Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1970

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APR 9 1971

In the Matter of:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner, :

VS.

ROOSEVELT HUDSON HARRIS,

Respondent.

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Place Washington, D. C.

Date March 23, 1971

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2	OCTOBER TERM, 1970
3	MANN THE BASE AND BLOCK AND SEED HOSE HOSE LIGHT WATER SAME WATER FROM MICH. MICH. MICH. MICH. MICH. MICH. MICH.
4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
5	Petitioner, :
6	vs. : No. 30
7	ROOSEVELT HUDSON HARRIS,
8	Respondent.
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10	Washington, D. C.,
the same	Tuesday, March 23, 1971.
12	The above-entitled matter came on for argument at
16	
13	2:00 o'clock p.m.
13	2:00 o'clock p.m. BEFORE: WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice
13	2:00 o'clock p.m. BEFORE: WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice
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PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will hear arguments next in No. 30, United States vs. Harris.

Miss Rosenberg, you may proceed whenever you are ready.

ARGUMENT OF BEATRICE ROSENBERG, ESQ., ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

the Court. This case is here on petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and it presents what has become a perennial problem of the kind of information you need to get a search warrant and how courts and mgistrates — magistrates and courts, I should say — should interpret them.

The particular aspect of the question which this case present is what law enforcement officers are supposed to do when they get information from someone who has not given information in the past and who is unwilling to let his name be used but who nevertheless gives information which a responsible law enforcement officer feels he cannot ignore.

Q Is it clear and do we know in this case that the informant had not given information in the past?

A Well, we don't know except that considering the many, many cases in which reliability is placed on the fact
"I have now received information from an informant who has

given information in the past." It is hard to believe that if he had an investigator would not have said so.

Q Well, it is not necessarily hard for me to believe that.

A Pardon?

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Q Do you think it follows from what we do know in the record in this case that we have here clearly an informant who had not given information in the past?

careless operator, I don't know, but the fact is that as one goes through the cases, particularly since Spinelli, but since McCray vs. Illinois, there is case after case in which it is almost a formula, "I have received information from an informant who has in the past been proved reliable," sometimes with the added statement of "he has given specific information about instances," but it is hard to believe that particularly a federal investigator who had had information in the past from this informant would not have so stated if in fact he had done so. And certainly at least we have to take this case, since he did not claim to have had information in the past, as representing the situation of an informer who had not given information in the past.

Q And here I gather the affidavit identifies the informant as a person, does it not?

A As a person, yes.

Q Sometimes the informant is an electronic surveillance bug, isn't he?

B.

A I don't think that is any problem here, not from the looks of the affidavit.

Q Well, the detective is an informant, he examined him and got an affidavit from him under oath as to what he encountered.

lar problem comes here in relation to someone who had some connection with the defendant because he purchased liquor for him. But the problem, as the brief in this case shows, can come about in all kinds of ways. The problem of the first informant is a very important problem in law enforcement because it can come at the one end from a completely responsible eminent citizen who happens to witness a crime. It came from ordinary citizens who simply feel they have seen something that causes them to make reports. Police get information — pardon?

Q I just wondered, what is this having found this person to be a prudent person, what is that?

A Well, Your Honor, I think in context it means credible. The court says you pay no attention to it at all, but it seems to me the opinion below in that respect, in that little respect, in the example of how not to read search warrants, and I don't know whether that is colloquialism or

not. Obviously this is not a master of the English language as we get from "I have received information from a person who fears for their life and property." He wouldn't get an "A" in English. But I don't know that that is the question. I think when it is read in context, "I have interviewed this person and found him to be proven," that means I found him in my judgment to be somebody whom I trust.

Q That is the same as saying --

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A Well, I don't think he is saying reliable. I think he is saying I offer you my judgment that this is a person whom I can trust and that gets us to this problem, one gets information from a person who has not given information in the past.

Now, the one thing that is clear about this affidavit on page 4 of the government's brief is that the informant is talking from personal knowledge. What he has said is this person has personal knowledge -- and I am quoting -- "of and has purchase illicit whiskey from within the residence described for a period of more than two years, and most recently within the past two weeks, has knowledge of a person who purchased illicit whiskey within the past two days from the house, has personal knowledge that the ilicit whiskey is consumed by purchasers in the outbuilding known as and utilized as the 'dance hall,' and has seen Roosevelt Harris go to the other outbuilding, located about 50 yards from the residence, on

numerous occasions, to obtain the whiskey for this person and other persons."

So that this case is clearly distinguishable from most of the situations that have come before this Court where we do not know the basis of the informant's knowledge, and we do. It is personal knowledge, and true the personal knowledge stopped at two weeks before the day, but that this is not still information is alleged — I think it appears anyway from the nature of the business — but the fact that he knows, the informant knows somebody who bought whiskey two days before the date of the affidavit. I take it the only importance of that is to show that the business is still going on, not just a presumption but that information adds that.

- Q The only problem that they ought to see is the informer in the case?
 - A That's right.
 - Q That is the only issue?
- A That is the only issue in the case. I take it that the informer had given his own information in his own affidavit by name, and it would not be hearsay, it would be his own affidavit, is no question that the search warrant could have been issued on that.

Now the question is should it be different when the informer is afraid or unwilling or for some reason will not make the affidavit to the magistrate but is willing to make

this sworn statement to the investigator. Now, this isn't --

Q Well, an informer wouldn't make a sworn affidavit --

- A No, a sworn verbal statement is what it said.
- Q I swear that --

Anna A

A What it says is -- has given under a sworn verbal statement the following information -- let's assume it is not sworn, I think that is not the issue. The informer is willing to give specific information but is unwilling to make a sworn affidavit to be presented to the magistrate. This is a situation which does arise, it is frequent, the court has recognized time and again that informers who must reveal themselves will not talk, so that this is a practical situation in which the law enforcement agencies must deal with, and the question is what do they do about it.

Now, opponent says when you get this kind of information, you go out and make a buy, but you will notice that the affidavit does say on page 4 that "Roosevelt Harris has had a reputation for over 4 years as being a trafficker...and over this period I have received numerous information from all types of persons as to his activities. Constable Howard Johnson located a sizable stach of illicit whiskey in an abandoned house under Harris' control during this period of time," and so on.

But the fact that for four years they had known about

this and haven't been able to make a buy suggests to me that it isn't quite that simple. There is any case in which you can go and corroborate an informer's information by making a buy or an equivalent. And of course there are many situations when you have first informants where that is impossible. You get word from a hotel maid that there is a gun under somebody's bed and he may be gone tomorrow, this is something one has to act on. And when you get word from an accomplice, which is the situation in several recent cases, that the diamond that he stole is about to be sold to a Mr. X down the street, you have got to act.

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- Q Well, surely this isn't that kind of a case?
- A No, this isn't that kind of a case.
- Ω This was over a period of four years that this man had been --

A Yes, but in a period of four years they have not been able to make a buy. All I am saying is that they had not -- it isn't that simple to say, well, go out and make a buy and corroborate the informant. Obviously for some reason this is not an easy case -- this has not been an easy defendant.

- Q This was in the Eastern District of Kentucky.

 In what town or village or city, do you know?
 - A I think it is -- I don't remember.
- Q I suppose it is a very small community, it might be hard for a law enforcement officer or his agent to

make a buy because I suppose it would be presumed that everybody knew everybody else in that community and so forth.

A Right.

Q Is that your point, that --

a I don't know. I know nothing more about this case than appears in the record. There are two things that appear in the record, one that they had the information over four years and acted apparently the day they got somebody who had personal knowledge so that I assume they hadn't been able to do it very easily before and the other thing that appears is that the statement that the informant says he fears for his life. Those are the two things that appear aggressive.

The fact is, however, that there are then lots of situations — not this case, but there are certainly many in the list that have to be considered beyond just this case as to what does one do about first information where either because of time or circumstances corroboration — you can't have a long investigation for corroboration.

And one of the first things I think one has to ask himself with regard to this question is what would be the motive for an informant to lie. I understand that an informant might have a motive -- it seems to me two motives. One is if he is an accomplice or somebody involved, is arrested, he wants to do something for himself. If I give information to the police maybe they will go easy. And the other is a grudge

against a particular person.

News

Neither of those, it seems to me, involves a motive to lie, particularly in the nature of a search warrant, because you are not going to accomplish anything for the police and therefore for betterment of yourself, or you are not really going to get the man you have a grudge against in jail if you send the police off on a wild goose chase.

So the informant, by a grudge, or by wanting to better himself, has a motive to give correct information and probably wouldn't do it unless he had some motive of that kind, assuming he is not the good citizen but the person involved in crminality in some form or other. But I have been trying to see what benefits he would gain for himself by lying and I frankly have not been able to think of any.

But assuming that even so we need some determination as to the honesty of the informant. The question is how do you get it if you can't for some reason have a further investigation or a further surveillance, and you do it at one end or the other, either what do you know about the person who gives you information or what do you know about the person informed against.

Now in some cases, I take it -- not this one -- in some cases, I take it, you can say I have received information from a respectable citizen who had absolutely no motive to lie, that he has personal knowledge that such and such occurred. It

seems to me something a magistrate could properly give weight to in determining whether to believe an informant who according to reports speaks not on hearsay but on personal knowledge.

Now, one just has to bear in mind in that situation that the more you describe the informant the more you tend to identify him. If an investigator says I got this information from a hotel maid who was there at nine o'clock in the morning or something like that, he is identifying — it isn't very hard for anybody who wanted to to find out who that hotel maid is.

Nevertheless I do think that in some situations an investigator could probably say I have received a report from a citizen who had absolutely no motive to lie who is well regarded in the community. The investigator here did about all I guess he thought he could do. He said I have interviewed this person, received his statement under oath, and I am giving you my judgment that he is a credible person.

- Q Did the officer have the informant's name?
- A Did he?
- Q Yes.

- A I don't know, Your Honor. It doesn't appear from the record.
- Q Would it make any difference in your approach if the informant, the first time informant, refused to give his name to the officers?
 - A Yes, I think it would. I think that these are

all nuances that we have to consider. I think it would be more specific, that's right, it would strengthen this affidavit at that end if the officer said this man gave me his name and address and a sworn written statement. He didn't do that here. He gave him a sworn oral statement but he would not identify himself. This is — these are all things to be weighed and I don't give a great deal of weight to what was said about the informant here because there isn't much, it is just that we do have a judgment of the officer that I tell you — I on my oath tell you, Mr. Magistrate, that this is a credible person.

Now, we have a system of permanent magistrates or upgrading magistrates, they are going to know the investigators in their region. It seems to me something they have a right to consider.

Q They are going to do what? I missed that, Miss Rosenberg.

better than the commissioners do now, certainly in the ones where you have full-time magistrates, are going to know the character of the investigators who regularly come before them, and it seems to me that this is something they have a right to consider, whether as long as they could swing thing -- I don't have to decide, don't have to ask the court to decide -- yes, Mr. Justice?

Q In this particular case, it worries me, if I

understand you correctly, they have known for four years that this guy was in the bootleg business and I would assume the only way they could know that is from people bringing them information.

A Yes, because the --

Q Why did it take them four years to get a "reliable informant"?

A The information might be, you know, from the neighbors who saw people come. I don't know the reason but --

Q I wonder why he was more reliable than all of the others?

have personal knowledge. I don't know what else they had.
Unfortunately it is true that people have reputations, I guess in much bigger crimes than this, Mr. Justice, but a lot of things we know that we can't prove, and that brings me to the second and what I think is the more important part of how do you believe the informant in this case, and that is the statement that we have heard about this man for four years and we found -- and once we found whiskey in an abandoned house under his control. And I at least in the situation we have here where the informant speaks from personal knowledge, we are not dealing with a very informant like Spinelli, we are dealing in a situation here where the informant speaks from personal knowledge and the question is should we believe him or not.

In that situation I do ask this Court to modify the language of Spinelli to the effect that reputation is really a matter of bold suspicion having no weight whatsoever.

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This Court said as long ago as 164 United States that good reputation can make the difference between innocence and guilt in the trial of a case. And prior decisions of the Court have said that reputation is something you can consider in probable cause. And actually in the trial of the case --

Q What language expressly in Spinelli is it that you find yourself uncomfortable with?

A The fact that defendant there had a reputation as a gambler was "a broad and unilluminating assertion of suspicion that is entitled to no weight in appraising the validity of the magistrate's decision to issue a warrant."

This is contrary to Brinegar, to Jones, to Rugendorf. As I say, it is contrary to the old Edgington case about good character and really we keep bad reputation out of a trial, not because it is irrelevant but because too much weight could be attached to it through a jury.

And so it seems to me that at least in a situation here, as I say, there they were dealing with an informer who speaks through personal knowledge, certainly at least in that situation, and the question is merely can we act on this personal knowledge even though we don't know this man, and we haven't dealt with him before. You consider the fact that the

person he is informing against has been the subject of a lot of suspicion. And if I have to narrow it beyond that, I quess it is particularly true in fields like liquor and narcotics, where reputations are generally -- have some backing. Certainly it is true that it is possible for somebody to have the name without the game, but it is extremely unlikely with relation to premises where liquor is sold, and therefore when you get, as I say, not a very kind of suspicion, not a tick, but an informant who at least to the officer is willing to make statements under oath, then it seems to me whether you -- and the issue is, as Mr. Justice White said at the beginning, you believe your informant, you have the fact, which is what this case presents, that as far as I can see he would have no motive to lie even if it is assumed he had got into trouble when he talked to the police, it would still do him no good unless the information he gave was -- turned out to be lies. If he sends the police on a wild goose chase, that doesn't help him.

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Secondly, the officer is willing to swear that he has examined the man and found him a credible person; and, thirdly, the person informed against is someone who has had this reputation. I take it they were trying to get and could not really get a way of checking the information.

Now, let's not forget that this isn't guilt or innocence.

This is simply a presentation to the magistrate for authority

to go in and look at the premises to see whether this reputation and the informant's information together are accurate, whether there is in fact illegal activity concealed here.

No.

B.

Q Miss Rosenberg, I think the trouble with it not being guilt or innocence, I understand that in moonshine cases if you move a motion to suppress, you have had it.

A Well, that is true, Your Honor, but the fact remains that they didn't find the whiskey and that is the end of that for the government.

Q But the fact that you find it doesn't validate the warrant.

A No, the fact that you find it doesn't validate the warrant. What I am saying is that even if we assume that this informer had some motive which might conceivably — had some reason why he was willing to talk to police, and apparently a lot of people weren't, the fact is that he would have no motivation to give false information. He had everything to gain by giving accurate information, if he hopes to gain anything, than by giving false information.

Q I suppose you would probably say, wouldn't you, that an informant tells people that liquor is in a certain place, there it is, and if they go there they will find it, they go there and they find it, it wouldn't be easy to convince you, would it, that the informant was not worthy of belief?

A No. Unfortunately, the magistrate who has to issue the warrant just doesn't have that --

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Q They don't have to try the guilt or reputation for truth and veracity of all the witnesses in a search warrant case, do they?

A No, Your Honor. I think there is no question that if this informant had given them an affidavit, this case wouldn't be here. The point is that you do go to the man who is unwilling to give his name to the magistrate, and the question is how much more in the face of that, what do we need to corroborate it, and I say that this corroboration can come in different ways.

I take it if you could really say to the magistrate this information comes to me from a leading citizen of the town, who has absolutely no motivation to falsify, then it wouldn't matter whether the person informed against had a bad reputation or not.

Q Wouldn't it be to go out and get two or three witnesses who would swear to the magistrate that these people have a general reputation for being truthful, for telling the truth?

A I take it --

Q That is so, isn't it?

A Well, it gets awfully complicated because if there is a motive, if there is a real interest in keeping the

identity of the informer secret -- and this Court has recognized that time and again -- then you can't get people to swear to his reliability because that would reveal him immediately.

There is a real movement on in this country to upgrade police investigations.

Q To do what?

A To upgrade. But it seems to me in relation to this matter of warrants that those who must deal with the police and sort of train them must make them understand what this is about.

Now, I think it is possible to make law enforcement agencies generally understand that you can't barge in without a warrant, that you can't barge in on just reputation, because that is not enough. I am not disputing that the police sometimes find this very exasperating, you know they want to act in a hurry, but I think here are principles which can be explained and understood.

But I think that if we try to lay down rules that are contrary to normal experience of law enforcement officers, then law becomes to them something sort of archaic, a series of rigid rules that they don't understand. And I truthfully believe that to say to an alcoholic and tax investigating officer that when he gets an informant, the fact that he has sort of heard rumors about this place, to put it as vague as

that for four years, is something that is entitled to no weight 1 2 whatsoever. It is just contrary to life as he understands it and something that is going to make -- that becomes a rule 3 13. that to him does not seem to accord with experience. And I think that it is in the long run to the interest of good law 5 enforcement that we uphold reasonable judgments. And I think 6 in this case where the officer had information on personal 7 knowledge which he thought came from a credible person, but 8 which also coincided with a lot of other unspecific information that he had been acquiring over four years, it was proper 10 him to ask for a search warrant, proper for the magistrate to 99

give it.

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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Miss Rosenberg.
Mr. Umin, you may proceed.

ARGUMENT OF STEVEN M. UMIN, ESQ., ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MR. UMIN: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court. The search that took place here and the circumstances that gave rise to it, took place in Middlesboro, Kentucky, in a little shack alleged to contain alcohol on which the tax was not paid, but in fact the --

Q This was in the City of Middlesboro?

A To the best of my knowledge it was. It was on Dansbury Avenue in Middlesboro. Now I have seen pictures of the place, which are in the record. To what extent Middlesboro

is a big city or not is something I am not familiar with.

Sport Sport

The circumstances however are paralleled by similar circumstances in every metropolitan area and indeed now suburban areas that I am sure this Court is all too familiar with, the circumstances in which a law enforcement officer, familiar with some reputation of a particular suspect, becomes on a given day possessed of information not devised of his own observation but from the say-so of a layman that an illegal stimulent is harbored in a given house. That to be sure happens probably hundreds of times a day in the metropolis of this country with respect to narcotics.

The decision in this case will therefore affect those cases greatly as well as it will the pursuit of the illegal whiskey in the back woods.

I think we can say on this record that this is a case in which an officer got possession of information from someone not another law enforcement officer, and not from his own observations, to the effect that there was an illegal stimulent in this case, non-tax paid whiskey on someone's premises.

The record doesn't show a number of things. It
doesn't show with any great clarity that this was a firsttime informant or indeed even someone who may have been unreliable in the past. To be sure, this Court has counseled that
magistrates interpret search warrants, affidavits for search

warrants in the light of common sense. The government here would have common sense suggest first that prudent means re-2 liable, perhaps not credible but reliable, and secondly --3 Q Suppose the case was up for trial before a B. jury and they put on this same informant, would it be up to 5 the government to prove that he had a good character for 6 truth and veracity? 7 A No, it certainly wouldn't, Your Honor. 8 Suppose this affidavit for the application of a 9 search warrant had indeed used the term "reliable, trust-10 worthy" --11 12 Yes, Your Honor. That of course is not this case, although I think it would be insufficient under this 13 Court's standards in Aguilar. Aguilar was precisely that sort 10 of case. 15 Then you are not standing on the word imprudent? 16 17 No, I am certainly not. In fact, I would plan 18 to assume though not concede that this is a first-time in-19 formant for purposes of the argument I would want to make. 20 But he was reliable? 21 Of course not, Your Honor. There is nothing in 22 this record to suggest that. 23 Do you suggest that prudent negates the idea of reliability? 24

I wouldn't suggest that it negates it, but --

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particularly the informant context. It may well bear a strong inference of unreliability. A reliable --

Q Let me hear that again.

13.

bear a strong inference of unreliability. A prudent may bear a strong inference of unreliability. A prudent narcotics informer may really be one who makes educated guesses about who it is in the community who may well have a bottle of illegal liquor on his premises because he is being paid for the number of people he actually turns up. Having seen Roosevelt Harris at a party, he said, at which illegal liquor was served, he would take a guess that Roosevelt Harris may have a bottle of liquor in his house. It may be perfectly prudent for him under those circumstances to suggest to an officer a list of thirty or forty people for whom search warrants may be obtained, but one such person is Roosevelt Harris.

Now if it turns out that in 29 cases the liquor is in fact found, the informant would subsequently be found reliable. But it is that one case that we are concerned about, and in proving narcotics or liquor informants may well be inclined to take a guess just on the chance that it will turn up reward or payment or whatever it is, encourages him to continue as an informant, something of course that this record says absolutely nothing about.

Q Would that same argument not apply if the man was on trial and you summoned a jury and the jury was before

9 you and you were trying his quilt or innocence? 2 Of course, in the jury --A And you put him up for his witness? 3 It indeed would but in the jury context there is 4 25 a thought --Well does the jury have a right to assume he is 6 a man of bad character? 7 No, I wouldn't --A 8 No? 0 9 The jury may have a right to --10 A In the preliminary proceeding of getting a 17 search warrant? 12 Excuse me, Your Honor, I'm sorry. 13 It would in a preliminary proceeding of getting 90 a search warrant but not in the actual trial --15 No, I wouldn't suggest that the magistrate 16 should necessarily presume unreliability in this case. I 17 suggest simply that the inference of reliability, knowing what 18 is known about informants, particularly in the stimulent con-19 text, is not compelling at all from the word prudence. Pru-20 dence may suggest, as the Court of Appeals suggested, that a 21 22 man is circumspect. It may suggest that he is very good at 23 taking educated quesses, and that it would be sensible for 24 him to do that. I don't suggest that unreliability is compelled

either, but that the inferences are equally balanced and a jury

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could well begin without any notion of what prudence meant or with a notion that it meant reliable or unreliable.

Q The word prudent in the context of this statement may have a connection with the fact that the informant feared for his life or property and he was being very prudent --

A Certainly.

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Q -- in not revealing his name and so on. It seems that it could well be related to the preceeding sentence in the paragraph, doesn't it?

A That certainly --

Q It has nothing to do with reliability or not.

A That is the point. I mean the context of the affidavit and the context of informant behavior generally lends to the word prudence so many connotations that it is difficult even to settle on a meaning; even more important than settling on a meaning is coming up with some basis for magistrates to assess whether that judgment of prudence is correct. How can a magistrate know what the word prudent means in an affidavit, what it implies about the judgment made if there are no, in fact, circumstances stated in the affidavit to substantiate the meaning of prudence in this context? That after all is the function that this Court has historically attributed to the magistrate.

The check before the search upon the probaility that the search is warranted, the check upon a judgment that a man

is reliable. The magistrate in this case would have to first define prudence in a way that would allow the determination of reliability and, second, speculate in the dark as to whether this man was properly determined to be reliable or prudent or whichever was settled upon by the officer in question.

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Q Getting away from the nuances of prudent for a moment, what significance do you contribute (a) to the specificity of the allegations made in the affidavit as to what the informant told him and, second, to the allegation that the agent himself had gone to the extent of getting the informant to put his information under oath?

A As to the details, Your Honor, I think there is very little you can attribute to that in this context. The details in no sense resemble the details in Draper, which were details predictive in nature. In that case it could be said that when details given by an informant were subsequently confirmed by an agent, therefore they had a chance in that case not to eventuate it, the informant became more credible because the information predicted was in fact confirmed to be true and indeed the informant — the likelihood that the informant was giving personal information was increased by the nature of the details in Draper.

There was vritually no real detail in this affidavit at all. The details given pertains to the relationship among buildings on a given residence in an at best medium size town,

probably observable detail, but suggests no particular knowledge on the part of the informant or any particular credibility.

Indeed it should be noted that as to that detail the investigator in this case didn't even go so far, as this record shows, to confirm that before applying for the warrant.

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of the case and the personal observation aspect of Draper is likewise not here. The critical point is though nothing in this case, as decided by the Sixth Circuit, impairs law enforcement at all or certainly not to any degree sufficient to outweigh the interest of individual security. That after all is the test under the Fourth Amendment, is a search reasonable; reasonable involves balance, and this Court has expressed that test in Camara and in Terry as the balancing of the need to search against the enormity of the invasion.

In this case, a number of alternative opportunities were presented to the officer. Even if it were true that a buy had been difficult to make in four years, a fact which itself would undermine, it seems to me, the merit of the notion that this affidavit created probable cause. Even if that were true, that wasn't the only technique available. Such a buy to be sure would be constitutional, as would the procedure established by United States vs. Lewis, in which the buy is not made by the informant at all but by a government agent who calls the premises and sees if he can make a buy

there.

In Lewis, the government agent actually went to the premises and made the buy, came back a second time and made another buy, and had evidence available for trial. But even if the buy were not possible, in the course of the conversation, as Mr. Justice Douglas suggested in his dissent in Lewis, in the course of the conversation about the buy the homeowner alleged to have illegal whiskey on his premises might well say something to substantiate probable cause. "Who are you? I have never heard of you before. How do I know that you are not a cop?"

who has received information that there is illegal liquor at a certain place might well — and I would suggest in many instances would — enhance the probable cause that he could present to a magistrate in an affidavit. So it is not simply the question of whether a buy was available, an available technique, a buy by the informant or buy by the government agent, but whether other investigative techniques in this case, such as a mere phone call, would not have in fact turned up enough strongly indicative evidence of involvement in the traffic of illegal alcohol as to warrant a proper affidavit in this case.

I don't even suggest that there aren't cases in which that kind of further investigation may not be possible. The

Americans For Law Enforcement filed an amicus curiae brief presented here a case in which in the course of that brief in which a cash register was stolen from a grocery store and the cashier in the grocery store, a young employee, some days later observed the cash register in somebody's house and hears the owner of that house boast that he stole it. Well, that is not a situation in which law enforcement can make a buy or can make phone calls to see whether they can make a buy. And so the police officer in the real life case by Americans for Law Enforcement ran around the neighborhood and asked the neighbors of the informant, is he liable, is he credible, what was his reputation, checked with the police to see whether he had a criminal record or not, checked his employer to see whether the employee would have any motivation in that case to lie or fabricate or distort, a factor just as strong as

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Having gone through that process, the officer could at least have presented an affidavit to a magistrate. The notion that he has done his best to clear the reputation of this informant for truth and veracity in that environment.

- Q Could I ask you a question here?
- A Yes, Your Honor.

lying in the formation of affidavits.

Q I have trouble with your argument for this reason: I understand you to agree that the government had a case against a man like this and put an informant on the stand,

he testified, yes, he saw him sell the liquor, and the jury 2 would have convicted him, the judge wouldn't be called on to 3. set aside, would he, necessarily? 4 No. Your Honor, he would --5 But here is a case where the only question is 6 getting up some evidence, there is not near so much at stake as 7 the quilt or innocence, and you are claiming that in the pre-8 liminary proceedings to get a search warrant the evidence must 9 be stronger than the evidence to convict a man of a crime.

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A Not at all, Your Honor. I don't believe that is the essence of my claim. First of all --

Q Isn't it? Suppose that the government simply put this informant on the stand and it did not put on any evidence to show that he was truthful and trustworthy in the community, and the jury went on and convicted him, is there any reason why that couldn't stand?

A Certainly if the defense has done any effective job at impeaching the credibility of that witness, an opportunity they had at the trial but not before the magistrate, that conviction can stand, Your Honor.

Q That is what you are exacting, is an opportunity -- is getting a search warrant, a higher burden on the government than would be imposed on them to convict the defendant.

A I really don't believe that is implicit in the argument, Your Honor.

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For one thing, this informer is not before the magistrate.

A That is certainly true and even in such a circumstance when an informant is named in an affidavit, one of the functions of naming him in the affidavit --

That is the argument you are making. You are not making it on the ground that --

A No, but I mean what the magistrate has in that case is the power to call the informant before him and crossexamine him.

Q I understood that the hearsay rule with reference to trial, I didn't understand that there was any wellestablished hearsay rule in connection with people who testified to get the search warrant.

Indeed the very opposite is true. Hearsay is permissible in a warrant affidavit of this kind, but it is for that very reason that magistrates -- and this Court has insisted upon some assessment of the reliability of the person conveying the hearsay. It is because the magistrate will be satisfied by evidence that would not be competent at a trial that you want some assurance that the person conveying the hearsay is not conveying a mere fabrication. That assurance need not be given in the form of cross-examination. It need not be given in the form of disclosing his name so that the magistrate can call him before him and cross-examine him. But it should appear in the affidavit that the stretch that it is reasonably possible for law enforcement to take, to confirm the reliability of the person giving the hearsay, have been taken and continue to substantiate that the informant's credibility stands up.

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Q They don't have to confirm that witness when he is before the jury trying a man as to his guilt or innocence.

A That is always left to the defendant, Your Honor.

Q But this alleged affidavit that this unknown person gave to the agent, what kind of affidavit was it, that John Doe swears something?

A Your Honor, the record doesn't support the notion that there was an affidavit given by the unknown person. It supports only the notion that a verbal statement was given described in this affidavit was sworn. There was not even an affidavit from this informant.

Q But how can you make an unnamed person make a sworn statement?

A That is the real problem presumably the government relies upon to the extent it does rely upon a sworn statement which to some extent today it does not. The effect of swearing somebody in would be to inhibit the chances of falsification by threatening an informant with perjury or prosecution under some other false statement statute. Obviously

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the function of inhibition in this setting where you don't know who the person is and only the affiant does, there is no evidence of any other present at the swearing in would be virtually nil.

Q I quess there is some effort on the part of the informant to the best he could be sure that the fellow was telling the truth.

> It shows some effort but --A

It may not be effective but it shows some effort.

A Certainly. The search warrant does not issue as a prize for effort. It does issue when probable cause is established and probable cause is established when there is a reasonable basis for a magistrate to infer that an informant is credible. Merely swearing him in does not provide a reasonable basis in these circumstances and there are so many alternatives available to an affiant in these circumstances without disclosing the informant's name which would buttress reliability.

Q You say then it would be better if the officer had actually taken a written affidavit from the informant and said to the magistrate I have a written and signed affidavit from the informant?

A I think that would come very close to sufficiency. The magistrate could simply then call for it and see if he wished and see who it was.

Q Well, he might say I won't furnish the affidavit because he is afraid.

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A It could be submitted to the court under seal.

That would be very weak under those circumstances, I would think for the court's knowledge alone, and from that point on without disclosure to the rest of the world.

Q The affidavit's reading would be to clarify the officer's case.

A Only because the affidavit enabled called the informant into an in-camera session altogether would it go to the informant's reliability, Your Honor.

Of course it is not this case. There is no affidavit or sworn statement here.

Q But apparently they do orally swear to --

A Yes, for whatever that may mean, in Middlesboro, Kentucky or anywhere else. I have on many occasions myself said I have sworn on a stack of bibles and I had no notion at the time that I was threatened with perjury or threatened with anything that seriously buttressed by reliability. I hope that it does prompt to tell the truth, but I don't think that kind of thing which on this record, by swearing, does much to buttress anyone's reliability.

Given the alternatives that are available to law enforcement in a circumstance like this involving minimal law enforcement impingement and indeed alternatives that are

commonly used throughout the country, the suggestion that this Court ought to put its imprimatur upon a confirmation of reliability amounting to no more than the use of an ambiguous term in an affidavit is a suggestion in effect that this Court can sign over to the police the security of persons and their houses, not simply the security of persons in their houses at the discretion of the police, but in the discretion of the police acting upon an inarticular hunch.

This Court has said it is faced against an inarticulate hunch even if an officer in an emergency, and from that point on in every affidavit case this Court has ever considered, and this case amounts to no more than an inarticulate hunch after an interview that someone may be giving reliable information about a person who mysteriously has been known to be in the business of trafficking in illegal alcohol for four years but about whom no better information appears to have been obtained, and whom in this may be some difficulty in making any buy at all to confirm that he is in fact engaged in that traffic. Under these circumstances I suggest that an affirmance of the Sixth Circuit's decision would do nothing to impair effective law enforcement and a reversal would do enormous damage to the protections of the Fourth Amendment that this Court has jealously guarded over the years.

Thank you.

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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mr. Umin.

Mr. Umin, you acted at the Court's request and by appointment by the Court. We thank you for your assistance to the defendant and to this Court.

MR. UMIN: It was a pleasure to do so, Your Honor.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Miss Rosenberg.
The case is submitted.

[Whereupon, at 3:00 o'clock p.m., argument in the above-entitled matter was concluded.]