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Supreme Court of the United States

October TERM 1969

In the Matter of:

Docket No. &6

ELVIN MORALES,

Petitioner

VS .

IEW YORK,

Respondent

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Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

November 20, 1969

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

300 Seventh Street, S. W.

Washington, D. C.

NA 8-2345

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CNHAM IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October 2 TERM 1969 3 4 MELVIN MORALES, Petitioner 5 6 No. 86 373 NEW YORK, 7 Respondent 8 9 Washington, D. C. 10 November 20, 1969 11 The above-entitled matter came on for hearing at 12 11:05 o'clock a.m. 13 BEFORE: 14 WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice 15 WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice JOHN M. HARMAN, Associate Justice 16 WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Associate Justice POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice 17 BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice THURGOOD MARSHALL, 'Associate Justice 18 APPEARANCES: 19 RICHARD T. FARRELL, ESQ. 20 375 Pearl Street Brooklyn, New York 11201 29 Counsel for Petitioner 22 BURTON B. ROBERTS District Attorney 23 Bronk County 851 Grand Concourse 24 Bronx, New York 10451 Counsel for Respondent 25

PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Number 86. Morales against New York.

ORAL ARGUMENT BY RICHARD T. FARRELL, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. FARRELL: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court; Richard T. Farrell for the Petitioner, Melvin Morales.

Your Honors, this case comes to this Court via writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, which court held that certain police activities founded upon less than probable cause, did not constitute a violation of the Defendant's rights under the Fourth Emendment, and do not, affect the confession yielded by the Defendant after he was seized, as we contend, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The facts in this case are fairly simply set forth.

Early in the morning of October 4, 1964, in Bronx County, New

York, Mrs. Addie Brown died of multiple stab wounds; 31 to be

exact, inflicted upon her by at that time an unknown assail—

ant in an elevator of a 21-story apartment house in a public

housing project in the South Bronx.

The police efforts at the scene at that time on October 4th, yielded no leads, but on October 5, 1964, Detective

Aubrey Ferguson was walking in the vicinity of the scene of
the crime and met Mrs. Rebecca Morales who is the mother of the
Petitioner here, Melvin Morales.

Detective Ferguson knew the Morales family; knew them at a different address and he asked Mrs. Morales: "What are you doing here?" And she said, "Oh, I live there," pointing to the building in which the crime had been committed.

The police, also sometime after October 5th, had information from a young man who testified at the trial that he
had been outside the premises where the crime was committed and
had seen someone outside the building at the pertinent time.

Q Was that the very young boy?

A Yes; that's Everett Roberts, Mr. Justice Stewart, whose testimony the District Attorney abandoned at the summation.

By the time Savarra Musio who tried this case in the Supreme Court, finished cross-examining this young fellow, he had the crime being committed sometime in October, November or December of 1964. And I doubt very much if he could have given a description much better than that available by looking at Page 1320 of the record. "Morales is a skinny Puerto Rican," which is a fairly accurate description of a great number of people in the South Bronz.

But on October 11th the police called again (from the testimony of Detective Ferguson, at Page 732 in the record) and said, "we're rounding up some of the neighborhood narcotics addicts." About October 11th, 1964 the police officers came to the conclusion that Morales, who did not live in the building

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with his mother, they found him as a habitue of the neighborhood, not seen around by who, we don't know exactly, but it appears with these marcotics addicts who were rounded upon the llth.

And the police then concentrated their efforts on trying to find Melvin Morales to talk to him. The first of their efforts was to contact his mother, Mrs. Morales, telling her that they were interested in speaking to Melvin.

Now, if instead, there was this phrase that you said the detective used to describe due process of getting this information -- if, instead of that, a dozen detectives or 24 detectives had walked up and down the street talking to every narcotic addict and the others of that world and got the same information, would you say the case was different or the same?

Mr. Chief Justice, I attached no significance to the fact that the officers rounded up these other narcotics. addicts.

I assume that you did when you emphasized that phrase so much.

Well, you will have to excuse the advocate for perhaps using what I consider/a "loaded term." I do not attach any significance to the fact that there was a "round-up."

- 0 Well, you cleared up the questionfor me.
- On October 13, approximately nine days after the

event that led to the homicide investigation and about three days after the police had started to concentrate their efforts on finding Melvin Morales, the police officers followed Mrs.

Morales from her home to her place of business and staked out the beauty parlor.

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About 4:00 in the afternoon Mrs. Morales was visited by one of the officers; I believe it was Carroll, who asked her: "Well, do you think your son will be around?" And she said, "Well, I think he'll be up this afternoon." As a matter of fact, the testimonial record by Mrs. Morales indicates very clearly that she had informed Melvin Morales that the police were interested in speaking to them and Morales seems tohave said, "That's all right, mother; I will come up."

At 8:00 that evening on October 13th, Melvin Morales did, in fact, come up to his mother's beauty parlor. He arrived in a taxicab, stepped out of the cab; Detective Carroll took Morales, put him in Detective Daum's car; Detective Daum went to see Mrs. Morales and said in words, or in substance, "Come on out; we have your son; please pay the taxicab."

Mrs. Morales: "May I talk to him?" The detective: "No, that isn't necessary." As we repeat the statement of facts, and the Respondent's brief points out/officer did interfere with her access to her son.

The police officers then took him in the detective's car down to the 22nd presenct, brought him upstairs in the

stationhouse; put him into the lieutenant's office and commenced the process of interrogation. Daum made some reference
to the following rights of the Petitioner: He said, "You can
have a lawyer; you don't have to talk us, and anything you

say to us may be used against you."

Morales declined to speak to Daum, and at that point said, "I'd rather speak to Detective Carroll." Detective Carroll returned from his brief departure to get coffee and cake. The first words out of Morales' mouth, in words or in substance, was: "Carroll, you know I can't take a beating." Carroll replied to that: "Stop building fences; stop making alibis; stop building crutches; there is one thing you can't do: you can't lie to God. Do you believe in God?"

Morales: "Yes, I do."

"Between you and your God, did you do this thing, Morales?"

"Yes, I did."

- Q How long did all this take?
- A From the time that Morales was picked up, Mr. Justice --
 - Q I mean the interrogation.
- A The interrogation lasted approximately 45 minutes. From about 8:00 in the evening on October 13th until 8:45 when he made the first damning statement in response to the question: "Did you do it?"

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Approximately 45 minutes, Your Honor. A

Well, I'm not clear on your answer. Forty-five minutes after Detective Carroll came in the room or 45 minutes from the first--

A Forty-five minutes after the initial taking into custody outside his mother's beauty parker. The trip to the stationhouse --

Q No, no, no. How long after Carroll got into the stationhouse and Morales got into the stationhouse, was it that the statement was made?

A It would seem to be about 10 to 15 minutes; Your Honor. It's impossible to fix the time with any precision. It was 45 minutes from the initial time of taking into custody and approximately 10 minutes between the time they arrived at the stationhouse to the time of the first statement: "Yes, I did."

CArroll then repeated to Morales substantially the same warning given to him by Detective Daum earlier and Morales gave a full-blown verbal confession; that he had needed marcotics; that he had beenin his mother's apartment and went outside for a breath of air; saw a woman entering the building; followed the wo man into the building; got into the same elevator with her; as the elevator went up he snatched at her purse; she resisted; he stabbed her; the elevator stopped and he fled.

at that point Detective Daum returned to the interrgation site. And Daum and Carroll made essentially this observation to Morales: "Now, since you, Morales, are going to have to repeat your story to detectives from the homicide squad, the precinct detective who is charged with the responsibility in this case and perhaps the District Attorney and another unspecified list of police officers, "Why don't you write your statement down so no one can Change it on you?" Morales complied and that led to the second confession in this case, a polygraphic statement completed at about 9:05 on October 13.

Thereafter, true-enough to the police officers' words, there was a further procession of police officers interrogating Morales and he substantially reiterated his confessions. Later in on/the evening the Assistant District Attorney from the Bronx County's office arrived on the scene, conducted a question and answer session with Morales and which he gave to a stenotype reporter. And then that session was completed sometime early on the Morning of October 14th, now about 4 and 1/2 hours to five hours after the initial taking into custody.

Morales was taken to the scene of the crime where he reenacted it, the crime.

At 4:00 on the morning of October 14th he was in the emergency ward of Morrisania Eospital, being treated for what appeared to be narcotics withdrawal symptoms. A week later, around October 20th, police officers visited Morales at the

Bronx House of Detention. They said they wanted to talk to him. And according to the police officers' own testimony, they said that Morales had formed a new resolve: He said, "No, I will not talk to you; I am going to fight this thing," meaning, obviously, the charge of murder.

Morales was duly tried and convicted in Bronx County; question of the a preliminary hearing on the/voluntariness of his confession; the famous Suntley hearing in New York City, when this Court's decision of Jackson versus Denno was held.

Morales did not testify at the Huntley hearing. The trial judge found his confession voluntary; the jury was charged on a question of voluntariness; the jury convicted Morales; he received a life sentence.

The Appellate Division of the First Department of New York found unanimously, without an opinion. The Court of Appeals of the State of New York affirmed, again unanimously, but this time with an opinion.

This Court granted certiorari inthis case on April 21, 1969.

Your Honors, at the time the police officers picked up Melvin Morales, they knew the following concrete, specific information about him: His mother lived in the building where the crime was committed. He was a narcotics addict. He, they had been told, had not been seen around since the time that the crime was committed. And that, Your Honors, is about

all they knew about Malvin Morales.

However, with this scanty information, the police officers, for the very obvious intention of taking Morales into their custody and bringing him down to the stationhouse for interrogation.

The Court of Appeals for the State of New York said in its opinion that it may be conceded that there was no probable cause. They did not make a finding on the question of whether there was probable cause or not. But, I submit, on the record in this case, and especially in Tight of the testimony of the two officers who picked Morales up in the first place. One saying, "Well, I had nothing definitely to tie him to the crime." And the other saying, "I was dubious about his connection at the time and it wasn't until the interrogation it brought/out that I was convinced that he was guilty."

There is quite obviously no probable cause. Further, the Court of Appeals did, however, seem to make a finding; a finding which I submit, is probably binding on this Court. The Court of Appeals said on Page 58 of its Opinion in 22 NY 2d.

"The record does not support a finding that Defendant consented his to/detention and questioning." Says the Court of Appeals, "The fact that there is no consent; the fact that there was no probable cause does not necessarily make the seizure here unreasonable. We must examine to see whether under all the circumstances whether the seizure here was reasonable or not."

The Court of Appeals, of course, was writing in May of 1968. They were writing without the benefit of the illumination supplied by this Court in the case of Davis versus Mississippi, decided on April 22nd, the day after this court granted certificati in this case.

Davis versus Mississippi, Your Honors, I think, makes it painfully clear that if the police do not possess probable cause, do not have a warrant, they cannot take a citizen off the street and bring him to the stationhouse. The only thing they can do is Footnote 6 in the Davis Opinion.

The only thing they can is request the voluntary cooperation of the citizen. Morales was not requested to voluntarily cooperate. He was grabbed by one police officer; rushed into the other officer's car and taken down to the stationhouse.

tion: "Defendant testified he was so loosely guarded when taken from the car to the station that he could safely escape." Well, Well, I don't know about that. All he said inhis testimony on Page 915 in the record is that the police officers didn't hold him by each arm. But the Court of Appeals: "Oh, but this was a reasonable seizure within the Fourth Amendment." No probable cause and therefore caused no arrest. There couldn't be an arrest; there was no basis to link this man to the crime. No consent.

Said the Court of Appeals here: "The question is, was it reasonable to do whatthe police officers did?" And in marching through the consideration of what constituted reasonableness, the Court of Appeals said, "There is no practical alternative to taking the man off the street and dragging him under the stationhouse. The police station is a better place to interrogate defendants.

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I reiterate on oral argument what I say in the brief:
That's exactly what I think this Court decided in Miranda
versus Arizona, because the police station is such a dandy

Q Did he raise his Fourth Amendment claim at the trial?

A Your Honor, the first time the Pourth Americanent claim was raised inthis case was by me in the New York State Court of Appeals. The first time in this case. Haley versus Ohio, however, stands for the proposition that once the contention has been contended by the highest court of the State that question is properly preserved for review by this court.

And Your Honor, the Court of Appeals quite obviously considered this question as a brief reading of its opinion will indicate. Although it was raised I have no qualms about admitting that the question was raised for the first time by me in the Court of Appeals. That is not, I think, particularly an objection to this Court considering that question since the

highest court in New York has considered the question properly preserved for its review.

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Q And that may be that it may be true, but it also may be true that the State might have more proof to put in as to the background in which the focuse of the police suspicion of this man came to their attention.

A Yes, Mr. Justice Harlan; that's one of the principal escape valves in the Respondent's brief in this case.

"Oh, we may have more evidence." But that question, I think, is referrable to the proper procedure under the New York practice since the question has been properly preserved for review by this Court I think the only thing that the people can rely on is what they have got in the record right now.

They could perhaps go out and beat the bushes now, the event five years after/and find some more evidence. And perhaps this Court could be convinced to send it back for hearing. I do not think that is necessary in the state of the record and especially in light of the testimony of the two arresting officers. Because those two officers had nothing even remotely approaching, in their view, probable cause to make the seizure. And it is these two, if you will, petty officials, to borrow from Boyd versus the United States, whose determination to take this citizen into custody that is under review in this Court in this case.

If this Court be not convinced that the unconsented to

seizure of a citizen for the purpose of bringing him into the police station for interrogation, does not violate the Fourth Amendment, then I, quite frankly, confess a bit of confusion about what the Davis versus Mississippi was driving at.

But, the --

Q What bearing do you think the stop and frisk cases have on this?

at all, Mr. Justice Harlan, except for the very general proposition that the police may make some temporary estoppage of a citizen if there is a reason to inquire about his suspicious conduct. The only think the police officers saw Morales do was to get out of a taxicab. That's far from the kind of conduct, I think that is --

- Q Well, there were some events that led them to be there to see him get out of the taxicab; were there not?
 - A Yes, Mr. Chief Justice, there certainly were.
 - Q And these events didn't just happen to be there.
- A Oh, they were there because they were looking for Melvin Morales. But as to the reason why they were looking for Melvin Morales that makes the seizure here unreasonable within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment.

They were not operating on anything remotely approaching probable cause for his arrest. They had nothing but a bare suspiction that he might have something to tell them about the

crime. Since, of course, his family lived in the building; he was an addict; he had not been seen around. It hardly inordinately points the finger of suspicion of Morales.

The Court of Appeals said the checkerboard square of investigation pointed only to Morales. But at most, to give the people their due, four out of the 64 squares on a checkerboard will fill them in. That hardly amounts up to the kind of justification of the seizure and detention of the citizen, as in this case,

To say that since Morales knew the police were looking for him that his coming to his mother's beauty parlor may be read as a surrender, flies in the face of both the determination by the New York Court of appeals that there was nothing in this record to support the consent argument and it is also tantamount, in my opinion, to saying that a lamb that goes out to the pasture surrenders himself to the wolf. If Morales wanted to surrender to the police there were better places to surrender than your mother's beauty parlar. There are police stations, and many of them.

But Morales, I don't think, can be said to have surrendered in this case. I think the Court of Appeals has decided that way. There is no surrender; no consent to interrogation at that place under these circumstances and since that
is the determination, I believe, on the question of fact by the
highest court in the State of New York, I do not think that

question of fact is reviewable by this court. But if the Court be convinced that there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment it becomes another more pressing problem.

If the Fourth Amendment was violated what effect should that have upon the use of Morales' confessions? Taking my leave from the American Law Institute's Model Code of Prearranged Procedures, especially Article 9 of that document; and from Wong Sun versus the United States. I believe that the answer to that question that once the confessions are taken so close, at least in point of time, to have unreasonable seizure within the Fourth Amendment, those confessions must be barred from evidence without reference to the fact of the voluntariness or not.

As this Court has said time and time again, the purpose behind the exclusionary rule is to discourage the police from engaging in the prohibitive conduct; the prohibitive conduct here is an investigatory detention upon less than probable cause.

The involuntary submission of the citizen to the custody in the police station, if the Fourth Amendment is to be protected in this context, the confessions that came at the police station just like John Davis's fingerprints in the Davis case, must be barred from evidence, whether they were voluntary or not.

The next step, of course, is if the Court not be

willing to buy a rule based upon hearsay exclusion we then come to the question of where there is kind of continuation between the initial police illegality, that is the seizure of Morales on the street corner, and his confessions that will permit the Court to say that there has been a dissipation of the primary taint.

Again, there are leading cases: Wong Sun versus the United States. You have Blackie Terry whose confession was excluded from evidence. He was seized on his own premises and made admissions almost immediately.

Wong Sun took off and was at large for several days.

He came back and made his confessions. As to Wong Sun, the taint of the primary illegality of any uncertainty had been dissipated, but as to Blackie Terry; as to Melvin Morales in this case, the link between the illegal police activity of seizing Morales without probable cause and taking him without his consent into the custody, is so linked closely both in time and in circumstances.

Because Morales was ataken down to the police station and interrogated almost immediately. The mere fact of interposition of -- I think it probably would be called the best point in time, Escobedo -- should not by and of themselves be of sufficient attenuation of taint. The oppressiveness of the initial seizure was followed by the oppressiveness of the detention at the place selected by the police, which was followed

by the oppressiveness of the isolation from everyone else in the room but the police, which was followed -- by the confessions.

The link between these confessions and the seizure is so close, both in time and in circumstances, I believe, Your Honors, that it cannot be reasonably said in a realistic appraisal of this record, that there has been the kind of attenuation between the unlawful police conduct in the first place violating the principles renounced by this Court several months ago in David versus Mississippi, and the confessions to say that the confessions are not the tainted produce of this initial police illegality.

And further, Your Honors, we submit, that the confessions of the defendant, each and every one of them were not proved to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

He did confess he was warned, but he was a narcotics addict, a group prone to be garrulous; to have a rather shallow perception of their rights and responsibilities. He was isolated from his only ally in the field, his mother, who testified that she wanted to tell him that he shouldn't speak to the police officers.

He was alone in the police station; he was isolated; he did, after the fact, as Haley versus Ohio indicates, also is germane — after the fact, for whatever light these subsequent events may throw on what went before — after then he

did wind up in the emergency ward of the Morrisiana Hospital, being treated Wor what looked like narcotics control symptoms.

Now, when he had been completely freed of the fetters of police custody; when he was completely alone with several days to cogitate, ruminate over the possibilities of his right to not speak with the police officers, when the police officers arrived on October 20th Morales told them, in essence: "Go away. I don't want to talk to you." Removed in time and space from the inherent — we submit, inherently coercive atmosphere surrounding him at that police station, Morales found the resolve that would have stood him in good stead if he had been in a position to assert that resolve at the time he was initially taken into custody.

Q How old was Morales.

A Mr. Justice, at the time he was arrested he was approximately 30 years of age and had been a narcotics addict since he was 17 years old. He graduated from junior high school; had some trade school experience. He had a yellow sheet. The arrest record in New York is called, of course, the yellow sheet, of some sizable dimensions.

And the Court of Appeals said, "This is no babe in the woods; this is a man familiar with the criminal processes. And to buttress their conclusion the Court of Appeals said that he was so familiar with the criminal processes that he chose not to rely on the fact that he was unlawfully arrested, but he --

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now speaking of Morales -- chose to rely on the stronger argument of his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.

Morales, the experienced criminal. The mere fact that he was 30 years of age, Your Honor, I submit and the fact that he had a rather extensive criminal record, doesn't make him an expert on the ins and outs of the Fourth Amendment; Fifth; Sixth; the 14th. And also the requirement that the issues be raised from the moment of the course of events at the trial.

Here, however, we have the -- he couldn't afford a better lawyer, so he got someone who made, really an error. He raised the issue that this Court must now decide: Can this confession or these confessions be admitted in light of the violation of the Fourth Amendment rights.

Your Honors, thank you very much.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE: Mr. Roberts.

ORAL ARGUMENT BY BURTON B. ROBERTS, DISTRICT

ATTORNEY, BRONK COUNTY, NEW YORK ON BEHALF

OF RESPONDENT

MR. ROBERTS: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Assuming there was no surrender -- assuming there was no surrender in this case and if there was a surrender, certainly the Fourth Amendment would not come into play -- but the taking into custody, the detention, the seizure, the arrest, of Melvin Morales is, under the circumstances of this case, was

reasonable and appropriate within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

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The Fourth Amendment, as opposed to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, applies a flexible and variable standard that is not absolute, like the Fifth and the Sixth. Guidelines have been provided by Terry against Ohio. And I submit that thepeople have the right to detain someone where there is a reasonable basis for belief that that individual has information concerning a crime which has been committed.

Justice Frankfurter stated it much more eloquently than I in Culombe. He said, "There are things which cannot speak and it is necessary to detain and to interrogate witnesses who possibly may be suspects in order to ascertain who has committed a particular crime."

This case, like all cases appearing before this Court there has to be a balancing between society and the individual. In this case the Petitioner who counsel has characterized as a lamb, was found by a jury of his peers to have delivered 31 stab wounds to a 56-year-old woman in Bronx County, Mrs. Addie Brown.

The police, arriving upon the scene, questioned individuals and before this investigation was over, they literally questioned over 100 individuals. What information did they receive that first night? They knew that the individual or possibly the individual who committed this crime,

lived in that building, because one of the tenants, after the elevator arrived upon his floor, heard footsteps below this particular floor and heard a door.

questioned Mrs. Morales. They questioned her son, Snooky.

And the evidence indicates in the record and that is all we have to go on — is that two individuals were interrogated by the police at the stationhouse. Snooky Morales and a man by the name of Shorty. They had no probable cause to arrest, in the technical sense of the term, either Snooky or Shorty. But, I respectfully submit, conducting this investigation, based on the information which they had, they had a reasonable basis to detain and take to the stationhouse, these two individuals and question them and check out their alibis, ascertain whether or not these individuals could clear themselves in orderto solve this crime involving Mrs. Addie Brown.

They could never revive Mrs. Addie Brown, but it was incumbent upon these police officers, characterized as "petty public officials," to work from daybreak to backbreak in order to solve this crime so that there would not be more Addie Browns, figuratively speaking, in Bronx County in the City of New York. They had to work and they had to investigate and they had to interrogate and I respectfully submit they went into the streets and they knew, these police officers, they knew Melvin Morales. They knew Melvin Morales to be a hustler and a

petty thief who had numerous convictions as a narcotic addict and for policy. They knew this individual and they knew his haunts and they looked in his haunts and this individual was not seen in his familiar haunts.

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During the course of this investigation prior to the time that Melvin Morales was taken to the stationhouse, they went and interviewed the mother. Detective Ferguson spoke to the mother. Detective Ferguson was told by the mother that her son was not around; that she had not seen her son for some time. Subsequently, svezal days later, to Detective Carroll, and Detective Daum, once she discovered they were searching for her son and looking for her son, she gave an alibi for her son. She said, "He was here; he was here in the apartment."

A detective had gone through the premises; a detective who knew Melvin Morales. He had not seen Melvin Morales in the apartment.

The little boy — and his age doesn't appear in the record — was a little boy who had a combine, a band and this little boy was walking his friend home at approximately 3:20 in the morning and Everett Roberts, according to the testimony in this record — and I'm not going to comment on what the Assistant District Attorney stated concerning his testimony at this time, but that little boy described to the police, prior to the time that Melvin Morales was detained, or surrendered,

described to the police an individual of receding heighte,
a Puerto Rican, thin, and indeed, the description matched, in
the minds of the detectives who were working on this case,
Melvin Morales. And they intensified their search for Melvin
Morales.

And this boy in court identified Melvin Morales as the individual he saw at the time of the homicide; and this little boy stated that he saw this individual on the day — on the Wednesday following the Saturday night or Sunday morning that he saw the individual at the bench in front of this woman.

Now, the Court's notion of probable cause is less than the conservative attitude of both prosecutor and police officials with regard to probable cause, as evidenced by the Peters case.

And I say to this Court that if there was probable cause or this Court was able to find probably cause from the Peters case or in the Peters case, certainly the Court may very well find from the record we have here, which we were not able to develop because the question of unreasonable detention was never raised in the trial court; it was not raised in the Appellate Division, our Intermediate Appellate Court; it was first raised — raised for the first time in the Court of Appeals.

Certainly, if it was raised, I respectfully submit,

 we would have had an opportunity to develop evidence and produce evidence which would show how all of this information
interwove, and whether or not we had, indeed, additional information which would enable us to have probable cause to make the
arrest.

But I state thaton the record itself, there was a reasonable basis, which I contend is all that the Fourth Amendment requires -- a reasonable basis todetain this individual in order to interrogate him and all because there was a reasonable belief that he had information concerning the commission of this crime.

Q Did the officers who picked Morales up at his mother's beauty shop -- did they testify?

A Mr. Justice Harlan, they did. And they testified if I might add — and if I may just go off the subject that I have now, and go back to voluntary surrender for a moment. They testified that they saw the mother and they stated to the mother that they were looking for her son, Melvin Morales. And she said, "Why, he's been around. He's not hiding. I'll tell my son that you're looking for him, Detective Carroll." And, in sed, she called up her son, and this is the testimony in the trial; testimony of Mrs. Morales, substantiated in part by Melvin Morales himself when he testified. And she said, "Melvir, Detective Carroll wants to see you," and he said, "WELL, I'll see him." And she said, "Well, come up to the beauty parlor."

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And the same day he arrived at the beauty parlor she spoke to that son and told him where she would be and she then told Detective Daum and Detective Carroll that her son would be at the beauty parlor, later that evening. And at 8:00 o'clock the son arrived. Now, he knew that Detective Carroll was looking for him. The mother stated, "come to the beauty parlor." He did arrive at the beauty parlor; Detective Daum and Detective Carroll were there; he voluntarily went with Detective Daum and Detective Carroll to the stationhouse, which certainly is different from the Davis case in that this 30-year-old man, as contrasted to a 40-year-old boy -- this 30=year-old man voluntarily went with the police officers to the stationhouse; no handcuffs, no chains, no guard, with detectives whom he knew and whom he had seen, certainly for the last 13 years of his life; was taken to the stationhouse and there in the stationhouse, interposing his own free will within ten to 15 minutes after Detective Carroll questioned him; advised of his rights, prior to Miranda; told that he didn't have to say anything; that anything he said could be used against him; and that the detective would testify in court concerning what he said.

- Q Mr. Roberts, when was he arrested?
- A He was arrested on OCtober 13th with --
- Q Where?
- A At the beauty shop; outside the beauty shop, sir.
- Q You mean arrested outside the beauty shop and went

Voluntarily with them?

A I use the term arrest -- the constitutional term arrest. When a person's right to freedom and movement is interfered with, I consider it an arrest. I consider --

Q So from then on he wasn't voluntarily free; was he? From that moment on.

A From that moment on he was not voluntarily free to go.

- Q And what basis did you have to arrest him?
- A Sir?
- Q What basis did youhave to arrest him?
- A The basis --
- Q In the record.
- A From the records, sir?
- Q Yes, sir.

him was circumstantial evidence, indicating that the person who committed this crime was a tenant in that building; that this individual, Melvin Morales, was seen outside the premises of the building, contemporaneous with the time just before or just after Mrs. Addie Brown was killed; that this individual was a narcotic addict; had been an addict for many years; that this individual was a petty thief; that this individual was missing from his haunts; that his mother --

Q Now, where in the record is that. You are --

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Section 1

A A fair share --

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What more cause did you have that this was 0 Morales?

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The evidence --

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At the time of the arrest.

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-- the fact, sir, that he was not seen in his usual haunts for a period of nine days subsequent to this crime; that the mother stated at first that he was not in the apartment; stated subsequently that he was in the apartment; that a boy saw him sitting on a bench at the time that the crime had been committed.

And I state further, sir, that when I use the term arrest I equate it with seizure; I equate it with detention and I state that the people or the state has the right to seize someone when they have a reasonable basis or believing that that person has information with respect to a crime. And, in equating that with his Fourth Amendment rights we take into consideration the entire totality of circumstances: the nature of the crime that was committed; the state of the investigation; the individual himself who has been saized; whether or not the atmosphese of the stationhouse would be so coercive to such an individual who was ring-wise, that he would not be able to cope or would be so cowed that his statement that he would make after being advised of his rights would not be voluntary; how long he had been detained and certainly I believe that when one

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is seized on the basis that he may reasonably have information with regard to a crime that that detention can only be for a short period of time, rather than for a lengthy period of time.

The extent of time that this man was seized, as far as his statement concerning his complicity in this crime was concerned, was from 10 to 15 minutes, sir.

And based on those facts, sir, I believe that under the Fourth Amendment, recognizing that the standards applied by the Fourth Amendment are flexible and variable; that the totality of this situation warrants the action taken by the state.

- Q When was he booked?
- A Pardon, Mr. Justice?
- Q When was he booked?
- A He was booked the next morning.
- Q When did he -- I thought you said he confessed all of this ten minutes after his arrest.
 - A He did, Mr. Justice Marshall.
 - Q Why wasn't he booked then?
- A He was not booked at that particular time because at that time in the City of New York there was no 24-hour arraignment and he could not be arraigned until the following morning. He was questioned --
- Q Well, when was he booked? Is booking arraignment, or are they different?
 - A They are different. He was not --

Q He could have been booked that day.

A He could have been booked that night and he was —— I just don't know; I just don't know that offhand. I do know that prior to the time that he would be booked it is a procedure that we setablished that an Assistant D.A. who is on felony duty reports to the scene of the crime in order to interrogate the individual, advise him of his rights, even prior to Miranda; ascertain whether the police department has also advised this individual of his rights in order to ascertain the voluntariness of the statement which this individual has given. That was done in this case.

Q Is that in all crimes, or just felonies or homicides?

A That is felonies. All homicides and also important felonies. That has been instituted in Bronx County before I came up there as Chief Assistant.

Q Does this record show in any way how many narcotics addicts lived in the particular building or apartment this man and the victim lived?

A There is nothing in the record to so indicate.

There --

Q Does the record show how large an apartment it is: how many units?

A The record does show that it was a 21-floor apartment building and if I may just speak to my -- 21 floors.

We just don't know how many units?

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- Q It was a large apartment.
- A Over 100 units. It was a large apartment house.
- Q What was the defense at the trial, Mr. Roberts?

A The defense at the trial was alibi. And the defense at the trial was that this confession which was offered in evidence was not voluntary.

In fact, there was a contention of the defense during the course of this trial that this man was a suspect; that this man was thought by these police officers to have committed this crime. In fact, Defense Counsel did everything but state that these officers had probable cause or reasonable basis for believing in their own minds subjectively that this individual had committed this crime.

- Q Is the entire trial record in the Court here?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q How long is it?
- A There are two volumes: 1340 pages.

I might — may it please the Court, in the event that you do not find that the guidelines established by Terry should be adhered to in this case, though I certainly think that the situation of Officer McFadden arresting —arresting Terry by seizing him, preventing him from movement because he saw Terry looking into various windows and talking to somebody and then

looking into these windows again. If that is appropriate 500 2 3 4 5 8 7 8 9 10

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police action, and indeed, I do believe it is appropriate police action, then certainly in this case where police officers have interrogated numerous individuals; where they have a reasonable basis for interrogating this individual, Melvin Morales, and do, in fact interrogate him: and when Melvin Morales has an opportunity to interpose his own free will, and within ten minutes, readily admits and confesses to this crime I respectfully submit that his Fourth Amendment rights have not been violated.

Q How soon after the -- or how long before the arrest -- I'll put it that way -- did the police discover that he had not been coming to his home to sleep and was not around?

A . I believe it was two days -- it was two days thereafter they suddenly discovered that he was not around.

Presumably sometime after the person of Morales description was identified as being near the entrance of the building before or after the crime?

That is correct, sir, Mr. Chief Justice.

Q And does the record indicate that after that the police madeginguity of his mother?or of other people in the house, in the building?

They made inquiry of his mother prior thereto. They made inquiry of his mother due to the fact that they found the brother, Snooky, in the hallway that same morning. They did

make inquiry of the mother following the description given to them by Everett Roberts on three different occasions and went to the house on three different --

Q He didn't live with his mother; did he?

A The record does not indicate whether he lived with the mother. There is an indication from the record that he did stay several times a week with his mother.

And according to the mother, he was with the mother on the night of the murder; or was in that apartment on the night of the murder, where the crime was committed. And this evidence was known to the police prior to the time that they took Mr.

Morales into custody; or when he surrendered.

Q Did the mother and any testimony pinpoint how she knew that he was in her apartment, the family apartment at 3:00 a.m. or whatever the time of this crime was?

A She stated that he was sleeping on the dining room table at that particular time and that when the police arrived at the apartment he was then sleeping on the table.

And this is refuted by one of the detectives, I believe Detective Texeira, who testified that he walked through the apartment and actually walked through this room and did not observe anyone sleeping on the dining room table.

Q What did the alibi show about where he was during the time of the murder?

A Pardon?

Q What was the alibi? You say he put up an alibi.		
What was that alibi. Where was he testifying that he was at		
that time?		
A Mr. Justice Black, Mrs. Morales testified that		
he was sleeping on the dining room table.		
Q During the time of the murder?		
A During the time of the murder and during the		
whole evening; he was there.		
And that during the time the police came to interro-		
gate the mother the Morales family, and in particular,		
Snooky, the brother, he was sleeping on the dining room table.		
That is in the record.		
Q And you say that the detective testified that who		
he went through the apartment he did not see Morales anywhere		
inthe apartment?		
A That is correct, Mr. Chief Justice.		
Q And what time did thepolice go through the		
apartment?		
A I would say about 4:00 or 4:30 in the morning,		
Mr. Chief Justice.		
Q And then he was absent from that apartment for		
nine or ten days thereafter?		
A According to her he came to the apartment		
Q According to whom?		
A According to Mrs. Morales, Mr. Chief Justice.		
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According to the detectives they did not see him at the apartment; they did not see him at his usual haunts.

And Mrs. Morales stated that on the night in question.

or the early morning of October 4th, Mr. Chief Justice, that

the detectives did not enter the apartment. This was refuted

by the detectives who said they did enter the apartment and

went through the apartment and did not see Mr. Morales asleep

on the dining room table.

Q This has to do with the alibi defense, primarily; doesn't it? This colloquy.

With respect to what's really an issue here, as I understand it, and that is the Fourth Amendment claim, the mother testified that she telephoned her son when the police told her that they would like to interrogate her son; is that correct?

- A That is correct, Mr. Justice Stewart.
- Q And was he when she telephoned to him?
- A The record does not indicate where he was at that time, Mr. Justice Stewart.
- Q He did not make his home regularly or all the time permanently with his mother; did he?
- A According to the record, he live there sporadically. He lived there two or three times a week and then lived elsewhere.
- Q And also visited her at her beauty shop, which was as I gather, in the vicinity; is that right?

How far away from the apartment house was the 0 2 beauty shop? 3 The record does not so indicate. A 4 I should think, Mr. Roberts that when the police 5 came and the police detectives went through the apartment and 6 compared that with his mother's statement that he had been 7 there, this might have put them on notice of the suspicious 8 circumstance relating to Morales. 9 Mr. Chief Justice, they were on notice. They 10 were ---11 You suggest that on this record they had a basis 12 even as early as that to suspect that Morales may have been one 13 of the people involved; or might be a person involved? 14 Mr. Chief Justice, on that night they did not 15 know that he had been there. It was only subsequently when the 16 mother stated that her son Melvin was in the apartment, that 17 they were able to piece that together. 18 That's when they began to make inquiry about 19 seeing him; was it? 20 They had made inquiry about seeing him prior 21 thereto, but they had made inquiry to the mother -- as soon as 22 they made inquiry to the mother about seeing him she then alibid 23 and stated that he was in the apartment; he wasn't outside the 24 apartment. He was here sleeping on the dining room table. 25 37

That is correct, Mr. Justice Stewart.

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May it please the Court: Inthe event that this Court finds that there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of this defendant, I respectfully submit it was attenuant.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE: We will continue after lunch.

(Whereupon, at 12:00 o'clock p.m. the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at 12:30 o'clock p.m. this same day)

12:35 o'clock p.m.

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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Roberts, you may proceed. You have approximately two minutes left.

MR. ROBERTS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: As to the attenuation in the event finds that it was an unreasonable seizure; in Miranda there was discussed the taint of the coercive atmosphere of the stationhouse. And the Miranda case decided that this could be moved by a full and fair disclosure of Defendant's rights to silence and to counsel. By identical reason, we contend here that the confession was not the product of illegal custody, but was the result of this man interposing his own free will and confessing to a detective of his own choice: Detective Carroll. He refused to talk to Detective Daum and insisted on talking to Detective Carroll, and when Detective Carroll asked him whether he believed in God and abked him whether or not between God and himself, did he commit this crime, he stated that he did.

And I submit that there seems to coincide with the State's theory that this is a voluntary surrender. The fact that shortly after he was brought to the stationhouse he confessed to this crime within ten minutes after he was questioned by Detective Carroll.

In conclusion: the People submit that the seizure was proper under the Fourth Amendment; that this man was seized, not but based on the fact that he was present in the vicinity at the time the crime was committed; that a false alibi had been given for him by his mothers that he was not found in the usual haunts; that he had a reputation of being a petty thief who had numerous convictions and was known to have numerous convictions by the detectives assigned to this case.

I respectfully submit that there was voluntary surrender in this case, and therefore the Fourth Amendment may not
even come into play in regard to the fact situation in a case
known as People of the State of New York against Morales.

Thank you very much.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Farrell, you have five minutes left.

ORAL ARGUMENT BY RICHARD T. FARRELL, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR, FARRELL: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: I would very briefly like to return the Court's attention to two items of testimony that appear in the record.

In spite of the intricate complex of facts upon which the police officers might have operated to seize Morales, we have summarized in our brief on Pages 13 and 14 and over to 15, the facts upon which they actually did operate. They actually operated on the slimmest of evidence; so slim that one police officer, when asked whether Morales was a suspect or not, was

led to this remark: He said, "Was"— he was asked was Morales a suspect. After he was given a lead by the trial judge, the officer said, "I concur with the judge, everybody is a suspect." The reach of the police officers here — it's not limited to Melvin Morales — but these party officials, to borrow from — I was wrong, it was from James Otis's speech in 1761 — the police officers here, these petty officials, have in their power to determine who is a suspect and we know now from the police officers, who is a suspect. It is thee and me, Your Honors.

And the second point to which I would like to address the Court's attention was the attack on the admissibility of Morales's confession was not an attempt to find a way around otherwise overwhelming proof of guilt. Absent of Morales's confessions, there is nothing to tie him to the crime committed in this case.

As a matter of fact, the clothes that it is clear that he was wearing on the night in question had been turned into a clearning establishment on October 5th. The woman in the cleaning establishment found no traces of blood on those clothes. The police laboratory in examining those clothes, found no traces of blood.

If Your Honors look at the pictures in the r of the scene of the crime, there is blood on the floor; there is blood on the wall; there is blood on the door. Morales's

clothes showed no signs of blood and it is the People's own testimony that points to these clothes as the clothes as being worn by Morales on the night the crime was supposed to have been committed.

The only item of clothing missing was his shoes, but his trousers — if you look at the pictures in the record, Your Honors, how his trousers could escape from being covered with blood and gore; how his 31-stab-wound victim, or alleged victim, could not have blood on him, entrenches upon almost a lack of proof of guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, absent these confessions.

And Your Honors, as I think the Court well understands our position is that the confessions are the produce of an unlawful seizure and therefore, should be denied from use on this trial.

Thank you, Your Honors.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mr. Farrell for your submission, and thank you, Mr. Roberts for yours. The case is submitted.

(Whereupon, at 12:43 o'clock p.m. the argument in the above-entitled matter was concluded)

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