
RARY COURT. U. S.

# Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1968



### ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

March 27, 1969

Date

300 Seventh Street, S. W.

Washington, D. C.

NA 8-2345

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1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	October Term, 1968
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4	THE SINCLAIR COMPANY,
5	Petitioner; :
6	vs. : No. 585
7	NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, :
8	Respondent.
9	$\frac{1}{2}$
10	Washington, D. C. Thursday, March 27, 1969
11	The above-entitled matter came on for further argu-
12	ment at 10:30 a.m.
12	ment at 10:30 a.m.  BEFORE:
	BEFORE: EARL WARREN, Chief Justice
13	BEFORE:  EARL WARREN, Chief Justice  HUGO L. BŁACK, Associate Justice  WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice
13	BEFORE:  EARL WARREN, Chief Justice  HUGO L. BŁACK, Associate Justice  WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice  JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice  WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice
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13 14 15 16 17 18	EARL WARREN, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice ABE FORTAS, Associate Justice THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice APPEARANCES:
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	EARL WARREN, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice ABE FORTAS, Associate Justice THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice APPEARANCES:

### PROCEEDINGS

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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: No. 585, The Sinclair Company, petitioner; versus the National Labor Relations Board.

Mr. Wallace, you may continue with your argument.

FURTHER ARGUMENT OF LAWRENCE G. WALLACE, ESQ.

#### ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MR. WALLACE: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:

I said yesterday that Section 8(a)(1) of the Labor Act, when read together with Section 8(c), prohibits the employer from coercively interfering, by threat or reprisal, with employee free choice in selecting a bargaining representative.

Now, of course, Congress never said in the Act, or in its legislative history, that the threat of reprisal need be in any particular form of words, or that it need be confined within the compass of a single communication in order to be an unfair labor practice.

Congress was concerned with substantial rights, and did not create any such loopholes in this Act.

Now, in this case, we are not dealing with an employer who was so ill-advised as to threaten his employees in blatent, unequivocal terms; but the Board also has a responsibility, in protecting the rights that Congress has guaranteed, to determine whether an employer who has carefully avoided the utterance of any specific, overt threat, has nevertheless intimidated his

employees by getting the message across in the totality of what is said that there is a real threat of company reprisal if they should select the union.

In assessing whether the employer's communications were calculated to have that effect, and more importantly, whether they were likely to be understood by the employees as such a threat, the Board, of course, tries realistically to take into account all the circumstances, including any factors that may make the employees especially susceptible to employer intimidation.

As Judge Hayes of the Second Circuit, who is a longtime and distinguished scholar of labor law, has suggested in a
dissenting opinion, "It is not always easy for those of us who
are in a profession which shows no signs of obsolescence, and
which offers a wide variety of employment flexibility, to
appreciate that the insecurities of workers who are not so
fortunately situated can make them painfully vulnerable to the
pressures of equivocal or veiled threats by their employers."

Now, one additional word of background may be illuminating before turning to this record.

The particular kind of threat involved in this case, the threat of plant closure, has long been recognized as one of the most flagrantly coercive and destructive of employee free choice. In one of the leading opinions in this entire field, Franks Brothers against the Labor Board, in Volume 321 U.S., in

a unanimous opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Black, the Court singled plant closure out for special emphasis in the following language:

"Before the election was held, petitioner conducted an aggressive campaign against the union, even to the extent of threatening to close its factory if the union won the election."

Part of the record which the Board was dealing with in this case is cogently summarized, I believe, in the petitioner's brief, and I would like to read a few short sentences at the bottom of page 5 and the top of page 6:

"During this same period, 1952 to 1965, changes were made in weaving industry equipment. The company's looms were automated to the point where they could be run without an operator. Electric clutches and fingers were added, which made it much easier to operate, and some skills formerly needed were eliminated.

"Although it was not unusual to have apprentices in 1952, the situation changed in the industry after that time because of automation. The company had had no apprentices since 1952."

The question, then, was whether the employer's communications to this group of employees whose skills had become
technologically outmoded to a substantial degree, were likely
to have had a coercive effect by conveying a threat of reprisal.

Now, the Board relied on the purport and effect of these communications as a whole, rather than on any particular statements, and they are rather diffusively spread over the record. It is difficult to present, in the course of an oral argument, the communications as a whole, but I will attempt to make a quick survey of them.

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Relying upon the Board's findings in its opinion, at first, and the distillation that it made of these communications, from the record, if I can begin as background with the earlier communications starting on page 172 of the appendix, in the findings, and there were findings in the Board's opinion, in the first speech made to all of the employees when the President of the company first learned of the union's organizing campaign, long before any demand for recognition had been made, he spoke, toward the bottom of page 172, of the company's financial condition, indicating that ever since the last strike, the shop had been running on thin ice.

the union's demands, the union's only weapon is a strike, and pointed out that, while he did not intend to close, a strike could lead to a closing of the plant.

He also told the group that the wireweavers' craft
was a small one; that it would be difficult for them to find
other jobs, because it was not like finding a job as a machinist;
that many of them did not have the education, which would make

it difficult for them to find another job; and that many of them were getting too old to go out and find new jobs.

Continuing on page 174, he said that he did not think the Lindsey organization, the new owners, were going to be concerned if, through contract negotiations with the union, our people went on strike; that a strike could close respondent's plant and nothing would prevent Lindsey from having respondent's weaving work done at Lindsey's plant in Ohio and Mississippi.

He also stated that respondent was subject to foreign competition; that it was conceivable that if the plant was closed, under any circumstances, that some of the work would go to foreign companies; and that respondent had handled foreign wires in the past.

He pointed out that all they had to do was to look around Holyoke if they thought a strike could not close respondent's plant.

Continuing with a letter sent on November 5th to all of the employees, on page 175, in the text of this letter he said that the new ownership is interested in profits and not pressure. They have no ties with Holyoke or Massachusetts.

Skipping down, "The union promises you a lot, but what can they deliver except pressure and the threat of a strike?"

He then stated, "I do not believe the threat of a strike will cause the new owners any loss of sleep; however, a long strike would be bad for me because I would like to remain in Holyoke."

Next I would like to turn to 178 in these findings, getting into the period within 30 days before the election, upon which the Board directly relied, in a letter of November 30th addressed to all the wireweavers. Reading from page 178, the third line: This letter warns that:

"A strike can still close the Holyoke plant, but other plants can pick up the work and that the new ownership is interested in profits and not pressure."

He then points out that "The Teamster Union cannot do anything to improve our profit position, but can only make big demands which the company cannot meet, and then call you out on strike, because a strike is a union's only weapon to enforce its big demands."

He then asks, "Can you afford a long strike when you know the Holyoke plant has been given a second chance to stay in business and furnish jobs for all of us?"

I would like to turn directly to the employer's last communications during the two days before the election. First of all, a leaflet which was distributed to the wireweavers two days before the election, and which appears on page 137 of the appendix, in a fold-out. It begins, you will note, on page 137 of the appendix, with a cartoon showing a grave being prepared for the Sinclair Company, surrounded by tombstones marked with the names of other companies in the area that had closed down, and underneath the cartoon, among the comments is the statement

"The Holyoke-Springfield industrial graveyard is filled with companies which died under union pressure."

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Then on the next page, on the reverse side, in the first column, under the heading, "Many were sick when the union doctor came in." It says, "Some of theindustrial corpses were already sick when the unions came in with big promises to the employees of what the unions could do for them. These companies needed higher production and better quality to meet the stiffer competition. Union doctors gave them bloodletting strikes, restricted production, and higher labor costs. The result, as you see as you look around, was the death of these companies."

Then on the following page, which continues the leaflet, page 139, under the caption, "Our history is not bright.

Against a background such as ours, your dreams of union miracles
can be dangerous to your real job security. We don't know what
the future holds for any of us, but you can be sure the new
owners of Sinclair Company are looking for profit, not Operation
Holyoke Rat Hole into which to pour dollars without hope of
profit."

The final page pictures five factories in the area which have closed down, with, among the captions, "Unions furnish no job security here."

appendix, the employer admitted that he had no basis for believing that unions or union activities had had anything to do with

the closing of any of these plants, despite the representations in this leaflet.

Q What has been the history of labor relations in this company?

A. There had been a union prior to 1952, an independent union which is now affiliated with the Teamsters, Wire-weaving Union. There had been a 13-week strike, after which the plant reopened on a nonunion basis, until this present controversy in 1965.

Q That was before the new management came in.

A That was before the company was sold to Lindsey Wireweaving, but the President of Sinclair, the wholly-owned subsidiary, is the same man who was the manager when it was an independent company. He is the son of the founder.

Finally, I would like to turn to the note cards introduced into evidence by the company, which were the basis of the final speech to the wireweavers on the day before the election.

These begin on page 162 of the appendix, and I would like to, naturally, read selectively in the limited time we have.

Beginning on page 163, in the middle of Card 5, "What can they do?" -- meaning the union -- "Demand higher wages and expensive welfare and pension plans, which could lead to even larger losses than we have had," -- although on page 69 of the record, I might point out, President Sinclair testified that the company made a profit in fiscal year 1965, not losses -- "can

call you out on strike, you people know what it is like, you have had strike experience. I don't think our new ownership will lose a minute's sleep over whether the union threatens the company with a strike. They have made it clear to me that they look for a profit and not a hole to pour money down. If we have to negotiate with the Teamsters and cannot reach agreement on a contract under which we can make money, they can care less about the threat of strike."

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Continuing on the next page, in the middle of Card 9, "Now I would be the last one to blacklist you getting another job if this plant closed by strike, but the Teamsters can't guarantee you another job either. Again let's look at facts head-on. No one likes to admit he is getting older. We are all Jack Bennys. We are never going to be over 39. We don't look that way to an employment manager. Most companies probably have a large number of applicants, are young, have better educations, and certainly a lot better insurance rating than you and I. They can be hired for a lot less money. True, you have experience, but it is limited to a particular, small craft. I assume, in case we are forced to shut down because of a strike, that some other plant will pick up our business. This is not necessarily so. Pressure is still on from foreign wireweavers. Maybe three months from now I will be forced to sell foreign wires if the Teamsters Union stops our production. You all know we have had to handle foreign wires in the past."

Then on the next page, at the end of Card 12, "I have given you the facts today, and by mailings, as I know them to be. It is not a rosy picture for you or for me. Now the decision is up to you. Perhaps you feel I am exaggerating or bluffing. I am deadly serious and I am deeply concerned."

And the final sentence: "To you and your dependents, this is one of the most important elections in which you will ever vote."

We believe that on this record, in the circumstances of this community and this audience, the Court of Appeals correctly held that it was permissible, perhaps not required, but permissible for the Board to conclude that the atmosphere of free choice which Congress has ordained for representation elections had been undermined by an implied threat, a threat that the employer anticipated that it would not be able to be able to agree to a contract with the union, and anticipated making other arrangements for its wireweaving needs; if the union should win the election, that this would lead either to the closure of the plant or to the transfer of the wireweaving operations elsewhere.

Under the Act, this was a judgment for the Board to make, subject, of course, to the safeguards of judicial review.

It is the sort of judgment that the Board is required to make in a very large number of cases every year.

For example, during fiscal 1967, more than 8,000

representation elections were conducted by the Board, and during the same year, objections were filed with the Board to 1369 such elections.

Q Mr. Wallace, are you going to talk about the authorization cards here?

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A I am, Your Honor, in just a moment, if I may.

In evaluating such objections, the Board has shown appropriate solicitude for the statutory rights of employers under Section 8(c) to express their views during the campaign. For example, at a 1966 decision concerning Ameress Corporation in Volume 162 of the NLRB Reports, the Board held that the following inaccurate and intemperate criticism of the union was privileged under this section, a statement by a supervisor that the company did not want the union in, that "all they was good for was blowing up people's houses and kidnapping their kids, and that they was run by nothing but a bunch of gangsters."

The Boards decisions also have upheld the right of an employer to explain realistically to his employees that his business situation is unfavorable and precludes increases in their compensation or other benefits so long as this is done in a non-coercive way.

The employees in such a situation might still wish to select a bargaining representative to protect them against reductions of benefits or loss of employment. Of course, we do not claim that the Board has been infallible in its judgments in

every one of the many cases requiring it to draw the line be-2 tween protected expressions of views and implied threats, but 2 we do claim that in the present case, the Board's conclusion was 3 an unremarkable one. It was a clearly warranted implementation 4 of the Congressional mandate for protection of employee free choice from the threat of economic coercion by the employer and, 6 indeed, we think the case would become remarkable only if this 7 Court were to convert this record into a script which thereafter 8 could be used by employers with impunity to intimidate their 9 employees. 10

Q What do you mean by that? If we didn't decide for you, this would be a bad precedent?

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A Well, I mean that this record would be published, and I am certain it would be used in counseling as to representations that could be made in the course of these campaigns, and as to which the Board could not make a judgment that coercion had unlawfully had occurred.

Q Well, if we decided you were right on this issue, there would be nothing improper about that?

- A Of course, that is true.
- Q You are telling us that you are right in this case.
- A It is another way of telling it. That is quite correct.
  - Q You are cautioning us.

A That is exactly the point I meant to make. But once it is decided -- it was decided in this case -- that wrongful coercion by the employer destroyed the accuracy of the elective process as a measure of employee sentiment, the Board's remedy of a bargaining order, it seems to me, became plainly warranted on the facts of this case.

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The union had made a very strong showing of employee support by obtaining authorization cards from a large majority of the employees, 11 of the 14 in the bargaining unit. The authenticity of these cards is no longer disputed, and the employer never disputed the authenticity of eight of them. No claim has been made that they were obtained by misrepresentation or coercion.

The cards themselves, which are in the appendix on page 109, unequivocally designate the union as bargaining representative, and include an application for membership in the union.

In these circumstances, the employer's coercive power during the election campaign permitted the Board, and it does not always draw this inference, but it permitted the Board to infer that the employer's refusal to bargain in response to the union's request, based on the cards, was motivated not by good faith doubt as to the union's majority status, but motivated primarily by a desire to try, by wrongful means, to dissipate that majority.

Q Now here, of course, the union lost the election, didn't they?

A That is correct. What I just spoke of was the basis for the Board's finding of an 8(a)(5) violation, a refusal to bargain for which a bargaining order is always the appropriate remedy.

The Board held, moreover, in this case, that even in the absence of an 8(a)(5) violation, the bargaining order would have been an appropriate remedy for an 8(a)(1) violation, and is so indicated by the Franks Brothers case, which I have referred to in 321 U.S., in which this Court said that the union had lost its majority because of the employer's coercive threats and none theless upheld unanimously the bargaining order based on the authorization cards.

- Q What was the date of that case?
- A That was in 321 U.S., and it was under the Wagner Act.
  - Q Not under the Taft-Hartley Act.
  - A Not under the Taft-Hartley Act.

Because the employer's 8(a)(1) violation in this case

could not readily be cured so as to restore the conditions necessary for an election, free from the effects of his wrongful coercion, the Board was warranted in relying on the decisive majority
indicated by the cards as a more accurate showing of employee
sentiment than an election would be in the existing circumstances.

and thus to decide that the requested right of employees to bargain collectively should be enforced without further delay.

of any bargaining order, there will be opportunities for interested persons to request another election to measure any changes in employee sentiment after a reasonable period of time.

In sum, therefore, we believe the Court of Appeals was entirely correct in treating this case as a rather routine example of the Board's proper discharge of its statutory responsibilities, which is the flavor one gets from the opinion of the Court of Appeals reviewing this record.

Thank you.

Q Could I ask you a question on these cases which
you sketched out as to the Board using its judgment on the total
ity. Has the Board ever been reversed on one of these cases
where it approached these unfair labor practices on a totality
approach? Has it ever been reversed?

A Not to my knowledge, although there have been relatively few cases in which the only wrongful conduct, the only unfair labor practice, was in implied threats of coercion without any wrongful interrogations or wrongful discharges.

There are two Seventh Circuit cases upholding the Board in such situations that are cited in our brief, and those are the only ones that I know of other than this decision from the First Circuit upholding an order based exclusively on this kind

of unfair labor practice. fema Thank you. (Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m. the argument in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)