
## Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1970

In the Matter of:	
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EDWARD H. COOLIDGE, JR.,	ê
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Petitioner	
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VB.	ő
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,	
Same of the tree of the C	8
Respondent	8
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Place Washington, D. C.

Date January 12, 1971

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BENHAM 1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	OCTOBER TERM 1970
3	NAM MAN DLA MES NAM DE DE MES MES MES MES MES MES MES MES MES
4	) EDWARD H. COOLIDGE, JR., )
5	) Petitioner )
6	vs ) No. 323
7	STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,
8	Respondent )
9	400 CER 100 AED 100 AED 100 MAR 444 CEU 133 488 AED 100
10	The above-entitled matter came on for argument at
1 I	2:00 o'clock p.m. on Tuesday, January 12, 1971.
12	BEFORE :
13	WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice
14	
15	WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice
16	BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice
17	HARRY M. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice
18	APPEARANCES:
19	ARCHIBALD COX, ESQ. Langdell Hall
20	Harvard Law School Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
21	On behalf of Petitioner
22	ALEXANDER KALINSKI, ESQ. 531 Union Street
23	
24	
25	
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will hear arguments
3	next in Number 323: Coolidge against the State of New
4	Hampshire. Counsel you may proceed whenever you are ready.
15	ORAL ARGUMENT BY ARCHIBALD COX, ESQ.
6	ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
7.	MR. COX: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the
8	Court:
9	This is a first degree murder case here in forma
10	pauperis on certiorari to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
terds terds	Two constitutional questions are presented.
12	The first is whether a search warrant issued by
13	the Attorney General of the State, upon the unsworn reports,
14	oral reports of his subordinates while he is active charge of
15	a criminal investigation and when he will actually himself,
16	lead the prosecution, is a valid search warrant for the pur-
87	poses of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
18	Of course we submit that it plainly is not.
19	The second question, which relates to an entirely
20	different incident so that we may win on either grounds; the
21	second question is whether a wife's acquiescence in the taking
22	of her husband's personal belongings, would validate what
23	otherwise is an otherwise unconstitutional search and seizure,
24	in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, this
25	being a state case.
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These two questions are better understood if I outline the salient points concerning the case.

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On January 13, 1964, a young girl: Pamela Mason, B left her house in Manchester, New Hampshire on a babysitting assignment. She disappeared; eight days later her body was found by the side of the principal interstate Highway leading 17 south.

The state's theory later became that she had been 8 shot by a .22 caliber Mossberg rifle; also her throat had been 9 cut with a knife and that the body had been dumped there 10 about 9:00 o'clock or 9:30 perhaps that same evening when it 11 was covered by an unusually heavy snowstorm, and then after a 12 rainstorm eight days later, became visible. 13

This was a disappearance and crime which excited 14 enormous attention in Manchester and indeed, through the State 15 of New Hampshire. At the time the police broadcast appeals 16 for people to come foward with the names of anyone who was 87 out of the house that evening and eventually one of Petitioner's 18 neighbors reported to the police that he had been out of his 19 house that night. And they went to the house on January 28th, 20 the police; two of them, and questioned him about his where-21 abouts. He gave an explanation which, unfortunately for him, 22 later turned out to be false. 23

He also showed the police some guns he had in the 24 house at that time and spoke to them very freely and they asked 25

Ten . him if he would be willing to go to Concord to the headquarters 2 of the State Police to take a lie detector test and he said that he would, but since he was working as a bakery truck 3 B, driver, asked that it be on his day off: Sunday. 5 Then on Sunday, February 2nd, they did indeed to 6 up to the state police headquarters and he took the lie detector test, which produced affirmative information of his 7 guilt. But, at that time he did admit that he had embezzled 8 a small sum of money from his employer. 9 When they went back to Manchester he was questioned 10 late into the night by the police and he was not actually 11 arrested in a formal sense until after midnight, but the trial 12 judge found that he would not be permitted to leave at any 13 time after they had returned from Concord. 14 The first search and seizure of which we complain 15 occurred on that day, February 2nd while Petitioner was in 16 custody at the Manchester police station. Two different 17 officers who had never been to his house before, went to his 18 house and with the acquiescence of his wife, Mrs. Coolidge, 19 obtained his guns and clothing and took them away. 20 0 Are these the same guns that the police had 21 seen before? 22 These were the same guns that different A 23 police had seen before and there is no indication that these 24 two men had any information about what had happened before.

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Did the wife at this time know that her 0 2 husband was at least in the company of police and had been for a considerable time? 3

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Yes, she did and I thought it would be con-D. A venient, Mr. Chief Justice, to -- I'm going to argue the 5 6 question about the Attorney General's warrant first, and I thought it might be convenient if I refrained from stating the 1 facts about this search which took place chronologically first 8 until I come to what will be the second branch of my argument, 9 and then I will address myself to the specific questions that 10 you mentioned. 1

The second, as I say, Petitioner was held at the 12 police station. He was held overnight on this larceny charge 13 and then he was released on his own recognizance but he was 1A not a prisoner during the ensuing weeks. 15

The second search and seizure occurred some weeks 16 later on February 19, which is almost three weeks after the 87 first. Attorney General Maynard, who had taken active charge 18 of the investigation and prosecution, had called a conference 19 in his office in Concord for the purpose of reviewing the 20 evidence that had erstwhile been developed. There were 21 present: representatives of the Manchester police and the 22 state police and two assistant attorneys general. 23

Those officers presented to him what their in-24 vestigation had revealed and presenting it, the trial judge 25

explicitly found to him in his capacity as the chief prosecuting officer of the State of New Hampshire.

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Ω Mr. Cox, incidentally, is there a transcript
 4 of what took place at that meeting in the AG's office?

A No; there was no record made of that and none of what was said was under oath. And Police Chief McGranaghan did testify during the trial on voir dire, concerning what took place, but there was no record as as I say, it was not under oath. This was just, I think quite genuinely some -with the chief investigator and later prosecutor, what they had been able to develop.

Then, at the end of that conference, after about 12 two hours, we know from Chief McGranaghan's description, he 13 asked for an arrest warrant and four search warrants against 11 the Petitioner, and the Attorney General, having a commission 15 as Justice of the Peace, took Chief McGranaghan's oath to the 16 complaint and then he, himself, issued the five warrants, none 87 of which we are concerned with here: the warrant for an old 18 Pontiac automobile ---19

20 Q Does the attorney general ordinarily have a 21 commission as Justice of the Peace in New Hampshire?

A I don't -- I know that Mr. Maynard did. I suspect that others did. New Hampshire had an extraordinary practice at this time. Chief McGranaghan testified that they never went out of the police department to get a search warrant

they just had the inspectors, captains, all commissioner 1 Justices of the Peace. He testified to this. And that is 2 not -- I don't want to overstate it. That is not the practice 3 today because the statute has been changed, but it was, as I A said, the practice at this time. This wasn't an odd happen-13 stance, apparently. 6 That evening ---7 Q Mr. Cox, do I understand that that there is 8 no challenge to Mr. Coolidge's arrest here? 9 I don't think it makes any difference here. A 10 There was a challenge to Mr. Coolidge's arrest. It's very 11 clear in the headings to Petitioner's brief in the New Hampshire 12 Supreme Court that they challenged the arrest warrants on the 13 same grounds as the search warrants. It's one of the black 14 letterhead things, but as far as I can it does not make any 15 difference to our contention in this case. 16 Both facets of your argument, your entire 0 17 argument, of course in this case, depends upon the continuing 18 validity of the exlusionary rules; doesn't it? 19 Oh, yes. I assume that and -- if I may. A 20 That evening Petitioner was arrested in his house 21 pursuant to the arrest warrant and it was an hour and a half or 22 two hours later that the Pontiac car was towed to the police 23 station and it was searched the next day and then again a year 24 later. 25

The search is important without going into the details, because in the course of vacuuming the car the police came to tiny particles that were later examined under a microscope which experts sought to associate with particles that they said were substantially similar, taken from the clothes of this unfortunate girl.

And the expert testimony was that there was some 7 extraordinarily high degree of probability that the body must 8 have been in the car. This, I would say, this evidence which 9 the court first refused to suppress on our motion before 10 trial, and which was admitted over our objection, pressed all 11 the way through the trial in that appeal, was not essential 12 to the prosecution of the case. It was not conceivably a case 13 where you could say that this was harmless error within this 1A court's rules. 15

Indeed, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire noted 16 three or four or five times the very dubious character of the 17 evidence against -- of the proof against the Petitioner in this 18 case. On 265 it says "the proof was not wholly free from 19 weakness." Then it speaks of how the limitations of time cast 20 doubt on the state's theory and how further doubts were cast 21 by certain other evidence; and how the ballistics evidence 22 blew up, to put it colloquially in the state's face during the 23 trial. 20

So that this, I think -- I'm simply emphasizing the

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1 importance of this question.

2 Now, our first contention here is basically a very simple one ---3 Q Well, does it make any difference to your A case whether the evidence obtained in this way was weak 5 evidence or strong evidence? 6 A No; I was simply negating any possibility 7 if the rule -- there was a case decided the same day in -- in 8 California. I can't think of the name of it now, that could 9 be applicable here. That is that it was harmless error. 10 I think that isn't true and I do emphasize that 11 this was a very close case on the trial so that this evidence 12 was important to the press, too. 13 Now, first my primary contention, as I say, is 14 that the admission of evidence obtained under the search 15 warrant, violated the Petitioner's constitutional rights 16 because the warrant which is issued by the chief prosecutor 37 instead of a neutral and detached magistrate. 18 And I need hardly remind the court that it has 19 said over and over again since Johnson against the United 20 States, Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion, that one of the indis-21 pensable conditions to a valid warrant is that the inferences 22 from the facts which lead to the complaint are drawn by a 23 neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the 23 officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting 25

out a crime.

2	The closest case, unquestionably, is Mancusi
3	against De Forte, where the court dealt with a subpoena duces
4	tecum that had been issued by the district attorney in New
5	York and Justice Harlan, in writing the opinion, considered
6	whether the evidence would have been admissible if the sub-
7	poena could be treated as a search warrant. And he said no;
8	and there was no dissent on that point in the court, because
9	the district attorney was not a detached and neutral officer.
10	Now, the state replies that Attorney General
11	Maynard, before he signed the warrant, took offichis black
12	prosecutorial hat and put on his white Justice of the Peace
1.3	hat. We think that that purely formal step did not, indeed,
14	could not confer on him a neutrality, a disinterestedness,
15	under these circumstances. He was, as I say, in active charge
16	of this prosecution. He was the man that the press had been
17	badgering for days.
18	Q He was the Attorney General of the State?
19	A Yes, but I would emphasize too, that he was
20	in active charge and hethrough the prosecution of the
21	trial.
22	Q Did he prosecute the case?
23	A Yes; yes. He had promised a vigorous, ruth-
24	less investigation just four days before he signed the warrant,
25	and the banner headline was: "Maynard has suspect." He was
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thoroughly wrapped up in the investigation and its success.
 Now, I don't direct this, again, personally. As a matter of
 fact, I knowhim and have a high regard for him, but it's
 beyond any man's human capability to be neutral and detached
 under those circumstances.

6 Q Well, do you challenge the existence of 7 probable cause for the warrant?

8 A We don't argue that; it has been argued in 9 the courts below. I'm prepared to assume that there was 10 probable cause here.

11 Q Would you say that the invalid warrant would 12 have prevented the police, who had probable cause, to search 13 the Pontiac, that the invalid warrant would have prevented 14 them from searching it if they had found it in motion on the 15 highway?

A Well, I would raise the question and do raise the question of whether the police raly on the warrant, and they do not assert any exigent circumstances, that that matter is really not looked into in the court below. I would suggest that under Giordenello against the United States the shift in claim is not available here.

But I would go on, Mr. Justice White, and I was about to do it, there would be three other grounds that the state invokes here, apart from the one, because I do not -and one is the line of cases beginning with Caryll against the

United States -- Caryll against the United States and ending with the Court's opinion which you delivered in Chambers and Moroney.

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A. I say that those cases are entirely distinguish-5 able. It's one thing for the police to stop a car in motion 6 on the highway when there is probable cause to believe that 7 the driver is either carrying contraband or fleeing the scene 8 of a crime. It's guite another argument to go to a man's 9 home and to search about in an automobile that's parked in his 10 driveway which is not in motion and is not about to be in 11 motion ---12 Q How do you -- on what basis do you say it's 13 not about to be in motion? 14 Well, in this case it's because he was in the A 15 custody of the Manchester police. 16. Well, I know, but I suppose other people in 0 17 his family had access ---13 Well, what I meant was that there was no A 19 evidence that it was about to be put in motion. There was no

evidence that it was about to be put in motion. There was no indication of an exigent circumstance. I think the burden is on the police if they are seeking to show that there is some reason for not getting a warrant. This wasn't hard to do here, where they had gotten a warrant that very day and had taken the time to do it. But, I think the burden, generally speaking, is on the police to show some exigency.

Now, if you got the car going, carrying contra band with somebody who was engaged in that you would have some
 reason to think you should act quick. But I see no reason,
 in all candor, and no way if you say --

5 Q Mr. Cox, when you stop the car on the high-6 way after it's in motion why you could always immobilize it 7 and wait for a warrant.

8 A Well, yes; and of course that is what divided 9 the court in changing its mind. But at least there one was 10 able to say that, well, what's the difference between searching 11 it then and there and taking it down to the police station and 12 searching it later at the police station. I'm not making 13 anything turn on the fact that this car was not searched until 14 the next day, or until a year later. I make nothing of that. I discloud any evidence on that. 15

I make a great deal of the fact that this was not incident to the arrest because the Petitioner had been arrested an hour-and-a-half or two hours earlier and was in custody at the time and I make a great deal of the fact that if the car was not stopped under circumstances indicated, that if you took time to get a warrant you might miss your chance to stop it and search it.

23QBut, the car itself was subject to one of24these search warrants.

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A The car was described as a container of the

things that were in the trunk.

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2	Q In the affidavit?	
3	A Yes. It was not described as the object of	
4	the search. Indeed, I think that it indicates that the police	
5	weren't really interested in the car except as a container	
6	of and I would suggest perhaps I can put the point by	
7	oversimplifying it most dramatically I don't see the dif-	
8	ference between searching for this object in a car parked in	
9	a man's garage and saying that you don't have to get a warrant	
10	to search for it if it's on a bench in the garage, or if it's	
11	in an office in the house or in the bedroom. It's really just	
12	as movable.	
13	Q Now, Caryll raised that	
14	A No; Caryll involves stopping the car on the	
15	highway when it was in motion and the contraband was being	
16	carried, and the language in Caryll was very explicit on that	
87	point. Chief Justice Taft, wasn't it, spoke of a right of	
18	free passage except under these circumstances. He was talking	
19	about people that are moving; things that are fleeing, as	
20	Your Honor told it in Chambers and Monroney, not about some-	
21	thing which is simply a container at the man's house.	-
22	And I press again: if what one is thinking of is	
23	a small what difference is there today between	
24	saying it may disappear because it's in the glove compartment	
25	in the car that is parked by a house or saying it may	
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disappear because it's on a bench in the barn or is in an 2 office in the building, where it could just as readily be put in the car and carried away. 3

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I submit that once Your Honors stepped over this 4 line the whole trend of the law of searches and seizures, 5 6 which encourages better police work and puts a disinterested magistrate between thepolice and the citizen and would 7 virtually be gone, I submit. I don't -- I'm rather skeptical 8 9 of students who parade horribles to me but it does seem to me that that would be true in this case. 10

Mr. Cox, did I understand you to concede that 11 0 had this application for a warrant been presented to a clas-12 sically neutral magistrate there ---13

A I said that I didn't think I had to dispute 14 that part. And I would point out, Mr. Chief Justice, that 15 from Certified Lumber(?) through Auguilar, this Court has 16 consistently held that the fact that you might get a search 17 warrant the right way will not excuse a search and seizure 18 made without a warrant or upon an invalid one. 19

And the question here is clearly: if the police 20 could justify by saying, well we could have gotten the warrant 21 the right way; we couldn't have gotten a neutral man to sign 22 it; in the first place there was a always a little bit of 23 uncertainty or speculation after the event, but in the second 24 place, the whole reason for the exclusionary rule would be 25

1 undermined because they would always come to court later and 2 defend it if they could. This was covered again in Mancusi. 3 and De Forte and the opinion quotes similar language by Justice Holmes in the Silverthorne Lumber case. D. I'm not sure it was relevant; I couldn't 5 0 recall the context in which you had mentioned this, but I 6 recall now; it was in response to a question. You didn't 7 volunteer the point about the --8 -- yes, but I don't stress the point. I A 0 10 don't want to conceal the fact that I don't stress it. We don't volunteer that there was probable cause. I don't know the state whether there was or not, but I'm not making any claim of 12 that. 13 I was not suggesting that it was relevant. Q 14 A Right. 15 Now, I think I should go on to the other and more 16 difficult, theoretically more difficult issue in the case, 17 which is the effect of the wife's consent to the taking of the 18 .22 caliber Mossberg rifle and some clothing from Petitioner's 19 closet; bedroom closet. 20 Very briefly, the facts are these: on that evening 21 of February 2nd, while he was being detained at the police 22 station ---23 Q Mr. Cox, before you go to February 2nd, may 24 I ask you about January 28th. Was Mrs. Coolidge present when 25

the police went out to the Coolidge home -1 2 A She was; she was. And do I get an intimation from the record 0 3 that the police asked questions and Mr. Coolidge showed him 4 guns and helped them inspect the car and agreed to take the 5 lie detector test at that time? 6 A He was entirely free and open in responding 7 and showing anything or responding to anything they asked. 8 Was she present, too, at all times? 0 9 She was present. I would simply say that A 10 the circumstances had changed so much by February 2nd when he 11 was being held in custody and that neither she nor the police 12 would be entitled to infer from his conduct then that he was 13 authorizing her to make up his mind for him later. 12 Well, this is my next question: if there is 0 15 anything from which a consent can be inferred on January 28th 16 is there anything in the record which would support an infer-17 ence that it was withdrawn between January 28th and February 18 22 19 There was nothing -- there is no evidence of A 20 his saying anything to her which would cause her to draw a 21 different inference. As I suggest, there was a marked dif-22 ference in the circumstances and his willingness to make that 23 decision at that time does not seen to me to properly authorize 23 her to infer that she could make the decision later. 25

May I speak briefly of the main points with respect to the wife's consent. First I would emphasize that there was a seizure and I think in the constitutional sense, a search here. The State Court of New Hampshire said no. I can illustrate the point best by putting another homely little example.

Suppose that the FBI agent were to come to my 7 office in Langdell Hall and say there was a valuable manu-8 script missing from the library of this Court and describe it, 9 saying they had some reason to think it was in Cambridge. 10 Assume further that I say, "Oh, that's curious, I have seen 11 something that looks very like that in my Brother Professor 12 Dawson's office down the hall. He keeps it in a bundle of 13 books in his library. Come on, I'll show it to you." Each 12. ofus has a key that fits every other office and we can 15 occasionally go in to borrow books. 16

17I take it if I had led the FBI into his office18and showed them that document at their request that everyone19would say that it was an unconstitutional search and seizure.

But you had no

21 A - No; quite so. I'm fond of him but not 22 married --

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But, that goes to the question, Justice Harlan, which I think is the highlight, and that is whether the wife was or was not authorized. F clearly would not be authorized. But the point I was trying to make simply was that this turns on the matter of the effect of the consent and not on whether they had to hunt around and it took them an hour to get rather than being taken there quicker.

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Q Assuming her authority, do you claim she was coerced?

A Well, we didn't present that in our petition, because I didn't think I could get certiorari on that question. It was found she was unusually nervous. It was found that the police discouraged her mother from staying in the house. It was found that she had been threatened by a captain of the New Hampshire police that afternoon, and told that she could go to jail if she withheld anything. She testified she felt she had to.

I think the point is and the reason I stress this: that in any case if you make a constitutional effect of a wife's consent turn -- if you make the constitutionality of the search and seizure turn on the wife's consent you are adverting all kinds of overreaching and pressures in taking advantage of ignorance on the part-of the police.

Q Well, why isn't that adequate safeguard to the voluntariness of the consent was -- you had a good case in Amos, which you cite Amos; I guess you do.

A Yes, you do. You know, what happened months afterwards is always hard to reconstruct. Voluntariness is a

1 matter of degree. That was just an element; I'm not --2 The real point, I've stressed three facts here 3 and tried to do this in the few minutes available. First, A that these were Petitioner's own private belongings. I would 5 say that the wife's general custody and possession did not extend to that. 6 7 Q But if there -- if the officers had seen if in plain sight on the table in the room they could have taken 8 the gun? 9 I -- we do not deny that. A 10 Okay. 29 Q Second; because at that point the officers A 12 would have been engaged in pursuing their business with Mrs. 13 Coolidge, whereas at this point that would have been a 10 At this stage they had followed her into the bed oom, simply 15 seeking to make her the instrument of defeating her husband's 16 constitutional rights. 17 And the third point, I say, is that he was avail-18 able and could have been asked. And I submit to you -- I 19 doubt that I have time to elaborate it, but I submit to you 20 that when you stop and think about it, the only consequence of 21 giving effect, legal effect to the wife's consent here would 22 be to enable the police to second-guess the chance that he 23 would disagree. And I submit that that is not consistent with 24

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the spirit and the letter of the constitution.

So, we think on either ground the judgment below should be reversed.

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Q This may be effected somewhat, I suspect,
4 by the fact that she, sometime earlier, had witnesses her
5 husband's openness to have them see the guns and look around
6 the house --

A Yes, but I would submit to you, Mr. Chief 7 Justice, that his willingness to do that on one occasion --8 what was it, many days before -- four days before; excuse me, 0 should not be taken as a surrender of the privilege of making 10 up his own mind on a later occasion when he said nothing. He 11 certainly didn't say to her then or when they got married: 12 "Dear wife, you have the authority to turn my most personal 13 possessions over to he police anytime you feel like it." 14

I don't think that was the effect of his conduct,
either. I submit that's the answer, Mr. Chief Justice.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mr. Cox.
Mr. Kalinski.

ORAL ARGUMENT BY ALEXANDER J. KALINSKI, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

The two issues, search and seizure issues which have been raised here by the Petitioner, turn on the admissibility of or rather suggest that the vehicle which

belonged to the Petitioner and certain vacuum sweepings taken
 from it subsequently to the time it came into the custody of
 the police or it came by unlawful means because of the
 issuance of an invalid search warrent.

5 And secondly, that certain items of clothing, 6 particularly and the murder weapon, a weapon which was sub-7 sequently testified to as being the weapon which fired the 8 fatal bullets, was obtained in derogation of his rights from 9 his wife at a time when he was not present.

Taking the first issue that the Petitioner wages, 10 we suggest that the Petitioner is stressing form rather than 11 substance. The basis of their contention is that the search 12 warrants were invalid because they were not issued by a neutral 13 and detached magistrate since the magistrate, so to speak, who 12 issued the warrants was the attorney general who was in 15 charge of the prosecution then and subsequently he tried this 16 case to the jury. 17

And the real issue, we say is: were the Petitioner's 18 constitutional rights affected by denying them in any way by 19 what actually happened here. Looking at the substance of what 20 happened, the trial court has specifically ruled that on the 21 basis of the following facts any magistrate, neutral and de-22 tached magistrate would have found probable cause and would 23 have issued the search warrants under these circumstances. 21. But why have a search warrant at all, then? 0 25

The police officers were very properly under -A the circumstances, seeking a search warrant and I am simply 2 stating that to deny the substance of what happened here and 3 say the search warrants were illegally issued under these 1 circumstances, would be --5 Are you telling us that the Attorney General 0 6 at that stage was a neutral ---7 You say he was neutral, in fact; I suppose? 0 8 I say he was neutral in fact, Mr. ---A 9 The fact being what? 0 10 On the basis of the facts which were A 11 presented to him and which are as follows: that on the evening 12 of the murder the Petitioner was missing from his home from 13 5:00 to 11:00 p.m. The time of death was fixed at about 9:00 14 -- between 8:00 and 10:00 p.m. that evening. At the time of 15 death, rather at 9:30 p.m. that evening Petitioner admitted 16 and other witnesses tetified to the fact that his vehicle, 87 his 1961 vehicle was on the highway opposite from where the 18 body of the victim was discovered eight days later, plus the 19 fact that he tried to obtain alibis for his whereabouts on the 20 evening of the 14th from other people; plus the fact that the 21 ballistics indicated that his weapon --22 I would like to just warn you, Mr. Kalinski, 23 when you get through I'm still going to ask you to explain the 24 fact that after knowing only that, how did he become neutral?

And the longeryou give me facts the more difficulty I, 9 personally, am going to have in finding that he's neutral 2 because he knows all of this. 3 A No; I don't think the evidence shows that he a. knew all of this at that time. I think the purpose of the 5 conference was to acquaint the attorney general with ---6 Q Did he issue the arrest warrant? 7 A Yes; he issued the arrest warrant and the 8 four search warrants. 9 Q Well, after he issued the arrest warrant, did 10 he know more facts after that? 11 No; at that time all the facts had been A 12 presented to him, some of which he ---13 In this conference room what was the purpose 0 14 of that? To present evidence for a search warrant or to 15 sum up just how good a case he had against this man? 16 For both reasons, Mr. Justice. 2 17 0 Well; did he participate in whether or not we 18 have got a good case against this man? 19 The testimony of Chief McGranaghan was that A 20 the conference was called for the purpose of presenting any-21 thing that had been -- that was relevant to the case at that 22 time, but ---23 And that's what they were discussing; weren't Q 23 they? 25

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New Hampshire law; could he have tried him? 1 In effect, he was also the judge; yes, to a A 2 certain extent. To the extent that he could issue a search 3 warrant lawfully under New Hampshire law. 1 But could he have been a judge and found him 0 5 guilty if the New Hampshire law was that way? 6 A New Hampshire was not ---7 Could he have investigated, prosecuted, 0 8 issued a warrant and convicted, just because Massachusetts 9 says that that's the law? 10 A I don't believe that that would be proper on 11 in any state and that was not the law in New Hampshire, but 12 it was the law that the Justiceof the Peace could issue a 13 search warrant under proper circumstances. 14 Well, it didn't say an attorney general could? Q 15 It did say that a Justice of the Peace could A 16 do so and in fact, many Justices of the Peace --17 I have one final question: is there anything 0 18 in the record which says that as of this moment, I, Joe Blow, 19 the Attorney General of New Hampshire, cease being prosecutor 20 and become magistrate? That's not in the record; is it? 21 I don't quite follow the question. There is A 22 nothing in the record of that nature. No --23 I'm just trying to find out when he changed 0 24 his hat. 25

The second A When he signed the search warrants it was parfectly proper for him to do so, we state, under these 2 3 circumstances. That's all I want to know. 13. 0 Did you say he was a Justice of the Peace? Q 5 Yes, sir, Mr. Justice. A. 6 How was he a Justice of the Peace, by what 7 0 authority? 8 A By the authority of the constitution and laws 0 of the State of New Hampshire. 10 What does the constitution provide ---Q 11 A He applies for a commissionand it's issued to 12 him by the Governor and the Governor's council and he is sworn 13 after the commission is issued before two other Justices of 12 the Peace and the commission constitutes his warrant to act as 15 a Justice of the Beace. 16 How long has that been in the constitution of Q 37 New Hampshire? 18 Since the initiation of the constitution; as A 19 I understand it. 20 What date? 0 21 bBack in 1700-something, Mr. Justice. A 22 Since that date the constitution has provided Ø 23 that the attorney general was a justice of the peace? 28 Not the attorney general; anyone who A 25 27

applies for a commission as a justice of the peace and is 1 2 issued a warrant, a commission, rather, by the Governor and 3 Council. 4 And he was issued a warrant? 0 13 A Yes; he was issued a commission. 6 What was the sentence in this case? 0 7 Life imprisonment, Mr. Justice'. A Why is it that the District Court's judgment 8 0 isn't in the record. At least I don't ---9 I'm not sure that it is, but the ----10 A I notice at page 259-of the record you said - Q 11 that the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Who does the 12 sentencing in New Hampshire; the jury or the judge? 13 The trial judge does the sentencing. 14 A And could the ---15 0 In a capital case it's up to the jury to A 16 recommend capital punishment or not. In this case they chose 17 not to recommend it. 18 But there has been sentencing, Q 19 There has been a sentence of life imprisonment A 20 by the trial justice. 21 I see. In other words, it would still be 22 0 life imprisonment unless the jury says: he's guilty; and we 23 impose death. 23 That's correct, Your Honor. A 25 28

3 Q I see. 2 Now that you have already been interrupted, 0 may I ask you if you know about how many justices of the 3 peace are there in New Hampshire? A 5 A Yes. I was going to get to that. There are quite a few justices of the peace, many of whom are not even 6 members of the bar. 7 Right. Q 8 A And this has been the -- incidentally, the 9 practice, as Mr. Cox pointed out, in the last session of the 10 legislature, the legislature changed the law and now a search 11 warrant can only be issued by a justice of a district or a 12 municipal court. 13 The prior practice of any justice of the peace 12 having authority to issue a search warrant or an arrest warrant, 15 has been changed. 16 About how many are there? I didn't get that Q 17 answer. 18 Hundreds; literally hundreds ---A 19 Oh, I thought thousands; literallythousands. 0 20 aren't there? 21 I wouldn't say there were thousands; I would A 22 say ---23 The population of the state is about a half a 0 20 million? 25

A The population is about 700,000, and I can't 1 really answer your question definitely and say that there 2 are -- there may be thousands, but it is a great number. 3 I'm familiar only with a little area up 0 A there, quite closely familiar with that, of 200 people, but I 5 am sure there are dozens of justices of the peace among those 6 few ---7 A Every -- practically every real estate broker, 8 every accountant, everyone in many offices in which legal ---9 Every lawyer? Q 10 A Every lawyer. 19 Q And most legal secretaries. 12 Every legal secretary, practically are all A 13 justices of the peace. 10 And most real estate agents. 0 15 A Yes, Your Honor. 16 And they all had at the time of this search, 0 17 they all had power to issue search warrants. 18 Yes; that's right. There is no question about A 19 that. 20 Q Up to the time the -- that it was changed, 21 was it customary for the attorney general to issue such 22 warrants? 23 A It has happened --24 0 As a justice of the peace? 25 30

Yes. It has happened in the past on many 8 A occasions. 2 Has it ever been attacked before? Q 3 It never has been raised before and in fact A a amongst the police, which has changed substantially back in 5 -- around this time after this case, was for a police officer 6 to go to a fellow police officer who was a justice of the 7 peace and have a search warrant or an arrest warrant issued. 8 The practice in New Hampshire never was for police 9 officers to go to a magistrate -- hardly ever, to go to a 10 magistrate of the district court and have it issued. 1 Was the officer who made the affidavit here Q 12 for this warrant, did he happen to be a magistrate, too? 13 I do not know the answer, Your Honor. He A 12 probably was. He was the chief of police ---.15 Would the -- wouldit have been any different 0 16 if, instead of bothering the attorney general, he had acted in 17 both capacities himself? 18 Yes, because then he would be passing judg-A 19 ment on himself ---20 Q Well, he could have done it the other way. 21 The attorney general could have made out the affidavit and he 22 could have issued the warrant. 23 I think it --A 20 If they are both JPs and they both have the 0 25 31

same information.

2	A Well, the point was the the attorney general
3	didn't have the information; the chief of police did.
<i>Z</i> ,	I don't think there is anything further
15)	Q What articles were seized?
6	A Under the search warrants the only item of
7	evidence that was seized was the 1951 Pontiac and there is
8	some question about whether that was under the search warrant.
9	Q The automobile, you mean?
10	A The 19 the automobile of the Petitioner.
11	At the time they arrested him the automobile was seated in
12	parked in his driveway and the police arrested him; took him
13	to the police station; called a tow truck and the tow truck
14	took an hour to an hour and a half to get there and the
15	vehicle was removed.
16	The search warrant authorized the executing
17	officer to search the vehicle, but it did not specifically
18	identify the vehicle as an item to be seized.
19	Q Wholly aside from the warrant under
20	A Yes, I think on several independent grounds;
21	on probable cause alone, which I have outlined; on the seizure
22	incident, which was lawful arrest and I don't believe that the
23	arrest warrant was ever challenged here, but it may be
24	Q Yes, but what about aside from that, did you
25	have any other grounds for seizing the vehicle under New
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dia no Hampshire law and impounding it as evidence or --2 A Only that it was an instrumentality of the 3 crime. Q Well, what if it is; can you seize - are you 1. authorized to impound automobiles for that? 5 Under the statute, as I recall it, the 6 A RSA 595, one of the sections enumerates the items which may be 7 specifically seized and the fourth or fifth one is a general 8 cen which states that anything connected to the crime for 0 which the Respondent was arrested. So, under that particular 10 category of the statute, I would answer your question: yes; 11. it would be something that could be seized since it was an 12 item of evidence pertaining directly to the crime for which he 13 was arrested. 14 You had just started telling me what articles 0 15 were seized in the controversy here. Would you mind --16 Under the search warrant the only possible A 17 item would be the Petitioner's vehicle and the vacuum sweep-18 ings which were obtained from it subsequently to its --19 What? 0 20 And the vacuum sweepings of certain minute A 21 particless which were taken out of the vehicle after it was in 22 police custody. 23 Is that what's in controversy here? 0 24 A That's what's in controversy with respect to 25

the issuance of the search warrant.
 Q What were those sweepings?
 A The vacuum sweepings were examined by
 experts and they were segrega ad under a microscope and also
 similar items were taken from the clothing of the victim and
 compared by the experts and on probabilities he testified that

10 clothing?
11 A No; they were mostly plastics, paints, metal
12 and things of that nature.

was the sum and substance of the evidence on this point.

the particular particles probably had a common source. This

Were these particles fabrics from her

13 Q What was the date of this conviction, Mr.
14 Kalinski?

15AThe date of the conviction was June of 1964,16the 17th, I believe it was. '65; excuse me, Your Honor.

Q Thank you.

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A year and a half after the crime took place. A 18 To summarize the first point we simply contend 19 that on the substance of what happened here there was probable 20 cause; the trial court found that any neutral and detached 21 magistrate would have found probable cause and the way we read 22 the Auguilar case and the Giordenello and the other cases is 23 that all -- this is all that the constitution requires is that 20. on the basis of adequate facts presented to a magistrate who 25

was in fact, neutral and detached, these, the finding of
 search warrants were issued.

Q How about the language of the cases. It
doesn't talk in terms of neutrality in fact.

5 A The next issue raised by the Petitioner, has 6 to do with certain items of clothing and the murder weapon 7 which was obtained by the police from the wife on the date of 8 February 2, 1964..

9 I would like to just go over the facts briefly 10 with respect to how this -- these items were obtained, be-11 cause I think this is very crucial to sustain the -- to 12 explain, rather, the finding of the trial court that there, 13 in fact, was no search and seizure in this case with respect 14 to the murder weapon and the clothes.

As Mr. Cox pointed out, on January the 28th when 15 the police were conducting a very general investigation, not 16 knowing who they were looking for or even what they were look-17 ing for in terms of a murder weapon, and based on the reports 18 only of a neighbor that this particular individual, the 19 Petitioner in this case, was not at home on that evening be-20 tween 5:00 and 11:00 o'clock, they went to his home and asked 21 him about where he was that evening. During the course of 22 this visit he fully discussed his activities on thatevening. 23 He took them out and showed them his car and he brought out 24 three weapons to show them. The police officers who were 25

there, looked at the three weapons and neither of the three 2 weapons was the murder weapon.

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3 So, while they were there they asked him if he would mind taking a lie detector test and he said no; that he 1 was a bakery truck driver and could not get off except on a 5 Sunday, so could it be on a Sunday. And they set a date for 6 the following Sunday, which was February the 2nd. 7

On February 2nd one of the officers that was 8 there, called him and he came down to the station voluntarily 9 they stayed at the station -- this was at 1:00 o'clock in the 10 afternoon and they stayed until about 3:00 to 3:30 talking 11 about whether he should take the test or not. And finally he 12 agreed to go with them to state police headquarters in Concord. 13

Before, or rather during the tests there, they 12 turned him over to Sergeant McBain at that time, of the state 15 police, who administered the lie detector test, which was 16 inconclusive, but is the course of administering the test the 17 Petitioner admitted a larceny of \$300 from his employer. 18

, The police then took the Petitioner back to 19 Manchester and since he had been giving them conflicting 20 stories about where he was on that evening: that he was out 21 with a girl or that he was out with somebody else or that he 22 had gone to another town, they kept checking what he told them 23 and he stayed at the police station until 2:00 o'clock that 24 morning. And at about 9:00 that evening the sergeant came down 25

from Concord and talked to the Captain in charge of the police 2 station and he and another police officer -- not the first two 3 that were there on the 28th, went out to the Petitioner's D. home to talk to the wife to verify one thing about the 5 larcenty that he had told them, namely that he had bought a 6 washing machine, and secondly, to discuss with her his where-7 abouts on the evening of the murder: January 13, 1964.

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See.

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When they arrived there the mother-in-law, the Petitioner's mother, was there and they started to talk to the Petitioner's wife and the mother-in-law made some statements and the testimony is that she left at their request.

12 After the mother-in-law left, the Petitioner's 13 wife discussed this with the two police officers who were 1A there; namely; about where the Petitioner had been on that evening. They told her that they were conducting a general 15 investigation, an investigation into the crime, the murder and 16 that at this point also they had no knowledge of what weapons he had shown to the other two officers. They had no knowledge 18 of what particular weapon they were looking for. They asked 19 her and told the Petitioner's wife that they were examining 20 "hand weapons."

She volunteered that he had some rifles and asked 22 if they would like to see them. They said yes. She went into 23 the bedroom and they followed her. Then she said, "I believe 20, I asked them if they wanted the guns." In other words, the 25

request for -- to take the guns did not initiate with the police officers; it initiated with the Petitioner's wife. And one of the policeofficers said, "no," and the other one said "we might as well take them," which is consistent with the finding of the court that they did not at that point know what they were looking for.

As it turned out, later that evening and she 7 brought out not three, but four weapons, one of which turned out 8 to be the murder weapon. Later that evening at the police 9 station the other policeofficer who had been down at the 10 ballistic laboratory, returned about close to midnight and 1 for the first time, at the time when they already had these 12 four weapons at the police station, they know that they are 13 looking for a .22 caliber Mossberg rifle. And he recognizes 12 that there's one on the bench at the police station. 15

The evidence was that the Petitioner saw his clothes and his guns at the police station that evening and in fact, the next morning, offered to sell one of the guns to one of the police officers.

20 And, it's within this factual background that the 21 Petitioner raises the question of a search and seisure. The 22 trial court ruled and the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld 23 the ruling that there was, under these facts and circumstances, 24 no search and no seisure. There was no quest; they did not 25 go throughout the house looking for anything. In fact, it was

only at the offer of the wife that they took the rifles with 8 them and under these circumstances the contention of the 2 Respondent here is that there was no search and seizure and 3 if that's the case, then there is no issue for this Court to A pass upon and the ruling of the court below should be upheld. 5 But, even assuming that there was a search or a 6 seizure, under the law it is the contention of the Respondent 7 here that a wife has the authority to consent to a, voluntarily 8 consent to a search and seizure of her home that she has 9 lawful control and possession of. And I think --10 So, technically you think the situation here 0 11 is as though the wife had taken the guns out of the closet and 12 taken them down to the police station --13 A And handed them over. 10 "Here are my husband's guns." Now, she may Q 15 not have authority to do that, but you say that if the police 16 had taken them there nevertheless wouldn't have been any 17 search and seizure involved? 18 A That is correct, Your Honor, and the fact that 19 she also made a statement that evening which I haven't referred 20 to before, was -- it's in the evidence: "We have nothing to 21 hide," and the basis of that statement is obviously the events 22 that happened four days earlier when the two other police 23 officers were there and the Petitioner himself brough out 24 weapons and showed them the car and answered all their questions 25

without any hesitation. There was no reason for her not to
 believe otherwise but the fact that they did not have anything
 to hide.

Had he been arrested at that time? A 0 A He was not arrested until three weeks later. 5 He was not even a prime suspect in the case at that time, 6 7 because the police had nothing to go on at that point, other than the fact that he was not home that evening. It was not 8 until several weeks later that the weapon that was tested 9 was obtained that evening and indicated that it was the murder 10 weapon; that indicated to the police that he was the perpe-81 trator of this crime. 12 That's the weapon you say the wife gave to 0 13 them? 13 Yes, Mr. Justice Black. A 15 So that under those circumstances we say that 16 there was no search and seizure and there is no issue. 17 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you. The case is 18 submitted. 19 Mr. Cox, you acted at the Court's request and by 20 appointment and thank you for your assistance to the Court and 21 of course, for your assistance to the Petitioner. 22 MR. COX: Thank you. 23 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: The case is submitted. 28. (Whereupon, at 3:00 o'clock p.m. the argument in 25 the above-entitled matter was concluded) 40