Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1970

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In the Matter of:

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U. S. BULK CARRIERS, INC.	
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Petitioner,	00
VS.	0.0
DOMINIC D ADGUSTING	
DOMINIC B. ARGUELLES,	
Paspandant	•
Respondent	
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Place Washington, D. C.


Date November 12, 1970

## ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

300 Seventh Street, S. W.

Washington, D. C.

NA 8-2345



Docket No. 29




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2	OCTOBER TERM
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<i>A</i>	U. S. BULK CARRIERS, INC., )
5	Petitioner )
6	vs ) No. 29
7	DOMINIC B. ARGUELLES,
8	Respondent )
9	400 400 and
10	Washington, D. C.
11	The above-entitled matter came on for argument at
12	2:20 o'clock p.m. on Thursday, November 12, 1970.
13	BEFORE :
14	WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice
15	WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice
16	WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice
17	BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice
18	HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice
19	APPEARANCES:
20	GEORGE W. SULLIVAN, ESQ. 26 Broadway
21	New York, N. Y. 10004 Attorney for the Petitioner
22	I. DUKE AVNET, ESQ.
23	222 E. Baltimore Street Baltimore, Maryland 21202
24	Attorney for the Respondent
25	

1	PROCEEDINGS	
2	MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will hear arguments in	
3	case Number 29, U. S. Bulk Carriers against Arguelles.	
4	Mr. Sullivan, I am sure you and your friend probably	
5	realize that if you want to get back to New York, one way to do	
6	it New York and Baltimore, respectively one way to do it	
7	is to finish up as rapidly as you can.	
8	MR. SULLIVAN: We will do our best, Your Honor.	
9	ORAL ARGUMENT BY GEORGE W. SULLIVAN, ESQ.	
10	ON BEWALF OF THE PETITIONER	
11	MR. SULLIVAN: Mr. Chief Jusice, and may it please	
12	the Court: in this case the Petitioner, a steamship operator,	
13	has sought to review a decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of	
14	Appeals, a divided decision which reversed the U.S. District	
15	Court in the City of Baltimbre.	
16	The case involves in essence, whether the grievance	
17	and arbitration procedures in the collective bargaining agree-	
18	ment that were negotiated by the National Maritime Union, with	
19	the steamship employer will be the basis upon which the disputes	
20	that have arisen and have referred to in this case will be	
21	resolved.	
22	The initial cause of action as stated by the	
23	Respondent in the District Court sought to recover, firstly, a	
24	transportation differential between first class and second class	
25	transportation. That was resolved before the case ever got to	
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its final posture in the District Court.

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The next item in his claim involves certain overtime earnings that he said he was entitled to, but had not been paid and these were disputed by the master of the vessel at the time he signed all articles in the Port of Saigon.

The third issue involves alleged penalties to which he refers as his source of entitlement: 46 U.S.C.A. Section 596.

Now, to see this case more or less in posture I would like tor eview briefly the facts. Mr. Arguelles, an American Merchant SEaman, was engaged in the Port of Galveston, Texas on August 3, 1955 to serve as an Ordinary Seaman aboard the S.S.U.S. PECOS. This is a merchant vessel; this is not a Navy vessel, despite the U.S. in the title.

He served aboard the vessel and at a time when the six months which was the period of the articles he signed as part of his engagement, expired on February 3, 1966, the vessel was entering at anchor, anchorage off from Cape St. John, which is just off the coast of South Vietnam. The vessel was destined to go to Saigon and discharge cargo which was in the ship.

The local authorities denied -- they didn't deny; they just didn't grant it; as a factual matter the vessel couldn't go up the river to the port of discharge and everyone was required to stay on the vessel until practique was granted. This is a form of clearance to establish that the crew is

healty, meets the quarantine requirements and what have you.

On February 13th, practique was granted and the vessel proceeded up the river to Saigon, a trip of some seven hours. Thereafter, on the 15th the cargo was discharged and on the 17th the Respondent, in company of seven other men, asked to be signed off articles. They were referred to the U. S. Consul who was acting in that port in the capacity of Shipping Commissioner, which is customary in foreign ports when a seaman leaves a ship.

The men were given a payroll voucher, which outlined the earnings, the base wages and overtime which was certified by the Consul and the men were given transportation to return to the United States. A dispute arose at that time; the men wanted to be paid off in cash. Because of the situation in South Vietnam and the currency situation, U. S. currency was not given to the men. They were allowed \$50 to use for expenses incidental, perhaps, to their travel home.

Because of the dispute that arose the men --Respondents, missed the plane. They left the next day, and based on the testimony of the Respondent in his pretrial deposition, he arrived in Galveston on or about the 19th of February.

For reasons of his own convenience, I assume, he didn't report to the company agent until the 22nd of February, when he was given cash as certified to in the voucher. It was his claim that this was wrong; he should have been paid off

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more expeditiously; that this was a violation of Section 596; the failure to give him his overtime wages was likewise a 2 failure to pay earned wages, even though they had been dis-3 allowed by the department head of the vessel in accordance with 1 the terms and provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 5

Further, he was claiming because the 11 days when practique had not been granted at the anchorage at Cape St. John, that he was unjustifiably restricted to the ship and was entitled to additional 11 days of overtime, eight hours a day, as a penalty.

It gets somewhat confusing in analyzing the claims 11 for penalty because it appears that at one point in the com-12 plaint filed in the District Court there is a claim for double a day's pay as provided for in Section 596 as a penalty on top 14 of the penalty of overtime not paid -- rather claim for restric-15 tion to the ship but not paid. 16

Now, our position, in essence, is this: that all of the claims that have been presented here are based on the terms and poovisions of the ecollective bargaining agreement and in the collective bargaining agreement there is a procedure for presenting grievances, a procedure for arbitration and it has been the position of the Petitioner that at least in the first instance, 22 based on the decisions of this Court, he is required to pursue 23 those procedures to get the remedy available, if he is entitled, 20, rather than going to court and start a lawsuit. 25

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Q Well, is there an "all disputes" clause in the 1 contract or just something limited to the interpretations of the 2 contract? 3 A It is limited to the interpretation of the B, provisions of the contract, Your Honor. 5 Well, what's the statutory penalty got to do Q 6 with that? 7 Well, the statutory penalty --A 8 Let's assume the employer -- let's assume the Q 9 employer owed some overtime and that he was late in paying it 10 but then he tried to pay it and the only thing was the question 11 about statutory penalties. 12 If the employer owed you overtime and was late A 13 in paying it --14 And then he paid them. Q 15 A The penalty would --16 There is a statutory penalty for each day that Q 17 he was delayed; wasn't there? 18 Yes; double day's pay, but ---A 19 Q All right; that's something that -- let's assume 20 that that's all that's left over in the dispute between the 21 parties. It has nothing to do with the collective bargaining 22 agreement. 23 A Well, we first have to determine the overtime 24 is due and owing. 25

0ecl)	Ω No; the employer agrees; he's paid it already.
2	A Then there would be no basis for penalty
3	either if he's paid it unless there was a delay beyond the
a,	period
63	Q There was a delay, and the employer finally
6	pays it.
7	A I assume you are speaking hypothetically? As
8	opposed to the facts of this particular case, because we don't
9	concede there was a delay in this case.
10	Q Well, you jmean your arbitration should then
11	consider only the amount of the overtime?
12	A Yes, Your Honor.
13	Q I thought there was an "all disputes" clause
14	to this contract.
15	A If I may read from Article 12 which covers
16	this. Perhaps we are differing on terminology.
17	"In case a dispute arises over the interpretation of
18	any of the provisions of this agreement, whether the said dispute
19	originates on board ship or on shore, the union agrees to take
20	the matter up with the company and make every effort to adjust
21	said dispute.
22	"Inthe even that no " and so forth.
23	This would pretty much be resolved through the
24	disputes arising under the terms and provisions of the contract
25	itself.
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Q What kind of disputes arise that would not be
 covered under that clause. Can you suggest a hypothesis?that
 would cover all conditions?

A Well, if --

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Q Wages, hours --

A If, in the context of wages, if the earned wages admittedly due to a man were not paid I don't believe the contract would then be able to be resolved. You would then have to go to court and sue, but the big question is determining under the contract, and that's what I think are the basic issues in this case, whether anything is due in the first instance. If the money is due and concededly due and the company just arbitrarily refuses to pay it, I think the man has a cause under 596, because the contract doesn't go that far.

But, before you can even get to anything like that, of arbitrary nonpayment one has to first determine that something is due, and this has not been done and that's where I believe it's very important the grievance procedure be pursued.

I think in the decisions of this court in cases --Q Then your position, Mr. Sullivan, is that the collective bargaining agreement provides pro tanto, anyway, a barrier to bringing suit under this statute?

A Until the disputes are resolved one way or the other and if it is assumed that if they are resolved in favor of the seaman the wages would be paid; there wouldn't be any need

for the penalty in that instance.

Q Then, I take it you are conceding Mr. Justice White's hypothetical situation, where there was overtime and its payment was delayed, but it eventually was paid and then we have a question of the availability to him of the statutory penalties?

A I believe the decisions have held, Mr. Justice Blackmun, that overtime -- all wages are carnings within the context of the statute, so there wouldn't be any distinction between the base wage and the overtime rate. Once it is determined that the overtime earnings are due, if they are arbitrarily withheld beyond the period provided in the statute the penalties might very well be justified, unless again, we get back to another aspect of Section 596: sufficient cause, if it can be shown there was sufficient cause for the nonpayment of the monies due. Then, of course, the penalties have not been applied in most instances.

This Court in Johnson versus Isbrandtsen determined a case which doesn't quite touch the facts of this case that we are reviewing here, determined that there was sufficient cause and even though there was a delay in the payment because of wrongful withholding of certain funds out of earned wages.

Q Well, isn't there a strong policy reasoning underlying the statutory penalty?

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A I think it ---

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Q In terms of protecting a seaman who doesn't
 carry much of a reserve as a businessman does; isn't that part
 of the statutory scheme?

A I think that purpose, where money is due is to prevent the employer from being arbitrary and capricious and not paying money conceded to be due to the man.

Q Well, really isn't it broader than that, that it prevents the employer from delay in payment of the money due?

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Well, when you come to the --

Q It doesn't make any difference whether it's arbitrary or capricious under the statute; does it?

No; but there may be sufficient cause. If that A 12 is resolved then we come to another problem or there could be 13 a problem. But, what has been claimed here, these overtimes and 14 restriction to the ship under the conditions I've endeavored to 15 describe, create -- rights that were created by the terms and 16 provisions of the collective bargaining agreement themselves; 87 therefore, if there is a dispute, we submit it should be re-18 solved on the basis of the grievance procedure and the arbitra-19 tion procedure in this contract. 20

Q Well, do you envision that the grievance procedure itself, if it's found that this overtime was due and further held -- it further was determined that they were withheld without sufficient cause that the grievance procedure itself could take cognizance of the statute and give double pay?

A I don't find anything in the agreements that would provide that. The agreement merely provides that the resolution of the dispute would lead to the payment. The union would refer the matter to the company for payment.

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You see, as a practical matter, what happens when these ships pay off at the end of a voyage, you usually have a union patrolman aboard and the individual crew member that has a problem, he says well, he worked certainovertime and it's not being allowed. The union patrolman will talk to the department head. In one instance, the chief mate or the chief engineer or the chief steward and they will endeavor to resolve it there. If this can't be done it will be referred to the contracting officer or contract enforcement officer at the union's headquarters and it will endeavor to resolve that between the contract enforcement officer and the company representative in the company office. And it usually would be done. If not, then it would go on to arbitration and the arbitration will find.

Q So, in the lower court, both the majority and the dissent, as I read it, agreed that in order to bring your position or the grievant's position into play the rights asserted by the seaman had to have their source in the collective bargaining agreement. At least that's the way I read it.

And what I want to ask you is whether the different facets of this man's claim can be traced to eit ar the collective bargaining agreement itself or the articles under which he

signed which I didn't find in the record. How do you trace 9 them; how do you find them? 2 I trace them to the contract, Your Honor. A 3 Contract of what? 0 A A The collective bargaining agreement that was 5 entered into between the National Maritime Union and the em-6 ployer. 7 0 You can do that? 8 I endeavor to do so, both in my brief and in A 0 outlining those sections in a single appendix we have referred 10 to them. 11 0 And the articles have no relevance? 12 The articles containing the statutory pro-A 13 visions under which the man joins the vessel and they do set 14 forth Title 46 U.S.C.A. 596. However, the conditions under 15 which he worked on the vessel, the nature of overtime which is 16 not covered in the articles, is determined in accordance with the 17 agreement. And the restriction to ship which he is talking about 18 for those 11 days when practique was not granted off of Cape St. 19 Jaques, would be something that has ceded; a right given to him 20 by the contract, and not by the articles. 21 I suppose the only reason he would be entitled 0 22 to overtime, any overtime pay at all is because of the collective 23 bargaining agreement. 24

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Yes, Your Honor; this is true and this is our

position and in reading the decisions in this Court it appears 1 that the Court has gone to great lengths to give the collective 2 bargaining agreement the force almost of law. I read the 3 phrases "the common law of the contract," and the "code of the 4 industry" and there we have this maritime industry that operates 5 many, many vessels. Generally we're talking about a number of 6 unions as well as a number of companies and a number of manage-7 ment organizations and have endeavored to set up a practical 8 basis on which to keep the vessels operating smoothly and to 9 determine the rights of the union members, especially in this 10 overtime and perhaps restriction to ship area where overtime 11 would be involved; and provide a uniform, expeditious basis for 12 resolving these claims. 13

Now, if you go to litigation and you come into the
U. S. District Court every time a man says, "Well, the chief
office didn't allow my overtime," you will have a lot of cases;
you will also have a lack of uniformity and resolution because
the men in the union and in the company offices are very
familiar with the ship's operations and the conditions under
which these claims may arise.

21 Q Mr. Sullivan, did I detect in this record a 22 reference of this man to the union's agent in Japan?

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Yes, you did.

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Q Is this action of itself indicative of the desirability of such a statute?

A Mr. Arguelles, the Respondent in this case, 2 returned to Galveston, which was his port of sign-on. If I 2 understand his testimony in the pretrial deposition, ordinarily 3 he shipped out of Balitmore. And in going to the union agent 1 in Galveston, I think the first problem there is to resolve the 5 question of the restriction to ship and whether it was justi-6 fied and the best man to determine this or to give information 7 on the positions in Saigon and that this anchorage where the 8 ship was held, would be the port agent in Yokohama. 9

Now, in writing to him he would get, perhaps an authoritative expression on whether the restriction of ship was infact, a condition in that area and whether the basis of his claim that he is entitled to eight hours a day overtime for those 11 days when he couldn't get off the ship, is justified. The idea of him writing to the agent would allow an opportunity for the reply from Japan to come back to Mr. Arguelles in Baltimore, since he was not living in Galveston and not regularly shipping out of Galveston made his base of operations in Baltimore.

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And in any event, under that Article II, Section 2 of the collective bargaining agreement, if he was dissatisfied with that advice it says as you read down, that he was entitled to a further matter to the head office of the union, if he didn't want to follow the advice of the agent in **Galveston**, which apparently he didn't do, but he wouldn't do anything else. He went back to Baltimore; he engaged counsel and

ultimately brought this lawsuit, which gave rise to the problems we have here.

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Now, again I go back to the decisions of this Court 3 in similar problems in other industries and it seems, in follow-1 ing the provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 5 1947, Section 301(a) that it is desirable to have these things 6 resolved between the company and the union in accordance with 7 their contract. And I think perhaps one thing that disturbed 3 the Fourth Circuit more than anything else is the time-honored 9 concept that a seaman is a ward of the Admiralty and therefore, 10 a person to be protected. 11

But, in these instances you have on the one side a very powerful union; you have a very effective labor-management relations system working in the maritime industry and it seems that at least to make an exception in this type situation, to let the parties to the agreement endeavor to work this out and I think they are best qualified to do so.

Now, as in the Maddox case and the Baca versus Sipes case, a decision of this Court, it was suggested that the effort be made to resolve in accordance to grievance procedures before the litigation would be resorted to, and perhaps that is what you had in mind, Mr. Justice Blackmun: did he get fair treatment, adequate treatment at the hands of his union?

I think that he did here. He didn't give the union really a chance to take the matter up. I think he just dropped

it when they said "Write to Yokohama." He didn't take it any further and I think he should have. He eventually engaged counsel, and counsel has certainly been qualified to take the matter up for him with the union and that wasn't done; instead, they started the lawsuit.

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And really, in granting summary judgment of the District Court, I think the District Court Judge reached the conclusion that there was really no dispute on this point, that he didn't pursue grievance and arbitration procedures. That's why the summary judgment was justified.

Now, today, again with the shipping industry operating all over the world and men leaving ships occasionally in foreign ports, I think uniform procedures are most important and we should have a system on which everyone may rely and expect to have a certain amount of predictability in the results. This is why it becomes important, I believe, to follow the grievance procedure and the arbitration procedure set up in the agreement. This is what they wanted to do and this is what would best serve the needs of the industry generally. We're trying to strengthen our American Merchant Marine so it remains an important factor.

Mr. Gibson, the Secretary of State for Commerce, recently at the International Labor Organization meeting in Geneva, was quoted as saying that the American seamen today enjoy the highest wages of all seamen in the world and have

better living conditions and working conditions on the ship 1 because of the free atmosphere of collective bargaining. I 2 think it's a desirable result, to uphold the agreement and the 3 basis which the parties of the agreement wanted to utilize to 1 resolve their differences. Litigation is always there as a 5 last resort but really that's what it should be: a last resort. 6 First efforts should be made. 7 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Avnet. 8 ORAL ARGUMENT BY I. DUKE AVNET, ESQ. 9 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 10 MR. AVNET: Mr. Chief Jusice, and may it please the 11 Court: I would like just to cite a few additional facts here 12 befora I go into the argument. 13 I would like to point out that the statute provides 14 that in the foreign voyage the seaman is entitled to be paid 15 off in 24 hours after the cargo is discharged; or in four days 16 after he is discharged; and for not doing so, the ship is liable 87 for two days pay for each day of delay. And that the wages 18 should be recoverable, "as wages in any claim made before the 19

court." 20

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Then there is another Section 597 which provides that where a seaman asks for a draw at any port he must be paid 22 a portion of his wages due: a third; otherwise the whole amount 23 becomes due and he is entitled to be discharged. 24

Now, in this case Mr. Arguelles, the seaman, went

first to Saigon during the six month period of these shipping 2 articles and then went back to Taiwan to take on another cargo 2 and the six months was about to expire and one day before the 3 six months' period, on February 2 of 1966, Mr. Arguelles asked 4 the captain to be discharged. The captain said, "No." And he 5 said, "I'd like my draw," and the captain said "no." Reading 6 between the lines it is obvious here the captain did not wish 7 to lose Mr. Arguelles and he intended to keep him beyond the 8 six months period of his articles, knowing that by the time the 9 ship got to Saigon or near Saigon, that the six months would 10 have expired and he would still have the services of Mr. 11 Arguelles, even though Mr. Arguelles no longer wanted to serve 12 beyond the six months 'period. 13

Well, I point out it's not a case of a man who didn'twant to go to Saigon, the thing he agreed to do; he had already been there, but because the articles were about to expire he wanted to get off the ship and get paid. Then the vessel arrived in Cape St. Jacques, which was on the 3rd, the day the articles expired, he again asked to be discharged and be paid off and again he was refused.

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Now, assuming that the ship was not granted clearances; that is that the crew was not granted shore leave. There was no objection, apparently, to the agent coming aboard with an American Consul, if necessary, so that the men who wanted to get paid off whose articles had expired, could be paid off, but

the captain didn't want that. Apparently, reading between the lines, he wanted to keep that crew on the ship and maybe it was because he couldn't get replacements or it was difficult to get replacements. But be that as it may, this violated the articles so far as Mr. Arguelles was concerned, because he was there only on six month' articles and they were forcibly keeping him there beyond that.

Well, they were confined to the ship, then, in -- at Cape St. Jacques for a period of some ten or eleven days and finally the ship was moved up the river toward the Port of Saigon.

May I ask you this --

A Yes, sir.

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Q If the six months' expiration date comes at a time they are in a foreign port, does the seaman have a right to iinsist upon -- the articles until he's at his home port or can the master of the vessel terminate him then and there?

A The procedure, Your Honor, is to decide -- for the man to decide whether he wants to continue on and then he resigns his articles or if he decides he doesn't want to continue on then he's paid off right there and the captain replaces him with someone else.

Q Suppose he wants to stay on but the captain wants to terminate him. My question is: may he be terminated in a foreign port?

A I would think so, because the article says
 2 it's only for six months.

3 Q Suppose the six months' period ends when the
4 ship's in the middle of the Pacific Ocean?

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A Well, of course, as a practical measure, he would be continued on until the next port and he would be paid off at that next port.

Well, when the vessel arrived then in Saigon, and this is on the 13th of February, again he asked to be discharged and be put off and again he was refused, it being the obvious intention of the captain to keep him aboard there regardless of hte articles and regardless of what his wishes were.

Finally, it was on the 17th that Mr. Arguelles was finally permitted to leave the ship and then, instead of being paid in American dollars, as the law requires, he was paid by simply a voucher and given \$50 and the answer was given, not there, but here, later on, that there not cash enough to do it.

Now, there is no proof that there was any law that
barred the payment of American dollars in Saigon; there was no
proof in the record at all. On the contrary, Mr. Arguelles
testified, and that's the only testimony we have here, direct
testimony, that he thought he was entitled to be paid off there,
and this prompted an argument between him and the American
Consul and some of the other seamen who wished to be paid off.

Then they flew him to the states and there he had to wait for approximately three days before the company decided to pay him off. Now, the evidence is clearly contrary to what my brother has stated, that he waited there to be paid; he didn't wait around and neglect to go to the office. He was not paid by the company until the 22nd when the others were paid off.

Now, these are the facts in the case and then the man said, "You haven't paid me all my overtime." They said, "Well, you will have to go to your union." He went to his union; the union says, "You go to Yokohama." Now, of course, this is a futile thing for him to do; he couldn't negotiate with Yokohama or the delegate there; and contrary to what my brother says, it is the job of the union to take the matter up at a higher level if there -- if the grievance has not been settled in the local courts.

Now, the grievance contract says, "Must be settled in an American Continental port or in the final port of discharge; here being Houston. Or the American Continental Port, which would have been also Houston.

Now, this is where it should have been settled and it wasn't settled here and it was for the union to take it up, not this man, because this man wasn't getting any relief from the union and therefore he came to me and after I wrote to the company to try to get them to pay the man they refused and I finally took it to court.

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750 Now, these are the facts in the case, may it please 2 the Court. I think that you are emphasizing these facts 0 3 on the theory that this is the kind of recalcitrance that the A statute was intended to penalize. 5 Exactly, Mr. Chief Justice. A 6 And, to answer now, Justice Stewart's question: it 7 is true that the amounts of the overtime -- or rate of the 8 overtime, is fixed by the collective bargaining contract, but 9 the remedy, Your Honor, is given by the statute and this is --10 In other words the pay remedies 0 11 And the question arises, therefore: whether the A 12 collective bargaining remedy is a mandatory substitute for the 13 statutory remedy. We say "no." We say that the man could 14 pursue either one of the remedies. 15 Now, Mr. Justice Blackmun has significantly pointed 16 out that precisely to overcome an abuse such as has occurred 17 there, and that is where the union subjects the man to a futile 18 -- to a futile result; that is, to try to contact an agent in 19 a foreign port. That in that kind of a contingency the man 20 should be permitted to go to court and get the relief which is 21 guaranteed by that statute. Of course that statute is in the 22 interests of making and building a strong Merchant Marine for 23 the defense of the country and for a solid mercantile develop-24 ment in our country with regard to the Merchant Marine as was 25

indicated by this court in a decision written by this Court fairly recently, which I cite in my brief.

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Q How long has this statute been on the books?
A The statute originated, Mr. Justice, about
1750 and there it was amended about 1915, in its present form,
and this has been the policy -- this statute is based, of course,
upon policy, to have a strong Merchant Marine dating from -back to the date of the Revolution.

I would like to point out now at this point that Mr. Sullivan, My opponent, is arguing that there's no lead now for this type of statute because American seamen are much better off than they were a century ago. I won't argue with him that they are better off now and that that is due to the collective bargaining machinery; however, it is not as good a situation as counsel would have you believe.

Today, the passenger vessel trade, that is American 16 passenger vessel trade is very much off. These people are 17 having difficult times, which means then that seamen may be 18 subjected to delay in payment of their wages or nonpayment. We 19 have a number of marginal shippers in the Merchant Marine to-20 day, people owning one ship or two ships who are making their 21 profit through trade in the Saigon run. Now, with the unwinding 22 of that war and the end of that war, obviously these small 23 companies are going to be in financial straits and these seamen 24 then will suffer as a consequence, because there will be a 25

delay in payment and which will mean no payment at all,
 eventually.

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And so it is important to have this two-for-one specter facing the ship owner or ship operator so he will know that those wages must be paid promptly in order to encourage these men to go to sea.

We're having a number of mergers today and people don't know who their employer is and in these instances there are delays and nonpayment of wages compelling the men to go to court under this statute.

Q Do you think that the grievance procedure itself, could take account of the statute and give the man what the statute gives him; that is: double pay for any wages wrongfully withheld? A one-hundred percent penalty for each day that it was wrongfully withheld and that that could be done bythe grievance machinery and that would give your clients and others similarly situation much faster relief because, generally speaking, a grievance procedure works faster than a Federal Court case; doesn't it?

A Well, in the first place, Mr. Justice, I don't think that the grievance machinery would necessarily work any faster because in this particular industry where you have the personna commodus involved, being out at sea, whether it be on the company's side or the workmen's side, these cases are long in the handling. Now, until you get the parties together;

until they can be heard, particularly an arbitration case, it 8 takes a long time. There is considerable grumbling about this 2 in the industry. 3

Q Well, it couldn't go any - faster in a Federal 4 Court, could it? 5

A Well, it is, Your Honor, because they don't go this long or this far; they don't come up to the United States Supreme Court. They usually terminate in the District Court.

Well, if a man's in Japan he can hardly be a 0 9 witness in the Federal District Court in Baltimore, either, any 10 more than he can be in these grievances. 11

That's correct. But usually they end up in the A District Court and do not go up on appeal.

To answer your other question, Mr. Justice, it is true that an arbitrator could do that, that is, impose the penalty of two-for-one, but I have never seen it done and it is very unlikely that the arbitrator would do that. There is nothing in the grievance procedure that would require them to do that. 19

Q Suppose he didn't take account of it, what 20 you're talking about. 21

You mean the arbitrator?

Q Yes.

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If he didn't -- you mean recognize the grie-A vance of the seaman and didn't decide in his favor?

9	Q Yes.
2	A Then, of course, the seaman wouldn't get
3	anything and he's come away empty-handed and that would be
4	controlling.
5	Q Why couldn't he come to the Court at that
6	stage?
7	A I doubt if he could then, Mr. Chief Justice,
8	because if he did then there would be nothing due him because
9	he had agreed to go into the arbitration proceeding.
10	Q Does the grievance procedure and the arbitra-
11	tion operation have the power to subpoena?
12	A Not that I know of; no, sir.
13	Q So that if the employer wanted to engage in
14	dilatory tactics in not having their master or other available
15	and they didn't want to take their depositions they could delay
16	an arbitration a good deal longer than they could do it in
17	Federal Court by power of subpoena.
18	A That is correct, sir.
19	And so I think, Your Honors, that it's best to leave
20	the law as is and if they want to substitute the collective
21	bargaining run before the statute, I think the place to do that
22	is in the Congress and not to come here and ask Your Honors to
23	do that and I think it is salutary that we have both remedies so
24	that the seaman can choose which one he wants.
25	Thank you.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you. 1 You have about two or three minutes left, if you 2 wish. 3 MR. SULLIVAN: Well, if I may, then I would like to 1 say something. 5 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT BY GEORGE W. SULLIVAN, ESQ. 6 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 7 MR. SULLIVAN: The facts of the case insofar as 8 lining up with 596, and the payoff, there was really -- we have 9 always contended on the merits there was no delay in this case. 10 The statute provides that the payment of wages, 11 assuming that you are talking about everything that is con-12 ceivably due to the man, may be made within four days after the 13 discharge, or within 24 hours after the cargo is finally dis-1A. charged from the vessel. 15 Now, Mr. Arguelles, and this is in his deposition, 16 which is set forth in the --17 Well, you're not suggesting that we try to 18 redetermine the facts here? 19 A No, Your Honor; I'm not, but they made the 20 certain allusion that it was on the company agent's dilatory 21 tactic that he wasn't paid promptly in Galveston. Actually he 22 was in Galveston on the 19th, based on his testimony and he 23 didn't go to the company agent's office on his own. He took the 20 time himself, rather than to go over there. He could have been 25

- 19	paid off within 24 hours after the cargo was off the vessel.
2	The cargo was completely discharged on the 18th in Saigon.
3	MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Very well; thank you Mr.
4	Sullivan.
5	Thank you, and the case is submitted.
6	(Whereupon, at 3:00 o'clock p.m. the argument in the
7	above-entitled matter was concluded)
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