LIBRARY SUPREME COURT, U. S.

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1969

In the Matter of:

JAMES TOOAHIMPAH TATE, et al.

Docket No.

300

Petitioners,

VS.

WALTER J. HICKEL, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE UNITED STATES, et al.

Respondents.

SUPREME COURT, U.S MARSHAL'S OFFICE

Duplication or copying of this transcript by photographic, electrostatic or other facsimile means is prohibited under the order form agreement.

Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

January 14, 1970

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

300 Seventh Street, S. W.

Washington, D. C.

NA 8-2345

441-032

6:09

ORAL ARGUMENT OF:

PAGE

Omer Luellen, Esq., on behalf of Petitioners

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM 2 3 JAMES TOOAHIMPAH TATE, ET AL., B Petitioners 5 No. 300 VS 6 WALTER J. HICKEL, SECRETARY OF THE 7 INTERIOR OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., 8 Respondents 9 10 The above-entitled matter came on for argument at 99 10:05 o'clock a.m., on Wednesday, January 14, 1970. 92 BEFORE: 13 WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice 94 WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice 15 WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice 16 BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice 17 APPEARANCES: 18 OMER LUELLEN, ESQ. 19 Р. О. Вож 96 First State Bank Building 20 Hinton, Oklahoma 73047 On behalf of Petitioners 21 RICHARD B. STONE, 22 Office of the Solicitor General

Department of Justice Washington, D. C. On behalf of Respondents

23

24

PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Number 300, Tate and other against Hickel.

Mr. Luellen, you may proceed whenever you are ready.
ORAL ARGUMENT BY OMER LUELLEN, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MR. LUELLEN: Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Associate Judges of this Honorable Court: This case, 300, on the petition for writ of certiorari in the Tenth Circuit. It pertains to the approval or nonapproval of the will of an Indian who owned restricted properties, pursuant to our Federal statutes governing the disposition of Indian lands upon the death of an Indian.

I feel certain that this Court is familiar with the fact that the governing statutes under which we are discussing this case, are found in two sections, commonly called the 1910 Act; Section 1 of the 1910 Act which now has been codified as 25 U.S.C. 372 and Section 2 of the 1910 Act which has now been codified as 25 U.S.C. 373.

372 pertains to the determination of the heirs of a deceased Indian that has an allotment or who will in the future have an allotment, upon his death, dying without a will.

And Section 1 of 372 proceeds to state that upon the death of the said Indian his heirs shall be determined by the Secretary of the Interior and his decision shall be final and

conclusive.

Then we have Section 2 of the 1910 Act which is codified as 25 U.S.C. 373, which states that if an Indian dies owning an interest in trust — it doesn't really say an Indian, it says "any person dying owning an interest in trust or restricted lands or funds that are restricted, he shall have a right" — this person shall have a right to make a will, provided the will shall not have any force and effect until and unless — unless and until it is approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

Now, that is the general situation here. This

Indian, George Chahsenah, made a will, his last will in March,

1963. He was a member of the Comanche Tribe of Indians. He

lived in the little town of Apache, Oklahoma, located about 20

miles north of Fort Sill.

I don't know whether any of you gentlemen or any member of this Court has ever been to Fort Sill in World War I or World War II. Apache is about 25 miles north of Fort Sill.

George Chahsenah was a member of the Comanche Tribe of Indians. He made his last will; he made several wills and I certain that will be brought out here later. His last will was made in March, 1963. He died approximately five or six months later and the procedure for making wills where the Indians have restricted trust lands, we go to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which in this case, of course, was in Anadarko, Oklahoma, about

about 30 miles north of Apache, Oklahoma. He went there in
March, 1963 and made his last will in the office of the Field
Solicitor and his will was properly drawn, according to procedures, and he died some six months later.

0)

And his will, of course, was presented for Probate and several hearings were had before the Examiner of Inheritance, Ken R. Blaine, who had the position of Examiner of Inheritance. It is a position created by the Secretary of the Interior, giving the hearing examiners the general authority to make determinations concerning the deceased heirs of Indians that die without wills and also in regard to the approval or nonapproval of the will.

We had, I think, around four hearings in this case and finally, the Examiner of Inheritance made a — rendered an opinion or ruling or opinion, in which he upheld the validity of this will of George Chahsenah, and he approved the will. In his finding, which, of course, is contained in the appendix, he goes into certain findings about the fact that this Indian apparently was addicted to alcohol and perhaps I should have said prior to this time that in the hearings on this bill there the devisees and legatees were represented by legal counsel. The certain disinherited nieces and nephews were represented by Mr. Hill; also Dorita High Horse, who it was found later by the Court to be his natural daughter.

And the Examiner of Inheritance had made a finding

that although this Indian apparently was addicted to alcohol and was an excessive drinker and he had made different wills at different times. At the time he made his will he was perfectly competent to make his will; he was not intoxicated. In fact, the will was proper in every respect and Examiner of Inheritance approved the will.

Q That's not challenged by anyone; is it?

A No.

Then on appeal by the contestants of the will, the appeal was taken to the Secretary of the Interior, as directed by the regulations and at that time the authority to approve or disapprove of wills of Indians had been delegated to the Regional Solicitors.

Now, originally, up untils short time prior to that they brought those appeals up here to the Washington office and usually the Solicitor or the Associate Solicitor for the Depastment of Interior made the determination. But this time it was sent down by a delegation of authority to the Regional Solicitors. And the Regional Solicitor for this region was at Tulsa, Oklahoma. Mr. Sanford, the Regional Solicitor, is still the Regional Solicitor.

The hearing before the Regional Solicitor of Oklahoma; reviewed before the REgional Solicitor. The Regional Solicitor found that the facturm of the will was proper as the Examiner had found. He found that this Dorita High Horse was the natural

daughter of the decedent, George Chahsenah, and he found, although the factum of the will was proper in every respect, the fact that George Chahsenah apparently had not supported Dorita High Horse during her minority, that there had not been an equitable treatment of the heirs of law of George Chahsenah by his will, and under his — the Regional Solicitor, from his discretionary authority, held that equity had not been achieved and he disapproved the will of George Chahsenah and directed that the estate be distributed to his natural daughter.

Now, he also, in his order, disapproved or disallowed that he would also make the same finding as to any other wills of George Chahsenah. Now, he had made several other wills prior to this time. He made that same finding in regard to any other wills.

- O They were what, some five previous wills?
- A Correct, Your Honor.
- Q And normally, when a will is set aside for some reason or another, you go back to the next previous will. But that wasn't done here at all. You just set aside all of them.
- A Set aside all of them. That's in the last paragraph of the original Solicitor's decision.
 - Q Who were the relatives in the will as written?
- A In the will as written? It was his niece, Viola Epinpotter and her three children. He had lived with this niece a considerable portion of his lifetime and was living with

25

her at the time of his death. He had no children except Dorita High Horse; he had no wife; he had no father and mother. He had nieces and nephews, of which Viola was one of them and then he gave his estate to Viola and her three children.

And under this decision, Miss High Horse gets

Yes. Under the decision of the Regional Solicitor acting in delegated authority for the Secretary of the Interior, he held that equity was not achieved by this will. The Indian did not make an equitable distribtuion of his estate, therefore his will was disapproved and the entire estate would go to Dorita High Horse because the Examiner of Inheritance had made a finding that she was his daughter and heir at law.

And the findings of the Examiner as to the competency of the testator were not disturbed?

No. On appeal the original Solicitor specifically found that the factum of the will was proper. All the techni-

Has the doctrine of dependent relative revocation of wills been applied in the area of Indian wills?

The regulations provide there shall be no implied revocation of Indian wills.

Well, that wouldn't necessarily take care of that

What doctrine was it, Your Honor?

The doctrine of dependent relative revocation, 9 which Mr. Justice Stewart was referring to indirectly, or 2 directly. 3 Do you mean the conditions of the family? 4 If the will fails, if a given will fails for 5 some reason it falls back on the prior will. 6 Well -- Oh, yes, I understand what you mean. 7 Q Do the regulations preclude the application of 8 that doctrine? 9 No, there are no regulations that preclude falling A 10 back on prior wills. 11 Q Did the particular official who made this 12 decision, have before him the prior wills? 13 Hehad the record, and I believe they are in the 13 record, Your Honor; at least the substance of the prior wills 15 were in the record, what they provided. 16 His first will that he made he gave his entire estate 17 to Viola Epintanger, the one that later on came in in his last 18 will, practically his entire estate. Then he gave some mis-19 cellaneous friends some property at different times in his wills. 20 Q Would you mind clarifying for me, if you will, in 21 just plain, simple words, so that they are easy to understand, 22 say, to whom he devised his property in the will that was held 23 bad? 24 He devised his will, it is found at Appendix 25

qu	page 64.		
2		Q	To whom was it?
3		A	He gave it to his niece, Viola Epinpotter and
4	her son, l	Frank:	ie Lee Tooahnippah in equal shares, an interest
5	in the all	Lotme	nt of Rupirock.
6		Q	Now, who is that, his niece?
7		A	Yes, and her son.
8		Q	His niece and her son.
9	2	A	That's his interest in one allotment.
10		Ω	Who is fighting that?
11		A	The natural daughter, the one that he does not
12	mention in	his	wills
13		Q	You mean natural daughter you mean by that a
14	illegitima	ite oi	e legitimate child?
15		A	Well, I called her illegitimate. Mr. Hill has
16	contested	allmy	statements of illegitimacies. She is his
17	daughter,	born	out of wedlock at least.
18		Q	Yes.
19		A	He never lived with this mother, except maybe
20	for a shor	rt int	cerlude.
21		Q	Is that who all the fights are between?
22		A	That's who the fight is between.
23	Α.	Q	And if this is upheld what would happen with th
24	property?		
25		A	If the will is upheld?

If the verdict is upheld, the judgment of the Non Court of Appeals? 2 A If the judgment of the Court of Appeals is upheld 3 it will go to the actual daughter who is not mentioned in his will. 5 Q All of it or part of it? 6 All of it. A 7 All of it. Q 8 Yes, sir. A And what was the next prior will; to whom would 10 it have gone? 73 Well, I'm not certain who the next prior will --12 I think it went to a nephew. 13 It went to a cousin, Rosa Mae Waha Rastow. 13 They are on the record. A 15 Yes. 16 Are you challenging the constitutionality of the 17 law to which the Secretary acted? 18 No, I'm not challenging the constitutionality of 19 the law under whichthe Secretary acts. The Circuit Court held 20 that the -- The Tenth Circuit held that the action of the 21 Secretary of the Interior, whatever he says about an Indian will 22 either approves or disapproves an Indian will and that is final 23 and conclusive and cannot be taken to judicial review, it cannot 24 be taken of the Secretary --

1 2 3

9 9

Q Are you making that holding on the ground that that's not what the statute says? That such a statute would be unconstitutional?

A I didn't say the statute -- it doesn't apply as to Indian wills, is the way I interpret it. Section 1 applies tointestate succession. It says it shall be final and conclusive and this Court in several cases have held that the determination of heirs under the Section 1 is final and conclusive and not subject to judicial review.

Section 2 does not have the final and conclusive clause that the determination or the approval or non-approval of an Indian's will by the Secretary of the Interior is final and conclusive. That's omitted from Section 2.

But, the Tenth Circuit in two or three cases, the Heffelman case, the Attocknie case and this case have held that Sections 1 and 2 complement each other and that final and conclusive as it applies to Section 1 of the intestate succession, means that it also applies to complement Section 2; therefore, it's final and conclusive and not subject to judicial review by the court, even though —

Q Then is your argument based solely on the question of the statutory construction, or is it based on attacking the constitutionality of the law?

A I'm not attacking the constitutionality of the law, I just -- my position is that Section 2 does not have

31	
que	the final and conclusive clause and therefore
2	really Q Well, Mr. Luellen,/your whole argument the in brief
3	only issue for us to decide, as I understand it,/is whether or
A	not the action of the Secretary of the Interior when a judicia
5	review of that action is precluded by the statute. That's all
6	it is; isn't it?
7	A That's it
8	Q Well, I must say you haven't really gotten to as I understood it,
9	that issue, which, / is the only issue we have before us.
10	A Well
27	Q We have nothing to do with the background of the
12	wills or
13	A It's not in the statute, Your Hoyor
14	Q I know it's not, but that's the issue for us to
15	decide; isn't it? That's what your position is; isn't it?
16	A Although
17	Q That's a matter of statutory construction,
18	according to your judgment?
19	A What?
20	Q That is a matter of statutory construction,
21	according to your judgment?
22	A Well, yes, it would be a matter for this Court
23	the construction under Section 2 means its final and conclusive
24	or whether it doesn't mean it?
25	Q Do you raise a constitutional question? If so,
- 5	

what is it?

A

A I don't think I raisé a constitutional question; in my opinion, I don't.

Q Well, haven't you got a subsidiary issue? Let's assume that you prevail on the ground that this review is not precluded, then don't you have the question as to whether the Secretary, in doing what he did, acted within the scope of his authority?

A That is true.

Q And that's in issue, as well as the one that Mr. Justice Brennan was talking about.

A Yes. You take one issue, and then if you say you still have the right to review and he still has the other issues.

Q Right.

A Whether the District Court was proper in this case or whether the Secretary of Interior was proper.

Q But, Mr. Luellen, that's not the question in issue here to us. If you prevail and it's judicially reviewable, all you are entitled to is for a remand to the Court of Appeals to have the Court of Appeals decide the merits; isn't it?

You have only raised with us, as I understand it, the question presented is whether the decision of the Secretary of the Interior approving or disapproving the will of an Indian is subject tojudicial review. That's the only question presented

here. You haven't asked us to decide the merits.

A No

2 9

20.

- Q The Court of Appeals refused to decide the merits.
 - A That's right; it did.
- Q But the Government seeks to sustain the judgment below on the grounds that the discretion was properly exercised.

A They say that the decision of the Secretary of the Interior was proper. Of course, we contested that and the District Court held it was improper.

Q Your claim must, of necessity, be, as has been suggested, that first it's subject to judicial review and that there might be some standards by which the Secretary of Interior exercises his authority. Are you suggesting that the judicial review is based upon general standards of review as administrative action? That it must not be arbitrary and capricious; it must be based on some rational —

A Yes. We -- I think that would be our position, yes. We feel that there is no statutory preclusion of review; that Section 1 does not complement Section 2; therefore, it's on the general review abilities of the courts to review sometime, someplace there must be a question that has an action in the administrative review unless the statutes preclude the review and we feel like Section 1 does not preclude review under

Section 2.

E

9 9

Now, of course, this has been up in several cases. It has been up in Homovich versus Chapman, in the circuit here; the District of Columbia Circuit. And they raised that point in that case that it is not subject to — The decision of the Secretary of the Interior was final and conclusive and not subject to review.

In Homovich versus Chapman, the decision in the District of Columbia, they held it was subject to judicial review.

Then, later on in Hayes versus Seaton case, which was discussed, and you had your dissenting opinion in Hayes versus Seaton, which goes into that much in detail.

Then we come along with the Heffelman case in the Tenth Circuit and they say Section 1 and Section 2 complement each other; therefore it's -- you cannot review the Secretary of the Interior's decision approving or not approving the wills of Indians, going back and saying Section 1 complements Section 2.

Approaching the factum of this will, why this -- why the District Court held that the Secretary, acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner, directed theapproval of the will, that goes back to the facts, of course.

But when it went up on appeal the Tenth Circuit didn't go into the facts whatsoever. They just said, "No

jurisdiction," and directed the action be dismissed and the estate redistributed in accordance with the decisions of the Secretary of the Interior.

2

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

34

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

20

25

Now, of course, in the District Court the facts were gone into and the District Court held that in this case the Secretary of Interior was acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner, without the rationale for his decision and directed that the estate be distributed pursuant to the terms of the will.

The question is, going back to the facts of that particular phase of it, which I think gets into this case any figure it, is first, whether the Secretary of the Interior way you could sit up there and determine whether this Indian did equity to his heirs and does the discretionary authority go that far? Can you just arbitrarily say to an Indian, "I don't want to approve this will; this is an unjust will, unactual will," something like that. And I don't believe the prior cases with memorandums to the Secretary of the Interior in 1941, which is in my brief in two or three different places; at that time it was thought by Mr. Slattery who was Chief of the Indian section of the Interior, that the will of an Indian -- he had a right tomake his own will, and that the Secretary of the Interior didn't have the right to substitute his will for that of the Indian.

Q Is there any suggestion made that the Secretary

should fix up the legacy, sort of a comparative rule of beneficiaries and due equity by fixing up a legacy for this woman and letting the rest of it go according to the testator's will?

A There is no --

- Q No suggestion of that kind?
- A No suggestion of that kind, that I know of your Honor, and there is no power that I know of, to do that.
 - Q Well, he relied on equity; didn't he?
 - A I didn't rely on equity.
 - Q No, you didn't, but the Secretary did.

valid disposition of this Indian's property, to just say "We're going to do equity." Where is the criteria? When could you ever say when is equity done? Suppose the Secretary of the Interior had said, as I put in one of my briefs: "Well, this Indian here, he's a member of the Comanche Tribe of Indians. The Comanches were notorious warriors. You read about the Comanches. I just never would approve of a will of an Indian — a Comanche Indian." That would be arbitrary and capricious and be subject tojudicial review; and also would be subject to mandamus, I think, under 1361.

Q Could I ask you whether this provision covers all property which is covered by the will? I suppose Section 2 is figured only when the Indian owns restricted property; is that it? That is, property which the United States is holding

in trust for him. If he doesn't own any of that property, but owns a lot of otherproperty, then the Secretary has no power? No power over his other property. Well, now, assume he owns both kinds of property restricted and unrestricted and he make a will covering both. Does the Secretary's invalidation of the will invalidate as respects the other property, too?

(prop

2

3

13

5

6

7

8

9

10

99

12

13

94

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

A In my opinion it does not affect the other property, the nonrestricted property.

So, in an Indian will the non-trust property is unaffected?

Yes. Now, of course, the Osage Indians have a different situation. The Secretary of Interior has to approve it and also the courts, but you can probate an Indian's will where you have two witnesses and the will has complied with the Oklahoma statutes. The fact that the Secretary of the Inter could not approve his will, I don't think it affects his nontrust property. That is my opinion; at least.

Now, this will gave all of his property to his various -- and I didn't finish up. Of course, in the next paragraph he gave his -- he gave to Vila Tooahnippah and Julia Tooahimpah, daughters of Viola, and equal shares in his interest will of George Chahsenah. Then he made a residue clause and gave all of his residue to Viola and her three children.

His entire estate, which was in trust and restricted

property, was distributed and taken care of in this will. He never did mention Dorita High Horse in any of his wills. His first will he gave it to Viola. That's the niece that he lived with most of his lifetime.

Then there, a pariod of some three or four years, as Mr. Justice Stewart, I believe was noting there a while ago, he tells the different ones he gave his properties to and then when he knew he was in bad health and got ready to really go on out into this other world, he came in and made this will and he had it spelled out. He told certain allotments to certain persons. And then he set the residue to these four.

The factum of this will has never been disputed. The only thing is the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Regional Solicitor said this Indian did not achieve an equitable purpose because he should have been held liable for the support of this Indian girl while she was a minor and therefore, using his — what the Secretary says is his discretionary power, he withheld the approval of this will.

The District Court said that was arbitary and capricious and there was no rationale for this action and he directed the Secretary of the Interior to approve the will.

And then on appeal to the Circuit Court the Circuit

Court said Section 2 is under Section 1 so far as final

and conclusive; it's not subject to judicial review and they

refused to review it and directed the case be dismissed and the

estate be distributed pursuant to the judgment of the Secretary of the Interior.

I filed my petition for certiorari here, which this

Court has seen fit to allow. I am not certain what actions you

could take. You could either, I suppose, direct the Circuit

Court to go ahead and hear the case on the facts, if they have

jurisdiction; if you hold they have jurisdiction, or you could

direct that.

It would be distributed as directed by the trial

Q If we send it back, assuming that you prevail and we send it back to the Court of Appeals, what standards should the Court of Appeals apply? I put that question to you before, but I am not clear on your answer. Should they apply general rules of administrative action?

- A I would think so --
- Q To support the --

A I think they would apply the general rules of review. In my opinion, I don't know what other rules they can apply. I think would be the general rules; yes.

I believe I have taken up most of my time. I'll just reserve any time I may have left.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mr. Luellen.
Mr. Stone.

ORAL ARGUMENT BY RICHARD B. STONE, OFFICE
OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

Q Let me ask at the outset, Mr. Stone, whether the power to review the will and grant or withhold approval, is one in which the Secretary, for which the Secretary must have reasons, or whether you think its an absolute, unreviewable power?

A The Government's position, Mr. Chief Justice, is that this is an unreviewable power under Section 2 of the 1910 Act. Of course, we are basically putting forth two contentions in this case: one is that the Secretary's determinations are, in fact, unreviewable, and the other is that even it there is a limited standard of review, which is to review whether the Secretary has exceeded the scope of his authority in rendering his discretionary decisions.

Q Is that a question on the merits, Mr.Stone?
That's the merits.

- A Yes, I believe it is.
- Q And that was not reached by the Court of Appeals?
- A That question was not reached --
- Q Why does the Government ask us to reach it?

 If we should decide that there is judicial review, why shouldn't we send it back to the Court of Appeals to decide the merits?

 Why should we reach it?

A Well, I think that is a possible disposition of the case, and it would be understandable if the Court chose to decide it this way.

9 9

I think the question was sufficiently clear that the Court could — that it is sufficiently clear that the Secretary has the right to apply equitable considerations to the case, that this Court could reach that decision quite easily, and remand, if necessarily, with instructions to apply that rule.

Q Would you think that the Court of Appeals, having thought it had no jurisdiction at all, do you think if you go back to them that they might need some guidance as to what standards would apply to the review?

A I think it would be helpful, Mr. Chief Justice, if the Court of Appeals were given some standards of review, and I think that the standard that they should be given is a very broad one and the Secretary has extremely wide powers in this area and that a reversal would only be in order if the Secretary had grossly abused his scope of discretion.

But, I would like, with the Court's permission, to discuss very briefly the historical context in which the general Allotment Act and the Act of 1910 appears, because I think it heavily bears — this historical context bears very / on both of the contentions that the Government is making in this case: the contention that the Secretary is given absolute discretion, non-reviewable and the contention that Congress intended for him to exercise very wide range of considerations in deciding whether to approve or disapprove a will.

The General Allotment Act was one of the major

-

A

aspects of Congress's effort to make reservation Indians economically integrated and self-sufficient members of society. Under the allotment system prior to 1934 the Government divided and alloted reservation property and gave them to individual Indians and their families. The properties were conveyed under an arrangement which this Court has characterized not as a technical trust arrangement, but as a kind of special guardianship by which the Department of Interior was entrusted with the duty of restricting alienation of the Indians' interest in these lands in furtherance of a Congressional policy which this Court has described as "The promotion of prudence to afford protection to dependent and natural heirs" and also, "reserving restrictive land for the Indians.

is a very special one between the Government and reservation and communities
Indian tribes/and that special relationship has survived the breakup of certain reservations and the allotment to individual Indians of tribal land. At least it has survived with respect to the allotted lands themselves, and at least to the extent that the Government continues to guard against improvident alienation of these properties by the Indian allottees.

It was Congress's hope at the time that the original Allotment Act was passed, that the Government's guardianship from the time at which it would be deemed advisable to remove the restrictions would be only about 25 years. It was hoped

that at the end of that time these lands could be conveyed to the Indians in fee simple.

In the majority of instances, however, the removal of restrictions on alienation soon resulted in acquisition of these properties by parties unrelated to the Indian allottees, usually, in fact, by nonIndians.

In furtherance of the statutory purpose of the Allotment Act, which was to preserve the value of the allotted property for the benefit of the allotted /and their families, in most cases the period of guardianship has been extended.

Q Mr. Stone, looking atat the brief filed by the Solicitor General, he's posed two narrow questions: whether Section 372 read with, apparently, 373, gives final and conclusive posture and status to his decision and whether he may take equitable considerations into account.

Now, most of the members of the Court are familiar with this historical background. It would be helpful, I think, if you would address yourself to the specific question.

I thought a reminder of the historical background, and particularly, the historical purpose of the General Allotment Act Xhich was to assure that these conveyed Indian lands were made for the benefit of Indian allottes and their families, would be rather helpful to an understanding of the statutory context.

It's rather helpful to an understanding of range of the

Secretary's powers in approving or disapproving alienation of Indians Rules.

The Secretary's statutory duty to preserve these lands in the hands of the allottee during his lifetime is supplemented by a duty to supervise disposition of allotted properties upon the death of the allottee, pursuant to the Act of June 25, 1910, which is the Act under consideration in this case.

And Sections 1 and 2 of this Act, taken together, provide a complete enumeration of the Secretary's powers over the disposition of allotted properties on the death of the allottee.

Section 1, as you know, authorizes the Secretary to determine the legal heirs of the deceased; and this determination, by statute, / State law, in this case the law of the State of Oklahoma, Section 1 as this Court is doubtless aware, provides that the Secretary's determination of heirship is to be final and conclusive and requires only that the Secretary hold a hearing with notice.

This Court has explicitly held that the Secretary's determinations of heirs are not reviewable by any court. In other words, this Court has specifically held that Section 1 determinations are not reviewable, even if errors of law are alleged. This is the First Moon v. White Tail case, cited in our brief at 270 U.S. 243.

The Court recognized in the First Moon case the

Secretary's unique and pervasive role with respect to these
restricted properties and found that "Abundant reason for the
provision precluding review becomes apparent upon consideration
of the infinite difficulties which otherwise would arise in
connection with the sundry duties of the Secretary of the
Interior relative to Indian allotments."

Now, Section 2 of the Act of 1910, which is, of

Now, Section 2 of the Act of 1910, which is, of under course, the key provision / consideration in this case, requires the Secretary, in a case in which the deceased Indian has left a will, to approve or disapprove that will, if the will is disapproved, as in this case, the propertypasses in its entirety by the laws of intestacy; that is, the restricted property bequeathed in the will.

Q How about Mr. Justice White's question: What if an Indian owns, in addition to allotted land, what if he owns realty or personailty of his own, does the Secretary have any right to disapprove that will with respect to that property?

A No, the Secretary, as far as I am aware, has no right to disapprove any disposition of that other property at all.

- Q Well, if he owns both kinds of property --
- A Restrictions were only to the --
- Q Allotted.
- A Both and testimentary restrictions

9 9

into the conveyance of the restricted property, at the time the 2 allotment is made. 3 Q Is that regardless of whether he is on the 3 reservation or not? 500 I believe that it is regardless of whether he is 6 on the reservation or not. Would I be correct in saying that former Chief 8 Judge of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, Judge 0 Barefoot, couldn't make a will? Suppose you have a full-blooded 10 Choctaw Indian? 98 I'm not aware of any reason why he couldn't make 12 a will, Mr. Justice Marshall. 13 Well, would it have to be approved by the 14 Secretary? 15 Only with respect to the restricted property 96 that has been allotted. 17 You're sure that it still wouldhave to be 18 approved by the Secretary. 19 A Yes, I assume the Secretary in the case of such 20 a testator would give great weight to the testator's will and 21 would assume that the disposition that he made of the property 22 was provident, and I assume that actually, by the time that such 23 a person would have been granted his restricted land in fee

525

24

25

run only to the restricted property and of course, are tied

simple, which the Secretary also has the power to do.

600 2 3

4

5

6

8

0

10

11

12

13

14

15.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

But if, by some chance he stillheld land under, subject to restrictions, that the Secretary would continue to have the power to approve the will insofar as disposal of the restricted territories.

If the Judge was alive he might put him in contempt.

Yes, that would pose a very knotty question.

Are there any rules or regulations or statements of administrative policy with respect to classes of beneficiaries who will be disapproved or who must be included, or anything like that?

In other words, can an Indian will his property to a white man or a whisky dealer or somebody to whom he owes money?

There is no regulation or statutory provision prohibiting him from willing this land to a white man, but the allotment purpose and the mandate given to the Secretary by the/Act of 1910 would subject the Secretary to very close scrutiny if he were to -- or would cause the Secretary to very closely scrutinize any will which gave restricted property to a white person.

I noted in this connection that there was at one time at the moment the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior quite are /general and don't refer to what specifically, what types of considerations are to be taken into account in approving or disapproving a will.

Q And no such administrative standards --

A

11.

A There was at one time, a set of regulations which the Secretary -- which were laid out in the Nimrod case which is cited in our brief at 24 Fed.2d. I don't have the cite in front of me.

Q Mr. Stone, as far as the regulations are concerned -- I haven't read them -- is it fair to say or what is the fact, do they go to the factum of the will, the way a will should be executed?

A Well, there, Mr. Justice Harlan, the regulations are very silent with respect, both to the factum and to the equitable considerations to be taken into account. There are practically no technical requirements laid out in the regulation at all, simply that the testator should have testimentary capacity and that there should be two competent witnesses.

Unlike the Section 1 determination, which is prescribed according to state law, that is, the determination of heirship, approval of the will is subject to the Secretary's own standards altogether. There are no technical requirements and the Secretary has produced very few technical requirements. The regulations, in short, like the statute, leave the Secretary and his delegates with maximum flexibility and discretion and that is quite informative with the entire statutory scheme under which the Secretary supervises these restricted lands, both during the lifetime of the allottees and after the death of the

allottees.

B

9.5

Q Are there any other instances in the administrative precedent where the Secretary has done what he did here that you have been able to find?

A There are other instnaces in which the Secretary has applied equitable considerations.

Q And rewritten the wills -- not rewritten the will, but set it aside because of the disposition?

A No; I have only been able to find cases in which the wills have been approved, though it was clear that equitable considerations were taken into account. Now, I have been unable to locate a decision that is cited in the decision of the solicitor; it appears to be unrecorded. I have searched for it in the Interior Department cases, and haven't been able to find it.

The Regional Solicitor cited one case in which a will had been disapproved on equitable grounds. That case was not reviewed later by any court; it wasn't brought to any court and I haven't been able to find the decision.

Q Mr. Stone, we have observed that we don't have the merits before us, but the merits are not totally irrelevant. Would you agree that the contest between a daughter — a natural, illegitimate daughter, who had relatively little contact with the testator and a niece with whom he had lived and who had a relationship somewhat like that of a natural child; is it a

close question?

A Mr. Justice Burger, I believe, in view of the policy of the Allotment Act to preserve Indian lands, restricted lands in the hands of the allottees and their families and dependents is not a close question in a case in which an Indian has — an Indian allottee has totally neglected his only born child all through her childhood and thereafter. However, I don't think it's important to note whether this is a close question or not, because it is a question that has been left to the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior and it is —

Q That's the question here; isn't it? That's the question which we have inthe case, whether it's been left entirely to his discretion.

A Yes, and it is the Government's view that the Secretary's discretion at least applies to determining whether property has been allocated for the purposes -- consistent with the purpose of the Act.

I know in this regard, if the Chief Justice is interested in the closeness of the question from an equitable point of view, that the reason the Solicitor didn't find it close at all, decided the fact that the testator had made five or six wills and had changed his place of residence around a number of times so that he could feel that there wasn't that much weight to be given to the equitable considerations on the side of approving the testator's will and he felt quite

compelled by the fact that this man had never in his entire lifetime, done anything to support his daughter; never used any of the substantial income from his restricted properties in furtherance of her support and the Regional Solicitor felt that this was quite contrary to the purpose of the allotment act and of its conveyances.

Q Am I correct that all the parties inthis case are Indians?

A Yes; I believe that all the parties in this case are Indians.

Q So, when you keep emphasizing the fact that Congress meant for this to stay with the Indians, that's irrelevant; isn't it?

A Well, no, Mr. Justice Marshall, I divide that point into two. I think that it is -- part of Congress's purpose was to make sure that these lands passed on to Indians as opposed to nonIndians.

Q And what was the other point?

A But the other point which I think was really more central and was borne out by the statutory scheme, is that Congress intended for the specific — Congress was looking, not only to the interest of Indians in general, but to specific allottees and their immediate families and dependents. The original Allotment Act allotted land on the basis of the size of the family. The head of the household got a certain amount

and each dependent or ward of the household received a small amount of allotted land which was held by the Secretary in trust for that individual.

da.

Q Is there anything in the legislative history that said that the Secretary of the Interior should have the right to decide as to whether or not the testator distributed it fairly among his heirs, providing they were all Indians?

A Yes, there most certainly is, Mr. Justice

Marshall. I would like to quote now from the Congressional

Record, which is laid out at pages 11 and 12 of our brief, a

conversation occurring in the debate on the Floor of the House

of Representatives between Repre entative Cox of Indiana and

Mr. Burke, who is the — was the Chairman of the Indian Affairs

Committee of the House of Representatives.

Dassed, Congressman Cox asked Congressman Burke what the purpose of Section 2 was, from two points of view. He was interested, first of all, in knowing why Indians were given the power to write wills with respect to restricted properties which they had never had before and furthermore, what the Secretary of the Interior's role was with respect to approval or disapproval of those wills. And Mr. Burke cited the primary case to which he thought that Section 2 was directed, which was case in which an Indian allottee has after-born children who are not covered in the original allotment and in a case of that kind the Indian

frequently wishes to have these after-born children provided for and one way to provide for them would be to give them a disproportionate share of his own allotment upon his death.

6:

As Chairman Burke says -- I am now on page 12 of my brief: "In a case of that kind undoubtedly the Interior Department would okay it, whereas if it was a will giving his estate to some person who ought not to have it, then they would disapprove it."

- Q Well, what is there in this case to say that these people ought not to have it?
 - A Well, there isn't necessarily --
- Q Isn't the best equitable argument you've got that Miss High Horse should have a part of it?

A There is no provision, Mr. Justice Marshall, for giving her a part of it. The only power that the Secretary has is to approve the will or disapprove the will and he must take into account which of those produces a disposition of the property that is more in harmony with the purpose of the General Allotment Act to proserve this land in the family, and in harmony with the purpose to give some consideration, at least, to the testator's will.

- Q Just from a technical standpoint, could he have let the fifth will stand; or the 4th or the 3rd?
- A From a technical point of view, I believe he could have let the fifth will stand if it was still in existence

and were found to be properly executed, he could. I'm not familiar with that and counsel for co-respondent, Dorita High Horse, Mr. Hill, I believe, is better acquainted with that.

24.

And Mr. Stone, am I right about this, that what you have been saying about equitable considerations, that's not that broad; is it? I gather what you've been saying is that what the Secretary decides, if someone who should have been the object of his bounty was excluded by the will and the Secretary thinks that was unfair to exclude that person, then the Secretary may disapprove the will; is that it?

A I am sure, Mr. Justice Brennan, that I see the distinction between --

Q Well, obvously -- these words "equitable considerations," I don't know what that means. I gather what you have been saying is that really it comes down to whether he unfairly excluded someone who should have some provision --

A I don't think it has to be posed that narrowly,
Mr. Justice Brennan. I think it's better posed in terms of
whether the disposition which he made of his lands is in conformity with the purpose of the allotment act, which was to
keep those lands in the hands of the testator and his family
or more generally, within the Indian community.

Q Well, I know, but you -- what you have here is that everyone involved is within the family, either nieces or --

A But, there is surely a distinction, however,

with respect to that, and I think the laws of intestacy bear this distinction out altogether, since they give all of the property to the daughter and none to the nieces and nephews.

There is a distinction.

Q Yes, but the basic consideration here was that he should not have excluded from his will, his natural daughter in the distribution or the devises, rather, of these allotted lands.

A That is correct.

B

Q That's what the whole thing turned on. The Secretary just thought it wasn't fair not to have made a provision, for a share at least, of those lands to the daughter; isn't that right?

A The Secretary made the decision that it was not in keeping with the purpose behind the allotment for this girl to be left out of her father's will. Now --

Q But, does it appear in the record, Mr. Stone, whether the nieces were also allottees or potential allottees from their parents?

A From my knowledge it doesn't, Mr. Justice White.

It's possible that Mr. Hill may be better acquainted with that.

I didn't pick that up.

Q Well, it isn't in the record; is it?

- A Excuse me?
- Q It isn't in the record.

A Certainly not in the printed record. It may be in the transcript of the administrative hearing, which was stipulated out of the printed record. But I don't think this was the focus of the hearing examiner's inquiries.

just read to this Court, is illuminating, I think, not only because it shows that Congress intended to give the Secretary broad discretion with respect to whether restricted lands ought to be alienated by wills from the immediate heirs of the allotment holder; but also because it shows the purpose that Congress had in mind when it gave allottees the right to make wills was not to advocate prior policies of assuring that restricted lands remained in the family of the allottee. So, rather than to allow the allottee in certain situations, later flexibility in providing an even distribution of assets to his own heirs.

It would be a rather startling development in the statutory context under which the Secretary maintains complete power, both in and testamentary to determine whether this lands ought to be alienated to read the right of an Indian to make a will, all of a sudden, to mean that in this particular context, in other words, the context of a debt by will that --

Q Tell me, Mr. Stone, is there any suggestion that these particular petitioners are nieces and nephews of the decedent; weren't they?

A One was a niece and three others who were deeded

世

10.

land were nephews. 4 0 Well, now, would they be excluded from the class 2 of allottees? 3 I'm sorry, Mr. Justice Brennan. 13 Well, the allottee here was a decedent; right? 5 A That's right. 6 And for the purposes of the allotment act, would 7 these nieces and nephews, whatever they are, be included in the class? 0 No. They might have if they were not his --10 if he was living in their home they may be included in another 88 allotment from another household. 12 No, no. In his allotment? 13 No, they would not be included in his allotment. 14 Well, then is the Government's point that they 15 have to lose because Congress never intended that any except 16 his immediate family should be the benefiary of these allotted 17 lands? 18 I wouldn't say it that flatly, Mr. Justice 19 Brennan. I think Congress has left the Secretary greater dis-20 cretion than that. I think it evinces the policy that there 21 ought to be general disposition made to those within the 22 immediate allotment. 23 Well, is that an answer to me, then, that they 24 might have approved this will, even though all the allotted

lands went to nieces and nephews, rather than to the --0 Yes, the Secretary might have conceivably found 2 1 to man 3 Q Well, he certainly would have if there hadn't 1 been a natural daughter. 5 Oh, yes; I think that's true. He certainly 6 would have. At least I have not been able to ascertain any reason from the record why he would not. 8 If the Court had jurisdiction on this, would it 9 have to decide what it felt was fair; would that be the 10 question? 18 I don't believe, Mr. Justice Black, that the A 12 Court would decide whether, what it thought was fair. I think 13 that the Regional Solicitor would detide what he thought was 84 fair. 15 Yes, but I understand that the argument is --16 Yes, I think the Court would onlyhave to take a 17 look at the record and decide whether there was any substantial 18 evidence to support the Regional Solicitor's reasoning. 19 Q Well, in the final analysis he would be overruling 20 him as to whether he thought it was fair; if he would go con-29 trary to the thing; wouldn't he? 22 If the Court would --A 23 Would the Court be finally passing on all of --24 Under the very limited standard of review of A 25

24.

discretionary finding of an administrative agency, which is simply to determine whether there was a substantial reason, substantial evidence --

Q I'm not talking about the degree now, but in the final analysis --

A That's right; in the final analysis the Secretary's determination were reversed his discretion would ---

Q And your claim is that the Government was left by the Congress with complete and conclusive powers to decide this question, without any judicial review?

A Yes, that is the Government's contention. I think that, although it is not always the most appealing position for the Government to take, to say that there is absolutely no review, I think that all of these special conditions under which allotted properties are subject to the guardianshipof the Secretary of the Interior, might be viewed as this Court has viewed them in the historical context of the Government's relationship to Indian tribes and tribal lands.

Q You don't think there is any significance to the presence of nonreviewability clause in the case of an Indian who has not left a will, in the absence of such a clause --

A I think, Mr. Justice Harlan, that there is -- it would certainly be better, from the Government's point of view, if the words "final and conclusive" were cited again --

Q It certainly would. How do you explain the

difference between those two provisions in that regard?

Well, it is our position that the final and conclusive language was not repeated in Section 2 because it was unnecessary. It was so clear that Sections 1 and 2 were complementary provisions, which together, encompassed all of the Secretary's powers in respect to reviewing disposition of debt of restricted lands. And we have charted, I think, considerable positive evidence to the effect that Congress intended for both Section 1 and 2 provisions to be nonreviewable. I just read very, very briefly from Page 11 in our brief from the same date which this Court -- on the basis which this Court decided in Section 1 determinations were in fact, nonreviewable in which Mr. Cox asks Mr. Burke under the provisos that now exist in Section 2, does it not place complete power in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, over the willof an Indian, with absolute power to revoke the Indian's will and the answer is: "Yes, I think it does."

At this point I must ask the Court's permission to give the rostrum to co-respondent Dorita High Horse's attorney, with whom I agreed to split the time in this case.

Thank you.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mr. Stone.

41

Mr. Hill.

ORAL ARGUMENT BY HOUSTON BUS HILL, ESQ.

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

99

12

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT DORITA HIGH HORSE

400

2

3

B

5

6

7

8

9

10

49

12

13

80

15

16

97

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. HILL: Mr. Chief Justice and Honorable Justices of this Court: In order to enlighten Mr. Justice White and Justice Thurgood Marshall on the point as to what effect this will would have if the Secretary of Interior had disapproved it and there was unrestricted property which would be handled by the state courts in our state. And the only thing about the unrestricted property, in the State of Oklahoma we have a statute which makes the surviving spouse a fourth heir to the, toone-third of the property. So, if it's that situation, why, the surviving spouse would be entitled to one-third of it, regardless of the will. And the only thing that the county judge and probate judge might take into consideration is the fact that the Secretary, acting by and through his agent, had either approved or disapproved the will. They could take that into consideration and might be persuasive to him, but he wouldn't have to be bound by that as to whether or not the will should be probated in the county court of that county on the unrestricted property.

Q But now, the same statutory provisions in most states which give what is sometimes called "the dower right," to the surviving widow, also give virtually unrestricted power to the testator to omit his children if he wants to.

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, is that true?

A Yes, sir. Normally, it's required that they make some indication in the will that they intended to deprive that child. Now, if the Court please, I handled this case throughout the trial before the Examiner of Inheritance and am thoroughly familiar with the facts of the case. And I want to say this --

Q Who did you represent?

A I represented Dorita High Horse and some of the other nieces and nephews. Now, bear this in mind, that here this full blood Comanche Indian was another allottee. He inherited this land, itself, from his mother and some of the others, under the General Allotment Act of February 7, 1887. That was the General Allotment Act which only affected the wild tribes and it did not include the five civilized tribes which the Justice was making mention a while ago about Justice Barefoot. I am a member of the Choctaw Tribe, myself, but it didnt have any effect upon the five civilized tribes or the Osage tribes, themselves.

But of these wild tribes, you take the Comanche and the Apaches, the Otoes and Wastows and tribes like that. Now, the first — after the legislation was enacted in 1910 giving the power and authority to the Secretary of the Interior to determine, under Section 372 whether or not certain heirs were entitled to be heirs of the deceased and holding that, in the statute, that that was final and conclusive, then in Section 373

make a will if he is 21 years of age, pursuant to the Indian to make a will if he is 21 years of age, pursuant to the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Interior. And then it was not valid unless and untilit was approved by the Secretary of the Interior and then it would be approved or disapproved by him after the death of the Indian. And normally, that's the way they handled those matters down there, to wait until after the Indian dies. Then his will is submitted to the Examiner of Inheritance and he has a hearing onthis and determines whether or not the Indian was competent to make the will and whether or not the will itself complied with all the requirements made under the rules promulgated by the Secretary of Interior.

Now, once having done that, then he determines whether or not there are any other causes by which, or reasons by which he might say, "Well, I don't think this will is fair and equitable because it doesn't take care of the decement's or the testator's heirs, themselves.

Now, this Dorita High Horse it is true that she didn't live with her father, who was George Chahsenah, but the trial court, the Examinerof Inheritance found that she was the legitimate child of George Chahsenah and that she didn't get any benefits from his estate and he didn't provide for her all during that period of time and even after she became of age, didn't. He made six wills down there and I want to say to the Court that I am thoroughly familiar.

The first will he made he made and left the beneficiary, this Viola Attuwattu, which is her name and she was married to a man by the name of James Tate, who was also a Comanche Indian.

Q What relation, if any, was there between that beneficiary and the decedent?

A She was a niece.

O A niece.

next he made a will to Sammy Schwartzer who ran a grocery store there; Sammy was a white man. Sammy was the one who bailed him out every time he got put in jail when he got drunk and he would pay his fine and he would help him and give him money. And he testified that he didn't think that this will had any consequence. After he found out about it he thought that the Indian didn't even know what he was doing and that was part of the testimony, of course, that I tried to submit to the Examiner of Inheritance that the man wasn't even competent to make a will in the first place. And all of the evidence was to the effect that he didn't know what he was doing; he had never transacted any business for himself and was an habitual drunkard all of his life.

Q From what period of time did he make these six wills?

A From 1956 to 1963. He died -- he made his last

will early in 1963 and he died in October of 1964.

13.

Now, bear this in mind that up until 1954 he lived with his mother, his father having died when he was a young man. But they were living there in Apache.

Q Well, didn't a Government lawyer help him draw his last will?

A Yes, that's true and the Government lawyer draws all these wills, Your Honor and he --

Q Did he draw all six of them?

A Well, somebody inthere drew all six of them;
yes, sir. And they, under the rules and regulations they are
required to ascertain whether or not he had a child, or has any
surviving brothers or sisters or mother and father. Now, they
didn't ascertain that and yet it was on record there in the
Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, the area
office at Anadarko, that he did have this child, Dorita High
Horse. She was on the ______ and Comanche and Apache rolls,
he even made the per capita payment in 1958 as his child and
the nieces and nephews knew about that. They knew that she was
on the roll as his daughter.

Q Who was Fred Benke?

A Sir?

Q Who was Fred Benke?

A Now, that was a white man. I don't know anything about him.

And so was Schwartzer? 9 But all the evidence was, if the Court please, 2 that this Indian was an accoholic and he would do anything to 3 get a drink. 1 Well, the Government lawyer who drew this will, 5 wasn't he requiredtto find out whether the man was capable? 6 Yes, but --A 07 Did he raise the question at all? 0 8 He didn't raise the question at all, Your Honor. A 9 He drew six wills; he talked to them at least 10 six times. 98 I beg your pardon, Your Honor. He wouldn't be 12 the one that would be in there all that time. 13 Well, it would be a Government lawyer. 0 84 A They can change from time to time. 15 But they are all Government lawyers? 16 Yes, sir; well, they could be or they could have 17 been somebody else in there. They might have had someone else 18 in there that wasn't a lawyer, but he knew how they drew these 19 wills. 20 But, did he not represent the Government? 0 21 Yes, sir. A 22 The Government had the responsibility of finding 0 23 out whether this man was apparently capable? 28

Yes, sir.

Q Obviously he was apparently capable?

elose.

A

A Obviously, and they testified that they had no independent recollection of when he came into the office to execute this last will.

- Q That issue is not before us now?
- A No, sir; it really isn't, Your Honor.
- Q It's been resolved against you by the Solicitor or by the trial examiner or whoever it was.
 - A Well, the trial examiner did hold, Your Honor --
- Q They found that he was competent and the Solicitor agreed with that?

A That is right, Your Honor. And we don't have to go into that, but I thought itmight be helpful for the Court to know that here was a man who was a drunkard and who would make a will on the slightest provocation. He would exchange goods and property and meat and groceries and everything else to get some money to buy his liquor and was either drinking or drunk all the time.

O But this is not before us now.

A No. And he, as a matter of fact, when he was with this beneficiary under the will, this Viola Attuwattu and her children and family he was only there just a short time. He hadbeen living with all these other nieces and nephews from time to time, so he wasn't one that was just living with them and they were taking care of him or anything like that. They

Prof. didn't take care of him, he was paying his own way all of the 2 time. 3 There is no evidence he ever lived with his 13 daughter; is there? 5 No, there is not, sir; no, sir. 6 Is there substantial evidence that she is his 7 daughter? 8 A Substantial evidence, Your Honor, that she was his legitimate daughter and under Section 371, I think it is, 9 10 that where the Indians cohabit and their offsprings, for all intents and purposes, that offspring is a legitimate child and 98 the Secretary of Interior, acting by and through the Solicitor's 12 office so held that Dorita High Horse was the natural daughter 13 of George Chahsenah, who was the testator of this will. 94 So that there can be no doubt --15 0 That's right --16 -- be no doubt that she is his daughter --17 Yes, sir and under Section 372 --A 18 And if part of the property or all of it went to 19 her, it would be an Indian. 20 Yes, sir. When the will was vacated and set 21 aside, all the property went to Dorita High Horse, the daughter 22 Now, the Secretary of Interior said we don't need to go into 23

these other wills, because we are familiar with them; we know

what they held; they didn't any of them mention anything about

20

Dorita High Horse or didn't take care of her in any way and she wasn't the beneficiary under any of them.

So, we're setting those aside, too. So, it isn't like, Justice, that you were speaking of, where you would go back to the next will and if you had gone back to the next will you would have gone back to this cousin of his --

Q All that all of his wills had in a mon was that they showed a very clear intention not to make Dorita High Horse the object of his bounty; is that right?

A At least she wasn't mentioned. I don't think that he didn't intend to take care of her, but he certainly didn't mention her in any of those wills.

Q And if he had died intestate, I suppose she would have been the sole heir.

A She would have been the sole heir; yes.

Q And so probably one could see as the sole purpose of making a will was to see to it that she did not inherit his property; is that right?

A Not necessarily so. I think the sole purpose of making the will was in order to get some money to buy some liquor, Your Honor.

Q If he hadn't made any will she would have --

A If he hadn't made a will she would have been the one to inherit all of this property; yes, sir.

Now, I handled this case that went before this Court.

A

This Homovich versus Chapman that went in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. And that's a case wherein I had taken the position and the Government had taken the position that under Section 373 that the courts could not review the decision of the Secretary of Interior where he had passed upon or either approved or disapproved the will. In that case he approved the will in Homovich. Homovich was a full-blooded Comanche Indian and he had married a white woman who was a school teacher in Warwick, Oklahoma, and she came in and wanted to set aside this will so she could participate and it was almost like the case of Blanset versus Cardin which came up from the east side of the State of Oklahoma where a Choctaw Indian had married a white man and he was willing to participate in her estate and that was the leading case in construing these particular statutes.

7

2

3

13

5

6

7

9

10

99

12

13

10

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And they held there that the Congress under its plenary powers, had given a great supervision over these Indians and their property and he had placed that supervision in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior with all the discretionary power and authority necessary to take care of that without any intereference on the outside by the courts or anybody else. And whatever he did with respect to that, why, that was it. It was more or less final.

Q If your argument is accepted, does that settle who will get this property?

	A	Yes, it would, but I
	Ω	Who would get it?
	A	I think the Court here
	Q	Justice Black has a question.
	Q	Who would get it?
	A	Who would get this?
finally un	Ω	The property when it's finally settled. If
8 your argument is accepted.		
	A	Dorita High Horse, the daughter, would get the
property i	.f my	argument is accepted, Your Honor.
	Q	That is the illegitimate child.
	A	And I want to bring this out. Since this case
has been i	n li	tigation, Miss Viola Attuwattu, who is the niece,
is decease	ed no	w and one of the other beneficiaries; one of the
other neph	lews,	or grand nephew, is also deceased, so there are
only two	child	ren left.
*	Q	Does the record show how much this property is
worth?		
	A	Sir?
	Ω	Does the record show how much this Indian left?
	A	Yes, it does, but it probably wouldn't in the
Court here	, bu	t when it was at the Circuit Court of Appeals it
did show.		
	Ω	You could just tell us the size.
	A	WEll, I would say this property is worth in the
	property in the property in th	A Q Q A Q your argument A property if my Q A has been in li is deceased no other nephews, only two child Q worth? A Court here, bu did show.

neighborhood of \$100,000, because it's got some production on 9 it, if the Court please. 2 Well, it's \$64,000-odd that s the official 3 finding. 13 That's the official finding; yes, sir. A 123 But you know that's worth \$50,000? 0 6 Well, I would say it was worth a little more y than that. I think this productiveness had probably made it 8 worth a little more and of course, they had production on it 9 at the time that they made this appraisal, Your Honor; and I am 10 sure they were trying to get enough --9 17 That was an official appraisal; was it? 12 Yes, sir; it was. They have official appraisals 13 after any of these Indians die and are under the supervisionof 14 the area offices, sworn on behalf of the Secretary of the 15 Interior, they had to make an appraisal of these properties. 16 If your argument is accepted, as I understand 17 it, the property would go to the daughter, even though she is 18 illegitimate? 19 Yes, sir. A 20 And if it is rejected, it would go to his niece. 21 No; it wouldn't even go to his niece, Your Honor. 22 She is deceased. It would go to two of these grand nieces. The 23 two grand nieces, they are the only ones surviving now. 24

Just one grand niece?

A Yes. And that's what the Congress had in mind and that's what --

.Q These new people.

ang.

A Yes, sir; and that's what the Secretary of the Interior had in mind when he asked Congress to pass this 1910 Act, was to give him all this power and authority so he could determine these things himself, rather than leave it to the United States court.

And certainly that was the first time that they ever had any authority to make any wills, was under the 1910 Act.

Q You mean Indians didn't have the authority to make wills on their property, real and personal property?

A Well, if they owned persona) property independent of their restricted which was being held in trust by the United States Government under the General Allotment Act, they could have disposed of that property, if it is unrestricted property.

Restricted property could not be disposed of by the Indians until the 1910 Act, and then in 1913 amended Section 373 so that the Secretary of Interior then could either approve or disapprove this will after the death of the Indian. I think they decided that sometimes they might approve this will before the Indian died and then they would be caught with having permitted the estate of this Indian to go to somebody who was not entitled to receive it or they shouldn't receive it. And that is the whole purpose behind this thing, is to protect

these Indians and the Indian heirs of these testators and the Indians who took advantage of this section to make a will. 2 So, I think if this Court would determine that it 3 didn't have jurisdiction to hear this under -- they claim under 1 28 U.S.C. Section 1361 --5 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Your time is up. 6 MR. HILL: Thank you. 7 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Luellen, you have a 8 few minutes left; do you have anything else? I think we have 9 the picture pretty clearly and you can be brief, I think. 10 MR. LUELLEN: I will just take a few minutes, Your 11 Honor. 12 Justice Harlan made some inquiry about the regulations 13 there found in Brief for Petitioner's appendix A, Judge 14 Osterico's regulations. Nothing in the regulations whatsoever 15 about an Indian must disburse equity when he makes his will. 16 Where did you say they appear? 17 They are in Appendix A in the Brief for A 18 Petitioner. Appendix A, Brief for Petitioner. 19 Q Thank you. 20 And here is what it really says about an Indian. 21 It says, "Making approval as to form, an Indian at the age of 22 21 years and of testamentary capacity, who has any right, title 23 or interest in trust or restricted property, may dispose of such 24

property by a will executed in writing and attested by two

disinterested adult witnesses." Now, that's the meat of the regulations right there in the factum of the will.

Q Where were you reading from?

A That was on Page -- Appendix A-2, page A-3.
A-3, Subsection --

0 15.28?

pera

A Yes, 15.28.

Q Thank you.

In those wills that the Department of the Interior prepares and sends down to the various field offices for the Government employees, the Government attorneys to use, It has instructions, it is in my reply brief, it has instructions in there that says, "Be sure to find out what the Indian wants to do when you make this will." It's printed right on the back of those forms. If you look up the original record you will find in that original will, the instructions to the field officers tell them to find out what the Indian's desires are. There is nothing in there about finding out about who—about disposing the equity between the heirs.

Now, the Counsel, Mr. Stone, he said there was no case he could find where they had disallowed a will of an Indian for equity, and I agree withihim. There is no case where they have ever thrown out a will and said, "Well, we didn't disburse equity; we didn't do equity, therefore we will disallow this will." This will be a new field in that respect if this becomes

the law in this case.

que de

Pos

I -- Mr. Hill mentioned about -- one more point and
I'll let the Court decide this case, in which you are going to
anyway.

Now, Mr.Hill stated that this niece had died since this hearing had been held before the Examiner of Heirs and one of her children have died. That's immaterial to the issues in this matter. It is very well Dorita High Horse could have died the next day. The sin is cast as of the date of the death of the testator. What happens after that is immaterial and the Secretary of the Interior as to who is going to die and who is going to live, he couldn't make any determination about that, because one or two of these devisees and legatees have died since this matter came into the courts. That's immaterial in this matter.

The Secretary can't sit back and say, "Well, so and so is going to die, so we will give it to them to give to someone else.

Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mr. Luellen. Thank you, gentlemen; the case is submitted.

(Whereupon, at 11:22 o'clock a.m. the argument in the above-entitled matter was concluded)