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# Supreme Court of the United States

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JOHN F. BAVOS, CLERK

Docket No.

In the Matter of:

PHILIP JEROME STILES,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

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Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

November 20, 1968

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7 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 October Term, 1968 3 4 Philip Jerome Stiles, 5 Petitioner, 6 No. 74 V. 7 United States of America, 8 Respondent. 9 10 Washington, A. C. Wednesday, November 20, 1968. 11 The above-entitled matter came on for argument at 12 11 a.m. 13 BEFORE: 14 EARL WARREN, Chief Justice 15 HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice 16 JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice 17 POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice 18 ABE FORTAS, Associate Justice THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice 19 APPEARANCES: 20 CHARLES J. ROGERS, JR. 21 725 Howard Building Providence, Rhode Island 02903 22 Attorney for Petitioner 23 ERWIN N. GRISWOLD Solicitor General 24 Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 25 Attorney for Respondent

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## PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: No. 74, Philip Jerome Stiles, petitioner, versus United States of America.

Mr. Rogers.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES J. ROGERS, JR.

#### ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. ROGERS: Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished Justices of the Honorable Supreme Court of the United States:

I would like to indicate at the outset for the record that I would like to allocate my time in 20 minutes for argument and reserve ten minutes, if possible, for rebuttal. I would like to also for the record indicate that I was assisted in and truly appreciate the help from the Solicitor, John Knotty, III, of Rhode Island.

The petitioner, if it please the Court, is under sentence at the present time to a term of two years in an institution to be decided by the United States Attorney General. He was charged, tried and convicted, first, in the District of Rhode Island and in the Federal District Court for a wilful failure and a knowing failure to report for induction into the Military Forces of the United States.

The case, I feel, is accurately cited in the brief for petitioner. I submit to the Court that perhaps the issue in this case is whether or not the defendant in that case and the appellant here did, in fact, have notice of the draft notice

itself. The record, we feel, is replete and the testimony will fully indicate that the petitioner in this case, Philip Jerome Stiles, did not in fact receive the notice that was sent to him by the draft board in Westerly, Rhode Island. The first contact that the petitioner had with the Selective Service System of the United States occurred on the 18th day of April 1963, wherein he filled out his application pursuant to the regulations.

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Justices of this Court that his first communications with them subsequent thereto was on 5-17-65, wherein the petitioner in this case advised his local Selective Service draft board that he would, in fact, be in the State of Tennessee and that the transcript will indicate that that was received by the local draft board on the 20th day of May 1963.

The matter of notice relative to receipt of the draft notice has, in fact, been discussed in the case of Bartchy v.

The United States and I submit that this is a very important case. The case does indicate that the defendant does have a duty to properly advise his draft board of his address, but the case indicates that he is not, in fact, required to remain in one place, even if he is in fact anticipating the arrival of a draft notice.

I submit that the petitioner in this case did not, in fact, anticipate a draft notice. I must admit and do admit that the petitioner in this case directed communications to the local

draft board that contained language that was less than desirable from the point of view of the recipient. However, the defendant did, in fact, and the appellant in this case did, in fact, notify his draft board that he would in fact not be at the address that was listed on his papers in the custody of the draft board.

And subsequent thereto he was sent an induction notice by the draft board.

He notified them by letter on January 17, 1966, and he advised the draft board that he would be away.

Q Did he in advising the draft board that he would be away from his residence advise them where he would be?

A If it please the Court, he did not. But he did advise them that he would, in fact, furnish addresses.

Q Did he do it later?

A He did, if it please the Court.

The notice was sent on the 17th day of January 1966, and the draft board promptly on January 24, 1966, sent an induction notice to him ordering him to, in fact, report for induction on the 9th day of February 1966. This notice was, in fact, received by a person other than the applicant. It was received by his mother.

Additionally, I indicate for the record that it was received at an address other than the address that it was sent to. It was sent to 10 Fortin Road. It was received not by the appellant, but by the mother of the appellant, and further than

that, it was received at an address other than the address of the appellant.

Q Was it sent to that address wrongly by the Board? Did the Board send it to his correct address?

A The Board did, in fact, send it to the correct address, if it please the Court. It was received by another person at a different address, if it please the Coard.

Q You mean the Post Office Department wrongly delivered it to another place?

A No, sir.

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Q What are the facts? Just tell us the facts.

A The facts, briefly, are that the communication was, in fact, addressed to the appellant at 10 Fortin Road and that the same was, in fact, received by a person other than the appellant and that the return receipt received by the draft board indicated that it was received at a post office box, Post Office Box 10, if it please the Court, a different address.

I submit, further, that we are in compliance with the so-called Bartchy Case. This matter, if it please the Court, I feel is of great significance because this particular appellant has, in fact, done everything he could. And I feel that I agree with the case law of this country, that a person has a duty to remain in compliance with the law.

And I submit that we did not anticipate any draft notice, that the appellant did, in fact, notify the draft board

in advance of his departure.

The Name

Subsequent thereto, he notified the draft board from Mexico. The transcript will indicate that he was not aware of the issuance or acceptance of the induction notice until he returned to the United States sometime after he was due for induction.

Q What was the notification he sent from Mexico? What did he tell them?

A He advised them as to an address in Mexico, if it please the Court.

- Q Where he could be reached?
- A Yes, if it please the Court.

The communication listed his address for the time being as listed as Coreo Veracruz, Mexico. It also contains a request for a new draft card to facilitate his return to the United States.

I feel that we have, in fact, in good faith adherred to the regulations. The defendant's actions clearly show an intent to comply and not an intent to fail to comply.

The Solicitor General in his brief cites a number of cases with which most of these cases I agree. I submit that none of these cases permit conviction and sentence without definite knowledge. This is not a case where we are attacking classification. It is one that very simply stated, if it please this Honorable Court, he never received the notice.

I submit that all of the appellant's conduct should, in fact, be taken into consideration for determination of whether or not he is, in fact, guilty as charged.

Q Am I right in understanding that your defense, your sole defense at the trial, was the defense of insanity?

A No, if it please the Court. I filed at the trial a plea of not guilty certainly and I filed a subsequent plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The record, if it please the Court, I feel is replete with testimony from both sides. I would like to deviate for a moment to explain that, if it please the Court.

The record will indicate that this appellant has, in fact, been treated by psychiatrists and psychologists. I have produced qualified psychiatrists in the Sate of Rhode Island and I moved that the Federal District Judge for the District of Rhode Island permit the defendant, in that case, the appellant here, to in fact be examined.

This motion of mine was, in fact, denied by the trial justice. Subsequent thereto, the appellant was, in fact, examined by three psychiatrists, members of the United States Navy, and was found unfit for military service. The report of the attending physicians is contained in the trial transcript and before this case began, if it please the Court, the trial justice knew because he had the report on the record that this young man was, in fact, unfit and had, in fact, been declared unfit by

psychiatrists of the United States.

The prosecution in defense of the psychiatrists certainly differed as to the extent of the insanity. However, I submit to this Honorable Court that both sides found that there was, in fact, an emotional disturbance.

Is that the issue that you were raising, the so-called insanity issue, whether he was emotionally unfit for military service or were you raising a defense in conventional criminal terms, that if you gave him the M'Naughton test or that he was unable to distinguish between right or wrong or unable to control his actions.

What sort of insanity defense were you making?

- A If it please the Court, at the particular time, the jurisdiction in Rhode Island was following the so-called M'Naughtor Rule.
- Q Does the question of whether he was or was not mentally or emotionally suitable for military service have anything to do with the M'Naughton Rule except possibly it involved some of the same criteria, but the standard is quite different, isn't it?
  - A I agree with Your Honor.
- Q What does fitness or unfitness as an emotional matter for military service have to do with the issues that were before the District Court and are now before us?
- A If it please the Court, at the trial leve, it was a clearly straight criminal defense.

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On the M'Naughton basis? 0

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I filed a defense of not quilty by reason of insanity.

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The M'Naughton test? 0

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The M'Naughton test was, in fact, applicable at that time. I requested the trial justice to give to me the charge of the American Law Institute rule. The charge wasn't given as exactly requested by the American Law Institute rule.

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My psychiatrist, if it please the Court, found that the applicant in this case and the defendant in that case was,

in fact, insane. That was his conclusion.

The examining psychiatrist -- and I would like to emphasize ---

Q Now you are saying "sane" and in your argument you were saying that he was unfit for military service. What did the psychiatrist testify to? Did he testify in terms of the American Law Institute test or the M'Naughton test or did he testify in terms of the military suitability?

If it please the Court, the transcript will indicate that as far as his military suitability goes, he testified that clearly the defendant, appellant, was not suitable. He also said that in his opinion that the defendant, in that case, appellant in this case, was not competent.

If it please the Court, the transcript would, in fact, indicate that they found him unfit for military service from a military point of view and even though they have but one hour to examine this young man, the transcript would indicate that there were many areas that were not, in fact, touched upon. They felt there was in fact an existence of a chronic emotional disturbance of long standing, if it please the Court.

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The trial justice did, in fact, write to me my request for charges under the American Law Institute Rule, thereby making the ALI Rule the law of that case, while the law of the jurisdiction remained ---

Q You are here urging that the trial judge committed a reversible error by failing to find that the judgment against the defendant should have been not guilty by reason of insanity?

A In effect, yes, Your Honor. I feel that the transcript would, in fact, and does, in fact, bear out the position, if it please the Court.

Q Mr. Rogers, I notice you opened and said you were going to give only 20 minutes. You haven't yet touched on the issue that I must say to you in all candom is the only one that really concerns me in this case, and that is the refusal of the trial judge to postpone the trial.

Are you going to get to that?

A Yes, Your Honor, I will address myself to that immediately.

If it please the Court, in the ordinary criminal case, many things happen. The United States Attorney had, in fact, argued against me in my motion to have the then defendant, now

appellant, examined as to suitability. Subsequent thereto, he was, in fact, examined at the United States Naval Hospital at Newport and we had between us a report that indicated clearly unsuitability for service.

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I went on the record, if it please the Court, out of the presence of the jury and so advised the trial justice. The transcript will, in fact, indicate that, and I construe the remarks of the Assistant United States Attorney, as in fact being a motion to either dismiss or a motion to postpone.

The trial justice did not, in fact, recognize it as a motion to, in fact, dismiss. I concede and I agree that this is a discretionary matter with the trial justice. However, I submit that it is error for him to fail to recognize it as such a motion.

Additionally, in that the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity had, in fact, been put in issue and the fact that the United States Attorney did, in fact, indicate and clearly indicated on the record that the appellant, then defendant, was in fact willing to submit for induction at that particular time, and I asked the Court to bear that in mind, that the transcript does, in fact, indicate that from the lips of the United States Attorney came the words "In that he is, in fact, unwilling to report for induction, we feel no further prosecution was in order."

Q Is this the situation as you saw it at the time, if

the Government were to find on an examination that he was not, in fact, fit for induction, his having said, "I will go through this examination. If they find I am fit for induction, I will be inducted," the Government would have dismissed this prosecution?

Is that it, and that you wanted an opportunity to go through this examination and the trial judge refused you the opportunity? Is that what it all comes down to?

- A No, if it please the Court.
- Q Let me ask you this: I am looking at this colloquy between the trial judge and Mr. Gearon, who I gather represented the Government.
  - A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Mr. Gearon says, "This is the position that if this man submits to induction, in all probability he will not be acceptable anyway. But in view of the fact that he is unwilling to go down to induction, the Government would take the position and the United States Attorney has recommended that there will be no further prosecution because it would really, in effect, if it were a person who could be eligible for the Armed Services, there would be a point in going forward with it. But insofar as this person, while charged with failure to report for induction, which is a serious crime . . " et cetera, and then the Court says, "Are you ready to go to trial or aren't you?"

Then I thought your position was, although the Government was willing to postpone the trial and not even to go forward 2 3 4

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with the prosecution if, in fact, it were determined that he was not fit for induction, that the trial judge didn't give the opportunity to have the examination which would determine that fact. Is that right? Is that right or not?

A It is not, Your Honor. The examination had already been accomplished at that time and the trial justice well knew of the findings of the three Navy psychiatrists at that time, if it please the Court.

This was immediately before trial. We went to trial approximately two minutes later.

- Q The Court said, "I see no need of it. Let's try this case and get it behind us."
  - A Yes, Your Honor.
  - Q That is what the judge did say?
  - A Yes, Your Honor.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Solicitor General.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERWIN N. GRISWOLD

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MR. GRISWOLD: May it please the Court:

This is a troublesome case. They say that hindsight is always 20/20 and there are at least a half a dozen points where I wish it had been handled differently and might not have come here.

However, in reviewing it in our office, although there are a number of critical points, we found none where it seemed

to us appropriate for officials in the Executive Branch of the Government to do anything, but to present the case to the Court.

issues which I think are not serious and which I will leave to the brief. It seems to me clear, for example, that the defendant was not "insane" within the legal definition of that term, that there is virtually no evidence that he was insane, and the jury's verdict that he was not insane should not be subject to review.

It also seems to me clear that proof that he was "unfit for Military Service" is irrelevant in this particular prosecution. Otherwise, any person who had a health impairment could simple ignore ---

Q Apartment, Mr. Solicitor General, from the prosecution as such, I gather that a finding that he was unfit might have a bearing, might it not, on the issue of whether the trial should have been postponed?

A The question whether the trial should be postponed is another issue.

Q Apartment from the merits of the prosecution itself, the fact that he was not fit for induction may not have been relevant on the issue of guilt or innocence. But it might well be, might it not, relevant on the issue as to who ---

A Yes, Mr. Justice, and that is one of the two issues which I am picking out of the group. I am simply trying now to dispose of others. Perhaps I didn't make it clear enough that I

thought that that was a different issue than the one as to whether the trial should have been postponed.

Then there was the argument about the authority of the clerk of the Draft Board to issue the notice. I don't think that is an issue. It seems to me that there are two principal places where there are problems. The first arises out of the form of the statute which makes it a crime if a person knowingly fails or neglects to or refuses to perform any duty.

And the question of the effect of knowingly, I would point out that the indictment goes even further. The indictment says, "Wilfully and knowingly." The statute only requires knowingly.

I don't know whether there is any difference. I think it is arguable that knowingly in that statute doesn't quite mean perception within the mind, but means that the circumstances were such that he knew he was doing wrong.

With respect to that, it is probably clear that he did not in fact himself receive or know about the notice to report for induction. So we do have a case in which the Government has to maintain that he knowingly failed to report for induction, although he did not have actual knowledge of the notice to report for induction.

There is a long history in this case going back to 1963 when the defendant filed a printed form in which he filled out his name with the Draft Board, in which he declared his

disaffiliation from the draft system. He was, however, at that time a student and the Board continued his 2-S student deferment.

In the fall of 1965 he ceased to be a student. The Board sent him on November 29, 1965, an order to report for a physical examination. He ignored that. He did not report.

The Board, it seems to me, used a certain amount of calm at that time. On December 21, 1965, they sent him a second order to report for a physical examination on January 6, 1966, and the record is clear that he received both of these notices and that he failed to report on January 6, 1966.

On January 11, five days later, he was declared delinquent under the regulations of the Selective Service System. A delinquency notice was sent to him and the record is clear that he received that delinquency notice.

The particular notice which was sent to him was a somewhat old form. We have examined it in the record. It advised him that he was subject to criminal penalties. It did not advise him, as the regulations plainly say, that he would be subject to immediate induction ahead of even volunteers.

On January 14, he was ordered for a third time to report for a physical examination, this to be on January 20, 1966. It was on January 17 that he sent to the local board the letter which appears on page 48 of the appendix. I think I will read the whole letter. It is somewhat bizarre.

"Dear Sirs:

"Your threatening letters continually arrive, tell me exactly what to do and informing me of the penalties for not complying with your directives."

That shows that he was aware that he was in a somewhat serious situation.

"In response I can only repeat my previous assertions that I am unwilling to be part of the organized murder and threat of murder which is the basis of any army."

I might point out, however, he has never made a claim of conscientious objection at any time either in the record or in connection with the trial.

"There are better forms of communication than impersonal printed forms filled with orders and threats. If the man is to function socially as something more than a self-destructive machine, the improvement of communication is of great importance. If you wish to discuss these matters further, perhaps we could arrange a mutually convenient time and place. I hope that you folks rise above crude attempts at manipulation and engage in some constructive interaction.

"Love, Bill Stiles."

And then a postscript: "I am soon going to take a vacation trip of a month or two. I tell you this because my leaving town with no definitive forwarding address might otherwise seem evasive. Don't worry, I will send you postcards letting you know how I am getting along."

He then did leave town apparently about January 20.

The record contains some evidence that he was very much concerned about the reporting for the physical examination on January 20, that he came pretty close to doing it, but that he finally pulled out.

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It was on January 24th that the Board sent him the notice to report for induction on February 9th.

Mr. Rogers has said something about this being received at a different address to which it was sent. That is true, but I think it is quite immaterial. The place where it was addressed was 10 Fortin Street, Westerly, Rhode Island, and it was received at Post Office Box 10, Westerly, Rhode Island, which is the place where the mail for 10 Fortin Street is delivered, because the people who live there have a post office box. It was received by his mother and signed for by his mother.

It and that the contents were not communicated to her son. I may say, too, that this was his last known address and the record includes the regulation of the Selective Service System that the mailing of any order, notice or blank form by the local board to a registrant at the address last reported by him to the local board shall constitute notice to him of the contents of the communication, whether he actually receives it or not.

He on February 11th sent a postcard to the draft board from Knoxville, Tennessee, in which he said he was still thinking

of them. Then on February 10th he mailed a postcard from Veracruz, Mexico, which is on page 51-52 of the record. I would simply point out that the address he gave there in Spanish is simply General Delivery Veracruz, Mexico, which is not a very permanent address.

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Hereturned to Rhode Island about the middle of March.

I find it difficult to say that the record contains any evidence so that the jury could have found that he actually knew of the notice to report for induction. It does seem to me that it contains adequate evidence to support a determination by the jury that he was well aware that such a notice was very likely to come and that he took steps to obstruct the communication of the knowledge to him.

In the Bartchy Case to which Mr. Rogers has referred in 319 U.S. involving a seaman who did take steps to see that the draft notice came to him, he gave the Houston address of his union. He informed the union that he could be in New York and to them to send it to the union office in New York. The Houston office did send it to the New York office. The New York office made a mistake and instead of delivering it to him, sent it back to Houston.

When he called for mail in New York, they said there was none. In that case, the Trial Court acquitted him of failure to report for induction, but convicted him of failure to keep the board informed as to his address. This Court reversed the

conviction on the latter point, concluding that he had taken appropriate steps and that it was not his fault that it had not gotten to him.

In the course of the opinion, however, the Court said, speaking through Mr. Justice Reid on page 489, "Regulation, it seems to us, is satisfied when the registrant in good faith provides a change of forwarding addresses by which mail sent to the address which is furnished to the Board may be by the registrant reasonably expected to come into his hands in time for compliance."

It is quite clear here that he did not do that. The District Court charged the jury that they had to find that he knowingly and willfully failed to report for induction and the jury found him guilty. On the whole, it seems to me that there is evidence to support that verdict. I think I am concerned about the consequence of a decision to the contrary, because I can see the article in the Selective Service Law Reporter which will advise people that when you know that the draft notice is about to come, write your Board thatyou are about to take a vacation and you will let them know and be sure that you see to it that whoever is at home to receive the mail doesn't open it and doesn't let you know anything about it.

If that is a way to avoid the obligation to report for induction, it could be a fairly serious matter.

Let me turn now to the other aspect of the case which

I think was the part that first gave me concern when I knew about the case. Anyone who has been an educational administrator for a good part of his life has had contact with situations like this. It is very hard to know just where to draw lines here.

It was obvious this young man needed help and certainly Mr. Rogers has devoted a great deal of his time and energy and skill in providing that help. I am rather thinking of help at an earlier stage.

- Q Do the records show wherein this petitioner was a student?
  - A Yes, the record shows that he was classified 2-S.
- Q He was a student. But does it show where he was a student?
  - Q It appears as Columbia University.
  - A It says Columbia University at the time of trial.

In the record at page 73, the FBI agent testified that he in fact registered at the University of Rhode Island and has failed to attend classes and then as a result failed the course, and whether he intended to be a student at the University of Rhode Island, I don't know.

At the time of trial he was a student at Columbia
University. Whether he was successfully pursuing that, of course,
again I don't know.

The colloquy I obviously am not going to take time to read it all. It is in the record at pages 20 to 23. It is set

1 out in full in our brief at pages 16 to 18. As an officer in the Executive Branch of the Government, I could not bring myself to the conclusion that that was a motion for a continuance. Even if it were a motion for a continuance, the question of its granting by many decisions and by proper judicial administration is a matter for the discretion of the trial judge.

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Almost never, I suppose, is a denial of a continuance regarded as error. I suppose you can amend that and say for the sound discretion of a trial judge. Whether it was sound here or not, I don't know.

As I have indicated, it is easy to second guess. My own wish is that the Judge had said, "Well, let's let this go over a couple of days and see what happens."

He didn't do that. I find it difficult to see how an officer of the Department of Justice can say that the Judge did not act in a properly judicial manner in making that determination. That passage is very appealing. It was very appealing to me, as I looked into it and examined it, I did think it appropriate to bring it specifically to the Court's attention in the brief in opposition which we filed here. But I could not bring myself to the conclusion that there was either a motion for a continuance or an abuse of discretion in denying it if it was treated.

Q Mr. Solicitor General, on page 19, Mr. Gearon says, "We would continue it. " He used the word "continue."

A Yes. He says, "We would continue." Whether that is a

motion for a continuance, I don't know. I don't greatly care because even if it is, I think the judge had discretion to deny it.

Q But I am also worried that the judge's language is sort of "gung-ho" language.

A Either he is guilty or he isn't.

Q "Let's get it behind us." Let's try this case. Let's get it behind us.

A I agree, Mr. Justice. I wish it hand't been handled the way it was. But I accept in terms of what is sometimes referred to in the books as this Court's supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice.

Q Mr. Solicitor General, does this accurately state your position? That the best you can make out of this colloquy is that the Government representative would not have objected to a continuance if the judge found that? On the facts as he and Mr. Rogers laid them out for the judge, it was justified.

A I think that is exactly what I get out of it.

Q That is the most you can get out of it?

A I think that is the most I can get out of it. I think I can properly say I have no objection if anybody else can get more out of it. But that is the most that I could get out of it.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Rogers.

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REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES J. ROGERS, JR.

### ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. ROGERS: If it please the Court:

With reference to this motion to continue, I wish to make it crystal clear to this Court that there was absolutely no doubt in my mind that I was going to trial immediately. I would like the Court to notice that I was ready enough to have this Court on the record.

If it please the Court, I am certain that, all being practitioners, we have been before a Court and it doesn't take too much powers of observation to know when you are going to trial and when you are not going to go to trial. I would indicate also for the record that the Solicitor General has, in fact, read these communications that I brought to the attention of the Court.

I indicate to the Court that now clearly there is no doubt in my mind that the additional plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was clearly necessary under those circumstances. I think that the record will indicate the accuracy of it. I know that a defense of insanity was applicable here.

The Solicitor General does, in fact, concede it would appear to me that the young man had no notice. He indicates that this young man failed to show up for physical examination. I submit to the Court that he wasn't on trial for failing to report for physical examinations. I concede that.

He was charged with not reporting for induction. Additionally, the Solicitor General concedes that the notice that the then defendant, now appellant, received was not one that commutained notice of immediate induction into the Armed Forces.

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I submit that it is very important to realize that all of this voice conduct should, in fact, be taken into consideration Did he or did he not comply with the requirements as laid out in the Bartchy Case? To the best of my humble knowledge, there is no statute and there is no case in existence in this country that will find someone guilty and sentence him -- and this young boy is under sentence for two years in a Federal prison -- and I submit that there is no statute or no case in existence in the United States that will charge, try and convict somebody and sentence them for an offense committed that they didn't know about.

I submit that factually the Solicitor General is incorrect when he says all you have to do to avoid the draft is to
send some radiculous letter and I say ridiculous letter such as
my client sent and leave town. This is not true. It is necessary, clearly, to adhere to the requirements of the so-called
Bartchy Case.

This country will not permit one to avoid military service in this manner. It is necessary, I feel, that when a man does not, in fact, comply with the requirement of the Bartchy Case to put him in a jail. But when he does comply with the

requirement of the Bartchy Case, I feel clearly, Your Honor, that the conviction should, in fact, be reversed and the young man should be set free.

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I trust that I have shown that he did, in fact, comply.

Q You are not really suggesting that petitioner in good faith left a series of forwarding addresses?

A I do, Mr. Justice Fortas. I truly do. I feel and I am well aware, if it please the Court, that you personally have tried many cases. I know that.

Q That wasn't my question. My question was whether it is your contention, based on this record, that the judge should have instructed the jury to bring in a verdict of not guilty because your client in good faith left a series of forwarding addresses at which he might have received the notice, had the Board been diligent in giving him notice.

A Yes, I am, if it please the Court. There are other cases in this area that the Government cited, Graves v. The United States at 252 Fed. (2d) 878. In that case somebody was off tending bees, if it please the Court. He requested a 60-day delay and left.

He was living in his automobile or what-not. He was off tending his bees. His mother also received that draft notice. I submit that this young boy did not have any knowledge, any prior knowledge, that any communication was, in fact, coming to him.

The Solicitor General indicates that his last communication did not indicate immediate contact from the Draft Board.

In the Bartchy Case, if it please the Court, it indicates clearly that you must be expecting this. This young man had no idea that the United States Army wanted him.

Additionally, he did in fact send them notice such as it was. He sent them notice on prior occasions and, on subsequent occasions, also.

If it please the Court, as I indicated for the record when I began my argument, the first thing this young man did after registering for the draft was to advise him way back in 1953, if it please the Court, that he was leaving to go to Tennessee.

I feel his actions must be considered as a whole.

I submit that his actions, although he may not have sent them an address -- at WXYZ Street, Apartment 4, et cetera -- he did, in fact, provide them the best possible information he could in fact provide.

Q How do you explain the two instances where he declined to appear for the physical examination?

A I have nothing factual, if it please the Court, to back up what I say. I submit that he very probably should have been charged by the United States Attorney for a violation of that section of the Selective Service law and the only thing I can do, if it please the Court, is to indicate that my personal explanation of why he didn't show up, I submit he was sick.

That is why I filed the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, if it please the Court.

Q Leaving the insanity aside for the moment, the original letter that he wrote to the Board saying he didn't want to be associated with murderers and so forth, and his refusal on two occasions at least to appear for physical examinations, shouldn't those be taken into consideration in determining whether these postcards and letters that he got from Tennessee with no address and the general delivery address at Veracruz, shouldn't those things be taken into consideration in determining whether he was actually trying to comply with the regulations?

A Yes, Your Honor. All of his conduct should be taken into consideration. But I submit that no emphasis should be placed on the bad, the ridiculous, the foolish than his other attempts, if it please the Court, and his other activities.

I want to thank this Court for allowing me to have the time.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Rogers, the Court wants to thank you also for accepting the representation of this indigent defendant. We consider that public service.

We thank you, too, Mr. Solicitor General, for your very fair representation of the Government in this matter.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled oral argument was concluded at 11:55 a.m.)

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