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# Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1968

In the Matter of:

THE NATIONAL BOARD OF THE YOUNG MEN'S
CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS, et al.,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Docket No. 517

Office-Sup \*\*\*\* Court, U.S.
FILED

MAR 13 1969

JOHN F. BAVIS, CLERK

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Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

March 3, 1969

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### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1968

The National Board of the Young Men's Christian Associations, et al.,

Petitioners,

v. : No. 517

United States of America :

Washington, D. C. March 3, 1969.

The above-entitled matter came on for argument at

12:48 p.m.

#### BEFORE:

EARL WARREN, Chief Justice
HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice
JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice
POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice
BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice
ABE FORTAS, Associate Justice
THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice

#### APPEARANCES:

RONALD A. JACKS, Esq.
1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
(Counsel for Petitioners)

PETER L. STRAUSS, Esq.
Assistant to the Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

## PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: No. 517, The National Board of the Young Men's Christian Associations, et al., Petitioners versus the United States.

THE CLERK: Counsel are present.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Jacks.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF RONALD A. JACKS, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MR. JACKS: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court.

I believe we have made arrangements, the petitioner in the Solicitor General's office, for the use of a diagram, if we may, that the Marshal is bringing in at this moment.

I may just in advance say that this is an action for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It arises out of the United States Army's seizure and use of private property, in this case buildings, belonging to the Petitioners, during the Panamanian riots of 1962.

The issue before this Court, as we view it, is whether the Court of Claims correctly held that U. S. military forces may seize and use private property without incurring a duty to provide compensation under the Fifth Amendment whenever they are faced with a "immediate necessity."

The facts are as follows: If I may briefly refer to

guara.

it. This is a chart that was prepared by the United States

Government for presentation in the organization of American

states following the Panamanian riots in the course of a

charge that the United States was the aggressor in these riots.

Its accuracy has been stipulated to.

The buildings that are here (indicating) are the real property in question. This is the Masonic Temple and this is the YMCA, belonging to the petitioners here.

This is Cristobal and Colon on the Atlantic or Northern end of the Zone. This is the Canal Zone and this is the Republic of Panama and the boundary runs down the middle of this street, llth Street, and down Bolivar Avenue.

On the evening in question, January 9, 1964, the United States Military Forces were called to this end of the zone in response to a request from the Civilian Command and ordered to clear the Zone of rioters.

The United States Army troops, starting here on Front Street, moved down 11th Street, cleared the Zone of rioters moved behind the YMCA and Masonic Temple, had brief scuffles with rioters who were then in both of those buildings, evicted them, moved them out to the streets, and took up position, stationed troops on the boundaries in the middle of the street just inside the Border on the boundary line.

This is approximately from 10 to midnight on the night of January 4. Shortly after midnight they began to

receive sniper fire directed at the troops stationed in front of the building.

Q Directed at what station?

A Pardon me, Mr. Chief Justice. Directed at the United States Army troops stationed in the street along 11th Street and Bolivar Avenue. They were actually out in the street at that point.

Q Will you point out where your building is again?

A Yes, this is the YMCA and this is the Masonic Temple.

Q Right next to it?

A Right next to it. The Masonic Temple forms the building inside the right angle at that point.

Q Is that involved in the litigation?

A Yes, it is, Mr. Chief Justice, both the Masonic Temple and the YMCA are petitioners in this action. The troops were stationed along Bolivar and 11th Street and began to receive sniper fire and at that point the local commander ordered them to withdraw into the YMCA, the Masonic Temple and the Old Commissary.

Army troops inside the building. In the morning of the 10th the mob began to form over here on Bolivar Avenue and directed a concentrated Molotov cocktail attack first at the YMCA where a Company of 140 men of troops were housed.

They finally about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 10th succeeded in setting it on fire, forcing the troops to evacuate at which point they moved down the street and began to concentrate on the Masonic Temple in which the Army not only had troops but it had established a Command Post and an Observation Post.

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There is a photograph in the back of the Appendix which shows the Masonic Temple, it shows the roof as being higher than the other buildings in the area and having a parapet and it was from that position that the Army was able to command this entire area, both from observation and later in attempts to quell the rioters.

The mob was unable to set the Masonic Temple on fire due to the difference in construction. Although they did start some fires in the interior. Thereupon, they moved down to the Old Commissary, not owned by the Petitioners, owned by the Government, and finally succeeded in setting that on fire with Molotov cocktails the next day.

On the basis of these facts Petitioners made claim first to the Department of the Army and then the Court of Claims, contending that there was liability where the Army had seizued and used Petitioners' buildings as sources of refuge and defense.

The Court of Claims held ---

Q May I ask first, what if any damage was done to

those blocks that were in that area where you have your pointer right now?

A Yes, Mr. Chief Justice. If you will see the shaded area indicates those which were damaged. There was no damage to these buildings here, no damage to these buildings down here. These buildings were never occupied by U.S. Army troops.

The damage was done to buildings occupied by United States Army troops during this course of the conflict.

- Q How about those other blocks that you have got in there, over to the right a little?
  - A Over here?
  - Q No, those cross lines.
  - A These are the buildings in question.
- Q Well, I know but they weren't all the Masonic Temple.
  - A That is the Masonic Temple.
- Q Was there general destruction done in that whole area?
- A As to these buildings, Mr. Chief Justice, this building that I am pointing to right now is owned by the Government. That was destroyed.
- Q No, what I want to know is this: You have got certain blocks that are right there in the area of these two buildings. You have them marked with the diagonal lines

across them, like that. Do you see what I mean? 7 Yes, your Honor. Now, what damage was done to those blocks, not 3 any particular building but those blocks other than in those 4 two buildings? 5 In these three buildings? 6 No, I am not talking about three buildings. I 7 am talking about the general area that has those diagonal lines. 8 A There was no damage other than to the building, 9 These shaded areas indicate buildings, not blocks. your Honor. 10 Just those three? 0 11 Yes, your Honor. A 12 0 All right. 13 The hatch lines going down Bolivar Avenue mark 14 the boundary line, don't they? 15 That is correct. A 16 Those are not buildings or any area despite 17 anything else? 18 No, they are just indicating the boundary line 19 in this case. There is no damage here and no damage here. 20 I can't read your legend from here but what does 21 that mean, those diagonal lines? 22 That says buildings looted and damaged or burned. 23 This is attached to the Appendix, Mr. Chief Justice. It is 24 the last page of the Appendix. 25 7

On the basis of these facts the Court of Claims held that there was no liability for the seizure and use of these buildings; that is, the YMCA and the Masonic Temple, holding that there was no liability for occupancy of private property which is immediately necessary for the safety of troops or to meet an emergency threatening great public danger.

Judge Davis dissented. Judge Davis said that on his basis of the applicable case law he thought it clear that the Government is liable where it first takes the property for its own military use and then exposes the place to enemy attack or evokes it leading to injury or destruction.

In this connection, Judge Davis said, and we should emphasize this, there is no exception from liability as I read the materials for temporary seizures for military use in the face of eminent hostility or to meet an emergency.

Once the property is taken for a military use the Government is responsible for its subsequent injury no matter how quickly that follows upon seizure.

Thus, in our view the issue here between the majority and the dissent below centers on the all important question of whether the immediate necessity or eminent hostility creates an exception in the general duty to provide compensation.

We think it does not and cannot, that the Court of Claims' decision if allowed to stand creates a grave and unwarranted threat to the citizen's right of compensation.

For if an immediate necessity is sufficient to confer absolute immunity upon the Government whenever it seizes and use private property, then we are indeed faced with a new era of governmental power.

Q Is your question here, or at least one of the questions here whether this indeed constituted a seizure by the Government followed by the damage or whether it was damage incurred in the course of a military or quasi-military operation?

A No, Mr. Justice, I would characterize the factual element of the issue as to whether there was a seizure and a use for a military purpose and we take the position as that expressed by Judge Davis below that once there is a seizure and use by the U.S. Armed Forces for military purpose there is liability no matter how the damage occurs.

Q Let us see if I can get to it this way.

Let us suppose that the United States troops had been drawn up in the street outside of these two buildings but the mob then attacked, throwing Molotov cocktails and doing whatever they did.

The troops then retired into these two buildings, the conflict continued. Damage resulted to the buildings. Would you still contend that the United States must pay you for the damage done?

A Yes, your Honor, although that is not the facts in this case.

- Q I understand that.
- A But I would contend that there would be.
- Q Well, now tell me why?
- A Because in that case, your Honor, the Army, once it took those buildings ---
  - Q Well, the question ---
- A I am saying taking but not in the constitutional sense, Mr. Justice.
  - Q Well, then don't say it.

Once the Army retired into those buildings as part of its protective operation.

A I would say there would be liability because by so doing under the established case law it then exposes those buildings to special response on the part of the opposing forces.

Q What you are saying then amounts to the proposition that in any riot situation any building to which is physically occupied, which is physically occupied by the military forces of the United States falls within this category; that is to say, that the United States is liable for the damage inflicted upon that building by the attacking mob.

A I would say, Mr. Justice, may I qualify that.

I don't think that I would make quite that broad a statement.

- Now this to me is a critical area.
- A Right.

Q What do you think constitutes a compensible taking in a riot situation and which you don't?

A I would say the criteria would be as follows,
Mr. Justice.

First of all, there must be a necessity which justifies the seizure, not going to whether duty of compensation is available but whether there is authority to take it. Then the use must be actual and not constructive or passive. By that I mean the Army has to withdraw into the building, use it as a Command Post, a defense fortress, an observation post, as opposed to merely standing in front of the building or passing through for 30 seconds.

Then the use that the Army, thirdly, gets out of that building, must have some benefit to the Government, as was present in this case. It can also have a benefit to the owner but it must have a benefit to the Government.

Then I should suggest fourthly that that benefit should relate to the specific mission that the Army is involved in in that particular case, as it was here.

And then finally, that use should be of sufficient scope and duration. Now this will depend upon the facts in each case but to make it clear that it was more than fleeting or merely consequential; in this case the Masonic Temple was occupied for a period of 7 days, the YMCA for a substantial period of time until the troops were forced to evacuate.

- Q These are not simple standards?
- A No, your Honor.

Now let me just put this to you very simply because we are not engaged in what is entirely an academic exchange of verbal dialogue here. Let us take one of these riot situations that the country witnessed the summer before last or so and let us suppose that the United States troops are there and they are in the street and the mob is throwing Molotov cocktails and stones and shooting and doing whatever they did.

Let us then suppose that the troops retire into or take refuge in or go into, go into let us say, a building, and from that building they take defense, they observe the mob and take defensive action or whatever you want to call shooting guns at people in those circumstances.

Now in your submission to the Court is that a compensible taking and if it is not a compensible taking, what are the elements which distinguish that case from your case?

A I would say that is a compensible taking,
Mr. Justice, and that the elements are substantially similar
to those involved here.

Q And if we should disagree with you on the case that I put to you then we would have to disagree with you on the case submitted to us by adjudication?

A Not necessarily, Mr. Justice, because I think

this is a stronger case. Here we are involved with buildings that were held for a substantial period of time in which there was a substantial number of men involved, which were used throughout the riots and here we have, although we don't think it is necessary to make out liability, here we have a fairly strong evidence of a causal connection between the seizure and the resulting destruction, the point being that just the buildings occupied by the troops as indicated by the hash marks are the ones that were substantially destroyed.

Q Well I may be wrong on this but my recollection of reading the documents here is that the damage to the Masonic Building occurred after the troops had retired into that, after the YMCA building was set on fire?

A No, your Honor, if I may correct you on the record. The facts are that the Masonic Temple -- there were rioters in the Masonic Temple and the YMCA that were looting and somewhat destroying the interior when the Army first arrived.

They moved those rioters out of the buildings. We don't make any claim for that damage. The Army then took up positions in the streets and they were subsequently forced to retire into both buildings at once. That is, the Masonic Temple and the YMCA and the damage to those structures by Molotov cocktail occurred the day and the second day.

Q Why don't you make a claim for that part of the

damage inflicted in the initial phases of the operation that was inflicted by the Army, let us say, or by the exchange of civilities between the Army and the mob?

A Well, because, your Honor, that damage, to be precise if I may, on the basis of the record, that initial damage was all done by the rioters. They had got in and they were looting the interiors of the buildings and the Army moved them out.

And so there is no damage really done by the Army.

Q Let me ask you one more question, and then I will leave you alone.

Do I understand from your last statement then that if the rioters had been in the building, and the Army had moved in troops to roust them, and the Army had inflicted damage on the building in the course of that operation, by shooting with less than television western movie accuracy, for example, that in your submission the Army would have been liable for the resulting damage?

A It would not have been liable, your Honor, because ---

Q It would not?

A It would not because there was no use made of that building, your Honor. That building is really in that case a random consequence of battle. That just happened to be in the way of the exchange. But the Army never seizued and used

that building.

I think the key is the Army has to take and retire to and use, and at that point as Judge Davis said liability attaches.

Q Do I understand that the Army went there to protect these two buildings?

A It went there, Mr. Justice, for the purposes of clearing the rioters from the Zone and protecting the Zone in general.

- Q Including those two buildings?
- A Including those two buildings; yes.
- Q And the use of that building was for the same purpose?

A The use of the building, we contend, Mr. Justice, was primarily to protect the troops. That is spelled out on the record, which is stipulated to. That is the reason the Army withdrew into the building, to protect the troops.

Q Well, if they had withdrawn the troops from around the building and back down that street, what would happen to those two buildings?

A If they had been destroyed there would be no claim here.

- Q Would they have been destroyed?
- A It is not clear. It is not clear.
- Q Well, did either the Masonic Temple or the YMCA

- A Did either of them?
- Q Yes.
- A Yes, they did, your Honor.
- Q They had troops?
- A Inside the buildings. Oh, you mean privately.
- Q No, I mean did they hire troops?
- A No.
- Q Obviously they didn't. They needed the Army to protect those buildings or they wouldn't be protected, and if they had stayed outside the buildings to protect the buildings you would have no claim, but if they go inside the building for the same purpose of protecting it you do have a claim.
- A May I rephrase my answer to that question, Mr. Justice.
  - Q It would help.
- A I think that they withdrew into the building to protect the troops primarily. If they had not gone into the buildings and the buildings had been lost there would be no claim.

For example, there were troops stationed all behind here but never in these two buildings here. Yet these buildings were never destroyed. We don't contend that it is necessary to show that the mob moved just against the buildings the Army occupied to make out our test, because once there is seizure

and use there is liability. But we think that is an important point.

Q What if they had retired behind the building so to keep the building between them and the rioters in the process of trying to shell or shoot the troops had destroyed the building?

A Then I would not be making a claim here today,

Mr. Justice. I would contend, although that is a close question
that that falls within the true battle damage situation.

Q But they were still using the building for protection?

A In the facts of this case I think that could be argued both ways. If you could show that they put the buildings up as a buffer, that they in effect deliberately sacrificed them to protect the troops, then I think we would have Caltex and we would be prepared to argue as we do in Point No. 2 of our brief, that Caltex should be overruled.

Q As long as it stands you couldn't recover it?

A Not without overruling Caltex I believe in that case, if they sacrificed the buildings to protect the troops.

But, of course, we contend that is not the fact.

If I may I should like to use my remaining time in rebuttal.

Thank you.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: You may.

Mr. Strauss.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF PETER L. STRAUSS, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES

MR. STRAUSS: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court.

Petitioners seek to recover from the United States in this case the value not of the use of their buildings but of the damage which rioters inflicted on those buildings during the course of general anti-American riots in the Canal Zone.

The President, the Congress and this Court have unanimously agreed on the legal principle which ought to apply in that situation. And I should like to quote it.

It is a general principle of both international and municipal law that all property is held subject not only to be taken by the Government for public use, in which case under the Constitution of the United States, the owner is entitled to just compensation, but also subject to be temporarily occupied, which is this case, or even actually destroyed, which is perhaps Caltex and is not involved here. In times of great public danger and when the public safety demands it.

In this latter case governments do not admit a legal obligation on their part to compensate the owner.

That statement as the Court may recognize from the Court of Claims' opinion in this case originated in the veto message from President Grant to the Congress. It was then

of the 43rd Congress, Second Session, which is the most thorough congressional study ever undertaken of Government liability for damage claims and which has acquired independent stature as a source book on international law in this area.

This Court then adopted this in the Pacific Railroad case, page 238 of Volume 120, as its own test of constitutional taking. It remains the Government's contention today that the temporary occupancy of premises under the immediate compulsion of the public emergency and for the purpose of dealing with that emergency is not a constitutional taking for which compensation is required.

Now I think counsel has fairly stated most of the relevant facts but there are a few additional things which I would like to emphasize.

First, it is quite clear from the record these riots started well before the troops arrived, two or three hours earlier. The troops arrived down in this area and at the time they arrived there were rioters throughout this general area. There were no rioters down here.

The troops came and they found the rioters at the buildings for which Petitioners are now claiming compensation. Then when the sniper firing started and it wasn't only sniper firing, the Court of Claims is quite clear, the record is quite clear that Molotov cocktails were being thrown while the troops

were on the streets, the Army fell back from its positions and it did not do so only along Bolivar Avenue, into these two buildings, it was forced to fall back into the Commissary Building, it was forced to fall back here where you can see ---

Q I can't see. You are between me and the chart.

A It was forced to fall back here where you can see there are not many buildings, in general along the boundary, behind the railroad tracks, and there are photographs in the exhibits of record in the court, not reproduced in the joint appendix, which shows the bunker positions built with sand bags behind these railroad tracks.

That left the troops behind the sanitation building here. There were no troops in the sanitation building. That did not stop the rioters from burning the sanitation building. During the course of the riots the sanitation building was completely destroyed.

So it seems to us that this indicates the negative of the Petitioners' theory, that there would have been no burnings had the troops not been in their building.

It certainly also indicates the negative of the theory that it was to these two buildings particularly that the presence of the troops drew the rioters' attack. The rioters were all along the boundary line although from the start they were concentrated principally in what we call the salient.

They didn't favor any buildings particularly with

their attack. They made their attack throughout.

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Q Suppose the Army, a month in advance of this trouble, had said we foresee that there is going to be trouble and we, therefore, will occupy these two buildings.

A Well, I think we would have a much different case.

Q I know it would be different. And I appreciate your agreeing with me but would that be a compensible taking in the constitutional sense?

A I think it would be.

Q And that compense and the payment for that would have to cover the consequential damages, wouldn't it, or would it?

A It is not clear the extent to which it would.

I may say that the damage issue, how much ought to be paid if
there was a taking in this case is not settled on this record
and there would be required some further proceedings to settle
that question.

And we do concede that the rioters did the amount of damage the petitioners claim they did.

Q If the Army a month in advance had occupied these buildings and the riots had occurred and the rioters had destroyed the buildings. Do you think it is an open question as to whether the Government would have to pay the total cost of the building as distinguished from just

compensation for use and occupancy without taking into account the damage done by the rioters?

A The Government would be liable. And if the Court concludes that there is a taking in this case, of course, the Government would be liable.

- Q No, no, no. That is not my question.
- A Yes, sir. I agree.

Q Wait a minute. Wait a minute.

The critical question is whether the Government would be liable in that situation for the destruction of the building which was brought about as a result of the conflict between the rioters and the troops.

A It seems to me there would be a difficult factual question but one which might possibly be resolved as to what damage would have occurred had the troops not been there and that if it could be determined that some damage would have occurred had the troops not been there that damage would be subtracted.

But otherwise I would agree with the proposition that the Government would be liable.

Q I am not sure that I would, but you say that the Government would be liable for the damage that occurred in the course of the riot, less such part of that damage as could be shown to be not attributable to Government occupancy?

A If I may explain the basis on which I do that

it seems to me ---

Q Well, that is what you are saying, isn't it?

A That is what I am saying and I am saying it
because it seems to me you have your finger on the distinction
which is crucial to the so-called target doctrine on which
petitioners may rely.

Under that doctrine as petitioners have already argued, if the Government makes a target of a particular building by turning it into a fortification, then in principles of international law, at least, although it has not been held in the domestic contacts, the Government is liable for the damages done.

But it is quite clear that in this case no such target was made. For as Professor Borchard points out in the work petitioners cite, the State is responsible for the use and occupation of buildings and real property only if they are being used in more than a temporary way and the use is not impelled by military necessity, thus he says,

"The target doctrine extends only to property occupied in advance of actual fighting, rather than such as is occupied during an attack or retreat."

So that even conceding as I have, the answer to your question, the established principles applicable in this case require that no compensation be paid. There is nothing in the

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record to suggest that there was any previous use of these buildings.

There were riots in the Canal Zone in 1959. I have looked into them and so far as I can determine there was no use made of these buildings at that time.

It seems to me that the principal task I have to carry out here is to make a case for what we have called the public emergency statute for what President Grant referred to as this exception for temporary use during and under the compulsion of war.

And to do that I have to start at some distance from ordinary Fifth Amendment concepts.

In particular, I want to look at the body of law which would ordinarily govern the riot situation. That is to say, municipal liability for tort.

If a person's property were destroyed because the police failed to protect it at all or withdrew from the area when the rioters seemed to be getting the upper hand he might file a claim on the theory the police hadn't given him adequate protection, or he might make the same claim if he thought that because police used tear gas or Billie clubs, instead of rifles or machineguns on looters looting went unchecked and indeed there are many such claims which had been filed in New York and in other cities which were the subject of urban riots.

Those claims are tort claims. And it is apparent

that in the absence of statutory liability for riot damage generally those claims could not succeed.

No.

The decisions made whether to use guns or not, where is the most effective place from which to fight a riot, how is the most effective way to deal with it are quite plainly discretionary functions of Government for which no Government concedes tort or other liability.

Under Federal law for example any such liability would be foreclosed under the Tort Claims Act. And the reasons for denying liability and not that no loss has occurred, it is rather the desire to avoid any interference with official action, but even the prospect of the litigation or liability might bring.

It is to permit the officers to concentrate exclusively on the most efficient way of dealing with the danger.

The public necessity exception can be viewed as an extension of this discretionary function reasoning.

By excusing policemen or troops from eminent domain liability from entering buildings in the heat of emergency and for emergency purposes it, too, protects their decisions from unwanted influence.

Had the troops in this case simply left the buildings to the mob there would have been no liability; had they used weapons which kept the mob away from the buildings there would have been no liability.

Indeed it is significant to what the real characterization of this case ought to be, the petitioners make no claim for the value of the use of their premises for what would be the ordinary Fifth Amendment measure of relief.

They say the troops had a right to be there. They seek only to recover the damage done by the rioting mob, when the troops were unable to control them with the weapons their commander allowed them to use.

Thus, petitioners seek the damage which New York Merchants will be unable to obtain and should be unable to obtain because of the discretionary function.

We believe it is as important to foreclose the possibility of liability here. There have been riots such as the Harlem riots of 1943.

- Q Excuse me, do you imply if there were a compensible taking its measure here would be the use?
- A I think that certainly would be the primary measure.
- Q What I am asking, is it your position that were there any at all, were they entitled to any compensation it would have to be measured by the value of the use of those seven days of the building and not at all by the value of the damage that was done?
- A The closest cases this court -- the closest this Court's case has come to that question were the leasehold

cases that arose out of World War II, such as the General Motors
case, and in those cases the Court seemed to be saying that
you didn't simply get the amount of money that could be valued
for the time that the Government was there, it was also the
inconvenience to the petitioner and he was entitled among other
things to get the premises back in the condition in which he
gave them to the Government.

We cannot see any particular reason for avoiding that liability except to the extent we would argue that the Government would not be responsible if it had a leasehold for the damage done by an earthquake.

Similarly it might not be responsible for the damage done by a rioting mob, only to the extent that the Government could be said to have brought that damage onto the buildings was the basis behind my answer to Mr. Justice Fortas, could the Government be held liable for the rioting mobs down there.

Q But your claim is they aren't liable at all?

A No liability here at all. And I make reference to the failure to claim rent value only to show that this really isn't a Fifth Amendment claim.

It seems to us it is in everything but name a tort claim. This is for tort damages and it looks exactly like the claims that are arising out of the urban riots today except for this particular characterization that petitioners can make and argue because troops were forced by the rioters

back into their buildings in order to be able to carry out their function of protecting the Zone and still staying alive.

Q If that is what it is in fact, the equivalent of a tort claim against a municipal authority, then your war cases aren't very helpful, are they?

A I am trying to explain. The war case doctrine ---

Q That is not very relevant if this is the kind of case you told us it is.

A I think it is in the sense that I think the law has always had ---

Q This wasn't a war. These were not enemy troops; they were civilian rioters, weren't they?

A They were civilian rioters.

Q There was no war.

A It was close enough to being a war.

Q Congress hadn't even voted on it, had they?

A No, they had not.

There have been riots such as the Harlem Riots of 1943 and the Cambridge, Maryland Riots two summers ago, for what they considered to be good reasons the police did not go into the riot zone but simply tried to contain the riot in the area where it was occurring by protecting the fringes.

It seems to us that there is no apparent justice in giving the protected people at the fringes of the riot area a better shot at compensation for whatever damage they suffered

despite the presence of police or troops than those in the riot zone who received no protection.

Since urban violence and hostility to the police go hand in hand it is not going to be difficult for the future riot situation for plaintiffs to make the claim that the presence of police in their area drew a rioters' attack.

When the Government is responding to the emergency situation, in other words, as under the discretionary function generally, whether it is an emergency situation of war or of riot, it ought not to be subjected to the pressures and distortions that a preferential rule of liability can bring.

Moreover, it should be clear that petitioners are not the only ones who suffered losses at the mob's hands. In the ordinary Fifth Amendment case you have a very clear sort of question to be resolved, a real question, social question to be resolved.

You have on the one hand a man who owns a piece of property and that property is taken from him. You have on the other hand society as a whole which benefits from the taking and the general question is who is going to bear that loss?

The riot situation, the war situation, it seems to us is quite different. Total property damage done is immense. In the Canal Zone it was about 10 times as great as petitioner's claim here. Lives are lost, many are injured. Only a few of the citizens damaged in such a catastrophy will have troops or

police or firemen on their premises.

through their taxes, have to bear two burdens of loss. Nor can it be said what the community has gained it ought to pay for. If you gain from a riot or war or major crime, the community should be free to deal with the losses it suffers as a whole and not required to give some citizens preferential treatment.

There is an enormous difficulty in basic unfairness in determining whether such calamity losses occur because the Government is present and how much of a loss would otherwise have occurred and hence need not be compensated.

The rule that petitioners seek might be just as arbitrary as the law's present rule of letting such losses lie where they fall. The problem of distributing them is too complex to be solved by compensating those who received the most direct effort in protection by the Government.

No case we have discovered in this or any other court has required the Government to pay on Fifth Amendment grounds or any other grounds for the damage that rioters or fires or other instruments of catastrophy do during Government efforts to contain them.

No case we have discovered characterizes Government entry onto private property. Under the compulsion of such an emergency as a taking, as shown in our brief the law and

practice since the founding of the nation has been entirely to the contrary.

Even destruction which the Government itself deliberately brings about need not be compensated. Indeed other cases of such entry are generally treated as court matters.

If, for example, a fireman damages a hedge in bringing a hose to fight a neighbor's fire or a policeman must break down the door to arrest someone hiding behind it, those claims are not ordinarily brought as Fifth Amendment claims. The claims are brought as matters of tort. The fireman was negligent or the policeman had no necessity or legal basis to make his arrest. And this is no failure of analysis.

This is entirely consistent with the line this court has followed in determining whether or not a taking has occurred Under that approach conduct which is basically tortious or would be if it occurred between private citizens is insufficient in itself to be a taking in the constitutional sense.

Thus in the three Portsmouth Harbor cases in Volumes 231, 250 and 260 of the reports, the court twice found the firing of harbor guns over petitioners' lands not to have been taking. When the third complaint was filed the court concluded that that showed sufficient duration of use and sufficient intensity of use to show that a servitude had been imposed.

Similarly in Crusby and in Griggs versus Allegheny
County this court stressed the number of times airplanes were

flown low over petitioners' houses in discussing the taking issue.

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In United States versus Dickinson in 331 U.S. the court said that property is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made on an owner's use of it to an extent that as between private parties a servitude has been acquired either by agreement or in the course of time.

There was no agreement in this case. If the servitude did not already exist the one brief occupancy of petitioner's buildings was insufficient to impress one in itself. Like the result of the first firings of the guns over Portsmouth Harbor and the first flights of planes over Mr. Causby's chicken farm, the damage in this case would be answerable only in tort if it were answerable at all.

Q Do you think it makes any difference in this case that this happened in the Canal Zone?

A I would not think so. Because this court is being called upon to decide a constitutional matter generally and no distinction occurs to me that would respond to the fact that it happened in the Canal Zone.

Q The Canal Zone has what, a Governor appointed by the President of the United States?

A It is an unusual situation. I am not entirely sure I understand it myself. There is the Panama Canal Zone Company and then there is also the Canal Zone Government. The

Canal Zone Company, which is ostensively a corporation, but under Government charter and owned entirely by the Government, is responsible for most fiscal affairs and owns most of the property in the area.

The Canal Zone Government supplies what a city Government would ordinarily supply, municipal protection, fire protection, police protection and in addition there are large Army bases down there such as the one from which these troops came. These were not Canal Zone troops. These were Government troops, the same as Government troop on any other ---

Q What do you mean they were not Canal Zone troops?

A In the sense that they weren't Canal Zone policemen or Canal Zone firemen. They were not employees of the Canal Zone.

Q Are there Canal Zone policemen and firemen?

A There are Canal Zone policemen and firemen. And as in Detroit they were the first to attempt to quell the disturbance and they failed to do so and the troops were then called in.

Q By whom?

A As I recall the facts the Lieutenant Government of the Canal Zone asked the military to take over, which is perhaps a unique situation in the Canal Zone, and the military on assuming control then brought in the troops to help control the riots.

We do not believe that the Mitchell case, the Russell case for the reasons I have already discussed or any of the cases in International law applying the so-called target doctrine require any different conclusion.

This court itself showed the way past Mitchell and Russell in the Pacific Railroad case and in Caltex. Mitchell the trader was forced to accompany the Army some 300 miles to the place where his goods were destroyed. Russell involved steamboats which the Army commandeered to haul Government freight on the Western Front.

Thus, both of those cases are like the case which

Justice Fortas put in which under international law compensation

would be required. They were both cases in which the Army took

the property involved in advance of fighting and for its own

use whether for defensive purposes or from any other and not

cases like this one in which the Army was forced into the

building, by fighting, without advance plan or arrangement to

do so.

- Q Suppose they had known the Commanding General of the Army or whatever else he was and at 12 o'clock noon he looked it over and decided the best place to conduct a fight would be from the YMCA and they fought then within 30 minutes?
  - A I think that would be a difficult case.
  - Q That would what?
  - A I think that would be a difficult case. I think

one incident of that war with that battle were the only occasion on which damage had occurred there might be a strong tendency to say that there was liability in those circumstances.

But, if on the other hand, it was one out of 10,000 operations in a huge conflict, the Court might find that his visit to the cite at 12 o'clock was in itself a product of an emergency that was developing at the other side of town and consequently compensation need not be paid.

- Q What is the difference except in point of time?
- A As I understand the rationale of the doctrine,
  I should say that I am perhaps giving too much credence to
  these international cases involving the target doctrine. Maybe
  I am following it too far.

Those cases arose in a special situation where you have neutrals, foreigns living in one country which was at war with insurgence or some other country, and the troops of the country in which these neutrals live had to fight a battle with their opponents and chose -- and the choosing is really the important part -- and chose the place where the neutrals lived as the place to fight their battle.

And international cases have held that in those circumstances compensation is to be paid. Now there is a notion in that that the choice is an invidious one, that when the Commander of the Government troops is thinking where shall I

fight, he may make the decision I would rather fight where it is not my people's property being damaged; I would rather fight on the land of the Imperialist Sugar Company or something to that fashion.

And this rule of compensation was fashioned and applied entirely in cases which might be considered Imperialist cases. They involved Latin American Government on the one hand resisting liability, and European and American Governments on the other -- North American Governments on the other hand insisting upon liability.

As we cited in our brief there are a number of other cases which refused to apply the doctrine and refused to apply it because the property of the natives was equally exposed to the risk of harm. There wasn't any discrimination in this case, in other words.

So that is a doctrine which arises not only out of the fact of choice but also out of the existence of discrimination. Perhaps I should insist that the possibility of discrimination should be there as well as the factor of choice.

But the thing which distinguishes the question you put to me, Mr. Justice Black, in this case is the factor of choice. That at least in that case one could say that the General had visited the area, had looked it over, and had said, "Here we fight."

Whereas in this case there is no such factor. The

about it. The rioters were there when the troops arrived.

They went to where the rioters were and they fought them there and they stayed there no longer than there were rioters in the vicinity.

Q Where the rioters were and then got in the building?

A They were driven into the buildings. They first took up positions here along the street and then after one soldier was killed, several were wounded, sniper fire was going at them and Molotov cocktails were being thrown at them, they decided they could no longer stand in the street.

Q Do I understand also, Mr. Strauss, the troops went in there they had to put rioters out.

A That is right.

Q Rioters were already in the building.

A Rioters in the case of the YMCA were already burning the building.

Q They were already in the building and they had to put them out in order to defend the building as well as to protect their own lives.

A That is right, but they did not stay in the building at that time so far as the record shows.

Q The border between the Zone and the Republic is that street, Bolivar?

Q Right there where the YMCA building is, Bolivar Street. Right down the middle of the street?

- A Down the middle of the street.
- Q Or is one side or the other of the street?

A It is a very free access. Part of the reason for that which doesn't show on this map, is that Colon, which shows here as the Republic of Panama is on the peninsula. This is its only land border here. So that this corridor down here is the only access which the citizens of Colon have to other parts of Panama. It is Panamanian.

The map continues more or less like my hand with sea around it on those sides and then this is the border which you see here.

Q And the rioters, they did more than just throw things across or shoot across, they came across themselves did they?

A They were trying to come across, yes. They were in the Zone and they repeatedly tried to attack the Zone, and they also attacked although they did not succeed in burning, they attacked a small building down here, they attacked something which you will find referred to as the Old Fire House which is this building here.

They were burning railroad ties along here.

Q Now they did so by throwing Molotov cocktails

across or by coming across themselves?

A Well, they would run up. There was at one point an effort to push a burning car across the boundary here. The difficulty was that the tear gas that the troops were using couldn't keep the rioters far enough from the building to keep them out of the reach of the Molotov cocktails.

I think one can put it that way. Had they been using something with a little longer reach, a 30-30, they might have been able to keep them away.

Q Mr. Strauss, is there anything in the record to show that when the troops went there they intended to use the YMCA building or the Masonic Temple as a rendezvous for the troops?

A No, not that I am aware of. There is one other matter that I should point out about the facts, as long as counsel has mentioned it, I would just like to stress it. The YMCA and the Masonic Temple are separate entities.

They are represented by one counsel. But they are otherwise separate and this business of observation post and command post applies only to the Masonic Temple. Troops were in the YMCA for only 12 hours and there is no indication that during the 12 hours they were there that any command function or similar function was performed.

In conclusion, I would just like to state again --
Q You say they were there 12 hours?

3 A At the YMCA building for only 12 hours from 2 midnight until about noon on Friday. 3 Both are parties here, litigants here, aren't they? 4 Both litigants here. That is right. 5 A How long were the troops in the Masonic Temple? 6 Counsel says a week. I wasn't aware that it 7 was that long but it was at least until the 13th. Q And there was an observation post set up? 9 And there was an observation post set up in the 10 Temple after the troops were driven into it and as part of 11 their efforts to continue to maintain the Zone boundary. There 12 is no indication it was set up in advance. 13 Thank you. 14 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Very well. 15 Mr. Jacks, you may proceed. 16 REBUTTAL ORAL ARGUMENT OF RONALD A. JACKS, ESQ. 17 ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS 18 MR. JACKS: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. 19 I should only like to comment, I believe, Mr. Justice 20 Black, you asked how long were the troops in the YMCA and it 21 was until about 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 10th or 14 22 hours and they left only because the fire started by the 23 Molotov cocktails drove them out. They had to abandon the 24 building. They could no longer inhabit it.

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Q What is your idea about how they decided to get there?

A How the troops decided to take over these buildings?

Q That is right.

A The record is not clear as to when that choice occurred but it seems to me that it is a fair inference to say that when the troops in the street in front of these buildings began to receive sniper fire that it was a prudent decision to withdraw into these buildings, one.

Two, the Masonic Temple as I alluded to earlier is particularly well suited for a command and observation post because it is the highest building in that area and if the court will forgive a personal reference, you will see that you can see the entire Zone at that point and command whatever action you wanted to take.

Q Is there a fact finding?

A The facts ---

Q That would state the reason why they withdrew into the buildings?

A Yes, Mr. Justice Brennan, the facts, as developed in three documents, one, the formal presentation before the OAS, by written form two, the statement of facts from the General Counsel of the Army to me, and three the oral presentation, all indicate as we point out in our brief that the

troops moved into the building to protect the troops. Those were the statements that the United States Government has given assigned as the reason for the seizure of these buildings.

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Q So there is nothing in the way of a fact finding that they took these buildings in order to establish a command post?

Honor, on the basis of these formal presentations by the

Government and those facts clearly show, that is the Government's

own version of the facts show they admit that the buildings were

taken as command posts, observation posts and initially 'seized

to protect the troops.

Q How did the troops get in that position where they needed protection. They got in that position because they were there to protect the buildings, am I right?

A I would say that that was one purpose, Mr.

Justice Marshall, but the paramount purpose was to protect the

Zone, not to protect these particular buildings. To protect
the Zone.

Q Am I correct that they went into the buildings and threw the Molotov cocktail people out?

A The record doesn't indicate that there were

Molotov cocktails, I believe, on the part of the rioters in the

building at the time the troops first entered and cleared them

out. There may have been some they found there but that it not

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in dispute here.

Q Weren't there fires in the buildings when they first got there?

A In the YMCA, yes, and no claim is made for those.

Q Well, there were fires there. The troops didn't start the fires; somebody else started them.

A That is correct and they were quickly put out.

Q And can there be any question that a major part of their job as witness of fact that they were lined up in front of the YMCA building, was that they were there to protect the building?

A I would say not that building, again, Mr. Justice Marshall. They were lined up all along the boundary line for blocks in either direction.

Q Well, would you suggest that in the futre in a situation like that the Army just let the building burn up?

A No, your Honor. I am suggesting that where the Army takes a building, seizes it, retires into it ---

Q Well, do you see a difference between going and seizing a building and being driven into a building?

A I am not so sure that they were driven into the building but I think that in this case it is the use of the building that is the crux of the matter.

- One soldier was killed right there?
- In front of the building. A

- Q Right there? And others were wounded?
  - A Yes, your Honor.

- Q And there was sniper fire?
- A Yes, your Honor.
- Q Now uncontrolled sniper fire is coming this way toward me and I back up into the building. I am not seizing the building am I? Am I? I mean speaking only of myself.

  I am not speaking about the Army.

A Mr. Justice Fortas indicated we could call that retiring into.

Q Yes.

Q As I understand it your claim is they were there to protect the whole Zone and in protecting the whole Zone they chose this place as the best place to protect the whole Zone, and that they whereby subjected the Government to pay for it because for the purposes of compensation zone to equally distribute the costs of warfare or whatever that is among those who ---

- A Yes, Mr. Justice Black, you have stated it.
- Q You are not claiming are you that they would be liable just because of a battle where they injured some property?

A No. It is the seizure anduse of these buildings to protect the entire Zone.

Q Would it have to be an actual seizure with the hands or what do you mean by seizure?

A Well, as I indicated to Mr. Justice Fortas when we were discussing factual criteria, I think there has to be an actual use, going into the building, establishing a defense fortification, a command post ---

Q Wouldn't that depend on whether the Government took charge of these to make these people the target, what was bound to be a tremendous personal loss of the YMCA for the protection of the Zone. Is that your claim?

A Yes, your Honor. That once the Government decides that the YMCA and the Masonic Temples buildings are to be sacrificed if they are to be sacrificed for the common good then the public purse must make good and that we can't and it seems to me that the central issue here is we can't deny liability on this ground of immediate necessity.

- Q What would have happened if the troops hadn't gone ---
  - A Pardon me, Mr. Justice.
- Q What would have happened if the troops hadn't rallied around or gone into the YMCA?
  - A And it had been subsequently destroyed?
- Q What would have happened in this particular situation?
- A The record is not clear, your Honor. I can't speculate.
  - Q Well, there were rioters in the building, weren't

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there?

A There were rioters there. I am sorry but this point is unclear.

Q Well I mean to say it isn't very reasonable to suppose that if the Army hadn't come the rioters would have said, "We beg your pardon and backed out of there?"

A The troops cleared out the rioters out of the YMCA initially.

Q Right, that is the point, isn't it?

A Yes.

And then they took up positions without occupancy in the buildings in front of that.

Q You don't contend, do you, that when the troops went there they selected by premeditation these two structures saying these are the places where we will defend this whole area. Now just let me finish please.

But, isn't it the fact that on the contrary, as far as this record shows, they made no decision to go into the buildings, either of them, until they went in under extremist with one soldier having been killed, others having been wounded and the rioters were in the buildings and it was under those compulsions that they went into the building.

Am I correct on that?

A Mr. Chief Justice, I frankly cannot tell what was in the Army's mind when they first entered the Zone.

Q Well, no, but have you any right to assume under what is in the record that they did go there with the premeditated intention of using those two places as a rendezvous or as a defense point for that area?

A No, your Honor, I can't assume one way or the other on that.

And on the contrary, one soldier was killed right at the entrance to the building before they went in, others were wounded, the rioters were in the building and they went in both for protection of themselves and I assume for the protection of the building.

Now is there anything wrong with those facts?

A I think the sequence is important, Mr. Chief

Justice.

The rioters were in the building initially when the troops arrived. The troops cleared them out, took positions in front. They had not taken over the buildings yet at that point.

Q What would you expect them to do, go out into the line of fire and get some more killed?

A No, your Honor, we have no quarrel with the Army's decision to use these buildings and we have no quarrel with the Army's decision not to effectively defend them.

Q Well, I think you do because you claim they were doing it for a purpose other than to defend the area and defend

the people in it.

A No, I am sorry if I created that misimpression,
Mr. Chief Justice. I contend that the Army seized the buildings
as Mr. Justice Black indicated for, the defense of the entire
Zone. It was a prudent decision to withdraw in there.

But our point is when our buildings are seized and used for a governmental purpose the Government as a whole should pay.

- Q Were there any others destroyed?
- Q Is there anything in the record to show if the Army hadn't shown up they would have been destroyed or blown up?
  - A Yes, there is.
  - Q What is there in the record to substantiate that?
- A I think again it is the causal relationship between the buildings and the Army were in and the Army was not when read as a whole.
- Q Am I correct that when the Army arrived the buildings already burning a little bit?
- A There was a small fire in the YMCA, alone, and that was quickly extinguished and that is no part of the total loss by the Army.
- Q What would have happened if the Army hadn't put it out, with the rioters in there?
  - A If the Army hadn't cleared that building?
    - Q Yes, if the Army hadn't gone in there as you say

to defend themselves, what would have happened to that building if they hadn't gone in there and done that?

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A I don't know, Mr. Chief Justice, except that is not the portion of the YMCA that was destroyed, because it was a brick construction primarily whereas the portion that was destroyed was wooden. So it is not clear that the building would have been necessarily lost.

- Q Were any other buildings destroyed like that?
- A Yes, the buildings by the hash marks, the YMCA, the Masonic Temple and the Old Commissary building, which is here owned by the Government and the sequence of the mob was first at this and then the Masonic Temple and then later at this.
  - Q There were no troops in the Commissary building?
- A Yes. There were troops in the Commissary building.
  - Q Were there troops in the Sanitation building?
- A The record is unclear on that and I do yield to the Solicitor General in pointing out that was burned and I am not sure whether it was surrendered or not.
- Q Those were Government buildings were they?
- A Yes. I refer the Court to the Appendix in our brief where we shown on page 220 Exhibit E-10, in the back of the Appendix.

Mr. Chief Justice, may I?

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Yes.

MR. JACKS: E-10 on page 220-A, the building, the tall building on the left is the Masonic Temple and the observation point was on top of it, and the building on the right is the YMCA and you can see off to the right the damaged portion.

This was taken shortly after the destruction of the

YMCA.

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Q That is the picture, E-10?

A Yes, Mr. Chief Justice, E-10. And on the preceding page, 219, shows those are pictures of the troops inside the YMCA before they were driven out by the fire.

Q What in a general nature was the damage to this building, to either of them?

A The YMCA lost a total wing which was in the nature of an auditorium which was primarily of a wood construction. The main building where the initial fire was, Mr. Justice, was not substantially destroyed. It was the wing to the YMCA that was lost, and the Masonic Temple it was a second and third floor fire damage to the interior. The Masonic Temple was made of brick and mortar construction so it really didn't go despite continued efforts to set it afire.

Q Was that from Molotov cocktails?

A Yes. The record is clear on that, being thrown in to the second floor over a long period of time.

(Whereupon, at 1:55 p.m. the oral argument in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)