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# Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

Office-Supreme Court, U.S. FILED JAN 23 1969

JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

Docket No.

376

In the Matter of:

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DUNBAR-STANLEY STUDIES, INC.	00
Appellant,	00 00
v.	00 00
STATE OF ALABAMA	00 00
Appellee.	** **

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Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

January 16, 1969

# ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

300 Seventh Street, S. W.

Washington, D. C.

NA 8-2345

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#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1968

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Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc.

Appellant, :

v. : No. 376

State of Alabama

Appellee.

Washington, D. C.
Thursday, January 16, 1969

The above-entitled matter came on for argument at

10:10 a.m.

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#### BEFORE:

EARL WARREN, Chief Justice
HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice
JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice
POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice
BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice
ABE FORTAS, Associate Justice
THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice

#### APPEARANCES:

J. EDWARD THORNTON, Esq.
P.O. Box 23
Mobile, Alabama 36601
Counsel for Appellant

WILLIAM H. BURTON, Esq.
Assistant Counsel, Department of Revenue, and Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for the Appellee

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## PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: Counsel are present.

A.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: No. 376, Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc., Appellant, versus Alabama.

Mr. Thornton, you may proceed.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF J. EDWARD THORNTON, ESQ.

#### ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT

MR. THORNTON: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court.

In the beginning the city of Mobile decided to exclude the taxpayer from its business of selling 59 cent baby pictures in Mobile by imposing a license that was applied exclusively to the taxpayer in the amount of \$50 a day.

about three years operating in eight cities advertising its existence, but it was not until after this proceeding began that the State of Alabama discovered the taxpayer and assessed a transient photographer's license on the taxpayer, not only for the current year but for as many years back as they could go.

This assessment was made in the State Department of
Revenue and we appeared in protest of that assessment making
substantially the same arguments that we are making in this
court today but unsuccessfully.

We appealed to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County where we made substantially the same arguments that we are

making here today and unsuccessfully. We then appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama making substantially the same argument and again unsuccessfully.

In fact, this sort of gets to a man's ego ultimately. So we are here today on this case where the facts are substantially these: ---

Q May I ask you please, what court did you say you filed the suit in?

A The assessment was made against us by the State Department of Revenue.

Q You mean in Montgomery?

A That is correct.

We appealed then from that assessment to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County and from there to the Supreme Court of Alabama.

The facts are that the taxpayer has been engaged in business of taking baby pictures for some while and it has a good many experts who are very good at posing children and has done quite well at it.

They have agreed with the J. C. Penney Company to conduct their operations in and through the J. C. Penney stores.

The operation is that the local manager of the Penney stores decides when they would like to have the photographer from taxpayer.

The advertising, direct mail and other advertising is

furnished to Penney by taxpayer and then the photographer goes in at the given time, has sittings, poses the children, exposes the film, sends the exposed film back to the offices of taxpayer which are in Charlotte, North Carolina, and then moves on. That is, the photographer moves on.

The exposed film is developed in North Carolina. The pictures are printed and finished and then forwarded back to the J. C. Penney store, the local store where they are delivered to the customer.

Now had the State of Alabama imposed a license on all of these operations; that is, had the State of Alabama imposed a license on all non-resident photographers coming into the state and holding themselves out as photographers, having sittings, posing children, exposing film and then forwarding the film out of state to be developed, printed and finished, and then the finished product to be returned to the State of Alabama, had Alabama had a license in those words, I take it even the Attorney General of Alabama and even the Supreme Court of Alabama would not have contended that that would meet an attack under the Commerce Clause.

at a time -- for example, instead of saying all non-resident photographers, suppose the legislature had said all photographers who hold themselves out as photographers, take sittings and such.

I take it that the Attorney General would not claim that such a

license could be imposed on this taxpayer, and on down to the present place where the present license in Alabama which says on transient photographers a license of X dollars.

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Q Why wouldn't he be here, I wonder, if it applied equally to residence as well as non-residence?

A The operation that they would be engaged in is one that is clearly an interstate activity. We start with a non-resident photographer. We expose the film in Alabama. We send the film out.

Now if the license included all of those things, this would clearly be attempting or an attempt on the part of the state to license that which it can't license.

We have the right to do this under the Federal Constitution. The State of Alabama doesn't give us that right.

Q But I understood you to say that if they had imposed this tax on all itinerant photographers, whether they were in or out of the state, that the Attorney General would not be here to defend them.

A I doubt very seriously if he would.

Q Well, now, just what is the defect in that, if they treat all of that class of photographers alike in a non-discriminatory way?

A This would be an effort to attempt to use a license which would be a license, a non-discriminatory license, on photographers. All photographers shall pay a license. But

the application of that license, albeit, a non-discriminatory license, on this interstate activity would in our judgment run afoul of the Commerce Clause.

And the State of Alabama has not made that contention.

What they have contended is this: They say, "Take this series of events beginning with the non-resident photographer, exposing film in the state, sending it back to North Carolina for developing and then sending the picture back," they don't claim the right to tax all of those activities; that is, both the in-state activities and the out-of-state activities.

They don't claim that.

A

They say, "But what we can do is," and this is why we are here today, they say, "We can take this series of events and chop them up in pieces and we can catch the local activities and we can license them." And this is why we are here today, because we say they cannot do that.

You see, this is a unitary transaction.

Q Yes, I understand that. But I am just trying to get straightened out.

Suppose that instead of sending these pictures to

North Carolina, they sent them from Montgomery to Mobile and at

the same kind of an operation. Would there be anything wrong

with that tax?

A Well, if the operation was entirely in Alabama, that is, if this was not a non-resident photographer -- of

course, this takes one of the issues, that is to say, the developing of the film and keeps that in the State. If that would do, that would give them a little more local activity to in effect hang their hat on.

Q Would that be all right?

14.

A I would not say so. I would say that if they applied that to a non-resident photographer who is traveling about over the country ---

Q No, we are talking about the state. They take the pictures in Montgomery and they process them in Mobile. Do you think there would be anything wrong with this tax as applied to that situation?

A On the statement that you have made, the answer is no, I see no objection to it.

Q No objection to it.

Now, do they apply -- does the State apply this tax to that class of photographers?

A I cannot answer that. I do not know. I do not know of any one so operating.

Q I see. The record doesn't show that?

A No, sir.

Q I see.

A And I do not know of any other photographers operating as we operate. I do know of one other, Olan Mills operates as we do with certain variations. They are in

Chattanooga, Tennessee, is where their headquarters are. Our headquarters are in Charlotte, North Carolina.

- Q Do you mean there are no photographers in Mobile that specializes in taking baby pictures?
  - A No, I can't say that.

Q Well, they are taxed, too, aren't they? Aren't local photographers taxed but taxed differently?

A Yes. Well, a local photographer that has an office there and operates at a fixed location is the magic word in Alabama.

If a photographer is at a fixed location in Alabama, does pay a license, yes.

Q But your point is that the transient is charged more and your second point is that because he is a transient, he can't be charged at all?

A That is correct.

The reason the transient -- we say that the transient shouldn't be charged at all is because of what the State is attempting to do. They are attempting to take what we conceive to be this unitary transaction and split it up in parts and apply the tax to that part.

Now with reference to photographers in the State, you see, the license on a photography shop at a fixed location is a certain amount. In this case, by reason of the fact that the film goes outside the State -- well, I will repeat this or make

this statement this way: Our photography operation is at a fixed location, if it is a J. C. Penney store. So we are at a fixed location.

Now a prior case in Alabama involving Olan Mills — they had what they called branch operations which was operations at a specific branch in Alabama and they insisted that they had a right to not to be taxed as a transient because that license is \$5 a week.

The license at a fixed location is \$25 a year. And so Olan Mills said "You can't charge us a transient license because we are doing business at a fixed location." The Supreme Court of Alabama said as appears in a quotation in our brief on page 27, the statement that by sending the exposed film outside the state, this made the operation a transient operation. And, therefore, the transient license would apply even though the film was exposed at a fixed location.

And we say this is where the discriminatory nature of this tax makes it difficult. But, of course, we are really attacking on the more fundamental ground, which is the right of the State to take a unitary transaction, split it up into parts and license part of it. And this is the attack which we are making.

Q Excuse me, sir. But your attack is solely the Commerce Clause, isn't it?

A That is correct.

Q In other words, you are not attacking this is a discriminatory tax on any other ground other than the Commerce Clause?

A That is right.

We say that as applied here, the assessment that was made against us for operations in Birmingham, had we been — had we taken out a license at a fixed location in Birmingham, for the 2-1/2 years involved in this case, the license would have been \$62.50.

As a matter of fact, by reason of charging us \$5 a week for operations at Birmingham, it turned out to be \$110.

Now we say this makes it discriminatory and discriminatory against it because of inter-state activity.

Q Suppose the tax were exactly the same as the tax on photographers who have a fixed location?

A Well, then we would be relegated to our first point which is, that a unitary transaction of this kind cannot be broken up into parts to license part of an inter-state activity.

Q Do we have two questions before us?

If we should decide that this is not a violation of the Commerce Clause because of an improper regulation of Interstate Commerce or an improper burden on the Interstate Commerce, then if we should decide that, then are you suggesting that we must go on and decide whether this discrimination standing alone

makes the tax unconstitutional?

No.

A No, sir.

Q That is a State question, is that what you are saying?

A Largely.

We are anxious to have the Court hold that this unitary transaction as I so described it, that the effort on the part of the State to break that into parts and license the local part of it, this should destroy this tax.

And if the Court comes to that conclusion, my case is through.

I threw the other two in here because I didn't come up here for an academic session. I came here to win a lawsuit.

And if I lose it on that ground, I want the Court to know that this case may well also fall afoul — in fact, I think it does fall afoul of the Opelika case which is the flat license, the flat ungraduated license theory which when applied as an admission to Interstate activity is bad. We say that is No. 2.

But, of course, we concede that if we win only on that point, the State can beat us because they will then graduate the license.

So, with No. 3, if we win only on the ground as applied to this case, it was discriminatory because of the Interstate activity, and that if instead of our sending the exposed film out of the State, we kept the exposed film in the

State, they will get us again there.

28.

So, the last two points will arise, we hope, only if Point No. 1 is not reached. But we think Point No. 1 should be reached and we think this completes the case.

We have the photography cases set out on pages 15 and 16 of our brief. This isn't the first time that a State has tried this -- I don't mean to say tried this sort of thing in a derogatory sense -- but I mean this isn't the first effort that a State has made to tax such activities there.

And interestingly enough, Alabama, was one of the culprits there, too, Dozier against Alabama, and there was one against North Carolina.

There the local activity which the State sought to impose the license on had to do with frames. One of them was said that if anyone who sells a frame in the State where the picture was developed somewhere else, if you sell a frame, picture frame in there, this is subject to a license.

This court held in the North Carolina case that this is what I suggest is the case here. This was a splitting up of a unitary transaction into its parts in an effort to impose a license on one of those parts which could not stand. The Alabama case, Dozier against Alabama is the same case.

Now, of course, the Drummer cases, this is the Drummer cases with this difference: In the Drummer cases, the States have sought to license the solicitation of orders in the State

out of this series of events. This court has unanimously insofar as I recall held that you cannot split them up into solicitation and put the tax on them where there is this interstate activity throughout.

Q It seems to me that the complicating factor here is that this could be regarded as the J. C. Penney operation.

J. C. Penney rounds up the children and does the selling and delivers the photographs after they are made as I recall the facts here.

A That is correct.

Q And in that sense it is different from the typical Drummer case?

A That is true.

And then you have these out-of-state photographers who come in and expose the film and send the film out of state to be developed, and then the photographs are sent back to J. C. Penney so you have a situation here that is a little complicated in the intermingling of intra and inter-state aspects, a little more of a mingle than some of the others on our books.

A That is true.

Of course, response No. 1, this case doesn't involve

J. C. Penney as the court is aware. The assessment was made

against us. And in the appendix it is pretty clear that the

State was very anxious to see to it that no agency was developed

between Penney and taxpayer.

This is true. There isn't any agency. But this is a slightly different case than the Drummer case as you say where there -- he has no ---

Q The tax is not imposed on J. C. Penney but the facts inevitably and inescapably involve J. C. Penney.

A Well, maybe your Honor recalls the city case which is before this court and we went off on that point there. We don't think we should have gone off on it. But nevertheless, there they insisted that my suit for declaratory judgment to hold up this \$50 a day license which, of course, this is destructive — I mean if this stands, we are gone. We can't sell enough 59 cent baby pictures to make that kind of license.

But there, after we got to court, they met us by saying, "Well, you are the wrong person."

And we said, "No, we are the ones you tried to put in jail. We are the ones that are interested. We are the ones that is going to pay it."

This is not a J. C. Penney. It is not quite like a leased section of a department store where there you know the department store will get an overall catch-all license and then they will lease out various parts of the department store.

We are not quite that. We come and go. We come and go at Penney's.

- Q You are not quite, but somewhat?
- A Somewhat, yes, that is true. But I would like to

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emphasize one thing. We deliberately do business this way.

That is to say, we want a local business where a disgruntled customer or anyone like that has someone to go to. We are not unaware of the fact that there has been criticism of transient photographers just as there has been criticism of transient operators of any kind where a man spends his money and he can't protect himself.

So we are very proud of our product. We think we have a very good baby picture. But we want the customer to know that he has someone with this sort of reputation that J. C. Penney has, that he can come to see about us and we deliberately encourage that because we think that is good.

- O Does your case rest particularly on the fact or or your claim rest particularly on the fact that they cannot license you to do business. Suppose they were simply taxing, imposing a tax on the part of the activity done in Alabama, would your argument be the same or are you claiming that here they are actually licensing Interstate Commerce by putting the tax on the whole thing?
  - A Well, yes, sir.
- Q When there is only one part of it taxable in Alabama?
- A Well, we say the one part is not taxable. But that is correct. We are saying that the licensing of us to expose film ---

Q What about a railroad that does Interstate 9 2 business and they can tax the track in the state and other parts? Well, of course, an Ad velorem tax I -- that 3 A would be something else. Gross receipts tax, I am not sure 1 about those. Certainly net income tax, I am not sure about 5 those. But here it is a license and it is a license on the 6 doing of this kind of business. 7 In the Interstate business, that is your claim? 8 That is correct. A 9 And putting up a bar to their doing an Inter-0 10 state business unless they pay a tax? 91 A That is correct. 12 Or part of that business in Alabama? 0 13 That is correct. A 84 Which would bar you? 0 15 A That is correct. 16 Did I understand you to say that you are not 0 17 making an equal protection clause argument at all? 18 That is correct, we are not. 19 So you don't rely on the distinction between 20 itinerant photographers and fixed location photographers? A No, except insofar ---22 I understand. You are saying it is discriminatory 0 23 24

--- as applied in this case.

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The only discriminatory feature we are raising is the discriminatory application in this case.

Q But you don't say that it is discriminatory against itinerant photographers except that it discriminates against those who are in Interstate Commerce?

A Well, it discriminates against those who send exposed film in the state out of the state. Yes, sir, but that is the only part but the objection is the Commerce Clause. You see, this is discriminatory against Interstate Commerce; insofar as I know that has never been recognized.

Q Why aren't you making an equal protection? You didn't raise that in the court below at all?

A No, but we are interested in the Commerce Clause.

This is the point under which we developed the case and the discriminatory aspect of it is by reason of the Commerce Clause.

Q But let us assume, did you say that the Clause, that the law does not discriminate against itinerant photographers? Let us assume there is an itinerant photographer who is solely based in Alabama. Assume you were.

Would you say that you had a valid equal protection argument against this tax because it taxes fixed location photographers less than it taxes itinerant photographers?

A No. I would not. I say that Alabama can make a difference between itinerant and fixed location photographers. We raise no point on that.

Q Well, then, why would you say that -- aren't you really then crowded back to your very first point? That that is really a license on Interstate Commerce because it isn't discriminatory without reason anyway, is it?

A Well, this is, of course, the point we want most of all. But if I may, on page 27 in the brief, the reason they held, the Supreme Court of Alabama held, the reason they held that we were subject to a transient or an itinerant license was because it says this, "True, in the branch operation," — this had to do with Olan Mills case, page 27 — "there is a fixed location. But it sends its films back to Chattanooga to be processed and the pictures are ultimately made in Chattanooga."

Now on this basis, you see, it was because this

Interstate activity that the transient \$5 a week license is

imposed rather than the \$25 a year license. Now we say this is
a direct discrimination against Interstate activity.

Now as to the equal protection clause, as to the state making a difference between itinerant photographers and the resident photographers, we make no point on that.

Have I made myself reasonably clear?

I will reserve the remaining time for rebuttal.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Burton?

ORAL ARGUMENT OF WILLIAM H. BURTON, ESQ.

#### ON BEHALF OF APPELLEE

MR. BURTON: Gentlemen, in the first instance here,

and the city of Mobile of entering into some kind of evil conspiracy to put this company out of business.

But actually, the tax levied by the State has nothing whatsoever to do with the tax levied by the city. They are two separate and distinct entities and there is no evidence in the record that there was any kind of collusion or conspiracy here between the State and the city.

If it is any feel where there is a confusion, and it is in this field of Interstate Commerce and as I read the cases, if there is one universal principle that applies to all cases, it is that each case stands on its own shoes or on its own facts.

Now in this particular case, not in this case but in similar cases where the State has assessed this license tax against photographers operating for Olan Mills, the Supreme Court of Alabama on not one but on three occasions has held that this tax is directed at the photographer and the individual photographer.

That is, the person who comes in and takes the picture.

And we disagree with counsel for the appellant that the court has said it is wrong sending the film out of the State. If that were true, I wouldn't be here arguing the case. But what the Supreme Court of Alabama has held in defining the characteristics of this tax and its authoritative meaning is that it is directed at the individual photographer and on his activities

in the State more or less of conducting the sitting and taking the picture.

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If you read the license, it says -- actually this license is levied under Title 51. That is a Revenue Code of the State, Section 569.

Now the first part of the statute relates to fixed locations or photograph galleries. Then there is a last sentence there which levies a separate and distinct license on transient or travelling photographers.

Actually, it reads as follows: "For each transient or travelling photographer, \$5 a week."

Now in the case of Graves versus Alabama, that was a case involving one of Olan Mills' photographers. And it was a criminal case brought in the Circuit Court.

In that case, when it got to the Supreme Court of
Alabama, the court held that the license was directed at the
photographer as the statute says. "Each travelling or transient
photographer, \$5 a week."

Q Do your courts characterize this license tax as a privileged tax? Isn't it a license deemed to amount to giving a personal privilege to do business?

A Your Honor ---

Q It is not for inspection. It is just for the privilege of doing business in Alabama, isn't it?

A It is a license tax. It is not a permit fee,

strictly speaking a license. It doesn't give anybody the right 1 72 to do anything. Q But without it you can't do business in Alabama? 3 Right. 113 A So it is for the privilege of doing business in 5 0 Alabama? 65 It is for the privilege of doing this business in 7 the State of Alabama, that is true. 8 O When you state this business, what does that 9 contemplate? 10 A Well, this business is to do business as a 11 transient or travelling photographer. 12 Q What business is the transient? 13 Our court has defined that in this Graves case, 14 Graves versus Alabama. 15 As being? 0 16 As being a photographer who goes about the State 17 from county to county where he has no fixed location. 18 And does what? 19 And takes pictures and conducts sittings. A 20 It stops with that? 0 21 Yes, sir. A 22 Q You say this doesn't implicate the development of 23 the pictures and all the rest of it? 28 A No, sir. 25

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What our court has said that this license is directed at is the photographer taking the picture, conducting the sitting, and, gentlemen, that requires a person with skill.

It is an odd in itself.

I have always looked on a photographer as somebody who takes a picture. The proofreaders and the film developers in North Carolina or Tennessee, that is not what this license hits. It hits the photographer, the individual photographer.

Now this assessment was made against Olan Mills, the company.

Q Why make the difference between the transient and the fixed photographer? They both do the exact same thing, right?

A No, sir. We say that there is quite a distinction between the two. We say that the license on a fixed location or a photograph gallery is another class and that this license was ---

Q Why?

- A Sets up ---
- Q Did I understand you correctly to say a moment ago that a photographer has great expertise in taking the picture. That is what you are licensing. That is what you said a minute ago.
  - A Yes, sir. That is true.
  - Q Well, is there a difference between the expert

photographer taking a picture in a fixed location and an expert photographer taking a picture in the exact same location but moving on?

20.

A I would say, no, sir, not in the operation of the camera and taking the picture. I would say it would all be the same recognizing ---

Q Well, why do you charge the itinerant more if it is the same action?

A That depends on whether the itinerant or the transient is charged more, if he stays one week, it is only \$5.

But if a person ---

Q Why is it that the itinerant who works 52 weeks is charged more than the stationary man who works 52 weeks?

A Well, we say they are in different classes or sub-classes and that the State ---

Q Yes, your law puts them in different classes but what about the -- has your court ever explained or gone into the basis for the different classifications, why the different class?

A I believe, your Honor, in this Graves case they touched on that. I don't know how deeply. I don't recall that part of the case, but I believe that they did touch on that and in the Graves case they did point out that this transient photographer license, it applies to those who come from without and within the state alike.

In other words, a photographer has a fixed location in Montgomery and it has been so applied, and he sends photographers out in Monroe County or Mobile County, Jefferson or some other county in Alabama, then his photographers, where they don't have a fixed place of business, they pay this license or are supposed to.

Q Suppose in your State taxation system, a photographer -- suppose there is a large photographer's business and he has half a dozen people in there who take the pictures. Do you charge him one or a half a dozen licenses?

A In that case, your Honor, the license would be on the photograph gallery. It would be only one license, that is true.

Q Well, I thought you told us a little while ago
that this was a personal thing that was directed against the
person who takes the pictures and if that is true, why wouldn't
you charge him six license fees instead of one if you had six
people taking pictures?

A Your Honor, our reasoning there is that they are two separate and distinct licenses.

Q What are two separate and distinct licenses?

A Well, we say that the photographer who has a fixed place of business is in a different class from the travelling photographer that goes from county to county. That is a different, you might say, operation and it is a different

class or sub-class which this court has said that the Congress and the State Legislature can, for the purpose of taxation, set up classes and even sub-classes.

Q What is the State's interest in separating these two that you just mentioned for purposes of taxation? There must be some reason for the classification, musn't there be?

A Your Honor, I might say this along that line in explanation: In the case of the fixed location, if you have five places of business in one city, you would have to pay five different licenses. Under the general provisions of the Revenue Code relating to licenses and more particular, Title 51, Section 831A, if you have got ten places of business, fixed location places of business, then you would pay ten licenses.

Actually, the travelling photographer can take for a week on \$5 to operate throughout every city in the county. Whereas, the photographer with the fixed location would have to pay a license for each separate place of business.

Q Let us see if there is any class distinctions here. Suppose the photographer does business in six counties, takes pictures in six counties, he develops the pictures in those six counties. Now suppose there is another photographer who takes the pictures in six different counties, but he does not develop them in any of those counties, but sends them off to be finished.

Could you charge him a license, this last one, which

would bar him from doing that business, if he didn't pay the license or the whole thing?

A Your Honor, in that case, if they have no fixed place of business, I think you would charge them both this \$5 license just the same whether they develop the film in the county or whether they send it out. You would charge him this same license of \$5 a week.

Mell, I gathered from this case up to date -maybe it is wrong -- that in the main what they are complaining
about is this: They send a representative to Penney's. He
takes pictures with the understanding that those will be sent
out of the state, developed and brought back and they complain
that on that business you are charging them a license which
would forbid them to do business without it and you could
prosecute them for it, could you not?

A Your Honor, you could prosecute or penalize a person for not paying any tax, whether it is in Oklahoma,

Alabama or anywhere else. Every one of these statutes ---

Q Yes, but it is quite different if you are taxing him, if it can be shown that what your tax is is a tax directly on Interstate Commerce which says you have got to pay this much tax to do business in the state in Interstate Commerce.

How are you doing that?

- A Your Honor, we say that we are not.
- Q Why?

1	A	Because of the fact that this tax is not an	
2	entrance fee.		
3	Q	Not a what?	
4	A	It is not a license, strictly speaking.	
5	Q	It is something to keep them from doing business	
6	in the state i	n Interstate Commerce if they don't pay it, isn't	
7	it?		
8	A	Your Honor, they are supposed to pay the tax.	
9	But it wouldn't keep them out.		
0	Q	Wouldn't keep them out? But wouldn't they be	
7	prosecuted for	it?	
2	A	Yes, but that would be not for paying the tax.	
3	It wouldn't be a		
4	Ω	It would be for not paying a tax on doing	
5	business in Interstate Commerce. That is what I understand is		
6	that charge.		
7	A	But the same person located within the state	
8	would also be		
9	Q	Well, that is a different question.	
0.0	A	Yes.	
9	Q	Can you tax Interstate Commerce at all? Can you	
2	put a tax on i	t?	
3	A	No, sir.	
4	Q	You can't engage in Interstate Commerce?	
5	A	I agree wholeheartedly	

Trying to find out, why it wouldn't be doing business in

Interstate Commerce. They went to Penney's, took the picture,

and then it off to be developed and then sent back, why wouldn't

that all be a part of the Interstate Commerce transaction or

can you divide it up contrary to their argument into segments

and force them to pay the license to do that business?

A Your Honor, it has been held by this court and
I think you have written some of the opinions that I have read
that where you can realistically separate activities and localize
them, that you can validly tax that.

Q That is right.

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A And that is exactly our contention in this case, and another point right there, this court in United Gas Pipeline versus City of Mobile held that it was the prerogative -- I won't say prerogative -- but the right of the State courts to define the meaning of a tax and tell what the characteristics of a tax are.

In that case, this court sent that case back to Alabama for the State courts to define the meaning of the tax.

And Mr. Justice Douglas there said that the case shouldn't have been sent back. He said the license tax in that case was valid at the time. It didn't need to go back.

Mr. Justice Harlan in that case he says that it doesn't make any difference whether it was an entrance fee or

not. He did think that resolved the constitutional question involved. But this court ---

Q Well, which one had the most people with it?

A Well the majority sent it back, your Honor. The majority of the court sent that case back to Alabama.

Q What was the citation?

A Your Honor, I have it right here. That is United Gas Pipeline versus Ideal Cement Company, 369 U.S. 134.

Q Thank you.

A Now there is also a case by the Supreme Court of Alabama. When the case was sent back, the Supreme Court of Alabama actually defined the characteristics of the tax and it held that that tax was a local tax although United Gas Pipeline Company was engaged in transporting gas in Interstate Commerce. That was their business in selling it.

But they held that this license levied by the city of Mobile on the selling of natural gas in Mobile was a local license. And you could realistically separate that activity from United's Interstate activity.

That is exactly our argument in this case.

Also, another case that we rely strongly on is the Caskey Baking case whereby a license was levied on bakeries.

I believe those selling bread to people, retailers, licensed retailers in the State of Virginia. And the bread was baked in West Virginia and transported over the state line.

It is more or less one of the Peddler cases.

But this court held that the license tax directed atthat local activity of selling the bread and delivering it off of the trucks was sufficient for the license tax to validly attach.

Another point in the Graves decision, the Supreme

Court of Alabama has held that inherently this tax does not

discriminate because it applies equally to all transient photographers whether they come within or without the state.

Clearly this type of operation, counsel for the appellant relies mainly on the Drummer cases and I suppose the leading case in that line is the Nippert versus Richmond. But there the license was levied on solicitations and the orders were sent to Washington. I believe Nippert represented a Washington garment manufacturing company.

The court held that the solicitations were clearly an Interstate Commerce and that the license could not be validly levied in that case.

Q Mr. Burton, I am afraid that case illustrates the fact that you make a mistake in relying on something that I have written in this field.

A Well, your Honor, I want to point out one thing.

In that case it was brought out that before you could secure the license in that case, that you had to get a permit from the Department of Public Safety. And that is not so in this case.

And along the line of your questioning there, whether it was more or less an entrance fee, this license if you go up to the probate judge's office and you put the money down, you can get -- everybody is entitled to buy this license. I don't care whether you are in the business or not.

This is in no respect an entrance fee, really a permit or license. In fact, the probate judge will welcome you with open arms if you come up with the money and he will issue the license.

- Q I thought you had said it was a license fee.
- A Sir?

Q I thought you said it was a license fee. Am I wrong? I understnad you now that it is not a license fee, but I thought you had said it was.

A It is a license tax, your Honor. I have used that word and it is used rather loosely. But this is a license. It is a tax. And the Alabama court has held that it is on the doing of business. It is not a right to do business. If you don't pay this license, in other words, you can come in to the State of Alabama and you can do business and your contracts are valid, it doesn't keep you out of the state.

- Q But it does put you in jail?
- A Well,
- Q But it does put you in jail.
- A Your Honor ---

Q That might put you out of business, pretty effectively.

A That is pretty effective, yes. But I will say this. We have provisions in our sales tax and use tax and income taxes that have the same provisions. Oklahoma does.

Colorado or any of the Federal tax laws -- I mean if you don't pay any tax.

Of course your statutes say that before any person shall become engaged in any business, they shall pay the judge probate a fee or the tax which is required. Doesn't it? And your statutes also say that every license is a personal privilege to transact business.

### That is what ---

A The statute does say that, your Honor. That is very true. There is no disputing that. That is down in black and white. But as a matter of application, actually,

- Q You mean you just don't catch some people?
- A Well I tell you it is not the duty of the state or the Federal Government.
- Q Yes, but no lawyer advising his client would advise to go and do business without getting the license and paying the tax.
- A Well I would think that that would be pretty bad advice.
  - Q As I recall it the NAACP pay a \$10 license.

Q \$10 as I remember it. I think the fine was \$100,000.

A Yes. I don't know exactly what license. I don't believe that came within the scope of these business licenses.

These are purely business or occupational taxes.

Q I was thinking that is what that was.

A It could be. I am not familiar with the case, your Honor.

Q But it indicated a little danger of not paying a license tax.

A Yes.

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But actually this wouldn't cause your contracts to be void or anything. You could do business in the state, and I will say that as a matter of application the criminal provisions are not used very often by the Department of Revenue.

Q Weren't they in that Olan-Mills case? The Olan-Mills case was a criminal case, wasn't it?

A No, sir. Leon Graves versus the State of
Alabama was a criminal case. And Leon Graves was an agent or
photographer for Olan Mills.

Q But you said they don't usually do it. And against that I have an example of when they actually did it.

A It is true that in the Leon Graves case they did

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invoke the penal statutes; yes, sir, they did. But in present times they very seldom bring a -- and it is really frowned on. They try to bring several actions to recover these licenses.

Thank you, gentlemen.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Thornton, you may proceed.

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF J. EDWARD THORNTON, ESO.

ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT

MR. THORNTON: I just have a word.

I think the facts in the Graves case may be of some importance. Olan Mills at that time was engaged in a two-stage operation. It had solicitors who went through the states soliciting orders. It had a photographer who followed.

When the photographer came through, they arrested him for not having a transient photographers license. Question No. 1 was, is the mere exposure of film engaging in the business of photography?

And the Supreme Court of Alabama held it was, it being so essential a part of the photography business that a license on photography generally would apply to the mere exposure of film.

Now it is that holding that comes over into these cases here where they say, "Well now, we have already held that the license is only on." That is not quite true. It was true in the Graves case because that is all that Graves did.

But they have now come along and said that is all you have to do in order to be subjected to the license. This is true but it is true in a sort of a back-handed fashion.

But, nevertheless, it does show that the license is on the mere exposure of film. And we are taking the position that when that is connected with the entire transaction which goes across the State line ---

Q Well, let me ask you. If I understood Mr. Burton correctly, if you had a photographer based in Montgomery and he sent photographers around the six adjoining counties but all of the work was done in the State of Alabama, nevertheless under this statute as to the activities of those photographers who went around to the six counties the license fee would be \$5 a week; the \$25 a week would be reserved for what was under the fixed location.

Do you agree with that?

A I believe that would be a correct construction of it.

Q Now suppose in that very situation all that happened or rather instead of developing everything in the State of Alabama, of the pictures taken by those photographers who went around to the six counties, this photographer sent that part of the business out of state.

Would you be making the same argument that then this would be discriminatory against Interstate Commerce?

- Q On the \$5 license.
- A That is this case.
- Q I see.

- A But here, you see, the point is that we were taking pictures at a fixed location at Penney's.
- Q Yes, but I gather then, if you are right, then all that the photographer who now does all of his work in Alabama would have to do to escape that \$5 a week tax would be to send the developing work out of Alabama to be done, wouldn't it?
- A Well, the going out of the state is what makes the photography at a fixed location a transient operation. If it is already a transient operation, I don't believe whether he develops it in the state or out of the state makes any difference.
- Q Yes, but I was trying to get what your view would be of the position where everything is now done in the state and all photographer does it to change his practice to send the developing work out of the state, your position then would be that what may be a proper tax now would become an unconstitutional tax to the extent of the \$5 a week charge.

Well, that is this case, isn't it?

A Well, no, no, the reason we got the \$5 a week -the reason we became a transient -- repeating myself a little

\$25 a year if a license is on it. Of course, we would contest that license. We are contesting the license because we say we are in Interstate Commerce.

Q I see.

A But if the license had a fixed location with charges, it would be \$25 a year. But by reason of the fact that we send it outside ---

Q The only reason they put you in the transient class is because you send your pictures outside the state?

A That is correct. That is exactly right. And that is my last point.

We get to that after we get to -- and I don't ever want you to get there. I don't want you ever to get to that point because you see they can cure that so easily, we will be back in court. We want the first point.

- Q How can they cure it?
- A What is that?
- Q How can it be cured? You say they can cure that so easily.

A Well, they will just amend the license and say that regardless of where the film is developed, the license will be \$5 a week.

- Q For whom?
- A For transient photographers.

Q Well, how do they prove you are a transient?

A The reason they prove we were a transient here was because we sent it outside.

Q Well, that is it. How could they ever prove that you were a transient if they amended the ordinance like that?

A Well, my point is that they might cure that by eliminating the discriminatory nature of the tax because of the Interstate activity. This they could cure.

Q Well, you see you would still object to the \$25 a year?

A Oh, yes. Yes.

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Q And that is the point you would like us to -they can't tax you at all?

A That is correct.

Q Now, let us suppose that I am a manufacturing

-- steel products, selling them all over the country, and I

decide to establish an office, a sales office, in Alabama,

Montgomery. I establish an office and put several employees in

there and the state says, "Look, if you are going to establish

a local office here, you have got to get a license."

And yet every order that is taken is sent out of the state, is filled from out of the state. Would you say Alabama could not make them take out a license to set up a local office?

A No, I would not say that. I would say they

- probably couldn't acquire a license for a local office.
- Q Why can't Alabama do that to you insofar as you take pictures at a fixed location in Alabama?
  - A Well, maybe they can.

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- Q Because that really disposes of your first point?

  Doesn't it?
  - A No, my last point.
  - Q I think it disposes of your first point.
- A Well, then if it does I don't want to make that concession. And I didn't understand your question. I am sorry.
- Q Well, Mr. Thornton, there is a little more to the facts of this case than just the mere exposure of films, isn't here? Don't we have in this case that Penney gives extensive advertising to the fact that these people will be there at a certain time and will have a fixed location in the city to transact this business and it does transact business in this particular place?
  - A Yes, sir.
- Q Well, doesn't that bear somewhat on whether it is a local thing that is being taxed or not or whether it could be taxed as a local activity?
- A Well, admittedly, the more local activities we engage in, the more the state has to catch on to.
  - Q Yes.
  - A But we think in this case -- you see this license

isn't at Penney. If they go at Penney that is a different proposition as to Penney's activities, with reference to advertising and coming into the state and so forth.

But here where our coming into the state is purely transient, we come in and out merely exposing film, we say there that the isolating this part of it and attempting to tax that as a local activity is actually a tax on the entire transaction. We say that is an attempt by the state to license in Interstate activity which they can't do.

So the \$25 license should not apply, if I am keeping myself straight.

- Q Your first point and your last point are inconsistent. I mean they are mutually exclusive, aren't they?
  - A I hadn't thought so.
  - Q No?

- A I hadn't thought so.
- Q Because your last point starts out on the proposition that we are taking photographs at a fixed location?
  - A Yes.
  - Q And the only reason you make an itinerant out of it is because we send the photographs out of state?
    - A That is correct.
  - Q But if you say you are taking photographs in a fixed location, it seems to me they ought to be able to put the \$25 charge on you.

A I am backing off on that completely. I hope that is stricken from the record.

(Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m. the above-entitled oral argument was concluded.)