Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1970

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Supreme Court, U. S. APR 2 1971

Docket No.

153

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In the Matter of:

ELEANORE TAFT TILTON, ET AL.,

Appellants,

VS.

ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, ET AL.

Appellees.

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Washington, D. C.

Date

Place

March 2, 1971

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1	IN THE SWPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	OCTOBER TERM, 1970
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4	ELEANORE TAFT TILTON, ET AL.
53	
6	Appellants :
7	vs. No. 153
8	
9	ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON, SECRETARY
10	OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, : ET AL., :
11	
12	Appellees :
13	
14	Tuesday, March 2, 1971 Washington, D.C.
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1	PROCEEDINGS
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3	MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Weill hear arguments
4	next in Tilton and others against Richardson.
5	Mr. Pfeffer you may proceed whenever you're ready.
6	ARGUMENT OF LEO PFEFFER, ESQ.
7	ON BEHALF OF
8	MR. PRERFER: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please
9	the Court.
10	This is a tax
11	Q I should comment to you as we indicated before
12	we ppened this morning, that Ar. Justice Marshall is unavoidably
13	absent due to illness, and he will make whis own decision as
14	to the participation and if he does then participate, it will
15	be on the basis of all of the usual papers and on the tape recor-
16	ding of the argument, of course.
17	A Yes, Mr. Chief Justice, Counsel will
18	Q I understand that's entirely agreeable.
19	A Yes.
20	This is a taxpayers suit challenging both the inter-
21	pretation and secondarily, the constitutionality of Title I
22	of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963.
23	The statute provides for grants of federal funds to
24	construct what are called "academic facilities" that are under-
25	graduate educational institutions. They're post-secondary level.

And as far as is relevant to this case idddefined academic facilities amont others to exclude those used for sectarian instruction or religious worship, or any school which is part of a school or department of divinity.

5 Other than that it does not contain any express 6 exclusion predicated upon the nature of the beneficiary insti-7 tution. The question as presented by this appeal, as we see 8 it, first, is not, although that appears to be how all appellees 9 seek to frame it, is not whether church related colleges are 10 disqualified from participating in the benefit of the statute.

If it were, that was the question, we would not be here, we conceed, and have never contended to the contrary, that the mere fact that a college is church related does not either statutorily or constitutionally disqualify it from .recieving federal funds.

The question as we see it, is whether a sectarian institution is disqualified both statutorily and constitutionally.

Now we have defined in our complaint, in our brief,
what we mean by sectarian. And specifically we call it one
in which the provocation teaching, or practice of religion is
a meaningful and major part of its existence.

23 24 24 25 Q Where is that written down in your brief? 24 A Well the latest is in reply brief. I'm reading 25

-	0 332 michie
yes.	Q All right.
2	A This, well, it's in our original brief, as
3	well. But I'm reading now from the reply brief, it's in the
4	original brief as well.
5	The provocation, or practice of religion is a mean-
6	ingful and major part of its existence.
7	This case was brought before this Court decided
8	Walz against Tax Commissioners of New York. Had this case
9	been brought after that decision perhaps we would have defined
10	sectarianin terms of the Courts decision in Walz as one whose
11	dominant policy is to assure future adherance to a particular
12	faith by having control of their total education at an early
13	age. That's in the Walz case.
14	Now
15	Q What do you mean by the word?
16	A Well
17	Q Are you suggesting that the two definitions
18	are synonomous?
19	A Basically, I guess
20	Q Or that one is preferable to the other
21	A Nome
22	Ω Or that
23	A Well, they; re preferable in the sense that it's
24	wiser to use the language of a recent decision of the Court
25	than to use your own language. But basically I don't consider
	6

din a any substantial difference between ----2 So that they are basically synonomous. 0 3 They're basically sympnomous, yes. A 4 Now----Well, Mr. Pfeffer, isn't a meaningful and major 5 0 6 part of its existence a little different from control of total education at an early age? 7 Well, total education, as I understand it, total 8 A education in Walz in the context and I think what it means 9 was that instead of assuring adherence to a faith by teaching 10 them only religion, and a lot of them go to a secular institution 11 for a secular education, it's a total education so that it 12 has, as it were, total control of both the secular and the 13 religious aspects, that's how I interpret total education, and 10. I believe that's what the was the intent of ---15 We're not talking about -- how many church re-Q 16 lated are Roman Catholic parochial schools? There are Lutheran, 17 there are Jewish, 1 suppose both Reformed and --- Onthodox, 18 arent' there? 19 A How many are there? 20 Q Church related parochial schools. How many dif-21 ferent faithe? 22 A How many different faiths have parochial schools, 23 or how many faiths have church related institutiona? Which are 20. completely different. 25

Que	Q No, that have parochial schools.
2	A Well, the major ones, as I know, the major
3	ones are the Jewish, the Lutheran, the Seventh Day Adventist,
4	and of course, the Roman Catholics. Those are the majors, there
5	are some Episcopalians
6	Ω Now under your definition all 4 of them would
7	be sectarian?
8	A I have no definition which necessarily charact-
9	erizes an institution as sectarian or merely church related,
10	simply on the basis of a faith to which it has a relationship.
11	There are many , many institutions which
12	Q Well, let me put it this way. Has any one of
13	those 4, can it be said that the propogation, practice, or
14	teaching of a religion is not a meaningful and major part
15	of the existence of a parochial school?
16	A I think so. If we use the term church related.
17	If we use the term sectatian, no.
18	Q I'm trying to get at this through your defin-
19	tition.
20	A Oh. If it's not a meaningful or major, then
21	it's not sectarian.
22	Q Well does any of the 4 that you named
23	A Well there are
24	Q Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Jewish, and what was
25	the 4th, Seventh Day Adventist?

A Yes, sir. But there are some of those in which 1 the relationship to the church is so tenuous, it's a vestige 2 of a nations history. 3 B. You mean by that that some particular, let's say 0 5 a college identified perhaps with a Roman Catholis order, 6 may, in its particular circumstances not be sectarian --- . 7 A Yes, indeed. Yes, indeed, the mere fact that 8 it is Catholic does not mean it must be sectarian. And there 9 are Catholic institutions----10 Q Can you think of any Roman Catholic elementary 11 schools that would not be sectarian? 12 Well, I----A 13 0 in----14 Well, I, offhand I can't think of any, but ----A Can you think of any Lutheran elementary 15 0 schools that ----16 A I can't. I can think of Episcopalians, I can 17 think of Unitarians. 18 Q Let's hold it to your 4 for a moment. Can you 19 think of any Jewish elementary schools as to which ----20 A yes, I think it's quite possible. For example, 21 let me give you an example what are known as Sholem Alechem 22 schools which are secular schools. They do not have a religious 23 context. 24 Q There are no elementary schools ---- . 25 9

1 A No. At this point we're talkingabout colleges. 2 As in response to Mr. Justice Brenaans inquiry. 3 Q Well let me finish. How about any elementary 13 schools in the Seventh Day Adventist? 5 A My knowledge is that they would all be deemed 6 sectarian. I think there are Episcopalians that would not. And certainly ethical culture which would ---7 Q Are there some Baptist ----8 A Pardon? 9 10 Q Baptist? Baptists prefer to have very little purpose, 11 because they don't use----12 Q How about Methodists? 13 I don't think they have parochial schools. Now 14 A the reason we have used the term sectarian in this brief and 15 in our proceedure because that's a term which has a long history 16 behind it. 17 Thirty three of the fifty states of the Union use 18 the term sectarian and none of them uses the term church rel-19 ated. 20 And indeed the statute which is at issue here uses 21 the term sectarian. It does not use the word church related. 22 Now the posture of this controversy, by reason of the fact 23 that the Court below did not pass upon the basic issue which 20. ve present. We had a trial in which we sought to present evidence 25

in respect to 4 institutions in Connecticut, all Catholic,
 to show primarily to present, to create a record as to what
 might be deemed sectarian and what might rot be.

We had precedent for that in state Court in Maryland just 2 or 3 years ago. There were 4 institutions which were challenged under similar statute. Court held 3 of them sectarian, one of them said the relationship of that fourth institution to a faith or a religion was so tangential that it could not be deemed sectarian.

But the Court took the position ----

11QTell me, did the Maryland Court of Appeals12adopt your definition of a sectarian in that case?

A Basically. The Court below took the position that under the statute, and this was a decision urged by the government, and this is the oposition, this is the interpretation thatthe Commissioner has applied throughout the nation.

That it is completely irrelevant as to what the beneficiary institution --- . What it was created for, what it's purpose is, what its practice is. The sole test, both as to meaning and as to constitutionality is whether the particular facility to which the federal funds are earmarked whether that particular facility is not used either for sectarian instruction, or religious worship.

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If that facility, an island of secularity, so to speak,

1 surrounded by a sea of sectarianism, is clear of religion, then 2 it matters not what the sea is, and there fore the Court found in finding the facts, the only finding of the facts it 3 made was that we presented no evidence, in fact we do not contend 4 we did not contest the fact that in these 4 institutions, the 5 facilities which were financed, in part, with federal funds 6 were not used for religious instruction or worship, indeed, the 7 evidence showed there were no cruxifices there, no religous 8 images, that they were completely secular. 9

10 And the Court below adopted the governments position 11 and simply disregarded and felt it, deemed irrelevant all 12 the evidence presented as to the nature of these institutions.

NOw, on the basis of that, the Court in effect held this: that this is a fair conclusion, I believe, of what the Court has held and what the government contends that it is perfectly constitutional for the government to appropriate funds for building facilities, and I want to interrupt for one moment.

19 The term facilities has been interpreted by the 20 Commissioner quite broadly. It does not mean necessarily a 21 building, a library or a chemistry laboratory in a building, 22 the rest of the building which is committed to the devotion of 23 religious teaching so long as that library is not used for that 24 purpose, that library can be financed.

25

Now, an institution which admits only students of a

4354 particular religion requires them to participate in religious 2 activities, compells them to comply with the doctrines of the 3 religion, forces them to attend church, requires them under 4 penalty of dismissal to take instruction in the theology and 5 doctrines of that religion, and does everything to proprogate and advance a particular religion, other than confer degrees in 6 7 divinity, that such an institution can constitutionally re-8 cieve governmental funds, so long as in its bookkeeping, it allocates those funds to the construction of a chemistry lab-9 10 oratoy, or a biology classroom.

This is the crux of the Courts decision. I cannot
see how the Constitution of the United States, which forbids
a religious test for public office, nevertheless permits the
financing of public facilities which apply to anybody but members of a particular religion.

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This, yet, is what the governments position---

17 Ω Does the record show, in this case, whether
18 the Catholic schools in Connecticut admit only Catholics?

19AWell, we believe that such a finding could20have been made by the Court. Among them, the institutions, more21than 95% of these students are Catholic.

22 We do not contend, necessarily, that any one of these 23 institutions fits this description, but we do noot conceed 24 that they do not.

We are unable to dgaw conclusions because the Court

1	below made no relevant findings of the fact. It says its all
2	irrelevant. We don't care how many students there are. We don't
3	care if the studenta are required to take theology. We don't
4	care if they're all Catholic. So long as the money is allocated
5	to that part of the institution from which religion is excluded
6	this is within the purpose of the statute and the Constitution.
7	Q Does the record itself in this case
8	answer the question I asked?
9	A I think so.
10	Q What does it show?
11	A It shows at least one of the institutions
12	has over 95% Catholic. It shows that it advertises in
13	primarily Catholic periodicals.
14	It asks
15	Q But your general statement was at the be-
16	ginning, that these institutions at least, would not admit
17	anybody except from this denomination.
18	A I'm sorry, I don't think I said that.
19	Q Well, then I misunderstood you.
20	A I said the Court could have so found that
21	at least one of them, it could have so found. It made no
22	findings. It could have so found. Had it so found, I believe
23	such a finding would have been supported by the evidence in
24	the record.
25	But we don't know what the Court found. The Court said

1 it doesn't make any difference.

And the lower Court, these 4 institutions are really not the important things in this case. We brought them in only to create a record. To provide specificity to use the language in Flast against Cohen of this Court.

6 But the Commission who is the real defendant in 7 this case is applying this law nationwide. We'd be perfectly 8 willing to drop the suit against these 4 defendants, we have 9 no desire to recoup any of the money they have gotten.

We are seeking an adjudication which will be a party to the Commissioner of Education, in carrying out the functions and duties and obligations under this Act.

Now we claim that first our argument is that it is not necessary for this Court to reach the constitutional issue. We believe that the statute can be reasonably read to limit it to such institutions which are not sectarian in the sense which we have indicated. And in the sense which has been used in the State Courts in interpreting their own statutes.

I say that there are 150 years of interpretation of the word sectarian. We do not contend, we've never contended that merely because an institution is church related is disqualified or that Congress intended that is should be disqualified.

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Now, we think it is reasonable and under the well

1 established rules, the Court should seek, if it really would do so, it could seek to interpret the statute in the context 3 which I suggest.

2

4 Certain far more acceptible, far more defensible, 5 or far more acceptible in interpretation, than, for example, 6 the interpretation of the Supreme Being in the (Seeger) case.

7 The statute had been administered on the 0 8 other premise, though?

9 Yes, indeed, it had been administered ----. A 10 Or else we would n't be in Court.

11 But leaving aside any further discussion of consti-12 tutionality which is inextricably wound up with constitutionality, we claim that it is part of the Constitution of the United 13 States and of all the states of the Union that public funds 14 may not be used to finance the operation and construction 15 of a sectarian institution of the type which we describe. 16

We believe that is a principle which might be said 17 to be part . of the common law of the American Constitutional 18 System. 19

It was given its most perhaps broadest pronouncement 20 in the Everson case in 1947, in upholding bus transportation. 21 The Everson case which was a 5 - 4 split was meant nothing if 22 there were not agreement that you could not finance the oper-23 ations of the institution itself. The Everson principle has 24 been criticized because it the term no aid is too broad. This 25

I Court in Walz also suggested it may have been too broad.

The Everson principle is not a no-aid principle. The Everson principle is no-subsidy principle and the Court distinguished in Walz, it distinguished in (Allan) the textbook case, between aiding an instrtution which the government does many times, and subsidising it, financing it, that is what we contend is unconstitutional.

Now, we have said, in our brief, and the government
takes exception to it, that we have been unable to find in
the history of the United States, a precedence to this Higher
Education Facilities Act of 1963 for governmental financing of
the construction of a sectarian institution.

The government says ever since their brief, ever 13 since the moral act, the (Landgrand) Act of 1962, the gov-14 ernment has financed church related institutions, we've said 15 sectarian, and gives as evidence for that, support for that 16 assertion, a study made by I presume the Library of Congress, 17 which is called in the Congressional Record, listing the 18 educational institutions, chunch related educational institu-19 tions, which have recieved (Landgrand) funds. 20

I should like to, it's a brief list, I should like to list, read you the list of, I think, less than a dozen institutions which are cited in support of this assertion.

Brown University

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Yale University

Rutgers University Dartmouth University University of Kentucky University of Delaware Atlanta University Maryland State College Auburn University Kansas State University University of California.

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10 Yes, University of California, and Kansas State University. How are these church related? Well, wach one has a little --- to show how it's church related. I will read only 12 one: Kansas State University. To the naked eye I would assume 13 one would not suspect Kansas State University of being church 10. related. 15

But this government says it is. It reads as follows: 16 Kansas State University, Methodist Church gave (Bluemont) Cen-17 tral College to State as site for new agricultural college, 18 which was to reciever (Landgrand) funds. The Kansas State Ag-19 ricultural College became the State University. 20

This is the whole part, ergo it follows that the 21 government has given mongy to a church related college. 22

I submit, Your Honors, if this prooves anything, it 23 procoved the opposite of what the government decided for. It 24 prooved a recognition that (Bluemont) College so long a part of 25

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the Methodist church could not recieve government funds. So what was done? A gift was made to a state university, the state of Kansas, the state of Kansas made it a public institution, and recieved funds.

This is, I submit, an argument which does not stand strongly in this case. Now I recognize that the Everson decision is a decision of discord. And what this Court gives, this Court can take away.

And if the Everson principle is dead, perhaps this Court should say so. My argument is that the Court did not say so. That notwithstanding the criticisms and it is legion.

There's not a Law Review in the country which from time to time does not have an article showing how broad the Everson bictum is and criticizing for overbreadth.

But the supreme judiciary body of the United States is not the Law Reviews. It is not the briefs of ---. It is this Court, and I submit that this Court did not in any way impair the integrity of the basic principle of Everson of no financing of sectarian institutions.

Q What do you say about the conclusion in Everson, apart from the language?

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The conclusion is certainly not a---I mean the judgement.

A The judgement said and indeed this is how Everson is interpreted in every one of the cases, this statute

is constitutional because it does not subsidize the operations of parochial schools. It does not finance. This statute is constitutional --- it provides welfare with safety benefits. The Court said it just deals with --- . It's to protect the children from the hazards of the road.

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It does not, and the (Allan) textbook case, theCourt said the same thing. This statute does not subsidize, does not fincance the operations of the parochial schools.

Q I guess the Court could say the same thing in these cases.

A It could say, I wonder how it could say it, but of course---

Q If it could say so in (Allan) and if it could say so in Everson, then it could say so in this---

A It could say but respectfully and with a good deal less validity. I don't know how the Court could say that financing a building which is part of an institution, not financing an institution---

Q How do youdistinguish a building, really, from transportation facilities, as a tool of education?

A Well, the answer is, Mr. Chief Justice, that Everson was based on the fact that transportation was not a tool, but the --- claims that it was. The 4 Justices, Mr. Justice (Ruthers Mr. Justice Jackson asserted that it was.

But the --- Court said it is not, said it is a tool

of public safety. It is to protect the children from getting run over.

That's the premise of the Everson case. It is how it is interpreted. Now if theCourt, if the Court is prepared to overrule Everson, I think it should do so in clear unambiguous language.

I should like to quote to the Court a short statement from the treatise of Chief Justices. He said, "in the United Statea against (Barth) and opinion which is to overrule all former precedents and to establish a principle never before recognized should be expressed in plain and explicit terms, A mere implication ought not to cause prosporstrate a principle which seems to have been so well established. General expressions ought not to be considered as overruling settled principles without direct declaration to that effect.'

If this Court is prepared to correct a century and a half of error, I submit it should do so clearly and unambiguously. I submit further it has not done so. In no case has this Court in any way impaired the integrity of the basic principle of Everson, no financing or subsidy of the operations or construction of a sectarian institution in this sense that we are using that term.

Q Mr. Pfeffer---

24 A Yes.

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Q --- some time, would you comment on the

Cont. Bradfield case ----2 Yes. A 3 --- particularly in the light of the fact 0 4 that it is not cited in the governments brief? 5 At this particular point. There is no A 6 need to --- . Bradfield against Roberts was an 1899 decision 7 in which the Supreme Court unanimously upheld a contract be-8 tween the city of Washington and a corporation formed by an order of nuns to operate the Providence Hospital in the city 9 10 of Washington. The Court held the statute constitutional on two 11 basic concepts. First, that there is nothing sectarian in 12 the operation of the hospital. This hospital, the Court said 13 is operating according to its charter, and it is a hospital 80. which treats ill people. It does not teach, it does not 15 propogate religion. 16 Within the term sectarian as I've used it, they are 17 not a sectarian institution. The Court indicated that it's 18 a separate corporation, but I don't think that's a critical 19 factor, I think the law pierced the corporate veil to prevent 20 fraud, and I think the law would pierce the corporate veil 21 22 to prevent violation of the first amendment. But the critical factor is not whether this is a 23

25 But the critical factor is not whether this is a 24 legal fiction, a separate corporation, but when this is in 25 truth and fact an institution which propogates and practices

religion. It does not. It propogates nothing and teaches med-2 icine.

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3 Secondly, here's another critical distinction. The Court pointed out that no person is denied admission and A. treatment to that hospital because of the religion or faith. 5 It is not limited to members of that faith. It said, indeed, 6 7 it had to be, because as part of its contract with the city of Washington, it had to take indigent patients. 8

Now I submit to you, that a state cannot make a con-9 tract, the federal government cannot make a contract with a 10 sectarian educational institution of the type I've described 11 whereby the state will pay that institution money and send 12 its students there. 13

It can do it with a hospital. But an institution has 14 the right to say indeed has a constitutional right to say 15 under the religious liberty clause, we will not admit anybody 16 here unless he's part of our faith and indeed if he is part 17 of our faith as bhe record shows he must take Catholic theo-18 logy, or Lutheran theology, must go to mass or to communion, 19 this is a condition which a sectarian institution has under 20 the free exercise clause an absolute right to make. 21

22 Now if I am correct, that up to the present this Court 23 has not impaired the integrity of the basis of Everson, I 24 submit that the fact that the funds which are allocated are 25

That was not involved in Bradfield against Roberts.

1 earmarked for a particular facility which of itself is not religion----2 I take it from your discussion of Bradfield, 3 0 4 though, that the, since you say the separate corporation is not very important in the case, that the government may give 5 money to a church, a religious organization to carry on a non-6 religious activity. 7 A welfare activity. A 8 A non-religious activity. Q 9 Well----A 10 Well that's what they did in Bradfield. 0 1 They gave money to the church to carry on a hospital. In which 12 hospital there were no religious activities. 13 That's not all. In which activity was avail-A 14 able to everybody. 15 Well, I agree with that ----Q 16 But that's part of the picture. A 17 I know, but nevertheless the government may Q 18 give money to a church to carry on non-religious activities. 19 Subject to certain other qualifications. A 20 So the answer is yes. Q 21 Yes, subject to qualifications. Yes, to a A 22 non-religious activity, but not one which is limited to the 23 members of that faith, or which has a religious bar or deter-24 mination. And to who can get the benefit of those facilities. 25

Q But would it have made any difference in Bradfield if there had been a place for prayer and worship in the hospital?

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A It would have, if every patient were required to go to prayer as they are in religious institutions. It would have made all the difference in the world. The record shows that Catholic participation in Catholic theology courses is required.

Q Would it have made any difference in Bradfield if as I think is the custom in Catholic hospitals, there were a crucifix on the wall of each hospital room?

A I don't think that would have been enough to make a difference. I don't think that would have been enough to make a difference. I don't think, if that's all there was, I don't think that would have brought it into the framework of a sectarian educational institution of the type which I've discussed.

Nor, that each nurse was a nun? 0 18 No, I think not. 19 A And that she was wearing ----20 0 No, I think not. I think ----A 21 Nor that the director of the hospotal ----0 22 I don't think that would have made ----23 A Well, then, Mr. Pfeffer, I suppose the 0 20. government had given the money to the church to carry on the 25

100 non religious activity even though the church might have 2 carried it on, anyway. 3 Well, I don't see what the relevance of A 12 whether the church would carry it on or not. 5 Well, ----0 6 I would say yes. Offhand I can't see how A that makes it constitutional ----7 Well if just saves the church money. 8 0 A Oh, that I don't ----9 But the bookkeeping feally isn't very 0 10 important. 11 It's not the bookkeeping that's not very A 12 important, it's the point that the bookkeeping is impor-13 tant for this reason. The bookkeeping is important that it's 84 not because it saves the church's money, but because, indeed 15 it's not important, I think it's absolutely not important, 16 but not for the reason which you might be suggesting. It's 17 not important because the money is used, not to save the 18 church money, not the church might be a case of the church 19 has to go, indeed that they claim that they have to go out 20 of business unless they get the federal funds. 21 Qq Well Mr. Pfeffer, you certainly have to 22

conceed that what happened in that case was the subsidy of a religious order operating a hospital, wash't it? It was government subsidy with government money to operate an activity

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17901 of a religious order, to the hospital ----2 It was not, again I'm I must go back, Mr. A 3 Justice----A. but wasn't it that? 0 5 It was that, it was more than that. A 6 It was a religious subsidy, wasn't it? 0 7 It was a subsidy to operate a public service A 8 available to all of the public without any requirements of 9 religion, without being ----No matter how you parcel it, it was still 10 0 a subsidy of a religious institution, wasn't It? To that 11 extent? 12 It was not, I've never said that the A 13 constitution forbids the subsidy of religious institutions. 14 I said, of an institution which is engaged in the propogation 15 and teaching of religion. 16 Well----Q 17 This hospital is not engaged. A 18 Well isn't the Catholic church? 0 19 But that the hospital. A 20 So you're saying that you may not subsidize Q 21 an activity which is a religious activity. 22 Exactly. An activity which is a religious A 23 activity. 20. Then the only question in this case is Q 25

1 whether the teaching of mathematics in a building is a religious activity or not. 2 The teaching of mathematics in a building A 3 may be a religious activity ----4 Well, we haven't reached that point, have 5 we? We've only reached the point whether the government can 6 subsidize the construction of a building. We don't know 7 what it's going to be for. 8 A I say the government cannot subsidize the 9 construction of a building whether you call it religious or 10 not religious. 11 Then why can it subsidize the operation of 0 12 a hospital? 13 Because nobody was barred from entering A 14 that hospital becuase of religion, I cannot get away from 15 that. This is the critical difference. 16 Well I suppose the government could have 0 17 gone into the business of building hospitals on its own---18 A It could, but it could not bar a non-mem-19 ber of any particular religion because of religious ---. And 20 I cannot see how the government can itself subsidize somebody 21 else to do what it cannot do. 22 Well suppose that the government would be Q 23 barred by the First Amendment from building a sectarian 20, school----25

5 Indeed it would. Now if you take, Mr. A Justice Brennan, youtake your argument and carry it out ----2 I'm not making an argument, I'm amking 3 0 A a statement. I'm sorry, your suggesting. Seeking to meet 5 A your question, suppose you have a church that does nothing 6 but prayer and worship and the government gives it money 7 to be used only for the construction of a new furnace? Because 8 the furnace is out of order and the church has no money. 9 So the government gives it money to construct a 10 furnace room at that church. Is that constitutional? 11 But that's not the case we have here. 0 12 It is, indeed. The argument which we make A 13 and the case which we make and the Court said that even by 10 its decision even so, if the chemistry laboratory, if the 15 biology laboratory, if they're in order th make it possible 16 for a student oto get all of their education under religious 17 auspices, which is what the Court said in Wals, then this 18 chemistry lab is just as much part of the whole religious unit 19 as is the room used for teaching religion or prayer. Now 20 I must, inviview of the time, I mustgo, if you'll permit me, 21 to the Walz test, which is the latest voice of this Court, the 22 latest statement of this Court on what the establishment 23 casss 24

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The Walz---

1 0 This Connecticut case, was that decided 2 before we decided Walz? 3 A Yes, indeed. Yes, indeed. I'm---1 I gather from your brief you're suggesting 0 that we may have a different test in Walz than the purpose-5 effect test we have in----6 7 A No, I'm not contending that at all. I'm contending all tests, Everson, (Shimp) (Allan) and Walz are 8 basically----9 10 0 All the same? ---all the same. Are basically all the same. A Con Con They are different formulations of what I've said to be a 12 hundred and fifty years of constitutional law of the United 13 States. 10 If there are going to be changes, this Court will 15 have to make them. I am not challenging constitutional law. 16 I think ---- judicial opinions attempting 0 17 to draw a distinction between an exemption and --- . 18 Yes, indeed. Walz does this. And the A 19 difference is that the exemption applies no surveyance, no en-20 tanglement, subsidy does. And entanglement and surveyance 21 here there is galore. 22 The Act provides that for 20 years a facility is used, 23 if at any time in 20 years a facility financed with federal 24 funds is used for sectarian worship or prayer, the institution 25

91	must pay back to the government
2	Q 20 years, what happens?
3	A It belongs to the institution.
4	Q And then it can be converted
5	A Anything.
6	Q Even though the government paid for it.
7	A Presumably, I'm not saying that's consti-
8	tutional, but the government feels that 20 years is the life
9	expectancy of a building, after 20 years the depreciating
10	value, they can do anything that they want. I presume that
11	that's the rationale.
12	But if Your Honors, please, what is required under
13	this statute? The government must keep an eye on that in-
14	stitution for 20 lest religious teaching be into a
15	humanities class. Because if it does it violates a law.
16	This is survelance for 20 years. Moreover, in Everson,
17	this Court ruled not only that it's unconstitutional for a
18	public financed institution to teach the Genesis version
19	of the Creation, but it's unconstitutional not to teach the
20	Darwinian version. of the Creation, of evolution.
21	So that this Court, the United States will have
22	to police these colleges, make sure not only do they not
23	teach Genesis, or evolution or the Creation with point to
24	Genesis, that they not teach the Creation with point to Dar-
25	win.
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This is survelance of the most extreme kind. This is the entanglement of the state and religion of a type which every decision of thes Court, going back to Watson against Jones, 1870, in every decision the Court said that the government must keep out of censuring, looking into what's happening in the religious institution.

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It's done that in Russian Orthodox cases. It's done it in the (Cattle) against Connecticut. It says, this we are not to go into. The eclestastical or theological religious institution and spy upon them or oversee them or entangle ourselves in their activities.

I cannot see how ,under this statute, the government to be faithful to its constitutional obligation because I'm sure can see that the government may not finance a facility which is used for religion---

Q	What is that form of survelance?
A	Well,
Q	It lasts for 20 years.
A	Yes,
0	What form does it take?

A Well according to what appeared from the government, the government will probably be in a better position to answer this than I am, if they have any reason to believe that there may be use of the premises for religion they inspect it. And they can and do exercise control to make sure

1 that either that's discontinued or that appropriate counter-2 measures are taken.

Now, I'm not privy to how they administer it, I'm 3 saying that there is no way of avoiding it. There is no 1. avoiding the constitutional barrier or the statutory barrier. 5 Q Well is it an express statutory provision 6 which says you shall keep this survelance over 20 years? 7 No, the statute says if this facility is A 8 used in violation of this provision as well as other pro-9 visions, but I'm talking only about this provision, within 10 a 20 year period, that the institution must reimburse the gov-11 ernment. 12 Well, now the proceedure for survelance, Q 13 is that set up by regulation, is that it? 84 I think the government would have to answer A 15 that. But whether there are or there aren't I think it's not 16 constitutional. If there arentt it means only that the gov-17 ernment is neglecting its constitutional statutory obligations. 18 The test is not whether it's doing it, the test is 19 whether it's required by the law of the constitution. 20 That's why I was asking you whether it was 0 21 required by the law----22 Yes, indeed. they are required by law and A 23 the constitution to uphold the statute and the constitution. 20 And this requires no other way unless they take the institutions. 25

Where if they don't at least they don't there is some evidence to the contrary.

Q And you say that the survelance adds to the unconstitutionality---

A Under the Walz test. The title ---. It is not the only thing. There is far more than that, but this is, it is our contention that no matter how you look at this , it's inconstitutional.

The basic premise is a premise which is long establishe in constitutional law. The struggles which have been had, both this Court and the Law Review and the --- of how to formulate that.

But the heart and blood of it is that you cannot tax the whole community to support a religious enterprise whose purpose is to propogate and teach religion. And who bars from its facilities those who are not of the faith.

This to me is basic constitutional law, and I don't think any test how ever formulated can get away from a face to face encounter with that basic proposition.

Now, one word ----

Q So fundamentally, I take it you just take issue with the notion from the ground up that there if there ismore than one activity going on in a sectarian school, that everything that goes on in it is sectarian---

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That's not the --- I didn't say that.

Well is there any secular education going 1 Q 2 on? In, surely. 3 A You think it's inextricably intermingled à. 0 with---5 A Absolutely. I'm saying that that secular --6 wider the --- test it doesn't make any difference. Under the 7 entitlement case it makes no difference because it still re-8 quires survelance to keep it that. Unless you wanttto overrule. 9 Then you think it's irrelevant to some 0 10 schools that you would clasify as sectarian under your def-11 inition, some school undertakes to live up to the conditions 12 to grant that you must nevertheless disregard the conditions 13 or to say it's unconstitutional for them to agree with those 14 conditions. 15 Yes, unless the Court wants to overrule A 16 Everson, wants to overrule Walz, and I believe overrule Allan, 17 t00. 18 So I take it that you would agree that you 0 19 can subsidize a church, give money to a church to carry on 20 an activity, which activity itself is not aimed at propogating 21 a faith. 22 Yes, subject to a condition which I've re-A 23 peated many times. 24 Well, yes, well----0 25

1 A I can't get away from it because the mere 2 fact----We'' remember that. 3 0 The mere fact, it's more than that, it's A A. more than that. The mere fact that the institution is limited 5 to members of a faith, and the members of the faith are re-6 guired to accept instirction which they are, in that faith, 7 as a condition to using that facility which is the key sweep, 8 indicates to me, sir, that that facility is a means not an 9 end. 10 It's there in order to make sure that we get kids 11 who will take religion. \$2 By the facility you mena the institution, 0 13 not----12 No, ----A 15 Not the particular laboratory, though, Q 16 is it? \$7 That's what I mean. Why does an institution A 18 which is ----19 I thought what we were dealing with here 0 20 was the construction of a building which was to be used as 21 a laboratory, for something, chemistry, has nothing whatever 22 to do with religious teaching. And you say that that's ----23 It has nothing to do with religion, Mr. 0 24 Justice Brennan, if it's, anybody can go in there, it's not 25

200 parto of the institution, it's not a means to achieve the end 2 of the institution. We cannot ----Recently you may have noticed that opened 3 0 on the campus of Catholic University, is a theatre. A. Yes. A 5 The Harkness. He's its director, that's 6 Q open to the public. But if the government had built the 7 Harkness Theatre, since it's on the campus of Catholic Univer-3 sity, he's on thefaculty of Catholic University ----9 That's not enough ----A 10 Would you ----0 11 A That is not enough for me to express an 12 opinion. In fact I don't have that here, and I'm not required 13 to express an opinion, that's not in any of these cases. 84 Wouldn't necessarily be invalid. Q 15 A What? 16 It wouldn't necessarily ----0 17 It would not necessarily but in order to A 18 get into that theatre, you had to go first to a chapel, where 19 you got a sermon on religion, and then we went to the theatre, 20 I would say we have an analogous case here. 21 That's what I would say, because that's exactly what 22 the government, and I say that is perfectly permissible. 23 Mr. Pfeffer, suppose, against the back-20 ground that we have in this country of a shortage of doctors, 25

probably a shortage of lawyers, the government embarked on a grant program to grant to any school, any university, including Georgetown, and Catholic University, grants for law schoola, and basis science, and medical schools, to be built on the land owned by the University, and to revert to them as it does here, in fee after 20 years. Would you, I'm not clear from what you said now whether that would nor would not be permissable, constitutional.

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A I will not say whether it would be permissable. I'll say under what conditions it would not be permissable.

I think, because that, I think, is what is relevant here. I am not required to spell out for the government what it what do. We are here to try to convince the Court what the government may not do. It may not say you cannot go to the law school unless you take theology, unless you participate in mass, unless you are of the Catholic religion, the Lutheran religion---

Q I should have included in my hypothesis what I believe to be the fact that at Georgetown University you can go to the law school without going to any other school or the chapel.

23 A Then I say a very good case could be made 24 our for saying that as in the Maryland case that the relation-25 ship of that institution to the church has reached a point

where it is no longer sectarian.

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And indeed this is what is happening with many of them; it's what happened with Yale, with Harvard, with Columbia, with Princeton. They started out as sectarian institutuion. This is what happened with some --- institutions. They are going through the same proceedures, Fordham, Notre Dame. I wouldn't be surprised that in 10 or 15 years, the relationship between Notre Dame and the Catholic church will be somewhat analogous to the relationship with Columbia University and the Episcopal Church.

Or Princeton to the Presbyterian Church. All the institutions, now many of the institutions are going through the same development. And they reach a time, as with the Court of Appeals in Maryland, held when you can say that this is nolonger a sectarian institution.

The public school system of the United States went through the same metamorphosis. It started out as Protestant schools, as bible schools, and it was against this cpntext that the state constitutions were written, provided that they cannot be supported because of their Protestant, not their Catholic church relationship, church sectarianism.

But little by little, through a period of development they became truly non-sectarian institutions. And I say that there are many such institutions, of higher education, that have a church relationship.

(internal Well, Mr. Pfeffer, let's take these specific 0 2 institutions here, could the government include students who 3 want to go to these schools in a generally applicable scholar-13 ship program? 5 In scholarship to students who could choose A 6 any college that they want ----7 That's a scholarship program based on finan-0 8 cial need, but he can take his scholarship and go anywhere 9 he wants to. 10

A If Your Honor please, I would like to exercise my priveledge of not replying to a question which I believe is not relevant to this case.

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Yes.

A Because the issue is a difficult one and I don't want to foreclose any possible position which I can take sufficient time.

Q Of course in that situation the government would be furnishing the most critical element of religious activity, namely, the people.

A Well, then perhaps if that's so, then I would say assuming you'd say that, I'd say it's constitutional --- but I'm not prepared at this point either to make any claim or to defend it, I'm not required in the light of this case, nothing in the Courts opinion below, nothing in the position taken by the government.

1 Well I thought you read Allan as a part of 0 2 going on the ground that it wenttto the student instead of 3 the institution. A 4 5 0 don't I find that in your brief? I said that Allan pressed that there was 6 A 7 no subsidy for the institution. Well, isn't that the same as saying it 8 0 went to the student instead of the school? 9 No, there was no subsidy there involved. A 10 The use of books was involved. Allan, as I interpret Allan, 11 iswam 12 Do you think it might bave been different 0 13 if the student had got the money to go to a bookstore and buy 1A the books? Do you think Allan would have come out then? 15 I'd rather not speculate.on what Allan was 16 decided. I would say it didn't decide that. What I think 17 Allan decided was this: that just as a Catholic child, or a 18 Lutheran child can go to a public library to borrow a book 19 which he needs to help him in his studies, he can, under this 20 statute get in from the state directly without going to the 21 public library. 22 But I do not interpret Allan to say that the fact 23 that this book is limited only to persons of a particular 28 religion will nevertheless make it constitutional. 25

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fine l Does the record show how many of the 2 institutions in Connecticut were recieving this aid, are sec-3 tarian and non-sectarian? 4 Well, in Connecticut here's what we did. A 5 0 Yes. We show in the record, those who brought 6 A the suif, I mean those who examined the various institutions 7 3 in Connecticut which they could, and they chose, in bringing the suit, they chose those which they deemed would be basically 9 religious. 10 They did not choose others which were not sectarian, 11 according to the standards used, which did have church re-12 lationship. 13 If Your Honors please, I should like to reserve the 10. balance of my time for rebuttal. 15 Very Well. Q 16 Thank you. A 17 Thank you, Mr. Pfeffer. Mr. Friedman? 0 18 ARGUMENT OF DANIEL M. FRIEDMAN, ESQ. 19 ON BEHALF OF APPELLEES 20 MR. FRIEDMAN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may 21 it please the Court. 22 The Higher Educational Facilities Act of 1963 rests 23 on findings by Congress that at that time there was an urgent 20. need for a tremendous expansion of the higher educational fac-25

ilities in the United States. And in order to enable the young people of this country to obtain an education which they needed and which held out great promise, for the future, the provision in Title I, for grants to educational institutions only permits grants upon a determination that the grant will result in the creation of urgently needed expansion of facilities which will increase the enrollment of the colleges.

so that the critical fact of this statute is that it was designed in order to enable this country to expand its higher educational facilities at a time when existing facilities were inadequate.

Now, the statute as Mr. Pfeffer has indicated is very explicit that no federal grants may be made for any facility which is used for sectarian instruction, or sectarian worship. And in addition, no grant may be made for any facility which is all or part of a school of divinity, and school of divinity, in turn, is defined very broadly.

It's defined as a school for the education of students to prepare them to become ministers of religion, or to enter upon some other religious vocation, or to prepare them to teach theological subjects.

Q Now once a grant is made, though, Mr. Friedman---

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Pardon?

Mr. Pfeffer suggests that once a grant is

Canal I made, once you get over these hurdles, if the institution 2 qualifies for a particular facility, then is the --- policing 3 arrangement? Let me say specifically what the -- there A 1. isno policing as we use the term ---5 Well what is the statutory policing --- deals 6 0 with? 7 A There's no statutory provision for that. The 8 only statutory provision is that academic facilities cannot 9 be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious 10 worship. 11 Now, what the Office Of Education has done in this 12 area, is it relies primarily upon the representations made 13 by the institutions, when they seek a grant. They are required 10. to certify that none of these facilities will be used for re-15 ligious purposes. They are specifically instructed in several 16 places on the application forms, that this is the limited 17 purpose. 18 They do have some on site inspections. The on site ----19 Is this under some standard proceedure, 0 20 regulations, or ----21 No, this is just under what I might call A 22 informal proceedures. They are informal proceedures. From time 23 to time, ----20. ---regional setups throughout the country? 0

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A They have regional offices but they do not have regional inspection proceedures. The information they have given me is that since the funds were recieved in 1965 there have been approximately 3200 grants. Of the 3200 grants approximately half of 1600 resulted in facilities that have now been completed.

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And of the 1600 completed, there have been approximately 400 on site inspections.

But the nature of these facilities since these are buildings, the nature of these facilities means that the inspection, the kind of inspection is relatively simple.

In other words, a look-see, look at the catalogue, to see what courses it---

Q Well, where did I--did I read in one of the briefs, there are so many briefs here I can't be sure, that there had been an indident about some institution in Mississippi---

A There are shown in the record in a stipulation, the page is 82 - 84, three instances where information came to the attention of the Office of Education that 3 institutions apparently had been using some of their facilities for religious purposes.

In 2 instances, the institution agreed to stop it, in the third instance, where they were using an assembly hall for a chapel, the institution decided to return to the federal

government the money it had recieved for the grant.

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The federal government in these grants, I think it is self evident, does not pay the full amount for the facility. It's only a porportionate amount.

Q Now is it so that at the end of the period, 20 years, I think Mr. Pfeffer suggested, then the fee---

That is---

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Q --- and I gather at that time, the assembly--A That's---

Q It could be converted into a---

A That's right. Twenty years, I think, is the regognition by Congress as that point at which the conrection is --- .

One thing I should say, however, that if during the 20 year period it is discovered that an impermissable use is being made of one of these facilities, it does not necessarily automatically revert back to the government and they do not necessarily have to refund the amount.

They have the priveledge of terminaking the impermisable use, which is what happened in 2 Or 3 of these hypothetical cases.

Q What happens if they do not terminate? A If they do not terminate the use? Then they are required under the statute to refund what they have recieved from the government, but it's on a formula under which

they refund the relative value of what they got from the 1 government to the total cost of the facility on the basis of 2 the then value of the facility. 3 Is that a statutory formula, or ----Q A. Yes, that is the statutory formula. A 5 Suppose they don't return it? 0 6 Well if they, I presume the government could A 7 either then bring a suit to---8 What happens to the building? 0 9 I suppose this would depend on what relief A 10 the government seeks. The building might revert to the gov-11 ernment. 12 Does the statute provide that it does? 0 13 The statute is not explicit on that, the A 14 statute merely states that if ----15 You mean that it's not clear on it. 0 16 It's not clear on it. That's right. And A 17 we're hopeful that no such cases will arise, this, at least 18 as of this time, there have been no instances where the gov-19 ernment has had to resort to that, except for these 3 instan-20 ces. 21 Now let me, since Mr. Pfeffer has been talking largely 22 about what I might call theoretical institutions, let me say 23 that as far as these 4 colleges are concerned, the record in 24 this case is unequivocal, that there has been no prohibited 25

religious use of any of the facilities here, which was testi-1 2 fied to without any question, in the Appellants here introduced no evidence that there was no religious use made of any 3 of these buildings that there were no religious plaques, 4 no religious symbols in any of these buildings. 5 Mr. Friedman, in these, what does the 0 6 evidence show about whether these institutions limit their 7 student to one freligious faith? 8 The evidence is very explicit on that, A 9 that they do not. There was again, uncontradicted testimony 10 by the heads of all of these institutions ----11 Q But the Cout made no findings, on that? 12 Court made no findings. A 13 And it's implication was that it would n't 0 84. have made any difference. 15 Presumably A 16 So we must consider this case as hough it 0 17 were a case involving an institution that did limit it's 18 enrollment? 19 I don't think, Mr. Justice, it would A 20 necessarily make any difference, but I don't think the Court should consider it on that basis, but even though the Court, theDistrict Court did not make any findings, we have this 23 record, and this record is uncontradicted, 1) that they did not discriminate, that they do permit members of any faith 25

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to attend the schools.

Q So that what does the record show about whether or not people who attend these institutions must attend chapel?

A The evidence is again uncontradicted that no non-Catholic is required to attend any religious service.

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what about Catholics?

A Catholics it varies, I believe, in some, the testimony was that in some of the institutions they are not required to, and in some they were.

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Some of the institutions ----

Q What about the ones where they require some of the students, mainly Catholics to, as a condition for participating in the secular education program, to attend chapel and to take a course in ---

A Well, Mr. Justice, I'd like to correct my answer, on thinking back---

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Yes.

A ---the testimony is, by the presidents of these colleges that the Catholic students are not 'required to attend any religious services.

They say that Cathòlic doctrine may require them in some circumstances to do so, but that that is a matter for their own consciences.

In other words, that's independent of any

without the compulsion of any school regulations ----

That's correct.

---it's just a matter of faith involved. That's right.

Q Well how about a school that does require, Mr. Friedman, and some schools do, West Point, for example.

A Well again, Mr. Justice, I wouldn't think that that would make any difference, because as I will come to in a minute, under what we think is the appropriate test, the question is you look to see the facilities being subsidized.

Are they secular? Now as Mr. Justice Brennan has suggested, West Point, they may have compulsory chapel. Litigation now pending in the District of Columbia over the validity at the Naval Academy.

But if I may say one othet thing Mr. Justice White, with respect to the way that these schools operate, the evidence is also uncontradicted, that there are a large number of lay people on the faculty.

Indeed, the head of the Psychology Department in one of these colleges thestified that of the 7 full professors on his staff, 4 of them were Jewish.

Q How about the curriculum. No they include courses in religious instruction , which it's mandatory for the student to take?

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1 A I believe that those courses are not 2 mandatory for non-Catholic students. I think that Catholic 3 students are required in some instances to take certain courses. 1 Again, however, these courses are not taught exclu-5 sively by Catholic teachers. Almost every one of the schools, 6 for example, ahas a Rabbi on the staff. And interestingly en-7 ough, the Rabbi is not restricted to teaching Jewish theology, 8 he, one of the Rabbis teaches a basic course in introductory 9 Survey of Religion. 10 Now, I would like, if I may, just briefly, to refer 11 to the contention of Appellants that the statute doesn't apply to these, does not permit these grants. 12 13 That is, that the statute is silent on the type of institutions that may recieve grants. All that it speaks 14 about tis that it permits grants to institutions of higher 15 education. And that seems to be a neutral thing. But the 16 qualifications that the statute creates for the reciept of 17 these grants is based on the academic situation of the school, 18 not upon its religious affiliatin. 19 However, the language of the statute strongly suggests 20 that Congress recognized that grants would be made to church 21 affiliated, religiously affiliated institutions because of 22 the specific exception for grants to divinity schools. 23 Now it's common knowledge that most divinity schools 24 are operated by religiously affiliated institutions, and Congress 25

when Congress excepts from the permissable category of institutions that may recieve these construction grants, divinity
schools, it seems to me a very clear implication that grants
are permitted for non-divinity school aspects of these church
related institutions.

But if there is any question about this, I think
they're completely dispelled by the legislative history in
this case.

9 Q Did you say that --- make grants to divinity 10 schools?

11 A No, they can not make, they specifically 12 cannot make grants to divinity schools under this statute, 13 and what I suggested is that the existence of that exception 14 is rather strong evidence, we think, that Congress recognized 15 that grants could be made to non-divinity school institutions 16 that were connected with religious organizations.

But the legislative history, it seems to me, is really clear beyond any doubt. First of all, there are a number of people who testified during the course of the debates in Congress that in order to accomplish the necessary expansion of the educational facility, the private, non-religiously affiliated and the public higher education institutions in this country would not be enough.

24 They need to pull upon the existing facilities of 25 the religious institutions. And while there was considerable

debate during the course of this legislation over the wisdom and constitutionality of these grants, there was nobody who suggested that the statute did not cover grants to these institutions indeed, it's exactly to the opposite, because several of the sponsors of the legislation explicitly stated during the course of the debate that this statute does cover religiously affiliated institutions and indeed, in both the House and the Senate, an amendment was proposed that would have excluded grants to religiously affiliated institutions and that amendment was defeated by a voice vote, ----, in both instances.

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Q Mr. Friedman, somewhere along the line tell me whether there's any implication in the fact that your brief did not cite Bradfield.

A No, Mr. Justice, there is no implication and I have to confess that perhaps it is an oversight because I think that is a persuasive authority, and if I may, may I cite another case that we have not cited in our brief, which refers to Bradfield, and that is a case called Quick Bear v. (Lupe) in 210 US 50, and that was a case which involved the validity of grants by the SEcretary of the Interior of Indian Trust Funds, to be used to sponsor and send Indian children to a parochial mission school on an Indian Reservation.

This was attacked on a number of grounds, including the constitutional ground, and the Gourt disposed of the con-

1 stitutional question in one sentence, citing the Bradfield 2 case, the Court said, "It is not contended that it is uncon-3 stitutional and it could not be." 4 Which Court said that? 0 5 This Court, Mr. Justice. A 6 0 In what case? 7 In a case called Quick Bear v. (Lupe) A 8 in 210 US in 1908. 9 That was a long fime ago, when was that? Q Pardon me? 10 A When was that? the second Q 12 A 1908. More that 60 years ago. Q Mr. Friedman, grants of a non religiously 13 affiliated school, have they exceeded an amount of grants 14 to religiously affiliated schools? 15 Yes. Let me just give you some rough fig-A 16 ures on that. 17 The record shows that the total grants since they've 18 started making grants in 1965 have been about a billion and 19 a half dollars. The best estimate they give is roughly 15% of 20 those grants have been to religiously affiliated schools, 21 another 15% have been to non religiously affiliated private 22 schools, and the remaining 70% roughly, have been to public 23 schools which may include state universities, community colleges, 24 technical----25

Q I take it the commitment which you mentioned earlier, not to use to teach religion and so forth, is that limited to a commitment by the religiously affiliated schools?

A Oh no. That is across the board and indeed, the specific forms which they have to fill out in order to qualify for the grant, these documents repeatedly point this out to them and they are required to make these representations along with many others with respect to the way the facility will be constructed.

Q Does the legislative history show whether there are any statements to the effect that the church schools do not continue to run without government suppost?

A there were not in connection, no, this bill, Mr. Justice, was not directed to that issue, this was just directed, of course, to institutions of higher education,---

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Well, did it show anything about that?

17 A No. What it shows, Mr. Justice, is that
18 the belief of the Congress that the necessary expansion of
19 bigher education facilities could not be accomplished without
20 the participation of the religiously affiliated institution.

Why?

 22
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 Because there just wasn't enough capacity

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 available with the existing---

Q Wait a moment, they've been building, haven't they?

A Well it was one thing, I suggest, Mr. Justice, to try to create a new institution, it's another to increase the capacity of existing institutions. And Congress decided that the best way to deal with this problem facing American higher education was to increase the capacity of existing institutions that already had the experience in this area.

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Now if I may turn to the ----

0 Before you turn, let me just ask you one thing about the survelance question. Suppose, 3 years after a grant were made, and the building built, for chemistry and mathematics, and biology, it suddenly developed that all those subjects had been abandoned and it was being used for a divinity school. I suppose the government would move in and 10. do something about it, wouldn't they?

Yes. We would do one of two things. As soon 16 A as we found about it, the first thing we'd do is to tell them 17 to stop it. And if they were reluctant to stop it, refused 18 to stop it, we would then tell them that they had to refund, 19 give us back some money, and I suppose that if they in effect 20 said that we won't do either, we would then take whatever steps 21 had to be done. 22

I suppose maybe an eviction proceeding. 0 23 Concievably an eviction proceeding, concie-A 20 vably a suggestion of some sort of forfeiture, well I don't 25

know if we could forfeit the land, but certainly we could go against them and I suppose sue them in effect for breach of contract and get as a measure of damages whatever the amount was we contributed.

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Q Then, if Imay pursue that by carrying it over to the Everson case, suppose it developed after school busses were provided to take elementary children to school it was learned that a religious teacher was put on the bus every morning so that they wouldn't lose this time and they were reciting the Lords Prayer and singing religious hymns, and listening to religious instruction.

I suppose that would be stppped too, wouldn't it? A I would suppose they presumably would say that they would not extend any subsidy to parents as long as the bus was being used for that purpose.

Q Does the one in your mind under the Everson situation call for any more survelance, government survelance of the religious institution than the other?

20 Q I suppose as soon as this deviation occurred 21 there would be a great many people calling attention to it.

I don't think so, Mr. Chief Justice.

A Well, that's right. For example the way the record shows the way they found about one of these 3 cases that I have referred to is someone sent in a newspaper clipping to the Office of Education containing a story

on the use of one of these facilities as apparently as a chapel for holding religious exercises. 2 Mr. Friedman, is there anything in the 3 0 legislative history indicating that there was consideration 4 whether building more colleges, more universities was or was 5 not a more acceptible alternative then using religiously af-6 filiated schools? 7 I don't think it was focused that specif-A 8 ically. I cannot be sure of that, Mr. Justice, because I 9 haven't read, frankly all of the debates are very lengthy, but 10

the debates I have read indicate that there was a recognition

of the fact that the capacity was needed and that the relig-

iously affiliated schools for a long time had been an essen-

tial portion of American higher education ----And it was better to expand that ----

To expand that ----

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---- then to build new ones?

I can't go so far as to say, that, but what A I do suggest and it seems to me that this is quite clearly implicit in the Congressional judgement to structure the statute this way.

Did you all participate in the Horace 0 Mann case in Maryland?

The government? No, we did not Mr. Justice. A Are you going to say something about that Q

çui	case?
2	A Yes, I would be bappy to say right now that
3	I think it fits into the
4	Q It was cited only once, I guess, cited
153	as a compare case.
6	A Yes, the Appellants rely very heavily on
7	the Horace Mann standard. We think that the standard applied
8	by the Maryland Court of Appeals in the Horace Mann case,
9	which is a determination whether the institution as an entity
10	was primarily sectarian or primarily secular, we do not think
11	that that is the test that this Court has considtently applied
12	in dealing with establishment clause.
13	Q What did we do, dismiss that?
14	A Well, there were two things. You denied
15	the Petition for Certiorari in one of them and you dismissed
16	the Appeal in the other one. There were two
17	Q When you say we haven't consistently done
18	anything, you're only talking about 2 cases.
19	A Well, Mr. Justice, I suggest I'm talking
20	about 4. Because I'd like to
21	Q Everson and Walz and what else?
22	A Everson, Walz, we start with the test, which
23	is the purpose and primaryeffect test. That test was formulated
24	in 1963 in (Shemp). That test was used 3 times more in 1968,
25	the Court applied the purpose and primary effect test in the

Allen case. And the same year it applied the same test in
the Everson case involving the validity of the Arkansas antievolution statute and then last year in the Walz case, although it didn't quote the language of that purpose and
effect test, it did use that language and cited the case at
that point.

Q You're saying, really, that there is only
8 one test that---

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That is---

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10Q---define, and that's the purpose--11AThat is correct, Mr. Justice, and let12me say with respect to Mr.Pfeffers contention that somehow13Everson is the test and if this Court is going to drop14Everson now it should do so explicitly.

In the (Shemp) case, when the Court first ennunciated
the purpose and primary effect test, immediately after quoting
the language which we rely on, it cited the Everson case.

18 So obviously the Court must have believed that the 19 purpose and effect test, it was there announcing represented 20 an application of the somewhat broader generalized principles 21 that the Court announced in Everson.

Now, the Appellants argument, the Appellants attack on the purpose and effect test, rests almost exclusively on the notion that somehow the secular and the sectarian are so intertwined that any meaningful separation is impossible.

I think the Court crossed that bridge in the Allen
 case, where it rejected the notion that somehow you couldn't
 separate secular and the sectarian. It recognized there that
 the religiously affiliated schools performed two distinct
 functions.

And if it was felt there that there was no such permeation of the two, such intermingling of the two, when you're dealing with children in the primary and elementary schools, where they're far more impressionable than mature college students, certainly you cannot make that claim in this context, where we're dealing with students in college and indeed, some of these universities have graduate schools.

The purpose here is plainly secular, there can be
no question of that. It was designed to accomplish an expansion,
a desperately needed expansion of the facilities available,
for higher education.

Facilities as defined in the legislation,
 includes only buildings, does it not?

A Buildings or certain equipment. Ω for---

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A Yes. For example, one of the grants here involved a foreign language laboratory. And it also excludes certain types of buildings. For example they ordinarily couldn't give a grant for atheletic facilities unless this was part of a course in Physical Education.

qui	Q Does it include books, could it include
2	books?
3	A I don't believe, not books Mr. Justice.
4	It does include libraries, two of these grants are for
5	libraries.
6	Q Libraries has two meanings, it means a
7	collection of books, or it means
8	A No, this means the building in which the
9	books are housed. That's all they give. These are grants for
10	facilities, for physical facilities to be used
11	Q Structures, building structures plus cer-
12	tain equipment.
13	A Yes. And I would just like to say one last
14	thing in conclusion becuase I have to turn the argument over
15	to my Co-Counsel, that the statute, the test is the primary
16	effect. Now of course, this statute, these grants obviously
17	do help the church affiliated institutions. They help them in
18	much the same way that the parochial schools were aided by
19	subsidizing ther parents for the bus fares in Everson, that
20	they are aided by paying for the books in Allen.
21	But the critical thing it seems to us is the primary
22	effect, and the primary effect here, while it helps the rel-
23	igious schools does not constitute a forbidden government
24	intervention, consider it an actual government support in
25	furthering a religion as such.

1 The government here does maintain its neutral position 2 toward religion andwe think that the way this statute is 3 structured does permit room for that benevolent play at the joints which this Court indicated last year in Walz is one 4 of the essential elements under the establishment clause. 5 6 Thank you, Mr. Friedman, Mr. Ahern you 0 have five minutes, but we'll run a few minutes over if 7 necessary to let you finish today. 8 ARGUMENT OF F. MICHAEL AHERN, ESQ. 9 ON BEHALF OF APPELLEES. 10 MR. AHERN: I think I can finish in that 11 time, Mr. Chief Justice. Mr. Chief Justice and may it please 12 the Court. 13 Since the interest in the State of Connecticut in 14 this case is identical to the interests of the United States 15 government, we subscribe to the arguments advanced by the 16 government in it's briefs and in oral argument here this morning. 17 In addition I should like to point up one or two as-18 pects of the case very briefly which we think the Court 19 should consider very carefully. 20 Now while the Appellants in this case have stated 21 that they brought this action, they could have brought this 22 action in any state of the United States, the fact remains 23 that they brought the action against 4 colleges in the state 24 of Connecticut, and named the state of Connecticut as a defendant: 25

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in the case.

While we have not officially sought to represent all of the states in this matter, we feel that by being named a defendant in the case we have been cast in the role of representative without portfolio for all of the states , in this area.

Incidentally, this role seems quite appropriate in this case, because Connecticut is known as the Constitution state.

I want to emphasize to the Court that each of the states in the United States are participating in this grant program and are vitally interested in seeing that federal funds continue to flow under this Act to the states to enlarge and expand educational facilities in order to accomodate the rapidly growing numbers of young people aspiring to higher education.

I should also like to direct the Courts attention to the fact that in view of the state of the Congressional Record, when this Act was being considered, I dnn't think it can be seriously contended by Appellants that Congress intended to violate the establishment clause of the Constitution by providing federal funds to religion.

The Congressional purpose, clearly stated in debate and in Section 701 of the Act, was to meet an educational crisis by providing funds for academic facilities to further the

educational development of its citizenry which would be beneficial to the whole nation.

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3 We submit it was to implement that national purpose 13 that the Act was adopted. And it was to advance that purpose that the states have participated in the grant program.

6 I would also like to point out that Congress 7 evidently anticipated the recent holding of this Case in 8 Courts Walz decision to the effect that excessive entanglement 9 by the government in administration of religion might 10 make thelegislation be declared unconstitutional.

11 Under the Act under consideration here, each state 12 was required to establish an agency for the purpose of screening 13 grant applications and establishing priorities among projects 14 within the state.

15 However, the states were given no authority to adopt 16 supplemental quidelines with respect to hiring practices, 17 or for inspection proceedures subsequent to construction.

18 The states' responsibility and authority terminated 19 when the application was approved and submitted to the U.S. 20 Commissioner of Education.

21 In like manner, the Congress provided in Section 757 of the Act, that the United States Government could not 22 become involved in, and I quote, "the personnel, curriculum, 23 methods of instruction, or administration of the colleges 24 which recieve grants". 25

1	The sole responsibility and authority of the gov-
2	ernment after completion of construction was to determine
3	for a period of 20 years, by on site inspection, whether
4	the facility was being used for the purpose for which it
5	was constructed.
6	That is, education, rather than being used for
7	religious purposes.
8	
0	Accordingly, I submit that Congress could not have
9	done more to avoid entanglement with religion by the Federal
10	Government of the states.
11	Q What's the total amount of these religious
12	institutions in Connecticut have recieved since the Act
13	A I don't recall how much was recieved
14	by all of the religious, the church related institutions in
15	Connecticut, but it's only a portion of the building costs
16	for each project.
17	Q You don't know the Gollar figure?
18	A I don't know the dollar figure, I believe
19	Mr. Williams will have that for the Court tomorrow.
20	In conclusion I would just like to state that Counsel
21	for the Appellants here this afternoon has made an issue
22	and quite a significant issue, of the fact that he has labeled
23	the 4 colleges intthis case sectarian whereas the Appellees
24	refer to them as church related.
25	And he indicated that he was consistent throughout the

case in labeling and calling them sectarian.

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2	I would refer the Court to page 99 of the Appendix
3	in which the stipulation entered into between Counsel for
4	the Appellants and the State of Connecticut as set forth, and
5	further direct the Courts attention to paragraph 16 in which
6	we considered and used and agreed upon the following lang-
7	uage. "The Commission and members thereof have had occasion
8	to consider questions raised concemning the constitutionality
9	of grants to church related institutions on at least several
10	occasions."
11	So I submit that Counsel for the Appellants on
12	occassion has used ther term church related in referring
13	to these institutions. Thank you.
14	Q Thank you, Mr. Ahern.
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16	(Whereupon argument in the above entitled
17	matter was adjourned, to resume at 10:00 a.m. the following
18	day.)
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