BRARY

COURT. U. S.

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

52

-

Office-Supreme Court, U.S. FILED

DEC 19 1988

JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

71

Docket No.

In the Matter of:

Presbyterian Church in the United States, et al.,

Petitioner;

vs. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,

Respondent;

vs. Eastern Heights, Presbyterian Church, et al.,

Respondents.

Duplication or copying of this transcript by photographic, electrostatic or other facsimile means is prohibited under the order form agreement.

Place Washington, D. C.

Date December 10, 1968

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

300 Seventh Street, S. W.

Washington, D. C.

NA 8-2345

-					
d'auge	TABLE OF CONTENTS				A PROVIDENCE
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF:	P		G	E
3	Owen H. Page, Esq., on behalf of Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church		24		
4					
5	Charles L. Gowen, Esq., on behalf of Petitioners		46		
6					
7					
8	ශ ක මෙ				
9					
10					
11					
12					
13					
14					
15					
16					
17					
18					
19					
20					

1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	OCTOBER TERM 1968
3	
B,	PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE : UNITED STATES, et al, :
5	Petitioners, :
6	vs. vs. No. 71
7	MARY ELIZABETH BLUE HILL MEMORIAL :
8	PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, et al, :
9	Respondents. :
10	
11	Washington, D. C.,
12	Tuesday, December 10, 1968.
13	The above-entitled case came on for oral argument
14	at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
15	EARL WARREN, Chief Justice
16	HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, Associate Justice
17	WILLIAM ORVILLE DOUGLAS, Associate Justice
18	JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice
19	WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice
20	POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice
21	BYRON RAYMOND WHITE, Associate Justice
22	ABE FORTAS, Associate Justice
23	THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice
24	
25	

APPEARANCES :

CHARLES L. GOWEN, ESQ., 434 Trust Company of Georgia Building, Atlanta, Georgia, On behalf of Petitioners

RICHARD T. COWAN, ESQ., and FRANK B. ZIEGLER, ESQ., 24 East Oglethorpe Avenue, Savannah, Georgia, On behalf of Respondents

OWEN H. PAGE, ESQ., 305 Realty Building, Savannah, Georgia, On behalf of Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, et al.

PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: All counsel are present.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Gowen, you may con-3 tinue with your argument. Excuse me, Mr. Page, I know you had A already started your argument. You may proceed.

ORAL ARGUMENT OWEN H. PAGE, ESQ.,

ON BEHALF OF EASTERN HEIGHTS PRESBYTERIAN

CHURCH -- Continued

1

2

5

6

7

8

9 MR. PAGE: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court, 10 yesterday counsel for petitioner observed, as I recall, that the respondent churches had ceased to function. I think this 200 12 was an attempt to bring the situation within that section of 13 -- to put the church on, which has been identified, I think 14 yesterday, as Section 6-3.

For a complete explanation of that section, if the 15 16 Court will refer to page 83 of the Appendix. Let me just sum it up for you. That refers to a situation in which we either 17 have a church which is withered and died on the vine or one 18 19 which is in the process of withering.

Now, the viability of these churches, I think, is 20 not affected by the fact that these cases are before you today. 21 Furthermore, if you examine the action of the Administrative 22 Commission, of which counsel made some input, you find that it 23 is a completely innocuous act. What it did is do nothing more 24 than accept or recognize the removal of the section by their 25

1 own volition. And then it says in effect for those members of 2 the congregation who still wish to work, we will furnish you a 3 minister.

So as to the question as to whether these churches
should have appealed the action of the Administrative Commission, there were two reasons they didn't have to. First, with
regard to the First Amendment, these people, individually or
collectively, have the right to withdraw. Second, the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church has no prohibition against
a church taking this action in a suit.

Q

11

12

13

Prohibition against what?

A Prohibition against an individual church withdrawing.

Q Oh, I see.

14 Q So, are you -- is this argument addressed to the 15 proposition that there was no implied trust?

16 A No, sir. I was just rebutting yesterday that I
17 thought he might have left this impression.

18 Q Well, I want to be clear about one thing -- I thought
19 I was, but I would like to get your view on it. You do not
20 contest the finding or the conclusion of the court below?

21 A No, sir, I do not.

22 Q That there was an implied trust.

23 A No, sir, I do not.

24 Q And that the terms of that implied trust are that
25 this property will be used as part of and subject to the

mechanism of the church and the central direction and guidance of the church and the church discipline?

A Yes, with one qualification in here, because when we 3 A. talk about the implied trust, Mr. Justice, we are talking about the imposition of equality, which is the doctrine and discipline 5 6 of the church, at the time of the acquisition of the property. 7 Now, what the Supreme Court of Georgia found -- and this was 8 on a statutory mandate that the court invoked -- the court 9 found under Section 2822408 of the Georgia Code that when 10 property is devoted to a specific doctrine or trust, the court dine. will intervene to prevent the property being diverted to a 12 doctrine which is contrary to that which existed at the time of 13 the acquisition of the property.

14 Q Well, you have, as I see it, in your case, it comes 15 down to two points: One, assuming that there is an implied 16 trust, which you agree to; two, is that trust dependent upon a 17 maintenance of the church policy at the time the trust was 18 createdly, namely as of the time of the acquisition of the 19 property by the local church.

A

A

20

25

1

2

Yes, sir, that is correct.

21 Q And, three, if that is so, was there such a change 22 in the policy of the church between the time of acquisition 23 and the time of the disaffiliation so as to defeat the implied 24 trust.

Yes.

, foreign	Q Is that an accurate
2	A That is correct, yes, sir. So we then look at the
3	Constitution to determine what was imposed upon the property
Ą,	at that time, then we look at the charged transgressions,
5	which are set forth in the action, in the resolution of the
6	church. And let me just briefly refer to them. I think
7	Q Would you mind stating to me first how was this trust
8	created?
9	A This trust, Your Honor, under the
10	Q Did anybody sign anything?
11	A No, sir, there was no
12	Q How was it created?
13	A It was created under the I would assume under what
14	we call the quality of this particular church government, which
15	is acknowledged to be a representative type church. But it
16	represented a type church, of course, that may have a variation
17	of policy. For example, a representative type church may be
18	representative in its spiritual relationship, as we acknowledge
19	here, but it may have congregational aspects in relation to
20	property. So what we have here under the theory
21	Q Does the Constitution provide that?
22	A No, sir. This is
23	Q Where do you get that?
24	A This is an implication, Your Honor, from Watson vs.
25	Jones, that they say in this particular type of church
1	

1	government, where you have a series of ascending adjudicatories,
2	that there is an implied consent absent some particular trans-
3	gression of the Constitution that it is held for the benefit
4	of the church as a whole.
5	Q Is that the only place you get it?
6	A Yes, sir.
7	Q Then its origin is in the secular laws in the sense
8	that either the legislature or a court has said that in these
9	circumstances, a trust or right?
10	A Yes, sir, in the secular law.
11	Q And
12	A There is no canonical law supporting this in this
1.3	particular case.
14	Q None at all?
15	A Yes.
16	Q So this is a doctrine of secular law?
17	A Yes, sir.
18	Q You say apparently you don't argue that if the
19	terms of the trust which is imposed by the secular law may not
20	be adjudicated by the secular court, that therefore the trust
21	cannot be observed.
22	A In Gonzalez vs. Archbishop, Mr. Justice Brandeis, I
23	think, put this in focus for all of us. He said and this
24	came, I think, in about 1929 and some years after in Watson
25	vs. Jones in which he said "absent evidence of fraud,
	20

1 collusion or arbitrariance, that the secular courts are the 2 findings of an ecclesiastical court in matters involving 3 ecclesiastical law, even though civil rights are involved." A This theory has been followed by any number of decisions, both 5 state and federal subsequent to that time.

6 So what, with the knowledge in Watson vs. Jones, you might say it was by absolute deference to the authority of the highest church court, it no longer -- it has been modified and the court may now look beyond the rules formulated as to the types of churches to be acknowledged there.

11 Now, absent the doctrine of implied trust, could this 0 12 case get into court?

No, sir. A

14 Q And that is the creation of a court's opinion, do you 15 think, in Watson?

16 Yes, sir, subject to the complication of Gonzalez. A 17 0 It mixes the Court up considerably in connection with 18 the policies of the church of one kind or another?

19 No, sir. May I take this exception? When we look --A 20 you see, when we look at charged transgressions, we do not in-21 quite into the faith that inspired those particular constitu-22 tional commandments of the church in its organic law. All we 23 look at is at this organic law, in its doctrine and discipline, 24 and it is purely a factual matter.

25

7

8

9

10

13

Q But is it a factual matter?

1	A Well, the factual matter here is that the general		
2	assembly made a pronouncement concerning civil disobedience and		
3	becoming in civil affairs in direct conflict with the church's		
A	constitution. The constitution says you shall not do this.		
15	Q Suppose it does that? What does that have to do with		
6	the titles of land that some people		
7	A Well, under the theory that we are having to move		
8	along on, sir, we have to go on the theory that this constitutes		
9	a breach of the trust. And under the law, if there is a breach		
10	of the trust on the part of the denominational church at a		
11	high level, then the property is restored to still honoring		
12	the concept, the constitutional concept.		
13	Q It goes to the people of far distance?		
14	A Sir?		
15	Q It goes to the people of far distance from the church?		
16	A No, sir.		
17	Q Well, who would get it?		
18	A Those who are still, in this instance, as the Supreme		
19	Court of Georgia found, those who are still occupying the		
20	church premises.		
21	Q And you say the unanimous vote is there against		
22	this thing?		
23	A No, sir. They unanimously voted to sever their		
24	relationship with the Presbyterian Church, but		
25	Q And to keep that property for their own use?		
	30		
l			

1 Which they had financed by their size or pledges. A 2 You see, there is a difference here. There is the same thing 3 in Kedroff. In Kedroff there was some evidence, as I recall, *A* in the record that the Russian-based church had money in the 5 cathedral in New York. There is no evidence like that. This 6 is all raised by the local people. 1 But does this departure from the original document 0 8 fall into that phrase, fraud or whatever you referred to? 9 A Yes, sir. And subsequent courts have expanded the 10 word "arbitrariance" to mean an ultra vires unconstitutional act, and these are clearly charged in the initial pleadings on 11 the part of the petitioner -- I mean on the respondent. The 12 13 reference would be in the appendix, at pages 29 and also 116 14 where these constitutional violations are charged. 15 0 Just what are -- you were about to specify --16 A Yes, sir. Q This is from the Constitution. 17 18 Citizen councils or that which include nothing but A 19 that which is ecclesiastical and are not instrumental in civil affairs, with concern to the commonwealth. Well, that is by 20 21 way of humble petition, in case of extraordinarial by way of 22 advice or satisfaction of conscience, if they be inclined. 23 And then the other violation, that it is the duty of the 24 people to pray for the magistrates, to bonor their person, 25 to pay them tribute and other dues, to obey their lawful

commands and be subject to their authority for conscience' sake.

1

2

25

3 Q But what are the departures from that? 4 A The decisions are in the resolutions which bring to the Court's attention pronouncements by the highest tribunal, 5 6 in 1965, in 1966, in which the highest tribunal went on record 7 condoning civil disobedience and embroiling the church in the 8 military and diplomatic affairs of the Vietnam war. Now, these 9 were the bases, the primary basis for the action that is before 10 you, and these are reflected in the judgment of the Supreme 11 Court of Georgia. 12 Q Mr. Page, who do you think would be better able to 13 decide that question, an ecclesiastical court or an ordinary 14 jury in Savanna, Georgia? A Mr. Justice, under the theory that is presented to 15 16 us, and property rights being involved, it of necessity has to go before the court. 17 18 Q Before? A That is correct. 19 20 0 Before the --21 The secular court. A -- before the church courts have had an opportunity 22 Q to pass upon it? 23 A In this particular instance, of course, we once 24 again ran across a rather unique situation. We have the tribunal

1	of the the supreme tribunal of the Presbyterian Church acts
2	both as a legislative agency and also a judicial agency. So
3	we find them pronouncing and then they are going to sit in
4	judgment
5	Q Is that true when you join was that true when you
6	joined?
7	A Yes.
8	Q You submitted to it voluntarily?
9	A Yes. I think when people submit
10	Q Is that correct?
Čar Čar	A With this qualification, Mr. Justice: I don't be-
12	lieve you submit absolutely to I believe you submit condi-
13	tionally that the people to whom you are submitting are going
14	to honor their constitutional concepts of that government or
15	agency at the time you adhere. I don't believe they have any
16	absolute right to
17	Q Well, what is the reason you didn't follow through
18	within the church before going to the courts?
19	A Well, there were two reasons: First, I think, this
20	action, as I mentioned, was made on the highest level and I
21	believe it might have been a little exercise in futility to
22	attack the legislative pronouncements before the judicial body
23	which is going to determiné its own legislative acts. And,
24	more importantly, if and this, I think, is devout if the
25	act of the general assembly is an unconstitutional act, in what

they did, then I don't believe that it imposes any responsibility upon the lesser tribunal, which is the local congregation, to appeal that act. And certain courts where this situation has been presented, where the high tribunal has been accused of an ultra vires or unconstitutional act, they said no appeal is necessary. I don't believe it imposed anything on them.

Q So it is in part true, that you referred to mandatory
9 findings on the churches or the statements of views of the
10 hierarchy of the church?

A Under the provisions of the church as set forth in the resolution of 1880, there are two types of pronouncements: one is the judicial decision and what is called the impeach act --

Q The what?

15

25

A An impeach act decision, such as this. And it says
that the members of the church have to submit to both, with
equal dignity and respect less they violate the constitution
of the Presbyterian Church.

20 Q When you get down to the bottom here, is there any-21 thing in the dispute at all except who controls this property?

22 A No, sir.

23 Q Nothing in the world?

24 A No, sir.

Q Who controls the property.

1	A	Who has its possession and use of the property.
2	That is r	ight.
3	Q	And they claim that it is gone from the mother church?
4	A	That's right.
5	Q	And the big church wants to get it so it can do what,
6	use the p	roperty?
7	A	Yes, sir, so that it can
8	Q	But they have to get some other congregation, don't
9	they?	
10	A	Right.
And And And And And And And And And And	Q	They have no congregation to go there?
12	A	That's correct.
13	Q	And nothing involved in this dispute except the con-
14	trol of th	his property that the local people bought?
15	A	That's right.
16	Q	I suppose there is the question of whether this is
17	a departu:	re from the church, isn't there?
18	А	Well, I am wondering, sir, if that assessment hasn't
19	been made.	•
20	Q	By whom?
21	A	Has it been made initially in the when it was
22	presented	in the local court.
23	Q	Well, it
24	A	In part, I mean.
25	Q	I am asking whether there was anything involved in

this case other than property. You said no. But, as I under stand it, it stands on the premise that this was a departure
 from the constitution of the church and that the courts shall
 determine that it is a departure from the dogma of the church.

5 A I understood the question, when he said basically
6 there is no question who is entitled to possession of the
7 property. That is what I thought he said.

Q That is exactly what I meant, and I can't see whether
9 the dogma of the church has anything to do with that issue.

10 But your point is, as I understand it, that you in Q 11 effect agree that unless the court properly -- a court properly 12 finds that there has been a departure from the church dogra, 13 church policy, as concerning clergy at the time of the aquisi-14 tion of the property by the local church -- unless there has been a departure by the central church, the church dogna or 15 policy, then you agree that you're wrong and the central church 16 is right, that the central church is entitled to the property. 17

That is what it comes down to.

18

A

19 Q So your case really depends, as I see it, upon two 20 Questions: One, did the court below properly go into the --21 do they have any business going into the question which you 22 put; and, second, was it properly decided. So when you look 23 at it from that point of view, your whole case depends not on 24 the property law in the common law sense but upon the question 25 of church dogma.

1	A And applying the proper church policy to it. In
2	this instance we find out under the theory there was not a
3	prescribed use in Watson vs. Jones, that the right to dictate
4	this property as far as use, alienation, acquisition, who
5	shall be the minister, who shall finance the church program
6	and discipline all under the church constitution, is given to
7	the local church.
8	Q On that point we did not agree with you two on that
9	issue about the trust, but one thought that a trust of the
10	church couldn't be decided in a court of law to take away
11	property from somebody to whom it belongs on the basis of
12	church dogma. Then the case is quite different?
13	A Yes. Then you would have to look in the record as to
14	the historical position of this church in relation to a church
15	property, and where it has recognized the church control in the
16	local
17	Q You say on page 18 of your brief that the simple
18	court has power to override the decision of the ecclesiastical
19	authorities, but to enforce its decision first would be offensive
20	to peace and order; second, it would approve it arbitrarily
21	would violate this act; or, third, it would be repugnant to the
22	principle of equity. We have a lot of controversies in
23	churches take birth control. How would your theory go
24	about resolving the birth control dispute in the church?
25	A Well, I don't know. I know that is a raging problem.

1	I don't know whether I don't know what status that has with-
2	in the Catholic Church, whether it is a canonical situation or
3	not. I couldn't answer that, Mr. Justice.
4	Q You're talking about offense to peace and good order,
5	arbitrary or ultra vires, or repugnant to the principle of
6	equity.
7	A Yes.
8	Q If I have read our prior decisions, I don't see the
9	relevance of those three standards to Watson, to Kedroff.
10	A Well, Watson this subsequently modifies Watson.
11	Now, that is subsequent state and federal for example, in
12	Kedroff, Kedroff even said "we believe the right to select
13	clergy where no improper methods are shown is given constitu-
14	tional" so it gives this Court the right to look in, and
15	that is what we contend, and historically where property has
16	been in dispute, the Court has looked in. But may I suggest
17	this
18	Q You will agree, won't you, that it is better if
19	possible, in view of the First Amendment, that this Court not
20	to look into anything in connection with dogmas unless it is
21	imperatively required by some law?
22	A Yes. May I answer it this way: It seems to me
23	that a church can only claim the protection of the First
24	Amendment, free exercise, if it operates within the framework
25	of its own constitution. There is no restraint of this church

1 by action here. As long as it operates within the constitu-2 tional --3 They are not attempting to interfere with its dogma, 0 are they? They are just simply insisting on withdrawing from 13 it and keeping the church? 50 6 That's correct, and they are asking the highest A 7 church tribunal the same constitutional counterbuilding that they would impose on the lesser. But let me --8 9 Q Let me ask a question, please. One of the issues aveabaran managementer and wards a structure in the second 10 that was tendered to the jury was your contention that the 27 central church had departed from the original dogma, from the doctrine of coordination. Is that right? 12 13 A Yes. That was one of the issues that you tendered. Now. 14 0 if the jury disbelieved on everything else, if they disbelieved 15 16 you on everything else they might still have come in with a 17 verdict on your behalf because they believed that the church. 18 the central church had departed from the doctrine of coordin-19 ation as it existed as of the time that these properties were and a second a second as a 20 acquired. That is the thrust of the instructions under which 21 the jury was operating. Is that correct? A The thrust of the charge encompassed all of them. 22 23 2 It encompassed all of them. The lower court said in and the second and a second and a second as a second s 24 its finding that there has been a departure from the church water an average of the and a second s 25 dogna as of the time of acquisition, then they declared for the second s 39

1 the plaintiffs. Is that correct? 2 A Yes. 3 And the jury might have decided this case on the 0 a basis of the crisis by the central church in respect of the 5 doctrine of coordination. 6 Yes, that's right. A 7 0 That was one of your charges and one of the things 8 that you -- on which you submitted proof. An I correct? A Let me just conclude on this. I believe --9 10 0 Let me give you another one of those specifications index and a second and a second a second a second 19 and see just where we stand. The general assembly -- one of 12 its objections they made to the departure from the dogma is 13 the general assembly's failure to endorse a proposal to amend 14 the U.S. Constitution to overcome this court's school prayer where a work of the second sec 15 decisions. The respondents characterized this as giving sup-16 port to the removal of Bible reading and prayer in the public 17 schools. Now, what is there in the Constitution that says 10 that the church as a whole must endorse a constitutional and the state of a second state of the second state and a second state of the second s 19 amendment to overcome the decision of this Court? . I a serie a serie and an analyzing and an a serie of a serie of a serie of the series and the series of y 20 A Mr. Justice, there was no evidence submitted on that. 21 I think --TTREE CONTRACTOR CONTR 22 There may have been no evidence, but you charged 0 that, And it is one of the things, I suppose, that went into 23 the and an end of the second second and a second is the second 24 the judgment. 25 A All I know, sir, is the evidence which was introduced

1 which was based on the action of the court. 2 Let me just conclude on this. the logic period is a second provide the second contract of the provide 3 I know, but, as a matter of fact, is that a departure? 0 Quite frankly, Mr. Justice, I couldn't answer that .a A 5 I just --6 2 Why can't you answer it? You don't want to? In a strike same distance in the second strike For two reasons -- no, sir, For two reasons: First, 7 A 3 I am not a Presbyterian, and I was not a member of these clurch 9 congregations at the time this initial action was taken. 10 0 Well, but, you tell us these other things are depar-11 tures. and and the second products of the data to the second seco 12 A Well, these are matters which have been introduced And the second second and a second 13 as a matter of proof. Now, that is the only way I can respond 14 to that. compared and a second contract of the second 15 2 Are there any Presbyterian lawyers here on either 16 side? and a second 17 A No, sir, I don't think so. 18 0 Were there any Presbyterians on the jury? A No, sir. 19 20 (Laughter.) These non-Presbyterians decided what was actually 0 21 22 the dogma of the Presbyterian Church? 23 A I think that under the -and was made and the second according to a second 24 Is that statement correct? 0 ----25 That was under the instruction of the court. Let me A 41

5450	just conclude the
2	Q Was the judge a Presbyterian?
3	A No, sir, the judge was not a Presbyterian.
4	2 So everybody
5	2 Shouldn't the judge be disqualified from the case,
6	do you suppose?
7	A Justice, I assume that is addressed to the judge
8	himself. I certainly wasn't asking him to be disqualified.
9	In conclusion, if you look at the record, there is a
10	fatal federal question before this Court and I submit that
11	this case should be dismissed because there is no federal
12	question before the Court that seems to be raised. And here
13	are the four points that they raise:
14	They said that the federal question was raised in the
15	Supreme Court of Georgia on a motion for rehearing and that
16	there were many question thrust before that court that were
17	entertained, the federal question was the motion was
18	entertained and there were many federal questions presented
19	and answered. That is not the record. And, of course, this
20	vio]ates the historical position of this Court that, on a
21	motion for rehearing, when the federal question is raised
22	first, you must entertain and decide.
23	The other question was that an overruling in Mack vs.
24	Kahn, they violated the rule of again, the Georgia Court
25	has adopted a federal rule in which you do not have a vested 42

right in a prior decision, and the Supreme Court of Georgia so ruled.

and the

3	Looking again at the other, that in overruling Mack vs.
4	Kahn, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments; the ap-
5	plication of Watson vs. Jones, this is not the case. Mack
6	vs. Kahn specifically stated that on the proper showing of a
7	complete abandonment of the dogma and doctrine, that the court
8	would then protect the rights of the local property the
9	local church, who were adhering to the dogma and disciplines.
10	This comes to absolutely no surprise to us. All the Supreme
dana d	Court of Georgia did was to modify a substance of law, which
12	it had the right to do, to change the complete to that is
1.3	substantial1.
14	And, finally, they contend that the federal question was
15	properly raised on the local at the initial level in the
16	trial court by the general allegations that this act that
17	the act of appropriating the property violated the laws of
18	the United States of America. This lacked the required
19	specificity of the state court and also the federal court, and
20	there was no motion or other appropriate action taken in the
21	trial court to bring this federal question to the state court
22	and thus to this court.
23	Thank you so much.
24	Q Does the record show how much this land on which
25	this church is located is worth?
	43

ų	A Yes, sir.
2	Q What is it?
3	A It would run together approximately \$170,000.
4	Q \$170,000.
5	Q Could I ask you, to make sure as I understand it,
6	there really isn't much question in this case but what the
7	church dogma was involved and the distribution of the case in
8	the lower courts required interpretation of church dogma.
9	A The application of it.
10	Q Yes.
11	A Yes.
12	Q Now
13	A The final determination.
14	Q let's assume for the moment that this Court held
15	that the First Amendment forbad the civil court from adjudicat-
16	ing church dogma as granted. I take it that as a rule you
17	would then say that the implied trust imposed by the secular
18	law would still prevail?
19	A That's right.
20	Q You wouldn't challenge that at all, on the First
21	Amendment grounds?
22	A That's right.
23	Q Then the property would go to the mother church.
24	A Unless there was a violation of the trust.
25	Q Well, but let's assume that the First Amendment
	44

and the second se	
1000 - 10000 - 10000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 -	forbids the civil court from adjudicating whether or not there
2	has been a breach of trust and forbids it because adjudicating
3	the breach requires an interpretation of church dogma.
15	A But the federal courts haven't held that, Mr. Justice.
55	Q Let's assume that we held it, though?
6	A _Well
7	2 Then what would you say about the implied trust?
8	A Well
9	Q The breach may not be your claim may not be
10	adjudicated because of the First Amendment.
11	A I guess I would be in the position of a tennis
12	player whose matched parts would add out.
13	(Laughter.)
14	Q What would you say, though?
15	A I would say
16	Q I know you would say we were wrong, and I would im-
17	plore you not to do that.
18	(Laughter.)
19	Q The issue here that has been argued is that the
20	First Amendment forbids that kind of thing.
21	A I take exception to that under the precedents that
22	have preceded this case here.
23	Q It seems to me that, instead of that you might be in
24	the position of a tennis player who had just won his game.
25	A Well, sir, I certainly welcome that. I play a little
	45

1 tennis, and it is nice to win.

2

3

4

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Gowen? ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES L. GOWEN, ES2., ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

5 MR. GOWEN: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court, I think in this question of property you must consider 6 7 that the Presbyterian Church is a great church, composed of 8 many thousands of people who have joined it over the years. 9 These local churches, when they join, when they became members of the Presbyterian Church, this great church, when they 10 joined it, they placed their property under the policy and 11 12 control of this church and, therefore -- they didn't have to do this. They could have remained with the congregation of 13 the church. They could have kept that property but it was 14 because they wanted to do this, just as I did, and I happen 15 to be a Presbyterian -- just as I did when I joined that church. 16 I put myself under the policies and control of the church and 17 therefore these local churches did with their property at that 18 19 time.

All that the Savannah Presbytery is asking you is to put
a minister who is a Presbyterian minister because these
churches no longer have Presbyterian ministers. They renounced
the church and all they have to do is put a Presbyterian
minister in the church to hold services for any members of
this church who might want one. And the vote was unanimous by

those who were there. I think the court will take judicial cognizance that there are very few churches who have all their members there at any one given day. And it was a --

Q It was a pretty good vote, then?

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

A It was a good vote. But, on the other hand, one member of the clergy refused to follow the actions, according to the records in the case. It says all members of the profession save one. And there was only one member of that church who wanted a Presbyterian service held in it, I say he has a right under the constitution and law to have that.

81 We think Watson vs. Jones and Kedroff have decided every issue in this case in favor of the respondents. We think 12 Watson vs. Jones and this case are very similar on the facts. 13 14 Both involve Presbyterian churches. Watson involved the state-15 ment by the church on the question of slavery. This case in-16 volves the statement of the church on civil rights, because the evidence is that the witness for the plaintiff says that 17 was the main reason that they withdrew. And in each case the 18 case is brought to trial on ecclesiastical issues in a civil 19 court which this court says could not be done. 20

The churches of this country have lived under Watson vs.
Jones for a hundred years and we have been fifteen years with
no injury to our religious life.

24 Q What will be the situation in the case if it is de-25 termined here, for example -- I am not suggesting it would be, but just assume that the court determines that adjudication of church dogma is contrary to the First Amendment and that the lower courts' adjudication must be set aside. Where does the case stand, then?

A Well, then this court, if it reaches that conclusion,
should instruct the Georgia Supreme Court to deny us of the
relief sought by the plaintiff and give the relief sought by
the defense, which would give them possession of the church
property for the purposes of conducting services --

10 Q On what basis would your claim then rest?
11 A My claim would rest on the implied trust that is
12 recognized in the similar Presbyterian Church in Watson vs.
13 Jones.

14 Q This would be a trust implied by the secular law?
15 A Yes. But both in Kedroff and Watson vs. Jones,
16 after the church tribunal has made its determination, it is the
17 duty of the civil court to close properly in the direction of
18 the ecclesiastical community.

19 Q What would be your remedy to give possession of the 20 church?

A This principle, of course, of the court to issue an order to the Presbyterian Church, that the Presbytery of Savanna should have possession of the church for purposes of holding --

25

0

For the court to enforce the ecclesiastical decision?

1 Yes. In fact, all the courts have held that it is A 2 the duty of the civil court to enforce the rights of the --3 of the civil court to enforce the ecclesiastical rights.

Mr. Gorman, you were going to give us citations --4 0 There is nothing on the church law that deals 5 A 6 directly with the disposition of property or ownership of the 7 central church.

8 Q There is just one other thing I would like to know. I understood from your brief that most of these specifications 9 of departure from dogma of the church were not binding on any 10 of the local churches except to one --

12 A The business of making women eligible to hold church office, and that was an amendment to the constitution of the 13 church and was regularly voted by the Presbyterians and there 14 was no attack upon the adoption of that constitutional amend-15 ment. All of the rest of them are merely statements of posi-16 tion and there is nothing in the Book of the Church Order and 17 nothing in the evidence of this case, there is nothing in the 18 case to say that I as a Presbyterian have to believe any one 19 of those to remain a member of this thing, of this church. 20

21 Now I understood counsel a few moments ago to say 0 22 that there were two kinds of pronouncements that would come from the general assembly, and both of them were binding on the 23 24 churches.

> I don't think this is in the -- this is merely -- if A

11

25

you will read the statements, and they are all in the record. that are complained of, if you will read the statements you will find there is nothing more than a statement of the posi-tion of this general assembly. The next general assembly could have an entirely different position, and there is nothing in it that says that any member of the church has to believe it or past actions. It simply is no more than a deliverance of a minister in a church who might preach a sermon which --with which they didn't agree. Q Why would he do that? (Laughter.) A Thank you. (Whereupon, the above-entitled oral argument was concluded.)