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# Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1969

Supreme Court, U. S. APR 7 1970

In the Matter of:

Docket No. 595

LOUIS S. NELSON, Warden,

Petitioner,

VS.

JOHN EDWARD GEORGE,

Respondent.

SUPREME COURT, U.S.
MARSHALIS OFFICE
APR 7 2 09 PH 770

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Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

March 31, 1970

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g.	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	October Term, 1969
3	AND BEE BEE AND THE
A.	LOUIS S. NELSON, Warden,
5	Petitioner,
6	vs. No. 595
7	JOHN EDWARD GEORGE,
8	Respondent.
9	X
10	Washington, D. C. March 31, 1970
4 4	
12	The above-entitled matter came on for argument at
13	10:35 a.m.
14	BEFORE:
15	WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice
16	WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice
17	WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice
18	BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice
19	APPEARANCES:
20	LOUISE H. RENNE, Esq.
21	Deputy Attorney General of California
2.2	San Francisco, California Counsel for Petitioner
23	GEORGE A. CUMMING, JR., Esq.
24	111 Sutter Street, Suite 1100 San Francisco, California 94104
25	Counsel for Respondent

oK

### PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: The first case for argument is No. 595, Nelson against George.

Mrs. Renne, you may proceed.

ARGUMENT OF LOUISE H. RENNE, ESQ.

#### ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MRS. RENNE: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court
This case arises on a petition for writ of certiorari
filed by the Warden of California State Prison from a decision
rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. The Court below held the jurisdiction existed in
United States District Court for the North District of California
to entertain a petition for writ of habeus corpus filed by a
California prisoner serving a California sentence in California
in order to challenge the constitutionality of an unrelated
North Carolina conviction sentence of which he has yet to serve.

The Court below held that the California warden was an agent for the State of North Carolina and the proper party respondent to defend the action.

It is respectfully submitted that the question raised in this case is essentially one and that is whether habeus corpus relief is presently available to a California prisoner in California, who seeks to challenge the constitutionality of a sentence which has been imposed by another state.

Q Mrs. Renne, does the State of California have any

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option when another state places a detainer on a prisoner who is incarcerated in a California institution?

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have to answer this question in two ways, Your Honor. If another state is not a party to the agreement on detainers, then in order for that prisoner to stand trial in another state requires an executive agreement followed by extradition proceedings.

Clearly in this case the state has a reserve clause.

Under the agreement on detainers a prisoner, if a prisoner invokes the agreement on the face of the statute, the State of California is required to send that prisoner back to the other state. If, however, it is the other state that initiates proceedings, there is a reserve clause detained by the Governor may or the prisoner may disapprove and not be willing to go to the other state.

We believe, Your Honor, that the answer to the first question we have raised is clearly in the negative. If the Court should, however, decide that habeus corpus relief is presently available, then there is another question which is raise by this case, and that is what is the appropriate forum in which to bring an action of this kind? The district of confinement or the district of sentencing.

The facts of this case are that the petitioner below,

John Edward George, was in April of 1964 convicted upon his plea

of guilty to first degree robbery in the San Francisco Superior

Court. He was sentenced to state prison and under the California indeterminate sentence law, that is, indeterminate to five years to life sentence. Following his conviction, the petitioner was confined at San Quentin Prison and detainers were placed against him by three states — the State of Kansas, the State of Nevada and the State of North Carolina.

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At this time North Carolina and California were parties to the agreement on detainers which, as I have indicated, if a prisoner seeks to stand trial in another party state, he may invoke the procedures under the agreement, and that is what happened in this case.

Accordingly, in March of 1966, George was temporarily released from custody in California to stand trial in North Carolina. After one mistrial George was convicted of robbery in February of 1967 in the North Carolina State Courts, A sentence of 12 years to 15 years was imposed and, as George alleged below this sentence will not begin to run until he is in North Carolina.

George was returned to California in February of 1967 and in September of 1967 the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. In December of 1967 George filed a petition for writ of habeus corpus in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of California.

His first petition was captioned John Edward George versus the State of North Carolina, and the District Judge

dismissed the petition for failure to name proper party respondent. Thereafter, George recaptioned his petition, naming the warden of San Quentin Prison as an agent for the State of North Carolina and naming the warden of North Carolina Prison "name unknown."

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Of California dismissed the petition on the basis of this Court's decision in McNally v. Hill, under which the Court had held that a prisoner must be confined under the sentence he is seeking to challenge in order to attain habeus corpus relief.

Thereafter, a certificate for probably cause to appeal was granted by the District Court, but prior to opening briefs being filed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals this Court's decision in Peyton v. Rowe was decided. And in Peyton v. Rowe this Court held that a Virginia prisoner could challenge the constitutionality of a consecutive sentence imposed by the State of Virginia.

On the basis of Peyton v. Rowe George filed a motion to remand the proceedings to the District Court. We were given notice of the motion and as our first appearance filed an opposition to the motion to remand and moved to dismiss the proceedings on the grounds that Peyton v. Rowe should not be extended to the interstate case, that the California warden was not a proper party to respondent in this habeus corpus action, that a North Carolina official who might be a proper party respondent was not before

the Court, service of process had not been obtained and could not be obtained and, accordingly, the District Court, Northern District of California, was without jurisdiction to proceed.

Q Did you try to vouch, so to speak, or give notice to the North Carolina authorities of this proceeding?

A Yes, Your Honor -- although it is not in the record

-- we have been in contact with North Carolina's Attorney General's

office since the inception of this case. Their position is,

although it is not a matter of record -- but their position is

that habeus corpus relief is not presently available in a case

of this kind.

Q I suppose that is based on the theory that the Court in California can have no jurisdiction over the State of North Carolina?

A That is correct, Your Honor. They have not been served with process, we are not aware of any way in which they could be. Nevertheless, the Court below disagreed.

Q Do you what anything else, though, in this case than that the California authorities cease giving any effect or recognition to the North Carolina judgment?

A Well, it is our position that while we recognize there is a conviction, we give no effect to it. So that habeus corpus relief is not presently available in any court. We do take the position that it is only after this Court decides, which we strongly urge that it not do, that there is custody within the

meaning of habeus corpus statute, it is only then that this 8 Court need reach the question of what is the appropriate forum. 2 If it decides that custody is existent in this case, it 3 is only then it need decide whether ---13 Q Yes, but the threshold is the only issue between 5 California and the prisoner -- is the only issue whether Cali-6 fornia authorities should continue to recognize the North Caro-7 lina judgment? 8 No, Your Honor. A 9 0 Why? 10 The prisoner is seeking to set aside the North 11 Carolina conviction. 12 Q Why? What dispute is there between him and the 13 California authorities? 14 It is our position there is no dispute. 15 But he says it makes a difference in terms of his 16 parole, things like that. 17 A Your Honor, there is no showing in this record that 18 his parole is affected ---19 Well, there is no showing. 20 --- by the North Carolina conviction. 21 But those were his allegations, weren't they? 22 What he said in the Court below was that the fact 23 that there was a conviction outstanding assuredly affected his 24 parole. As a matter of fact, that is not California policy and 25

we submitted a policy statement on the adult authority in the

Where there is a conviction outstanding in another state, particularly where that state happens to be the place of residence, primary place of residence, of the prisoner, we will release -- it is our policy we will release the prisoner on parole earlier than might otherwise be the case.

This case, Your Honor, this is our policy. It is not like Peyton v. Rowe, where in Peyton v. Rowe you had consecutive sentences imposed by one state and there was a statute which said that the sentences should be treated as one for purposes of parole eligibility. You do not have that kind of statute in this case.

- Q Was there a hearing in this case?
- A No, Your Honor. What happened is ---
- Q Well, if you have an allegation and a complaint in a petition that the North Carolina judgment does make a difference in terms of the prisoner's treatment by the warden of the California Penitentiary, and did the state respond to it? Did they file a return?

A What happened, Your Honor, we were not given notice of the proceedings until the Ninth Circuit. We filed an opposition to the motion to remand, stating that the only sentence that this man was serving was a California sentence.

Q Yes, but let us assume for the moment that it did

make a difference, that his allegations were absolutely true, that the detainer did make a difference in his treatment by the California authorities to his harm. Wouldn't you think that that would state some kind of case for controversy between him and the California authorities?

A No, Your Honor.

Q Why not?

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A Because, in order for habeus corpus relief to be available, he must be in custody in violation of the sentence he is seeking to challenge. The California sentence was imposed in 1964. Service of that sentence makes no difference whether he was acquitted later in North Carolina or not. Whether or not

O Do you think -- what if he did not bring a habeus corpus action? He just sued the warden to restrain him from taking into account the North Carolina judgment. Do you suppose he could do that?

A I don't think so, Your Honor.

Q Why not?

A Because -- I don't know what his theory of action could be. If what he was challenging is the reasonableness of prison policy in considering any charge or even a past conviction in determining whether or not he is more likely as a prisoner to escape, then what he would be challenging is the reasonableness of prison policy.

But as yet there is no constitutional right to parole,

there is no constitutional right of level of confinement rather than another.

In any event, what you are talking about in this case is the reasonableness of prison policy. If we are going to get into the questions about whether or not the California imprisoning authorities can consider the fact that the man has been convicted in another state in determining whether or not he is eligible for minimum custody, then, Your Honor, we respectfully submit that you are also going to have to face the question as to the past conviction situation, because if the prison authorities consider past convictions fully served in determining whether he maybe is more likely to escape or whether he is eligible for minimum custody, then the writ of habeus corpus, the business of the Court, is going to be substantially expanded.

We think there is a decided difference between where you have sentences lumped together by one state and where you are talking about sentences imposed by another state.

Q So you think the only issue in this case really is whether a prisoner detained in one state under a sentence by that state may at any time, whether sentences of other states make any difference or not in his treatment by the prison, whether that prisoner is in prison in State A, may raise it, in that state the validity of some convictions in State B that who has not served yet, that is the issue?

A Yes, Your Honor.

I would like to make clear that this case is not like a case where California has used the conviction of another state as a prior conviction to increase the length of confinement or to render habitual confinement of statutes available. That is not this case at all.

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Q What if it were the case? Let us assume that the North Carolina conviction had been before the California conviction and that conviction had been used by California as a basis for habitual criminal conviction or to enhance sentencing and he was sent to jail in California and then he brings his writ of habeus corpus to have declared unconstitutional the prior conviction of North Carolina.

A Well, California is itself clear, Your Honor, but where this state is attempting to increase the length of statutory service, then in California he may challenge the out-of-state conviction.

O Now how does this action go forward? Does it go forward as to the extent evident in North Carolina is essential or witnesses from there are essential? Both sides must get the witnesses there, don't they?

A It is a burden of proof on the state, Your Monor.

But in this case, Your Monor, California is attempting to use

the conviction for their own purposes. But we are not attempting

to use the sentence of North Carolina for any purpose at all.

Q You are, in effect, saying there is no case for

1 | controversy here at all between you and the prisoner?

A That is part of the problem, Your Honor. That is part of the problem, but ---

Q What else are you saying?

A Most importantly, Your Honor, we are saying that Section 2241(c)(3) of the Federal Habeus Corpus statute provides that the writ of habeus corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless he is in custody in violation of the Constitution. He is in custody under the California sentence. He is not challenging that sentence.

That is why we say that custody under the habeus corpus statute is lacking. We think that the lack of custody is particularly emphasized by the Court's holding below that we are the agents for North Carolina.

Q Well, letting the Constitution and the law aside, why didn't California turn him loose and let North Carolina feed him?

A Well, the record does not show what the facts are.

But the facts are that this man was given a parole date, an
earlier parole date, but there was a subsequent occurrence. It
is a matter of dispute; the state says one thing and the prisoner
says another. But there was another occurrence in which his
parole date was canceled.

Q But I take it your position is that the California
District Court has jurisdiction over the body but not the subject

matter.

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A Our position is, Your Honor, that the District

Court has jurisdiction over the prisoner for anything connected

with the California sentence. But Mr. George has never challenged

the constitutionality of the California sentence.

- Q Well, he cannot challenge it in North Carolina.
- A No. It is our position, Your Honor, that -- excuse me, challenge California sentence in North Carolina?
- Ω No. He cannot challenge the North Carolina sentence in North Carolina as long as he is in jail in California.
- A Well, he has not attempted to exhaust his state remedies in North Carolina.

Now two of the issues he has raised in his writ of habeus corpus in the California Court have already been determined by the North Carolina Supreme Court.

Q But you don't want to rely on that, do you?

A No. Although we think certainly since he has never made any attempt to have his third issue determined by the North Carolina Supreme Court, then his petition below -- he first alleged that the North Carolina sentence was imposed outside the time limits provided by the agreement on detainers, so that the North Carolina Court was without jurisdiction to proceed and that was a deprivation of due process.

His second ground was also related to his right to a speedy trial. These were the two issues that the North Carolina

1 | Court determined.

It was in his petition for writ of habeus corpus in the California Court that he made the determination -- raised the issue of knowing use of perjured testimony. We think that the practical difficulties of the Court's decision below emphasize the lack of custody.

The Court has held that California is an agent for North Carolina, but it is respectfully submitted that the agency could note some sort of voluntary acceptance of authority, and we have never assented to defending a North Carolina conviction. We are unwilling to do so.

- Q What do you visualize -- what is your ultimate holding of the Court of Appeals, that the jurisdiction is in California over this proceeding?
  - A That is correct, Your Honor.
- Q What do you visualize happening when you come back to the District Court? Let me put a specific question to you.

Supposing California said to North Carolina, we give you an opportunity to come in to defend and if you do not choose to do so, we will erase the detainer. Is that foreclosed under the Court of Appeals decision?

- A Well, the Court of Appeals has never said exactly what our obligation was ---
- Q No, but I am putting it to you. What do you think about California's right to take that position vis-a-vis North

Carolina and say if you do not choose to come in, we have got no quarrel with this man ourselves. It is your judgment that is being attacked here. He is in our custody, but if you do not choose to defend him, we will erase your detainer.

A Well, certainly honoring of a detainer is a question solely of accommodation. We do not have to honor a detainer, but even if we did not give effect to the detainer, there is an interesting fact actually in this case, and that is that the State of Kansas still has a detainer filed against this man and the State of North Carolina knows that.

When and if this man is released, he could be released to stand trial in Kansas. As far as we know, there is nothing to preclude the State of North Carolina then going to Kansas.

We can have their detainer honored there. Or if that result would be the result we did not honor the detainer, what the Court actually would be asking us to do is give a greater right to a detainer than we can give, or to review a conviction which we can give in an extradition proceeding where an extradiction warrants, or where extradition proceedings are instituted in the California Courts.

We cannot look at the underlying reasons for that extradition warrant. It could be we disagree. But we cannot do that under law. We cannot look at the underlying facts.

North Carolina officials, but we are not so sure that they will

be willing to come out. No. 1, ---

Q Could you just give them that opportunity and then say if you don't care to come in, we are not taking the responsibility for this? We will remove your detainer.

A I suggest, Your Honor, that if the man goes into another state, North Carolina possibly could get ---

Q But as far as California is concerned, by taking that procedure and refusing to become the agent for North Carolina in your own Court to defend their conviction of this man, you say, "All right, if you do not want to come in, we are not going to honor your detainer." Wouldn't you have the right to do that?

A Well, as I say, Your Honor, honoring a detainer is solely a matter of commodote, but it could be North Carolina would not have a detainer, All a detainer is a request to be notified of the man's release.

Q Mrs. Renne, if you indulged in what seems to be this very cavalier treatment of a sister state, you probably could expect reciprocity the next time the situation were reversed, could you not?

A We could, Your Honot.

Q And if so, what would be left of the doctrine of commodote?

A Well, I think it is a very serious problem, Your Honor. I think what the Court below has ask the state literally

to fight among themselves. And the practical problem of transporting records and witnesses across country, even assuming you

could get the witnesses. For example, if a deputy district

attorney tried this case below and is no longer with the North

Carolina State Government, then we don't know how North Carolina

could get that deputy district attorney in a California Court,

that deputy district attorney was unwilling.

From the prisoner's point of view this result is untenable. He is asking a California judge to review North Carolina's conviction. The California judge can't be familiar with North Carolina procedure. A california counsel, no matter how competent, he doesn't know where to look for the records, can't know what witnesses to call, can't get the witnesses even before the California court.

We have not suggested that there is another form available, because this Court's decision Ahrens v. Clark and the judicional rules of habeus corpus, you must bring your petition, if at all, in the district of confinement.

But we think bringing the suit in the district of sentencing has tremendous practical problems, too. You have the problems of escape, you have the problems of the confining state might be unwilling to have that prisoner go to the other state.

You have the expense problems and there are no funds we are aware of to provide for the transportation of prisoner or his counsel across the country.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mrs. Renne. 00 Mr. Cumming. ARGUMENT OF GEORGE A. CUMMING, JR. 3 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT 4 MR. CUMMING: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the 5 Court: 6 I am George Cumming of San Francisco, counsel for 7 respondent John Edward George. I think having in mind the con-8 siderations which led this Court to its unanimous opinion in Peyton v. Rowe two terms ago, we are here today to consider 10 whether or not respondent George is entitled to a timely and 0 7 therefore meaningful hearing on the constitutional claims that 12 he makes with respect to the North Carolina conviction. 13 You are not suggesting this case is on all fours 14 with the case you are referring to? 15 A No, I am not, Mr. Chief Justice. There is a dif-16 ference obviously. Peyton v. Rowe dealt with a prisoner facing 17 consecutive sentences imposed by one state. This involves two 18 states. 19 I would say at the outset, however, that this decision 20 has been presented to four Courts of Appeal and in that number, 21

I think some 16 judges, and none of those 16 who considered the heretofore had considered that to be a meaningful distinction between Peyton and this case, particularly with regard to Peyton's discussion and basis of the desirability and, indeed,

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perhaps a necessity of an early hearing on these claims, lest the records and witnesses and evidence be lost by the passage of time.

Q It is not only the fact that these are two states' convictions which distinguishes this from Peyton, but there is one other distinction, and that is that in this case, unlike Peyton against Rowe, the Court in which the petition for habeus corpus was filed was not the Court where the person was confined, which is a distinction, is it not, of some importance? Do you think perhaps it seems hyper-technical, but when I went to law school, it was thought in order for a court to have habeus corpus jurisdiction, the prisoner had to be confined somewhere within the jurisdiction of that court.

A And he is presently confined within the jurisdiction of the District Court of the Northern District of California.

Q But it is not that confinement that he is attacking.

A That is correct, sir. I suppose it is a question of whether or not he is presently confined along the lines of Peyton v. Rowe.

Q Mr. Cumming, what is the significance of the detainer in this sense, if I may clear this up in my own mind. Suppose California of its own volition, not under any pressure of any court or any other source, just simply said, "We no longer accept detainers from anybody."

Does that prevent the State of North Carolina from

1 taking this fellow as soon as he is released from custody in
2 California. What is the process? What would stop them from doing
3 that independent of a detainer?

A I think independent of -- I think we have to go back in time in a case like this. California and North Carolina are parties to the detainer agreement. Pursuant to that agreement North Carolina attained temporary custody of respondent in order to try him.

The process for trying him absent, while he was serving the California sentence absent this detainer agreement, I am not sure. It seems to me that some of the problems in this respect for Kansas cy the Court's decision last year in Smith v. Huey.

Q But part of this arrangement is to have something more flexible than extradition, isn't it?

A That is correct. The respondent's application under this detainer agreement to be released to North Carolina for trial is deemed to be a waiver of extradition by him. Both to go to North Carolina to be tried and to return to North Caroline to serve any sentence there imposed, the detain agreement states that specifically. I believe it is Article III-E.

Q Well, suppose we would come to the day when California's sentence is running out. You come to that last day.

Could California hold him in custory for even one hour after the sentence had expired in order to accommodate another state?

A I believe that it could under the detainer agreement.

The agreement states that the warden of, in this case, California has a lawful and mandatory duty to give over the person of any prisoner whenever required by the detainer agreement.

Q But isn't that at the expiration of the sentence?

A Yes.

Ω Are you suggesting it could be two weeks, two months, six months later?

A I suppose if North Carolina didn't show up, having previously been notified. Apparently there is an administrative provision for the notification in advance of the expiration and if they did not show up and inquiries failed to discover why, I suppose he could with impunity at that point discharge the prisoner.

Q Well, if he didn't discharge him, the prisoner would have a pretty good habeus corpus claim, wouldn't he?

A He certainly would. At that point no authority,

I would think, would there be for the warden to hold him. I suppose from the detainer agreement you could probably infer some sort

of authority for short time to accommodate the agents of North

Carolina to make the trip to California and pick him up.

Perhaps it would require that they show up on the release day, so as to take him into their own custody immediately as he passed through the gates of San Quentin. I am not sure, but it would come perhaps to a split second.

In any event, this case involves a situation where at

on the record thus far and on the detainer agreement, the warden is bound to give respondent over to North Carolina upon the completion of his valid sentence in California.

Q What about Kansas?

A Kansas has a detainer outstanding at this time on an untried charge. That detainer may or may not be in existence at the time that respondent is released from California custody.

As petitioner has noted, ---

Q But assume it is, what do you do? Draw lots?

A Petitioner suggests they honor it on the basis of that detainer first recieved, and I guess if the Kansas detainer was first received, I guess he would honor that first and release the petitioner to Kansas.

Q Well, if the Kansas one is first, then clearly your case is in trouble.

A I suppose it is in this sense. That if we remain in the situation where it is the workings discretion as to what to do about these detainers, that is, if we stay out of court, as the warden urges that we ought to do, then we are in a difficult situation.

But this is one of the reasons we would like to get this matter on for hearing in the District Court, to find out the validity of this North Carolina sentence and then approach the District Court for an appropriate order to deal with these complicated problems.

1 O How did the North Carolina trial come up? Was that 2 at his agreement?

A That was at his request under the detainer agreement.

Q Under his request. He left California, went to
North Carolina, was tried in North Carolina, came back to California and now he wants to attack what he brought on himself.

A Yes, he does. He wants to attack it, may I say, at a time in which he feels that his attack can be meaningful, that is, at a time when the evidence and witnesses and so forth may be available to him.

Q In California?

A This obviously presents a problem to him. This relates to the second question that petitioner suggests is posed in this case, and that is the appropriate forum.

Under Ahrens against Clark, however, if there is any relief available to him, it is only in the District Court he is now confined.

Now if ---

Q Excuse me. Almost ten years ago it so happens I wrote an opinion for the Court which you may be familiar with, the North Carolina Post-Conviction Hearing Act, which I learned at that time, unless it has been repealed, was an extremely enlightened and progressive piece of legislation. But I don't know whether it applies if a person is not incarcerated in the

state.

As I remember, however, it requires that the petitioner, very much like Section 2255 of the United States Code, Title XXVIII, if the petition is filed with the sentencing court, that would be available to your client, wouldn't it or would it?

- A I am not sure that that is so.
- Q The North Carolina General Statutes, Section 15-217 through 222, I think. Are you familiar with that?
  - A I am not familiar with that.
- Q It would be well for you to become familiar with that. I think it would offer you a very easy way of relief in this case.
  - A It might very well.

I am familiar, however, with the decision in Word against North Carolina, which happened to involve the same state, and as I recall, in that decision they suggested that post-conviction relief was not available in North Carolina unless the petitioner was physically incarcerated there.

If memory serves me correct, Chief Judge Haynesworth on behalf of the Fourth Circuit invited the State of North Carolina to reconsider this matter in light of Peyton against Rowe and what it held with respect to the challenging of future sentences.

Q What is your controversy with the State of California, with the warden particularly? Let's assume for the moment that he was not doing anything
to you now -- to your client now -- and you had no anticipation
that he would on account of the North Carolina judgment. Do you
still think you would have a dispute with him with respect to the
validity of the North Carolina sector?

A I don't really think we do have a dispute with him.

- Q You mean -- you alleged a dispute with him, didn't you?
- A We are forgetting, as I understand it, the question of some immediate impact as a result of this detainer, such as heavier hand and so forth.
  - Q Well, put that aside for the moment.
  - A Yes, our dispute is this much. He under the detainer agreement and assuming that North Carolina is the detainer first in line according to their own ways of resolving this, and so forth, at the expiration of his current valid sentence the warden proposes to release him to the custody of North Carolina.
- Q Well, whenever he releases him, the Chief Justice suggested North Carolina could be at the door and the same result would obtain, and there is nothing the warden could do about it.
  - A I think the answer for that is ---
  - Q You mean you want him just not give him notice?
  - A No.

Q Just cancel out with North Carolina?

- 2 A No. Ideally I would like to have the warden say
  3 to North Carolina at that time, "I have been ordered by the
  4 United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali5 fornia, after a full hearing on the validity of your conviction,
  6 to refuse to give this man to you."
  - Q Well, if North Carolina stayed outside the doors, the warden would keep him in. Is that it?
  - A I suppose that might be so. I think the District Court has the unquestioned power to fashion an order which is directed to other California officials.
  - Q Mr. Cumming, let me ask you about this unquestioned power that you speak of. What would be the source of the power of the California Federal Court to interfere with the State of North Carolina picking up a prisoner at the end of his term in California?
  - A The source of that power would be two-fold: First of all, it would be under the Court's obligation to consider constitutional challenges that had been raised to that North Carolina conviction; and, secondly, I think it has been argued in briefs that there is no jurisdiction of the District Court in California over the State of North Carolina.

Under the facts of this case, the circumstances of this detainer agreement, I find that a difficult proposition to understand.

Ω Have you served any piece of paper to the State of North Carolina?

A No, we have not, except to the extent that the Ninth Circuit below held that as a matter of law, Warden Nelson is the agent of the State of North Carolina and actually nothing has been served on Warden Nelson, because of course habeus corpus is a little bit different than the usual plaintiff-defendant case.

The process is an order emanating from the District

Court calling upon the respondent to respond and show cause with

respect to the conviction, and we have never gotten that far.

Q Well, then, no claim has been made by you, I take it, from the outset that the California warden is the agent of the State of North Carolina?

A No, we haven't. Under the detainer agreement he is that state's agent for the enforcement of its rights under the detainer agreement, the rights as they now stand. In part what respondent wishes to challenge is violation by North Carolina of the very provisions of that detainer agreement under which he was tried, to wit, the fact that he was not tried within the mandatory time limit of that detainer agreement. And, therefore, I suppose our position on merits, if we are allowed to get to that, is that North Carolina simply lost the limited jurisdiction over him that it had under the detainer agreement.

O Mr. Cumming, is your position that if you are denied

relief here and then Kansas gets in before North Carolina, then you can litigate in the United States District Court in Kansas the same thing over again?

A I suppose, Mr. Justice Marshall, that we would have to. But that may be ---

Q That has to be your position.

A It has to be. The problem, of course, is that that may be many years in coming, and this is why I return again and again to Peyton v. Rowe. It is quite true that respondent has alleged some present impact of the detainer on him while he is in California now.

Perhaps there isn't any or perhaps it can be ameliorated, but primarily he is desirous of having a hearing on the claims that he makes with respect to the North Carolina judgment at a time when that hearing can be meaningful and not — he is presently serving an indeterminate sentence of five years to life, and so he faces the same problem with respect to his second sentence that Petitioner Rowe faced in Peyton against Rowe.

Q Would it be unreasonable to say that the most meaningful time to test that conviction was while he was still in the State of North Carolina, immediately following the trial, when everything was fresh in the minds of everyone?

A That is probably true. He did test it by way of direct appeal. Now we are into the matter of collateral attack upon that conviction.

Q What is the exact charge in the validity of the North Carolina judgment?

A He makes three, Mr. Justice Black. The first is that the detainer agreement by its terms requires that if a man be taken to North Carolina to stand trial, that he must be tried within, I believe, a 120-day period. And if he is not, the underlying charge shall be dismissed.

He was not tried within this period.

Q Well, was that that if he was absent, they couldn't get him? Do you mean that he is insisting that he was in jail and they could not get him out?

A No, no. Once he requests to be taken to North

Carolina and is physically taken there to stand trial, then the

State of North Carolina or any other party to this compact has a

limited period of time in which to try him and, indeed ---

Q But he wasn not taken, was he?

North Carolina filed a detainer on an untried charge and Mr.

George was notified of this charge, and he has some rights under the detainer agreement. The detainer agreement is essentially an attempt to improve the speedy trial guaranteed in these types of situations where a man is incarcerated for many reasons. You dealt with some of these problems last term in Smith against Huey.

He is entitled and did take ---

Was he taken back? 0 9 Yes, he was taken to North Carolina. A 2 At that time? 0 3 At that time and tried and convicted, and immediately 1 returned to California. So the answer ---5 Q What are you charging now? I wouldn't suppose 6 that would -- you are not charging anything unconstitutional about that, are you? 8 The fact that he was not tried within the time 9 limit that ---10 How long did it take? How long was it? 11 A I am not sure. It took longer than the mandatory 12 time provision of the detainer agreement. It seems to me the 13 detainer agreement provides for 120 days after he arrived in 14 North Carolina. 15 That is under North Carolina law? 16 No -- well, yes, this is North Carolina law to the 17 extent that this is represented by this detainer compact which 18 has been signed by a number of states and provision ---Did you carry that question to the Supreme Court 20 of North Carolina? 21 Yes, he had. A 22 And they decided against you under their law --23 On their law. A 24 What is your other question? 0 25

The second question would be notwithstanding the
violation -- the precise violation of this time period, it may
be that the delay represents a denial of a speedy trial under
the Sixth Amendment, and his third claim is that he was convicted
on the basis of testimony known by the prosecution to be perjurious.

Those are his three contentions. They may all be without merit, but we have never had a hearing on that and we would
like to have it.

I beg your pardon?

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Q Do you want to try that question in California?

A Under Ahrens v. Clark at this time that is the only place we can try it. And we will have some difficulty trying it there, but we will have a lot more difficulty if we have to go back to North Carolina and try it 10 years from now, or 20 years from now, or 30 years from now.

It will be impossible.

Q If he alleged that this North Carolina conviction were being used some way by the California authorities as bearing on his time for release under the California conviction, that there is a remedy in the California State Courts for a claim like that. Do you agree with that?

A I believe that to be the law.

Ω Well now, if that is the law, there is an allegation, as I understand it here, that that is what is happening,

that the California authorities are using this North Carolina conviction with prejudice. I thought ordinarily that a Federal habeus corpus proceeding could not be entertained until there 3 had been an exhaustion of state remedies.

That is quite correct.

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Why, then, would not this proceeding be premature in the Federal Courts since I gather there has been no effort to get a proceeding in the California State Court?

A It may very well be premature. I am not -- frankly, we were associated in this case when it was in the Ninth Circuit Court, and we were perhaps a little less familiar than what we might be with the arguments that we would make if we had some basis to get into the district.

Q Well, if on the record it comes to us, it would appear that he has not exhausted his remedies and I don't what has happened below. We just vacate everything that has happened and send it back, pending his going to the California State Court?

I don't think so, because ---

0 Why not?

Because we are also concerned not with ---A

The statute makes it clear, does it not? The Federal Courts cannot entertain a Federal habeus until then there is an exhaustion and a presently available remedy in the State Court. Isn't that correct?

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ought not be vacated for this reason. We are not only concerned with present facts as there may be, that is, holding him with a heavier hand, the things that I believe Mr. Justice White mentioned a few moments ago.

A That is correct. I think that the proceeding

But doesn't that suggest ---

A But we are also concerned with challenging the validity of the North Carolina ---

Q Well, doesn't that then raise another question that Mr. Justice Stewart put to you? If there has to be exhaustion of any available state remedies before any Federal Court can entertain habeus, may there not be in North Carolina a postconviction remedy which has not yet been exhausted?

I don't believe so.

Q That the state would require them to exhaust before the Federal Court can entertain this application?

That is correct, but I believe that there is no such remedy. As I mentioned, in Word against North Carolina, as I recall, the law there in North Carolina was that you had to be physically in custody in North Carolina.

The Fourt Circuit invited North Carolina to reconsider that matter, although I have trouble with that because the statute speaks in terms of remedies available at the time of the petition.

Well, your answer to me is there is no North

Carolina proceeding?

A So far as I know, they have not modified their law under the suggestion of the Fourth Circuit.

Q Mr. Cumming, suppose the State of California agreed and says we will lift the detainer, and then sends a telegram that tells him he will be released on such and such a date. What can you do about that?

A I suppose we would have to apply to the thenappropriate court to require that no one else in California
assist -- in other words, as I understand your question, you are
asking me what would we do if the warden gave us voluntarily the
sort of relief that we are seeking in the District Court?

Q My specific question was: If the warden releases the detainer and sends a collect telegram, so it won't cost California any money, to the State of North Carolina and says we will release Joe Bloke 11 o'clock at the east gate, what could you do about it?

A I suppose we would have to, as I said, apply to an appropriate court to prevent anyone from California in assisting North Carolina in attaining custody.

#### North Carolina ---

Q Wait a minute. Under what law could you prevent somebody from notifying another state that they are getting ready to release a prisoner?

A We couldn't prevent the notification.

0 Well, that's what I'm saying. Com No, we could not prevent the notification. 2 You couldn't do a thing about that. 3 0 That's right. 13 They could pick him up and go through extradition 5 and there he goes. 6 That's right. Then what is this case all about? 8 This case -- in extradition he at least has some 9 basis to appeal to the Executive of the State of California for 10 consideration for consideration. Extradition habeus corpus may 99 be limited, an extradition proceeding may be a very short one. 12 But he has some basis to appeal to someone to give some considera-13 tion to his claim that the North Carolina sentence is invalid. 10 At the present time he has none, because he has waived 15 extradition. Under the detainer agreement he has waived extra-16 dition by requesting to go there and stand trial. He has gone 17 there, he stood trial and in the interim he is asking them to 18 respond. 19 And in the meantime he is paying his debts to Cali-20 fornia and not his debts to North Carolina. 21 A That's right. That is entirely right. 22 Let me try a little variation of Mr. Justice Mar-23 shall's discussion. 24 Suppose not California, but North Carolina voluntarily 25

- surrenders or waives it detainer agreement, where do you have any jurisdiction in the State of California -- Federal Court, state court or any other court?
  - A Is it waived?

- Q It is just that we withdraw the detainer.
- A Well, then, I suppose he does not go to North Carolina to serve that sentence.
- 8 Q Well, he waives the detainer. That doesn't prevent
  9 them from having three deputy sheriffs from North Carolina sitting
  10 outside the east gate to pick him up.
  - A That's right. But they would have to go through traditional extradition proceedings. But, as I say, at least at that point he would have some recourse. It might not be as great a recourse as in habeus corpus at the present time, but at least some recourse in which he could bring to the attention of the Executive or perhaps under the court under extradition habeus corpus his charges.
  - Q Then it is possible we are engaged in an exercise in futility here? Unless we assume that North Carolina is just going to let this man walk off in the face of their conviction.
    - A I don't think that the Court is going to be exercising a matter of futility. I think that there is an ample basis based on this detainer agreement and the responsibilities which the parties state undertake for each other shall hold that North Carolina is within the jurisdiction of the District Court

in California. It has come to California once to pick him up,
taken him back there for trial, tried him. It will presumably
come there again to pick him up, take him back without extradition
or any judicial or executive inquiry into the propriety of that.

All that he is asking is that they come out here in the interim and answer to his charges that the proceedings which were had in North Carolina violated his constitutional rights.

Q But you do concede that if North Carolina surrenders its detainer, that no California Federal Court has any jurisdiction? Your entire jurisdictional claim rests on the agency concept, doesn't it?

A I don't think it does. We were required to sue the warden because he is the present custodian. If we sued the State of North Carolina, as indeed we did in the first instance in the first petition, which incidentally is not printed in the appendix because except for the caption it is identical to the amendment. It was captioned John Edward George versus the State of North Carolina.

Now if he filed that petition in the Federal Court in San Francisco, it might very well be that the Court would hold that it had jurisdiction over the named respondent, to wit, the State of North Carolina.

It strikes me that it would be inappropriate at that point to name the warden the traditional respondent in North .

Carolina, because obviously he is not in jail there. But I think

that there would be relief available. Or naming of Louis Nelson is because of his obligations under the detainer agreement. If he had no obligations under the detainer agreement, I do not 3 believe that we would be without remedy in California. Thank you very much. 5 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mrs. Renne, you have four 6 minutes left. 7 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF LOUISE H. RENNE 8 ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 9 MRS. RENNE: Your Honor, if I may briefly respond to 10 two primary points. Mr. Justice Brennan raised the question of 99 my representation to the Court. This is not a case and it is 12 our representation that this is not a case where California has 13 attempted to use North Carolina conviction to increase the length 14 of the California sentence or to classify the defendant as ---15

- Q Well, I took that position from the ---
- A That is correct, Your Honor.
- Q Is there an allegation here that it was relieved?
- A No, Your Honor.

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Q That is not alleged?

A No, that is not alleged. As I understand it, there is some allegation that it might affect his parole consideration.

That kind of allegation was made below. But that is a totally different question. The record doesn't support it and, in fact, we don't think the record ---

Q Yes, but that is -- I thought ordinarily the position was that there isn't presently available Federal habeus relief until you have established that you have exhausted all your state remedies that are presently available.

A Well, we do think in this instance, Your Honor, that there hasn't been any showing of an attempt to exhaust.

Q But I come back, then, why shouldn't this case go back to the District Court for initial determination now, whether he has available state remedies, whether in California or in North Carolina?

A Because that presupposes there is some sort of habeus corpus jurisdiction in the District Court of California,

Your Honor, and we are unwilling -- we don't believe that that is correct law. We think that it may be that this inmate has a remedy in the North Carolina Court.

If what he is after is to challenge the North Carolina conviction, he ought to attempt to seek relief in North Carolina in the State Court. That is our position.

And we think there has been no showing that he has attempted to do that. But we don't think there is presently available Federal habeus corpus relief.

I would like to make clear, too, in response to some of the other questions asked, that we will not hold a man one day longer on the strength of a detainer. If a man's conviction has expired, a responding state must come into California, seek and obtain an extradition warrant.

The prisoner can waive extradition. That is a different matter. But if he hasn't, we will release a man only pursuant to extradition.

In the parole situation there are two separate ways that the man might be paroled. If the adult authority, which is our paroling agency in California, believes this man is totally satisfied and ready for parole, we will release the man subject to hold, which means that we will notify the other state and the other state has to come in with an extradition warrant.

If we don't believe the man is ready yet for parole, but nevertheless we know he has a conviction or a charge in another state and it is quite clear that -- it seems to be clear that the other state wishes to obtain custody, which they can do under extradition, we may put it as a special condition of

parole, how to get parole.

Now if that other state does not come in with extradition warrant or the prisoner does not waive extradition, then we may reconsider whether the man ought to be on parole. But that is reconsideration under the California sentence only.

We respectfully submit ---

Q Assuming jurisdiction here for the moment, what do you think about the Court of Appeals suggestion that if it came down to a question of venue witnesses, that 1404(a) transferring 140(a) would be available?

A Well, Your Honor, as I recall Section 1404(a), that transfer statute says that the case may be transferred to an action where it might have been brought. It is our position that this case could not have been brought in another forum.

Now it is true that Word v. North Carolina, Fourth
Circuit opinion decided that the sentencing court was not an
appropriate forum in a case of this kind. But it is really
fortuitous that in both cases North Carolina conviction should
be involved.

In any other circuit this wouldn't be the case, the other recent case being the Third Circuit case in Van Scoten versus Pennsylvania where the Third Circuit held that New Jersey prisoners couldn't challenge future Pennsylvania sentences in a Pennsylvania court.

Q Have you looked into the North Carolina post-conviction

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A Well, I have read it, Your Honor.

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Q It seems to be applicable only to those imprisoned

A On the face of it, Your Honor, that does seem to

in North Carolina. Would you agree with that?

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be the case. But it might be, in view that North Carolina Legist

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lature would be willing to change its mind. It might be that

if the proper case ever arose in North Carolina, that there could

be some sort of reading of the North Carolina statute to encompass

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a case of this kind.

are aware of.

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There has never been that kind of an attempt that we

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Q That brings us back to the exhaustion point that

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A Well, it is a kind of ---

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Q He has an obligation to try to see if the North

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Carolina procedures will reach him.

Mr. Justice Brennan was raising.

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stand exhaustion in the technical sense, it does presuppose some

A It is a kind of exhaustion, Your Honor. As I under-

We do think that as far as equities of the situation

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sort of present habeus corpus relief. We are unwilling -- we

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don't think the law requires that.

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are concerned, that the prisoner ought to make an attempt in

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North Carolina to get some sort of relief there.

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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you for your submission,

Mrs. Renne. Thank you, Mr. Cumming. You were appointed by the Court. We want to thank you for your assistance to the Court and the Court's assistance to the petitioner. The case is submitted. (Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m. the argument in the above-entitled matter was concluded.) .16