Supreme Court of the U	nited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1970	Supreme Court, U. S. MAR 16 1971
In the Matter of:	23
	Docket No. 5714
LINDA JENNES ET AL.,	
Appellants :	
vs.	3 pr
BEN W. FORTSON, SECRETARY OF STATE OF GEORGIA,	OFFICE
Appellee :	

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1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	OCTOBER TERM 1970
3	100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
4	LINDA JENNESS, ET AL.,
5	Appellants)
6	vs) No. 5714
7	BEN W. FORTSON, SECRETARY OF
0	STATE OF GEORGIA,
8	Appellee)
9	an a
10	The above-entitled matter came on for argumenta
11	at 11:14 o'clock a.m. on Monday, March 1, 1971.
12	BEFORE :
1.3	WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Julice
14	HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice
15	JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice
16	POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice
17	THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice
18	APPEARANCES:
19	PETER E. RINDSKOPF, ESQ.
20	Suite 1154
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21	On behalf of Appellant
22	ROBERT J. CASTELLANI
23	Assistant Attorney General, State of Georgia
24	Atlanta, Georgia On behalf of Appellee
25	ON DENGET OF Whilested
	1

Ĩ	PROCEEDINGS
2	MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will hear arguments
3	next in Number 5714: Jenness against Georgia.
4	Mr. Rindskopf, you may proceed whenever you are
53	ready.
6	ORAL ARGUMENT BY PETER E. RINDSKOPF, ESQ.
7	ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS
8	MR. RINDSKOPF: Mr. Chief Justice and may it
9	please the Court:
10	This is an appeal from a three-judge Federal
11	Court, pursuant to 28 United States Code, Section 1253. That
12	Court denied the Appellants' motion for preliminary and per-
13	manent injunction against the application, enforcement,
14	execution of Georgia Code Annotated, Section 34-1010.
15	Section 34 of the Georgia Code is the Georgia
16	Election Code and I think for convenience sake I will just
17	refer to the individual sections as, for example, Section 1010.
18	The Appellants in this case are the Georgia
19	Socialist Workers Party, candidates for Governor and for two
20	of the Congressional Districts in the State of Georgia, voters
21	who desire to support them and the class of persons who desire
22	an opportunity to consider persons on the ballot other than
23	Democrats and Republicans.
24	Section 1010 of the Georgia Election Code provides
25	simply that inorder to get on the ballot unless you come within

1 stated exceptions, you must secure the signatures of 5 percent 2 of the voters who were registered to vote for the office that you seek at the last time it was previously offered for 3 election. It is a straight 5 percent of the registered elec-D. torate. 5 In the case of the lead Appellant, Mrs. Jenness, 6 the candidate for Governor of the Georgia Socialist Workers 7 Party, 5 percent of the number of the registered voters at the 8 last time the office she sought would come out to be some 9 88,175 signatures. 10 Is that a requirement, Mr. Rindskopf, that 11 0 the signatures need to come from a specified number of counties, 12 of anything such as that? 13 No, Mr. Justice Stewart, we do not have any 14 A distribution problem except insofar as, for example, in a 15 Congressional candidate, the signatures must --16 They have to come from the District, of 0 17 course. They would have to come from the constituency, but 18 the Governor always has a statewide constituency ---19 That's correct. A 20 0 -- anywhere in the constituency. 21 Yes, Your Honor. A 22 In other words, for the guberanatorial 0 23 candidate they could have all come from Fulton County, for 24 example? 25

1 A They could have all come from Fulton 2 County; that's correct. 3 O The Gandidate for a Congressional seat 13 wouldn't need anything like 80,000 signatures on a petition, 5 though, would he? A No, Mr. Chief Justice, in the two districts 6 with which we are concerned, which are the Congressional 7 Districts which divide the City of Atlanta, the Fourth and 8 Fifth, the numbers were 10,000 and 11,000. 9 Q Mr. Rindskopf, as I remember in Williams 10 against Rhodes the figure was 15 percent of actual votes cast; 11 am I correct in that? 12 A That is correct: 15 percent of the vote 13 case. 1A. And here it is 5 percent of the registered 0 15 voters. Which is the more difficult of the two provisions to 16 meet? 17 A As we have attempted, as we shown in our 88 brief at page 8 and page 9, in Georgia the number of voters is 19 generally about 50 percent of the number of registered voters, 20 or it has been in the last two guberhatorial elections. 21 So, the 5 percent total here actually works out 22 to something in the neighborhood of 10 percent of the votes 23 cast. 24 Q Incidentally, is a write-in permissible in 25

Cent Georgia? 2 Write-ins are permissible. A 3 Your answer to Justice Blackmun would be 0 4 what? Which is the easier? 5 Well, the 5 percent here comes out to A 6 slightly less than the 15 percent in Ohio. It comes out to 7 about 10 percent by the Ohio standard, so Georgia's requirement 8 is some percentage points easier, in terms of numbers, than 9 Ohio. 10 I might add thatsince that time Ohio has changed its laws, reduced its percentages, and in a three-judge Federal 11 12 Court decision this summer those reduced percentages were held unconstitutional. 13 There were other factors in the Ohio case 14 0 that are not present in this statute? 15 I think that's certainly correct, Mr. 16 A Justice Harlan. The first time the case was here; I am not 17 so certain thatit was correct when it was back in Ohio. They 18 19 were dealing with a number of the laws which this Court had already struck down and it seems that they were pretty well. 20 able to isolate out the number of signatures required and 21 strike that down on its own rather than as part of an en-22 23 tangling web, as the Court has said. When I say that the candidates here are candidates 24 of the Georgia Socialist Workers Party, I should point out that 25

the Georgia Socialist Workers Party is a political body, according to the laws of Georgia, which means two things: it means first that its candidates failed to receive 20 percent of the votes the last time the office of Governor was contested and, it means that its candidates failed to receive 20 percent of the nationwide vote for President.

But, it also means one more thing: it means that the party is registered with the Office of the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 901 of the Election Code, which basically requires the party to go through the same procedures that a corporation would to register. It has to file its bylaws, submit the names of its officers, and any other information the Secretary may, in fact, desire.

14 The Georgia Socialist Workers Party has complied 15 with this requirement.

0 This is the status that the Republican 16 Party occupied for guite a long time in your state; isn't it? 17 Well, it is and it is not, Your Honor. A 18 The Republicans, of course, have been on the ballot by peti-19 tion at the last gubernatorial election before this one. 20 And they were they by petition because Q 21 they occupied the status of your client? 22 That's correct. That is correct. A 23 And their candidate, in fact, as I remember 0 20. then got a larger vote than the man who was declared governor. 25

Q.S.	A He received a plurality.
2	Q Mr. Bo Callahan or something?
3	A CAlloway, Your Honor.
4	Q Calloway.
5	A Also pursuant to the Georgia Election Code
6	the candiates of the Georgia Socialist Workers Party were
7	nominated by the party to be its candidates for office in a
8	convention of the party and certification of the nomination
9	was filed with the Secretary of State.
10	So, we don't have here exactly the case of com-
11	pletely independent candidates. The nominees of the party here
12	have had to go through at least one hurdle before they get to
13	the problem of gathering signatures.
14	On the other hand, party candidates in Georgia,
15	belonging to a party which collected 20 percent of the votes
16	for Governor or President, need not gather any signatures at
17	all, nor need that party in its primary, secure any definite
18	number of votes before they can get on the ballot for the
19	final election. And in fact, in the instant case, the number
20	of signatures that Mrs. Jenness would have been required to
21	secure, exceeded the number of votes that were actually cast
22	in the Republican primary for the winner of that primary.
23	He got some 62,000 votes; Mrs. Jenness would have had to get
24	some 88,000 signatures.
25	Q What was the total cast in the primary?

1	A Just over 100,000, Your Honor.
2	So, it was just slightly in excess of the
3	signature requirement that she was required to meet. But,
4	there is absolutely no requirement once a party qualifies as a
5	party that it, in its primary, before it put its candidate on
6	the ballot at the final election, show any scintilla of voter
7	interest in the party.
8	Q Except that, the party must have received
9	at least 20 percent of the votes the last previous election.
10	A At the last previous election.
11	Q And that, one can infer is strength,
12	continuing strength in a political organization that has
13	managed to acquire that much vote, I suppose.
14	A Well, up until very recently, of course,
15	Georgia was strictly a one-party state.
16	Q Yes, as you just said, up until very
17	recently the Republican Party of Georgia occupied the status
18	that your client now occupies.
19	A That's correct.
20	I might add that the 20 percent requirement came
21	in for the first time in 1964; prior to that time to be a party
22	and be on the ballot regularly, going back to 1943, all you
23	needed was to obtain 5 percent of the vote at previous elec-
24	tions.
25	Before 1943, going back to the Georgia Code of
	8

1922, anybody could be a candidate who registered himself as
 such with the Secretary of State. There was no requirement
 that his party secure any certain number of votes; nor was
 there any requirement that he, himself get a petition with any
 number of signatures.

Q This 5 percent is bad, according to your argument. What percentage do you think would be all right, constitutionally?

9 A Well, of course I would want to argue that 10 you don't reach that question in this case because we think 11 the 5 percent is a restriction of freedom of speech. But, it 12 seems to me that, in terms of what's required in the other 13 states, the vast majority of those other states require one 14 percent or less.

15 It seems to me that whatever the reason that the 16 state can come up with for this requirement, it seems to me 17 that really its only justification could possibly be to protect 18 the ballot against clearly frivolous candidates.

19 Ω Your First Amendment would knock out all 20 requirements of this type; wouldn't it?

A Yes, it would, Your Honor; yes, it would. Unless, of course, the state could show some sort of danger which would accrue from unlimited numbers of candidates getting on the ballot. I don't think that, based on what the Court said about the Ohio case, or based upon what the state said

below here, that there is any sort of conceivable danger.

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Q Mr. Rindskopf, just before the last question you were tracing the Georgia legislative history and said that at one time there was no percentage requirement at all. What is the implication of that. Bring me along a little more closely.

A The implication of that, it seems to me, 7 is exactly the same implication that the recent three-judge 8 court in Ohio on the decision in 318 Fed. Supp. found that when 9 Ohio jumped its requirement from one percent to seven percent 10 and later back to four percent the state had to show some kind 11 of compelling interest for that increase. Ohio was unable to 12 show any compelling interest for that increase similarly in 13 Georgia. We would say that there has never been anyshowing 12 by the state that the increase from no signature requirement to 15 five percent of the registered voters has been shown. 16

17 It seems to me that the five percent requirement 18 was adopted completely arbitrarily in 1943, but it was con-19 tinued again in 1964. There never has been any showing, 20 nothing in the record in this case --

21 Q What is thepurpose of it, in your estima-22 tion?

A I really could not say. It's not like the situation in Ohio where Henry Wallace received enough votes to cast some sort of doubt about the result of the election,

because in Georgia, going back to 1872, everytime there has 1 been a statewide race the Democrats have carried. 2 So, it strikes me that it was a revision of the 3 election code and while they were revising it someone said, A well, we should put in some sort of a requirement. There is 5 nothing in the legislative history which would indicate any 6 reason for the change from zero percent to five percent. 7 0 There is nothing in Georgia law that 3 prevented in any way Mrs. Jenness or the two Congressional Q candidates from campaigning to the extent they wanted to cam-10 paign for the office that they sought, is there? Holding 11 meetings, having all the associational privileges they want; 12 making all the speeches they wanted, passing out all the 13 literature they wanted and urging their adherents and supporters 14 to write in their names? 15 It's just as it was in Ohio, there was a 16 state restriction on doing First Amendment kinds of things. 17 The restriction is getting on the ballot. 18 Well, specifically, the First Amendment 0 19 kind of things is rather a broad category. In answer to my 20 question, free to campaign, free to organize, free to do 21 whatever they wanted; free to pass out literature and make 22 speeches in support of their candidacy, were they not? 23 Certainly; certainly. I don't think there A 24 is any question that such a restriction would equally follow 25 11

and we don't have that here.

anh.

2	There is one specific problem with the write-in
3	vote in Georgia which may not be present in other states, and
4	thatis that there is a direction in the election code which
5	requires , write-in votes to be counted by the people counting
6	the votés exactly as they are written so that if there were a
7	write-in vote for Linda Jenness and another write-in vote for
8	Mrs. Linda Jenness, those two votes would be counted separately
9	and however many write-in votes went down under the one column
10	or under some wrong spelling, would be counted separately and
11	there would be no accumulation of the votes.
12	Q Well, they would be counted?
13	A They count write-in votes; yes, Mr.
14	Justice Black. There is
15	Q Sometimes they get elected; don't they?
16	A I don't know of any recent example of the
17	write-in balloter being elected to Governor in Georgia.
18	Q Oh, Georgia, but county officers, important
19	county officers.
2.0	A Well, it's conceivable. I don't think
21	there is any showing in the record as to whether it has ever
22	happened.
23	Q You mean in Georgia?
24	A In Georgia.
25	Q Well, I know it has happened in other places
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close by Georgia.

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Well, certainly it has. Another restric-A tion on the signature gathering that takes place in Georgia, 3 is the requirement that signatures be gathered by apperson who A. is eligible to vote for the office that is being sought. 5

For example: in the Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts, which divide the City of Atlanta, the Socialist Workers Party would not gather signatures in the Fifth Dis-8 trict with a member of its party who was, in fact, registered 9 in the Fourth District. And this, I think, is an impairment 10 on the signature gathering requirement. It makes it, I think, 11 somewhat more difficult than it appears upon its face. 12

It means that unless the party is distributed 13 equally among Congressional Districts its chances of gathering 24 signatures in one district or the other depends, not on the 15 membership of the party, but on where the members of that 16 party live. And ---17

Is this true in statewide elections, too? 0 18 Well, of course in a statewide election A 19 anyone living anywhere in the state would be eligible to vote. 20 Two of the Appellants here, of course, sought Congressional 21 Districts. They were not running for at-large Congressional 22 seats; they were running for specific geographic districts. 23

And a major problem, it seems to me, along the First 24 Amendment line is the problem of one's FCC privileges, ... 25

whether one can get free or equal time if one is only a write-1 in candidate or if one is a candidate who is duly gualified. 2 FCC, or at least the television stations in Georgia have per-3 mitted people who are registered with the Secretary of Sate A as write-in candidates, to enjoy equal time. They have not 5 permitted persons who were not registered as write-in candida-6 tes and who did not meet the signature requirement to have 7 that equal time. 8

9 So, to that extent, a failure to either register 10 yourself as a write-in candidate, or to appear -- either to 11 register yourself as a write-in candidate or to secure the 12 signatures is, in fact, a limitation on your ability to appear 13 before the public.

In terms of the candiates here, the record has 14 their affidavits as to poverty, they are presuming in forma 15 pauperis, in fact, in this Court. The record also contains 16 stipulations of the parties as to the expense that was in-17 curred by the Secretary of STate, in checking the signatures 18 that were gathered by Mr. Calloway and by Mr. Wallace, when 19 they successfully met the petition requirements. And those 20 figures are some \$77,000 and \$81,000, by the Secretary of 21 State, just to verify the signatures which were gathered. 22

There was no actual showing in the record as to how much it cost to gather those signatures, but it would seem to me to be a highly reasonable speculation that it certainly

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Quei	cost at least that amount to go out there physically and
2	gather those signatures.
3	Q You haven't brought here the filing fee
13	requirement, have you?
53	A No, Your Honor, and in fact, we success-
6	fully challenged that in the lower court and the state has
7	not appealed.
8	So, if they were able to get their signatures
9	and show poverty they could go on the ballot without paying
10	anything.
11	I think the argument that the state has made
12	here is illustrative of the fact that the state really has no
13	compelling interest in this requirement. The state, for
14	example, has said in its brief that Georgia does not have
15	very restrictive laws and it points to some examples of other
16	states with more restrictive laws. For example, states where,
17	if you have voted in a party primary you cannot then come
18	along and sign a petition for an independent or a nonpolitical
19	party candidate.
20	It's quite true that in Georgia, anybody, as long
21	as he is a registered voter, can sign a petition. It doesn't
22	matter if he intends to go out and vote in the Democratic
23	or Republican primary the next day, and it seems to me that
24	this very freeness that Georgia offers indicates that it really
25	doesn't have any real purpose in imposing the signature
	1.5

1 requirement. I take it then, Mr. Rindskopf, you would 0 2 be making the same argument if the percentage was one percent 3 or a half a percent? 13. Well, I certainly don't have to make that A 5 argument in terms of reasonableness, because of course it is 6 here five. 7 0 Well, I know, but it isn't reasonableness 3 -- if that's all it is -- if you, for example, suggested that 0 perhaps the state would have a compelling interest in requir-10 ing one percent, then it does come down to a judgment as to 11 how much that is worth and maybe the state---12 Well ---A 13 Wouldn't you argue that there couldn't be 0 1A a compelling interest for even a half percent? 15 I would think, Your Honor, subject to the A 16 qualification, that the state might be able to impose some sort 17 of nonfrivolous --18 Q Non frivolous what? 19 A Non-frivolous. I think they might well be 20 able to protect the ballot against completely frivolous can-21 didates. 22 Q Well, is that a compelling interest? 23 I should think it might well be. A 20 And how much is that worth? Half a 0 25 16

1	percent?
2	A How could you weigh these things?
3	Q Well, why isn't it worth 5 percent?
Ą	A Well, I think, to go to as much as 5
5	percent or 10 percent of the actual votes becomes unduly
6	burdensome. It becomes in actual terms, an impossibility for
7	people who do not have some large support.
8	Q By "support," you mean money, resources?
9	A I mean both money, Mr. Chief Justice, and
10	people who are members of their party or who might be able to
11	go out and gather signatures for them, to say nothing of
12	people who might be willing to sign on their behalf.
13	Q Well, I suppose, at least I could, take
14	judicial notice of the fact that some of the very significant
15	political expression in this country is done by young people
16	and others not so young, who are pure volunteers who would do
17	these things if they had a belief; if they had convictions
18	about that particular issue or party.
19	Now, in terms of collecting, whether it's 10,000
20	names or 5,000 names, isn't that entirely possible with purely
21	volunteer efforts if, in fact, there is a significant support
22	for the views of either that party or that candidate?
23	A Well, it may very well be that the views
24	may be very unpopular ones, such as socialism in the State of
25	Georgia. I think the fact that the views may not attract a
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large number of adherents, is not really the determining
 factor.
 Or, turning to the young people, for example, if
 in fact, they were not registered to vote in Georgia, they

would not be eligible to either collect the signatures or to sign the petitions themselves.

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Q Well, when you spoke carlier, I think in
response to Mr. Justice White, you referred to a compelling
state interest and related that to frivolous candidates. Now,
did you mean by that the candidate who was frivolous because
of his person or his views, or a candidate who was frivolous
in the sense that he never could get more than minimal support.

A I think that a frivolous candidate is 13 someone who qualifies for office just because he wants to see 1A his name on the ballot. It may well be that even he has 15 First Amendment rights which would be infringed by any such 16 signature requirement. But in the instant case they have gone 17 to the trouble of organizing themselves as a political body, 18 according to Georgia law. They have filed papers with the 19 Secretary of State; they have paid him a minimum fee for filing 20 those papers. I think they have gone far beyond any sort of 21 frivolous question. 22

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Castellani.
 ORAL ARGUMENT BY ROBERT J. CASTELLANI,
 ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL OF GEORGIA,

T	ON BEHALF OF APPELLEE
2	MR. CASTELLANI: Mr. Chief Justice and may it
E	please the Court:
4	Mrs. Jenness's argument and her attack on
5	nominating petition laws is based on two different grounds:
6	the first ground is that she claims there is a denial of her
7	equal protection rights.
3	The second ground: she claims these laws violate
9	her right to freedom of association as has been recognized by
10	this Court in William versus Rhodes.
185	We shall characterize the equal protection argu-
12	ment as "The grass is always greener on the other side"
13	argument. In Georgia, as has been noted by this Court, there
9 A.	is not this tremendous imbalance between the two tests or
15	methods to get on the general election ballot.
16	In Williams we had all the additional burdens that
17	were placed upon third party candidates. Ohio completely
18	eliminated independent candidates. In Georgia, except for the
19	actual vehicle itself, that is the petition method as opposed
20	to the primary method, there is not this imbalance. As a
21	matter of fact, as a result of the three-judge court decision
22	below, if you go the petition method then if you can allege
23	poverty you do not have to pay any qualifying fees.
24	We therefore think that this lawsuit is bottomed
25	on an incorrect assumption. The assumption that is incorrect
	19

is that a primary method is easier than a petition method.
 We believe that if anyone went through both of these methods
 he would seriously question this assumption.

Now, Mrs. Jenness sees a primary as a method A whereby a candidate merely sits at home and waits for the votes 5 to come to his door and he is automatically nominated and 6 authorized to go on the general election ballot. In fact, that 7 is not the case. The primary candidate has to expend tremen-8 dous amounts of energy; his own resources; his organiza-9 tional problems, the complexities of a campaign, particularly 10 for the gubernatorial nomination in Georgia are simply not 11 recognized by Mrs. Jenness when she sees this imbalance between 12 the two methods. 13

Further, if a general primary candidate is defeated he no longer has a chance to get to the general election ballot, whereas to the person who is going the petition method, once they obtained the required petitions there is no problem of going on the ballot. They are automatically certified and they go on the general election ballot.

Therefore, we believe that while the grass may seem greener to Mrs. Jenness, in actual fact, a close and realistic examination of the two methods to get on the general election ballot in Georgia, will show that there is no inequality and her claim on this basis must fail.

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Your position has brought out the fact that

the five percent figure though, is at the high point in comparative figures with other states. Do you have any comment about that, Mr. Castellani?

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A Yes, sir, Mr. Justice Blackmun.

If you only look at the number of petition sig-5 natures that are required, Georgia, although it is not the 6 highest, is probably higher than most. However, as we 7 attempted to show in our brief, there are numerous other dis-8 abilities that are placed upon petition-gatherers in other 0 states that have these lower poll requirements. If I might, 10 some states require that when you sign the petition you have 11 to agree to support the candidate in the general election. 12 Georgia has nothing like this at all. 13

Some states prohibit you from participating in any primary. As a matter of fact, Mrs. Jenness could participate at the party's primary of her choice in Georgia. She could run as a petition candidate and yet go and vote in the primary and vote for the person that she would be mostlikely to oppose in the general election.

Some states forbid you to sign any other petition besides the first one. In other words, the first person to get to you, that's it. You are disqualified for any thereafter. In Georgia you can sign as many petitions as you want. Some states require that you must not be registered in any political party.

In at least one state -- I believe it's Rhode 7 Island, they prohibit you from participating in any primary 2 for 26 months after you sign a petition. 3 Now, we did not make an exhaustive study ---A Mr. Castellani, why did they pick this 0 5 method? Why did the State of Georgia, at this late date, 6 one; and number two: pick the 5 percent? 7 Well, sir, the late date was 1943. A 8 Secondly, this method was because 49 of the 50 states depend 9 upon nominating petitions as an alternative in one form or 10 another. Florida is the only state that I know that does not 11 use the nominating petition method as an alternative. 12 Well, has anything happened in Georgia 0 13 that suddenly made them realize that this was a good way of 14 doing it? 15 Mr. Justice Marshall I am not a Géorgia A 16 historian. I don't believe I can answer that question. 17 Well, can you answer the five percent 0 18 giestion? 19 No, sir; I think that --A 20 Well, what's the state's interest in the Q 21 five percent? 22 A Well, the state's interest in the five 23 percent, it seems to me, and I realize this Court has looked at 28 an awful lot of election cases and you have had the interest 25 22

thrown at you. We think that there are probably three
interests that probably overlap, but the first interest is, as
has been noted by the Court, completely frivolous candidates.
So that whatever you want to define that you consider frivolous candidates, we think of them as the person publicity
seekers; a person who is wasting everyone's time, if I can use
that term.

8 The second interest is that the national movement 9 today is an attempt to get more people to vote, to make it 10 easier to vote and we have had numerous comments about the fact 11 that had 12 candidates for governor in the primary, which is 12 too confusing and people just couldn't make up their minds. 13 We think that's an interest to keep it down to serious can-14 didates.

We also believe that by having this requirement we can, to a certain degree, encourage stability and compromise. If every splinter group knows that they have access to the general election ballot they are going to just go their own separate way and we think that this is not conducive to a good electoral process.

21 Q I recognize your answer to the general 22 question, but I'm still left with the point: why five instead 23 of one or one-half, two, three, four.

24 A And I say there were no legislative 25 materials that I have been able to find that would indicate

1	the why clause.
2	Q Well, you said that in the forties when you
3	adopted this you looked at the other states. Did you find
A.	that the other states were five?
5	A Yes, there are other states with five.
6	Q How many?
7	A I don't remember offhand, just three or
8	four
9	Q Well, I have great difficulty in your
10	saying you were trying to get in line with the other states
11	when it looks to me like you passed some of them.
12	A We admit that we passed some of them.
1.3	Q Why
14	A We attempted to show before
15	Q What's so peculiar in Georgia that you
16	need five percent?
17	A Well, they made the figure five percent;
18	I can't say why they chose five percent
19	Q I appreciate that.
20	A maybe they chose ten and decided to
21	cut it in half; I just don't know. But, the thing is they
22	made it so much easier to gather these petitions. Most of
23	these other states with the one percent or the one-and-a-half
24	or two percent also, and this is what bothers me, is that in
25	another state you go out and you sign one of these petitions
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I doubt very seriously that the person who is gathering these 1 signatures tells you: now wait a minute, if you sign this 2 petition you are not going to be able to vote in the primary. 3 In other words, you can't be registered with another party or A that you are going to be disgualified. Georgia has opted for 5 the other procedure: five percent. But, as long as you are 6 registered, sign as many petitions as you want and continue to 7 participate in the political party primaries and this is their 8 method. 9

Now, I couldn't give you an explanation as to why
 five percent was chosen. I am sorry. I talked with several
 people and they just don't know.

Q Mr. Castellani, I hope I'm not repeating anything Mr. Justice Marshall asked you, because I couldn't hear his question, but do you have, do you know of any reason why Georgia moved from no requirement at all to the present one that's under challenge?

A I have a guess and unfortunately I did not prepare myself on this point and I apologize; I probably should have. I think that previously Georgia did not authorize anybody, did not allow independent candidates to run. You had to be a party candidate, and then I think that there are several in states where this was the case and/my research of this question this problem has come up.

There were five or six states where you had to be

9 on a party. Q So your suspicion is 'that Georgia moved 2 in the direction of liberality rather than in the opposite 3 direction? A Yes, sir; yes; sir. I believe that A 5 previous to the 1930s and the 1940s before this came in I 6 do believe that there was -- you had to be a party candidate; 7 you couldn't get on a general election ballot, but I'm not sure S and I apologize. 0 Mr. Castellani, in your recital of 0 10 possible interests of the state you did not mention the one 11 sometimes included: the possible fraud on the voters. I'm 12 thinking of the case in the State of Nebraska some years ago 13 when Senator George Norris was up for reelection and there was 14 a great effort to defeat him which I think, if I recall the 15 history, succeeded, and one of the mechanisms was to find a 16 man by the name of George Norris and put him on the ballot to. 17 obviously to divide the vote. 18 Is that, whether you call it compelling or not, 19 is that a legitimate state interest, to have some limitation, 20 whether it's five percent or ten or 15 or three? 21 A Yes, sir; I would agree that it is. And, 22 as I prefaced my remarks: I don't pretend to be an expert in 23 the area of election law and I think that this Court in its 20 experience has certainly come across more cases and is more 25

rad	aware of the interests that a state has than I could. I
2	think of the ones that I think are the most obvious to most
3	people who are in this area, but of course to this Court that
Д,	is surely a legitimate consideration.
5	Q Well, Mr. Castellani, isn't it true that
6	the primary case, the white primary case in Georgia came around
7	'44 and prior to that time there wasn't but one party in
8	Georgia.
9	A Which white primary case?
10	Q The King case.
11	A I'm not familiar with that case.
12	Q It was the case that opened up the white
13	primary to let Negro Republicans vote in the white primary.
14	There wasn't but two parties there then; right?
15	A Again I say I am not familiar with the
16	history of Georgia around 1944, so
17	Q Could this have been to keep out third
18	parties? Could that have been the reason?
19	A Could it have been to keep out third
20	parties?
21	Q Yes.
22	A I can't say. I can't say what I can't
23	say that there was one overriding mode over all of these other
24	modes. I wasn't there and I haven't been able to talk with
25	anybody who has been able to give me one good reason why. They
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1	all have their own versions of what they recall, but that's
2	it, and I doubt that that would be evidence before this Court
3	anyway.
4	Q Well, for a while it not only kept out
5	third parties; it kept out second parties, didn't it?
6	A Just about. I'm not so sure that the law
7	was an instrument which kept out people in the second party.
8	I think that
9	Q Well, the fact was that there was just a
10	single party.
11	A The second ground on which these nominating
12	petition laws are challenged is that they violate this freedom
13	of association right that has been recognized by the Court in
14	Williams versus Rhodes. Of course, the Williams case is the
15	touchstone case in this field.
16	We hope that this Court can see the differences
17	between Georgia's law and Ohio's law. This Court several
18	times in its opinion in Williams, stressed this entangling web,
19	the totality of the Ohio structure that made it impossible for
20	third parties to get on the general election ballot. We
21	believe that we have shown that Georgia has only the actual
22	vehicle itself; that's the only difference that there is.
23	Now, we would like also to stress to the Court
24	that this law is not an absolute bar to appearing on the
25	ballot. It may be treated by some as a bar, but it is not.
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We have indicated before, numerous candidates, both state-8 wide candidates and local candidates have gained access to the 2 general election ballot through the petition method. 3 0 What does it take to get on the ballot A by the petition method? 5 This is the method under consideration: A G five percent, which we call the petition method --7 I see. And you say a number have 0 8 succeeded? 9 Yes, sir; the two most noteworthy candi-A 10 dates statewide, are of course George Wallace, and before him, 11 Howard "Bo" Calloway, the candidate for Governor, who received 12 the plurality but didnot receive the majority and this Court 13 decided Fortson versus Morris that the legislature could go 14 ahead and elect and they elected his opponent. 15 Now, Mrs. Jenness has argued that it is an 16 absolute bar to her because she simply can't meet it. Well, 17 we would first say to this Court there is nothing in this 12 record to show that she or anyone in her class has really 19 tried to meet it. We don't know what kind of effort would be 20 required because they have never tried. At least the record 21 doesn't show they have ever tried to go out and gather signa-22 tures. 23 Now, we will admit that some expenditure of effort 24 is needed. However, as we have indicated before, expenditure 25

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- And	of effort is also needed to win a primary. And we believe
2	before you can gain access to the general election ballot that
3	the state does have a right to require this showing.
4	We would also point out to the Court that the
5	Court decision below had removed the qualifying fee from
6	pauperism.
7	As this Court has also indicated previously, the
8	nominating petition law does not impinge in any way on the
9	right of Mrs. Jenness to meet with others of her choice, to
10	hold public meetings, to advocate any ideas, to solicit
11	members to her group, or in short, to do anything else to gain
12	access to the minds of her fellow citizens and to seek to per-
13	suade them to her point of view.
84	Now, as I have indicated, 49 states have nomina-
15	ting petition laws. Again, some are higher; most are lower;
16	some are the same as Georgia's. However, as we have indicated,
17	these other restrictions, we think, can at least point out to
18	this Court, although Georgia on its face, may be higher than
19	some of the states, perhaps a majority of the states, that you
20	can't just judge nominating petition laws on the number of
21	signatures required. You need to go deeper into the election
22	code, into the election scheme if you are going to make a com-
23	parison of Georgia with the other states in the nation.
24	We would stress to this Court that election codes
25	are not static instruments; they are continuously being
11	

çes	revised; they are under study by the legislature, by private
2	citizens groups, by interested people. We would ask this
3	Court to authorize the use of nominating petitions by the 49
A.	States who depend on them to help their election laws.
5	The national movement in election law today is to
6	make it easier to vote; to get people to the polls. We believe
7	that the petition law has a valid requirement and the state
8	has an interest in upholding it and we would ask this Court to
9	affirm the judgment of the three-judge court below and
10	authorize its use.
11	Thank you.
12	MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: I think we will suspend
1.3	now and let you begin right after lunch, Mr. Rindskopf.
14	(Whereupon, at 12:00 o'clock p.m. the argument in
15	the above-entitled matter was recessed to be resumed at 1:00
16	o'clock p.m. this day)
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9	1:00 o'clock p.m.
2	MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Rindskopf, you
3	have three minutes left.
4	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT BY PETER E. RINDSKOPF, ESQ.
5	ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS
6	MR. RINDSKOPF: I just have the briefest of points,
7	Your Honors.
8	First, when my opponent says that the 1943 laws
9	were less restrictive than the 1922 laws, he is just plain
10	incorrect. In 1922, in the Election Code found in the 1922
11	Session laws at page 100, it states very clearly that the
12	names of candidates of each political party and also the names
13	of any other candidates for the offices to be filled, are to
14	be placed on the ballot. And it further provides thatall
15	candidates for national and state offices, or the proper
16	authorities of the political parties nominating them, shall
17	file notice of their candidacy, giving their names and the
18	offices to which they are candidates, to the Secretary of
19	State.
20	So, the 1943 move from no petition requirements
21	to five percent was, in fact, more restrictive. Up until that
22	time anyone could get on the ballot simply by filing a notice
23	of candidacy with the Secretary of State.
24	The second point I would like to make is
25	Q They could be on the general election
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ballots?

1 That is correct. The law says "in all A 2 elections other than primaries conducted by political parties, 3 it shall be the duty to place on the ballot the names of party A nominees and all others who wish to be candidates." 5 Do you care to comment on the state's 6 interest in preventing fraud on the voters by use of the same 7 or similar names of candidates? 8 A Yes, I would. I think the state is ade-9 quately protected here in at least two ways: first, the 10 closing date for petition requirements is the same date as the 11 closing date for nominees who wish to enter into a party 12 primary. So that you cannot come along after the party primary 13 and file a notice of independent candidacy unless it's a fore-11 gone conclusion who is going to win the primary --15 Sometimes that is in Georgia; isn't it? Q 16 A Well, I think the election spirit is a 17 little more rough and tumble than that. It's probably safe to 18 say it's a foregone conclusion that the party nominee is going 19 to win. But --20 The party nominee was what? 0 21 A The Democratic Party nominee usually wins 22 the election. But, there is a second restriction which the 23 state has, and legitimately, and that is that party nominees 20. appear on the ballot, along with a party designation, such as 25 33

1	Lester Maddox: Democrat. An independent nominee wishing to
2	put a fraud upon the voters by appearing under the same name
3	would not have that party designation.
4	It seems to me that's a clear way of preventing
C1	what happened to Mr. Norris.
6	And those would be our points and we have nothing
7	further.
8	MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mr.
9	Rindskopf; thank you, Mr. Castellani. The case is submitted.
10	(Whereupon, at 1:02 o'clock p.m. the argument in
11	the above-entitled matter was concluded)
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