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Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1969 /970

In the Matter of:

WALTER J. HICKEL, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,

Petitioner,

vs.

THE OIL SHALE CORPORATION, ET AL. :

Respondent, :

Docket No.

221

SUPREME COURT, U.
MARSHAL'S OFFICE
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Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

January 21, 1970

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

300 Seventh Street, S. W.

Washington, D. C.

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 OCTOBER TERM 3 B WALTER J. HICKEL, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, 55 Petitioner 6 No. 221 VS 7 THE OIL SHALE CORPORATION, ET AL, 8 Respondent 9 10 The above-entitled matter came on for argument at 11 11:060'clock a.m. on Wednesday, January 21, 1970. 12 BEFORE: 13 WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice 94 HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice 15 WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice 16 POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice 97 18 APPEARANCES: 19 PETER L. STRAUSS Office of the Solicitor General 20 Department of Justice Washington, D. C. On behalf of Petitioner 28 22 FOWLER HAMILTON, ESQ. 52 Wall Street New York, N. Y. 10005 23 On behalf of Respondents

PROCEEDINGS

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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Number 221, Hickel against the Oil Shale Corporation. Mr. Strauss, you may proceed.

ORAL ARGUMENT BY PETER STRAUSS, OFFICE

OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. STRAUSS: Mr. Chief Justice and --

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Excuse me, Mr. Strauss.

MR. STRAUSS: Surely, excuse me.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Now we have a quorum.

Oh, you are out of the case. If you will stand by for a moment until we assemble a quorum.

MR. STRAUSS: I surely will.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Strauss, you now may proceed whenever you are ready.

MR. STRAUSS: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: As this is a rather complex case it might be useful at the outset to state a very brief outline form how I expect to proceed.

As the Court knows, the case principally involves

Section 37 of the Leasing Act of 1927 which provides for the

patenting of certain mining claims to Federal land which were

valid in 1920 and which, in the words of the statute, were

thereafter maintained in accordance with prior law.

So, after the statement I mean first to examine the history of the law of statements regarding the maintenance of

mining claims in the public domain and I do that in full consciousness of the difficulties which the Solicitor General just spoke of about lawyers' history, but nonetheless, feeling it is necessary to examine that.

And then I mean to cast a **Critical** eye at this

Court's decision in Ickes versus Wirginia Colorado Development

Corporation which is the other focus of this case, not

necessarily to procure its overruling, although we think and

desire that it should be overruled, but as a means of making

clear at least the reasons --

- Q Do you think you can prevail unless we overrule?
 - A I hope we can; yes.
 - Q I see.

A As a means of making clear the reasons, at least while we feel it must be limited to its particular facts and that I hope leads, naturally, to the questions of review which are also present in this case.

This case is part of the battle over ownership

rights to several hundred thousands of acres of land in

Colorado and larger amounts in Utah and Wyoming. All of this

land contains a rock called oil shale from which oil can be

distilled at a high temperature and no one knows quite how

much oil is there or what ever be recovered, but the amounts

are huge and I think there will be agreement that it represents

at least a century of this nation's present rate of consumption.

The oil shale which is already in private hands represents about a decade of that century or perhaps more. At present technically the most feasible portion of the oil shale over which the ownership dispute involved in this case is raising, represents a similar period and is also in the technically-accessible portion of the shale.

The dispute generally is whether --

O In what?

A.

- A In the technically accessible portion of the shale. The depth of which the shale is buried under the over-burden varies from place to place and private claims tend to be in the area where it's most accessible.
- Q And this issue here involves about 10 percent of the whole, you said?
- A Approximately. There is some dispute. I think it's sufficient to say it involves ten years' worth of oil consumption.
 - Q Out of 100.
 - A Out of 100 or more.
 - Q That makes it 10 percent.
 - A Yes.
- Q And by "technically available," you mean here is where it is very clear that it does exist; is that it?

A It's clear that it exists throughout, but it is more accessible to present methods of mining.

A

But the methods of mining are still rather, so inefficient that it is not economically --

A No one has yet mined it, although the Oil Shale Corporation certainly has plans in that regard.

The dispute generally is whether persons who make claims to oil shale lands before the lands were withdrawn from the possibility of the claim in 1920 had any obligation to develop their claims after that time or could simply hold them in speculation for indefinite periods of time without an obligation of maintenance.

If the Federal Government has clear title to the land then it would be able to sell leases to persons who, on condition, really, that they develop it and it would be able to collect substantial royalties once they do. If it must sell or patent the lands to the present claimants, of whom Respondents here are only representative, they must recognize rights and lands which have been left completely undeveloped, for 33 years and for which there would be no guarantee of development in the future, and it would receive only \$2.50 an acre as the total price and there are also obvious differences in the government's ability to control pollution, water use and other environmental factors and to guide a rational development of the resource.

Secretary's refusal in 1964 to issue certain patents to oil shale land, including lands held by three of the Respondents here, or groups of respondents, Ishould say: those represented by Respondents Napier, Umpleby and Brown. He refused those patents on the ground that the claims had been cancelled in 1931 and early 1932. An administrative proceeding would be permitted to become final at that time.

Ton .

It is clear that he probably would have also refused to patent the claims now owned by the Oil Shale Corporation, which represents the fourth group of respondents, if those claims had been before him, since those claims, too, have been cancelled in default proceedings in the early thirties. And these cancellations were part of a concerned effort on the Secretary's part to identify and cancel claims that were not being maintained in the early thirties when evidence was considerably fresher than it is now. And we set that history out in some length in our brief.

The first three sets of claimants, Napier, Umpleby and Brown sought review of the Secretary's 1964 decision in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado and there they were joined by the Oil Shale Corporation seeking declaratory judgment.

Although Respondents urge a number of reasons below for requiring the Secretary to ignore these old and final

administrative decisions from the thirties, the District
Court, and subsequently the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, considered only one ground, which was that the
administrative had been beyond the Secretary's subject-matter
jurisdiction and therefore, could be given no effect.

- Q May I ask you a preliminary question?
- A Surely.
- Q What are the major oil companies that are interested, directly or indirectly in this case?

A I think most of them are, Your Honor, and to varying degrees. Interested, I think, is a question of degree. I should say the Oil Shale Company and the Union Oil Company are the only two which I am aware that have made a very substantial independent step towards actual development.

In terms of land holdings, the hearings before the Subcommittee on Anti-Trust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, which was cited, at least in Respondent's brief, and I think in ours as well, contained a number of statements in that regard, and I think I have some here.

In any event, varying of the top 27 oil companies in the nation -- here we are, at page 192 of those hearings it shows holdings of patented lands, Union Oil Company has 50,000 acres. It's page 192 of the anti-trust hearings.

- Q It's not before us?
- A No, Your Honor.

Q All right, then would you go slow in reading it?

A Surely. It shows the Union Oil Company is holding 50,000 acres; Mobile Oil Company, 34,000 acres; Tidewater Oil, 22,000 acres and so forth, and I think Pascho in those hearings, the Oil Shale Company, in those hearings has stated that it owns at present sufficient land to produce 200,000 barrels of oil daily for 25 years or more and most of the oil companies are in a similar kind of position.

I think the information could be obtained by that place on Page 192 of those hearings. It gives a complete listing, I believe.

Q Where does the Union Oil Company stand --

A I couldn't say whether they have the rights in any of the disputed lands or not, but I would think, since they are a major holder I would think it unlikely that they did not have a dispute.

Q Were they parties to the old administrative proceeding?

A They were parties to the old administrative proceeding; that's right.

Q My view is that I ought to refuse myself from this case.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Counsel, under the circumstances we will suspend the argument in the case and set it for reargument at a later date. And we regret the inconvenience to counsel, of course.

These things do not always appear on the surface and this is one of the difficult problems and the possibility of an interested party does not automatically appear in the case of every record.

So, we will have to suspend argument until a date when we can assemble a quorum and when it's convenient to counsel.

MR. STRAUSS: Thank you, sir.

(Whereupon, the argument in the above-entitled matter was suspended at 11:20 o'clock a.m., to be rescheduled at a later date)