trying this case in the District Court and I can remember trying the genesis of U.S.A. versus Henderson where District Judge Kunzel (?), now deceased, made a footnote and he said in his many years at San Ysidro he has come to believe that there must be something that the officer can tell why he wants that woman searched.

It must be noted in this case that co-companion, Geraldine Harris, was without contraband and I note four or five times in this case it has been suggested that counsel didn't cross-examine the officer. I can answer that with the

footnote that appears in Seabron that the moment counsel there began talking about the weapon he swiftly retreated from that kind of cross-examination and I did say I wouldn't put my foot into it at that time and I believed it was the Government's burden, as I do now.

It is my argument --

A.

Q Is it a fact that 180 years ago could any vessel enter any port in the United States, or the 13 Colonies then, without being searched from stem to stern?

A I doubt very much. I don't think it should be that way today. A vessel is a carrier of notoriously large objects. Major narcotics is brought in in vessels and ships like this. I think that the law as to vessels and things, rather than a person, must receive a different treatment.

Here the Government concedes, in talking about the second of a tri-part search as enunciated by the Ninth Circuit: the baggage search, one; the cavity search, three; and the skin search, two. And this is really the issue, and only the issue, as to what, if anything is needed to compel a woman or a man, as the case may be, to remove her clothing and get naked.

Q Would you think that the constitutional problem would be cured if a physician or a registered nurse made the examination?

A No, I don't, not if the inception of it was

based on nothing more than we have in Sandra Denise Johnson's case I do not, which leads me to an argument I wish to raise quickly. Agent McCown has had 27 years experience on that border and I recall in Justice Jackson's dissent in Brenniter(?) how then Justice Jackson referred to the record of an officer, that as always he wants to protect that. He's in the business, the competitive business of ferreting out crime and he indicates in all of these that he has no prejudices, that he has no cause for alarm about race or age or anything.

Caro

A

I only wish to suggest and I note that my opponent today has the title of Judge and I presume that that's because Mr. Pierce is probably retired, but — from the bench — but, as a criminal lawyer for 13 years, in asking maybe 50 or 60 veniremen a question I used to ask, representing Mexican—Americans and Blacks; I asked 690 or more: do you have a prejudice against the defendant because of his race or religion?

And I never once got an affirmative answer and I quit asking that question because it was inconceivable to me that 700 or 800 veniremen wouldn't hold a prejudice.

So, when the customs agent indicates, as he is supposed to on cross-examination that he has no such feelings, may I suggest that all of us carry something with us as a police officer. I rent space to an ex police officer and I have had the occasion to eavesdrop on his conversations with fellow

policemen and they are appalling and they are startling and I could imagine some of the conversations thattake place here and though they will never appear in the record and perhaps I'm arguing d'hors(?) the record, but these are considerations on what goes into an incoherent hunch when a customs officer compels a lady on nothing he can tell us. His answer in the companion case here in Guarassi-Saville was: "I had an uncanny feeling; that's all I can tell you."

a

Q Well, again, that could be based on experience quite apart from any — from any personal prejudices, if, for example there were statistical, empirical objective evidence that among young men whose hair is down to their shoulders one out of every two is a smuggler and among those who had crew cuts, only one out of every 100 is a smuggler, wouldn't a customs officer doing his duty, be a little more careful when he searched the person whose hair was down to his shoulders, and it might not represent any personal prejudice on his part whatsoever.

A I concur totally; that's empirical, objective, base facts, but the Government concedes here that they do not know what other symptoms, if any, whether it was more than mere suspicion that caused 4,811 citizens in 1969 to be made naked. And until we know that balance sheet, until we can see that batting average I think my point is well-taken.

Q On how many of those did they find something?

1 A 1,311.

Q 1,311 had some narcotics or some other contraband?

A Something; yes.

Q And that figure doesn't suggest anything to you apparently?

A I suggests that we have a problem in this country. It suggests an insipid amount of smuggling of heroin. It does not, however, permit me to allow myself the imprimatur of the Fourth Amendment to condone this kind of conduct.

Q Mr. Beckler, going back over some ground that you have already covered, I did understand correctly, did I not, that you have no concern about indiscriminate search of luggage?

A I do not, Your Honor; I do not.

Q And you draw the distinction then only by a balancing of interest, even though the Fourth Amendment reads as to effects, as well as to one's person?

A Yes, I do, Your Honor. I feel that, as Mr. Chief Justice suggested, that when one brings in objects he should well anticipate, if he wants to enjoy the freedom of our soil that that should be looked at.

Q Well, sometimes people don't bring in objects; underclothing can be in luggage as wellas on the person. appreciate that problem, but I think in the effects of the person, the effects indicated in the Fourth Amendment, that does have a different status, rather than the person. I think that at no time in the history of our country, was it imagined or expected when the Fourth Amendment was enacted or through all this Court's great history that it was thought the people would ever have to be made naked and now we find that such a right can exist and should exist with the advent of personal carrying of narcotics, but the Fourth Amendment is the overseer of that right and it should be, as the Ninth Circuit said in suppressing the evidence in the District Court on an objective, articulable basis, a real suspicion directed at this person, something that adds scope to the search.

My final argument is simply that there was a piece of literature by Maxwell Anderson not too many years ago, and there was a character in there called Judge Gaunt, who ran around, after making a very bad rule, testing his own rules. I played devil's advocate in this case and I have tested the proposition on district attorneys and U. S. Attorneys, on ladies, men and fellow citizens alike, and the overwhelming reaction that I have received is that before a citizen should be made naked it should be on an objective basis.

I ask that the Court of Appeals' decision be affirmed in suppressing the evidence.

Thank you very much.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you. The case is submitted.

We will not call the next case until after the noon recess.

(Whereupon, at 12:00 o'clock p.m. the argument in the above-entitled matter was concluded)