
IBRARY E COURT. U. S.

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM

In the Matter of:

Date



ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

February 27 1969

300 Seventh Street, S. W.

Washington, D. C.

NA 8-2345

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

2 October Term, 1968

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4 JOHN DAVIS,

6 Vs.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI,

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Petitioner; :

No. 645

Washington, D. C. February 27, 1969

The above-entitled matter came on for further argument at 10:10 a.m.

Respondent.

BEFORE:

EARL WARREN, Chief Justice
HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice
JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice
POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice
BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice
THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice

APPEARANCES:

MELVYN ZARR, Esq. 10 Columbus Circle New York, N. Y. 10019

G. GARLAND LYELL, JR., Esq. Assistant Attorney General State of Mississippi New Capitol Building Jackson, Mississippi

PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: No. 645, John Davis, petitioner; versus the State of Mississippi, respondent.

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Mr. Zarr, you may continue with your argument.

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MELVYN ZARR, ESO.

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. ZARR: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: I would like to summarize the major points I made yesterday and then say a few things about the record. The major points were these:

- 1. That the petitioner was caught up in a police dragnet.
- 2. That the two detentions of petitioner yielding the two sets of fingerprints were illegal arrest because, in the first place, in neither case was there a warrant or any attempt to show exigent circumstances excusing a warrant; and secondly, even assuming that the warrant requirement could somehow be excused in this case, there was no attempt by the State to show probable cause for arrest.

Next, the fact that these arrests were for investigation only explains, but cannot excuse, the failure to comply with these constitutional safeguards.

Last, that fingerprints are not excepted from operation of the exclusionary rule.

Now, counsel opposite stressed to the Court yesterday

an arrest, and apparently relied upon the court below's ruling which in relevant part appears at page 59 of the record, which I shall just briefly read. The court below said this:

23.

"The officer said that he arrested appellant, but
the evidence, which is in no way contraverted, shows that
appellant was merely escorted to headquarters for interrogation as, in fact, were numerous others in the course
of an investigation by police of an unsolved major crime.
It is clear from the record that there was no intention to
arrest within the accepted legal meaning of the word."

Of course, there are two answers to this: (1) It is clear from the record that that statement is wrong; that the only testimony in the record about the December 3rd arrest is that of Officers Griffin and Thompson in which they say they arrested the petitioner and there is nothing to contravert that.

The second answer, of course, is that this was an investigative arrest and that, as we have argued, is illegal.

I have two evidentiary points.

1. I want to stress that the petitioner had done yard work for the woman. On page 17, the interrogation there makes that clear.

Next I want to stress that even though Mr. Justice

Stewart yesterday correctly observes that she testified that

"There was no doubt in my mind about it that Johnny was the one."

at other places she was not quite so positive. At page 22, previous to that, she says, "I recognized it was Johnny. I thought it was, but I wasn't perfectly sure right then, but then I knew that nobody else had been in the house but him. I asked him to carry a table through the kitchen where he threw the light where the meter was."

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On page 30 of the record, on cross-examination, she says in response to the question, "But by light of the flash-light, could you see his face?"

"Answer: Yes, sir; true. He had that fascinator, which is a headpiece, over it and I could see through that crocheted part his face and I recognized him, or at least that is who I thought it was. I was pretty sure it was."

Q Going back to the first three points you made in summary, the last of which was, or the third of which was, that fingerprints are not excepted from the exclusionary rule, there is the Bynum in the District of Columbia.

Are there any other cases on that point?

A Not that we could find, Your Honor, that dealt exclusively with fingerprints.

Q That is what I am talking about. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 10:10 a.m. the argument in the aboveentitled matter was concluded.)