ME COURT U. S.

# Supreme Court of the United States

Office Prime Court, U.S.
FILED

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JOHN F. DAVIS, GLERK

In the Matter of:

PAULETTE BOUDREAUX RODRIGUE, et al.

Petitioners,

V.

AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY,

et al.

Respondents.

Docket No. 436

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Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

February 25, 1969

# ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

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## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1968

Paulette Boudreaux Rodrigue, et al.,

Petitioners,

No. 436 V.

Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, et al.,

Respondents.

Washington, D. C. Tuesday, February 25, 1969.

The above-entitled matter came on for argument at

11:35 a.m.

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#### BEFORE:

EARL WARREN, Chief Justice HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice ABE FORTAS, Associate Justice THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice

## APPEARANCES:

PHILIP E. HENDERSON, Esq. P.O. Box 590, O'Neal Building, Houma, Louisiana Counsel for Petitioners

JAMES E. DIAZ, Esq. 201 West Main Street Lafayette, Louisiana Counsel for Respondents

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## PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: No. 436, Paulette

Boudreaux Rodrigue, et al., Petitioners, versus Aetna Casualty
and Surety Company, et al.

THE CLERK: Counsel are present.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Henderson.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF PHILIP E. HENDERSON, ESQ.

## ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MR. HENDERSON: Thank you.

Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court.

I am Philip Henderson from Houma, Louisiana.

In this case, there is presented the issue of whether the Beath on the High Seas Act is the exclusive remedy for wrongful death occurring to one of the workers on the artificial islands, the fixed platform, in the Outer Continental Shelf off the coast of Louisiana in this case.

Actually before the Court today are two cases that came here on a joint petition for writ of certiorari. The two cases present exactly the same issue.

In the Paulette Boudreaux Rodrigue case she is suing, she and her children are suing for the death of her husband.

Butley Rodrigue fell from the top of a derrick to his death on the drilling platform floor.

It is alleged that the death was caused by the negligence of the operator of the platform and the drilling company.

In the Dore case, let me continue and bring the Rodrique case up to the Court.

For the death, Mrs. Rodrigue brought actually three suits. She brought one suit under the Death on the High Seas Act. This suit was broad in admiralty. (?)

She brought two civil actions claiming that the Louisiana Death Act which was the adjacent state in this case, the Rodrigue death occurred on a platform which was 28 miles seaward of the coast of Louisiana.

In the civil actions, Mrs. Rodrigue contended that the Louisiana Death Act was extended to these artificial islands by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act which specifically provides that the law of the adjacent State shall be extended to the artificial islands in the Outer Continental Shelf and shall be applied when not inconsistent with Federal law.

The cases were consolidated. Motions were filed by the defendant to dismiss all of the claims actually contending that one or the other was an exclusive remedy. The Trial Judge denied all motions. The case was fixed for trial with the jury to hear the civil actions, the judge to hear the admiralty action concurrently.

On the morning of the trial after the jury was impaneled, the Judge changed his mind and granted a motion to dismiss the civil actions.

Q Mr. Henderson, may I ask, who were we given ---

q	A	Not me, your Honor.	
2	Q	By the Respondent?	
3	M	DIAZ: Yes, your Honor.	
4	Q	What was the question?	
5	Q	Who supplied this?	
6	Q	Do you know about this?	
7	A	I was given a copy, yes.	
8	Q	This talks about the Submerged Lands Act. That	
9	is not involved in this case, is it?		
0	A	Well, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act	
19	actually is	part of the Submerged Lands Act.	
12	Ω	I thought it came earlier.	
3	A	I beg your pardon.	
13	Ω	I thought the Outer Continental Shelf Act came	
15	earlier?		
16	A	Well	
7	Q	The Submerged Lands Act is something else, isn't	
18	it?		
19	A	I always refer to that Act as the Outer	
20	Continental	helf Lands Act. I have heard it referred to by	
1	other person	as the Submerged Lands Act.	
22	Q	They are two quite different statutes, are they	
23	not?		
24	A	Your Honor, please, I don't know. I am dealing	
25	here with th	Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.	

A And this is not my doctrine.

Q You are not responsible for this then -- indicating -- well, I will ask the man who is.

A Now, when the trial judge dismissed the two civil actions he held that the exclusive remedy for death on the artificial islands was the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. Excuse me. Was the Death on the High Seas Act.

Q Is there any question -- is there any issue between the parties here as a matter of fact that as to whether or not this artificial island was within the contours of the Outer Continental Shelf geographically?

A None whatsoever.

Q No dispute?

A No dispute about that as to either the Boudreaux Rodrigue case or the Dubois Dore case.

Now, both platforms were within the Continental Shelf and both were adjacent to the State of Louisiana. An appeal was taken for the dismissal of the civil actions to the Fifth Circuit.

In the Dubois Dore case, Mr. Dore was a crane operator on one of these artificial islands or platforms, the crane collapsed, Mr. Dore fell to his death.

For his death, his widow and children brought suit, a single action, claiming as one cause of action a right under

the Death on the High Seas Act and also claimed rights under the Louisiana Death Act.

The Louisiana Death Act allows recompense for not only the pecuniary losses but also recompense for loss of love, affection and companionship.

The Death on the High Seas Act only allows a recompense for pecuniary losses.

In the Dubois Dore case the defendant at the District Court level filed a motion to strike the Louisiana cause of action and to strike all claims for non-pecuniary damages.

The District Judge granted this motion and then certified the questions raised in the motion to the Fifth Circuit so that actually the Dore case reached the Fifth Circuit before the Rodrigue case though both involved exactly the same issue.

In the Fifth Circuit, the Court held that the exclusive remedy for death was the Death on the High Seas Act.

This Court has granted certiorari. The Rodrigue case actually followed the Dore case very promptly. Accordingly, the Rodrigue case issued a procuring opinion and said simply refer to our decision in the Dore case.

It is our contention that the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that the Death on the High Seas Act is the exclusive remedy. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act specifically extends the law of the adjacent State to the particular islands

and it is to be applied where not inconsistent with Federal law.

Now, the holding that the Death on the High Seas Act was an exclusive remedy is clearly in error because the Death on the High Seas Act specifically provides that it is not an exclusive remedy.

Section 7 of the Death of the High Seas Act reads,

"The provisions of any State statute giving or regulating
rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by
this chapter."

Now, it is hard to see how anything could be clearer than that.

Now, at the time of the adoption of the Death on the High Seas Act there were state statutes which were construed as giving rights of action for death on the high seas. The most famous of these cases was the Hamilton. Also, there happened to be a case, the E. B. Ward, Jr., which was a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case applying the very same Louisiana Death Act that is at issue here to a death which occurred in a collision between two vessels in the Gulf of Mexico.

Both of these cases were on the books at the time of the adoption of the Death on the High Seas Act. The clarity of this specific statement in the Death on the High Seas Act that it shall not affect the rights given by State statutes is highlighted by legislative history. At the time of this bill, it was a Senate bill when it was in the House just before passage, at that time there was debate as to whether the Act should be an exclusive remedy.

At that point, Section 7, which I have just read to you, provided that the provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this act as to causes of action accruing within the territorial limits of any State.

Now, that made it clear that there was a limitation upon this, what the Act was going to affect. However, those last words as to causes of action accruing within the limits of any State were deleted after arguing and after debate. They were deleted so that the Act would read that the provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this act, without any limiting feature.

Now, it is true that during that debate some of the people who debated said that this Act should be exclusive.

Some said that it shouldn't. Actually, the final vote on the amendment was 201 in favor of the amendment to 75 against it.

Counsel for Respondent seemed to take comfort from the fact that some of the persons who debated gave some reasons why they thought the amendment shouldn't be passed or if it passed, it didn't make any difference, but the fact is that there were 201 as opposed to 75 of the legislators who voted

for this amendment so that the Act would plainly read that the provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this Act. It couldn't be plainer.

Q I wonder how far you carry that. Suppose 20 miles out at sea from the Coast of Louisiana, but on a direct line, say disaster occurred and there was a death on the high seas at that point.

A On one of the islands?

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Q No, no, no. Not an island at all, just collision or ship or something of this sort. It had nothing to do with the Continental Shelf, way outside of the Continental Shelf.

Would you say that Death on the High Seas Act had the effect of giving cause of action also under Louisiana law?

A Well, now, the Death on the High Seas Act, of course, gives its own cause of action.

O I understand that.

A The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act would not give a cause of action because the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act applies only to these islands.

Q I am talking only about the argument you have been making here with respect to the Death on the High Seas Act.

A To the old cases that were in existence?

Q No, no. Death on the High Seas Act. You say that Death on the High Seas Act expressly reserves State causes

of action.

A Yes.

Q Now, I am asking you whether that would apply in a situation I put to you, say far beyond the Outer Continental Shelf there was death on the high seas and somebody claims a remedy under Louisiana Law saying that Death on the High Seas Act saves remedies under the State law and this death occurred on direct projected line from the middle of the State of Louisiana.

And, therefore, the contention is that we have a cause of action under Louisiana law.

A Oh, I don't think in that circumstance, your Honor, that the direct line from the State of Louisiana really has any bearing. I would think that the only time in which the direct line from the State of Louisiana has any bearing is under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act because ---

Q All right. So it is essential for you to demonstrate not only that there is a possibility under the Death on the High Seas Act but also that the Outer Continental Shelf Act does provide for the alternative uapplicability of Louisiana law?

- A I call it supplementary, your Honor.
- Q All right. I don't care what you call it. Is that right?
  - A Not necessarily.

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Q You have got to show that this, that Louisiana has jurisdiction by reason of the place where this death occurred.

A In the instant cases, your Honor, that point is clearly met because the Outer Continental Shelf Act does specifically say that as to these platforms involved, because they are adjacent to the State, that the Louisiana law does apply there now.

- Q Yes, but that is only as Federal law?
- A As an adopted Federal law, yes, sir.
- Q It does not involve Louisiana law?
- A Correct, sir.
- Q It does not give Louisiana any jurisdiction over the Outer Continental Shelf?

A That is correct. Jurisdiction, it is Federal jurisdiction,

Q Nor does it, as Louisiana law is relevant only as part of the Federal law?

A Yes, sir, it is adopted Federal law, Federal jurisdiction. It is adopted to be applied where not inconsistent with Federal law, but, Mr. Justice Fortas, to get back to your original question, your question could be phrased to be whether the State Death Acts in a situation in which the Outer Continental Shelf is not involved might still be applied according to my argument. That is the question.

O Correct.

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A Now, I point out first that that is not particularly at issue here but my question — but the answer is, I think, yes. I think that that is the clear intent of the legislators. They discussed that in the legislative history.

They discussed ——

Q Wasn't that of the Death on the High Seas Act?

A No, sir. The Death on the High Seas Act, they discussed the case of the Hamilton and they noted that because here was a Delaware ship involved, the defendant was a Delaware corporation, and I believe that the plaintiffs were citizens of Delaware, that with those facts, that the Delaware law could apply. The law of Delaware would have to be looked to, the Conflicts of Laws Rules of the State of Delaware would have to be looked to and if they gave a remedy in those circumstances the remedy would be available.

Now, it was also pointed out in that debate that the State of Massachusetts had different Conflicts of Law Rules and they discussed one of the men from Massachusetts got up and said in such and such a case there was a collision, but the ship was owned by a Massachusetts corporation but the other ship was not, was owned by a different State and that the rules were hopelessly in conflict and they gave no remedy.

And so, to answer your question iI would think that if a Delaware ship, if the Delaware law had not changed, if a

Delaware ship with a Delaware corporation with a Delaware plaintiff were involved, yes, Delaware could give its citizens a cause of action under its laws for a Death on the High Seas in addition to or supplementary to what would be available to that person under the Death on the High Seas Act.

Q But that would be in a Delaware court, perhaps in diversity of citizenship, would it not?

That would not be as a matter of Federal law?

A That is true.

- Q It would be a matter of additional Delaware law?
- A That is right. I think that that is certainly what these legislators were discussing when they amended this provision so that the provision would read, that the Death on the High Seas Act shall not affect State remedies.
  - Q State remedies.
- A That is precisely what they had in mind and they went through that discussion just exactly as I related it to you.

Now, in the instant cases we really don't have to see whether Louisiana in this day and time would apply its

Conflict of Laws Rules so as to in a given situation allow a cause of action, out there, because the Louisiana law as adopted Federal law is specifically extended to these islands.

But the crucial and important point is that the Death on the High Seas Act does say in plain terms that it is not an

exclusive remedy. That is different than the Jones Act which
doesn't say. The Jones Act -- I am certain the Lindgren and
Gillespie decisions -- the statement of this court was that
Congress in enacting the Jones Act intended to make a uniform
remedy.

However, the Death on the High Seas Act is different from the Jones Act in that the Death on the High Seas Act specifically provides that the remedy is not exclusive.

Now, actually ---

- Q Not exclusive but the legislative history also shows that the intent was to make a uniform remedy?
  - A Uniform basic remedy.
  - Q Yes.

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- A Actually they used the word basic in this discussion.
  - Q Yes.

"I want to be sure I get something." So, all right you have the Death on the High Seas Act but the man from Delaware says, "I don't want you taking away what might be available in addition under my law."

Of course, there is nothing unusual whatsoever in allowing cumulative remedies for the same wrong. Suppose that a man has a chattel or suppose that a man is using someone else's chattel in damages, why the man who has suffered the damage,

if he can come within the terms of the contract he can collect under contract.

If not, he can collect under tort.

But, does the fact that he may have a remedy under contract preclude him from having a remedy under tort?

- Q Does the 'Longshoremen's Act apply here?
- A Not in these cases.
- Q Why?
- A The Longshoremen's Act ---
- Q Doesn't the Continental Shelf Act say specifically -- refer specifically to the Longshoremen's Act?

A Yes, it does. The Longshoremen's Act is strictly an employer/employee act. The Workmen's Compensation Act, in both of these cases are not being employed.

Q What would be the situation if these people had not been killed but only injured?

A Every law available to them except, of course, the Jones Act.

- Q What about the Continental Shelf Act?
- A No, sir, they don't. The Continental Shelf Lands
  Act really doesn't say anything about ---
- Q Well, it says for purposes on these artificial islands the Federal law is the State law.

A Yes. Well, the State law, actually the State law is extended. That is correct.

1	Q	I see. But the Continental Shelf Act says that	
2	a matter, that	as a matter of Federal law, the State law	
3	will apply.		
4	A	The state law will apply; that is correct.	
5	Q	On these artificial islands.	
6	A	The State law will apply, yes. That is correct.	
7	Q	Except where there is some other Federal law	
8	that is applicable?		
9	A	No, it does not say that. It says where there	
10	is conflict.	Now that is the bone, if your Honor please.	
11	Q	Well, all right. Except where there is con-	
12	flicting Federal law?		
13	A	Conflicting; yes, sir.	
14	Q	Are you suggesting that the High Seas Act is not	
15	in conflict with the Louisiana law?		
16	A	Yes. That is it precisely. I am saying that	
7	there is nothin	ng	
18	Q	You mean either one of them applies that would	
19	permit recovery	y, isn't that whether or not in conflict?	
20	A	I didn't hear you, your Honor.	
21	Q	Either any law, you can apply any part of any	
22	law as long as	it allows you recovery?	
23	A	No, I am saying conflicting does not mean, is not	
24	identical.		
25	Ω	Does Louisiana law bar for contributory negligence	

Yes, sir, it does. A Ť Does the High Seas Act? 0 2 A No. Comparative as a rule. 3 Is that not a conflict or not? 0 2 No, sir. 5 You mean you apply the High Seas Act in that 6 respect but you want the recovery for suffering under Louisiana 7 law? 8 A What I am saying, your Honor, is that perhaps 9 and this is the meat of the matter right here. The word 10 conflict does not mean ---11 Different. 12 Different. Exactly. In other words, your Honor, 13 if conflict meant different -- in other words, if the only 14 Louisiana law that could apply out there was law that was 15 exactly and precisely the same as the Federal law that was 16 already in existence out there, what were the legislators doing 27 in saying that the Louisiana law has to be applied out there. 13 They were doing a vain and useless thing. 19 Q You would say that in this death case that if 20 contributory negligence were proven ---21 Yes, sir. A 22

I have lost my cause of action under Louisiana law.

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Q In this case. And you would say that if you

Louisiana law?

A If I can come within the terms of Louisiana law,
I can get the benefit of the Louisiana law. If I can prove
in this case, in a death case, I am contributory negligent, I
cannot bring myself within the terms of the Louisiana law and
thus that cause of action is out.

Yet, and, of course, goes with it my claim for loss of love and affection. Now if I can't come within the terms of Louisiana law I don't get it just as though there were a man with a chattel who were using it, and it was damaged, if the plaintiff can come within the terms of the contract he can have the benefits of the contract even though the remedies might be different, the statute of limitations might be different, he can bring himself within that contract, he can obtain the rights of the contract. If he can't bring himself within it, he can't.

(Whereupon, at 12:00 noon the Court recessed, to reconvene at 12:30 p.m. the same day.)

## AFTERNOON SESSION

(The oral argument in the above-entitled matter resumed at 12:30 p.m.)

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Henderson, you may continue.your argument.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF PHILIP E. HENDERSON, ESQ.

## ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

- Q Mr. Henderson, may I ask before you start?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q Do I understand, are you claiming the right of recovery under both statutes?

A Of course, I am claiming no double recovery. I am saying that I could have a right under either statute just like a seaman has a right under Seaworthiness and the Jones Act.

Q In other words, I take it that on the basic issue of negligence there would have to be a determination of the issue of negligence under both statutes?

## Right?

- A Yes.
- Q And one by the Judge and Admiralty, is that it?
- A It could be, yes.

The Death on the High Seas Act would definitely have to be by the Judge and Admiralty.

- Q And the other would be by a jury?
- A If requested. In other words, if I could bring

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myself within the terms of that law.

Q Now, which comes first, are you concluded that if there is a finding against you on negligence say by the judge of the High Seas Act, does that throw you out of court on the second one, too?

A Yes, it would.

Q Yes.

A In other words, if I can bring myself within the terms of the other I can come and have its benefits. To answer Justice White's argument ---

Q Is that Dore case the Higa case?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q The Higa case, is that what you call the Dore case?

A No, sir. The Dore case is one of the cases at issue here. There are two cases which have come before this Court now in a joint petition.

Q But there was an earlier decision?

A Yes, the Higa case I say is in my favor. Yes, that is true.

Q How do you visualize that case being tried. Are there some issues that will be tried before a Judge Admiralty and other issues before a jury?

A No, I think the whole matter could be tried jointly. If the party wants a jury trial under the Louisiana

federally adopted law it could all be tried with the judge sitting in admiralty. And if the jury finds contributory negligence, why, of course, there is no cause of action under Louisiana law.

There would, of course, be special interrogatories to the jury, with the plaintiff negligent. If they answer yes to that, why then the jury case is out. But if they say yes, why then it would go on to answer quantum and everything is as ordinary as in a jury trial.

But there would be interrogatories to the jury. It would pose no procedural problem. There are cases in which that is done. I tried to summon in my brief a case was tried under both the Death on the High Seas Act and under Japanese law as a matter of fact, as one cited on my brief, District Court case.

Jones Act is not in conflict with or inconsistent with unseaworthiness or damages under the Jones Act for unseaworthiness
are not in conflict with or inconsistent with Maintenson Cure (?)
They are overlapping and supplementary remedies, just as my
analogy in a man that might have a remedy for both contract
and tort.

They are not inconsistent. It is just the rule rather than the exception to have the possibility of two or three.

Q Your action in either case would be for

negligence which is your privilege and is different than between the Jones Act and Seaworthiness. It is a completely different situation. You have a different cause of action.

Here you are claiming that you have to have a cause of action for negligence in Admiralty and you have a cause of action for negligence under the Louisiana law.

Now, would you say that if we decided contrary to your view that under the Continental -- within the meaning of the Continental Shelf Act the Louisiana law is in conflict with Federal law, namely the High Seas Act that you have lost your case?

A No, I would say that as to the issue at issue here, narrow issue here in this case, there is not even a second remedy. There is no Federal remedy, no yea or nay as to loss of love and affection. The Death on the High Seas Act only treats pecuniary. It does not even treat loss of love and affection. It doesn't say yea or nay.

Q I understand that. You are just again arguing that it isn't in conflict.

A Yes.

Yes, if you would say that the two laws are in conflict, yes, your Honor, I have lost.

Q You have lost your case, in spite of the reservation of the High Seas Act?

A No, I would say that then the case which I

mentioned to Justice Fortas that the Louisiana laws would under this Conflict Rules allow recovery here, but yes, there could be recovery here. We couldn't use the Outer Continental Shelf vehicle.

I see I am running out of time and I did want to save time for rebuttal.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: You have five minutes while the white light is on. The red light will come on.

MR. HENDERSON: But I did want to save some time for rebuttal.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Oh, I see. Very well.
You may reserve it.

MR. HENDERSON: Thank you.

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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Diaz.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES E. DIAZ, ESQ.

### ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

MR. DIAZ: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

I am Jim Diaz of Lafayette, Louisiana, representing one of the Respondents in these two consolidated cases. I Represent Link Belt Company and Boat Equipment Company. Messrs. Richard Baldwin seated and Mr. Jim Blazek seated at counsel table with me represent the Respondents in the Boudreaux Rodrigue case, while Rubin Mayronne, a citizen of Louisiana, doing business as Mayronne Drilling Company, its insurer and

Humble Oil Company.

I also feel a sense of responsibility of representing the two Federal District Court judges, Judge Ainsworth as the organ of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in both of these cases whose decisions are here for review and who do not have an opportunity here today of defending their views.

These Louisiana trained ---

- Q Will you tell us why you presented this document to us?
  - A Yes, your Honor.

I prepared my argument here today in a little different perspective than I had argued it in my brief and I wanted to present this to you as a visual aid in following the argument which I am making here today.

It is merely as a visual aid for whatever benefit it may be to you.

- Q Is there anything new in this that isn't in your brief?
- A No, your Honor, it merely is an outline of my argument here today which varies in perspective from the argument I presented in my written brief.
- Q Did you argue in your briefs the Submerged Lands
  Act?
  - A Yes, your Honor.

Now, your Honor, in connection with the Submerged

Lands Act ---

Q It isn't our practice to have documents like this served on us at this time.

A I apologize if I was out of order, your Honor.

I merely meant it as a visual aid as a benefit to the Court.

- Q You did argue the Submerged Lands issue?
- A Yes, your Honor.
- Q Very well, proceed.
- A Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

I may point out at this time, sir, that I use the term Submerged Lands Act because that is the title which the United States Code annotated has on top of Section 1333 which I understood it to be the popular name as the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.

I may be in error on that, Mr. Justice Stewart, and I wish to state here though that my argument here is with reference to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.

- Q When was that enacted?
- A Your Honor, I believe in 1948.
- Q Yes. And the statute which we know of as the Submerged Lands Act was enacted in 1953, if I am not mistaken. However, we are talking about the Outer Continental Shelf?
  - A That is correct.

One of these Louisiana trained judges, they held that on deaths occurring on stationary platforms, that Death on the

High Seas Act is the applicable law, is the Federal dispositive law. That where there is Federal dispositive law the State law cannot apply and is superseded.

And, thirdly, that the State law, the elements of the cause of action provided by the wrongful death action of the State of Louisiana, these elements are inconsistent with the elements of the cause of action provided under the Death on the High Seas Act.

The issue here before us is narrowed down to the question as to whether the Death on the High Seas Act which restricts recovery to pecuniary loss can be supplemented by the law of the adjacent State.

Before proceeding to give a little more detail --
Q Isn't there also a question as to whether it is
exclusive or not?

A Yes, your Honor, that is the correlative issue involved.

I would like to mention in the Rodrigue case, there were two civil actions filed and there was an Admiralty action filed. The two civil actions were dismissed by a motion to dismiss by Judge West and those are the only two decisions which are here before the Court today.

The Admiralty action was tried on the merits and judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff on pecuniary loss and that action is not before the Court here today.

Now the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Boudreaux Rodrigue case as it affirmed the Dore cases. These two cases have in common the fact that both occurred on the Outer Continental Shelf more than a marine league from shore and the actions of both against third parties, nonemployers.

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The plaintiff's attorney has attempted to use two avenues by which to incorporate the State law. Those two avenues are the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and the Death on the High Seas Act.

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act provides as set forth on page 7 and 8 of our brief: In Division (a)(1) that the laws applicable to these artificial islands are the Federal Constitution and the Federal law.

It then provides that to the extent that the State law is applicable and to the extent that the State law is not inconsistent, then, these State laws may be applied.

And it also provides that the Executive Department of the United States is to define by extending theoretical boundaries into the ocean what adjacent laws are to be applied.

To my knowledge the Executive Department has not projected these State boundaries out into the ocean and out into the Gulf of Mexico.

Insofar as the Submerged Lands Act which unquestionably applies here, the Plaintiff's attorney in order to have the State law adopted as a Federal law, must meet these three requirements. The first requirement is, does the State law apply.

One of the first things I learned in Constitution law is that where there is Federal legislation in a field that the Federal legislature is competent to legislate upon, it supersedes those State laws which have been previously incorporated by Federal law in order to provide a remedy.

This court in limiting, in the Lindgren case and also in the Gillespie versus the United States Steel Corporation case in which Justice Black was the organ of the Court, there reiterated the precedent that where the Federal legislature has pre-empted the field previously occupied by State law and can competently do so, than the State law is superseded.

Now the Lindgren case is very apropos to this case.

Because in that case a seaman was killed as a result of an accident which occurred in Virginia waters and he was survived only by a niece and a nephew who were not dependent upon the seaman.

The plaintiff's attorney stated that he had the right to recover for general damages under the Virginia Wrongful Death Act as a supplementary law to the Jones Act which is exactly what is being argued here.

And the Lindgren decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the Jones Act had been legislated in order to provide this field of law previously covered by State law.

And, therefore, that the Jones Act superseded the Wrongful Death Act even to the extent of ruling out general damages.

Thirty-four years later this Court in the Gillespie case again affirmed the Lindgren decision.

But separate and apart from the general field of
Federal pre-emption is the question that there are three decisions by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which are the
Loffland Brothers versus Roberts, Ocean Drilling and Exploration
Company versus Berry Brothers and Pure Oil Company versus Snipes
cited on page 9 of our brief in which the Fifth Circuit has held
and this court has approved since writs of certiorari were
denied in each one of these cases has held that on the Outer
Continental Shelf under Section (a)(1) of Title 1333, it is a
Federal Maritime law that is to apply to personal injury
litigation and that the State law has no application whatsoever.

So that a personal injury litigation, insofar as the stationary platforms, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act as adopting Federal Maritime law governs.

There, this State law applied. The State law does not apply because it has been superseded by the Federal Death on the High Seas Act.

Even if this court were to hold that State law is to apply.

The second requirement written into the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act is that the State law, before it could be adopted has to be consistent with Federal laws then existing.

Now, I have set forth in this visual aid as I did in my memorandum, as to a comparison of the various elements of the causes of action provided under Louisiana law and under the Death on the High Seas Act.

The beneficiaries are different. The damages are different.

Now, the Plaintiff's attorney says that there is a hiatus in this particular field of law because no general advantages are provided by the Death on the High Seas Act. I submit to you that the Legislature in 1920, that the Legislature that enacted the Death on the High Seas Act specifically contemplated the granting of general damages.

Judge Putnam, Chief Judge Putnam of New York, author of the bill, provided in his original letter to Congress that the damages were for fair and just compensation. In 1914 the Legislative Judicial Committee modified and qualified that language by saying that it was restricted to pecuniary loss and this concept of restricting damages to pecuniary loss is not only applicable in the Death on the High Seas Act but in the companion case of the Jones Act which was enacted by the same Legislature in 1920.

I, therefore, submit to you, that the Death on the High Seas Act does not provide an incomplete remedy for damages, it provides for the complete remedy as intended by the

Legislature, so that there is no hiatus.

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Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act for the adoption of State
law, first its application of State law and secondly the fact
that the State law could not be inconsistent, have not been
complied with in this case, and, therefore, the State law has no
application whatsoever.

Q What do you do with the savings clause in the Death of the High Seas Act?

A Yes, your Honor, I am coming to that.

That is the second avenue that the Plaintiff's attorney has sought to use the wrongful death action of Louisiana. The Death on the High Seas Act legislative history shows that they intended, at least Judge Putnam did, intended for the Death on the High Seas Act to be the exclusive remedy.

Then, Mr. Mann of Illinois, in 1920, made an amendment because he was concerned with this. He says, "What about an Illinois constituent in Illinois. Does he have to go to New York to a Federal District Court to assert her remedy?".

He says, "I want to preserve to the State courts their jurisdiction under their own laws, for my own constituents to proceed under a State law."

I think that the legislative history and the arguments that were presented by the legislature in pages 20 through 23 of our brief, your Honors, show that their intention was not

to give concurrent jurisdiction, not to give concurrent remedies, but to give alternate remedies. They wanted to preserve to suers their right to proceed in State court under a State court remedy.

Q Which came first, the Death on the High Seas Act or the Continental Shelf Act?

A The Death on the High Seas was in 1920, your Honor, and the Submerged Lands Act was ---

Q Well, under the High Seas Act and before the

Continental Shelf Act there was limited applicability of State

law, wasn't there? With the coming of the Continental Shelf

Act certainly that Act said Federal law should apply on the

High Seas, or on these islands, artificial islands, right?

A That is correct.

- Q No State law, no State law as State law.
- A That is correct.
- Q Only State law as Federal law.
- A Only State law as adopted by the Federal law.
- Q So the State law was put aside and that Act said that if there is a Federal Act that is in conflict with State law, why it will be the Federal statute that will apply?
  - A That is correct.
- Q Are you arguing that the savings clause then in the High Seas Act is in effect repealed or set aside by the Continental Shelf Act insofar as these artificial islands are

concerned? That is the effect of your argument, isn't it?

A That is correct; that is why I say that you need not decide whether the Death on the High Seas Act is the exclusive remedy because the specific legislational point is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.

So that even if the State law could be supplemented, which we deny, but even assuming it could be supplemented under the Death on the High Seas Act, the specific act in question, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act would not permit it because the State law would inconsistent with the applicable Federal law.

Q Would you mind repeating to me precisely what you believe to be the remedy of people bringing suits like this for death at this place?

A The idea, your Honor, is that the survivors of a decedent have a right to proceed in a Federal form under Federal law.

- Q Complete.
- A Complete.
- Q No state law at all.

A No state law at all, your Honor: That is correct.

Now, I believe that is the case on the Outer Continental Shelf.

Q What about the Louisiana law which permits suits against insurance companies?

A In a direct action statute?

. O Yes.

A Your Honor, I don't believe the direct action statute first of all is at issue here but to answer your question ---

Q Well, it is involved in it because some things we could hold would affect it.

A That is correct, your Honor. Of course, I believe that the direct action statute is inimical to maritime law, inimical to the limitation of liability concept and should not be applied in maritime cases at all. And these cases ---

- Q Well, it does, doesn't it?
- A Your Honor?
- Q It does, doesn't it in some maritime instances?

  It has not been?

A It has been applied, your Honor. What I am saying here is that it should not be applied.

- Q Well, has it been applied?
- A Yes.

Q Well, why should that be taken away from them?

What reason is there to take that law away from them? A person to have a suit in Louisiana, simply because they live in Louisiana, why should they not get the advantage of a suit like that which might permit them to recover something, that without it they could never recover a penny?

A Your Honor, the only way I can answer that is

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this: I was trained as a lawyer in law school in practice to confine myself within the legislative provisions and I am saying that the legislative provisions here are clear. That the only remedy for deaths occurring under the intent of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the only remedy is under the Death on the High Seas Act exclusive of State law.

Q But you have to depend on both Acts for that, the High Seas Act and the -- what do you call it -- the Submerged Land Act?

- A Yes, sir, the Outer Continental Shelf.
- O The Outer Continental Shelf?
- A Yes, sir.

Q You have to go to both of them for that?

A You have to go to the fact which is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and the parent adopts the Death on the High Seas Act. What I am saying is, you could not then incorporate under the Death on the High Seas Act the State law which you could not do under the adopted provision of the Outer Continental Shelf.

You cannot do indirectly what you cannot do directly because the parent act is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and you have to look at that primarily.

If you cannot incorporate State law under that Act
you certainly cannot incorporate it under the Death on the High
Seas Act which in itself is incorporated in the Outer

Continental Shelf Lands Act.

Q Do you think a suit can be filed in the State court?

A Your Honor, I believe that the intention of Mr. Mann and Mr. Sanders who were part of the Legislature in 1920 was to allow suitors their ability to sue in the State form with State laws wherever State laws had been held to be competent, as in the Hamilton.

I think a very strong argument against ---

Q Just exactly what would be the consequences?

A As I see the consequences, your Honor, the survivors of the decedent would have an alternate or elective course. They could either go into Federal form, with Federal laws, substantive laws or they could go into a State form with State laws at their election.

Q You mean the same person would have two kinds of injuries depending on whether he went into the State court or the Federal court?

A I am of the opinion that the Death on the High Seas Act should be given as exclusive remedy, but if we are to give any effect to Section 7 of the Death on the High Seas Act, let us apply as Mr. Mann intended to preserve to his constituent, his right to go into a State court with a State court remedy.

Q Yes, but Mr. Mann wasn't dealing -- he wasn't

also dealing with the Continental Shelf Act. He was dealing only with Section 7 of the Act he was promoting, and the Continental Shelf Act says expressly and plainly that the laws and Constitutions of the United States shall govern these artificial islands.

A That is correct, your Honor.

Q And I thought your argument was but I am not sure now, that the Continental Shelf Act made the Federal law the exclusive source of cause of action for injury on those islands.

A Where there is dispositive Federal law covering the subject matter.

Q No. It is Federal law all the way. They may borrow some State law but it is still Federal law.

A I see what you mean. Yes.

On the analysis that Justice White has just suggested the Court of Appeals held to answer Mr. Justice Black's question, the only remedy is the Federal remedy, the Death on the High Seas Act. There is no State remedy under Section 7 or otherwise of the High Seas Act. The only remedy is the Federal remedy.

Isn't that what the Court of Appeals held?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q I am surprised to hear you suggest that nevertheless there may be a State remedy if the proceeding is brought into a State court.

A I am sorry, your Honor, I didn't mean ---

Q Oh, I thought that is what you answered Mr. Justice Black.

A I had understood his question as to the interpretation of Section 7 as to Death on the High Seas Act outside of the contents of the Outer Continental Shelf and

O Oh.

My -- my position is that the application of State law in this insofar as injuries occurring on a stationary platform that the application of State law is inimical to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and, therefore, could not be applied.

Q Well, there just isn't any recovery under State law.

A That is correct.

Q Now that there is a Federal statute, the Death on the High Seas Act.

A Yes.

Q May I direct your attention a bit more specifically to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Section

1331(a)(2). Now, merely reading that, I suppose it is at least arguable that after the enactment of that provision, Federal law applicable to a tort or committed on one of these artificial islands on the Outer Continental Shelf, the Federal law would include not only the Death on the High Seas Act but also such

legislation in the State of Louisiana relating to this tort as is not inconsistent with the Death on the High Seas Act.

Isn't that right?

- A That is correct.
- Q And so you get down to the question of whether the Louisiana law as in question here, that is to say, Louisiana law providing for recovery in the case of wrongful death, not only for pecuniary loss but also for loss of affection, consortium or whatever it may be, whether those Louisiana laws are inconsistent with the Death on the High Seas Act, is that right?
  - A Yes, your Honor.
- Q And that I take it is the issue before us, because if we find if we should conclude that the Louisiana tort law in respect that I stated is not inconsistent with the Death on the High Seas Act, then by virtue of 1331(a)(2), that Louisiana law is incorporated into the Federal law and becomes a Federal law available to these petitioners.

Is that right?

A Mr. Justice Fortas, I agree with you in part.

But I think that Section (a) (2) has two conditions preceding.

One is that there is no Federal dispositive law on the subject matter, and secondly, that if there is no Federal dispositive law, the State law may be used provided it is not inconsistent with other Federal laws.

Q Well, that is your argument in this, that is your submission and your adversary says the opposite, 1331(a)(2) does not specifically refer to those two pre-conditions as you would have us construe them to be?

A Yes. That is correct, your Honor, and I am saying that the Fifth Circuit also held that on the basis of the Berry Brothers and the Pure Oil versus Snipes.

That there were two conditions preceding the death.

As an alternative argument, your Honors, my principal position is that the State law cannot be applied whatsoever under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. But as an alternate argument, if the Death on the High Seas Act does allow a supplemental remedy, I submit to you that the case cited by opposing counsel, Higa versus Trans-Ocean which he says is in his favor supports our proposition because in Higa the Court held, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held, as affirmed by this Court in a writ of certiorari that the State law may be applied only where its wrongful Death Act provisions give it extraterritorial effect.

If that is the case, and that is the case we follow here, I submit to your Honors, that there has been no showing nor can there be any that the Louisiana Wrongful Death Act does not have extraterritorial effect.

Opposing counsel has cited E. B. Ward, Jr. Let me say this to you in connection with that.

The E. B. Ward, Jr. does not hold that Louisiana Wrongful Death Act has extraterritorial effect. It held at the time of the Death on the High Seas Act was not in effect, that because of the fact that the ship, the E. B. WARD was a Louisiana ship, it was Louisiana territory so that it could be governed by the laws of the State of Louisiana.

In conclusion, your Honors, I respectfully request that the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals be affirmed because the controlling statute is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. That there are patent inconsistencies in the State law and in the Federal law.

As to beneficiaries, statute of limitations, contribution among joint tort fees and as was held by this Court in the Tungus, you have to take the State law in its entirety and not just those parts of it which benefit you.

So if we are going to take this cause of action provided under Article 2315, each and every one of those elements is inconsistent and contradictory to the elements of the cause of action provided by the Death on the High Seas Act.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Henderson.

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF PHILIP E. HENDERSON, ESQ.

## ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS

MR. HENDERSON: May it please the Court, I will take the discussion of the Higa case first.

In the Higa case, Mr. Higa died on an airplane enroute

to California to Hawaii. He died when the plane crashed in the middle of the ocean. His dependents, survivors filed suit under Death on the High Seas Act and also claimed a civil action as we are here.

The Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Higa case first said, "We are looking to see whether the Conflicts of Laws Rules of Hawaii apply."

And it says, they took special note that the airplane was owned by a California company.

Said "No."

They then said, "There is no statute that would apply the Hawaii Death Act to this area and there is no decisional law that would apply under Conflicts of Laws Rules, the Hawaii Death Act to this death.

Now, in our case we have both. We have a statute.

We have the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and we also have our Death on the High Seas Act.

Snipes in Loffland Brothers cited as Fifth Circuit holdings did not hold that Federal law is an exclusive remedy. They only held that State law was not exclusive remedy.

In both of those cases the defendant said, "The man's action must be dismissed under State law because he was contributory negligent in one case and the State Statute of Limitation had run in the other."

The Court said, "No, that is not true, that the State

remedy is not his exclusive remedy; he does have a Federal remedy."

What other factors would you suggest, Mr.

Henderson, would it take in order to make these two conflicting

-- you have quite a number of things here -- statute of

limitation, different parties, and theamount and everything

else. Now, what other factors would it take in order to make

those conflict at a minimum?

A I think that the word conflict, the approach is wrong in trying to see where they are not identical. I don't think that the word 'consistent' meant not identical. Otherwise nothing could have been extended by that Act.

I think conflict means opposed to one another. For instance, if the Federal rule was that the minerals extracted from these artificial islands are the property of the Federal Government and the State law said that the minerals extracted are the property of private citizens, they are in conflict.

So, obviously, the State statute would have to give way, but as to a tort action or death action, why these are cumulative supplementary remedies. Cumulative remedies for the same incident is the rule rather than the exception in law, as my example where a man may have a right of contract or quasi contract or tort for the same incident.

They arenot in conflict with one another.

Q Sir, I know your time is up, but I want to

follow the Chief Justice's question to you by this question.

A Yes, sir.

Q Please assume with me for the moment that the Death on the High Seas Act provided a remedy for all of these factors, that is to say, not only for loss, pecuniary loss, direct pecuniary loss but also for loss of consortium, love, affection and whatnot, just as the Louisiana law does.

Please make that assumption.

But let us suppose that the Louisiana law fixed a higher limit on the aggregate recovery. Now, would you say that the Louisiana law was still available to you or in those circumstances would you agree that the Federal law and that the Death on the High Seas Act and the Louisiana State law are inconsistent within the meaning of the Continental Shelf Act?

A I would say there is no inconsistency. I would say that the Louisiana Act would still be available if I could bring myself ---

Q Why?

A --- within its terms.

Q Now how would you explain that?

A I think -- I say that the rule of law is that it does not follow that if there is one avenue by which a destination can be reached, that there can be no other avenue. I say that for a man whose chattel is damaged, if he has an avenue to get recovery under tort that does not mean he cannot

get in under contract and get something better.

Q Well, let me ask you this. Suppose the Death on the High Seas Act said expressly there shall be no recovery for any damages whatsoever of any kind or nature as the result of wrongful death and let us suppose the Louisiana statute did provide a remedy.

Would you say that those two are inconsistent?

A If they are diametrically opposed. If one says that it is the policy of the United States that you can't do this, then you can't do it. The State law must give way; yes, sir.

Q Well, wouldn't that be true of contributory negligence, between the two laws?

A No, I don't think that there is a diametric opposition. It is just one route to recovery. There can be another route to recovery if you can bring yourself to terms.

Q How about the Statute of Limitations?

A The two laws are not identical. There are many differences.

Q Well, I know. But let us assume there is a suit brought and it is beyond the two years ---

A Beyond the two years. All right. Actually, as a matter of fact the Louisiana Act has a one-year statute but if we assume that the Louisiana has a three-year statute, then if the person can bring himself within the terms of the

Louisiana Act as adopted Federal law he can have a recovery.

In other words, if he brings it within three years he can do

it. In the instant case if a man brings his suit within one

year and if he is not contributory negligent then he is entitled

to his Louisiana recovery.

If he can't come within the terms of the statute, if he is contributory negligent as I say, he cannot have his recovery under Louisiana Law. He just can't bring himself within the terms of that Act, just like within the terms of a contract situation. He can't come within the terms of the contract.

Q Your approach is destroying the Continental Shelf Act, word by word, line by line conflict?

A No, sir, the only real, the only question is the word inconsistent. If inconsistent with means opposed, why then that is one thing. If it means not identical, why then, of course, that is another thing, but I say that the word inconsistent cannot mean identical or there could be no law whatsoever extended out there.

Q Why can't you say that inconsistent means this much -- that if you would get different results under the two regimes there is ---

A Because, then the Legislature was wasting its breath and ink in extending the law and saying that the Louisiana law shall be extended out there, because it has got

to have a different result or what is the good of extending it out there. If it has no different result in extending the Louisiana law out there, then why in the world extend it out there?

The Legislature had to mean something in saying that law is extended.

Q Because there was a lot of causes of action which weren't covered by a Federal law.

A Yes, but then you would have a different result by the Louisiana law that is out there. It would be not identical with the Federal law that is out there. You would have a different result.

I say the cumulative remedy or the ruling law rather than a single avenue at recovery.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m. the oral argument in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)