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Supreme Court of the United States

LIBRARY Supreme Court, U. S. MAR 13 1970

In the Matter of:

Docket No.

127

WILLIAM MONKS,

Petitioner,

VS.

THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Respondent.

SUPPREME COURT. U.S. WARESHALLS OFFICE

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Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

February 26, 1970

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

300 Seventh Street, S. W.

Washington, D. C.

NA 8-2345

CONTENTS

2	ARGUMENT OF:	P	A G	E
3	Anthony G. Amsterdam, Esq., on behalf of Petitioner		2	
4	Archibald Kreiger, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, on behalf of Respondent		0.7	
5			21	
6	REBUTTAL:			
8	Anthony G. Amsterdam, Esq., on behalf of the Petitioner		42	
9				
10	1000 6100 6110 6110 6110			
99				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
13				
2)				
21				
22				
23				
23				

23

MAHM IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1 OCTOBER TERM 2 3 WILLIAM MONKS, 4 Petitioner 5 No. 127 VS 6 THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 7 Respondent 8 9 The above-entitled matter came on for argument at 10 11:50 o'clock a.m., on Thursday, February 26, 1970. 11 BEFORE: 12 WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice 13 HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice 14 JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.; Associate Justice 15 POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice 16 THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice 17 APPEARANCES: 18 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, ESQ. Stanford University Law School 19 Stanford, California 94305 Counsel for Petitioner 20 ARCHIBALD KREIGER, 21 Assistant Prosecutor Court House 22 Paterson, New Jersey, 07505 Counsel for Respondent 23

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PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Number 127, Monks against New Jersey.

Mr. Amsterday, you may proceed whenever you are ready ORAL ARGUMENT BY ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. AMSTERDAM: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: The principle thrust presented in this case is one that is entirely familiar to the Court. It is the question which this Court has wrestled with, frequently, for better than 35 years: whether, in a state criminal proceedings, or in this instance, a juvenile delinquency proceeding resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment.

A defendant's confession was inadmissible in evidence because involuntarily obtained by the police. This case arises prior to the cutoff date of Escobedo and of Miranda.

Q You make no Miranda argument; I take it?

A There is no Miranda argument, Mr. Justice; at all.

The issue of admissibility of the confession is entirely the traditional one of voluntariness, and for that reason, turns on all of the factual circumstances of the case.

It is for that reason that in our brief I tried to set forth in all the details that the Court might wish, the exact factual circumstances under which the confession was

obtained.

As I understand the State's position in its brief it initially asserts that it agrees with all of Petitioner's facts in the case. However, in the argument portion of this brief, it does make certain factual assertions with which we are in disagreement. There are a half dozen of those and I mean to advert to them specifically in my presentation, because I think the most important aspect of this case is the facts.

We begin with what is clearly a major factor in the case, and that is the Petitioner's age. At the time of his detention, interrogation and confession he was a 15-year-old; to be exact, 15 years and four months old.

The State, of course, does not contest that. But it does make three factual assertions in that regard, which I wish to bring to the Court's attention.

First, it characterizes the Petitioner as "above average" and indicates that he had an intelligence beyond his mere age. The State cites nothing in the record on either of these propositions; the Court will find nothing in the record to support either of these propositions, and as I take it, it is an inference of the Respondent, drawing from nothing other than the fact that the Petitioner managed to hold out for a goodly time to sustain police questioning.

The second factual matter raised by the State in

connectionwith Petitioner's individual characteristics, is that he was, as the State puts it, "court-wise," or in another place in its brief, "a hardened juvenile criminal."

Again, the record shows no such thing. The facts in this regard are set forth in our brief at page 46 in the footnotes 59. The trial record here shows only that the Petititioner previous to this detention and interrogation had been a probationer of the Juvenile Court. It does not show what caused him to be a probationer of the Juvenile Court and it does not show What contacts, if any, he had had with the police incident to becoming a probationer of the Juvenile Court.

There are, however, psychiatric reports in this record, one of which we advert to in our footnote, which shows that as of a time three months prior to his detention the only run-ins he had had with the police were a minor pilfering incident: stealing a flashlight and jacket from a car; a broken window incident and some misconduct inschool.

In reviewing the record for this argument, I notice that I omitted from that footnote that the same diagnostic report also indicates a charge of waywardness, whatever that may be, sometime prior to 1953 when he would have been 11 or 12. Again, no indication as to whether he had dealing with the police in that connection.

And for the sake of completeness, I simply want to

bring to the Court's attention that there is another psychiatric report made later after his prison juvenile commitment, in which, under sodium amatol interviews and methadrine interview at the State Diagnostic Center, Petitioner also adverted to two additional contacts with the police. However, this came out under amatol; it is quite unclear what these contacts were and there is no objective verification of this amatol material.

In any event, he hardly is shown by this record to be a hardened juvenile criminal.

And finally, the State says that the Petitioner was, and I quote: "Familiar with the ability to take refuge in silence." That is carefully-phrased statement to the extent that it seems to assert that there is anything in this record showing that the Petitioner knew anything about his privilege of self-incrimination or his right to resist police questioning. It is, again, totally unfounded in the record.

The only material cited by the State to support it is a statement that at one time the Petitioner was, in fact, totally silent during five minutes of particularly sustained police questioning. There is no indication that he knew of his right to maintain and retain that silence.

So, I think what we end up with in terms of the personality and nature of this Petitioner, is that he was simply a 15-year-old boy. I cannot honestly claim that there

is anything in the record indicating that he is subnormal, but I think there there is certainly nothing in the record to indicate that he supernormal, in any regard.

boy. First, it is undisputed that, prior to the interrogation which led to his confession, he was detained without access to friends, family or an attorney for a ten-day period. Now, I am quick to admit that this detention has none of the aggravating trappings that has sometimes attached to cases coming to this Court; no shuttling around from police station to police station and that sort of thing. He was simply detained in the juvenile home, and he was questioned by the police on four occasions: one immediately after his arrest, then several days later after having weakened when the police attention focused on him in connection with these cases, then as soon as a lie-detector expert could be gotten, and finally, several days later on the day in which he confessed.

The important thing, however, about that detention — there are, I think, two important things about the detention. It shows a very considerable callousness on the part of the police andthe juvenile authorities, and indicates that they were far more concerned with their investigation than they were with this 15-year-old's welfare and that of his family. He had been away fromhome prior to his arrest. His mother had called the police andhad called the juvenile

authorities and she had made continuing inquiries of him and had been assured that as soon as he was picked up he would be brought home.

In fact, when he was picked up he was detained for ten full days and his mother never learned that he was in custody, until the newspapers printed thathe had confessed.

Now, the State suggests, and here is a fourth matter in which we are in factual disagreement: the reason why Monks never saw his parents during this period was that he didn't want then. Again, the record has absolutely no support for this proposition. It seems to be an inference that from the fact that at the time of his arrest he was living away from home. However, as I have indicated, his mother had made steps to find him, both through the police and through the juvenile authorities. They knew that very well, and never got in touch with her.

But if it were so that Monks was so far from his parents that he felt that not even they, not even his mother and his father could be called to help him in this situation, it seems to me that bespeaks not strength and not a factor which supported this boy in his ordeal with the police, rather the converse.

Passing from thataspect of the continued detention to another --

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: If this is a good breaking

point for you, Mr. Amsterdam, we will break for lunch.

MR. AMSTERDAM: It is, Mr. Chief Justice.

(Whereupon, at 12:00 o'clock p.m. the argument in the above-entitled matter was recessed to resume at 12:30 o'clock p.m. this day.)

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(After the recess the argument resumes)

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Amsterdam, you may continue.

MR. AMSTERDAM: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

If the Court please: Prior to the recess I had noted Petitioner's ten-day detention prior to the interrogation that produced his confession.

The most important result of that ten-day detention is that, in fact, and to Petitioner's appearance, he was completely subject to the will of the police throughout that period. He was not being detained for some fixed time, after which he would appear in court. In fact, and as far as he knew, the police could hold him and question him whenever they pleased until he confessed.

I's like to get that time sequence clearer in my mind now, Mr. Amsterdam. He was in a juvenile detention home at this period?

A He was in a juvenile detention home for this ten-day period.

Q Does the record show whether the police were regularly stationed there, or whether they came intermittently and left to talk with him?

A There is no indication that they are regularly stationed there. When he was arrested and before he was taken to the juvenile home he was questioned for several hours by the police. Indeed, he was questioned from 1:00 a.m., when he was arrested until noon the following day.

Q I just wanted to be sure we didn't have a ten-day police station detention.

A No, we do not. We have only two days of police interrogation in the intervening period after the first police interrogation and prior to the day of his confession.

Q Does it appear why they picked him up?

A Yes. He was arrested in connection with two unrelated purse snatchings, which he admitted immediately.

However, he was being held, from all appearances for questioning on these offenses because the police officers had their attention called immediately to a similarity of motives between the crimes and on the Monday following the Saturday of his arrest, they began to question him on these two particular offenses. They applied to the juvenile court for leave to do so; they were granted leave to do so and they began to do so.

Now, here we come to, perhaps one additional factual matter in which we are in disagreement with the State, because we believe that the implication to him was obvious, that he simply had no right to refuse to answer police questions and that the police would persevere in holding him and questioning him, until he broke and confessed.

The State asserts in its brief that the police in fact, gave the Petitioner warnings of his right to remain sixent

at one point. The State citation to support that assertion refers entirely to a warning given after the Petitioner had been questioned on three days and during 12 hours on the third day without any warning or caution of any sort by the police at any time.

It is undisputed that he was never given any warning throughout the interrogation until he had twice orally confessed to the offenses. That point, and just prior to the formal transcription of his statement, he was told: "We are going to ask you to make a voluntary statement which you may make or you may not make, as you please. That is the sum total of the warnings on this record.

I want to make absolutely clear that he did not know and was not told at any time anything contrary to the clear indication presented by the police, continual questioning, that he simply was going tohave to answer.

Now, I come, then, to the final critical day, and time is very important here. At 7:00 a.m. he was up -before 7:00 a.m. he was up, because he ate breakfast at 7:00. At 10:00 police questioning began. The confessions were completed and signed at 1:00 a.m. the following day: 15 full hours after the interrogation began.

Now, during this time heewas not for one minute out of the presence of two or three police officers, except when he was being interrogated by a polygraph operator: never during this

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15 hours did he see or speak to anybody other than his interrogators. The actual amount of direct interrogation, of questioning of him is unclear, as it always is in these cases, but by the police admissions, the minimum possible time thathe could have been under direct questioning was six-and-a-half or seven hours. And that account of the time leaves several unexplained gaps in the day, as is invariably the testimony regarding matters of this sort.

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as no other record I have ever seen in this Court, what is going on throughout the 15 hours, because it is misleading to imagine that only six-and-a-half of that or seven of that involved investigation orinterrogation. The point is that throughout the entire 15-hour period he was subject to discussion and questions of the interrogative process.

While he was not being questioned he was being confronted with his friends who were brought in to say that he had
made admissions to them. They were undergoing polygraph tests
and while he waited outside the room to see what the result of
that testing would be, he hovered around to the scene of the
offense. He was told to sit and wait while the police officers
left him, went across the room and in his presence, discussed
whatthey were going to do next. All of this time he was undergoing on-going process of police interrogation.

So that the 15 hours, I think, have to be seen as a

block under which this 15-year-old boy was sugjected to the interrogative process and all of its pressures.

What is equally important is that he persisted, from the very beginning in denying these offenses. This is not one of these threshold confessions, by any means. The inquiry here is whether he voluntarily confessed, whether he willfully confessed.

Now, for two days of questioning he did not. For 12 hours on the third day of questioning, he did not.

Q If you eliminate the confessions, what, in your judgment would the record show? Is there enough to convict him apart from the confession?

A There is nothing -- not only not enough, Mr.

Jústice, there is no evidence, literally, pointing to his guilt, other than his confessions; absolutely none.

Now --

Q We've never had a case, I guess, have we, in which the person interrogated has had assigned to him bythe juvenile court, somebody like this man, Jarmolowitz?

A Never. And that is the one -- and that is the one legal wrinkle that makes this case different from any other.

Q We haven't had a case involving that?

A No, Mr. Justice; not that I know of. I mean to come to that, because I think that it the nub of this case.

Q Mr. Amsterdam, didn't you say that no other

evidence; what about his admissions to his friends?

Nest.

A They relate to the Weiss affair, which is an affair which is not now in issue, because there are two choices here: the so-called "Weiss affair," and the Giambro affair.

For the Weiss affair, he has already fully served all the time he can legally under the New Jersey law. The only thing that is in contention here is Giambro. Now, with regard to Giambro, there is one other confession. That is a confession, or an admission, rather, made to, not a friend, but to an inmate in the juvenile home, following and clearly derivative of the confessions that are in contention here.

One could not find on this record that that confession was not derivative of these. If these confessions fall, that admission clearly must fall.

Q Well, why do you say that?

A Because of his testimony. He was explicitly asked on cross-examination by the District Attorney: "Well, why did you tell Talon in the receiving home that you had done it?"

He said: "I had been denying it all along; I admitted it to them and the cat was out of the bag; I then admitted it to everybody."

Q WELL, it doesn't necessarily follow that any admission following a coerced confession is also coerced; I don't suppose.

A Mr. Justice, I think that the clear implication of this Court's holding in Robinson v. Tennessee, adopting Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion in Darwin, is that the State, at least has the burden after a first involuntary confession is given of showing that the subsequent confession is not tainted by it and is not involuntary. No such showing is possible or could be made on this record.

I do not assert that it could not be made. I assert that on this record it is not made.

Now, what actually went on in the course of the police questioning --

Q Before you go on, Mr. Amsterdam, I'd just like to clear up one other matter. Was there anything in the description given by this woman before her death, before she died, that linked him up with the attack? They said it was a man in a brown — dark leather jacket. Was there any follow-up on that?

A This much follow-up: again, all of these matters are detailed in the appendix to Petitioner's brief. The follow-up is simply this: That Petitioner did, in fact, have a black leather jacket. The victim's description was "a man;" this is a 15-year-old boy, " in a" -- now, it's unclear what she said. The officer first said she said, "dark leather jacket," but then remembered that somebody had said she said, "brown leather jacket." Monks' jacket was black and the jacket

was equally tainted by the confession. The jacket was disclosed immediately following the confession. Under Wong Sun there would be no question whatever that the jacket would fall, so that the only follow-up again, derives immediately from the confession.

When I speak of their being no independent evidence of guilt, I mean no independent evidence. Both the Talon admission and the jacket fall with these confessions. But, in any event, the probative value of the defendant's having a black jacket, and the victim saying that she was struck by a man with a dark jacket, is virtually nil.

Now, what in fact, happened throughout the course of this interrogation; was it that the defendant simply refused, resisted any efforts to get him to talk? He was, during these 15 hours, subjected to confrontations by friends in connection with the Weiss matter, was put under a lie detector nine times, was confronted with a prior admission in the Weiss matter, that heknew that it was snowing on the night of the Weiss offense, and was subjected to everykind of blandishment by the police:

"You can't fool God"-type of questioning; that "you will feel better for it," and "sit in the corner and search your conscience type of thing."

And, as I say, on-and-off questioning by the police, and then the lie detector and back to the police and back to the lie detector.

Now, I come to Mr. Justice Stewart's question about the

probation officer. I think that this case would so clearly be a case of coerced confession it wouldn't even be up here if it weren't for the probation officer. What both courts below seem to to to rely exclusively on the presence of the probation officer to distinuish this case from Haley, and as I read the Respondent's brief, almost exclusive reliance was placed on the probation officer there, too.

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So, the question now is down to this: whether, where the interrogation itself, which the probation officer was present at and did not stop, clearly makes a case of coercion under Haley, where is near presence, doing nothing, changes the result and somehow makes the confession voluntary. NOw, in that regard, I have several specific, factual points.

the critical time. Although he had been instructed by the court to be present when the Petitioner was interrogated by the officers. He seems to have construed this as not including the polygraph operator, with the result that the three-and-a-half hours of interrogation that went on on the 26th alone; the critical day alone, by the polygraph operator, during one of which he finally broke and started to make the confession, the Giambro confession. These were sessions where the probation officer wasnot present.

When he finally did break, who was brought in? Not the probation officer, but the investigating detective and he

then proceeded to make his confession to the detective, again out of the presence of the probation officer.

Q Where was Chester Jarmolowicz? Where was he?

A When?

Q Yes, he had been directed by the court, as we know, to be present. Where was he?

A We assume that he didn't regard the polygraph operator as a detective. I can't understand why he wasn't present.

Q And the record doesn't show where he was?

A Oh, I'm sorry. He was in the next room, as he said. The questioning went on in what appears to have been a small room, an antercom to the grand jury room. He was in the next room. There is no indication as to whether one could hear, and in fact, the door was closed so one would suppose that he couldn't hear and was not supporting by his presence, the petitioner in any way.

Now, Respondent states that the State Courts below made what the Respondent calls "express findings" that the probation officers presence was a restraining influence on the police. Letme make that very clear. The State Courts below made no such express finding, and could not, on this record, have done so. What the State Courts did was simply to rely on the fact that he wasassigned by the court and was sometimes there, as making this confession voluntary. It made no findings

that he had any impact on the police and indeed, no findings of that sort could be made, because he never said a word; never stopped the police from doing anything; never interjected.

There was no testimony bythe police that they regarded him as a restraining influence. In short, he was simply there.

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More important, the Petitioner was never told that he was there to protect him. He knew that he was a probation officer, but a juvenile's view of a juvenile probation officer wholly allies him with thepolice, and there was no suggestion communicated toMonks that he was there in anyprotective role.

In addition to that, I think this point is exceedingly important: that when he came to trial the probation officer was not a supportive or a friendly figure in any way. He was hostile to the Petitioner, he was heedless of the facts dealing with the circumstances of the confession; he admitted he didn't listen to any of the details of the questioning or the answers; he simply regarded his own role, the protection of himself, as what was important.

Q Is there anything in the record as to whether or not he told Petitioner he was there to help him or did he tell the Petitioner anything?

A The only thing he told the Petitioner was that ifhe did it he ought to say so. He did not tell the Petitioner anything. The Petitioner admitted --

Q He didn't say that "I'm here in place of your

parents to do what I can for you, "or anything like that?

A Absolutely not. The only thing in the record is this: at one point there is a leading question by the Court as to whether the Petitioner does not know that these juvenile probation officers are there to help juveniles? Petitioner says, "Yes, I know that." But it wasn't this probationofficer or anything else. Now, that is simply the juvenile court mistake. I think this Court need attach no significance to it. It certainly doesn't communicate helping him in what way, and the Respondent in this Court asserts that he was not there to help support him in refusing to answer questions or assert his privilege, if he felt like it.

The Respondent rightly points out that we have great concern for the probation officer's role here. We think that he was heedless, at the least of his role, and possibly mendacious, and I say that, not by comparing his testimony with that of thePetitioner, but by comparing his testimony with that of the police officers who sometimes testified he was under interrogation three or four times as long as the probation officer admitted. And by comparing his own testimony internally, which shows total heedlessness of any protective role.

The question, then, Mr. Justice Stewart, I think, is that not whether any protective figure may prevent a confession from being involuntary, but whether the presence of a figure

who does nothing to stop clearly coercive police questioning,
who is not known to the Petitioner to be there in a protective
role, andwho serves no function as an impartial observer in any
way, prevents an otherwise coerced confession from being
found coerced. We submit that it does not.

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you will use it to address yourself to your notice point in connection with the enhanced sentence.

A I will do that, Mr. Justice.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Kreiger,

ORAL ARGUMENT BY ARCHIBALD KREIGER, ASSISTANT

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MR. KREIGER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: If the prefatory statement made today by counsel was all that there was to this case, I am frank to say, here and now, that the State would confess error. But he very adroitly, and I am sure, very skillfully has kept the most important distinctive, significant fact of this entire case, for the last factor, and only when questioning by the Court has brought it forth.

The most significant fact in this case and which makes this case different from any others, was anticipated by Justice Stewart, when he said: "Had this Court ever decided the question involving a juvenile where the confession wasmade in the presence of a court-assigned representative?" And counsel

evaded it and said so far as he knows, "no."

I'd like to call to the Court's attention the fact that since I have written this brief I have made further research and I would like to helpthe Court in this connection. To my brief at page 7 I refer to the New York statute which provides for the notification of a parent or other representative before a juvenile who has been arrested may be interrogated.

I have found that there is a similar statute in Arizona; it is ARS, Title 8, Section 221 and construed by the Arizona Supreme Court in 1966 in 420 Pacific 2nd, 281, where the Court held that: hen a juvenile is arrested, it is the duty of the arresting officer to notify the probation officer at once and a probation officer is assigned to him and stays with him."

And the Arizona Supreme Court has held that this rule does not prevent the police from questioning a juvenile; it only prevents them from subjecting the juvenile to formal interrogation without permission of the person appointed, and that it is consistent with the rehabilitative process of the juvenile court to see that he's prevented from overzealous questioning.

Without such a statute in New Jersey, the Juvenile Court Judge in this case in 1957, made such an order and I would like to give the Court very briefly the chronological

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factors in this case which I regret to say, counsel did not give the Court, and they are these:

This juvenile was arrested on February 16th by the Paterson police. He was taken to the police station; I might say a prohibitive practice under the New Jersey law, notwithstanding, the juvenile confessed.

- Q And he was 15 years and four months old?
- A That's right.
- Q How big was he?
- A Well, Mr. Justice, I --
- Q Any record of it?
- A -- I never saw him; I don't know him. I only know --
- Q One of the witnesses referred to her assailant as "a man," and Petitioner's brief talks about him as a child.
- A Well, I'm sorry; I cannot answer you on that, sir.
 - Q You mean the whole record doesn't show his size?
 - A Pardon?
- Q You mean that there is no reference to his size in the entire record?
 - A No. No; there is none, sir.

When arrested on February 16th he immediately admitted several purse snatchings and admitted the method by which he had concealed these purses by burying them in the yard of a

certain house where he used to frequent for other purposes. The police immediately went to the scene and dug up and uncovered these purses. He was immediately sent to the Children's Shelter, where juveniles are detained. And when these facts came to light, the Prosecutor's Office of Passaic County, noted some similarity between the modus operandi in these cases and the two unsolved crimes in 1956: the Weiss affair in February and the Giambro murder in November.

Q Mr. Kreiger, were his parents there? Was his mother in Paterson?

- A Yes, indeed.
- Q When was she notified?
- A She was notified on February the 27th or the 28th, after the confession had been obtained.
 - Q Why not before?
- A Well, she was not notified before, for reasons

 I cannot giveyou, that I have --
- Q Well, don't you feel any duty to give some reasons for it?
- A Well, the only explanation, sir, I can give is this: there was an estrangement between the juvenile and his parents --
 - Q Is that a reason for not telling the parents?
- A The juvenile never requested it, never manifested any interest in his parents; in fact, he had run away from home

South .	he was sleeping in the cellar of a friend of his and in
2	abandoned cars
3	Q And you say he waived the right to notify his
4	parents?
5	A I wouldn't put it in legal terms, Mr. Justice,
6	but I
7	Ω Don't you think that the State had an obligation
8	before they questioned this boy for ten days to notify his
9	parents of what they were doing?
10	A I would like to first point out that the State
dan dan	did not question him for ten days.
12	Q Well, the State held him for ten days.
13	A He had been held for the unrelated purse
14	snatchings. That was his original detention.
15	Q He was held for ten days without notifying his
16	parents or anyone that knew anything about him; am I correct?
7	A That is true.
18	Q Why?
19	A Why?
20	Q You can't give a reason; can you?
P. C.	A I can't; no, I can't.
22	Q But, in the record you want us to uphold his
23	conviction.
24	A The record indicates that this juvenile never
25	manifested an interest; he never asked the superintendent at

shelter for his parents or advised them of where he was. que was estranged from his parents. 2 Didyou ever tell him he had a right to have his 3 parents? 4 Well, yes. A 5 Is it in the record? 0 6 The protection that Judge Shannock of the A 7 Juvenile Court afforded this juvenile, by providing for inter-8 rogation only in the presence of the probation officer. 9 Did he know that the probation officer was there 10 to protect him? 14 A Yes, sir; he did. 12 How? Where is that in the record? 0 13 He was told, he was told by the probation A 14 officer that. 15 What page is it? 0 16 Let me see if I can find it, sir. A 17 Well, we can get it later; that's all right. 0 18 Yes; I will get it later and I will supply it A 19 to you. 20 Sure. 0 21 On February 18th the Prosecutor's office, after 22 noting similarities between the purse-snatchings for which he 23 hadbeen arrested on the 16th, decided to interrogate this 24 juvenile and being in the shelter, they applied to the judge 25

of the Juvenile Court for permission to interrogate him. The judge granted permission on the condition that such interrogation take placeonly, and at all times, in the presence of the probation officer, Mr. Chester Jarmolowicz.

And

On February 18th, in the presence of Chester

Jarmolowicz, at the Children's Shelter, this juvenile was
interrogated and he made a slip of the tongue in which he said

-- they mentioned something to him about "Did you engage in
any purse=snatchings on 31st Street, 32nd Street, 28th Street,
and enumerated this east side section of Paterson and when it
came to 31st street, which is where the Weiss assault took
place, he says: "Oh, "he says, "I have an alibi for that one."

No one asked him or even mentioned anything about Weiss. And
then when they came to Rural Avenue(?) which was in back of
St. Theresa's Church, where a bingo game was held quite often
and where the victim Giambro was going the evening when she
was assaulted and later died. He said, "Oh, I read about that
in the paper; I had nothing to do with that."

And with as a starting point, the Prosecutor's detectives said to him: "Willie, would you submit to a lie detector test," and this juvenile, aged 15, said, "Why certainly," he says. "They're a fake; they don't prove anything. even when you submit to them.

"Very well," and that's all the interrogation that took place that day.

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On the 21st, two days later, arrangements were made for the polygraph operator to interrogate this juvenile and the interrogation took place in an antercom of the grand jury in the court house in Paterson. The tests were submitted, not lengthy, and immediately after he was taken back by the probation officer to the Children's Shelter, and the polygraph operator advised the detectives who were handling this case, "Don't ask him, or pursue any further interrogation," and there was no further interrogation.

In the meantime, the Prosecutor's office, pursuing their own independent investigation, and they came up with the names of a few of his friends and associates, two of whom — one was named Ogg and the other one was named Stopford. They interrogated them and they found out from them that this Monks lad had a day or two after the Weiss assault, which took place on East 31st Street —

- Q And that had taken place about a year earlier; hadn't it?
 - A That's right.
 - Q When this fellow was 14 years old.
 - A That's right; that's right, sir.

He had boasted to one of his friends that he had committed that assault and he had received something like \$30 that she had in her purse.

Q WEre those the people who frequented the candy

store?

A Yes, yes, yes.

Now, what made the Weiss case interesting, which gave the police the indication that this young man was connected with this assault, was at on the evening of the assault it had been snowing and immediately after this girl had been assaulted and was unconscious, the police came to the scene and there were footprints that led from the place of the assault to a house two-and-a-half blocks away on 15th Avenue andthe footprints led in the back door of that particular house.

During the period of investigation in '57 which this young man was not being interrogated, the police found out that young Monks frequented this place with his friends, where they would go to smoke a cigarette and do other little things of that sort in privacy.

In fact, the confession indicates that this was the place, the backyard of which he had buried the purses that he had snatched. Well, on the next occasion of interrogation the lie detector operator was present and --

- Q Was he a police officer?
- A Pardon?
- Q Was he a police officer?
- A No.
- Q Was he employed by the police department?
- A No. He's Mr. Arthur, who is associated

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with the Reed Associates, who are lie detector operators and I think they have offices in Chicago and New York.

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Incidentally, Mr. Reed is a co-author with Professor Inbau on "Lie Detection and Interrogation," one of the books cited by former Chief Justice Warren in Miranda.

On the 26th of February, which was the next occasion, Mr. Jarmolowicz went to the Children's Shelter in the morning of that day; it was around ten o'clock or so, and picked up Mr. Monks and he brought him to the court house and it is true that he was interrogated a little bit; not too much. He was again subjected to lie detector tests, quite a few but a minute, two minutes, five minutes; nothing extensive; nothing to wear out this young man, or to use the language that this Court has used quite often in these -- only in these two juvenile cases that I know of: Haley and Gallegos, there was nothing in this case and this record doesn't show the slightest callous disregard of the rights of this juvenile.

And bear in mind, that in 1957 the criminal law enunciated by this Court was not what it is today. In fact, we claim --

- When was Haley decided?
- A Beg pardon?
- When was Haley decided?
- Haley was '48. A
- When?

A 1948.

Q I thought so; I thought it was before '57.

and this case, is that they were both 15 years of age; because in this case we claim and the record shows, unless you disagree with methods, that the methods of the police in the interrogation of this juvenile were fair, reasonable, penetrating and an attempt to find out whether this young man was involved in this heinous offense of murder. Nothing wrong about that; a fair instrumentality in criminal investigation.

We state that thepurpose of this probation officer were several: first of all, to allow interrogation and to prevent overzealous pressure; to see to it that the interrogation was fair and that he was not tired, deprived of refreshment, rest or relief.

The right to interrogate this juvenile, granted by the juvenile court, did not require that the probation officer act as his counsel, tell him what questions to answer and what not to answer. The fact is that during a particular lull when the proceedings — when the detectives went to another part of the room and were conferring about trying to piece together various things that had already been developed, the probation officer sat alone with this juvenile and he said to him: "Willie," he says, "I don't want you to say anything to these police officers unless it's the truth, and I don't want you to worry about this

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I see nothing wrong about this kind of advice to a juvenile from a probation officer, because, bear in mind, that even up until the first decision of this Court in this recent case involving the Nebraska Statute on Juveniles, as to whether there was a right of trial byjury, which this Court did not deem necessary to decide, Justice Douglas, in his opinion said that the Juvenile Court is still set up for the purpose of rehabilitation and has not yet become a court for the trial of juvenile criminals."

And in 1957 the viewpoint, whether good, bad or indifferent, was clearly consistent with that policy.

Now, what else was this probation officer designed to do?

- Q What were the circumstances under which the court appointed this probation officer to accompany the Petitioner?
- A A petition was made by the Prosecutor's detectives to interrogate this juvenile because he was in custody at the Children's Shelter.
- Q So that the Prosecutor's Defectives had to apply to a judge of the court for permission to interrogate this juvenile who was in the juvenile center.
- A And the court granted that permission, providing that the probation officer was present at all times during

interrogation. Con S Now, much has been made --2 Q Is it correct that he was there for the purpose 3 only to see thatthe boy was not browbeaten or exhausted in any 4 way? 5 Well, that's true. A 6 Well, that's whatthe officer said. 0 7 That's what the officer said. A 8 That he wasn't there to advise him of his rights? 0 9 Precisely. A 10 And he wasn't there to aid and comfort him? 0 de de Well, --A 12 Just to make sure they didn't beat his brains Q 13 out. 14 Well, they didn't beat his brains out, Justice. A 15 There isn't a word in this record, expressly or by fair 16 inference --17 Q I agree with you fully, but my whole point is: 18 This is his testimony, that he was only to see that he wasn't 19 browbeaten. There was nothing to say to him that he shouldn't 20 be questioned for long periods of time. This man was not 21 trained in the law at all. He had a degree in pharmacy, this 22 man that's advising this boy. 23 And he was a probation officer for 15 years. A 24 And assigned a degree in pharmacy to advise this 0 25 33

fellow of his legal rights?

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A But how about his experience as a probation officer and handling the juveniles, which gave him great competence in the understanding of the probation process.

Q But he at no time told this boy that "You don't have to take a lie detector test?"

A He didn't advise this boy; he was not there as his counsel.

Q Well, didn't you just say he told him: "Now, you be good and get this off your chest and all." Do you call that counseling?

- A Well, he only told him to tell the truth.
- Q That's what you call counseling.

A I don't call that counseling. I don't call that counsel. Because, gentlemen, if this young man had a lawyer this juvenile would never have uttered a word. This would have been and remained an unsolved offense. Because I don't so think that a juvenile should receive the advice and the same kind of advice that a mature person should receive when it comes, and bearing in mind his future development.

For whatever it's worth, in a case cited in my brief, Chief Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote a concurring in this Culombe. He called it"State in the interest of Culombe," cited in my brief, where he states that "when it comes to juveniles and the advice he should receive, it

incongruous for his parent, if he's present at the time of police interrogation to advise this young juvenile not to talk, to arrange silence, because among things in the development of character and personality," as Chief Justice Weintraub said, "is the lesson which a juvenile must learn early, to face the music," and he didn't think and he stated in his viewpoint in dealing with a juvenile that "The same kind of advice should be handed to a juvenile as would be given to a mature person, bearing in mind the fundamental difference between the juvenile and rehabilitation process and the process of the criminal law."

Q What goes on in New Jersey now when they arrest a juvenile?

A I didn't get that.

Q What goes on in New Jersey now when they arrest a juvenile? If he had been arrested today would he have been given the Miranda?

A Right; he gets the Miranda warnings; he does, sir.

He does. He gets the warnings required by Miranda.

Q And he also doesn't testify in the proceeding unless he wants to; does he?

A That's true.

Q And that didn't used to be so.

A That's true, sir.

Q So Gault decided that; didn't it?

A Pardon?

- Q Gault made that much different.
- A That's true; that's true.

I don't think that Gault has so overshadowed the entire juvenile process that it has, as Justice Douglas said, "converted the juvenile court into a trial for juvenile criminals."

I don't think that has yet happened, whether it will or not, the future will determine that factor.

The fact is --

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Q Well, I thought you said it was a matter of interrogation. If you tell him he is entitled to counsel now and he said, "I want one," you'd have to appoint one; wouldn't you?

A He gets one; he gets one.

The fact is, in our judgment that most of the argument of Petitioner in this case has been what I will choose to describe an inflation of the significance of what are not such serious matters; or as the phrase has once been: "there has been an abundant resort to labels in this case, labeling everything that has been happening, that has happened here as being of a terrible nature and trying to put them all together to come up with the phrase, "a callous disregard of the rights of this particular accused," in order to justify and finally come up with the prescription that there was an involuntary or coerced confession.

I submit, gentlemen, that what has been happening here by the Petitioner's description of the various acts that are in this record and that are likely as well, to be innocent and free from the terrible connotations placed upon them, was the imposition of what one of the former justices of this Court referred to as "The tyranny of ravings."

We think that in this case the presence of the probation officer, the overall conduct of the police, in their interrogation, which was fair, reasonable, humoring and human and civilized, did not add up to such a destruction of the will, or such an overbearing of the ability of this juvenile to withstand the interrogation, as to constitute an enforced, coerced or run-down confession.

We think that, on the total record and on the totality of all of the circumstances taken together, without fragmentation or isolation, that there was in this case, no "callous disregard of the rights of this juvenile," but that there was a fair, reasonable and decent regard for his rights and that this confession in this case was voluntary and should be sustained.

Ω Is this youngster in for life?

A Yes; he is. I might say this, Mr. Justice: "He has come up for parole three or four times and he has been turned down on the basis of poor adjustment and I can also say this: this record has facts in here that are a little cloudy as

as to why a '57 adjudication finally came before the Appellate Division in New Jersey in '68 and I think you are entitled to know why.

In the first place, there were two court reporters in this case. Immediately after the adjudication of delinquency, one of them was called to the service and immediately sent overseas, so for three years, there was an inability to get a part of the transcript prepared which this reporter had taken.

Then we have in New Jersey -- an appeal, a notice of appeal had been filed. And we have in New Jersey, a practice, where periodically the court issues a show cause for dismissal of cases which have not been prosecuted, as the rules require.

And I was inthe office on each of these occasions
this young man would be consulted and would consult, as counsel
would go to see him at the Bordentown Reformatory where had
been committed originally, and he would say to his counsel: "I
don't want to go through with this appeal yet, but see if you
can hold it, because I'm coming up for parole and I don't want
this to interfere with my parole."

Well, the court wouldn't dismiss the appeal; we'll accept this. Before you know it, time runs by and in '67 he was transferred from the Bordentown Reformatory to States

Prison, which I call post-graduate elevation, where he undoubtedly went. Jailhouse lawyers and who aided and assisted

him in filing per st in the Appellate Division in August, 1968 an application to revive the appeal which had been suspended, and to proceed, and it was granted.

Counsel was assigned, the case was argued, the Appellate Division decided and so it went; and here we are.

Q Absent any investigation of the Weiss and Giambro affairs, and he had just admitted those other purse snatchings which he had just admitted, what would have been the normal course of dealing with him. Would he have been detained until those charges were heard by the juvenile judge or would he have been —

A As a matter of fact, what happened, Mr. Justice, is that on March the 20th he was committed by the judge of the juvenile court for these purse snatchings for which he was arrested on February 16th, to the Bordentown Reformatory for an indefinite term.

And it was while he was in Bordentown and after a complaint had been filed against him for Weiss and Giambro, in December he was brought from the Bordentown Reformatory to the Court House --

- Q Well, we he normally havebeen detained on those other charges --
- A Under New Jersey law he would be detained for such period as in the judgment of the Board of Managers, of the Bordentown Reformatory thought him to be ready to be

rehabilitated.

Q No, but I mean, when a juvenile was charged,
was -- he's arrested and charged with a purse snatching and he
admits it. Between then and the time of the hearing, delinquency hearing, what happens to him?

A He is detainted at the Children's Shelter, or he may be released in the custody of his parents or he may be released --

Q Well why was this young man detained?

A Why he was detained after February 16th is because on March the 8th, March the 2nd or 3rd, the complaints were filed in Weiss and Giambro and counsel was assigned --

Q I know, but why would you detain him during these ten days?

A Just as a matter for --

Q I mean if there hadn't been any investigation of Weiss and Giambro, would he have been detained?

A That I don't know, sir. It all depends upon the judge of the juvenile court and the state of their calendar and the circumstances. He might have been detained because of this prior involvement in other juvenile offenses, where he had been involved, and likewise, a complaint had been made against him by his parents for having run away fromhome. So that this young man was not the ideal youngster for release to the streets.

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- Mr. Kreiger, before you sit down: what does life mean in New Jersey now?
- Well, life in New Jersey means you are eligible for parole after 13 and a half years and he's practically served that, although in --
 - Ordinarily, I gather, you are --
- In this instance, as a juvenile, he was eligible for parole before 13-and-a-half years. In fact, as I say, he's been up for parole, I know, as much as four times.
- You are suggesting that his chances are that he will, in fact, will not serve more than 13-and-a-half years?
 - That's my suggestion; that's my best judgment.
- And Giambro is the only thing in issue here. He has served his Weiss sentence for five years?
- Under the 1958 Act which was held retroactive, even though he was adjudicated in '57, because it was beneficial to the juvenile and not held, because forthe first time it did away with indeterminate sentences inthe case of juveniles and provided for fixed terms not to exceed age 21, except in homicides.

If the Court would ask for argument on the second point dealing with the question as to the validity of the life sentence, otherwise I would rely upon my brief and the arguments contained therein.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Mr. Kreiger, we'll take thaton your brief.

MR. KREIGER: Thank you.

May I ask you if the record shows somewhere the number of times this young man had been arrested and what had happened to him, or is there anything in there about that?

A Mr. Justice, you will find that in the trial transcript that's on file with the Clerk of the Court, because this appendix was an abridged matter --

Q Was what?

A Was abridged by agreement between me and counsel for the Petitioner, but for the facts concerning his prior involvements are in the transcript of the entire trial, which is on file with the Clerk.

Q On file with our Clerk?

A Your Clerk.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mr. Kreiger.
Mr. Amsterdam, you have three minutes and I believe that
Justice Harlan had a vestion pending for you.

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT BY ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MR. AMSTERDAM: If I may just advert briefly to the questions the Court asked and to statements of Mr. Kreiger. I have five very short factual matters and then I will get to Mr. Justice Harlan's question.

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First, with regard to Mr. Justice White's question, Mr. Kreiger stated initially that during the ten days the boy was being held on those other purse snatchings and then admitted, in effect that that was not so. There is nothing in the record that will support the contention that he was being held in connection with the purse snatchings. The record —

- Q It's not that he was arrested for them --
- A He was arrested for them; that's right.
- Q He was taken into detention, he was detained --
- A Correct.

But, as Mr. Kreiger has stated, New Jersey law will be unclear as to whether he should be released under that situation and the clarification here is that he was held because he was being investigated for the Weiss and Giambro matters.

Secondly, Mr. Kreiger's statement that the boy was estranged from his family and that that explains to Mr. Justice Marshall why the mother wasn't called. The mother had contacted the police two or three times and the juvenile authorities more, asking that this boy be brought home when he was picked up. And both the police and the juvenile authorities knew that and the parents were not contacted.

Third, in response to Mr. Justice Marshall's question about whether he was told about the probation officer's role.

Mr. Kreiger has said that he will file something responsive to

that. I think the Court will find at pages 200 and 201 of the appendix all that there is. It supports my statement that he knew that the probation officer was a probation officer, had been assigned to "stay with him," and that's it.

Finally — no, two more points: First, Mr. Kreiger's statement as to what the probation officer told the boy. This is on page 90 of the appendix and this is supposed to be good probation officer's advice. "I took advantage of one of the respites in questioning, in one of these episodes, to ask the boy if he really knew anything about these offenses; that he should unburden himself and search his conscience and he would feel much better if he told it, because he would have to live with it the rest of his life. This sort of counseling I would give any boy in the juvenile court."

That's the support and assistance of the probation officer.

Finally, with respect to Mr. Justice Black's question:

I think, Mr. Justice Black, that you will not find in the record, the original record, any indication of the number of prior incidents of this boy. The record only shows that he was a probationer of the juvenile court at the time he was picked up here.

It shows nothing about the number, frequency, reasons for his being in probation. There is no such thing in this record.

Now, if I may --

O The record shows that he was five feet, eight inches tall.

A Pardon me?

Q In response to my question, the record shows he was 5'8" tall.

A I believe that's correct.

Q That's what he said he was, about.

A I believe that's correct.

Now, if I may speak very briefly, having only a minute left, to Mr. Justice Harlan's point. We think that the sentencing question is a fairly straightforward application in Paterson, with one wrinkle: there is no doubt that when this boy's maximum sentence was determined, subsequent to his original trial, that a finding was made which was neither required nor was any charge made at the original juvenile trial, which was thathe was adjudicated a delinquent on the basis of an offense which would be first degree murder.

That involves findings not made at the time of the trial, within the meaning of Specht, a new fact.

Under New Jersey law evidence is admissible, going to that fact, such as evidence of diminished capacity; in this case psychiatric evidence which wasnot put in by his counsel, as it should not have been at the original trial, since it didn't matter what degree of homicide he was found guilty of,

as a juvenile, prior to the new statute.

Now, the only question, therefore, is whether or not Specht applies if the new finding of fact is required, not by antecedent legislation, but by subsequent legislation which state law chooses to make retroactive.

As far as I can see, that makes no difference, whatever. It is the State of New Jersey which has chosen to say that a differentiation between two classes of people should be made: those who have been found guilty of first degree homicide and those with lesser degrees. The difference is critical. The difference in this case is the difference between six years imprisonment — this boy would have been released seven years ago, had it been a life sentence.

That fact is a critical fact; it was not in issue. The STate has put it in issue by the new legislation and we think that the Petitioner had a right to a hearing on it.

- Q What was the juvenile proceeding in which he was found to be a delinquent? What was his defense?
 - A The juvenile delinquency. The charges were --
- Q No; I didnt' say offense. I said how did he defend the charge; what did he have to say about the question of whether or not he was a delinquent at that proceeding?
 - A Not guilty; "I didn't done it."
- Q Did he have an alibi; did he say he was somewhere else?

A He has an alibi; that is correct.

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And I want to make very clear that I disagree with the State entirely, that that is inconsistent with diminished capacity. You don't have to admit anything to show the juvenile judge or the jury what the nature of the defendant is. It's not like the defense of consent in a rape case, which is inconsistent with alibi. To simply show the court that they are dealing with a juvenile who may be defective, retarded. Remember the court here ordered psychiatric treatment for this boy when they originally committed him, simply tells the court that if he did do it, which he says he didn't do it, then he hasn't got the capacity to be guilty of first degree murder. There is no inconsistency there, a good trial lawyer could present those —

Q Well, that answers my question.

My second question about that proceeding is what was the burden of proof required to show his delinquency in that proceeding, under New Jersey law?

- A In the initial proceeding.
- Q In which he was shown to be delinquent.
- A I must admit I do not know the answer to that question. Perhaps Mr. Kreiger could enlighten you. No issue has been made of this below and --
- Q Was it the duty of the state to prove his delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt?

A I have -- all I can say as to that, I'll be glad to find it out and submit, unless Mr.Kreiger knows the answer to that question, submit it to the Court in writing. No issue having been made of it below, I do not know the answer to that question.

Q Thank you.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Thank you, Mr. Amsterdam, Mr. Kreiger. The case is submitted.

(Whereupon, at 1:30 o'clock p.m. the argument in the above-entitled matter was concluded)