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Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1969

Supreme Court, U &

In the Matter of:

UNITED STATES,

MICHAEL BUIE,

Petitioner,

vs,

Respondent.

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Place Washington, D. C.

Date October 15, 1969

Docket No. 271

MARSHAL'S OFFICE OCT 21 2 58 PM '6

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2	October Term, 1969		
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4	MICHAEL BUIE,		
5	Petitioner;		
6	vs. No. 271		
7	UNITED STATES,		
.8	Respondent. :		
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10	Washington, D. C. October 15, 1969		
21	The above-entitled matter came on for argument at		
12	12:43 p.m.		
13	BEFORE:		
14	WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice		
15	WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice		
16	WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice		
17	BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice		
19	APPEARANCES:		
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24	Office of the Solicitor General Department of Justice		
25	Washington, D. C. Counsel for Respondent		

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PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: No. 271, Bule against the United States.

You may proceed whenever you are ready, Mr. Diamond.

ARGUMENT OF DAVID A. DIAMOND, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. DIAMOND: May it please the Court, this case concerns the application of the privilege against self-incrimination as developed in the Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes cases, and most recently in the Leary case, to the situation of a transferor of marijuana pursuant to the transfer order form requirements of the marijuana tax statute.

Briefly, the facts of this case are that the petitioner was introduced by a friend to two Federal narcotics agents acting in an undercover capacity. They had no knowledge of his existence prior to the introduction. They were introduced to him simply as "Mike", the petitioner's first name.

As a result of the introduction, there were various sales of marijuana and marijuana drugs. The sales were made not in pursuance of an order form issued by the Treasurer of the United States, as required by 26 U.S.C., Section 4742.

Petitioner did not request an order form from the agents. The agents had not procured such an order form. Petitioner was indicted on three counts, two of which were selling not in pursuance of an order form, and was convicted on one

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count of not selling pursuant to an order form.

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The case was affirmed by the Second Circuit, relying solely on United States against Minor. The Second Circuit held that the marijuana tax statute was, for practical purposes, the same as the Narcotic Drug Act involved in Minor; that there was no risk of self-incrimination to a transferor; and that the transferor of marijuana was not a person inherently suspect of criminal activities; and that the profession of transferring marijuana or being involved in marijuana transactions was not an inherently suspect illegal business.

This was not a statute designed to close down criminal activity but, rather, to regulate a legitimate activity.

Briefly, the Marijuana Tax Act statutory scheme consists of an occupational tax provision, series of provisions, requiring any transferor of marijuana, anyone who deals in marijuana, which is defined very broadly and includes selling it and giving it away, to register as a dealer, to pay an occupational tax, and to keep a record of his transactions.

There is also a transfer tax provision which requires a transferee, a purchaser or acquirer of marijuana, to obtain an order form from the Treasurer of the United States. He must pay in advance the tax on the material to be acquired. The tax is either at the rate of \$1 an ounce or \$100 an ounce, depending on whether the transferee is himself registered. He pays the tax based upon the amount he intends to acquire.

In order for him to acquire that order form, he must place on file with the Government, prior to obtaining the form, and prior to consummating the transaction, his own name and address and the name and address of his proposed transferor, as well as the amount of the drug he proposes to transfer.

There are numerous exemptions from the order form requirement and, as the Court noted in Leary, they are essentially all of the legitimate transactions that are involved in marijuana, transfers by doctors to patients, by pharmacists to customers pursuant to doctors' orders, by officials of the Government, and transactions for export, so there is left subject to the order form requirement a residual class essentially illegal transactions.

The information obtained by the order form, copies of the order form, are made available to any State of local official who is concerned officially with the enforcement of local narcotics laws.

Possession of marijuana is illegal in every State of the Union with certain very limited exceptions corresponding largely to the exemptions of the order form requirements under 4742.

Q You can't get an order form from the Secretary unless you show that you are legal under State law, can you?

A No. Any person may obtain an order form. Marijuana statutes differ radically, and narcotics statutes, in this regard. Any person desiring to acquire an order form may acquire it. If he is a so-called legitimate purchaser, one who is registered under the occupational tax sections, he pays \$1 per ounce. If he is an illegitimate purchaser, one who is not registered, he pays \$100 an ounce. But any person off the street who wants to acquire marijuana for smoking or any other purpose may acquire an order form.

Q And pay \$100 an ounce.

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A And pay \$100 an ounce; yes, sir.

The Leary case involved such a purchaser. The Leary case held that the marijuana statute, the transfer provisions, as applied to an unregistered transferee, who was Leary, applied to a person inherently suspect of criminal activities and existed in an area permeated with criminal statutes, particularly by virtue of the exposure of the information contained on the order form to the State authorities.

It held, therefore, that the privilege against selfincrimination applied. The Court in Leary also refused to sever
the statute so as to make the order form applicable but withdraw the information from the perusal of the State.

It also applied the privilege against self-incrimination to prospective acts, since in the Leary case the purchaser acquired the order form prior to the time that any transaction was consummated.

Petitioner here contends that the Leary reasoning

applies fully to the position of a transferor of marijuana.

Under the same order form procedure, the acts required of the transferor, in order to comply with the provisions of 4742, yield an even greater danger than they did to the transferee of marijuana.

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I reviewed briefly the acts which we consider constitute the self-incrimination aspects of this thing in terms of the transferor. There are four acts, some or all of which may be present with respect to any particular transaction in relation to marijuana on the part of the transferor.

I may note again that the name and address of the transferor must be on file with the Government prior to the consummation of the transaction. The mechanism provided by the statute is the use of the transferee. The transferee must procure the order form and give the information directly to the Government.

We maintain, however, that the statutory scheme envisions the transferee as a conduit for the transfer of the required information to the Government, which information demands acts on the part of the transferor incriminating to himself. He must, knowing that the information is going to the Government, and that it is incriminating to him, provide information.

- Q The form is Appendix B in your brief.
- A That is correct.
- Q As you point out, this is a form quite different

from the one in the last case, in that the seller's name is on the it comes from the Government, isn't it?

A That is correct. In addition, the general structure of the form is a directive to the transferor --

O To the seller.

A — to the seller, from the Government, authorizing him, so far as the Federal act is concerned, to transfer a certain quantity of marijuana to a specified transferee. Again, the transferee is the Government's conduit for sending this form to the transferor.

Q I suppose, though, if the buyer goes to a fellow he thinks is selling marijuana and says, "Give me your name," and the seller says, "Sorry, I won't do it," and then the pututive buyer finds the seller's name out from someone else and puts it on the order form, the seller may be incriminated, but he hasn't incriminated himself, has he?

A He hasn't at that point.

Q But when does he ever, as far as his name is concerned?

A The information goes to the Government through the hand of the transferee.

Q Through his hands, but the seller hasn't incriminated himself. I don't suppose there is anything that is illegally incriminating as far as the seller is concerned if a buyer furnishes information to the Government.

A No. There is no privilege against self-incrimination on behalf of the transferee in relation to the transferor's name. However, there are other acts required.

Cont.

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Assuming that the transferee finds the name, independent of the transferor, and delivers it independently to the Government, I may note in passing that the name was not revealed so far as this record is concerned, to the transferee by the transferor.

Q That was my next question. There is no evidence in this case that the seller ever gave his name to anybody.

A That is correct. The seller and the buyers were strangers. They were introduced by a third party solely on the basis of first names. That is in the record. However, once the transferee has obtained an order form, the transferor must accept that order form.

We contend that the act of acceptance is an acknowledgement and an adaptation of the information contained on the order form. The order form is an inherently incriminating device when it contains the information that the transferor has sold certain drugs illegally to a transferee. When the transferor acced to that piece of paper, even if he refused to accept it, if he were to ask about its existence, if he were to learn of the existence of this piece of paper, and then transfer drugs pursuant to it, he would be adopting the information on that paper as his own as being true and valid.

extent in the incriminatory act involved in the order form process. In our mind, it is the same thing as signing a confession that someone else has typed. The information may already be in the possession of somebody else, but when you take it as your own, you are acknowledging it as true.

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It is possible, although for practical reasons very unlikely, that a transferee might obtain an order form without speaking to anyone. Obviously at that point nothing has been done by the transferor to incriminate himself. When he accepts the piece of paper, he has enabled the transferee to say, when asked, "I gave this piece of paper to the buyer and he accepted it," assuming that the buyer would tell the truth. We cannot postulate that the statute will be maintained on the basis of the seller's perjury.

Assuming the seller would tell the truth when asked, he would be required to say that he accepted this piece of paper. In addition, he is required by the statute to retain the piece of paper, which constitutes an additional piece of evidence of his criminal act, for two years, and to make it available to all law enforcement officials who might come to ask for it in that two years.

Q Which precise statutory provision, of the ones contained in your appendix, has this man been convicted of violating?

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4742.

That is right. 4742(a) is the general require-A ment that you may not transfer marijuana except pursuant to an

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order form.

at the time --

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Do you assert that there is anything wrong with

that just as a provision in the statute?

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Insofar as the mechanism for obtaining the order

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form is provision (c) and (d) of 4742, and insofar as the order

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form requires that information be on file which is incriminating

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Do you say the Fifth Amendment bars the Govern-

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ment from prohibiting sales except on order forms, just as such?

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The use of the order form by itself, no. If this

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were to be an order form of the sort contained in the Narcotic

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Drug statutes, then we would not feel that the seller would be

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incriminated by requiring that such an order form exist. The

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theory of it in the narcotic drug case is, I believe, that the

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order form requirement is to see to it that unlawful people do not obtain narcotic drugs. That result is perfected by requir-

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ing the name and address of the buyer, of the transferee, to be

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in the hands of the Government prior to the sale, or issuing

order forms only to legitimate people.

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But in this case the order form does require that the

name and address of the transferor be in the hands of the

Government prior to the sale.

Q Suppose he gets the order form and fills it out.

Has he incriminated himself if he does nothing more than that?

A The transferor does not obtain the order form and does not fill it out. The transferee obtains the order form and fills it out.

Q Right, and if he takes the order form and fills it out and does nothing more --

A Has the transferor incriminated himself?

Q Have either been incriminated? The incrimination is when you sell the drugs, isn't that right?

A The information in the hands of the Government directs the attention of the Government to a group of people who are suspect, and very strongly suspect, of criminal activity.

Even the focus of their attention --

Q If they don't engage in this criminal activity, are they injured?

A They would presumably then be able to refute the implication that arises from the existence of the order form.

Q How is the filling out of the blank, in and of itself, without more, incriminating?

A I think there is a very heavy presumption, that that blank would not be filled out were the transaction not going to be completed. Among other things, the tax must be paid prior to filling out of the form; that is, you cannot

obtain the form without paying the tax.

Q To use a phrase we sometimes use, what "triggers' all of it is the buying or selling of the marijuana.

A Yes. If one were not interested in buying or selling marijuana, one would not deal with these forms at all. However, the danger, the suspicion engendered by the existence of the form, is such that the existence of the form, I think, would cause the attention of the authorities to be focused very closely on these people.

Q Isn't it the paper, the form, the filling out of the form, plus an overt act that makes the criminal offense here?

A The offense is the overt act, or the overt act in the absence of the piece of paper.

O But as Justice Marshall just suggested, the piece of paper alone, filled out and signed, doesn't incriminate the man at all, does it?

A If the transaction were to have gone no further than that, then I believe it would be incriminating in that the statute provides that the piece of paper may be used as evidence and the existence of the piece of paper may serve to bring into initiation the process of prosecution in relation to a drug.

Presumably the transferor who did not transfer, but is simply named as a transferor, would be able to testify that he did not, in fact, ever commit any acts of this sort, and were he to be believed, then --

000 Q Would there be any occasion for him to testify 2 about it at all if all he did was fill out the form? The transferor does not fill out the form in 3 this case. The transferee only fills out the form. 1 Q I am talking about the transferee now. If the 5 transferee just fills out the form, on Justice Marshall's 6 hypothetical, and puts it in the drawer of his desk, he has 7 committed no offense, has he? 8 This Court, in Leary, considered that the cor-9 relation between the act of filling out the form and the act of 10 selling or buying the drug was so close that it viewed the 99 existence of the form as being evidence of being a recent 82 transferee of marijuana, even though the existence of the form 13 did not necessarily imply that any transaction had been com-14 pleted at all. 15 What we have in Appendix B is what is issued by 16 the Treasury Department. 87 A That is correct. 13 In order to get that issued to him, a prospective 19 would-be transferee has to make an application for it, I assume. 20 That is correct. 21 In the application, does he give the name of the 22 prospective vendor? 23 A Yes, he does. 24 What is to prevent him from just putting George 25 13

that you put down nothing except a name and address of somebody.

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accepted this order form, he is acknowledging the truth of the information contained on the order form, that is, that he, the prospective, the proposed transferor, has transferred to this transferee the specified quantities of marijuana. At that time he has committed a self-incriminatory act.

In addition, he must retain that form for two years to serve as further evidence.

In connection with obtaining the order form, the Leary case held that an unregistered transferee is protected against obtaining the order form because it is self-incriminatory for him to do so. This makes it very unlikely that an illegal transferee will obtain the order form to give to the transferor unless the transferor insists upon it.

We maintain that if this statute is to be taken as written, and interpreted by this Court, that a major part of the motivating power for getting the information into the hands of the Government, who will use it to the detriment of the transferor, must come from the transferor himself. A transferee, under the present state of the law, is very, very unlikely to procure an order form unless the transferor simply insists upon it.

You cannot, under these circumstances, say that the transferor is a passive party who need only inquire whether the

order form exists. If the order form is to exist, it must be that the transferor brings it about that it exists, even though he himself does not ever go to the Treasury Department and sign his name on a piece of paper.

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Q That is the part I don't understand, and that is what prompted my question of a moment ago.

What has the transferor got to do with this?

A He must see to it that the piece of paper exists when the transaction is completed. If he does not see to it, it is very unlikely, either because the transferee will be incapable of doing it because he does not know the information, that is, the transferor has not given him his name and address, or because he does not desire to do it, it is very unlikely for either of those reasons that a transferee will obtain the order form.

If an order form is to come into existence, it must be because the transferor has provided the primary motivation for its coming into existence. He must affirmatively act to his own detriment.

We maintain that the self-incrimination comes about through a conduit that the statute has provided. The transferee is, in effect, the Government itself, for purposes of dealing with the transferor and procuring the order form. The transferee would not himself procure the order form if the transferor did not insist upon it.

Q The seller never incriminated himself, on the facts of this case. But if he had received an order form with his name on it, he automatically insulates himself from conviction under this statute.

A But he exposes himself to conviction under all the State statutes, whatever State statute is relevant, and to another provision of the statute which makes it illegal for him to be a transferor of marijuana without being registered. The petitioner here was an unregistered transferor and he is an inherently suspect person. If his name appeared on a piece of paper in the hands of the Government as a transferor, he would be immediately suspect.

If he saw to it that the transferee procured such a piece of paper, he would be seeing to his own incrimination in the eyes of the Government.

Q Why should he be able to say this when there was never an order form in this case?

A If there had been an order form, the incriminatory act would have been completed as soon as he received the order form or learned of its existence, and then transferred marijuana pursuant to it.

There was no order form in the Leary case either, and there were no registration forms in the Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes cases. The point is that filling out the order form, or acting pursuant to the order form in this case is in itself the

incriminatory act.

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In Leary, the incrimination, the dangerous incrimination, was at the hands of the State, not at the hands of the Federal Government, and information came to the State authorities not from Leary himself, but from the Federal Government. Leary provided the information only to the Federal Government, who then provided it to other people who would indict and convict Leary. This was felt to be too dangerous.

I would like to make a distinction between the Narcotic Drug Act and the Marijuana Act.

Under the Marijuana Act there are virtually no legitimate users of marijuana. There were in the last published reports 80 registered people, people who could deal legitimately with marijuana. I am informed by counsel for the Government that the number is now approximately 160. But it compares insignificantly to the approximately 200,000 registered people involved in the narcotic drug trade.

This is an illegal activity and this is a set of statutes intended to cause people to expose themselves as dealers in illegal activities.

I will save the remainder of my time for rebuttal.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Connolly?

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ARGUMENT OF JOSEPH J. CONNOLLY, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MR. CONNOLLY: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:

In the light of the preceding discussion of the principlies applicable here and in Minor, our brief submission will focus on the Government's view of the statute in this case, and our response to the central features of petitioner's argument.

requires that he receive from his transferee an order form which the transferee shall obtain, in some way compels him to make incriminating disclosures to the Government. We believe that his contention seeks to establish much more than the words of the statute or its operation in fact can support.

The offense defined by Section 4742(a) does not make criminal petitioner's failure to report any previous misconduct to the Government, nor does the order form provision require him to make incriminating disclosures to the Government in order to legalize his subsequent conduct.

The transferor is neither required nor entitled to apply for an order form from the District Director. The only duty which this statute imposes on the petitioner is to transfer marijuana only to those persons who have made their acquisition lawful by paying the tax and receiving an order form.

The statute punishes not a failure to disclose

information but a transfer, a transfer to someone who does not demonstrate that he has complied with Federal law. It is our position that the statute on its face and in practice can be complied with without the transferor's disclosing any information at all.

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Petitioner's argument to the contrary is found in that he asserts to be the practical consequences of the statute. He notes that the transferee must provide the name and address of the transferor in his application for an order form. He then assumes that the transferee can obtain that information only from the transferor himself.

This assumption is essential to the success of petitioner's argument for it provides the aspect of self-incrimination which is lacking on the fact of the statute. Unless it can be said that the transferee necessarily must obtain that information from the transferor, it cannot be said that compliance with the statute infringes the transferor's right to refrain from making incriminating disclosures.

on which his argument rests. If he is relying on common experience to justify the assumption, such experience in our view refutes the assumption as evidenced by the many cases like this one in which a purchaser who may be previously unknown to a seller of marihuana is introduced to him by a friendly intermediary who can supply the name of the transferor.

We also think it is appropriate to point out that this case seems to be a most unlikely vehicle to establish as a Constitutional principle a doctrine that a transferee of mari-huana can learn the name and address of the seller only from the seller himself.

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The facts in this case show that some 10 days before the transaction on which he was convicted petitioner sold a quantity of marihuana to narcotics agents in the kitchen of his apartment.

Petitioner would have the Court conclude that there was no way except from the petitioner himself that the agents could have learned his name prior to the second transaction. But we think it needs no argument that persons who sell marihuana in the kitchens of their homes are poorly situated to conceal their names and addresses.

By basing his argument on assumptions as to the practical effect of the statute, petitioner emphasizes the critical
difference between this case and Leary and its anticedents. In
each of those cases, the statute on its face imposed on the
petitioner himself an obligation to supply certain information.
There was only one way the petitioner in those cases could
comply with the statute — by supplying the information himself.

In the present case, it is clear that the transferor can comply fully and literally with the statute where he receives an order form for which he gave no information at all.

In his oral argument, petitioner makes the additional contention that even if he did not supply any information to the transferee to enable the transferee to obtain the form that the mere fact that he receives an order form thus obtained by the transferee is an incriminatory act; that is, I think the language that he uses, that he adopts the language on the form.

We submit in response to that contention that there is no increimination, htere is no disclosure upon receipt of the form at all. The petitioner is ---

Q Would it be an offense under 4742(a) for a man named John Smith to see marihuana to somebody pursuant to an order form in which the top name was Robert Jones?

A I inquired with lawyers more knowledgeable with the operation of the statute concerning that question, and the answer is not entirely clear.

If you will look at Section 4742(d) in the statute, the third sentence says, "The original shall in turn be given by the transferee to any person who shall in pursuance thereof transfer marihuana to him."

Thus the statute on its face does not prohibit a transferor from making a transfer pursuant to a form in which his own name is not listed as the transferor. As far as I know, and I asked, there has never been any prosecution brought asserting that that is a violation of the order form requirements.

Q That is a highly unlikely factual situation.

except that it does go I think to the petitioner's argument a little bit.

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A That is right. In the real world, in the lawful world of marihuana order forms, it is unlikely that a transferee applying for a lawful order form will change his mind and submit it to some other supplier of marihuana. So we don't often see that.

But I think that the Covernment can confidently assert that the statute on its face would not preclude a transferor from transferring if the order formwas not addressed directly to him. This I take it would exclude the situation in which the transferor was a prior party to a misstatement on the application for an order form, but I think that is far afield of what you were asking.

O The duty to put the seller's name on is placed on the Secretary, isn't it?

A That is right. The District Director puts the name on the form and he learns the name because it appears on the transferee's application.

Q So if a seller sells marihuana pursuant to an order form with someone else's name on it, you say he can or cannot be prosecuted under this Section?

A It is doubtful whether he can be prosecuted under this Section. The statute appears to contemplate that a transferor may make a lawful transfer on the basis of an order form

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not addressed to him.

Q Is that what the statute says, that it would be unlawful for any person to transfer marijuana except in pursuance of a written order? If that order is not directed to him, but actually it is directed to somebody by the name of Smith, that is not in pursuance, really, of a written order, giving the words their ordinary meaning, I suppose? It is an order to somebody else; therefore, it is not in pursuance of a written order, just as I say, implicitly in the statute.

A It is not clear on either side.

Q Let's say he can be prosecuted for that. What do you say to the general proposition forbidding him to sell unless he acknowledges who he is, that that violates the Fifth Amendment? Does it violate the Fifth Amendment to be required to say what your name is?

A No, I don't believe it does, not to his transferee in all events. He makes no disclosure to the Government incident to accepting the form.

Q Doesn't he acknowledge who he is? If he sells, and the law says you can only sell if your name is on the order form, and he sells, hasn't he admitted who he is? "I am John Smith," not Brown, or somebody else.

A Yes, he admits it.

Q What is your response, then? Does that violate the Fifth Amendment or not?

admitting that his name is John Jones. The information may not

have originated from him. He may .never have said his name is .

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John Jones, but selling the marijuana pursuant to this order form, under the law, is an admission by him that he is really Jones, and not somebody else, isn't it?

A Yes.

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Q Does that violate the Fifth Amendment?

A No, it does not, because there is no compulsion to disclose his name to the Government incident to that transaction.

Q Well, there shouldn't have been in Leary then.

A In our view of the practical consequences of the illicit dealings with marijuana, in any case in which an order form may be tendered to an illicit transferor, like petitioner, the most reasonable assumption, contrary to petitioner's assumption, is that none of the information was supplied for that purpose by the transferor.

It is, to be sure, difficult to assess assumptions on either side of the case in this area because it is so very unlikely that an illicit transferor will ever be presented with an order form. The 160 registered handlers of marijuana have no reason, so far as we know, to acquire marijuana on the illicit market.

The far more numerous unregistered consumers are hardly likely to secure order forms. The cost of incriminating themselves and paying \$100 tax, when their failure to pay the tax and to acquire marijuana pursuant to an order form, is not

Sec. 5 punishable under Leary, so it is quite easy to say suppose there 2 is a transferee who wants to acquire marijuana from an illicit seller, and who is willing to acquire an order form for that 3 1 purpose, but it is very difficult to translate that supposition into a factual hypothetical which makes sense in the real world. 5 Even if we were willing to accept that supposition, 6 however, and to accept the further doubtful precise that a 7 transferee of marijuana could acquire an order form -- that is, 8 whether the District Director could lawfully issue an order 9 form addressed to an illicit transferor --10

- Q Is \$100 an ounce your idea of a tax?
- A Yes, it is a tax.
- Q For marijuana?

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- A It is a tax on the transfer of marijuana.
- Q For one ounce?
- A One ounce. It is a prohibitive tax.
- Q Thanks for the "prohibitive".
- Q Is anybody eligible to apply for an order form?

 I understood the answer to be yes.
 - A Yes. That is, under Leary.
- Q Forget about Leary; just talking about the statute.
- A Leary interpreted the statute as contemplating that anyone could pay the tax and get an order form.
 - Q Construed the statute as so providing.

A That is right.

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Q So a person need not be registered in any way to be a purchaser, but a person needs to be registered to be a lawful seller.

A That is right. On that basis, we suggest in our brief that there is a serious question whether the District Director will or could issue an order form to Peter Strauss to acquire marijuana from Joseph Connolly, when Joseph Connolly's transfer would be unlawful under another provision of the statute.

Q What, in fact, happens when an application comes in? Does the Treasury check the name of the proposed transferor, the proposed seller, to see if that is one of the 160 registered sellers in the country?

A I believe that inquiry is made, but there is not a great volume of marijuana order forms. It might be a very difficult thing to do under the narcotics statutes where there would be 400,000, but under the marijuana laws, some check is made.

Q So only some 160 legal sellers are in the country, who are qualified and eligible to sell marijuana legally under any conditions. It wouldn't be much of a trick to check the name on the application of the proposed buyer, the name that he gives of the seller, against that list of 160. Is that done or isn't that done?

A That is done. The question as to what the District Director is to do in a situation in which he finds that the proposed seller is not registered apparently has not come up because there hasn't been an application for an order form to acquire marijuana from -
Q What accounts for the fact that there are as

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Q What accounts for the fact that there are as many as 160 lawful sellers, registered sellers, in the United States? Does it have medicinal uses?

A Present thinking is that it does not have medicinal uses, but there is still a great deal of experimentation being conducted in it. About 140 of the 160 registrants are doctors in private practice and doctors in research facilities who are seeking to determine conclusively whether it does have.

Q I can understand how those people, research physicians, might be purchasers, but I don't see how they could be sellers, or why they would want to be sellers of it.

A They might not be sellers except among research institutions. They might be transferors in its broadest sense.

Q It isn't really selling, is it? It is selling, transferring, and several other terms.

A The statute which prohibits unregistered trafficking in marijuana has a list of various activities, dealing in,
selling, giving away. Section 4742 and 4741, which imposes the
tax, speaks of a transfer which the statute defines as any exchange of possession except --

Q Would that include a physician giving it to a patient or a research center? That would be a transfer?

A That is right. That is a transfer under the statute, exempted from the order form and the transfer tax required.

To continue on with the question whether the transferor is likely to supply any information to the transferee in order to enable the transferee to get an order form, we think that any assumption along those lines contradicts the seller's basic instinct to avoid having this transaction come to the attention of the Government at all.

It is virtually impossible for us to conceive of a situation in which a transferor would cooperate with a transferee who had expressed an intention to get an order form. We would not expect Mr. Diamond to deny that for an illicit transferor in petitioner's position an order is just about the last thing that he wants, and if a transferee does produce an order form which he can and might have obtained without the knowledge of the transferor, we believe that the transferor would undoubtedly would refuse to complete the transaction pursuant to that form because it would be subject to intense scrutiny.

If that is true, then we see no reason to believe that an illicit transferor would, as a means of complying with this statute, provide any information to his transferee. In short, we conclude that this statute does not impose upon the

transferor of marijuana any duty to make an incriminating disclosure which, then, is transmitted to the Government.

I think that is the significant difference between this case and Leary; that whatever characterization you might want to give to the transferor's consummating the transaction pursuant to this document, that act involves no matter communicated by him or by the transferee to the Government.

Q I understood that the law said that no seller shall sell on an order form unless he writes his name on the order form. Would that make any difference? I guess it would not under your argument, because he still has the choice of just not selling.

A Well, that is one choice. We would like to preserve whatever is left of that argument.

Q There isn't much after Leary, is there.

A But the more important matter is that it is not communicated; that he may comply with this statute, he may have full and literal compliance with this statute without any communication.

g But if the law said "Don't sell without an order form unless you write your name on it before you sell it, and give a copy to the buyer," you would still say no violation of the Fifth Amendment?

- A That is a bit harder case.
- Q Oh, you think it is harder? You think there is

a difference between that case and just receiving the form and symbolically saying, "Yes, I am so-and-so"?

A My position stands. I don't think that involves a Fifth Amendment violation. I think the more you get me involved in communications directly to the buyer, then I am worried about the next step, but I don't believe there is any Fifth Amendment violation because in that situation I can't see any communication, and I can't see any communication in this case.

What incriminates the transferor in this case is not anything that he says, but what he does by selling marijuana.

That is what subjects him to possible prosecution under the law, and it is not on the basis of any disclosure which is made incident to this transaction.

Q You have probably already covered this, but I
want to be sure I get a distinction. In this case, it is not
an obligation of the transferor to send in a copy of the order
form to the Government. It is only his obligation to keep it
in his possession subject to inspection for a period of two years.

A That is the only statutory obligation. You point out that there is a difference between what the regulations contemplate under the narcotics laws and what the statute contemplates here. For the reasons which we set forth in our brief, we believe that --

Q It doesn't make any difference anyway because

that is a separate regulation or statute, but there is that 200 difference between the two. 2 Yes, sir. A 3 Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. 13 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 5 Mr. Diamond, you have about three minutes left. 6 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID A. DIAMOND, ESQ. 7 ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER 8 MR. DIAMOND: May it please the Court, with respect to 9 Mr. Justice White's question, I believe acceptance of the order 10 form does more than acknowledge the man's name. It acknowledges 31 the fact that he has transferred a stated quantity of marijuana, 12 and if he is an illegal transferor, as was petitioner here, as 13 would be virtually anyone prosecuted under this Act, he would' 14 be acknowledging that he has broken the law. 15 How would he acknowledge it? 16 He must acknowledge it to any person who comes to 17 inquire, any official who comes to inquire about this matter. 18 I believe that he acknowledges it --19 When he receives the order form. Under your sub-20 mission, he acknowledges that he has then sold the quantity of 21 marijuana. 22 A That is correct. 23 But he has acknowledged it, at best, only to the 24. buyer, only to the transferee, who is not the Government. 25 34

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A He has put himself in the position of being required to acknowledge it to the various State officials who come around as a result of that order form.

Q Because that is a separate obligation, to keep the order form in his possession, on file.

A I believe it is the obligation to which this statute looks; that is, the purpose of the buyer's name on the order form is to deal with the second purpose stated in the legislative history of this Act, that is, to expose all details of marijuana transactions to the scrutiny of both Federal and State officers.

If the purpose of this transfer provision was only to prevent transfers to unlawful people, the buyer's name would be irrelevant. The purpose is to expose the seller as well as the buyer to all scrutiny which may follow the coming into existence of the order form.

I believe that there cannot be any segregation of this statute --

Q Would the statute require him to disclose this information to anybody who comes around?

A To any official, State, local, or Federal official who comes around. He must produce his copy of the order form.

It would be frivolous, I think, to say something like at that point he need not expose it. There would be no purpose in his having to take it in the first place if he didn't have to

display it when the officials come around, since this serves more than the possibly valid purpose of seeing to it that these drugs go only to legitimate purchasers. They see to it that the seller is also exposed to official scrutiny, and that is done by seeing to it that he maintains a copy which he reveals to appropriate --

Q You say the law says to him, "If you want to sell any narcotics which may be legal under Federal law, but illegal under State law, the Federal law tells you that you must make a record of this sale, illegal under State law, preserve it, and than if a State official asks you for the record, you have to disclose it"?

A That is correct. We feel that is the fruition of the entire seller information of the transfer order provisions of the Marijuana Act.

Q Let's clip that in pieces, now. Suppose he had the record, but when the State officer called on him and asked for its exhibition, he simply stood on his claim of the Fifth Amendment and declined to do it and proceeded to test it out?

A I think that that would be rendering the entire transfer provisions prointless. There is no point to him taking the order form at all, since the buyer part of it is already taken care of by the buyer's name. If the seller's point is to have any purpose, it is to expose and reveal the seller.

If the seller were to decline to disclose the order

form and he were sustained on that, there would be no point in making him take the order form in the first place.

Q Aren't you suggesting that the Federal Government has no legitimate interest in knowing the sources independent of the prosecutorial aspect, but simply knowing the flow of the material?

A They perhaps do, but they may not make the man incriminate himself in relation to that legitimate interest.

They require him to register and maintain records of a different sort and under different provisions of this law, and those provisions are perhaps valid, but they cannot then require that he in effect, commit another crime by refusing to reveal that he has violated the first provisions.

We feel this case comes directly under the Albertson, Marchetti, Leary line.

In addition, the order forms are all used as evidence.

The statute describes them as such.

Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mr. Diamond and Mr. Connolly. We thank you for your submissions. The case is submitted.

(Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m. the argument in the aboveentitled matter was concluded.)