Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM - 1970

In the Matter of:

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Supreme Court, U. S.

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Docket No. 123

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOM OF BOILER-MAKERS, IRON SHIPBUILDERS, BLACKSMITHS, FORGERS, AND HELPERS, AFL-CIO,

Petitioners;

VB.

GEORGE W. HARDEMAN.

Respondents.

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Place Washington, D. C.

Date December 16, 1970

SUPREME COURT, U.S. MAR. HA. 'S OFFICE

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOILER-

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No. 123

The above-entitled matter came on for argument at

1:50 o'clock p.m., on Wednesday, December 16, 1970.

BEFORE:

VS.

GEORGE W. HARDEMAN,

WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice
HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice
JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice
POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice
BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice
THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice
HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice

APPEARANCES:

LOUIS SHERMAN, ESQ. Washington, D.C. On behalf of Petitioners.

ROBERT McDONALD, JR., ESQ. Mobile, Alabama On behalf of Respondents.

PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will hear arguments in Number 123: International Brotherhood of Boilermakers against Hardeman.

Mr. Sherman, you may proceed now when you are ready.

ORAL ARGUMENT BY LOUIS SHERMAN, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MR. SHERMAN: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court:

This case is here on writ of certiorari from the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth District, to review
a per curiam opinion assigning the decision, judgment, jury
verdict, District Court, in the amount of \$152,500 in favor of
George Hardeman, an expelled member of the Boilermaker's union,
who filed the complaint in the Federal District Court, April
1966, under Section 102 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, alleging
that he had been barred from a full and fair hearing under
Section 101(a)5.

The evidence at the District Court trial was of two kinds. First, the various proceedings before the union tribunals, such as the 172-page transcript of record of the hearing that was held that resulted in expulsion, which went into the details of his beating up the business manager, which is the principal reason for his expulsion; and, the proceedings at higher levels, when the case was appealed to the president of

the International and the executive council of the International.

The second evidence had to do with loss of wages,
which were computed on the basis of past and future. Mr.
Hardeman was 43 when this incident occurred in October of 1960,
and they figured it on the basis of mortality tables that he
would retire at 65, \$6,000 a year; therefore, plus some punitive
damages, they came out with this total figure.

The first part of the case has to do with the issue of full and fair hearing. As set out on page two of our brief, the language of Section 101(a)5 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, which states that:

"No member of any labor will be fined, suspended, expelled or otherwise disciplined except for non-payment of dues, unless this member has been (a) served with written specific charges, being given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (b) afforded a full and fair hearing."

There is no issue here on the written specific charges. They were made. He was given a reasonable time to prepare his defense.

The issue is whether he was afforded a full and fair hearing. From a literal stance, there should be no question of that, either, because the hearing took about 10 hours, witnesses, cross-examination, the rest. We concede full and fair hearing means something more than that, but there must be some evidence

to support the charges, and we think that the trial judge erred, and the Court of Appeals erred, in a way that is very important to the labor movement in finding there was no evidence.

The essential charges had to do with the by-laws of the local union, which was set forth at page four, and the language of the constitution of the Boilermakers relating to subordinate lodges.

First, as to the by-laws, they are very explicit that the local could, after proper hearing, punish as warranted by the offense the violation, which was defined as violence or threat thereof to intimidate any official of this International Brotherhood or subordinate lodge to prevent or attempt to prevent him from properly discharging the duties of his office.

The language of the subordinate lodge constitution was broader. It provided for expulsion of any member who endeavors to create dissension among the members or works against the interest and harmony of the Brotherhood. Now, there is no question about the evidence, in my judgment, as to the by-laws. We have the clear statement, not drawn by opposition witnesses but by Mr. Hardeman himself in the union case. This is the case before the union judges, if I might use the expression.

I think it may be just as well to read it literally.

He was unhappy about the way the business manager was administering the referral system as far as his own particular

problems were concerned. Like some other people, he was thinking of a quick instrument of change, violence.

So, he is sitting there in the union hall, and this is his language, on page 25: "I tried to make up my mind what to do, whether to sue the local or Wise (who is the business manager), or beat Hell out of Wise, and then I made up my mind."

That would seem to be pretty good evidence of violation of the by-law. The District Judge in his charge to the jury, which is set forth in our appendage ---

Q What did he do?

A He did exactly what he had in mind, which was to beat the business manager.

Q He did what?

A Beat the business manager, physically assaulted him. He didn't choose the more peaceful method of suing or going to the joint referral committee which existed for complaints of the sort he had in mind. He beat him until he got some kind of statement that satisfied him that Wise wouldn't jump him any more on the list. That was the issue between them.

Now, when it got to the District Court -- of course, if you get the time relations straight, the incidents occurred in 1960 and this case was before the Federal District Court in 1968, I suppose, when this trial took place. Complaint was filed in 1966.

If I may be indulged, I would like to read a statement

in the charge, which is in our appendix, page 37. This is the Federal District Court:

"Now, there may be, and I am not ruling on it one way or the other, but I will say this, that there is evidence in here which might support a finding of guilty under Section 1 of Article 12, the subordinate lodge by-laws. The trial body said 'We find him guilty; we recommend that he be expelled.' They didn't say 'We find him guilty under either one section or the other.'

"They said they found him guilty, and inasmuch as nothing here would support a conviction under this section, I think the verdict cannot stand on his being convicted of penalty, which was expelling him, and I think inasmuch as there is no evidence which would support a finding of guilty under this, that the finding of the board was erroneous and cannot stand in that respect."

Now, that is all they charged him with were those two sections and there is nothing in this record that would justify finding him guilty under those sections. Well, the use of the phrase "those sections" sounds like he's talking about both sections. It is very difficult to understand. All of it is about the fight.

"I am telling you as a matter of law that under the proof the findings which resulted in his being expelled cannot legally stand and therefore he was wrongfully expelled."

Now, the second issue before the union tribunal was the question of the violation of the subordinate lodge constitution dealing with dissension and working against the interest and harmony of the lodge. We think that in terms of the normal relationships between the courts and union tribunals, that union tribunals ought to be permitted to function in accordance with the realities of life, recognizing that they are not literate and skilled lawyers.

'9

There must be some recognition of whether they have done justice in the real sense, or whether they have engaged in handling a trumped-up case, or something of that sort. There is nothing trumped-up about this case. Counsel for Mr. Hardeman admits in his brief that he should have been disciplined. He stops at the question about the punishment.

But, this question of dissension and working against the interest and harmony of the lodge, the local trial board found him guilty on that account. Those are general words, but we think it was reasonable for the board to define dissension and harmony the way they did. We think that the process of reasonable inference is available to administrative tribunals and therefore it certainly should be available to working people who are trying to work out their problems of maintaining the integrity of their institutions.

What could be more calculated to cause dissension than a fist fight. Now, this wasn't just a fist fight between

1	
torick (two boilermakers, it was a fist fight in which one boilermaker
2	assaulted the business manager, who is not a very important
3	fellow in this world but
4	Q What happened to the other charge? The
5	intimidation?
6	A Well, he was found guilty as charged, which
7	meant that he was found guilty on both counts by the local body
8	Q Well, do you defend this, or do you attack this
9	only on the basis of stirring up trouble at the union?
10	A No, I defend it on both counts. I consider that
21	there was adequate evidence there certainly was some
12	evidence. I feel, as a matter of fact, under the most strict
13	rules there was definite evidence.
14	Q You need to prevail on only one of them. You
15	don't have to win on both, do you?
16	A That is correct, Your Honor. We have cited
17	Burke vs. Boilermakers, which pointed out that it is sort of
18	silly to expect unions to say "Guilty as charged on Count 1;
19	Guilty as charged on Count 2."
20	Q Well, wasn't that guilty of dissension or guilty
21	on that other charge of intimidation. If there is evidence on
22	either, I gather your position is you were?
23	A That is correct, because the language of the
24	by-law is this broad that it permits the punishment of one by
25	the offense and, therefore, expulsion, which Congress recognizes

is a legitimate punishment. They recognize it in the Landrum-Griffin Act; they recognize it in the Taft-Hartley Act.

A

Certainly, even if the one on dissension fell out, then the punishment should have been upheld.

Your Honor, this presents a more serious question on granting an award which seemed inconsistent to our system of trying to repair injuries if injuries have been received.

Because under this award, as you can see from the amounts involved, the plaintiff by not seeking reinstatement, he didn't seek reinstatement in this case, has managed to create pecuniary result in which he acquires an estate with interest even computed at a low rate, which would take care of his salary. It is just inconsistent with the whole thing.

But, more than that, what is involved here is the question of whether unions can be responsible. I beg your indulgence to read from a decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered by Judge Soboloff. The same system of justice that was involved in the case of Hoff is the system upon which the responsibility of the union rests in terms, for example, of handling wildcat strikers.

That's not just a figment of my imagination. The

Parks case is an illustration of what happens when a union tries

to assert its powers to maintain the validity of peaceful

institutions, in that case the maintenance of a council of

industrial relations which has maintained peace in the electrical

contracting industry for 50 years. Judge Soboloff said:

"By the judicial application of ad hoc stands in the pursuit of what is called democracy in union government, we have succeeded only in introducing not democracy but chaos.

This would not only tend to disintegrate the labor movement but be responsible for generating serious implications for employers, and others as well."

That is one of the serious problems facing the labor movement today, that when the internationals are asked to assert their powers to maintain responsibility, such as suppressing a jurisdictional strike, that the cry comes back, "How are you going to protect us against cases like Hardeman? How are you going to make sure we are going to do the job to satisfy courts?"

of course, we can tell them, as lawyers, that reasonable standards, reasonable risks, should be taken, as they were in the Parks case. In cases of this sort, which has been smashed aside, I think complete abandonment of the proper rules of review and the substitution of the court's views, are the sort of thing that are preventing us from doing what should be done not only in the interest of the labor movement but also of others in the collective bargaining relationship.

Q Is the issue that you've got a money judgment against the union?

A Yes, sir.

7	Q How much?
2	A \$152,500 for one expelled member.
3	In the Parks case, we were dealing with 1,000 people
4	In the case of Barriman vs. Nevada which is at 85 Pacific 2nd
5	250, there were 41 wildcat strikers involved.
6	Q Would you raise your voice a little, counsel?
7	It is a little hard for us to hear you.
8	Mr. Sherman, let me ask you a question, may I?
9	Suppose that the evidence here were to justify or would qualify
10	only under Article 12 of the local's by-laws, but not under
11	Article 13. Would expulsion be justified?
12	A Yes, Your Honor.
13	Q And you would say this because why?
14	A Because the blow of the fist is the thing that
15	was intended to be suppressed, and that was because in working
16	out the allocation of jobs, resort to violence on the part of
17	those who are concerned with the administration of the referral
18	system ought to be a very serious matter.
19	Q Well, Article 13 provides specifically for
20	expulsion, but Article 12 does not. It provides only for
Pag	A Punishment as warranted by the offense.
22	Q Yes, and why doesn't the article go further
23	then?
24	A Beg your pardon?
25	Q Why doesn't Article 12 go further?

A Do you mean ---

Q Why doesn't it also provide for expulsion?

A Well, I think that it depends upon the circumstances in the case. It is very hard for a court at any level to appreciate what was going on in Local Lodge 112 at the time.

Q Well, your theory must be, then, that the language "as warranted by the offense" necessarily includes expulsion?

A Yes. It might be a fine, it might be suspension, it might be expulsion. As a matter of fact, here they expelled him indefinitely. It's a little hard to understand what they meant by that, but there was no effort made on his part to secure reinstatement.

Q And therefore, your argument must be to the effect that conviction, so to speak, under either article justifies expulsion and hence the general verdict, if I may call it that, tied in with the evidence?

A That is correct.

Q All right.

A But, essentially, what it amounts to is that you leave in the hands of the people involved -- now, under this constitution, the local union, the brothers themselves, voted for expulsion. They had a trial committee that considered the evidence and made a report, and then the local committee voted him guilty and it voted expulsion. So, therefore, there was a

concerted determination by the people involved.

Q Would you say this is somewhat like a situation where a man is convicted in a criminal case on two counts, each of which has a five-year penalty, but he is given two five-year sentences to run concurrently, and this situation is somewhat analagous to that?

A That is correct, and as a matter of fact in Burke vs. Boilermakers, which is a per curiam affirmance by the Ninth Circuit, exactly that is what happened. They had a series of charges on which, when one fell out, the Court said there was no evidence on one but upheld the punishment because it had been proved on the others.

We have cited the criminal law as of the reason for the position that was taken.

I would like to take just a few minutes ---

Q May I ask you one question? How much of the damages awarded was labeled compensatory and how much punitive?

as compensatory, and \$20,000 was labeled as punitive. It was not labeled, but the presentation of the position by the attorney for the complainant was that he was 43 years old and he would retire at 65, and the number of years times the salary would come out that figure, so we deduced that as the division between compensatory and punitive. Of course, if he had been 20 years old and planned to work until 70, it would have been a

larger judgment.

Q' Is that the present value of the amount he would have recovered had he remained employed?

A Well ---

Q Computed on that basis, or just computed on the basis of so much per year?

year because although they recognized the principle of mitigation of damages, for some reason or other the evidence before the jury showed that he was living on \$300 a year, and even though full employment was coming up, they didn't pay any attention to that. But, I don't want to bespeak the jury.

Q I understand, I just was curious ---

A I would like to spend a minute or two on the question that is sometimes labeled preemption. Assuming that we are not right about the first part of the case, but we strongly feel we are, there are very strong public reasons for establishing a rule of review which will permit the union tribunals to function.

I don't think the word "preemption" is quite descriptive of our problem here. We have a case in which the Federal Congress has adopted a statute, and certainly there is no constitutional bar to the Federal Government adopting a statute, the Congress adopting a statute, through which they would give a duplicate remedy on the so-called refusal to refer.

There is a lot of evidence in the case, exclusive referral system, non-exclusive referral system, loss of wages and the rest of it. It was sort of a junior NLRB proceeding. The question is whether Congress intended by Section 102 to establish a duplicate remedy.

We think that as a matter of statutory construction that it did not so intend. We recognize that if you take a dictionary and use the words "appropriate relief" and chase it down to the end of the scope of that term you may come out with the answer that, "Yep, they did intend it." But, I think it is something like Amazon Cotton Mills.

The plaintiffs in that case back in '48 tried to find a basis to maintain injunction suits against picketing because the language of the statutes provided that unions could be sued for the first time. The court said, "Well, this is sort of ridiculous, Congress entrusted that function to the National Labor Relations Board, a centralized agency with procedures for complaint, trial examiner hearings, and a centralized agency to make decisions. It didn't mean to transfer the functions to 200 or more local tribunals with general jurisdiction.

- Q But you don't find any of this on the face of 101(a)5, do you?
 - A No, I think we are looking at 102.
 - Q Well, even looking at 102, do you find that on

the face of 102?

B

A I think, on the face of 102, it looks like just appropriate relief.

Q I gather your argument is to the effect of what 102 says is, this is available to you unless you want to go to the National Labor Relations Board. Is that what you are saying?

A No, what I am saying is that Congress could have written the statute in such a way as to establish a duplicate remedy, but it did not do so.

Q And therefore, that is my point. Therefore, you say there is no action under 101(a)5, and what you have to do is go to the National Labor Relations Board.

A I'm sorry, that is correct, unless he had sought restoration of union membership. If he had sought restoration of union membership, then he would have been in the right place.

Q What remedy could he get before the board?

A Well, he could get the same remedy that any other union member could get if there had been a refusal to refer him because of trouble with the union. Radio Officer's Union case.

He could get the same remedy that any non-union person could get.

Q Damages?

Î Back pay and reinstatement to his job. A 2 But not damages? 0 3 Yes, well it would be damages in the sense of A 3 back pay. In addition, I think that some of the trouble on this 13 point arises from the words "appropriate relief (including 6 7 injunctions." We checked back over the legislative history referred to it on roman numeral VII, cited, Second Volume of 8 Legislative History 1102. 9 You have to know a little bit about the background 10 of this legislation to realize that first there was the 11 McClellan Amendment, the Bill of Rights, which came up on the 12 floor, passed by a very narrow vote, and then as is evidenced 13 by McClellan's own testimony, the labor movement got involved 14 15 and helped to draft the Kiekel substitute, which was intended 16 to cut down the scope of the McClellan Amendment. 17 So, we look at the McClellan Amendment, and that 18 provides a comparable provision ---19 Where is it? Where are you reading from? 20 I'm reading from a copy. I regret to say that 29 we haven't ordered it in the brief. 22 Then you are not reading from the brief? 23 No. We cited it in the brief at page seven.

I'll just take one minute on it. The Secretary of Labor was

the one who was to enforce that, and he used the same words,

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appropriate relief but without limitation injunctions to restrain any such violations in talking plans of this title.

We submit that McClellan certainly did not have in mind, and Congress didn't have in mind in drafting that bill, passing that bill, that the Secretary of Labor would have a duplicate function in administering the National Labor Relations Act. Therefore, it's a fortiori, that when it was provided for by private action, intended to cut down the scope of the McClellan Amendment, that there was no such intention.

Q Thank you, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. McDonald, let me see if at the outset if I have a proper understanding of the Court of Appeal's opinion.

The Court of Appeals said that when the member of the union beat up one of the leaders, this was not a violation of the clause, this was not creating dissension among members and not working against the interests and harmony of the International Brotherhood. That is in effect what the Court of Appeals says, is it not?

MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir.

Q And that is what you have to sustain here, that this punch in the nose, beating, however you describe it, did not violate either one or both of those two clauses I just read.

MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir.

Q That will call for some explanation from me, so

I hope that sometime in your argument you will dwell on it, a 8 little bit anyway. 2 MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir. 3 ORAL ARGUMENT BY ROBERT McDONALD, JR., ESQ. 13 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS 5 MR. McDONALD: Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Members of 6 the Court: 7 This is the first appearance I have made before this 8 honorable Court and I might say it is an honor to appear here. It is the high point of my career. 10 This case is here on two issues that you granted 91 certiorari on: the issue of standard of review applied by the 12 Court of Appeals and the District Court, and the issue of 13 preemption. 94 Where was it tried? 15 It was tried in Mobile, Alabama, before Judge 16 Daniel Thomas, Mr. Justice Black. 17 To understand the standard of review, I might recite 18 the facts, as Chief Justice Burger pointed out. The union trial 19 board found Mr. Hardeman, as well as Mr. Braswell, because we 20 are also reviewing the Braswell opinion here, guilty of two 21 charges, Article 12, Section 1 and Article 13, Section 1. 22 Now, what they had done, in effect, was to charge 23 them with those two charges. The trial board came back and 24

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said, "We find you guilty as charged." Now, we came into court

alleging in our complaint that we had been denied a full and fair hearing because the evidence did not support a finding of guilt, or was there any evidence to support a finding of guilt under Article 13, Section 1.

B

Our position was this: that Mr. Hardeman, as well as Mr. Braswell, were in the same position as a man on trial in a criminal case with a two-count indictment, one count charging him with a simple assault, the second count charging him with rape, there being evidence of a simple assault but no evidence of any sexual contact, but the jury coming in and finding him guilty as charged. Well, guilty as charged necessarily includes the rape count, and that's what happened here.

Now, we had two counts, or two charges, against Mr.

Hardeman and Mr. Braswell in this case, and the first charge
was -- well, one which stated that through the use of force or
violence that Hardeman tried to restrain, force or intimidate
an official of the Brotherhood. The second charge -- incidentally there is no punishment set forth there, it is open.

Apparently, the punishment can be administered according to the
offense.

The second charge was Article 13, Section 1, of the International constitution, which points out that any member who creates dissension among the members or who seeks to create a dissolution of the Brotherhood or a division of parts -- in essence, it describes someone who is trying to dissolve the

union as an organization. And, that article says that anyone who is guilty of this will be suspended -- will be, not suspended, but expelled from the Brotherhood.

Now, it doesn't leave any question. There is no lesser penalty. It's just like a State statute that says if you commit first-degree murder you will be sentenced for life or your life will be taken from you. That is what Article 13 does. It's a much more serious penalty.

Now, when he was found guilty, when these men were found guilty, the expulsion vote that Mr. Sherman mentioned was really superfluous. They didn't need -- if they hadn't done it, or if they had voted not to expell them, they would have still been expelled by virtue of the fact they were found guilty under Article 13, Section 1.

It should be noted these gentlemen took necessary appeals in the union, and in doing so they were necessarily prejudiced in their defense because they had to presume they were found guilty of both, and so, by doing this, they had to be found guilty of both.

Q Do you think the situation would be any different if instead of saying "guilty as charged," they said we two brothers guilty and then recited the original charge?

A Mr. Chief Justice Burger, I do think it would have been different.

Q Tell me how.

A I think this. If they had found the members guilty of Article 12, Section 1, they could have said, "For a penalty, we will fine you \$100 each," or "We will suspend you for six months." Or they could have said, "For a penalty, we will leave it up to a vote of the Brotherhood."

And when it came before the Brotherhood, when a motion for expulsion was offered, the Brotherhood would have said, "Well, no, let's vote against this because it is too harsh." As it was, when the motion for expulsion was offered the Brotherhood knew they had been found guilty of a section demanding expulsion, so why not go ahead and vote for it?

- Q Mr. Sherman, just to that second point of expulsion, am I correct that Mr. Hardeman testified that he was sitting there quite worried about how the officers were ruining the local and everything, and he concluded that something had to be done and therefore concluded that he had to punch this man?
 - A Mr. Justice Marshall, that is correct.
 - Q Well, isn't that dissension?
 - A No, sir, that ---
 - Q Well, isn't it mild disapproval?
 - A Sir?

- Q Is it mild disapproval?
- A It would not be dissension within the meaning of Article 13-1. To say it would would be -- if you be guilty

of dissension under 13-1 in doing that, well, then, you could also say that someone who is presumptive enough when election comes around to run against the business agent in the election, to run for his job, now this man is certainly creating more dissension in the union and causing a division of difference of opinion there.

- Q But that's legal, isn't it?
- Q Suppose he punched the business manager once a meeting?
 - A Well ---

Q You know, the one- rule, you know?

A Yes, sir. My understanding, of course this was not made an issue of the case, but my understanding is that among the boilermakers, that it is not uncommon for a business agent to be punched. Of course, that is shocking, because we don't carry on business that way.

Q Maybe I should take judicial notice of that ---

have taken, if they found them guilty only of Article 12 and it were up to the members to decide the punishment, they could have found, decided a punishment that would have been consistent with the offense in the context of the way they carried on business. But, having found them guilty under 13-1, then they had no choice but to vote for expulsion because the men were expelled anyway by virtue of the fact they were found guildy.

The constitution demanded it.

Q Did he ask for some sort of a special verdict at the hearing? Did he ask if they differed with those particulars in any way?

A No, sir, but I do not think that -- of course, that wasn't an issue in the case either. But, I don't think ---

Q Well, it is. He didn't ask for what you're asking for now. That might have a lot to do whether he was entitled to it or whether he waived it.

A Well, sir, that was not within the procedure of the union remedy.

Q That didn't stop you from asking for it, because you're asking for it now.

Q Mr. McDonald, I think he may have gotten it without asking for it. On page 57 of the record in the letter to Mr. Hardeman, it says that the only explanation for the expulsion penalty is Article 13.

A I did not notice that, Mr. Justice White, but apparently it is.

Q Well, they certainly refer to it in the letter explaining what happened when his case was affirmed in the union, they refer to the fact that there were two charges and the fact that he was found guilty of the charges. Then it just says that Article 13 carries an expulsion.

A Yes, sir. Let me say this in regard to that

Standard of review. The standard of review is set forth by Congress in Section 101(a)5 or 29 U.S.C. 411-5c, as requiring that the members have a full and fair hearing. All of these Circuit Courts of Appeal, and they admit this in their brief, have held that in order to have a full and fair hearing there must be some evidence to support the charge.

We contended that in this particular case there was not some evidence to support the charge, and their brief ---

- Q Either one?
- A Sir?

Sec.

- Q Either one? Either charge?
- A No, sir, some evidence particularly as to Article 13, Section 1, because that is the ---
 - Q Which is which one?
 - A The automatic expulsion.
- Q I mean, which is the charge there? What's the charge against them under that?
- A The charge is that he created dissension among the membership to create a division of division of funds. It's on page 63 of the appendix.
- Q Or work against the interest and harmony of the Brotherhood.
 - A Of the International Brotherhood, yes, sir.
- Q If you will permit me to say so, I do not frankly at all understand what you are offering as a defense.

As I understand it the charge was one man came down from his office into a hallway, or something, and another one assaulted 2 him and beat him up. Is that right? 3 1 Yes, sir. Q Are you defending on the ground that he didn't 5 assault him and beat him up? 6 No, sir. What you have stated -- may I, Mr. 7 Justice Black let me go further, what you have stated was part 8 of the charge. That was the particular, really, the evidence. That was the essential thing charged against 10 him, wasn't it? 99 A Yes, sir, but in doing that they said that 12 this act, itself, is a violation of Section 13-1, which carries 13 with it an automatic expulsion. 14 Well, why do you say it is not a violation? 15 Why is not that a violation of 13-1? 16 Because this was a personal thing between Mr. 17 Hardeman and the business agent, Mr. Justice Brennan. It 18 19 wasn't a blow aimed at dissolving the union. Hardeman's motivation was not to attack the union as an organizational 20 structure. 21 No, but this reads that if any 22 member who endeavors to create dissension. You can stop right 23 there. To beat up the business agent, that's not an endeavor 24 or could not be found to be an endeavor to create dissension . 25

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- Call	A No, sir, I submit it's not, because I submit in
2	interpreting this section you cannot stop right there.
3	Q Well, the next paragraph
A	A Sir?
5	Q Now, I drop to the next paragraph, "or who
6	works against the interests and harmony of the Brotherhood
7	or of any subordinate lodge. To beat up the
8	business manager of the subordinate lodge is not to work
9	against the interests and harmony of that lodge?
10	A No, sir, because that is a personal thing and
G Com	this prohibits an attack against the organization itself, the
12	organizational structure.
13	Q Isn't the top authority in the union the lodge
14	itself? Didn't he appeal to the lodge?
15	A No, Mr. Justice White, the trial was in the
16	lodge, the local lodge. An appeal went to the executive
17	council of the International and then to the executive
18	president.
19	Q There were 61 votes in the lodge against 36
20	who thought that this was a violation of Section 13, and the
21	top appellant authority in construing the constitution within
22	the lodge thought it was a violation of 13.
23	A Mr. Justice White, I
24	Q Aren't those actions worth some consideration?
25	A I don't think that is the case. As I recall,

what was submitted to the lodge was not to determine. The 7 lodge did not hear the evidence, or review the transcript. All 2 that was submitted to the lodge was a motion to the effect that 3 4 look at page 56 in exhibit 5 Q two. 6 Mr. Justice Brennan, pardon me, sir, you are T in the appendix. Page 56 ---8 Exhibit 2 has a heading, to the left of the 9 column, 61 for and 36 against. To the right of that, the 10 parties guilty as charged, 61 were sustained, 36 were against. 99 Now, what was that ---12 A On the basis that a motion was offered to the 13 membership saying, "We have found, the trial board has heard 14. the evidence and having heard the evidence they find him 15 guilty. We move that the finding of the trial board be 16 accepted." Now, that was done at a local meeting without 37 hearing the evidence, or anything. That was still on a local 18 lodge level. 19 Without knowing anything, you say nobody knew 20 anything about it; still, they could get up 61 to 36 votes? 21 Yes, sir. The only thing, Mr. Justice White, 22 the only thing they knew about it was discussion around the 23 hall. 23

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Does the record show what was presented to the

lodge when that vote was taken or before that vote was taken?

think it shows that a motion was offered. It certainly does not show that any evidence or any research of the transcript was taken, because what happened in this case was the appeal was made to the executive council a trial de novo and retried the issues, the executive council being appointed, the executive council of the International union, and then ---

Q What did they hold?

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A They held the same thing as the -- of guilty as charged in accepting the finding of the trial board.

Q Did that end it, so far as they were concerned?

A No, sir. Then, to further exhaust their remedies, they took an appeal to the International president of the union.

0 What did he do?

A He examined the transcript of the executive council hearing and of the local lodge hearing.

Q What conclusion did he reach?

A He reached the same conclusion not to disturb the finding.

Q Was that the end of it, so far as the lodge was concerned?

A That was the end of it as far as the whole union was concerned.

expulsion was right or wrong?

Yes, sir, that's what the Act says. Did this Court here try that question? 2 Sir? A 3 As to whether he had been properly expelled? 1 No, sir. A 5 That's never been tried, at all, then, has it? 6 That is an issue in this case because the whole 7 heart of this damage suit is that the complaint says that we 8 were improperly expelled because we did not have a full and 9 fair hearing, and therefore we are seeking the approximate 10 damages. 89 Q You didn't have a full one, because you didn't 12 go and ask for a judicial review, if you didn't have it. 13 Well, we had a ---14 I don't understand how you attacked this 15 expulsion without attacking it directly in court. 16 We did, in this particular case. 17 Yes, we did for another case, but you say you 0 18 didn't try it out in the courts. 19 Yes, sir, we did, and I'm sorry I misunderstood 20 you. 21 Did you get all the evidence to show that he 0 22 was improperly expelled? 23 Yes, sir. A 24 Or did you just submit this technical argument 25

here about the two charges?

That, Mr. Justice Black, the two charges was the basis of our -- him being found guilty of a charge which there was no evidence to support it was the basis of our theory -- of our evidence in court that he was not given a full and fair hearing. Because, he was in the same position as a man on trial under a two-count indictment, and the evidence conforming to one count but not conforming to the other, and the jury comes back and saying, "We find him guilty as charged."

Q Well, then, to pursue your analogy, I go back to what I suggested before. What if in that criminal case he had only received the penalty for one of the two crimes and the penalties were penalties which could be the same? Don't the courts constantly affirm convictions down that if they don't need to reach the question they don't need to survive it?

A No, sir, because ---

Q I think if you'll look at the books you'll find they do it a great deal. If he is guilty of one, they don't reach the other.

A Well, the point here, Mr. Justice Burger, is that if he is guilty of one, you're saying here that he could get the same punishment under both charges, but on the other hand, too, he could get a lesser punishment under the charge if he weren't found guilty for the charge for which there is no evidence.

Q Well, from the Court of Appeals opinion, see if
this is the heart of the case. Court of Appeals said the
District Court found as a matter of law that there was no
evidence to support a finding of guilt under Article 13 of
the constitution. That's the one that deals with endeavoring
to create dissension or working against the interest of
harmony.

Now, if that, if the Court of Appeals is wrong in saying there is no evidence to support that, then the case was wrongly decided, wasn't it?

A That is true, but the Court of Appeals reviewed all of the transcripts and the evidence that was taken on this matter.

Q I don't see how they could reach a conclusion, myself, you may explain it to me. What happened here, when the officer was attacked, beaten up, and they go ahead and try him, how they can say that that didn't create dissension among the brethren, so to speak.

A Well, I ---

Q Mr. McDonald, let me add to this, and I think it turns the spot to Justice White's question. Whose function is it to interpret Article 13 of the constitution? You say it means what you have said it means.

A Yes, sir.

Q But whose function is it to interpret that? Is

it the union's function?

A It should be the plain meaning of the particular charge, because included in Section 101(a)5a is the requirement that the member be given specific charges. Now, if Congress is going to demand that he be given specific charges, they ought to demand specific proof. It would not be a fair hearing.

There are many things that the question of full and fair hearing is a broad term.

Q Well, it's perfectly obvious that the Members of the Court are disturbed about how you reached the result that beating up the business agent didn't create dissension among the members or work against the interests and harmony of the Brotherhood. You say it didn't because it means something else. I'm asking you who says it means something else?

A Your Honor, I think, Mr. Justice Blackmun, when you read the article together in its context, it becomes obvious — of course, maybe it doesn't — but it becomes obvious to me and apparently to the Justices who have reviewed this, that this article prohibits some attack against the organizational structure, itself, in that we're not saying here that Hardeman should not have been disciplined, that a court should just decide within the plain meaning of the ordinary meaning of a particular section.

Q There is a question, Mr. McDonald, whether the

court can have anything to do with what it means, whether or not ---

A Your Honor, I think that Congress has issued a mandate that the Court do it, because Congress has said that no member shall be expelled without a full and fair hearing, and in order to fulfill the wishes of Congress in 101(a)5c, you've got to ---

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A Mr. Justice Brennan, let me say this in regard to that. All of the courts of appeal, and Mr. Sherman admits it in his brief, have ruled that in order to have a full and fair hearing there must be some evidence to support the charge.

A No, sir, because I submit it's not, because if you're going to say, "Look and see if there is some evidence."

we've got to interpret the charge to see if there is some evidence. Otherwise, we'd be in the position of trying to decide an embezzlement case from the facts without looking to see the ruling embezzlement statute.

The issue is two different sides of the same coin, or looking through the same window from opposide sides.

Q If anybody is to interpret it, isn't the NLRB better able to do it than the Court?

A No, sir, Mr. Justice Harlan, because the courts

of course have more training in this type of thing, the use of words and interpreting the meaning of words, and because Congress gave the mandate to the courts in Title 29, Section 412, saying that any person whose rights are infringed upon in this area shall have recourse in the Federal District Court, which brings us to the second area, the preemption argument, which I have a -- would like to say just a few things about.

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In regard to the preemption issue, which is the second issue that this comes into here, we have to understand the reason for preemption is that what the courts have said in preemption is that Congress has carved out this area for the NLRB to operate in, and therefore they kept the State Courts from operating in that sphere.

Now, in this area, the preemption does not apply because Congress in 29-412, says he can bring a civil action for such relief as may be appropriate. Now, in our complaint, and our proof shows, that the wrong was done and we said as approximate results of this wrong this man lost wages for this time, and if approximate results is not appropriate relief there can be no appropriate relief. Appropriate relief is a little looser than approximate results in damages and approximate causes and things approximately caused.

Gentlemen, this is an important case. I don't have to tell you that, or I wouldn't be here. Hardeman is a man; his problems are held by every member of the labor movement

in this country. And, the whole purpose of our labor laws is to protect the individual rights and the individual working man, and this decision, this case, as long as it stands, will protect every working individual in the United States from such wrongful expulsion as Hardeman suffered.

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I think it is necessary. It is a good decision, and on behalf of Mr. Hardeman, my client, and on behalf of the members of labor unions in this country, I hope you will affirm the decision with a strong opinion to protect them in the future.

Q Mr. McDonald, I have one last detail. Do you feel that entering into the amount of this verdict was anything having to do with the hiring hall practices?

A No, Mr. Justice Blackmun, I don't. What we did is we presented the evidence here showing that Hardeman showed his income tax returns that he made so much before his expulsion, and then afterwards we showed that he could not get jobs, get work as a boilermaker even though he made every effort to, and then we showed his income tax return showing the earnings he had made for several years after the expulsion. The difference then showed it.

He was a man who was 43 years of age, who had spent his life acquiring a trade, which is a technical trade just like my trade of practicing law is something that I acquired, and then all of a sudden it was taken away from him. What could he

do at 43? He wasn't able to adapt to find something of equal value to him.

Q Conceding then that anything having to do with a hiring law aspect is clearly for the Board, I take it you are saying that there is no element of damage in this result that is attributable to the hiring hall phase of this controversy, and what was done in the hiring hall?

A No, sir, it was the ---

Damage I understood you just now to say, and
I'm merely asking as a corollary to that whether you are conceding that anything having to do with the hiring hall is for
the Labor Board and not for the Court?

A No, Your Honor, I'm not, because the -- we're relying on the Act to getting jurisdiction to the Court.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Q Thank you, Mr. McDonald.

Do you have anything further, Mr. Sherman?

A Yes, I have one small point, and that is to call the attention of the Court to Defendant's Exhibit No. 3, page 61, which is the out-of-work card of the union. You will notice that the rules for the administration of the hiring hall are set forth that call for re-registration each month. There was one entry on March 8, 1961, where he was apparently sent out for a job where he lasted for five days.

He made another entry in April, 1961, and the issue

really was whether his name continued on the list as a legal matter because it had been on once, or whether the union rule prevailed that if you didn't re-register each month, which is a normally accepted rule with the Board, that he wasn't eligible for further referrals.

Q Thank you Mr. Sherman.

Thank you, Mr. McDonald.

The case is submitted.

(Whereupon, at 2:50 o'clock p.m. the argument in the above-entitled case was concluded.)