Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBERT TERM, 1970

MAR 9 1971

In the Matter of:

Docket No.

156

GEORGE K. ROSENBERG, DISTRICT DIRECTOR,

Petitioner,

VS.

YEE CHIEN WOO

Respondent

SUPREME COURT, U.S. MARCHAL'S OFFICE

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Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

February 23, 1971

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

300 Seventh Street, S. W.

Washington, D. C.

NA 8-2345

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2	OCTOBER TERM, 1970
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5	GEORGE K. ROSENBERG, DISTRICT : DIRECTOR, :
6	Petitioner :
7	vs. : No. 156
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10	YEE CHIEN WOO :
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	Washington, D.C. Tuesday, Frbruary 23, 1971
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15	The above entitled matter came on for
16	
17	argumentaat 10:31, a.m.
18	
19	BEFORE:
20	WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice
21	WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice
22	WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice
23	BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice
	THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice HENRY BLACKMUN, Associate Justice
24	
25	

APPEARANCES:

3 CHARLES GORDON, ESQ.

General Counsel

4 Immigration and Nationalization Service Washington, D.C.

On Behalf of Petitioner

E3

7 GORDON G. DALE, ESQ. Santa Ana, California

On Behalf of Respondent

PROCEEDINGS

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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We'll hear arguments, the first on for this morning, in Mo. 156, Rosenberg against Yee Chien Woo. Mr. Gordon, you may proceed whenever you're ready.

MR. CHARLES GORDON, ESQ.: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court.

In this case, an alien who has been an overstayed temporary visitor in the United States since 1965, has the right to remain under a statute which grants special benefits to refugees.

The issue concerns the construction of Section 203 (a) (7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which affords a haven for refugees who have fled persecution in communist countries, who are unwilling or unable to return and who are not nationals of the country or area in which their application is made.

Respondent unquestionably fled communist China in 1953. However, like hundreds of thousands of others his flight stopped at Hong Kong, where he was granted generous residence priveledges, established a home, was married and had a child, and continued to live for 7 years.

In 1959, Respondent came to the United States for the first time as a temporary visitor for business, stayed a few

dend.	months, anf returned to his home in Hong Kong.
2.	Q He had established a business in Hong Kong,
3	had he?
4	A A business
5	Q What kind?
6	A Merchandising, and clothing. In 1960, the
7	Respondent again came to the United States as a business visitor
8	and left his wife in Hong Kong to operate the family business.
9	Q Was he, when he left Red China, communist
10	China, did he take his wife and child with him, or did he leave
gest top	alone?
12	A He left alone and was married in Hong Kong,
13	and the child was born in Hong Kong. He had previously been
94	married in communist Ching, and his wife had died. He had 5
15	children, whom he left there. He was married a second time in
16	Hong Kong, and had an additional child there.
17	After his coming to the United States in 1960, the
18	Respondent continued to remain in the United States. His wife
9	and child followed him to the Untied States in 1965, also enter-
20	ing asstemporary visitors. The temporaty stay of the entire
21	family expired in 1965, and they continued to remain here.
22	Deportation proceedings were brought against Responder
23	and his wife and a Deportation Order was entered against them
24	withtthe priveledge of voluntary departure.
215	Q Where did they live in this country?

A In California.

Immediately the Respondent filed an application for benefits under a proviso to Section 203 (a) (7), which grants refugee benefits to refugees who have lived in this country for 2 years.

That application was denied by the Immigration District Director and by the Regional Commissioner on the ground that the Respondent was no longer a refugee, since he had firmly established residence in the home in Hong Kong.

He then sought judicial review. The District Court ruled in his favor, finding that he had not been firmly resettled in Hong Kong, because of his allegation that he had never intended to remain there permanently, and that he harbored an intention to come to the United States---.

The Court of Appeals affirmed. They found --- the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit found that the question of whether he was firmly resettled is irrelevant, the Courts said that under the statute, once Respendent had been a refugee, he was entitled to its benefits, even though he had established a stable, new home in another country.

This con---

- Q That was because, I gather, the statute had been re-phrased---
 - A It had, and in a moment I shall argue---
 - Q Yes.

A --- develop that.

Q Yes.

A That conclus ion, incidentally is opposed by the later decision, of the Second Circuit, in Shen against Esperdy, which is reported in 428 F. 2d.

Now admittedly, Section 203 (a) (7) of the statute does not centain a specific disqualification of refugees who have been firmly resettled, but I believe that the purpose to exclude them, it clearly appears if we examine the history and the purpose of the statute, after World War II, the United States became deeply concerned with the massive problems presented bu millions of refugees left over from that war.

And it developed temporary programs to deal with those problems. These programs were feflected in a series of measures adopted from time to time. The first of these, the first major statute, was the Dispeaced Persona Act of 1948.

Under this statute, in a 3½ year perood, the United States recieved approximately 400,000 refugees. That statute did have specific language disqualigying refugees who were firmly resettled. The next major statute was the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, under which approximately 200,000 refugees were recieved into the United States and again the statute specifically

23 excluded refugees who had been permanently resettled.

After that, the next statute was the Refugee Act of 1957. This was a temporary statute, again, for a limited purpose.

2 And the purpose was to assign approximately 18,000 2 visas that had been unused when the Refugee Relief Act had ex-3 pired at the end of 1956. The 1957 law said that these visas 4 should be assigned to a group known as Refugee Escapees, and 5 in designating that group it did not mention firm resettlement. 6 The next of these temporary statutes was the so-called 7 Fair Share Act of 1960. Now this, again, was a temporary meas-8 ure. It was designed to enable the United States to participate 9 in a world wide movement to enable the United Nations to close 10 the remaining refusee camps. 99 And under the terms of this statute the United States 12 undertook to recieve what it considered itd fair share of these 13 refugees in the camps, 25%. Now again, this statute said nothing 14 about refugees who had been firmly resettled. 85 Did these camps date back to World War II? 16 World War II. 17 They werent the products of the 1957 events 18 in Hungary, or anything? 19 No, that's completely independent, and later. 20 The campa remained, as strange as it may seem, for all the years between World War II and 1960 ---21 22 Eighteen years after 1945. 23 And the problem had not been liguidated 24 in 1960, 1959, the United Nations undertook a concerted drive to close these campa and the United States cooperated with that 25

novement in so-called War Refugee --- and adopted the 1960 Law
as part of that movement.

Q These were not part---this law was not concerned with the refugee camps in the Middle East?

A No, specifically not, because the United Nations mandate to which it was tied did not apply to the Middle East.

Again, as I said, this law, the 1960 law, didnatumention firm resettlement, and it did add language which decreed that it would not apply to those who were nationals of the country in which their application was made.

Now from these developments, the Ninth Circuit took
the position, came to the concaasion, that because of this chain
of events, and the changes in the language of the statute,
Congress had intended to make a change in the language of the
Court, this was a clear manifestation of Congressional intent
to change the criteria.

Q What was the specific language that they arrived at?

A Two things. One, in the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 and in its predecessor, the Displaced Persona Act of 1948, there was specific language barring refugees who had been firmly resettled.

Becond, in the 1960 Fair Share law, there was new language saying that its benefits would not apply to those who

were nationals of the country in which the application was made. The Court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that this addition of the language, "not a national", was intended to be a substitution for the criteria for those firmly resettled.

No legislative history is cited by the Court of Appeals to support this conclusion and I would suppose that if Congress had intended such a marked departure from the previously established procedures, criteria, it would have expressed its purpose in some clear manner. Yet nowhere in the legislative history is there any indication that a change was contemplated.

Moreover, the Second Circuit in a very careful and a very long and detailed opinion studied the legislative history much more detailed than I must say the Ninth Cimcuit, they came to the conclusion that no change had been intended.

I think the 1957 law furnished the key. The 1957 law was the first law which changed the language which eliminated the "firmly resettled". But in the House report, reporting this legislation, and you recall Your Honors, this legislation was intended to take care of the group left over from the previous law. The House Committee said that they intended that in applying this alw, the same criteria should be utilized.

So it seems obvious that no change was intended.

Q The Second Circuit put it on the basis that the man had to actually be homeless---

A Exactly.

Q --- and if he wasn't homeless he couldn't---

A That's exactly what I believe the statute was intended to do.

Q Well, the Second Circuit held that---

A And of corse we agree with the Second Circuit. But I think that as I'll develop my argument, I think that the history of this legislation indicates quite decisively that these statutes are intended to deal with homeless people, to provide a haven for the homeless and the displaced.

I believe that the "not a national" language which was inserted for the first time in 1960, had an entirely different purpose from that envisaged by the Ninth Circuit.

The Court, unlike the Second Circuit, which as I say, considered this with great care, the Court below overlooked the fact that the 1960 Act was tied to the mandate of the United Nations. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The mandate of the High Commissioner, which is incorporated in a UN statute, specifically declares, among other things, that his mandate shall not extend to refugees situated in the country of their nationality.

So in adopting the criteria of the United Nations,
Congress followed that formulation. Now when that formulation
was carried over into the 1965 Act, which succeeded these laws,
I believe Congress had in mind the change in world conditions

that had occured by that time, 1965.

In the original refugee laws, Congress confronted a world, Europe particularly, that was shattered by war. The countries of Europe even the countries which were recieving t their own nationals, were unable to care for such nationals.

And therefore the United States pitched in and helped.

And in the earlier refugee laws, therewas specific provision for the reception of Greek, Dutch, German, and other ethnic refugees who were situated in the country of their nationality, Italians, I believe, was the other one.

Now by the time that the 1965 law was being considered the situation, as I say, changed. Congress, I believe, concluded that these nations were now able to care for their own refugees, and therefore, it inserted this provise that it would not extend to refugees who were in their own countries, the countries of their nationality.

Now particularly I call Your Honora attention to the situation of West Germany, which may have been in the mind of Congress, which previously had been the beneficiary of all the refugee laws which had been previously enacted.

By the application of the "not a national" proviso.

Congress apparently was saying that West Germany had now recovered. The ethnic German refugees who were comming into Germany could be cared for by their own country, and that was no
longer necessary for the United States to pitch in and help.

I think this is the basis for the adoption by Congress of the "not a national" proviso, and it seems to me completely without warrant to assume that Congress intended to utilize this special statutory provision for the aid of refugees who didn't need immediate help, who were not hameless, who were not displaced.

Our briefs recite the condistent administrative interpretaion which has found that benefits under these refugee statutes are not available to refugees who have become settled in stable new homes.

Q Mr. Gordon, on the Respondents' theory would the refugee status once acquired continue forever?

A This is the way I would construe it.

Q Incidentally, now that I've interrupted you, is there any distinction in the Immigration Law terminology between the term national and the term citizenship?

A Yes, it's a slight difference. For instance the present practice, national is a person who is holding permanent allegiance, to include citizens. It's a broader term than the citizens. As used in out context today, I think it's synonomous with citizens.

Now as I've said, the administrative interpretation is consistently the point of view I'm arguing here today, for example, when the 1957 Act was adopted, the State Department immediately promulgated regulations which announced the "firmly

resettled" concept even though the law hadn't said anything about it.

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In addition, a series of reported administrative decisions have expressed that concept. And finally, that concept has been reflected in reports which are made by the Immigration Service to Congress every six months showing the operation under Section 203 (a) (7), as required by Section 203(f) of the statute.

Now Congress had never questioned that interpretation, and indeed, no Court, other than the Court below has ever reached a contraty conclusion. Respondent seeks to find support for his interpretation in a statement made by Senator Kennedy during the course of the debate of the 1955 law, in which Senator Kennedy said that Section 203 (a) (7) refugees "must be currently settled in countries other than their homelands."

This statement was a small part in an explanation by Senator Kednedy of the many provisions of the 1965 law which primarily was adopted to abolish the national origins quota system.

I think Senator Kennedy was not addressing the concept, he didn't say he was and it doesn't appear that he was addressing the concept of firm resettlement, in context, and readin the statements in entirety I think Senator Kennedy was speaking of providing homes for the homeless, for the displaced. And in our reply brief at page 6, we set forth some additional ex-

cerpts from Senator Kennedys statement.

For example, Senator Kennedy spoke of the need for this country to remain "a haven for the displaced", and that "the cases of the greatest need can be processed at nnce".

Later in the floor debate Senator Kennedy commented that the bill "establishes what we mean by refugees. Those fleeing from communist domination and from the other categories mentioned in the statute.

I believe Senator Kennedys reference to those fleeing is an accurate paraphrase of the statutory requirement that speaks of those who have fled persecution.

Q To what other act were those remarks directed? Specifically.

A Senator Kennedy, there was a colliquy with Senator Kuchel who had questioned him about the scope of the statutory provision, to what extent it would benefit refugees and Senator Kennedy was responding.

Q What were they debating at that time?

A The 1965 law. This is the law which is in question today.

Now, as---

What do you suppose the Senator did mean,
when he used the language quoted by your brother in opposition?

A I think, Your Honor, he wasmmerely paraphrasing the statute.

	1	
qua	Q	Must be firmly settled in countries other
2	than their homeland	
3	Α	The word settled nowhere appears in the
4	statute.	
5	Q	But it does appear he did say it.
6	A	He said it, but it wasn't reflecting what
7	was in the statute.	
8	Q	What do you suppose he did mean
9	A	As I understand it he was paraphrasing what
10	the statute said, T	he statute said that the refugee must not be
11	in the country of h	is nationality. So what he was saying is
12	that they must be i	n some other country.
13	Q	Currently settled
14	A	Settled. And settled I think he must mean
15	by settled, he mean	s situated.
16	Q	Well
17	A	He didn't mean having a stable home, as I
18	understand it.	
19	Ω	He could mean permanently settled
20	A	That's why I
21	s Q	Permanently there
22	λ	And I don't think he was talking in that
23	context at all.	
24	Q	Had the Respondedns given up their connec-
25	tions in Hong Kong?	

qua	A	As far as I know they have, but they have
2	the right to return	. They were given a cettificate of identy
3	which gives them the	e right to return.
4	Ω	Is their child here with them in the United
5	States?	
6	A	Yes, sir. Not under order of deportation.
7	Q	Did they
8	A	The order of deportation is against Re-
9	spandent and his wi	fe and the child would go with them, if they
10	return, of course.	
99	. О	But the child is presently
12	A	In the United States.
13	Ω	The minor child
14	A	Yes. Sixteen years old.
15	Q	Is he in business here now? This gentleman?
16	A	I assume so, the record doesn't show.
17	He came here to atto	and a trade fair and to exhibit his goods
18	there. I assume he l	has continued in some business. Nothing in
19	the record tells us	that.
20	Q	Well, does the record tell us whether he
21	is still maintaining	g a business in Hong Kong?
22	A	It doesn't but I assume that he does not.
23	His wife was conduct	ting the business on his behalf and she came
24	here in 1965.	
25	I call at	tention to one other facet of the legislative

history, and that is the remarks of Senator Hart, who was one of the chief sponsors of this measure, as a matter of fact, his name was the leading name and the primary name on the bill in the Senate.

Now in describing the purpose of this legislation, Senator Hart said its concern is with the homeless and the oppresed. That's his language. And I think that's a correct description of what the statute means.

Now Section 203 (a) (7) reserved 10,200 numbers for refugees within its description.

Q Could I interlard just a moment, to the records? What happened after his last temporary visa expired?

Did he apply for an extension or did he just stay?

A There were applications for extension until 1965, then his authorized stay expired and his wifes did too, and a deportation proceding was brought and they were found deportable.

Q But he didn't try to secrete himself, or anything?

A No, no.

Now I've indicated that this is a small allotment,

10,200. The purpose of this small allotment, I think, is re
vealed in its legislative history, is to afford, grant permanent

authomity to deal with refugee emergencies, as they arise.

This---

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Çi.		
8	Q	10,200 over, in what span of time?
2	A	One year. This is an annual allotment.
3	Q	An annual allotment.
A,	A	Part of the annual quote. 6%, which adds
5	out to 10,200.	
6	Q	Yes.
7	A	Every year, 10,200.
8.	Q	Is it always over-subscribed?
9	A	No, Your Honor, it has been for the last
10	2 years, there was	a very heavy pressure on it, and indeed, in
11	1969, the chairman	and 25 members of the House Judiciary Com-
12	mittee wrote the At	torney General, saying that we anticipate
13	that this will be o	oversubscribed, can't you admit additional
14	refugees under parc	ole, and the Attorney General in 1970
15	agreed to do so.	
16	Ω	How does he choose if the quota is over-
17	subscribed, first o	come, first serve ?
18	A	First come first serve. It would have to
19	be that way. They a	are allocated on a monthly basis, incidentally
20	so that they try to	space them out.
21	Ω	Your suggestion is that, I take it, that
22	this Court is too s	small to expand the statute to include people
23	who can stay somewh	nere else
24	A	The state of the s
25	Q	Who have resettled somewhere else.

A I was about to say that.

Ca

Your Honor, I think that's the most important point I can make. The point is that this is a small allottment, intended to deal with emergencies, and throughout the legislative history, the sponsors of this measure and the committees emphasized the need to keep this reserve anthority in the hands of the President and the Attorney General so that they could deal with emergencies as the need arises.

Now---

Q Who were the sponsors?

A In the House, the principal sponsors were Senator, excuse me, I mean Congressman Feighan and Congressman Celler. In the Senate the princepal sponsors were Senator Hart, and Senator Kennedy.

Q Assuming that you prevail in this case, is there any authority in the Attorney General as a matter of discretion to allow this man to stay in this country?

A Well, if there were, there are a number of discretionary remedies, if---

I was wondering if there was any remedy,

I mean is there such authority, I'm not talking about whether

it would be exercised.

A I don't know whether there is in this case, it seems to me that there wouldn't be, unless he can establish that he is a refugee. And he doesn't claim that he has any right

or any eligibility for any discretionary benefit.

Now as I've said that is a small allocation and the fact that the certainty that it was intended for emergencies is underlined by the fact that the statute says that these persons shall be granted conditional entry.

You mean emergencies in the sense for people who haven't anyplace else to go, who can't stay anyplace else?

A Right. And emergencies do arise.

Q Other countries won't take them.

A I'm sorry I didn't hear the last---

Q Other countries won't take them.

have stable residence there. They'll let them stay there for a short time. They'll permit them to remain. For example, the Czekslovak situation, many Czekslovakian refugees crossed the border and came into ajacent countries, they did not have residence priveledges.

Under the emergency authority which is granted in this statute, the President and the Attorney General can admit them immediately to this country as conditional entrants.

Now, in addititon, the fact that this is designed for emergency action, for keeping open the opportunity to deal with emergencies is underlined by the statement in the House committee report on the 1965 law, that this statute, and I quote from the

8 Committees report, "will permit the President to act immediately 2 if the situation so requires, to come to the aid of refugees as defined in the Bill." 3 I believe the acceptance of Respondents interpretation 4 would defeat the statutory purpose. Approximately 2 million 5 refugees from China have settled in Hong Kong. 6 Your position is pretty well in the teeth 7 of the statute, isn't it? 8 I don't believe it's in the teeth. The 9 statute doesn't cover this situation. But the statute does say 10 11 that the person who seeks his benefits must have fled. That's the language of the statute. And Senator Kennedys expression, 12 I think is an apt one, we---13 Yes, but you could only admit them under 14 the statute from countries other than the country from which 95 they fled. 16 No, yes. But the statute then goes on to 17 say even if they have fled, they can't be admitted if they are 18 national of the ---19 If they're nationals, but all non-nationals 20 under the statute could be admitted ---28 If they have fled. 174 22 Well, there's no question, then is ff, about 23 this geneleman, is there? 24 Well---A 25

9	Q	He fled and he's not a national in the
2	country in which he	made application for entry
3	λ	That would be perhaps a literal reading
4	of the statute.	
5	Q	That's what I say, your position that
6	construction.	
7	A	That's a literal reading of the statute,
8	possibly, but I say	such a literal reading would defeat the
9	statutery purpose an	nd would be contraty to its purpose of
10	providing emergency	authority do deal with the homeless, the
gap Gap	people who haven't	got a place to go to.
12	Now	
13	Q	I don't understand why you say he had
14	not fled.	
15	A	He had fled, but he was no longer a refugee.
16	And this is a statu	te to deal with refugees.
37	Q	What was his status in Hong Kong?
18	A	He was an authorized resident. He had gotten
19	a certificate of ide	entity, which
20	Q	I've been there a number of times; I assume
21	that almost everyboo	dy is there on a very temporary basis.
22	A	No, fifty
23	Q	He wasn't a national, was he?
24	A	No. There's no Hong Kong nationality.
25	Q	British, I thought.

tion; There is British nationality. And British 2 nationality is world-wide procedure which could be followed in 3 Hong Kong. 2 Then he wasn't a British---A No, he never applied for that. He could have applied but very few Chinese refugees have applied. But 6 7 he did get residence priveledges in Hong Kong, and he has a certificate of identity---8 9 Did he have a business there? 10 A Business. He established a business and continued in that business for 7 years. He had a home there, 13 his family was there, he continued to reside there for 7 years. 12 If in the present posture, for some reason 13 or other, Hong Kong said that he had only 39 days to clear up 14 his affairs and get out, how would that affect ---9 8% If he had no stable residence he might still 16 be a refugee, but Hong Kong does not say that, Hong Kong per-27 mits the Chinese to remain there in residence indefinitely. 18 There is no suggestion that Hong Kong will expell a single one 19 of them. 20 Well, if in the future, and assuming you 0 21 prevail here, in the future he was so informed by Hong Kong, 22 and given 30 or 90 days to find a new place, would he them 23 resume in your view a refugee, a homeless status? 20 A It would be that he would then be considered

25

2	a rafugee. Then he would have no home, he then would be dis-
2	placed, because of the event that went back to 1953 perhaps
.3	and now were reinstated and then he could claim to be a refugee
4	But now in our view he has a stable home, he is a person who
5	can return to his home, he is not one for whom the statute
6	was enacted.
7	Q Does the record show why he pulled up roots
8	in Hong Kong?
9	A Well the record shows that he had an avid
10	desire to come to the Untied States, and I can only assume that
11	coming here as a temporary visitor he intended to remain.
12	Thank you.
13	Q Thank you, Mr. Gordon. Mr. Dale?
24	
15	ARGUMENT OF GORDON G. DALE, ESQ.
16	ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
17	
18	MR. DALE: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
19	please the Court.
20	Respondents position is that Congress knowingly, and
21	intelligently used the term "national" in excluding would-be
22	refugees under this Section 203 (a) (7). And we say when an
23	applicant qualifies under the literal terms of the statute,
24	unless he's become a national in an intermediate country he

25 is eligible for consideration under the law.

So when Respondent Harry Woo fled from Red China and he went to Hong Kong, and he opendd up his one-desk business of getting orders in the United States for clothing, and was able to live in an apartment, of one room, with his \$3 Hong Kong money when he arrived in Hong Kong, and was able to make a sufficient business so that he was able to get a trip to the United States as a business visitor, and he was given by the British government a certificate of identity, and that's all, he had not become a British national, he's eligible under the Act.

dura.

Q Isn't the status, as Justice Douglas suggested, that most of the people in Hong Kong, precisely that?

That is that they're there on a certificate of identity, which has much the same function as a passport, I take it.

A That is basically true, Mr. Chief Justice, except that a certificate of identity gives one no assurance of its continuance. It is a certificate of identity, it has to be renewed periodically, as a matter of fact, Respondents certificate of identity expired in 1967, at the request of the Petitioner, the Immigration Service, he was directed to apply for a renewal of his certificate of identity.

He did so, and was informed by the Hong Kong authorities, he must apply in Los Angeles, at the office of the British government there. The British Consulate. The British Consulate said, "We're not interested. Your application has to

be made in Hong Kong."

So at the present time Harry Woo has a 4 year old expired certificate of identity. We---

Q Well at the time he applied for renewal he was situated over here, wasn't he?

A That is correct, Your Honor.

Q But notlegally in the United States.

A He was legally in the United States undil 1966 I believe, on a series of extensions granted by the Immigration Service.

Q Yes.

A Of his original visit in---

Q But perhaps a better way to put it is that he was here at the sufferance, very definitely---

A I would say that he has been at sufferance since 1966 but he had a lawful extension of his business visitors visa, each year from 1960 through 1 65,

We contend that Congress used this term "national" because national is a well recognized term in international law. We use that term in our Internationality Act of 1940, we've used it again in our Act of 1952, the basic Immigration Act under which we now operate.

Certain rights and obligations go with nationality.

Among them of course, the most important, military service to the country of which you're a nation. And in turn the nation

provides the national with some protection abroad.

T

For example, could Harry Woo, the Respondent, expect some kind of protection from the British government or the United States? Not at all. They're not interested in him.

Do we provide pretection for people who have permanent residence in the United States if they're visiting abroad? Not at all, we have enough problems with our own citizens abroad.

This is getting back to the legal question for a moment, you've got a head on conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit. That seems to be recognized.

Could you tell me where you think the Second Circuit wen toff the track?

A Justice Warlan---

Q Do it at your own time if you---

A All right.

That's the legal question, if you---these two decisions. The facts are simple, and understandable, no dispute about them, and that's just a pure question of law, which Circuit is right, isn't it?

A I think that is correct, Your HOnor.

Now I'd like to know, at your convenience, where you think the Second Circuit went off the track.

A In the Second Circuit the Court stated in referring to the Fair Share Law, for example, the Fair Share Law of 1960, the basic refugee act of that time, and they claimed

that this statute provided the necessary understanding for the 1965 statute. And quoted the language under the United Nations High Commissioner for mandate and the Court used the language, this particular statute which used the term not a national only applies to those refugees who do not have the rights and obligations of nationals in the country in which they reside.

And the Court immediately picked this up and said it seemed to proove the Ninth Circuits position and s claim exactly it does indeed. But then the Court makes a leap back into legislative history. We claim that legislative history has no part in this case where the language is absolutely clear.

The Petitioner would have us completely topsy turvy apply the statutory construction rule. The statute is plain, but if you delve into the legislative history sufficiently, and not only this act but the '48 act, the '53 Act, the '57 Act, the '60 Act, the '62 Act, I assure you you can find sufficient confusion that now you can ignore the finding of the statute.

Now you're in a position to look and decide what would be a good standard to apply and that's exactly what the Petitioner has done to this statute.

- Q Ususlly don't you have to be a rafugee?
- A Yes, Your Honor.
- Q Well from what country is Mr. Woo a refugee?
- A refugee from Red China.
- Q Where did he come here from?

pod	A	He came here from Hong Kong.
2	Q	And he wasn't fleeing Hong Kong, was he?
3	9	He was not fleeing Hong Kong, but where
4	Q	He could have stayed in Hong Kong until
5	today.	
6	A	Conceivably he could have stayed in Hong
7	Kong	
8	Q	And have run his business there until today.
9	A	Conceivably he could have done that.
10	Q	As far as you and I know he could go back
949	there tomorrow.	
12	A	Except that apparently he would have a great
13	deal of difficulty	getting this so called certificate of iden-
14	tity we were direct	ed to obtain
15	Q	Well assuming that was done he could go
16	back	
17	A	If he had this
18	Q	The whole purpose of the Act was to protect
19	somebody from being	sent back to where he had fied.
20	A	That iscorrect
21	Q	I fail to see how he gets under the refugee
22.	Court.	
23	A	We claim
24,	Q	He's not homeless. He's homeless now, because
25	he gave up his home	

d.	A	We contend that where a refugee goes out
2	of Red China into H	ong Kong, which now has the highest popula-
3	tion of any area in	the world, where 2 million of the people
4	of 4 million are re	fugees, this is ho haven.
5	This is a	small piece of ground where true, he's
6	grieving and living	
7	Q	Well don't we agree, you and I, that there's
8	no country in the we	ould quite as good as the United STates?
9	A	Yesaman
10	Q	You don't want to use a comparative basis,
7 7 8	now, do you?	
12	A	No, no doubt about that belief about the
13	United States, Your	Honor.
14	Q	Well, he's not a refugee from Hong Kong,
15	A	I claim his refugee status did not terminate
16	merely because he ha	ad a place to put his feet in Hong Kong.
17	Q	A place to live, marry, raise a child,
18	and run a business,	is not a permanent place.
19	49	I claim
20	Q	What else do you need for residence?
21	A	I think, pardon?
22	Q	What else do you need for residence?
23	A	I think similar protections that the Con-
24	gress intendeddby us	sing the term "national". In other words,
25	some protection if	you are broughtfar from your home country.

000 The right, for example, in a democratic country to have something to do with voting, the election of officers, hold office. A person with some citizenship rights, not just A somebody who barely exists. 5 Do you say a man with a business is barely 0 6 emisting? 7 A I say the man was barely---8 You say a man that's got a business that 0 9 he's got enough money to come running from Hong Kong over here is barely existing when I don't have enough money to get from 10 here to Hong Kong. And he had money enough to get from Hong 11 Kong here. 12 A I don't know the source of his ability to 13 make that trip to the United States. I do know that the purpose 10 was to get orders for clothing which he then took back to his 15 one desk and parcel out to people to make the clothing. 16 There's nothing in this record that shows 17 that we was a pauper, is there? 18 No, Your Honor, I can't deny the fact that 19 he got to the United States. There's no question about that, 20 But I---21 Mr. Dale, let me ask of you the comment I made to Mr. Gordon. On your theory is a man once a regugee, 23 always a refugee? 24 No. Mr. Justice Blackmun, if he's become a

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100	national of an intermediate country, as congress said in the
2	statute, he's not qualified any longer for refugee status.
3	Q Do I take it that you do doalesce thatterm
4	National with Citizenshop?
5	A Yes, Your Honor.
6	Q So if he'd been in Hong Kong running his
7	business, after 20 years you would have the same case?
8	A We would have the same case under my analy-
9	sis, yes, Your Honor.
10	I think that it seems to me that it might be fruitful
11	to consider the spectre that the Petitioner has raised of in-
12	undation of the Untied States by refugees unless his standard
13	is applied, and the Congressional standard of nationals
14	Q Could I interrupt you? Purshing Mr.
15	Justice Blackmuns point, what is Hong Kong?
16	A It's a British Crown colony.
17	Q Crown colony, and you can't become a citizen
18	of Hong Kong, can you?
19	A There's no such thing, as I understand it.
20	You become a British national, if Great Britain chooses to
21	recognize
22	Q You become a British
23	A Subject, and you carry a British passport.
24	Q A British subject, and why didn't Congress
25	use the word citizenship, or citizen, or

A	I would suppose only that because the
term national v	was used in the 1952 basic Immigration Nationality
Act to determin	ne, to describe a national as one who owes per-
manent allegian	nce and it was used again in the 1940 Nationality
Act.	
So it	t's a term that has been used and I suppose that
The same contracts	
Q	What is a permanent resident of the United
States? is he	a national?
A	No, he's not. Permanent
Ω	Not a citizen
A	Permanent resident merely has a right to
reside, he has	certain obligations
Q	Well, I say, he owes allegiance in the
fact that he ha	as to serve in the armed forces?
A	Under our law he has to serve in the armed
forces, that's	correct.
Q	But you wouldn't call him a national?
A	He's not a national.
Q	Because you just defined national as a
citizen.	
A	Correct, I think that under our law there
13	
are a couple of	f island areas where the natives are nationals.
	f island areas where the natives are nationals. example, before the Phillippine Independence Act,
	term national of Act to determine manent allegian Act. So is it——————————————————————————————————

not citizens.

g-

Q Well I just wonder if, what about that in this case? People who are living there with certificates of identity and who have been there quite a while, are they nationals but not citizens?

A They're not nationals of the Crown Colony, and they're not citizens. They have a certificate of identity that identifies them as residing in Hong Kong, which can be lifted, so there's no law that says that there's anything that guarantees them anything like, for example, permanent residence in the United States.

If you have a permanent resident certificate here, so long as you do do not become subject to a deportable offense, you can remain here permanently, the law says you can. There's nothing that assured for a person who lives in Hong Kong, with a certificate of identity.

Mr. dale, what do you have to say about the governments argument that this statute, this whole scheme, program, was generously concieved to take cate of hardship cases, and you agree that it is a hardship type of statute, how do you fit your Respondent into the hardship category?

A Of course in the first place I do not subscribe to the governments contention that this is primarily a hardship statute. There is another section of the Immigration Law that allows parole in the United States under Section 212.

1 Parole in the united States where there is a real 2 emergency, you can be assumed that under this program of ad-3 mission to the United States under 207 there is a long, careful 3 screening of each applicant who seeks to come in under this statute, and nobody is just going to come drifting in under 6 203 (a) (7). 7 If there is a real emergency, section 212 I believe 8 would be used, which allows Attorney General to suddenly parole people into the United States. 9 This is really---10 You do not agree that the legislative his-11 tory of this particular statute demonstrates that it had the 12 purpose of giving relief to oppressed people, refugees, home-13 less people? Your don't agree with that? 13 Yes, I agree that was the intention, Your 15 Honor, but of course I contand that that ---16 Well, then it's a hardshop statute. 17 And that a man in the position of Respondent 18 is in a hardship situation, contemplated by the statute. 19 Q Well, had he ever had any implications that 20 his right to stay in Hong Kong would be terminated by the Brit-21 ish? 22

A He had not, at the time that he left, no.

I would like to refer to another point that we had

made, that the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees the

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signatories agree that they will not expell or compell refugees who come into their territory to go back to the country from whence their life or freedom might be threatened.

try .

But when the United Kingdom acceeded to the treaty it had the option to include all the territories for whose foreign affairs it was responsible. But the United Kingdom chose to exclude Hong Kong from this agreement. They did the same thing with the 1968 Ptotocol. Doubtless they had good reasons. Might China not impose certain conditions of the retention of the Crown Colony and say, "We want some of those nationals returned."?

But the United Kingdom didn't want that treaty restricting their freedom, and I wouldn't agree that Hong Kong was included. Does that sound like a certificate of identity holder like the Respondent could be assured that he had a night safe, even in Hong Kong? We claim no.

We claim that this refugee had a place to stay, but it was a very tenuous location indeed, and Congress contemplated that this was a hazardous situation and did say when you're a national, then you're disqualified.

Q Well Mr. Dale, I think that the governments direction to this man to apply for a renewal of his sertificate of identity in Hong Kong, to Hong Kong, was not a gesture, or a futile exercise but was for the purpose of seeing whether he could be reinstated there. And if he could, if he now could be

7 reinstated in his former position in Hong Kong, would you still 2 claim he's within the reachoof the hardship statute? A I would claim that he's within the reach 3 of the strict construction as passed by Congress, Yes, Your 23 5 Honor. Q Well it's still an assumption against fact, 6 that if Red China became a democracy mext year, would be still 7 be a refugee? 8 A I think we might look to the protocal to 0 which the United States has prescribed ---10 Q Would he still be a refugee under this 27 ACt? I understood you to answer my brother White that once he 12 left Red China he would be a refugee forever. 13 If he can return to RedChina which has be-94 come a democracy and he's then no longer in fear of persecution 15 because of his race, or religion, or political opinion, by no 16 means can he still maintain refugee status. 87 Well what's the difference so long as Hong 38 Kong is concerned? 19 A I think again it's the difference between 20 protections given to a national by his home country, his stand-21 ing in that country, as opposed to the mere temporary status of 22 one who is at sufferance in his intermediate country. 23 Q You claim he was a temporary resident of 24

Hong Kong?

25

1	A	Yes, Your Honor, he had nothing as sub-
2	stantial as nermano	nt residence inthe United States where you
Fin	was word the probability.	and and the second seco
3	have a card that say	ys this man has got a right to permanent
4	residence. He, all	he has to do is file an address report card
5	once a year.	
6	Q	How long was he there, 7 years?
7	A	He was there almost 7 years.
8	Q	And raised a family, he was just tempor-
9	alily there.	
10	A	I contend that he
dd	Q	How long was he in this country?
12	A	Something over 10 years.
13	Q	So he's three years more permanently here,
14	than in Hong Kong.	
15	A	I don't think we can contend that he had a
16	permanent residence	here, despite the 10 years.
17	Ω	Mr. Dale, a little while ago I think you
18	were about to say s	omething about quotas. If the quotas are
19	over subscribed, an	d he is here, then presumably there are a
20	lot of other eligib	le people who can't get in. You were going
21	to say something ab	out quotas.
22	A	Yes, Mr. Justice Blackmun, I wanted to
23	quote from the 1969	Visa Office Report on the numbers who have
24	applied and been ac	cepted under this statute.

According to that report, in 1966, 3,991 were admitted

out of an allowed quota of 10,200. In 1967, 4,337, 1968, 6,325, 1969,9,850. So that in none of the 4 years reported has the entire quota been used. And I think it's interesting that in one of the Immigration reports, referred to by Mr. Gordon, there is a record of denials of applicants who sought to come in and they denied them on the basis that they were firmly resettled.

And the total number of denials for the whole year 1967, was 82, So I think it's unrealistic to imagine that we're going to be innundated with refugees either applying abroad, or applying here, under this statute. The facts just aren't that way.

Q Does the record show why he didn't come here originally out of China?

Hong Kong, according to the applications that were before the Bervice, and were considered by the District Court, he indicated he tried to come here and was told do you have a sponsor there, and he said no I don't have a sponsor, "Do you have a guaranteed job"? "I don't even know anybody there." "Well, you can't go." so forget it.

Then he made applications to go to other countries apparently just before he again applied to come to the United States, he was told he could go to Indonesia, as a refugee, and about the same time he then was told there's a great program

going on against Chinese in Indonesia so he didn't go there.

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May I ask you, due to your familiarity
with the Immigration laws, are there any other methods by
which a man can be permitted to come here by any government
agency under circumstances like this except to go through the
Courts? What I mean is, is there a hard and fast and rigid
rule which the government officers are under oath bound to obey
that they must try to keep this man out?

A I don't see that this is an absolute rule, but the odd thing is that the Petitioner admits that they have decided every single refugee case in 1948, 1953, 1956, 1960, 1962 and this Act as if the language had never changed. All them are turned down if, in the opinion of the Immigration Officer--

Q Well, you're talking now about the rigid application of the law. Does anybody have any authority in the Immigration Department, all the way up to the President to make a suspension in cases like this? To loosten and to relieve hardships?

A Of course, we have the novel position of arguing for strict construction of the statute, which---

Q I understand that.

A ---benefit our client.

Q I understand that. But I was gust asking you for your information about the other.

A There is a provision under the---

It seems a pretty bad thing to have a case like that here before us. One man, he was living in Hong Kong, but so far as I'm a judge is a delightful place to live, so and reside, if your wife doesn't buy too many clothes, but it is a delightful place, and he leaves.

Of course he's not a refugee from there, strictly speaking, he's not a fefugee from there. He's a refugee from the other place and had found a place to light, like a bird in a ---. But is there any other method, we have so many of these cases, that present these type hardship cases, and this is a hardship case, as it is now, whatever may be said about the law, it's a hardship case.

And in living here, 7 years, is it?

A Ten.

A

20.

Q Ten. And he'd have to go back to Hong

Kong. Is there any power in any agency, the Attorney General,

head of the Immigration Department, President, that could suspend

the operation of law as to this man and his wife and child,---

Yes, Your Honor, there is, there's a provision under the Deportation Law that allows what's called suspension from deportation, if he has resided in the United States for in excess of 7 years. However, the instructions have gond down that no applications will be approved where the time has been built up either by Court action, or by private bills,

7	in Congress, or by	when you came in as a student, or if you
2	came in as a visito	r, or indeed if you came in in a legal cap-
3	acity.	
4	Apparentl	y the only way you could be assured that the
5	7 year rule might a	oply is if you were hiding out successfully
6	for about 7 years	
7	Q	What about a private bill?
8	A	Private bills are extremely difficult,
9	Your Honor, because	you have to have a Congressman who's ter-
10	ribly eager and willing to go to bat for you because it has	
99	been abused	
12	Q	How long has this case been pending now?
13	A	We first filed, I think, in 1965, and for
14	the	
15	Q	1955?
16	A	1965.
17	Ω	1965.
18	A	And we, the Court decision was in 1968, I
19	believe, and the Court of Appeals decision in our favor was	
20	in 1969.	
21	Q	Of course, you would agree that by the two
22	Circuits disagreed	this way, that it's a pretty close case.
23	A	Well I just think the Second Circuit is
24	wrong, Your Honor.	
25	Q	What?

Your Honor. I would like to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp. where the writere of the opinion said it's the business of Congress to sum up its own depated in its legislation. Moreover, its only the words of the bill that have Presidential approval where that approval has been given, it's not to be supposed that in signing a bill, the President endorses the whole Congressional Record.

And incidentally this record of hearings covers some 1500 pages that are referred to by the Petitioner, for us to undertake to reconstruct an enactment from legislative history is merely to involve the Court in political controversies which are quite proper in the enactment of a bill but which should have no place in its interpretations, and ending by and large, I think our function is well stated by Mr. Justice Holmes, "We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means."

We believe that on the basis of the statute, our client, Respondent, qualified under the statute should be considered and should therefore be eligible for such a visa, and we ask that the desision of the Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit be affirmed.

Q Could I ask you a question? You argued this case, I suppose in the---

7	A	Ninth Circuit.
2	Q	Ninth Circuit.
3	A	I did.
4	Q	Did you put in an Amicus brief in the
5	Second Circuit?	
6	A	No, I did not. I wasn't even aware of it.
7	Q	You weren't aware of it.
8	A	No.
9	Q	Thank you, Mr. Dale, thank you, Mr. Gordon,
10	the case is submitt	ed.
day d		
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