Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1968

In the Matter of:

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*****		Docket No. 749
ADOLPHO RODRIQUEZ	: ;	
	Petitioner, :	
VS	:	Office-Supreme Court, U.S. FILED
UNITED STATES,	::	APR 8 1969
	Respondent. :	JOHN F. BAVIS, CLERK

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Place Washington, D. C.

Date March 26, 1969

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9 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 October Term, 1968 3 X 0 4 Adolpho Rodriguez, 5 Petitioner, 0 No. 749 6 v. 0 7 United States, 8 Respondent. 9 X Washington, D. C. 10 Wednesday, March 26, 1969. The second The above-entitled matter came on for argument at 12 10:10 a.m. 13 BEFORE: 14 EARL WARREN, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice 15 WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice 16 WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice 17 BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice ABE FORTAS, Associate Justice 18 THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice 19 **APPEARANCES:** 20 WILLIAM ROSS WALLACE, Esq. 2200 Shell Building 21 San Francisco, California 94104 Counsel for Petitioner 22 BEATRICE ROSENBERG 23 Criminal Division Department of Justice 24 Washington, D. C. Counsel for Respondent 25 000

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PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: No. 749, Adolpho Rodriquez, Petitioner, versus the United States.

THE CLERK: Counsel are present.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Wallace.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF WILLIAM ROSS WALLACE, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. WALLACE: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court.

This is a case that comes up on the petition under Section 2255, a Federal prisoner who claims that he was improperly denied his right of appeal.

His petition alleges that he is of Mexican descent, did not speak the language well. The trial was conducted through an interpretor. At the conclusion of the trial and after the time of sentence the prisoner alleged that he requested the interpretor to ask the court and to ask his counsel to arrange for his appeal.

He also alleges that his counsel agreed to do so. And that an oral notice of appeal, if there is such a thing, was given but no written notice conforming to the statute was filed.

The prisoner originally and within six or seven weeks after the time of sentence filed what I suppose you would call an application for a late appeal. That was denied by Judge McBride, the District Judge in Sacramento and by the Circuit Court of the Ninth Circuit, upon the grounds that under the rule of the Ninth Circuit an application for a right of appeal, late, where a prisoner claimed that he had been denied that right of appeal must also show some basis for the appeal.

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In other words, it must show not only that he was deprived of that constitutional right but he must show that he had something upon which some reasonable basis upon which to appeal.

The proceedings were in 1963. In 1966 the prisoner then filed an application under Section 2255 and that application was very much more detailed than the previous ones. He had apparently risen in the hierarchy of the jail and had been there long enough to learn a little more English and that was a better job than the first one.

There again and without hearing, without reference to the transcript, without reference to his counsel and without reference to the United States Attorney, Judge McBridge denied that application and again he then filed his motion to have the appeal heard in forma pauperis in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The court again without hearing denied that motion, again on the basis of the rule in the Ninth Circuit that in addition to showing the deprivation of the right to appeal a

prisoner must show something more at least must show the basis of an appeal.

The cases in California in our Circuit are not wholly clear whether he has to show conclusively or whether the Judge here talked about rights constitutional or otherwise but in any event it is clear that in our circuit different from most of the circuits a prisoner claiming his deprivation of his right to appeal must show that he, if granted that right, has at least a reasonable basis upon appeal.

Now in the application for the motion for the writ of certiorari the prisoner set forth these facts. The Solicitor General in his opposition felt that a prisoner should at least show something that would indicate some basis for an appeal.

In our opening brief I pointed out that here was a prisoner of Mexican descent having very little knowledge of the language. He was tried with four or five other people, at least two or three of whom had separate counsel. The whole proceeding was conducted through an interpretor.

And how in heaven's name a person under those circomstances would be able to recognize and remember what errors occurred at the trial that might give him some basis for an appeal seemed to me an impossibility.

I think in the Solicitor's brief they have in effect waived that point. They seem not to rely any further upon the basis that something should be done that the prisoner must show

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something beside the actual deprivation of his right of appeal.

The brief of the Solicitor of the United States in this case seems to have waived that point and be really talking about whether this prisoner should now have a hearing, or whether this Court should send this matter back to the District Court to permit the District Court to interrogate and take affidavits from the trial lawyer that this man had or whether he has to bring the prisoner down from McNeill's Island.

We are talking now I think only of mechanics. My own view of the matter and I think I can express it easily is that if we take the rule of the Boruff case which as described in Hannigan simply says a prisoner who is deprived of his right of appeal or a prisoner's right of appeal with the ten day period during which that right must be exercised does not commence to run until such period as the prisoner is effectively represented by counsel.

Now, after our original brief I obtained from the court reporter in Sacramento the transcript of the last day of the trial. That is to say, the transcript of the day upon which this prisoner was sentenced, this prisoner and the others.

Oddly enough that transcript shows no oral notice of appeal. Although the lower court and the Circuit Court in our circuit had both said it was there. In other words, we have a judicial finding based on no fact whatever, an obvious result

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of not even looking at the transcript.

However, the transcript does contain a very much more important -- on page 3 of the appendix to my reply brief -the counsel then makes the motion not in very good language but he said it is just proceeding in forma pauperis in behalf of Adolpho Rodriquez and Etta Rodriquez while they are before the court, hereafter if they are transported away we would have to have them returned to make a motion before the court.

Judge McBride then says no, I don't wish to take up that motion at this time. It is 5 minutes after 12. We have taken all morning on it. I have no idea what your motion is and all motions have to be in writing.

Well, it was clear at that moment that the counsel who had been retained by Rodriquez and his wife for the trial was advising the court that he was stepping out.

You know the only purpose in making a motion of that sort is to indicate to the court that he was through, that lawyer was finished, and the motion to proceed in forma pauperis could only mean that he was in effect suggesting to the court that he was through, the court should appoint a new counsel and permit the man to appeal.

Section 37(a), Rule 37(a) says very clearly that if a prisoner is not represented by counsel, then the court must advise him of his right to appeal and the Clerk must enter the notice.

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Now it would have been perfectly simple to have accomplished that purpose at that time. Now we are five or six years later, yes, six years later. He has been in jail for six years. It seems to me perfectly clear that on the basis of the transcript the court can well now state that the prisoner's right to appeal commences at such time as the court in Sacramento appoints for him counsel and permits him then to enter his appeal.

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Now I think there is no point in my discussing the rule in the Ninth Circuit where I think because of their desire in the circuit and a very proper one to prevent repetitious applications under Section 2255 they laid out a lot of rules. I think the lower courts misunderstood the Dodd case somewhat.

But in any event while I can only agree with the courts in their desire to prevent to the extent they can, repetitious petitions under Section 2255, that has nothing to do with the right of a prisoner to be secure in his right of appeal.

Now this is not a case that can easily arise again. Because as your Honors well know, under the change of rule, no matter whether the prisoner is represented or not any longer the courts all now advise him of his right of appeal and if counsel is not going to take it the court simply instructs the clerk to enter the order.

So that we are talking about a situation that

certainly is not one to plague us in the future. This is a simple situation of a man having very little knowledge of the language whose trial counsel was not willing apparently to proceed past the trial who attempted to make clear to the Trial Court that he was withdrawing and whose failure and I think it a very serious failure on the part of the counsel was that he failed to file the proper motion.

Either that afternoon or on the following day. He did nothing further.

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What would the motion have been?

A I think it would have been a motion, your Honor, to permit the prisoner to proceed in forma pauperis on the appeal it would have meant I think also the appointment by the court of counsel for the prisoner.

Q The difficulty I have is that reading Roman III of the appendix to your reply brief, there is no real indication there of any wish to appeal, of any desire or purpose or wish to appeal.

A That I agree, your Honor. I think we have this odd situation.

The first time this came up Judge McBride said in his first opinion that the prisoner claimed that he had made an oral notice of appeal.

The case then went up before Judge Chambers and Judge Bone in the Circuit and somehow or another Judge Bone,

I think, wrote the opinion. Judge Bone said the right that notice of appeal, oral notice of appeal, was given by retained counsel. That was the basis of that.

Q You don't read the record as supporting that statement, do you? I don't.

> I don't read this record as supporting it, no. A That is what I mean. 0

No. Then it came down again on Section 2255 A application before Judge McBride and Judge McBride then said that an oral notice had been made. It goes back on up to the Circuit and Judge Jerkberg and I have forgotten who else was on the panel, they then affirm again that this oral notice was given.

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I can find no oral notice.

On the other hand, I can understand perfectly well that a Mexican prisoner would think that this motion that the man was making under this forma pauperis motion was just that and obviously it was intended as that.

How do we know that? 0

It could have no other purpose, your Honor. A

The prisoner to appear in forma pauperis if he is just going to the jail house, there is no purpose of his having the motion made except to have counsel appointed for him so he could appeal. If he had no other purpose. Otherwise he has got his 20 years in the Federal prison.

It seems to be one of the clearest cases that I know of of a failure for whatever reason of counsel to protect the right of the client to appeal.

Now I can understand Judge McBride, it had been a long 5 or 6 week's trial, conducted through an interpretor and a lot of lawyers and he was a little weary, I guess, himself and shut the man off before he had completed his motion.

Now that does not excuse counsel - He is retained counsel -- for not completing that motion and making it in writing and making it wholly clear.

On the other hand, it would seem to me an extraordinary thing for a court to hold that the prisoner clearly wanted to appeal -- he has alleged in all his papers that he wanted to appeal. There has been no denial on the part of anybody that he wanted to appeal.

He was denied his right of appeal, not on this basis, of this motion because nobody had ever even seen it. But denied it only on the basis that even assuming he wanted his right of appeal and that it should be given to him he must show in addition to that a basis upon which an appeal might be successful.

Inother words, in our circuit they have confused the constitutional rights provision under Section 2255 with the right of direct appeal. They have taken the right of direct appeal if it is late and added to it a demand that a

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prisoner be able to show, not only that he was improperly denied of his right of appeal but that having been so denied he still has valid grounds for an appeal.

Now, of course, that is a wholly impossible task for a prisoner in this situation who obviously has no knowledge of law, for him now to try six years later and recall what happened in the trial and what the trial errors were, it is perfectly impossible.

It seems to me perfectly clear that this prisoner should be granted a hearing. I don't know that even granting a hearing is necessary. But at least that I would think would be the minimum that the prisoner can have a hearing, his counsel can be brought in and it can be established, the facts can be established, the record is available, the transcript -the notes at least -- are available and the United States Attorney is available, Mr. Minelli, his counsel is available.

The case I think is one that illustrates better than most the difficulties that arise when these matters are handled in the lower courts without reference to counsel and without reference even to the transcript.

Because obviously here we have gotten off on the basis of somebody's recollection when five minute's work in reading the transcript and a few minutes in calling Mr. Minelli would have established that what Mr. Minelli was saying was I have represented the prisoner at the trial, I am not going to

represent him further and I ask the Court to appoint counsel to do so.

Ω Is there any indication at this point, what, if anything, he would be able to present on appeal?

A I have no idea.

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I can say wholly ex parte, your Honor, simply from discussing this matter over the telephone with Mr. Minelli, I tried to get him two or three times. He is a very busy trial lawyer and I was never able to make an appointment. He told me that he thought he had at least one valid ground of appeal.

But that this had been a long trial. He felt he had not been compensated as he should have been and that he was not going to take the thing up on appeal. That he told the prisoner he would not take it up on appeal for him but that he would arrange it.

Well, the prisoner, you recall in his petition said this lawyer said he would arrange it. Well, the arranging it was this forma pauperis business but he failed to do it.

So I think we have got a clear case where the prisoner was improperly deprived of his right, the right is an absolute right that in the absence of the prisoner knowledgeably waiving or giving up that right, there is not any indication here that this prisoner gave up any right to appeal knowingly. There is every indication from the fact that the prisoner started within six weeks, a few days after the

30 days went by he was writing out the first somewhat feeble attempt to get himself an appeal.

So it is clear that he wanted one. It is clear from my going through the records and my discussion with Mr. Minelli that the prisoner and his wife wanted to appeal.

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What has happened to the petitioner's wife?

A The petitioner asked me, wrote to me and asked me if I could find out where his wife was. He has not been able to communicate with her I think he said since 1943 or 44.

Q She was convicted?

A She was convicted.

Q I see.

A And sent to Terminal Island Prison, I think, in Southern California.

He asked me if I would write to her brother and I did and I received no reply. I have not tried to communicate with her in the Federal prison if she is still there.

Q She, too, seems to have been ---

A Yes.

But he has no knowledge of where she presently is and she may for all I know still be in the prison in California. Thank you.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Miss Rosenberg.

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ORAL ARGUMENT OF BEATRICE ROSENBERG

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MISS ROSENBERG: May it please the Court.

There really is a very narrow, almost no disagreement between petitioner and the Government in this case.

The cases are quite clear and quite general throughout the court that there are two situations which do call for some relief on bi-collateral remedy where prisoner claims that he has been denied the right of appeal.

One is where this counsel has not told him anything about his rights of appeal and has abandoned him and the other is if counsel has been guilty of what the court sometimes call broad but if you look at the case is a matter to overreach it.

There doesn't seem to be any conflict on the proposition that if a counsel assures the defendant that he will take care of his appeal and then deliberately does nothing, not just sit, the fact that this is a basis for collateral relief.

Where the Ninth Circuit and possibly two other circuits although their decisions are not wholly clear have been different where there has been a conflict is on the question of whether in addition to alleging a deprivation of the right to appeal the prisoner has to show that there was some basis of appeal.

And the Ninth Circuit is the one that insisted on

this requirement. We understand what they were trying to do which was try to sift the wheat, the good case from the bad one and we assume that if a man had a good point on appeal it would take a vote to his contention that counsel deliberately didn't do it.

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However, on reflection we have come to the conclusion that we can't support that as a requirement for requiring action in the District Court and the reason for that is that it seems to us not whodly consonant with the real remedy that you are trying to get at, what collateral relief was primarily and originally designed to do was to take care of the person who got caught in the coils of the law either the judge or the prosecution or his own attorney.

And it seems to us that those who are most likely to abuse, that really kind of make up stories that we do encounter could meet the Ninth Circuit requirement with no difficulty. But the truly honest, ignorant person who had been overreached by an unscrupulous lawyer would find it most difficult to specify whether there was legal error at his trial and for that reason we do not urge the Ninth Circuit rule.

But since the case is here we do think there are some things this court could help clarify with respect to this kind of a claim or perhaps even more generally with respect to this question of what does a judge do when he gets an allegation of this kind.

I think no one who has had experience with them can fail to appreciate the fact that a lot of these are simply not true and the result of wishful thinking.

On the other hand, there are some that are.

We have agreed that if what this petitioner alleges in his petition for a writ of certiorari which is much more detailed and much more specific than his allegations in the District Court, we have agreed that if what he alleges in the petition for certiorari were alleged to the District Court the District Court would have to do something.

We find it a little difficult to fault the District Court on not acting on what it had before it. But even assuming -- it is true that the District Court rested on the Ninth Circuit rule which we are not defending but even on the petition of the District Court it seems to us the petition is not specific enough as the petition for certiorari is to require action and we think that is different.

We think you have a right to require specific allegations in the District Court about what went on with his lawyer. We can't expect an ignorant prisoner to know where this legal error at a trial but he can know what went on with his lawyer.

Now, in the petition, he alleges something which is fairly consistent with what petitioner's counsel says. He has discovered ex parte. He says that he asked the attorney

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to appeal. Petitioner's trial counsel gave oral notice of appeal. I assume he considered this rather cryptic motion to be an oral notice of appeal.

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Then he says petitioner's wife was then placed in a room to await transportation back to the county jail and that one of his other papers in the record says he was held in the ounty jail for 30 days. But at this point he says, while they were waiting petitioner's trial counsel came to see petitioner and his wife and told him he would arrange for the cases to be appealed.

Now that is the part that we don't know what happened then. That is after this hearing, whatever went on there. And whether it is true or not I have no way of knowing.

But we agree that if that allegation if counsel said he would arrange for their cases to be appealed, which appears only in the petition for certiorari, it may to the District Court call for some action.

But the question is, what action.

And I think that this is important not only in this situation which we hope will arise rarely in view of the new rules but even more basically generally in 2255 when you get allegations often made out of whole cloth what is a judge to do and it seems to me that this court decisions in both Walker against Johnston in 312 United States and in Machibroda have been misunderstood.

In both of those cases there were responsive affidavits filled and the court held on the basis of those responsive affidavits where one side said "X" and the other said exactly the opposite that the Court could not decide the matter on affidavits that there had to be a hearing.

And I think there has been a tendency as a result of that to consider that affidavits have no part at all in 2255 applications.

As a result of what case?

A Machibroda.

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Q Machibroda, I thought so.

A And before that Walker against Johnston. Although in both of those cases there were affidavits. What the court said as I read both of those cases is these affidavits present a clear-cut conflict of testimony and we have something as clear-cut as that it has to be resolved in a hearing.

I presume if the lawyer in this case said I did not arrange, I did not tell the defendant I would arrange for the appeal, and the defendant said he did, there might be of necessity a hearing except for what I am going to say next because I don't think that is enough.

It seems to me that the first thing you do in 2255 generally and certainly in this situation is to try to get a responsive pleading. In one form or another.

Now this Court, just last Monday in the Harris case talked about flexibility of procedures. I don't think it has to be a formal responsive pleading like the old return in habeas corpus because that wouldn't be meaningful. But what you do want is to get something in the record which seems to me would most easily take the form of an affidavit, getting from in this case the attorney, since the Government has no part in all of this. This was retained counsel and the Government obviously knew nothing of what went on here. Get from the attorney a response.

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Now I can conceive of several responses which might settle the whole question one way or another.

For example, if the attorney says he haddid tell me he would like to appeal and I said I didn't feel that I could do it for less than X dollars and that I did not feel it was part of my obligation to tell him anything about his rights in forma pauperis. Why? Because we don't have to have a hearing. We just go ahead with an appeal if that is the situation.

On the other hand, we had a case, I think this term, maybe last, in which a prisoner alleged that his attorney had deliberately failed to go ahead with his appeal and the attorney had filed in court a written consent signed by the prisoner to dismiss the appeal.

I think experienced attorneys faced with charges

are probably being careful if they decide not to go ahead with an appeal to get some sort of acknowledgement from counsel because counsel appointed and abused, and appointed as well as retained are subjec to a great many charges, by prisoners, very few of which prove to be justified.

However, there may be other situations.

An Attorney may say I didn't feel the case had any merit. I was convinced that this client had a great deal of money. And I, therefore, saw no need to inform him of his rights in forma pauperis.

In that kind of a situation at least the issues are narrower. The court has the legal question to decide. Does a retained counsel have to inform a man he believes to be nonindigent of his rights?

Q Miss Rosenberg, is there any place along the line where you considered giving the prisoner a lawyer?

A Oh, I think that if it becomes -- once you get a responsive pleading, a man says as this prisoner says here while we were waiting counsel said he would arrange for an appeal, and he didn't do it. And I left convinced that my appeal was going through.

Now I think we get a reply from the lawyer first before we give him a lawyer. We get a responsive pleading whether it is in the form of a request to the United States Attorney to get it ---

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Q When, if ever, does the prisoner get a lawyer? A If, from the lawyer's response it becomes clear he was deprived of his right of appeal, of comrse, you give him a lawyer and you give him a transcript and you go ahead with the appeal.

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If it becomes clear from the response that you have a kind of an issue of fact that can't be determined on affidavits then you give him a lawyer and have a hearing under 2255, and if it is decided that he does have a right of appeal you give him a lawyer on appeal.

There is no question that if the appeal is allowed he is given a lawyer. The question is, can't we get a responsive pleading which at least serves the function of narrowing the issues and which may even avoid the necessity of a hearing before we have to give him a lawyer.

Q My problem is if I understand you correctly that in this very case once this petitioner had a lawyer the lawyer was able to say it properly so that you admit that if that had been filed in the District Court it would have had to have been heard.

Doesn't that mean that when he gets back to the District Court he has to have a lawyer?

A Your Honor, he didn't have a lawyer except a prison lawyer and I guess a pretty good one in this case.

The allegations that we consider sufficient are the

in the petition for writ of certiorari before counsel here was appointed.

Q That is the one?

A That is the one.

Q Well, he can't have that one in court because he is still in prison?

A All we are saying is these allegations that he makes here are the kind that a prisoner can make, particularly in the light of this Court's decision in Johnson against Avery and the system that has been developed in the Federal prisons in most of them of having assistance to petitioners he can say what he said here.

This isn't asking him for legal point. This is simply asking him to say what happened between him and his lawyer.

Now all we said was, if this same kind of an allegation, just copy, were put to th District Court the District Court would have to do something. We admit that.

The question is, what does the District Court do with that point? We say the first thing the District Court does before it appoints a lawyer or before it decides to hold a hearing is to ask for a responsive pleading from the person that knows.

Which is the lawyer in this case and would be in the form of an affidavit.

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And it seems to us that this serves at least the function of narrowing the issues. Because if a lawyer does say yes, he wanted to appeal and I said no, I wouldn't do it unless he paid me "X" dollars but I felt no need to do anything further even to informing him of his rights in forma pauperis then the District Court doesn't have to hold a hearing. It just has to appoint a lawyer and let the appeal proceed.

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Q Vacate the sentence I suppose so ---

A Well, there are two different ways of doing it and I think the one that your Honor suggests is a better one. It is a way suggested by the District of Columbia and by the Eighth Circuit, I believe, which is to vacate the sentence and resentence so that the 10 days for appeal starts to run, and, of course, at that point he has to appoint a lawyer for him.

I think that is a better way. And it had problems before because there would have been problems of credit on sentence, but in view of the new statute which gives a prisoner credit on a sentence for all the time spent in jail for that offense, these problems would not arise and it seems to me more expeditious and correct to have the sentence vacated and the appeal proceed in that situation.

Q How long?

A And I think that it would if I may respectfully

so suggest be desirable that an opinion indicate so that the courts who are faced with the problems will know what to do.

Q What is the other alternative procedure, Miss Rosenberg?

A Pardon?

Q What is the other alternative procedure? You said there were two of which this one you thought was preferable.

A The other alternative has been for the District Court on 2255 to consider the issues and say there is no issue here that is worth an appeal.

Or there is an issue here worth an appeal and I think the appellate court would rule this way and so I will order a new trial or I wouldn't.

I think that is undesirable because it doesn't remedy the wrong. The wrong is the failure to appeal and it seems to me, therefore, that if you are going back to where the wrong occurred you should give him the appeal immediately and have the Court of Appeals pass on it rather than the District Judge form whose rulings in a sense when he is trying to appeal ---

Q Miss Rosenberg, wouldn't you think that in a situation of this kind where we have an ignorant, illiterate foreigner who is being tried for an offense and he hears this colloquy in court and then shortly after 30 days attempts to perfect his appeal and in two subsequent proceedings the District Court examining the records and remembering what happened on both occasions treated this as an oral notice of appeal, and the two different panels of the Court of Appeals considered it as an oral notice, do you not believe t hat that brings a case to us in a form where we should decide whether the Ninth Circuit rule is right or wrong instead of trying to limit it in this way that you have been trying to do?

A Oh, we have been agreeing ---

Q Why do you try --

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A No, I think the Court ---

Q -- to narrow this down? Why isn't the man entitled? Do you want the judge to say if he does come in now and say I want an appeal on these grounds, and have the judge pass on his own actions and say, no, it isn't good enough, you can't appeal?

Why isn't he entitled to an appeal?

A Well, your Honor, I said I thought the preferable procedure would be to have the judge vacate the judgment and allow time for appeal. I think that would be the preferable procedure.

Well, now on this question of ---

Q I didn't understand that you agreed that this case should go back and he should be granted an appeal.

I thought you said he should go back and have affi-1 davits signed by himself and contra-affidavits filed by 2 counsel and so forth and then have the judge determine whether 3 or not this was a notice of appeal. A A Oh, your Honor, I don't think that I can on my 5 own say that counsel was derelict in his duty without having 6 counsel heard. I don't know what happened. 7 Q Well, somebody was obviously derelict. Who was 8 it? Was it the petitioner? Was it the lawyer? Was it the 9 judge? 10 A I don't know. 11 Q Or was it the Court of Appeals? Somebody has 12 been derelict here. 13 I don't know, your Honor. A 14 I do know that there are cases in which there is a 15 determination, counsel has said to a prisoner, I do not think 16 there is anything to be gained by appeal. 17 Q We have nothing like that in this case. There 18 has nothing been said like that here. 19 A We don't know what has been said, your Honor. 20 We know what the prisoner has said. 21 What is the exact disposition that you think 0 22 should be made of this case? 23 I think the proper is for this Court to rule A 24 that the prisoner need not show ground for appeal. That, if 25 26

the allegations in his petition can be sent back to consider whether the allegations in the petition for a writ of certiorari -- let me say that on the basis of the allegations in the petition for a writ of certiorari the District Court must determine whether the petitioner has been deprived of his right of appeal.

Now I think this does.

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Ω Isn't that the issue that is here right now?

A No, it is whether he stated a basis.

Q I beg your pardon?

A It is whether he has stated a claim which the District Court should consider. And we agreed that he has stated a claim which the District Court should consider but I do think that counsel is entitled to be heard.

Now if counsel chooses to say that I should have gone ahead, all right. But as I tell, your Honor, I have seen cases where prisoners have said counsel refused to take an appeal for me and then counsel has come forward with a document which the prisoner has signed agreeing to dismiss the appeal.

I don't think, it is unfortunate I think that this case has taken so long. It is unfortunate that his first attempts weren't considered more carefully. But if we are establishing the general rule I have seen too many cases where counsel was abused, unecessarily, to accept prisoner's word

as a general matter. I agree that if what Mr. Wallace says he has learned informally was correct maybe the easiest way in this case would be that. But I am in no position to say that counsel was derelict without knowing the facts.

Q Are you suggesting that there should be a remand here for the purpose of framing an issue as to what went on between this man and his lawyer?

A Yes.

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Q And depending on that, whether there would be a hearing or not? Is that it?

A That is right.

That is our position now. The reason I hesitated when you first asked me is we suggested in our brief that what was said in the District Court was so unspecific compared to what is said in the petition for certiorari that it would be appropriate to just let him start all over again.

However, I don't think that is terribly important. He has made these very specific allegations and in light of the fact that counsel is convinced that they have a basis in this case, then I think that it could well be a remand to consider this.

But I do think that we cannot in a sense convict counsel without giving him a chance to say what his version of the event is.

Q Do we have to convict counsel or do we have

to interpret what he said to the court and determine how the court understood what the counsel said? Isn't that what we are after here rather than to try a lawyer. We aren't trying any lawyer.

This man made a motion in court and he mentioned that the defendant wanted to go ahead in forma pauperis. And the court twice on subsequent proceedings has considered that as an oral notice of appeal and two different panels of the Court of Appeals has interpreted it in the same way.

Now, why do you say to us that we shouldn't interpret it that way for the purpose of determining whether this man gave notice of appeal?

A Well, your Honor, the judge said to counsel you have to file a written ---

Q I beg your pardon?

A The judge even in this hearing said to counsel you have to file a written notice. The prisoner himself said he did confer with counsel after sentencing. Something went on there.

Q Something went on. It is demonstrated in court from what counsel said.

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A No, after sentencing. This was at sentencing.

Q At sentencing his counsel said this man wanted to proceed in forma pauperis and the court interpreted that evidently as an abandonment of the client and a desire

from that moment for him to proceed in forma pauperis. And within 30 days or shortly after 30 days the defendant was trying to get into the courts. And what more do we need when the courts have interpreted below the way they have?

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A It still seems to me that the defendant has said that counsel promised to do something counsel didn't do.

Not it is very simple if that is the fact and counsel agrees it is the fact. I agree there is nothing further to do. We don't need a hearing. He gets his right of appeal.

Q You know full well that if this case goes back and counsel says no I didn't tell him I would appeal, what I said in court was what I meant. You know that the court is not going to believe Rodriquez as against a practicing lawyer in the city, don't you?

So he is denied the right of appeal then in spite of the fact that the courts below and all these occasions have said that except for the fact that he didn't delineate what his cause of appeal was that he couldn't appeal.

That is the issue they decided. Not that he didn't give an oral notice of appeal, but that he didn't give the reasons why he was appealing. And they say because of that and because of our rule he can't have an appeal.

Now, why can't we say if you don't abide by that Ninth Circuit rule, Miss Rosenberg, why can't we say that the

Ninth Circuit rule is wrong, that the man did give oral notice of appeal in the courtroom, that his counsel abandoned him there and left him in forma pauperis and that he didn't have to in those circumstances delineate the issues that he intended to raise and decide the case in that manner.

Inasmuch as two Courts of Appeals have done it and the District Court twice.

A Well, I think, your Honor, you are if so ruling accusing ---

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Q I beg your pardon?

A I think that we are accusing counsel of a dereliction of duty without hearing counsel.

Now, I agree that the indication in this particular case are, that this man should be given a right of appeal except that one of the things that is surprising on the other hand I must say is that there were other defendants represented by other counsel, separate counsel.

Now I am going to believe one may have not understood his obligations completely. I find it hard to believe that I think it is four different counsel. I am not sure. Didn't do so.

However, I think that we have rules here that must be applied across the board. And we cannot fail to face the fact that there are many prisoners who simply create stories out of whole cloth that sound very convincing and turn out not

2 to be, to be absolutely false on documentary evidence. 2 So that in having general rules about what a court should do I think that we have to consider that question and it 3 4 is what happens generally. 5 Q Miss Rosenberg, what is the predicate for your position here? Is it the rule of criminal procedure or is it 6 7 a supervisory power or some constitutional provision? A What? 8 Is it the right of counsel you are talking about? 0 9 Counsel on appeal? 10 A What reason do we give for -- what violation 11 Q may there have been here? 12 Well, there could have been a violation of the A 13 right to counsel. 14 Q I didn't hear you. 15 A Well, there could have been a violation of the 16 right to counsel, affecting petitioner's counsel in the sense 17 that does counsel's duty extend to carrying through to the point 18 of at least notifying of a right of appeal and what he should 19 do and particularly when it is retained counsel, does counsel 20 have a right ----21 Now does retained counsel -- if he fails to 0 22 follow his orders or fails to follow his agreement, that is 23 a deprivation of a right to counsel? 23 If counsel has overreached in some form or A 25 32

another that is the Calland case in the Seventh Circuit.

2 Q Yes. That is overreaching, but you would throw 3 in with that negligence?

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A Well, pure negligence is very hard to reconcile.

5 Q Well, I know it is hard. But I am asking 6 what you think the answer is.

A I think it must be a little more than negligence. It must be a failure in form of the rights.

Q Just plain negligence, just forgetting about it or he puts it in the wrong drawer or his secretary is sick?

A That is Robinson.

Q That may be Robinson, but what is your Department of Justice position on this?

A My Department of Justice position pure negligence without any poverreaching aspect is not enough.

Q Well, then I would suppose you would say there would have to be a hearing in this case based on your position?

A Not necessarily. Because he says that counsel agreed and then deliberately failed to take any steps. Now if counsel admits that there doesn't have to be a hearing.

Q Deliberate.

A Said I wouldn't do it under the Calland case. If counsel says the only way you can take an appeal is to pay me \$500 and you don't tell him that you can get an appeal another way that in and of itself is a negligence.

Q Because we have repeated cases here as you well know, where the claim is that either -- well, you wouldn't distinguish in this respect between between appointed and retained counsel, would you?

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A Well, I think there is a possibility of a distinction. If you have a client who is known to have \$100,000, I don't think you have to tell him of his rights to appeal as an indigent. But where you say, I think you have a good case on appeal ---

Q Let us assume there is an appointed counsel. Let us assume counsel in this case had been appointed and the same thing happened. You wouldn't have any different reaction?

A No. The cases are clear that appointed counsel is under a duty to either take a notice of appeal and ask for withdrawal or to notify the defendent of what must be done. He must inform him of the time for appeal.

Let me say, of course, that this is, we hope, a darn question.

Q Well, you seem to be making a difference between appointed and retained counsel?

A No, I think the only difference is the situation of a retained counsel saying to the defendant whom he does not know to still have funds, I think you have a good case on appeal but I won't do it unless you pay me \$5,000.

Now if this is a client known to have \$100,000, I

don't think a retained counsel is under a duty to tell him
 about the rights to proceed in forma pauperis.

On the other hand, if you have in this situation a case where counsel assumed that counsel felt he wasn't adequately paid for the trial, and he really did think his client was now a pauper, then he is under a duty to tell him about his rights as an indigent.

And if appointed occunsel has been appointed on the assumption that theclient was indigent he is under a duty to tell him.

Q All right.

Assume they tell him and the client says please appeal and neither the appointed counsel nor the retained counsel does so, are they both under the same standard?

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Q And so your line, the Department of Justice suggests to the court in all of these cases where there is failure of counsel to take some step which he had aeither agreed to do or the client expected him to do that we ought to draw a line between the negligence and the deliberateness?

A Yes.

Q And pure negligence you would say that whether the counsel is retained or not or appointed the client is stuck with his counsel?

A That is right.

Q Miss Rosenberg, isn't the real question here
whether there was, whether the prisoner deliberately gave up
his right to appeal? That is to say, whether there was a
deliberate failure to appeal. And that can be established
(a) by proof of a decision on the client part or the acquiescence of the lawyer's decision.

7 On the other hand, if the lawyer fails for whatever 8 reason to advise the client of his right of appeal, then at 9 least arguably there was no waiver or voluntary surrender of 10 the right of appeal.

And all of these are questions for the District Court 12 to look into and decide in this case once we -- if we do get 13 past the obstacle presented by the Ninth Circuit's ruling in 14 this case that since the petitioner failed to state a basis of 15 his appeal it will not consider the appeal.

Have I summed it up correctly?

A Right.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Wallace, have you finished your time or -- no, you have some more time.

REBUTTAL ORAL ARGUMENT OF WILLIAM R. WALLACE, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. WALLACE: I think I can finish very shortly.

223 I should like to address myself first to the question 224 asked by Mr. Justice Marshall.

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I think it is obvious in a situation of this kind

that immediately on remand counsel must be appointed for the prisoner. I don't think the court should be calling in a former lawyer and asking him to make an affidavit ex parte again. I think the ex parte business, we have had too much of that in this case already.

I think if counsel had been called in in the first instance, and the United States Attorney called in in the first instance we wouldn't be here.

Q Well, is there a constitutional right to a lawyer in 2255?

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A In the Boruff case in the Fifth Circuit the Court says we think it is not an unwarranted construction of the Rule 37(a)(2) to construe the words defendant not represented by counsel to mean a defendant not represented by counsel during the 10-day period after which failure to file a notice of appeal would forever bar such a right.

Q Well, at least, I suppose if this court ruled that there should be a hearing the practice in the Ninth Circuit would be to appoint counsel?

I would think so, yes, your Honor.

Q They do appoint counsel when they have hearings?A That is correct, your Honor.

Q Mr. Wallace, you are not suggesting are you that this court should tell the District Court at this stage how to go about ascertaining the resolution of the issue of

face if one develops?

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A No, I am suggesting this court should not do so.

Q We should not, and you are not suggesting, are you, that at this point we should instruct the District Court that it should or should not appoint counsel for the ascertainment or whether this petitioner's lawyer did or did not advise him about his right to appeal, did or did not fail to perfect the appeal?

A Well, I would assume, your Honor, if this case were sent back to the District Court and the rule of the Ninth Circuit is overruled by this court and this case is remanded to the District Court to determine whether this prisoner has a right of appeal, all of these things will be taken care of.

Q Then the District Court will go ahead and take care of its own.

A The thing I was objecting to was that some kind of a proceeding happened before the court held a hearing. I think the prisoner is entitled to be present or at least entitled to have counsel and then the Court can go on and have whatever kind of an investigatory hearing it wants.

So long as it is confined only the question of this man's right of appeal and not to the question of whether his appeal is granted would be a good one. I don't think that is any business of the District Court.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Before you sit down, I

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1	just want to say to you that the Court is conscious of the fact
2	that you are representing this indigent defendant by assignment
3	from us and we consider that a real public service on the part
4	of the lawyers to do that and we always appreciate it and we
5	appreciate your services in this case.
6	Miss Rosenberg, of course, we always appreciate your
7	able and very active representation of the Government in such
8	cases.
9	MR. WALLACE: I thank you, your Honor. It has been
10	a rewarding experience.
11	(Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m. the oral argument in the
12	above-entitled matter was concluded.)
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