
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Supreme Court of the United States



Supreme Court, U. S.

Docket No. 81

DEC 17 9 52 AH '60

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Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

December 8, 1969

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8 IN THE SUPPEME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October 2 TERM 1969 3 B RECTOR SIMMONS, JR., ET UX., 13 Appellants 6 No. 81 VS 7 WEST HAVEN HOUSING AUTHORITY, 8 Appellee 9 10 The above-entitled matter came on for hearing at 11 10:40 o'clock a.m. 12 BEFORE: WARREN E. BURGER, CHIEF JUSTICE 13 HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice 10 JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice 15 POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice 16 THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice 17 FRANCIS X. DIMEEN, ESO. New Haven Legal Assistance Association, Inc. 18 169 Church Street New Haven, Connecticut 06510 19 Counsel for Petitioner 20 F. MICHAEL AHERN, Assistant Attorney General of Connecticut 21 Counsel for State of Connecticut, as amicus curiae, in support of judgment 22 23 and Thomas with

PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Number 81. Simmons against West Haven Housing Authority.

MR. DINEEN: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the

Court: My name is Francis X. Dineen. I represent the

Appellants in this matter. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 United States Code, Section 1257, Subsection

2. It goes to the fact that the constitutionality of a state
statute is an issue and for the decision of the Appellant Division for the State of Connecticut, the constitutionality of that
state statute has been upheld.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut denied our petition for certification and so the appeal to this Court is from the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court.

The facts of this case involve relatively ordinary eviction action which was commenced in July, 1967. After pleadings were filed and defenses were raised and in fact, seven special defenses were raised as to the eviction actions that was brought.

In January of 1968 the trial took place; on January 16 judgment was handed for the landlord, the Housing Authority of West Haven. Therafter, on January 18 our appeal from that judgment was filed with the Appellate Division. At that time, pursuant to Section 52542 of the Connecticut General Statutes, it was required that we file with the Court a bond with a

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of the appeal. And in order to file that bond on behalf of our clients, we went to several surety companies, asking them what they would require to go on the bond as a surety. The bond in this case, because the rent was \$72 a month, would have been approximately something in the nature of \$400, \$5.

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In fact, the case that we cited in our brief in which the rent was approximately the same as our rent, the Trial Court had ordered that a bond in the amount of \$700 be filed in that particular case. So that, in any event, all bonds would have been something in the nature of \$500 to \$700 and this again, is to cover the rents that would accrue during the pendency of the appeal.

The surety companies that we approached, asking them that they go on this bond, demanded full cash collateral before they would sign a bond, as well as demanding their fee. This was impossible for our clients to pay; they were poor and they didn't have thatkind of money.

So, we went to the Trial Court and by motion on our clients' behalf, to waive the surety bond. We stated these facts to the Trial Court and asked that as an alternative in order to protect the landlord during the pendency of the appearance that we be allowed to pay the rent into the Court every month to be held by the Court in escrow and we also agreed in the

event we should lose the appeal and ultimately if the Supreme

Court of Connecticut heard it, and lose there, that this money

then would be turned over to the landlord. We also agreed that

if in any one month we failed to pay that rent into the court

that the appeal could automatically be dismissed.

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Now, we thought this was a fair alternative because the interest that the state has in protecting the landlord would be met entirely by this provision; by this alternative that we offered. If we paid the rent every month as it came due, and if we failed any one month and our appeal would then be dismissed, the landlord would then have all the protection that he would be entitled to.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Is it clear, Mr. Dineen, that the Court had the power, by way of equity discretion or some other source to waive the bond requirement and accept your alternative proposal?

MR. DINEEN: Your Honor, it appears to us that it is clear that they did not have that discretion. The reason I say that, we cited in our appendix the Appellate Court decision and on Page 57 of the appendix where we cited the decision, the Court says, "The right here to an appeal is not a constitutional one, though one based upon privileges of natural justice. It is but a statutory privilege in which the aggrieved party has the right to avail himself of only when he has strictly complied with the provisions of the statutes."

And later, on Page 60 of the appendix the Appellate Division says, "want of bond with surety, where bond with surety is by statute a prerequisite of review, furnishes a sufficient ground for dismissal of the appeal.

We made the motion in the Trial Court because there had not been a decision such as this with regard to waiving a surety bond prior to this time. Now, we made it because we felt we were offering a fair alternative. It turned out, from our understanding now of the Appellate Division's decision, that the Appellate Division decides that it does not have the power to waive.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: What did you say the suit was filed for?

MR. DINEEN: This is an eviction action, Your Honor.

MR. DINEEN: Well, there were two actions. The action that we're concerned with was based on nonpayment of

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: For nonpayment of rent?

MR.JUSTICE BLACK: And you offered to pay the money into Court?

MR. DINEEN: We offered to pay the money to the Court at the time of the appeal. During the pendency of the action from July, 1967 until the time of judgment, to January of '68, rent was not being paid. Now --

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Was there any defense?

rent. Prior to that --

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MR. DIMEEN: Yes, there was, Your Honor. There were defenses on the merits that no rent was due. Our defense all along was for two reasons no rent was due. One was that we claim that the landlord, the Housing Authority had not complied with Connecticut statutes and this is set forth as well on Page 29 of the --

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the claim for rent.

MR. DINEEN: There are Connecticut statues that require that any building that is considered a tenement house or a garden-type apartment and these are defined in Connecticut statutes, must have what is called a "tenement house certificate," stating that that building complies precisely with the tenement house laws. And if it does not have a tenant house certificate, then no rent is due and under a case cited, I believe in our jurisdictional statement, Dreamy Hollow Apartments against Lewis, no special proceeding or summary process action can be brought when such a house does not have this tenement house certificate. That was one of our defenses as to

It was the second defense, and thatrelates to the first action that was brought. There was an action brought some two or three months before this second action, which is an issue here — that was brought in early May. It was an effort bythe landlord to put these people out for another reason. It is our contention that under Connecticut law that once a first

action is brought there is no more obligation on the part of the tenant to pay rent to the landlord.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: But you offered to pay the rent plus the costs?

MR. DINEEN: I beg your pardon, Your Honor.

MR.JUSTICE BLACK: Did I understand you to say awhile ago you had offered to pay rent plus the costs?

MR. DINEEN: We had offered to pay rent every month from the time of the appeal. The point I am trying to make is this:

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: That would pay it off?

MR. DINEEN: I beg your pardon, Your Honor?

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: That would pay all the man was claiming?

MR. DINEEN: No, Your Honor; that would pay from the time the appeal started, during the entire pendency of the appeal.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: But would it pay the back rent?

MR. DINEEN: It would not pay the back rent, Your

Honor.

Now, as to that question that is no requirement in Connecticut law that in order to defend or to litigate in a summary process actionthat you have to pay any rent. In fact, generally when a summary process action is commenced, the landlord will refuse to take any rent, because this would be a

waiver, probably of his action.

Litigating and defending an eviction action is not conditioned in Connecticut, upon paying current rent.

Connecticut law does not require that; and this particular factor, we don't feel is relevant to the case. In other words, the fact that for several months, from July until January rent was not paid, is not relevant to the issues we present to this Court.

along during the litigation, we still would have come to the same problem that we come to here. We would have come to the time of appeal where we would have had to put up the bond with the surety. In other words, to get the surety we would have to put up a lump of money covering perhaps some six or seven or eight months rent. And so, the precise same issue that's raised by this case, would have been raised even if every month we had been paying the rent to the landlord or into the Court during the litigation.

But we had defenses, up until the time -
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: What did you say your second
defense was?

MR. DINEEN: The first was that there wasn't any temement house certificate. The second was that there had been a prior action brought which terminates any obligation ontthe part of the tenant to pay rent to the landlord. Once the

landlord commences an eviction action, he waives his right to collect rent and his effort to terminate the lease --

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Waives his right to collect rent?

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MR.DINEEN: To collect rent as such, Your Honor. He still is entitled to collect whatever the reasonable value of the premises are; but this would be a separate matter. The

These were our two defenses during the course of the trial, that rent was not due to the landlord.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART: What was the basis of the prior action; was that also an eviction action?

MR. DINEEN: That was an eviction action, Your Honor The basis of that was that they claimed a nuisance in this regard to our tenants. We defended that; that never came to trial; that action, in fact, is still pending, theoretically. It has never been withdrawn; it still exists. Our defenses relating to that action are set forth in the special defenses that we had which are part of the record in the second action.

MR.JUSTICE STEWART: So, that was the first action; an eviction action because your clients allegedly were committing a nuisance.

MR. DINEEN: That was the allegation.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART: And then that's never been resolved. And then there was a second action based upon the non-payment of rent and you had two defenses: first that since

they didn't have a certificate they couldn't ask you for rent.

MR. DINEEN: That's correct, Your Honor.

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MR. JUSTICE STEWART: And secondly, since they brought this earlier action they didn't have any right to ask you for rent as such, but only damages.

MR. DINEEN: They waived it or they were --

MR. JUSTICE STEWART: But I don't understand how you can say that if you had kept paying rent this question would still have arisen; because if you had, I suppose, in this action, which is only based on the nonpayment of rent, it couldn't have arisen; there wouldn't have been an appeal and there wouldn't have been a --

MR. DINEEN: Yes, Your Honor. If we had been paying -- let us assume we had been paying during the course of the litigation. Now, if we paid as rent there is technical use of words in Connecticut as to rent or use in occupancy. If we paid it as rent and it was accepted as rent, this would operate as a waiver of the action. In other words, once the landlord had renewed the tenancy then they couldn't continue on with the action.

But let us assume we didn't pay it as rent; we paid it as use and occupancy: he reasonable value of the premises as we went along.

Now, that wouldn't have affected the Court's judgment; because the judgment was based upon facts that took place prior

to this time; prior to the continuation of litigation.

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MR. JUSTICE STEWART: Nonpayment of rent; that's what this action was for.

MR. DINEEN: It was for a specific month, which was back in the month of May, which was what they were claiming.

What I am saying is if we were paying during the course of litigation that would not have affected the Court's judgment.

At the time of judgment, even though we were paid up and were current, we still would have faced this appeal bond, which says if you want to appeal you have to put up a bond with surety to cover the rents that will accrue. Even if we had no arrearage at that time we would have to get a surety and pay him, say, five months in advance, or whatever it would be that we would put down in the bond; say, five hundred dollars in advance and even if you were current and had no arrears, we would still, in order to meet this appeal bond, have to have our tenants put up \$500 then and there, which they couldn't afford.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, how would you lose if you paid the rent? I understand you said this was for failure topay rent. And if you did pay rent you would win.

MR. DIMEEN: Well, not necessarily, because this is a very technical action. The action that was brought related to a failure to pay in May. The first action was brought on May 6. We claim that we have a leeway to pay. In other words, they had been there for months before; sometimes they paid on

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the tenth; sometimes on the 15th. This was a working family and when they didn't have it they got a few days extra to pay.

The landlord had wanted them out. He brought the action on the technicality that they had to pay on the first. How, what I understood Mr. Justice Stewart's counter today, was if we were paying in good faith along as we went, rather, not necessarily on the first, which is the technical basis of the action, but say on the 15th or whenever they had it each month, wouldn't that affect the outcome? I'm saying no, that would not affect the outcome at all because we would still get to the point of judgment where the Trial Judge would say:

"Well, you didn't pay on the first, therefore a judgment for the landlord. I don't care whether you have been paying your arrears -- "

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: You mean that the Connecticut Court would say that for the past six months you paid \$72 every day -- every month on the second, therefore you are out?

MR. DINEEN: Yes, Your Honor. If you didn't -MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: That's what the Court would
say?

MR. DIMEEN: IF you didn't read the terms of the lease and that the eviction action was drawn on the basis of termination of lease for failure to comply with it, even though during the course of litigation we were paying use and occupancy, that Court would still say that there was a judgment

for the landlord. So that there could have been a time -- and what I'm saying is that makes this nonpayment or this failure to pay during the litigation -- there could have been a time when we came to judgment for the landlord and we had no arrears; we had been paying this use and occupancy all along and were still faced with the precise question that we are faced with here.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Dineen, let me see if I can get one thing clear. There were findings here and then there is some colloquy in the ecord which seemed to exolain the findings and I am not sure in which action this took place the finding I am referring to is the finding of the trial judge in the court in the first instance that this appeal was taken for purposes of delay and not in good faith. Now, do you challenge those findings?

MR. DINEEN: Yes, we did challenge those, Your Honor.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Well, now -- let's assume first that you are right and that the findings are in error; do we review a finding of the court of the first instance of states on a factual issue in which undoubtedly credibility and similar factors are --

MR. DINEEN: No, Your Honor. My contention as to that, as well, is that that finding is irrelevant to this appeal. That finding that the appeal was taken for the purpose of delay relates only to a stay of execution.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: But does that not also relate whether a bond would be accepted under any circumstances?

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MR. DIMEEN: No, Your Honor, because as I understand the Appellate Division decision there is no discretion in the court to waive the bond. In other words, even if they thought we were appealing for delay, or not to delay, but were appealing in good faith, whatever the trial court may have found, he still doesn't have the discretion to waive that bond. He requires a bond and failure to put up a bond makes us subject then to a motion to dismiss the appeal. Our feeling is that the finding that the appeal was taken for the purpose of delay is not relevant to the questions before this Court, because that only relates to the stay of execution.

The Appellate Division's decision in this matter, when they dismissed the appeal and denied our motion to review, says nothing about any delay; it simply says that we failed to put up a bond, and that the bond was required. The appeal was dismissed because we didn't put up the bond and the bond was not waived because there was no authority in the court to waive the bond.

Any question of delay, which we did dispute all along, even assuming that there were delay involved and that the finding of the trial court were correct, is not relevant to this appeal. The only thing that's relevant, as we see it, is the surety bond which requires, in effect, that an advance

be made on the rent in lump sum for some five or six months.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN: Now, that would depend a good deal on whether you approached this issue as involving the statute on its face or the statute as applied. Are you arguing that it is a matter of Federal Constitutional law a state could not insist upon security pending appeal in a situation where it made a determination that the appeal was frivolous, harrassing, taken for the purposes of delay; are youarguing that?

MR. DINEEN: I am not arguing that, Your Honor.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN: I didn't think so.

MR. DINEEN: Under Connecticut law the question of delay or frivolity doesn't relate to your being entitled to appeal. What we are questioning is when there is the right to appeal that's available to everyone, but is conditioned on the posting of this bond, which requires that you, in effect, put up several months rent in advance, that that is unconstitutional because it deprives; it's unconstitutional, we claim, for several reasons, both it denies equal protection of the law and it denies due process.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Where is that finding?

MR. DINEEN: I beg your pardon, Your Honor?

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Where is thatfinding made in the

case?

MR. DINEEN: Which finding?

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: The finding of fact about whether

was this: during the course of the trial this man had a nervous breakdown and was unemployed for a substantial period of time.

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MR.JUSTICE BLACK: During the course of the trial or before it?

MR. DINEEN: During the course of the trial. At the time of the appeal when we filed his financial affidavit he was working with Sears Roebuck. But during the course of the trial he had a nervous breakdown and was unemployed. He tried to obtain welfare assistance for the family but because of the fact that the eviction proceeding was pending, we were unable to get assistance from the welfare department. This is one of the background factors.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Wasn't it your duty to get some kind of finding from the court to show that he was indigent before you bring the case all the way up here?

MR. JUSTICE WHITE: Was it the opinion of the court that this was irrelevant, whether he was indigent or not?

MR. DINEEN: Well, this is our understanding of the Court's opinion that whether he is indigent or not, there isn't the power to waive the surety bond. I think that's implicit --

MR.JUSTICE BLACK: Well, suppose it's not: if it's a mere theoretical thing why should we have it up here on a constitutional question?

MR. DINEEN: Well, the Appellate Court, as I understand it, makes it clear that there isn't any power to waive the surety bond; the surety bond must be complied with.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: But suppose there is not; suppose that he doesn't need it waived, would you still claim you could get a decision on a constitutional question --

MR. DINEEN: I don't understand, Your Honor.

MR.JUSTICE BIACK: Suppose it is not an essential, would you still claim that even though you are not indigent you could a constitutional question decided?

MR. DINEEN: If you are not indigent?

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Yes. There is no finding on it.

MR. DINEEN: Well, I --

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: How do you say you can get to that issue without having something -- some kind of finding, something to show that really he was indigent.

MR. DINEEN: Well, we have an affidavit.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: That's right, but is there any finding?

MR. JUSTICE WHITE: Could you make the Court make a finding on indigency if they thought it was irrelevant?

it, on the basis because indigency is irrelevant, because the surety bond is required, I think that raises the consitutional question. We're claiming that the person was indigent. The

Court has denied usour request to waive the surety bond, regardless of whether he's indigent. I think that's enough to raise the constitutional question.

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MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Suppose he's worth \$50,000; would you still say that the Court still had to consider that he was indigent?

MR. DINEEN: But we have an affidavit, Your Honor, that indicates that he is indigent.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK? But I understand you to say that it's irrelevant whether he was or not.

MR. DINEEN: That's what the lower court said.

That's what the Appellate Court has said, that they would not waive the surety bond because they didn't feel that the statute gave them the power to waive it.

MR. CHIFF JUSTICE BURGER: But, if equal protection, on your arguments, is an absolute requirement that there must be a right to appeal, I'm still having some difficulty seeing whether it makes any difference that there is another way to protect the Appellee in this case, the Housing Authority.

MR. DINEEN: Well, we make two arguments on the basis of equal protection. One is that this classification - that is to say, those who can put up the surety bond as opposed to those who cannot is without a reasonable basis. The standard equal protection test.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Well, does it make a

difference to your case whether he could or could not put up
the rent during the pendency of the appeals? Suppose he could
not pay the rent at all during the pendency of the appeal,
would your position be different here today?

or --

MR. DINEEN: Yes. I'm not going that far, Your
Honor. Our position is that we offered to pay that and we would
pay that and also we offered that if we failed to pay the
appeal could be dismissed forthwith, in any one month that we
did that. We're not saying -- we're not asking that he need
not pay anything at all. We say that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the landlord during the pendency
of the appeal. We might even have said if it were a matter of
state law that the state might have had a legitimate interest
during the previous time, but that's not part of any statement

MR. CHIEF JUSTIC BURGER: But, if your position is sound on the equal protection grounds, would wour posture not be the same if you didn't have a dime to pay into the treasury of the court or refused to pay it?

MR. DINEEN: Not precisely, I don't think, because we do recognize that there is a reasonable and legitimate interest that the state may have improtecting landowners after a judgment has been rendered in their favor during the pendency of the appeal. What we're saving is it's arbitrary that they manifest the kind of interest for this protection by, in effect,

requiring that five or six months be payable at once, at one time, which is impossible to somebody who can't afford it.

We're saying that the reasonable way and the mostobvious way that they would have protected the interest of the landlord was to require that he be paid month by month. That way access to the courts would be available to everybody.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: How many months did you pay?

MR. DINEEN: The requirement was that we put up the surety bond --

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: I know, but how much money. You said you tendered an offer to pay.

MR. DINEEN: We offered to pay month by month from the time of --

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: How many months did you offer to pay?

MR. DINEEN: We did, in fact, pay, Your Honor, five months during the course of the entire appeal.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Did you have toput in an affidavit of indigency, not being able to make the bond?

MR. DINEEN: The affidavit was that we couldn't make the bond; yes, Your Honor, but the rent was \$72 a month and each month from the time of the appeal for five months thereafter, each month we deposited \$72 with one or another court; either the district court or of our own circuit court, so that

there is now, in effect, in fact, \$360 is on deposit, which has been deposited; \$72 per month since the time of the appeal. We had been doing, actually what we offered to do when we offered to deposit money in escrow --

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN: I thought your claim on indigency was not that you couldn't raise the money to pay the rent as it came due month by month, but you had no liquid collateral which was a condition preceding to your being able to get a surety bond, wasn't it?

MR. DINEEN: That's correct.

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MR.JUSTICE HARLAN: Isn't that the indigency issue?
MR. DINEEN: That's correct; Your Honor.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Well, if that's the issue, why didn't you have the money which was liquid that you put into court? How can you claim in one breath that you don't have it and then pay it into court?

MR. DINEEN: We paid only \$72 a month; we didn't pay the full \$360 at one time. We were in possession for five months after the time of the appeal. We had offered in our motion to pay \$72 a month to the court. This was what was denied us. We were indigent to the extent — not that we couldn't pay the rent; we offered to pay the rent. We were indigent to the extent that we couldn't pay the \$500 to the surety which would have been required in order to put up the surety bond. We could pay our rent monthly.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: You mean they would make you pay \$500 in addition to putting up the money for the rent?

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MR. DINEEN: No, no, Your Honor; that would cover that -- if we put up the surety bond that would cover the landlord for that period of time during the pendency of the appeal.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: And you had the money to pay the bond just the same as you had the money to put into the court, didn't you?

MR. DINEEN: No, we didn't, Your Honor. We didn't have the full amount of the rent. We had the monthly rent; we didn't have the five months rent to put down all at one time. See, the surety bond required that we put down in lump five times or six times each months rent. It would be something like \$400 or \$500 in lump sum at that time. We didn't have that money; we did have enough money to pay the rent each month on the first of the month, or whenever, as it came due, in the amount of \$72, which is what we did and there is now \$360 available to the landlord. But we were only able to pay \$72 a month.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: If you had paid that before he sued you, you wouldn't have had to be sued, would you?

MR. DINEEN: We have defenses Your Honor, regardless of what we paid; we have defenses on the rent. The technicality of Connecticut law is that you pay on the first, according

8 to the lease. We had defenses that there had been an estab-2 lished practice that rent was accepted late; this is a housing 3 authority, sir. 13 MR. JUSTICE BLACK: How late? 5 MR. DIMEEN: Many times it varied, depending on the 6 tenant, like the 10th, the 15th, something like that, depending 7 on when the tenant had it. This was a housing authority; 8 these are low-income people --9 MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Is this a test case? 10 MR. DINEEN: I beg your pardon? 99 MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Is this no more than a test case? 12 MR. DINEEN: No, Your Honor --13 MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Do you really have a genuine 14 litigation here? 15 MR. DINEEN: Yes, Your Honor --16 MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Well, why couldn't they pay their 17 rent? 18 MR. DIMEEN: He could have paid the rent. The fact 19 was that the action was brought at early time, as I said, on 20 the 5th of May without giving him an opportunity to pay the 21 rent for May. In fact, prior to may, in April --22 MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Four days? 23 MR. DINEEN: I beg your pardon? 24 MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Four days -- three or four days? MR. DINEEN: Three or four days, Your Honor. 25

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: And you said they declined to take it?

MR. DINEEN: No, Your Honor, they started the action and they would not take it at that time, once they started the action. As I said in answer to Mr. Justice Stewart, they started the action on the basis of a nuisance, because this really was not, essentially, a nonpayment case. They wanted to evict this tenant originally on the basis of a nuisance. But, as we pointed out in our jurisdictional statement, there is a right to a writ of restitution in Connecticut, so that this tenant can get back into the Housing Authority should we win on appeal.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART: Where is the family now; are they in housing authority?

MR. DIMEEN: No, they are not, Your Honor. But, as we pointed out in our jurisdictional statement, Connecticut does allow a writ of restitution so that we can get back into the housing authority should we win our appeal.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN: I would like to ask you a question: did the subsequent proceeding in the Appellate Division, I guess it was -- did you get any review there of any kind on the merits of your claim?

MR. DINEEN: No, Your Honor; not at all.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN: None.

MR. DINEEN: Not at all.

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MR. JUSTICE HARLAN: And that was concerned with what only?

MR. DINEEN: The Appellate Division was concerned with the motion to dismiss the appeal and our motion to review the decision of the trial court in denying our motion to waive the surety bond, and they dismissed the appeal --

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN: I see.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mr. Dineen.
Mr. Ahern.

ORAL ARGUMENT BY F. MICHAEL AHERM, ASSISTANT
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CONNECTICUT AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE

MR. AHERN: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court; The State of Connecticut is not a named party to this appeal. However, because of the decision of the West Haven Housing Authority, which is the Appellee in this case, not to further brief or orally argue the issue raised by the Appellants in this case. The State of Connecticut filed a motion with this Court for permission to orally argue the issue and the Court graciously granted it; that's why I'm here this morning.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Well, now, what's the state's connection with the housing authority? Is this a Federal --

MR. AHERN: The Public Housing Authority is established by both state and Federal statutes.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: The state's interest is through that --

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MR. AMERN: And also the state's interest in protecing property owners who have been, shall I say, denigrated by the tenants by nonpayment of rent so that they have their rights to their own property and the retention of their own property.

Because of the adverse and destructive effect on civil process if this appeal is sustained, the State of Connecticut and 14 of her Sister States, have together entered into an amici curiae brief in this case in support of the Appellee's position. This is pursuant to Rule 42, Subsection 4 of the Rules of this Court.

If I may, in reviewing the file in this case one cannot help but be amazed at the zealous and vigorous advocacy of the Appellants' rights by counsel in the lower courts.

In the period between the initial notice to quite possession on July 12, 1967, until the trial on the merits was had on January 9, 1968, six judges of the Connecticut Circuit Court were called upon to rule on the same number of motions: six motions. The legal maneuvering of counsel for Appellants has followed a tortuous and very exhaustive path through both the State and Federal judicial systems.

Appellants have had their day in court, in the

Connecticut Circuit Court, in the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court and in the State upreme Court.

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United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and finally to this Honorable Court this morning. I count 36 separate entries in the files concerning legal action on the part of the Appellants; and if I may, I would like to analyze them for you and highlight certain operations and approaches by the Appellants.

They became tenants of the Housing Authority on November 1, 1966 under a written lease, a monthly written lease which was renewable each month at the rate of \$72 per month. The monthly rent was determined by an objective schedule, according to their ability to pay. Having withheld payment of the rent for the months of May, June and July of 1967 the Appellants were given a statutory notice to quit the premises on July 12, 1967.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Was the other case pending then?

MR. AMERN: The other case has never been dismissed.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Was it pending during that three-month period that you say they didn't pay their rent?

MR. AHERN: I believe it was, Your Monor.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, was he correct that when a case of dispossession, the case is pending, you don't usually

pay rent?

MR. AHERN: Your Honor, I don't understand that to be the situation. The initial summary process for the previous summary process action was brought for reasons other than the statutory reasons for a summary --

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, why wasn't it carried through?

MR. AHERN: I believe it wasn't carried through because the attorneys for the Housing Authority recognized the fact that it wasn't a proper motion and they then had other reasons for bringing the summary process action --

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Which was brought about by the first action?

MR. AHERN: No; they claim it was brought about by the first action --

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, that's their claim. So, then you filed the second one. Now, of course you've got them clearly not paying their rent.

MR. AHERN: Well, if you please, Justice Marshall, this is the claim of the Appellant that the second summary process action was brought --

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, it is not their claim that you have never withdrawn the first case; it is still there?

MR. AHERN: They have claimed that; yes, sir.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, is that true? 質 2 MR. AHERN: Yes, it is. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Why? 3 MR. AHERN: Since I am not the attorney for the A Westhaven Housing Authority, I can't answer that question. 5 MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, you are defending them 6 here; aren't you? MR. AHERN: I am defending them as an amicus filing 8 a brief on behalf of --9 MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: You are not responsible for 10 what they did, of course; I agree with you. 88 MR. AHERN: But you were right that the action was 12 never withdrawn; the first action. 13 MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: And you just don't know? 14 MR. AHERN: No. 15 The Appellants, not having complied with the notice 16 to quit, were given their -- were asked again to quit and when 17 they refused, a summary process action was instituted in the 18 Circuit Court for the State of Connecticut. That was on July 19 19th of 1967 which was actually three months after the first 20 withholding of the rent. 21 After the preliminary motions were disposed of, trial 22 on the merits was had on January 9 of 1968, which resulted in 23 judgment for possession for the Housing Authority. 24 Pursuant to Section 52-542 of the Connecticut General.

statutes, the Appellants instituted an appeal which was
promptly filed with the Appellate Division of the Circuit Cours
of Connecticut.

In lie of the surety bond required by the statute, they attached to their appeal a motion to waive surety bond on the grounds of alleged indigency. After a full hearing in the court, the same trial judge who had heard the case on the merits earlier, denied the motion because he found that the appeal was not taken in good faith, but for purposes of delay and obstruction.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART: Now, that's Judge Di Cenzo?

MR. AHERN: DiCenzo; yes, Your Honor.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART: And his denial is on Page 23 of this appendix, I gather and the full hearing to which you referred appears on pages 13 to 22 in the appendix; is that what we are talking about?

MR. AHERN: Yes, it is, Mr. Justice Stewart.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART: And this same Judge Di Cenzo had decided in favor of the Plaintiff landord on the merits?

MR. AHERN: They had a hearing on the merits on January 9, 1968; that's correct.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART: That hearing is not in this appendix; is it?

MR. AHERN: The hearing is not made a part of the transcript. This decision, I believe is.

Page 7. 2 MR. AHERN: Correct, Mr. Justice Stewart. 3 MR. JUSTICE STEWART: Is that right? Thank you. B MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: I can't find that the Court of 罚 Appeals of the Appellate Division or whatever you call it in 6 Connecticut adopted that, or relied upon that; did they? 8 MR. AHERN: It is mentioned in the decision of the 8 ourt of Appeals to the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court that the lower court found that the --10 MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: Is that the reason that they 99 affirmed? 12 MR. AHERN: That's our position, Your Honor; that 13 that's the reason they did affirm. 14 The Appellants filed a motion for review with the 15 Appellate Division of the Circuit Court from the Judge 16 DiCenza's denial of the motion. That motion was denied by the 17 Appellate Division and the appeal was dismissed. 18 Thereafter the Appellants filed a petition for cer-19 tification in the Circuit Court of the State of Connecticut 20 and that petition was dismissed, or denied. 21 The Housing Authority then moved the Appellate 22 Division of the Circuit Court to terminate the stay of execu-23 tion, which motion was granted. 24 Now, concurrently with these state legal activities 25

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MR. JUSTICE STEWART: The judgment is, I guess, on

the Appellants, in order to delay their eviction, filed an injunction action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. That court in a very lengthy decision dismissed the Federal complaint and the decision was promptly appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the Federal Complaint as most on January 10, 1968 and an appeal was taken to this Court which noted probable jurisdiction, on April 7, 1969.

I think it should be emphasized at this point that the Housing Authority finally obtained possession of the premises on July 26, 1968, which was a full year after the filing of the summary process action in the Circuit Court in Connecticut and more than 15 months after the tenants decided to withhold the payment of rent to the Authority.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART: What has happened to the \$360?

MR. AHERN: I believe it is still in the custody of the Court. The Housing Authority has never filed a motion to reach it and the Clerk is holding it, pending the ultimate determination of this case.

In addition to the zealous legal representation .

provided the Appellant by Counsel in the lower courts, they
have had the benefit of extensive briefs by their attorneys and
also by several organizations who have filed amici curiae
briefs in this Court.

The question presented by the Appellant's appeal

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is whether the surety bond requirement of 52-542 of the Connecticut General Statutes, on an appeal in a summary process action is violative of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause.

adopted in 1806. Prior to that time if a landowner desired to oust a tenant of post ession, he was required to file an action in ejectment in the courts, which was a slow and expensive procedure. The purpose of the summary process statute was to give the company owner an alternate means of recovering possession of his property from the tenant who was either unable or unwilling to pay his rent.

I want to emphasize that the Connecticut Summary

Process Statute is not a statute of general application. It's

applicability is limited to those cases where there is a lease
which has terminated, either by time or nonpayment of rent, or
where there is occupation, without right or privilege.

I also want to emphasize that the property owner utilizing the summary process procedure, does not recover rent. He only recovers possession of his property. In order to reach the unpaid rent he must bring a separate, subsequent legal action for monies owed.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: I have read this opinion three times now and maybe I'm just stupid, but I don't see any indication that the court Fuled that if this appeal had been

taken without any suggestion of dilatory tactics, that it would have been decided differently.

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MR. AHERN: All I can suggest, Justice Douglas is that I read it differently. I think we agree with Justice Harlan in his decision on their motion to suspend execution.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: I'm just talking about the opinion that the Appellate --

MR. AHERN: I realize and we read it differently; that's all I can say.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGALS: Well, sometime could you supply a supplement to a memorandum. I don't want to take your time.

MR. AHERN: We will be glad to do that.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: Underlining or marking the lines and paragraphs in this opinion and possibly indicating --MR. AHERN: We will do that, Justice Douglas.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: I want to ask you a question about that statement on Page 20, practically at the end of the page.

MR. AHERN: Page 20?

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: The Court says: "You told me that, that it was — I am satisfied that you are; I'm satisfied that all these monkey wrenches that are thrown in here have been successful so far in keeping them in here and not paying any rent." The Legislature must have had something in mind when it wrote here: "Unless it appears to the judge who tried the

case that the appeal was taken for the purpose of delay" -what was he quoting from? Can't you find it? 2 MR. AHERN: I can find it, Mr. Justice Black, but 3 I can't find where the quote is taken from. 13 MR. JUSTICE STEWART: What page? 55 MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Here on Page 20, in the last 6 paragraph. aig MR. AHERN: This is the colloquy between attorneys 8 for the Plaintiff and the Court. 9 MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: It doesn't appear to be in any 10 of the statutes that are cited. There may be other statutes. 99 MR. AHERN: No, it does not. 12 MR. JUSTICE BLACK: He purports to be reading from 13 a statute. 823 MR. AHERV: Yes. Actually his quotation is taken 15 from the Section 52-542 of the Connecticut Statutes. 16 MR. JUSTICE BLACK: That is; what he said? 17 Unless what? 83 MR. AHERN: Unless it appears to the judge who tried 19 the case --20 MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Well, what's the summary process 21 that that "unless" is based? 22 MR. AHERN: That no appeal shall be taken -- if I may 23 read the whole sentence then you may context your --24 MR. JUSTICE BLACK: All right. 25

2 MR. AHERN: "No appeal" -- and this is from the 2 statute. 3 MR. JUSTICE BLACK: All right. 13. MR. AHERN: "No appeal shall be taken except within 5 said period and if an appeal was taken within said period, 6 execution shall be stayed until the final determination of the 7 cause, unless it appears to the judge who tried the case that 8 the appeal was taken for the purpose of delay." MR. JUSTICE BLACK: All right, now we have findings 9 here that this was taken for the purpose of delay. Are you 10 arguing that that settles the case? That statute? 99 12 MR. AHERN: Yes, I am. MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Well, why doesn't it, if that's 13 the statute? 14 MR. AHERN: Why doesn't it? 15 MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Why does it not? Have they made 16 any argument as to --17 MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: I thought this was an Equal 18 Protection point, not whether the thing should be stayed or not; 19 but/the bond should have to be furnished. 20 MR. AHERN: If I may, Justice Douglas, this is the 21 position of the Appellants. We do not feel that there is a 22 substantial Federal question involved. 23 MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: I understand that, and there 20 are some members of the Court who feel the same way, perhaps; 25

but I am just trying to -- in the setting of this statute it doesn't say anything about "the bond will be required if the appeal is dilatory and will not be required if it is not."

MR. AHERN: No; it just makes provision for a surety bond in all cases.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: No, no; it just says, "It shall be stayed unless it appears," which is hardly relevant to the constitutional question presented here; is it?

MR. JUSTICE STEWART: That passage, as Mr. Justice Douglas suggests, if it's the one appearing on Page 4 of the Appellant's brief, has nothing at all to do with the requirement of a surety bond; has it; just nothing.

MR. AHERN: It just states that the bond shall be required.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Unless?

MR. AHERN: Unless it appears to the judge who tried the case that the appeal was taken for the purpose of delay."

In other words, the "unless" modifies the state clause.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART: Yes.

MR. AHERN: Not the surety bond clause.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: Unless I have a different set of the statutes than you have,--

MR. AHERN: You raised a point that hadn't occurred to me; that's the trouble, Justice Douglas.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Well, if the stay was

entered, Mr. Dineen, would a bond -- if the court decided this was not for delay, but was in good faith, could be then stay the execution of the judgment without a bond?

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MR. AHERN: Yes, he could; in our opinion.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: That would seem to me to be the crux of the case.

MR. AHERN: I think this is where the Appellants and the Housing Authority disagree, whether or not the surety bond in all cases must accompany an appeal. Certainly, since it is for the sole protection of the landlord, the landlord could waive the surety bond requirement, we feel.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE: Could the Court waive -- could the Court say no bond because the person was indigent and the appeal is in good faith?

MR. AHERN: We haven't been able to find a Connecticut case that provides that, Justice White. However, we have cited cases inthe appeal that once the matter is before the court that the court could waive the surety bond as long as it provided adequate protection forthe landlord.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE: Do you think the Appellate Division assumes that waiver of surety bond was permissible if the appeal was in good faith?

MR. AHERN: There seems to be language in that decision, as I recall it, that would lead me to believe so; yes.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: According to the laws of Connecticut could the court waive a cause bond; surety bond, couldn't it?

MR. AHERN: Yes.

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MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: And wouldn't those come over here, too; it would seem to say that?

MR. AHERN: Justice Marshall, I couldn't say whether they would be appealed to this court. The way things are going today I think everything is appealed up here.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: But the problem I really have is why the argument is made by the Appellate that the court could not legally waive the surety bond.

MR. AHERN: I think that is/because of the word "shall" in this statute and they are referring to the same — this is the statute under which they have appealed to this court and which they claim is violative of the 14th Amendment; the bond on appeal and stay of execution.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHAL: Well, do you agree that "shall' means that?

MR. AHERN: I think it means "shall" unless the court feels that there are equitable considerations that should be taken into consideration by the court; either the court can use its good offices to have the landlord waive the surety bond requirement, which I think could be done, because the sole purpose of the surety bond is to protect the landlord's interest.

7 Then I think also that if the court felt that the 2 circumstances in the particular case warranted, it could waive the surety bond requirement as long as some means were pro-3 1 vided for the protection of the landlord. 50 MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: But you do see an equal protection problem if "shall" means what it says; don't you? 8 7 MR. AHERN: That's the crux of this case this 8 morning, I believe, Mr. Justice Marshall. 9

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MR. JUSTICE STEWART: As I understand it you don't assume have any precedents on it; is that correct? Is that fair to/

MR. AHERN: We have had cases in other jurisdictions

MR. JUSTICE STEWART: Yes; in other jurisdictions.

MR. AHERN: They would seem to give the courts that sauthority and we feel they apply to this situation also, but we do not have any Connecticut authority.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART: The only Connecticut authority, I guess, is the Appellate Division's opinion in this case; isn't it?

MR. AHERN: It's breaking new ground, Mr. Justice Stewart, I believe.

The West Haven Housing Authority, as I stated earlier, is a Federal and State instrumentality. It is set up by state and Federal statutes; it's financed by public bond issue and by grants from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, which controls its Operations. The income

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derived from the tenant rentals is used to meet its obligations to bondholders and to continue to meet the normal operating expenses of the Authority.

In defending the summary process action in the trial court the Appellants advanced seven special defenses, all of which were procedural; and all of which were considered by the trial court and evidently considered meritless.

It is obvious from the reading of the first special defense, and the trial brief that the reason the Appellants, the tenants, determined to withhold payment of rent from the Authority was that they were miffed because of the previous summary process action instituted by the Authority which was not prosecuted to effect.

The trial court in entering judgment for possession of the premises, expressly found that the Appellants had not paid rent for a period of eight months from April 1967 through December of 1967, which was immediately prior to the trial on the merits. And the trial court made the following significant statement in its memorandum of decision, dated January 16, 1968, and I would like to quote it:

"The record in this case clearly shows what can happen to a summary proceeding where the process is abused by dilatory tactics, defense is interposed to delay or obstruct the proceeding, and every effort made to delay a trial of the case on the merits." That can be found inthe record appendix at Page 5. by the trial court, that is on January 19, 1968, the same trial judge heard arguments addressed to the Appellant's motion to waive surety bond. After argument the trial judge found, and again I quote: "This appeal is being taken for the purpose of delay" and the motion was denied.

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Bond-posting requirements on the privilege of obtaining judicial relief are found in both the state and Federal statutes, and this Court has consistently held that the 14th Amendment to the Constitution does not prevent a state from prescribing reasonable and appropriate conditions precedent to the seeking of judicial relief in its courts, so long as the basis of the distinction is real and the conditions imposed have a reasonable relationship to a legitimate object.

Applying this standard to the Surety Bond Provision of Section 52-542, we submit, it is clear that the statute prescribes a reasonable and appropriate condition with a legitimate object in view; that is the protection of the land-lord.

We, therefore, submit that the statute is consitutional on its face.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE: You think it's unquestioned under the Connecticut statutes that to take any appeal, whther whether frivolous or nonfrivolous, the bond is required?

MR. AHERN: In this case; yes, sir -- in this case --

MR. JUSTICE WHITE: Is just isn't a question of getting a sta of execution?

MR. AHERN: No. We take the position that an appeal bond is required.

MR.JUSTICE WHITE: And that if the appeal bond is not filed, there is no appeal; not just that the order of eviction is executed?

MR. AHERN: The surety bond is essential to the appeal.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE: In any event?

MR. AHERN: That's correct.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE: But you think that what you said a while ago, that you thought the --

MR. AHERN: I'm talking about the language of the statute at this point. Then the question comes in whether, since both law and equity are fused in our court system, whether the court using equitable considerations itself, waive --

MR. JUSTICE WHITE: And you say that it could?

MR. AHERN: We feel that it could; yes, Mr. Justice
White.

MR.JUSTICE WHITE: And that it would, I take it, unless they thought --

MR. AHERN: IN the context of the proper case where the situation is such that the tenant, for a valid reason, has

not paid the rent or cannot pay the rent, we think that it would. This case, we submit is not a case --

MR. JUSTICE WHITE: If they had not paid the rent or put up the bond.

MR. AHERN: Pardon me?

MR.JUSTICE WHITE: I suppose that the court could decide if there was some valid reason for not paying rent, but for putting up the bond, it was found that he couldn't afford to put up the bond --

MR. AHERN: But he coul' continue to pay the rent as they claim in this case.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE: Yes. You think that in such a circumstance the court could waive the requirement of a bond?

MR. AHERN: Yes, we do, Your Honor; although we haven't found any Connecticut citations, we have cited cases in other jurisdictions.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE: But it certainly is not in the teeth of the statute.

MR. AHERN: It is in the teeth of the statute as far as its language is concerned; yes, Mr. Justice White.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: The trial judge seems to have, at least given some consideration to the idea that if he first found that the appeal was taken in good faith and not for purposes of delay, then he would consider the question, the question of the alternative of paying the rent into the court.

At the top of Page 22 in your appendix it says: "If they can", referring to the execution and the stay, "then I won't give any further thought to the alternative plan of substituting the Clerk or the Legal Assistance Association to hold the rent in the interim."

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MR. AHERN: That is correct, Your Honor. That evidently is the position of Judge Dicenda of the trial court. and we agree with it.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Now, the Appellate Court didn't approach that question?

MR.AHERN: I don't think it had to, Mr. Chief

Justice, because of the fact thatit went along with the finding
of the trial court that the action was instituted for purposes
of delay.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Well, at least time, by
my count here, the trial judge refers permanently and rather
vigorously at times, to the reasons why he thought this appeal
was taken for purposes of delay, but as Justice Douglas pointed
out, the Appellate Division never mentioned that. I would
like -- I would hope when you file the supplemental memorandum
that Justice Douglas suggested, that you give us your view of
why something which the trial court emphasized so much and so
often is not referred to by the Appellate Court.

MR. AHERN: We will attempt to analyze it to that effect.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: As I understand it, Mr. Ahern, you are going to try to demonstrate that Justice Jacobs' opinion -- or is it Judge Jacobs --

MR. AHERN: Judge Jacobs.

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MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: -- addressed itself, or addresses itself to the stay issue in good faith; is that right?

MR. AHERM: If I may --

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: Is that what you are going to do? In other words you are telling us that we ought to read this opinion as not addressed only to whether the appeal had to be dismissed for want of filing a bond, but also that the opinion addresses itself to whether or not a stay was properly denied because the appeal was taken in bad faith; is that right?

MR. AHERN: That is correct, Mr. Justice Brennan.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: All right.

MR. AHERN: Certainly the plight of the indigent tenants who are unable to pay their bills elicits the sympathy and compassion of all peoples; however we submit that some sympathy and compassion should be reserved for the real property owner who must meet his mortgage obligations and other financial obligations or risk the loss of his property. All landlords are not wealty; and all tenants are not indigent.

And most property owners cannot afford the luxury of a tenant

who is either unwilling or unable to pay his rent.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: I suppose this Housing Authority, like most public housing authorities, has a waiting list of other poor people who are, or claim to be, eliqible for occupancy here? Is there a showing in the record on that?

MR. AHERN: Mr. Chief Justice, I don't know whether the record shows it, but certainly I think the Court could take judicial notice of the fact that there aren't sufficient housing accommodations for the poor and that there would be a list of people waiting; and further take notice of the fact that the Housing Authority depends on the tenants' payment of monthly rents in order to meet its obligations to bondholders and itsfinancial obligations in the continuing operation of the Authority.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: I still have great difficulty on landlord law, when they paid this \$72 a month into court.

It's all the landlord was entitled to; it was in court and anybody that failed to pay it, they lost everything.

MR. AHERN: Well, Mr. Justice Marshall, I think the record will show that the offer to make payment in the court was made at the time that the hearing was held on the motion to waive surety bond which was nine months after they stopped paying rent. The offer was to pay current rent into the court; not the back nine months which they had not paid.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, then, am I wrong that at

that stage if they put up a surety bond they didn't have to pay that nine months behind; did they?

MR. AHERN: Not in a summary process action. A separate action would have had to been brought by the landlord

MR. JUSTICE MARSHAL: Well, that's what I'm saying. as of this the alternative was the surety bond, or \$72 a month into court.

MR. AHERN: That's correct, Your Honor.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: And it was solely for the protection of the landlord; and why did he have to have that surety bond when he was assured of his rent? \$72 a month.

MR. AHERN: Why would he have to? I believe the reason the court would not accept the recommendation of the attorneys for the Appellants was the fact -- and I think the court asked the direct question of the attorneys, whether they would make payments of the nine months in the arrears, and they said they would not; they would only take of the future payments.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, the surety bond wouldn's cover that nine months in arrears, either?

MR. AREEN: No, it would not.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, so far as that particular point, the nine months arrears, was out of the picture.

MR. AHERN: Well, I think this all comes into the fact that the trial judge found that there were dilatory

tactics used, because normally a summary process action takes considerably less than seven months to have a hearing on the merits.

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MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Oh, I've seen them in less than two hours.

MR. AHERN: Not in Connecticut. They have a hearing in Connecticut; a full hearing on the merits, Justice Marshall.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART: Actually, Mr. Ahern, is the action of the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court of April 11, 1968, appearing on Page 66 of the appendix, throws any light on the fact of the question of Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Chief Justice on a precedent, that is: whether or not the Appellate Division decided the case on the -- on an absolute and inflexible basis or whether it adopted, in part at least, the reasoning of the trial court?

MR.AHERN: Well, certainly on Page 67 the paragraph which starts on that page, they mention that they briefly review the proceedings in the Court below and I would assume that a review of those proceedings, even though they might not mention it here, would take into consideration the activities in the Court below, and the finding of the trial judge.

judgment or memorandum of decision before it at the time it reviewed the case.

MR.JUSTICE STEWART: This order here has to do with

finally, the vacation of the stay of execution; does it not?
The one appearing on Page 66?

MR. AHERN: Yes, it does, Your Honor.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART: And they do review in some length the dilatory -- what they refer to as the dilatory and obstructive tactic.

MR. AHERN: That is correct, on Page 67 and thereafter, actually.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: At 69 of the opinion the Appellate Court also notes, apparently, that some emphasis, as I read it, upon a review of the whole matter. Now, I suppose depending on what the author meant by the "whole matter," the finding of the trial judge on the lack of good faith, becomes more or less important --

MR. AHERN: I would trust that the statement of the trial judge would be given its widest application in that connection, Mr. Chief Justice.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE: Thank you

MR. AHERN: Thank you very much.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: The case is submitted; thank you gentlemen, for your submissions.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 o'clock a.m. the argument in the above-entitled matter was concluded)