Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1970

In the Matter of:

Supreme Court, U. S.

MAR 9 1971

Docket No.

125

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner

VB.

WILLIAM L. RANDALL, TRUSTEE,

Respondent

SUPPREME COURT, U.S.
MARSHAL'S OFFICE

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Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

February 22, 1971

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Qui. OCTOBER TERM 1970 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 Petitioner 5 No. 125 VS 6 WILLIAM L. RANDALL, TRUSTEF, 17 Respondent 9 The above-entitled matter came on for argument at 10 1:55 o'clock p.m. on Monday, February 22, 1971. 900 BEFORE: 12 WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice 13 HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice HAS. JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice 15 POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice 16 THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice 17 APPEARANCES: 18 RICHARD B. STONE, ESQ. 19 Office of the Solicitor General Department of Justice 20 Washington, D. C. On behalf of Petitioner 21 KEVIN J. GILLOGLY, ESQ. 22 One North La Salle Street Chicago, Illinois 60602 On behalf of Respondent

PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will hear arguments next in Number 125: United States against Randall.

ORAL ARGUMENT BY RICHARD B. STONE,
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. STONE: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court:

This case which is here on a writ of certiorari

from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit, raises a fundamental question as to the legal status

of taxes which an employer withholds from the wages of his

employees. And, specifically, the case raises the proper

treatment of those withheld funds in the event that the employer

becomes bankrupt or goes into a bankruptcy proceeding.

The facts of the case are relatively simple.

Halo Metal Products, Inc. filed a petition for an arrangement under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, and that is the provision which allows operation of the business to try to stall off the bankruptcy and was allowed by the Referee of the Bankruptcy Court to remain in the possession of the business and to carry on the business's operation, subject to the Referee's supervision during the Chapter 11 arrangement.

As is the custom in such an arrangement, the Referee entered an elaborate order requiring the debtor in

171.0 possession to file periodic reports and to maintain full 2 5 6 7 8 9

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records of its operation during the arrangement period. And in addition, the Referee ordered the debtor to open up three bank accounts. The first of these accounts was to receive all revenues received by the business during the operation in the arrangement period. And the second account was to receive periodically from the funds deposited in the revenues account the amount necessary to pay all employee wages and disbursements from this payroll account were to be made at proper intervals with the approval of the Referee.

The Referee ordered that simultaneously with meeting the debtor in possession's payroll obligation that the debtor deposit into a third special account the amount of tax and social security deductions that the debtor was required to withhold from his employees wages. And withdrawals from this third account were to be allowed only for payment of the withheld taxes and welfare benefits as those payments became, due to the United States Government.

The debtor failed almost entirely to comply with the Referee's orders, with the orders of the Bankruptcy Court with respect to these withheld taxes, although the income and social security taxes were withheld from the employee wages, the withheld funds were not placed in a special account nor were they paid over to the United States at the proper time, as required by the arrangement court.

During the arrangement the United States filed a proof of claim for \$1,075, that is one thousand, seventy-five dollars of FICA and income taxes withheld from employees' salaries on the ground that this amount was a special trust for the United States benefit under Section 7501A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and about that section I shall elaborate shortly.

Subsequently, about three months after the filing of the original arrangement petition, Halo was adjudicated a bankrupt. And a month later, on December 22, 1967, the United States filed a petition in the bankruptcy proceeding, asking that the withheld taxes which it claimed as a trust fund under Section 7501 be paid over to the United States, just as any trust fund would be paid over prior to payment of the costs and expenses of administration of the bankruptcy proceeding.

And the Referee denied the Government's petition and the District Court and the Court of Appeals upheld the Referee's denial of the petition and it is that on which we are here on a writ of certiorari to contest now.

Both of these courts held essentially that Halo's obligation to pay over to the Government the taxes withheld from employee wages was merely an administrative expense of the bankrupt estate and was thereby subject to the scale of priorities established by Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act of which I am sure this Court is quite familiar.

Now, I think it would be helpful to view the issue presented here, which is whether the Government is entitled to recognition of a trust fund for the amount of taxes withheld from the salaries of the bankrupt's employees during the arrangement period as breaking down, essentially, into two parts; two questions.

The first question is, and this is really the question as construed by the Court of Appeals: whether the trust fund concept is simply inapplicable altogether, as both courts below seem to have felt, in a bankruptcy proceeding.

And the second question, which neither court reached, but which I believe was the focus of the Bankruptcy Referee's decision, is whether, assuming that the trust does not disappear merely by virtue of the withholding employer's bankruptcy, but whether the trust is nonetheless, defeated or enjoined if the trust is defeated by virtue of the Government's inability to trace the res of the trust, and I will address myself to both of these questions.

Q As the Government looks at this case it really is not a matter of priority, at all.

A That's right, Mr. Justice Stewart.

Q And by contrast, the way these courts look at it, that's all it was.

A That's right.

Q Am I correct in that?

A That's exactly right, and prior to several 9 years ago, I believe in 1955 when the Third Circuit decided 2 the Connecticut Motor Lines case, every court that had looked into this and all the commentators, as I shall show shortly, viewed the question as not one of priorities, but simply a 100 recognition of a trust, and not the matter of relative priori-6 ties. 7 And then the question becomes: did the 8 trust to be --9 Yes; is it --A 10

Q -- it stood because the res --

A Exactly; exactly; that is precisely what I think is important to show. And what we are really alammed about in this decision is the fact that the Court of Appeals viewed these trust assets as debts and viewed this case as a matter of priorities between conflicting administrators.

O Yes.

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A Now ---

Q Well, it is apparently your theory that the bankrupt estate is really enjoying a windfall if it prevails here; is it not?

A That's right, Mr. Justice Blackmun, though it is hard to trace, as I intend to discuss at length, it is hard to trace precisely what happened to the funds, one likely, logical assumption is that this trust fund has simply been added

bankrupt's creditors. And therefore, collections from those assets would be windfalls to those creditors.

Q But the trust fund you are talking about in every case of this kind is a fund that arises from the bankrupt's assets themselves -- from the bankrupt's own assets?

A That's right ---

Q It's just something that — he paid wages but he wrote checks for his employees for an amount less than what they were getting paid —

A That's right --

Q -- and so he just kept the rest. And so there has never been a transfer creation of the trust fund?

Trustee make a transfer at the time he paid all the wages —
in fact he never did. And one of the points which I plan to
address myself to is whether the enjoinment of the trust ought
to be defeated by the fact that the Trustee never did make
these deposits and so that all we are really talking about is
whether a trust ought to be imposed on general assets of the
bankrupt estate. That is the question in this case, as we
view it.

But that is not the question as the Court of
Appeals viewed it and I think it is very important to see
exactly how the Court of Appeals did identify this question and

to make sure that what I consider the gross misconception in the Court of Appeals opinion be corrected.

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with the order of the Court, impresses a constructive trust on the total receipts of the bankrupt and regards him as having done what he had been ordered to do; is that substantially --

That's exactly right; that's exactly right, Mr. Chief Justice. That is our theory. And that is the theory of Professor Scott and that is the theory of all the courts which have directed themselves to this aspect of the case and the theory that the courts have gone on and since we have gotten into this I might as well anticipate what I expected to be a later statement of the argument: the theory that these courts have gone upon is that yes, in a situation where the res of a trust cannot be traced, where you are simply talking about general assets, is that you run a risk in either imposing the trust or disregarding the trust, you run a risk that the actual proceeds have been lost in the accounting procedure; there is no record to say where the assets went and so that either the beneficiary of the trust or the general creditors may have suffered in some way.

Now, it seems to me the most likely assumption is that the estate has been fattened by the failure to pay over these funds at the designated time and though we want to protect the creditors with respect to the general assets of the

estate, it has been the view of all the courts that have considered this that because of the fact that the Referee, the debtor in possession is himself an officer of the Bankruptcy Court and because the debtor in possession is the person who, by his negligence, failed to segregate these funds and failed to set up the trust for the benefit of the Government, that we ought not to make the beneficiary of the trust suffer because of the negligence of an officer of the bankruptcy court. We ought to give that beneficiary the right to rely on the fact that an officer of the bankruptcy court is going to do what the bankruptcy court tells him to, particularly when the bankruptcy court states in the order that it shall supervise all these operations on a weekly and monthly basis.

so that all who have considered this question have felt that the equitable considerations which militate in favor of recognizing this right to rely on the bankruptcy court doing what it says it's going to do, should eliminate the requirement of tracing the res of trust.

But, what I want also to make clear is that this is not the ground — this issue which I consider to be the crucial issue in this case is not the issue that the courts below went upon. The courts below, in my opinion, fundamentally misconstrued the whole nature of withheld taxes and the interrelation of the Bankruptcy Act with this trust fund.

Q I want to test your argument with a

hypothetical case if I may.

Suppose the money had been, indeed, put in this segregated account and had built up to many thousands of dollars over a period of time and a weekly check had been made and the money was always there; then the officer of the company having control of the account suddenly withdrew it all — of the segregated account, the tax, the trust account that you are arguing about. He withdrew all of it out, got it in currency and flew to Argentina.

Then wouldyou say that you could impress any constructive trust on the other assets of the company?

A That is a very different case than the one we are facing, Mr. Chief Justice.

Q Oh, yes; oh, yes.

A And I think -- I'm not sure what the answer to that question is; perhaps not, but I don't think that controls this instant case, for the following reason --

Q No, but what I'm driving at is I'm trying to set up the hypothesis where you could identify --

A If you can identify --

Q You can trace it all the way to Argentina now?

A If you can identify the res of this trust

I, at the moment, can find no argument against the proposition
that the general assets of the creditors of this company ought

then to be subject to the Government's tax claim. I would not want to go on record as committing the Government to that position, but it seems to me that if you can trace the res of the trust then you — then the Government ought to be required to go after that trace of the res and the persons clearly responsible for the waste of the res of that trust.

Q Mr. Stone, I gather the employees get credit for the amount on the books indicated as withheld from their --

A That's right, Mr. Justice Brennan. Their liability with respect to those withheld funds is charged at the time wages are paid and taxes withheld from those wages.

Q Without payment ever by the empployer --

A That's right. And similarly, if there are any refunds are owed it is the employee who has the --

Q Well, the point is there is nothing in the way of a trust involved here for the employees?

A No; it's a trust to the Government.

Q Only for Uncle Sam?

A Only for the Government. Now, that trust is set forth in Section 7501 of the Internal Revenue Code, which is quoted in page 26 of our brief and to which I refer the Court, and that provision states as follows:

"Whenever any person is required to collect or withhold any internal revenue tax from any other person and to

pay over such tax to the United States, the amount of tax so collected or withheld shall be held to be a special fund in trust for the United States."

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Now, I take it that neitehr Respondent nor the courts below would dispute that by virtue of Section 7501 an employer who withholds income and social security taxes from his employees' salary is the trustee of a trust, at least up until the point that the employer becomes insolvent.

Now, let us consider the case of the employer's insolvency and look briefly at Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act, which is set forth in relevant part at page 23 of our brief. That section, entitled: Debts which have priority, establishes those debts of the bankrupt which have priority over general unsecured creditors of the bankruptcy proceeding. And that section reads as follows:

payment of dividends to creditors and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates and the order of payment shall be (1) the cost and expenses of administration, including the actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate subsequent to filing a petition." And then follows a general enumeration of expenses considered to be administrative expenses of the bankrupt estate, followed by four other categories of debts which have priority.

And I note in that regard, just for the sake of

clarity that the fourth category of debts with priority includes "taxes which became legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States or to any state or any subdivision
thereof." And this priority for tax debts includes essentially
tax debts which are incurred by the employer prior to the institution of bankruptcy proceedings and it is not disputed that
tax debts incurred by the bankrupt during the bankruptcy proceeding are administrative expenses of the bankrupt estate and
share in the first priority. But that would not, in our view,
include these taxes for the reason I'm about to state.

Q Mr. Stone, we're really in a situation here of tension between two statutes; aren't we?

that we are not in a state of tension between these two statutes for the reason that though the Court of Appeals certainly thought we were, for the reason that Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act has nothing to do with trust funds. It deals with administrative expenses of the bankrupt estate and unless you can at some point identify withheld taxes as a tax debt of the employer there is no tension because Section 64 has no bearing on those --

Q This has to be your position. I think you have no alternative. The question I wanted to ask, however, is there anything in the chronology of the two statutes which of help here? Which is the older of the two?

A Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act is the 1 older of the two. 2 Q So that the other one which, as I recall, came in about 1934, the newer one --1 A Right. 500 -- does this lend you any support at all? 6 A Well, it lends -- I think it does lend us P some support. Of course it lends us some support that the 8 trust is still Congressionally enacted even though Section 64 0 was already on the books and the trust provisions of 7501 was 10 not refer in any way to a limitation arising from bankrupcty. 9 9 Q Do you know what prompted its birth in the 12 Revenue Act of 1934? 13 The institution of the trust fund pro-14 vision? 15 Yes. 0 16 Yes. As far as we can tell the Senate 17 Report and the HouseReport are both rather limited in terms of 18 explaining the purpose, but as far as we can tell the trust 19 imposed in Section 7501 was designed to forestall the possi-20 bility that courts would limit the Government to mere debt 21 collection procedures and would not allow either trust collec-22 tion or tax collection extraordinary procedures against those 23 withheld funds. 24 Am I correct: did this statute come into 0 25

being before withholding was established?

yes. It came in before the withholding of income tax and before the withholding of FICA, but there was already on the boards withholding of various excise taxes and it was these particular taxes which the original predecessor of Section 7501 was designed to take care of.

Q Well, in your view, isn't the trust section imperative to the integrity of the Social Security Act structure?

A It is imperative to the structure of the Social Security Act and to the withholding of income taxes; yes, it is, Mr. Chief Justice.

Our view is that the entire legislative scheme which we discussed at length at pages 7 to 10 of our brief, the entire legislative scheme behind the withholding of all taxes shows that the Government serves merely as a collection agent with respect to these taxes, that these are tax debts of the employee to the Government and not of the employer to the Government. And therefore, that these are neither taxes nor debts of the bankrupt to the Government, and therefore

don't come under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act which establish priorities for debts and expenses of the bankrupt estate.

Essentially, if an employee is paid \$100 in wages

receives \$85 and he is considered to have discharged the \$15 tax liability and the employer at that point merely holds, as the Tenth Circuit recently said, holds as a collection agent for the Government. He holds it for a brief period of time and is required to pay it over.

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less of how strong a policy Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act embodies as to the administrative priorities of administrative expenses, there is nothing in that provision which converts trust funds into administrative expenses or which deals in any way with the bankrupt's obligation to hand over funds which it has received in the capacity of collection agent and neither of the courts below nor the Respondent Trustee have attempted to answer what I consider to be a crucial threshold question of interplay at all does Section 64 have on these funds.

Q Do you think the Nicholas case bears on our problem here?

A Yes. I think that it certainly needs to be discussed. Of course, this Court reserved in Nicholas the question before us here. Nicholas involved the question of whether interest on withheld taxes accrued past the period of bankruptcy or whether it stops with the institution of bankruptcy proceedings or actual institution of bankruptcy.

And the Court in Nicholas held that interest did not accrue. It held on the broad general principle that

interest during the bankruptcy proceeding ought not to accrue at all because it eats away at creditors' assets and creditors ought not be disadvantaged merely because of delays attributable to the long length of the bankruptcy proceeding.

Q Does the Government have a lien for these taxes?

A A lien? Not especially, Mr. Justice White.

It is not filed --

Q The Government doesn't have the same lien for these withheld taxes as it would for the income taxes which the employer himself owed?

A That is a question that, if it hasn't been tested -- it can go in -- I suppose this hasn't been tested, but I suppose it could go in under --

Q Suppose the Government has a protective lien for income taxes and the employer goes bankrupt? What's the relevant position of the Government, vis-a-vis for its taxes and when it's got a lien for income taxes how do they stand as against administrative expenses?

A I don't know the answer to that question,
Mr. Justice White, except that I believe that if the lien is
perfected that they stand ahead of all unsecured obligations,
including administrive expenses, but I'm not sure about the
answer to that.

I want to point out that the Court in the Nicholas

case, cited the second sentence of Section 7501, and I think it is important, since no doubt the Nicholas case does have to be examined to determine the outcome of this case. The second sentence of Section 7501 after the trust is declared, says as follows:

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"The withheld taxes shall be assessed, collected and paid in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations, including penalties, are applicable with respect to the taxes from which such funds arose."

Now, we think, as we discussed in our brief, that the legislative history of that statute makes it clear that it was designed really — though it says "limitations," it was not designed to limit remedies but to expand Government remedies.

But, even with — even the quoted language taken at its face value is, I think, if anything, favorable to our position in this case, because the phrase "taxes from which such funds arose" clearly refers to the income and social security taxes owed by the employees and withheld by the employer and these taxes on the employees would not be subject to any collection limitations by virtue of the employer's bankruptcy.

Now, they would be subject, in any bankruptcy proceeding to a limitation on the accrual of interest during the bankruptcy proceeding. But they wouldnot be subject to a limitation by virtue of the employer's bankruptcy and therein I think lies the essential distinction, even given the fact

that the Court relied on the second sentence of Section 7501 100 in the Nicholas case. That is the essential distinction be-2 tween Nicholas and this case. 3 Q Mr. Stone, in general an employer -- not a 4 bankrupt -- an employer doesn't have to, or does he, keep 5 withheld taxes in a separate fund? He may use them, can't he 6 in business ordinarily? That is also an uncharted scene, Mr. Justice Brennan. I think that --9 Well, if he absconds with it is he prosecu-10 ted as an embezzler? 11 He could be. A 12 Oh, really? Under Federal Law? 0 13 I would think he could be. It is an em-14 bezzlement because he is --15 Well, is he prosecuted as an embezzler? 16 I don't know of any cases that have 17 raised this --18 Q Well, what do they prosecute him under? 19 This must happen, doesn't it, that an employer absconds with 20 the --21 A Mr. Justice Brennan, I wouldhave to say 22 that the Government has not tested at all the whole range of 23 permissible activity that an employer can conduct with respect 24 to these withheld funds. They are due so quickly -- in the

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ordinary case they are paid over so quickly because they are due --

The

bezzler?

Q If they are not and there has to be a prosecution because he absorbeds with them, under what do you prosecute? Some special provision of the income tax law?

A I don't know of a special provision that would cover that.

Q So then it would have to be as an em-

A I would think that the embezzling remedy would be available but I suppose -- I suppose a willful, a criminal prosecution for willful avoidance of tax payments under the normal criminal provision of the Revenue Code.

Court ought to definitely make tit clear that these withheld funds are not espenses and debts of the employer to the Government, bbut are held in trust by the Government, and that the mere fact of bankruptcy does not defeat the trust set forth in Section 7501.

And that in addition, the trust in this case ought to be recognized even though the res is not specifically traceable for the reasons set forth in our brief and as I have elaborated on.

I wouldlike to save whatever remaining time I have for rebuttal.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: In order to avoid interrupting you, Mr. Gillogy, let me put a hypothetical question to you that may help me clear this up in my mind. 3 ORAL ARGUMENT BY KEVIN J. GILLOGY, ESQ. 1 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT 3 MR. GILLOGY: Yes, sir. 6 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Suppose -- I would 7 assume that a large employer like General Motors or others of 8 that category probably have, at any given day, millions of 9 dollars in the segregated accounts. 10 Now, hypothetically, assume the impossible, which 11 is that Congress, acting very swiftly, would simply abolish 12 the whole statutory scheme. Whose property would that account 13 -- the fund -- who would be the owners of that fund? 10. A I would say under the existing law it would 15 be the United States Government. 16 And would they be the legal owner only or 17 the equitable owner? 18 Well, I would say the legal owner under 19 the trust theory. The legal title, of course, is in the holder 20 of the funds and the equitable title would be the United 21 States Government. 22

Well, don't you think the equitable title would vest in the employees if the Act had been repealed? The employees who had made these contributions under the Act --

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data data	A Of	, after the Act had been repealed
2	Q Th	at's right; the Act has been repealed.
3	A I	m sorry. If the Act had been repealed,
4	I think then the equit	able title would be in the employees.
5	Q Ti	e employees. In other words, there would
6	have to be an accounting	procedure to unscramble this very large
7	omelet and give to each	h employee what had, according to the
8	records of the employe	er, contributed to that fund.
9	A Ye	s, sir.
10	Q Th	at would be unpaid wages, then; wouldn't
18	it?	
12	A If	the
13	Q Su	bject to the limitations under the
14	with regard to price	rity that unpaid wages have under that
15	bankruptcy act. They	certainly don't take over administrative
16	expenses.	
17	A Ax	e we now talking about a bankruptcy
18	proceedings? I unders	tood Mr. Chief Justice was talking about
19	in any given situation	exclusive of bankruptcy.
20	QI	was taking it one step at a time. I had
21	just taken the first s	tage and then you can pursue it with Mr.
22	Justice White's illust	ration and see where you would come out.
23		as any bearing on this case.
24	A I	well, I wouldsay that once the case is
25	in the Bankruptcy Cour	t, either by a Chapter proceedings or by

adjudication, then the entire Bankruptcy Act prevails. Then
the systems of priorities are set forth by Section 64. If this
were rescinded or if it were repealed or if the Courts were to
strike it down and there were no bankruptcy, then I think there
would be no question as to where it would go: the equitable
title would be in the employees.

Q Let me pursue the hypothetical a little bit
beyond that. Take a trust company, bank that has a large

Det me pursue the hypothetical a little bit beyond that. Take a trust company, bank that has a large trust department and the bank becomes insolvent and goes through these processes. Are the accounts of the Trust Department, or the Trust company segregated accounts? Do they ever find their way into a bankruptcy proceeding of the corporate trustee?

A I think by the nature of the Bankruptcy

Act I believe that the trust company is specifically exempted

under --

Q This is all hypothetical.

A Hypothetical, assuming --

Q All hypothetical.

A So I understand you fully, the trust company became insolvent or bankrupt?

Q Right.

A I don't think there is any question at all that the Bankruptcy Act would prevail, assuming that it did come under the Bankruptcy Act, either voluntarily or

involuntarily.

Q You mean the general creditors could reach into the segregated accounts of the beneficiaries of the trusts? You don't mean that?

A I would say insofar as I understand trust companies they hold some of them in trust pools, where they comingle funds --

Q Yes.

A I think you get a different problem there.

Q This is not a trust pool --

A Was it an individual? Well, then again I think you have an entirely different situation.

Q Well, the equitable owner in the trust company hypothetical is the beneficiary of the trust; isn't he?

A Yes, sir; that's correct.

Q Well, I have taken you off enough --

A Yes.

Q Off the track.

heavily upon the trust fund theory and of the theory of trusts and trusts ex malificio. and I question why the Seventh Circuit Court did not address itself to this. And I think it's very obvious that the reason why the Seventh Circuit Court did not address itself to this particular argument to the Government is that it wasn't necessary for it to do so, because the

court there interpreted Section 64a to the Connecticut General case did and the same as the Green case did: that number one, they were not in conflict with one another; that Section 750lA and 64a(1) could be read separately and by the second sentence of 750lA it provided that the trust would have the same limitations on it as the taxes from which the fund cose and then went on to say that the taxes arose from and by virtue of the Bankruptcy Act and therefore the Bankruptcy Act would prevail and ergo Section 64a.

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But, further, if this were not the case, that the strong policy of 64a of the Bankruptcy Act would prevail over the general provisions and the general policy of Section 7501.

I would like to review rather briefly the history of these cases and starting out with the Guarantee Title Company case, an opinion in 1912 where Section 3466 of the Internal Revenue Code provided for a priority, as opposed to 7501 which provides for a trust fund.

There the Supreme Court held that it was a beneficient policy that 64a should prevail, especially and in that case it pertained to wage earners. This was reaffirmed by this Court in Davis versus Pringle in 1925.

Now, this line of cases goes undisturbed up until the time of U. S. versus Nicholas or Nicholas versus U. S. which was decided in this Court in 1964. The problem arises with the line of cases under City of New York versus Rassner. And in the

Rassner case the first case in 1942 in which this trust fund was found to apply. The Rassner case provided — the Rassner case said that it was a general provision of the Bankrupcty Act in Section 64a, as opposed to the specific provisions of the trust and the Rassner case went on to say that if it could be shown that the policy or if the provisions of 64a were other than general then the result would be different.

And this Court has shown in Nicholas versus the United States, in express language said that it is a strong policy that prevails in 64a. That being the case, then the props fall from underneath the Rassner case and all of the cases that follow it fall like dominoes.

This is the theory of the trustee. This has been the position of the Trustee from the very inception of this case.

In the Nicholas case the Court went so far as to say that the taxes that were incurred during Chapter 11, and this is precisely what we are talking about here, "come within the first priorities of Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act."

That is the costs of administration.

The history of the administrative and cost of administration provisions of the Bankrtupcy Act have constantly worked towards allowance of cost of administration and away from tax collecting. When you trace the history in the Bankruptcy Act as enacted in 1800 and 1841, 1867 and 1898, all gave

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top priority to taxes. It wasn't until 1926 that the priorities were change, the cost of administration was advanced and the taxes were reduced to a sixth priority.

of priorities was retained and further the tax collector was further restricted by being required to file his claim within the limitations set on all other claims. And again, in 1952 the act was again amended to give further priority to costs of administration by providing that costs of administration in a superceding bankruptcy takes priority over the costs of administration in the superceded Chapter proceeding, further strengthening the position of costs of administration.

And lastly, the 1966 the most recent amendment, which changed the priorities further or limited further the claims for taxes by holding that the taxes could only be claimed for a three-year period prior to the filing of the bankruptcy.

So, we see here historically this picture of the reducing of the tax claims and advancing the costs of administration and I think as the court below, in the very scholarly opinion by Mr. Justice Hastings, points out and refers to the Congressional, rather the Senate Reports and the House Conference Reports as it applied to the costs of administration and the need to preserve these costs of administration because, let's take just what could happen very easily in

this case.

The Government is only seeking to impress the trust on thosetaxes that were collected by the debtor in possession, but if you were to read Section 7501 it says "any person who collects taxes." That would also mean the bank-rupt prior to filing.

Further, in following the Rassner line of cases if you have every state and every municipality enacting trust fund legislation there is nothing left to administer in these cases. Or, worse still, you have a trustee who is going to wait and see if anyone is going to assert his trust rights and the estate is going to go unadministered during this period of time.

And, as the House Reports and the House Conference Reports and the Senate Report, I believe it was in the 82nd Congress, emphasize the necessity to protect the trustee in order to have orderly administration of the estate. If you don't protect the trustee, if you don't give him the first priority, then you are not going to have orderly administration of estates.

Addressing the normal routine that's employed by
the Trustee: first of all, he seizes the property in order to
protect it. In so doing he immediately incurs liabilities.

He's got to post a bond as required by court; he's got to assume
rent liabilities for use and occupancy; he's got to employ

inventory clerks; he has got to employ a closer(?) by rule of court. These are all obligations that he, himself, must take.

Q Could I ask you a question about ordinary taxes that a bankrupt owes a government -- a bankrupt company owes the Government.

Let's assume the Government has perfected a lien on the prior to bankruptcy on the assets of the individual of the company. What is the status of that lien in bankruptcy with respect to administration expenses?

any lien under the Uniform Commercial Code -- if it has been perfected it is a valid and subsisting lien and that property is excluded from the bankrupt's estate. But, that's by separate statute.

- Q . Well, so is this.
- A Yes, sir.
- Q So is this. It's excluded from the bankrupt estate and yet the trustee takes possession of it at the
 outset --
 - A Usually does as an accommodation, sir.
- Q Well, no; it's still the bankrupt's property, just subject to the lien; that's all it is. It's just a perfected lien; the Government hasn't taken possession of it. Now, the Trustee takes possession of the property -- it's the bankrupt's property; it's just subject to the lien.

Now, doesn't the lienholder have to share ad-8 ministration expenses? No, sir. Not even if there isn't any other funds? 13 No, sir; there is no provision in the Bankruptcy Act, Mr. Justice White. The -- usually an accommo-6 dation is worked out but the --Let me ask you the question I asked Mr. 8 Stone: is this -- in 7501 it says that these amounts owing for 9 withholding taxes shall be assessed, collected and paid in the 10 same manner and subjected to the same provisions of limitation. 17 as other -- as applicable with respect to taxes from which that 12 fund arose. 13 Now, does that mean that the Government, if it 14 wants a lien, if it wants some priority over other creditors, 15 if it wants the position of a lienholder, must it perfect this 16 lien and what else could that language mean? I mean, it may be 87 a trust fund but it says its collectible in the same manner as 18 other taxes. 19 A Well, you are speaking now of the second 20 sentence of 7501(a)? Well, I feel that the interpretation put 21 on that language in the Connecticut Motor Lines case, in the 22 Green case and also in this case in the courts below is that the 23 trust has limitations placed upon it by, as the taxes from which

the fund arose, and that is the Bankruptcy Act and therefore

the Bankruptcy Act is applied.

Now, I think from the hypothesis that you gave me it pertains to something entirely different, Mr. Justice White.

Q Why ---

A Because it was, again, a separate statutozy procedure.

Q Yes, but the Government didn't take the normal steps to perfect its tax claim here in order to give it priority over administration expenses. There is no claim that the Government has perfected any lien in this case; is there?

A No; there is none, sir. They did not perfect a lien. Well, as a practical matter, Mr. Justice White, if that were the case, the Trustee wouldn't take possession of the property and there would be no estate to administer. He would file a "no assets report," and that would be the end of the case.

Q If that's all the assets.

a If that's all the assets there were; certainly. And that happens in any number of cases, not only in tax liens but in uniform commercial code liens. This is very commonplace. But there you have it set forth with clarity in the law and if they have protected their position then there is nothing to administer --

Q Would you say that is a trustee is appointed for a company that has been adjudicated andhe finds that the

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Con	only sizable assets the company has is made up of withholding
2	taxes that haven't been paid over to the Government, he is
3	he won't treat that as a "no asset" case?
4	A He would treat that, sir.
5	Q Why? Under your position?
6	A No, because if I understand you, Mr.
7	Justice White, you are talking about funds that have been
8	segregated, but they are in a withholding tax account.
9	Q I'll just say that you find some bank
10	accounts and you find that the total amount owed for withhold
11	taxes exceeds the money in the bank. And there hasn't been
12	any segregation or anything; the only assets are bank accounts
13	but the obligation for withholding taxes exceeds the amount in
14	the bank.
15	Now, would you make that a "no esset" case or
16	A No, I would not, because the Government ha
17	not perfected its lien rights in that instance, and it becomes
18	the general funds of the estate.
19	Q Yes.
20	A Then you get back again to 7401 and 64a,
21	where do the priorities lie?
22	Q Well, let me
23	A Yes, Mr. Justice Brennan.
24	Q You said they did not perfect the lien.
25	I understand where the Government has perfected thelien you sa

that's treated exactly as you would any other lien case under the Commercial Code --Yes, sir. But suppose it has not perfected the lien B -- take Mr. Justice White's hypothetical, except that the money in the bank is earmarked -- earmarked on the account title, as withholding taxes belonging to the United States. 7 What then is the case? 8 Your Honor, I think you have a different 9 situation. As a matter of fact --10 Would you think that is a "no asset" case? 11 That's exactly what we did, sir in this 12 case. What we did -- let me change that: that's exactly the 13 way the Trustee treated funds that were on deposit in the bank 83 account that was created and set up in this case for deposit of 15 tax money. There was an account that was set up here and I 16 refer you to Abstract 39 which shows in the petition that 17 when the president of the corporation was questioned about the 18 assets he said that a bank account had been set up andthis was 19 set fo th in the petition. In Abstract 44, paragraph 1 of the 20 Referee's orders makes an order with reference to that bank 21 account. 22 Well, what we're dealing with here, I 23 gather, are taxes withheld after the petition had been filed? 24 A That is precisely what I am talking about. 25

Q And those taxes withheld had not been
deposited in that bank account, had they?
A I'm afraid I
Q Had not been segregated in an account as
had the taxes withheld before the filing of the petition?
A They were filed during the Chapter 11
proceedings by the debtor in possession.
Q What did he do with them when he withheld
them?
A He deposited them in a special account in
the State Bank of Elk Grove Village in Elk Grove, Illinois.
Those monies may still be there for all I know. We exercised
no jurisdiction over them.
Q Well, what are we talking about?
A We're talking about separate funds that
were when the Government went into possession an order was
entered ording him to open up three accounts. He did open up
an account in the Elk Grove Bank for the purpose of withholding
taxes and FICA. He did make some deposits in them. He made
some deposits, but not enough. That's right. He hasn't touched
these funds.
Q So, to the extent thathe created a separate
fund you make no claim
A I make no claim.
Q But the Government makes a claim with

respect to the total he should have deposited?

trust on property, on capital assets of the corporation that existed long before the Chapter 11 proceeding and is no way traceable and there is no question of comingling. There is no question of trust ex mal officio as it pertains to the corporate funds.

Q In round numbers, taxes withheld by debtor total how much?

A I would say roughly maybe \$200 or \$300.

Q And how much was deposited in the special account?

A Oh, excuse me. The total amount that was withheld, I'm sorry, was ten hundred and seventy-five dollars and fifty-two cents. The amount that was deposited was maybe two to three hundred dollars.

Q And so the seven hundred dollars he didn't deposit, is that what we're fighting about here?

A No; the Government wants the entire sum.

Q Well, I know, but if he paid the \$200 or \$300 on deposit there --

A Actually that would be it; it would be whatever is in that account.

Q Who would yousay had benefitted by the money which should have lawfully been put into the segregated account

but which was not put in, according to both the statute and the directions?

A I would say the wage earners, at least to the extent that credit was given to them for themoney that should have been deposited. I can't see -- in no way at all that the estate has been enhanced.

Doesn't the Government stand in the shoes

-- since the Government has had to take on the responsibility

of discharging the employees for that obligation, doesn't the

Government stand in the shoes of those employees? Shouldn't

they --

A As subrogees? I don't know any statutory provision --

Q It's a matter of equitable, established equitable principles relating to trusts.

A I would say under ordinary circumstances I would have to buy your argument. However, I feel that what we're here before this Court to interpret is the effect of 7501 and its interrelationship with 64a(1). And I'm just asking the Court to follow the precedents that have herebefore been set: thatit is a strong policy of 64a that must prevail over 7501 if there is a conflict.

In other words, this 7501(a) applies up until the moment any proceeding in bankruptcy is filed. Then the Bankruptcy Act takes over completely. I don't think you can have

the bankruptcy apply just piecemeal and have collateral legislation that is going to interfere with the administration of the estate, which is what 7501 does; because you are in real serious problems when it comes to the administration of estates if you are going to ask a Trustee who is worth his salt to come in and to expend money, his own money and incur personal liabilities and not know whether or not there is a trust that is going to be exerted by the United States Government and I suggest later on if the Court is to reverse the Courts below all the municipalities that would pass that legislation and all the states that would pass that legislation, you would have no orderly administration of the estate until the Congress of the United States would untangle it and I would say that there would be irreparable damage done to the system, during the hiatus --

Q Excuse me.

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A Yes, sir.

Q If the Government loses this case; if you are right, it's claim is still an administration expense; isn't it?

A Oh, no, sir; oh, no, sir; they are claiming over and above --

Q What do you think -- what priority does the Government's claim have?

A They enjoy a fourth priority under Section

4	64a(1). Excuse me no. Excuse me. No; I'm sorry. They
2	enjoy a first priority
3	Q Administrative expenses
4	A Administrative expense after the admini-
5	strative expense of the proceeding in bankruptcy
6	Q Well, this is accruing during the operation
7	of the business
8	A Yes, sir.
9	Q And so it's an administrative expense?
10	A Yes, sir.
deal deal	Q And they don't, aren't postponed to their
12	usual position with respect to taxes?
13	A That's right; they do enjoy that first
14	priority, but subject to the one condition that I stated.
15	Q And that is only to about \$700 of it and
16	the two or three hundred dollars they can have 100 percent of
17	it?
18	A Yes, sir, but I think the principle is
19	much larger than that: what could be done to the entire system.
20	Q Yes.
21	MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Stone, you have
22	four minutes remaining.
23	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT BY RICHARD B. STONE, OFFICE
24	OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
25	ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. STONE: Yes. I'll just take a minute, Mr. Chief Justice. I want to clarify one point.

I have been informed by my co-counsel that, as
to the Government lien on these taxes, if it is on real
property it is -- comes ahead of administrative expenses; if
it's on personal property reduced to possession then it comes
ahead, but if it is on personal property not reduced to
possession it comes behind preferred expenses. However, a lien
in a Chapter 11 proceeding cannot be perfected against the
Trustee in any circumstances. The Government is --

Q It doesn't need it because ---

A It doesn't need it because it has trust fund anyway.

Q Or you can say it doesn't need it because of its administrative expenses?

A That, I suppose, is an undesirable, but albeit an alternative --

Q How about this bank account?

A Oh, Mr. Justice Brennan, there is some reference — there is a report filed after the institution of — the actual liquidation had occurred, which refers to a special account in the bank, special tax account, but the Referee specifically found, and I guess this is the facts for the purposes of this case that no such monies had, in fact, been entered. And it's unclear from the little record that we

have, about the \$200 or \$300, that it was in fact a special

Government account and I would say that for purposes of this

case we have to assume that we are going simply at the general

funds of the estate in imposing trust with respect to those

funds.

I want to say in conclusion only that I think that Respondent's argument in this case merely affirms my prior statement that neither the courts below nor the Respondents have dealt with the issue of what is the nature of these debts: are they tax debts of the employer owed to the Government or does the employer hold them merely as collecting agent for debts of the employee.

below or Respondent has gone on, how they would recognize this trust fund, even if the proper amounts had been segregated.

It seems to me that under their theory which precludes operation under 7501 trusts when a bankruptcy proceeding starts, the trustee would not have been authorized to pay over segregated funds even if he had segregated them because they are simply — would be no trust in a time of bankruptcy and that is a totally unacceptable holding, from our point of view.

Q What do you say about 7501 insofar as it says taxes withheld by the employer shall be collected by the same procedures as other taxes?

A We have dealt with that at length in our

brief, Mr. Justice White. Briefly to reiterate, we say first of all that the legislative history shows that the real purpose of that second sentence was to make sure that it would be clear that tax remedies were available altogether to the Government. There was a fear on the part of Government that, absent that ordinary tax remedies would not be available precisely because this was not a tax debt of the bankrupt and the Congress wanted all available procedural remedies: trusts and --

The same

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Q This was cumulative, not --

A Right; right. But even if it is viewed as restrictive and I suppose it must be said that the Nicholas Court and I believe the Court went perhaps fatther than it had to. As an alternative ground the Nicholas court invoked the sentence to the proposition that interest couldn't be supported during this time. To the extend that it is limiting I believe that this case is distinguishable, because even though interest would have been precluded on any tax debt, including the employees' tax debt in a bankruptcy proceeding, the employees' tax debts would have, at no time been subjected to the collecting limitation of being placed in the bankrupt employer's estate and his funds available for general creditors.

Thank you.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mr. Stone.
Thank you, Mr. Gillogy.

The case is submitted. g g (Whereupon, at 2:50 o'clock p.m. the argument in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)